they also include implicit and explicit moral judgments, intentionality attributions, and even characterological ascriptions to the child that are likely to contribute significantly to the construction of social and psychological understanding.

Furthermore, the context of shared conversation is important. Contrary to C&L, conflict as well as comity is a salient conversational context because nothing focuses a young child's attention on differing mental states than the realization that conflict with another must be managed. Thus, maternal verbal conflict-resolution strategies in shared conversation during disputes, such as mother's use of justifications, references to emotions, and limited use of threatening or intimidating tactics, predict young children's emotional and moral development months later (Laible & Thompson 2002).

The second feature of social interaction highlighted by these findings – and largely neglected by C&L – is emotion. Young children's efforts to manage and comprehend their feelings and the emotions of others are significant catalysts to understanding mental states, and such experiences constitute salient interactional contexts in which mental state differences are the focus of shared observation and communication. This is true from the inauguration of the "epistemic triangle" in infancy, as emotions contribute to self-other differentiation and contexts of shared reference and joint attention (such as in social referencing). Moreover, emotion organizes early understanding of mental states by connecting emotion to broader emergent representations of relationships, self-referent beliefs, and comprehension of behavioral expectations. Emotion is important, therefore, because it is not only thinking *about* emotion (which has been the focus of much theory-of-mind research) but thinking *with* emotion about self and others that stimulates early social understanding. This is one reason why in our studies (see Thompson et al. 2003) as well as others (Lagattuta & Wellman 2002), relational influences are especially apparent in children's conversations about and comprehension of *negative* emotional events. Constraint and cooperation are both conceptually provocative experiences for young children.

In sum, emotion is often salient to the activity that contributes to social understanding. In early childhood, moreover, conversation about these experiences with an adult who elaborates the child's direct experience, in the context of a warm, secure relationship, provides a rich basis for the child's construction of social understanding. This social constructionist view provides provocative opportunities to integrate the focus on normative development, emphasized by students of early conceptual growth, with the focus on individual differences emphasized by students of early sociopersonality development.

In defense of enculturation

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Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) view enculturation as the internalization of cultural concepts given in social interactions. They claim that enculturation implies relativism and fails to take into account both the constructive activity of the child and the gradual nature of development. Their view is contrasted with the notion of the child as both enculturated and enculturing throughout the course of development.

Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) argue against a social construction view, which they see as equivalent to enculturation, or the internalization of cultural concepts given in social interactions. I would claim, however, that enculturation need not be seen as a simply passive process of information transmission (cf. Vinden 2000). Furthermore, if viewed as an interactive process, enculturation is a term that nicely captures the unique role that culture plays in human social development; a role that includes but extends beyond triadic interactions.

The narrowness of C&L's conception of enculturation is reflected in their discussion of its supposed implications. In the first place, they maintain that enculturation is the importing of "ready-made" concepts from the social world to the individual, which implies cultural relativism (cf. target article, sect. 3.2, para. 7). Enculturation need not involve, however, either a unidirectional social transmission model or radical relativism.

At first glance, enculturation may seem to be a one-way street. A newborn child seems little able to engage in even the most rudimentary of dyadic interactions. He or she is fed, moved, changed, spoken to (or not) according to the wishes of the caretaker. Crying may or may not influence these interactions – a responsive caretaker may attune him- or herself to the child, but the child is as yet unable to attune to the other as other. As C&L point out, young children may not initially understand the social implications of interactions and only gradually move from "behavioristic" interactions (crying brings food) to "behavioristic/mentalistic" interactions (crying makes Mom do what I want) to "mentalistic" interactions (crying makes Mom think I'm hungry). But the child, whether intentionally or not, certainly influences the actions of the caregiver from the moment of birth onwards. A child who comes into the world kicking and screaming, and whose behavior continues, for whatever reason, to be characterized by kicking and screaming in the months and perhaps years to follow, is certainly enculturating her caregiver in a manner quite different from the newborn who is all cooing and contentment.

My suspicion is that there are cycles of directionality in the enculturation process. At some points in the child's life, enculturation may be primarily a learning of the criteria for competent interactions by the novice from the expert. This is what the authors seem to focus on. Though they want to emphasize the active role of the child, they still seem to fall into talk that would imply that much of the learning is of norms (situational/relational norms, not ideational norms) already established "out there" in the world: "children . . . learn the appropriate contexts for the use of various words referring to the psychological world" (sect. 3.2, para. 3); they "learn the criteria for words to talk about human activity and then can reflect on the psychological world" (sect. 3.2, para. 9). What C&L fail to emphasize, however, is that at times learning may be primarily in the direction of child to other, as the other is called upon to adjust to the new abilities or demands of the child by relating in a new way. Enculturation is always *by* the child *of* others as well as *of* the child *by* others.

Enculturation need not invoke a relativism that leaves one unable to say that some forms of knowledge are "better, more complete, or more adequate" than others (sect 2.1, para. 10). As C&L clearly point out, there are likely basic universal shared practices that are common to all human experience. But it is also well documented that differences exist among cultures at quite a fundamental level – for example, the degree to which the individual or the group is emphasized (cf. Lillard 1998; Vinden & Astington 2000). If a cultural group puts a low priority on talking about inner states, or does not conceive of them as particularly personal and individual, then the public criteria for learning about thoughts and emotions might be quite different from the typical public criteria in a culture where people are seen as individuals with discrete, personal, private inner lives. Hence, although understanding and getting along with other human beings may be universal, what that means and the criterial situations for learning about getting along can vary widely from culture to culture. And if the criteria vary, why would the understanding constructed from those situations not vary also?

Certain kinds of criterial situations may provide knowledge that is better or more adequate for living in those situations. There is a certain kind of circularity here, but not, I think, a vicious sort. For example, when living on a small atoll in the Pacific Ocean, where one's friends, neighbors, and relatives are all the same people, individuality might not be as adaptive as communality. The

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same might be true for those living on an African-American inner-city "atoll" within a predominantly Caucasian middle-class city. Once an emphasis on group rather than individual processes is established, the situations in which that understanding is fostered become criterial and could tend to self-perpetuation. But what may work well on an atoll may not work elsewhere – what is better, more complete, or more adequate in one social or cultural situation may not be so in another.

That being said, there is still no reason per se why cultural variability need go hand-in-hand with a view of passive transmission of mental concepts to the child. The child is influential not only in constructing his or her understanding but also in defining the context in which learning takes place, and even the content of what should be learned. Furthermore, individuals are not the only things that interact in relationship – groups, societies, cultures all relate and influence one another.

In short, although I applaud C&L's efforts to make social interaction the center of development, rather than merely an add-on explanatory variable, I feel they are not radical enough. Seeing triadic interactions as the epicenter of development does not necessitate relegating cultural variability to the sidelines. Children's development is not constructive only in the sense that they gradually cobble together cultural criteria for language use and other behaviors. It is also constructive because part of their development consists in constructing the criteria for themselves and for others. Without this active transforming of the world, caregivers would never adapt to their children, peers would never learn how to pacify or enrage their playmates, and societal and cultural change would not exist.

Interpretation based on richness of experience: Theory development from a social-constructivist perspective

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Abstract: The view that children's understanding of mind is constructed through social interaction is consistent with other social-constructivist models. We provide examples of similar claims in research on emotion perception, pretense understanding, autobiographical memory, and event knowledge. Identification of common elements from such socio-cultural perspectives may lead to greater theoretical integration and provide a new framework for exploring human development.

Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) propose that the development of understanding of others' minds grows not from a kernel of knowledge already in a child's brain, nor from the assumption of environmental-cultural norms, but through dynamic, ongoing interactions with caregivers and the physical world. This is a welcome step into the already burgeoning literature in a number of areas – motor development, cognitive development, socio-emotional development – spurred by theories such as dynamic systems, the ecological approach, and contextual approaches. The view that children's understanding of mind is part of the larger process of social understanding and is constructed through social interaction is consistent with other models that attribute a critical role to the process of social interaction in development. We provide examples of similar claims in research on the development of the perception of emotion, pretense understanding, autobiographical memory, and event knowledge. These lines of research provide support for the notion that richness of experience, not rich interpretation, provides an interpretive framework for understanding children's emerging understanding. They also indicate that social interaction is fundamental to human development across a wide range of social, emotional, cognitive, and perceptual phenomena.

C&L argue that development of an understanding of others' minds (intentions, beliefs, emotions) is not "all or none." Research on infants' understanding of emotional expressions supports this contention. Whether an infant perceives an emotional expression and responds to it depends on the age of the infant, the expression that is being enacted, the task by which the experimenter measures perception, the definition of perception (detection, discrimination, recognition, understanding), and the context in which the expression is encountered (Walker-Andrews 1997). Infants as young as three months show intermodal matching for their mothers' happy and sad facial-vocal expressions, but not for expressions posed by a female stranger (Kahana-Kalman & Walker-Andrews 2001) Similarly, infants show intermodal matching for fathers' happy and sad facial-vocal expressions only when they have highly involved fathers (Montague & Walker-Andrews 2002). Lest one think that this is because infants are merely exposed to maternal expressions more than paternal expressions, refer to research by Dunn and colleagues (Dunn et al. 1991a; 1991b) that illustrates the importance of the family context and interactions in the perception of emotion by children.

Children's understanding of the pretense of others also develops gradually (Harris 1994b). For example, Walker-Andrews and Kahana-Kalman (1999) concluded in a study of pretense understanding that "toddlers move from appreciating that an adult partner initiated a game of pretend to understanding the pretend stipulations of the adult, and finally, at 24 months, to using that understanding to enter into collaborative pretend play" (p. 531). In particular, some 15- and 18-month-olds imitated the experimenter's pretend transformations as a way to coordinate actions with the experimenter. To borrow from the description of children's involvement in deception, the toddlers entered into the pretense "with only partial understanding and such experience is the context for learning" (target article, sect. 4.1, para. 6) about such mental states as pretense and deception. The comprehension of another's pretense emerges early in the second year, but the ability to tailor one's pretend actions in that interaction is not demonstrated until later.

C&L propose that conversation provides a context for children to interpret and talk about the mental world. Conversation also provides a context for thinking and talking about past events, as demonstrated by extensive research on the development of young children's autobiographic memory (Reese 2002). Although children's contributions to conversations at two to three years consist solely of short answers to specific questions, over time, children develop the narrative skills to discuss the past more fully and to eventually construct independent memory narratives (Haden et al. 1997; Hudson 1990; Nelson 1993). Through conversation children learn *how* to remember, not *what* to remember; they do not simply repeat what was told to them but acquire memory and narrative skills (Hudson 1990). This distinction is similar to C&L's argument that through social interaction, children do not simply adopt socially available knowledge, but rather, construct their own understandings within the interactional context. Research has also shown that individual differences in parents' reminiscing style affect children's independent narrative ability in later years, indicating that characteristics of the dyadic relationship influence children's autobiographic memory development (Reese et al. 1993).

Finally, research on the development of event knowledge illustrates the tension between performance factors and underlying competence discussed by C&L. A large body of research has shown that children's generalized event representations (GERs) provide a cognitive context for the development of memory, planning, narrative, inferential reasoning, and temporal understanding (Nelson 1986). Before children display these skills in novel, decontextualized, experimental tasks, they accurately use temporal language, draw appropriate inferences, construct future plans, remember stories and events, and construct story narratives when reasoning about familiar events in meaningful interactive contexts

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