(p. 210), and the spelling of Esagila (p. 101), Hydraotes (pp. 158 and 162), and in Berve's book title, prosopographischer (p. 239).

At the end of Chapter 15 W. raises the question whether it would not be better to follow the Zoroastrian tradition and label Alexander 'the Accursed' (p. 217). But, if Greatness is not Goodness, and one has to judge by the extent of the impact made on world history, Alexander merits the label the Great (pp. 220–1). This is not a post-colonial text, and not wedded to political correctness. So W. breathes new life into the myth of the heroic Alexander, albeit a flawed hero.

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ALEXANDER VS. THE NOBLES

S. MÜLLER: *Maßnahmen der Herrschaftssicherung gegenüber der makedonischen Opposition bei Alexander dem Großen*. (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe III, Band 974.) Pp. iv + 309. Frankfurt, etc.: Peter Lang, 2003. Paper. ISBN: 3-631-51224-4.

This book is a slightly revised dissertation that acknowledges its debt to the noted Alexander historian Gerhard Wirth, but is never far removed from K. Kraft's *Der 'rationale' Alexander* (1971), and E. Badian's portrait of the king. It has all the merits and disadvantages of the genre: copious notes, excellent scholarship, overly expansive or digressive discussion, and no index. Nevertheless, it is a highly useful book for anyone interested in the politics of the king and his administration.

Sabine Müller's goal is to investigate Alexander's methods of securing his rule, their effectiveness, and their psychological background. She argues that before his victory over the Persians at Issus, Alexander's power was much constrained by the Macedonian nobles, especially Parmenion and Antipater, who may have been more powerful than he. Considering the nobles and the king at odds, the author asserts that Alexander worked to confirm and increase his power both by undermining the opposition and by seeking military victories, which legitimized his rule. Conquering Persia, however, was detrimental to the nobles' power and interests. Alexander's victories emboldened him to move against Parmenion, whom he assassinated after charging his son, Philotas, with conspiracy against the king. M. stresses that normally, however, Alexander used legal traditions and institutions in protecting himself and his new autocratic power structure. Cleitus, who for M. represents the old conservative aristocracy, was killed by a raging and drunk Alexander, whose wine, however, made him do only what he wanted to do (p. 121). The murder was legally sanctioned. Then the cause of the nobles' opposition was taken up by the historian Callisthenes, who opposed Alexander in the *proskynesis* affair, and by the 'page' Hermolaus and his friends, who conspired against him. M. makes the intriguing suggestions that we should distinguish between what Callisthenes the propagandist wrote on the king and what he personally thought of his policy, and that Alexander's disparaging his own proclaimed divinity was intended to appease the opposition. Alexander used the principle of governing by *nomos* rather than force with the Persians also when, for example, he presented himself as Darius' successor, punished

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Bessus as a regicide, and executed a man who sat on his throne. His policy, however, failed to prevent local revolts against him.

The best part of the book is its last chapters. M. argues that Alexander's failure to overcome the army's resistance to marching beyond the Hyphasis in India, the tough fighting there, and even his grave injury in the Malli town, weakened his authority considerably. To restore it he tried to renew his reputation for invincibility by emulating mythical heroes and by traversing the Gedrosian desert. The army mutiny at Opis shows that he failed. Hephaestion's death completed his isolation: Alexander's grief over him was not extravagant or irrational, but a political show of respect to a designated heir and partner. Killing Hephaestion's physician was a warning to potential conspirators against his life. In summing up, M. argues that Alexander suffered from a '*Frondetrauma*', a heightened anxiety about secret aristocratic opposition, or in fact anyone who might threaten his rule. She thinks that Philip's assassination, which Alexander witnessed, was a formative event in the creation of this fear. His insecurity moved him to take radical measures to protect himself and his rule, becoming practically a tyrant, though almost all of his safeguards failed him in the end.

This brief survey cannot do justice to the many interesting observations M. has to offer on Alexander's career. Nevertheless, considerable portions of her discussion will not take Alexander's historians by surprise. There are also some problems of interpretation and methodology. M. relies too much on Curtius Rufus and ignores contemporary artistic evidence, despite its relevance to power politics and images. She treats power as a zero-sum resource, which leads her continually to detect rivalry over it, as in the case of Alexander and Parmenion, downplaying or ignoring cooperation and mutual exploitation between king and nobles, which Alexander's relations with Parmenion also exemplify. Conquest and expansion augmented the nobles' power, honor, and economic resources, too, so it is at best one-sided to argue that imperialism and military victories opposed their interests. It is surely telling that the most vocal aristocratic opposition to Alexander came from drunken Cleitus, and under the special circumstances of a banquet, and that it was carried on by the relatively marginal Callisthenes and the 'pages'. The emphasis on *Realpolitik* leads M. to underestimate motives related to Alexander's religious beliefs or sheer competitiveness. Similarly, the search for disloyal opposition induces the author to make the opposition of his general, Craterus, to Alexander's Persian policy suspect in the king's eyes, even though he continuously entrusted him with major, independent commands. She also construes some Macedonians' attempts to dodge the draft as deliberate political resistance. Finally, psychological explanations deserve a warm reception in Alexander studies. But it is arbitrary to claim that Philip's assassination made an indelible impact on his son's psyche. By and large, Alexander's measures to ensure his own safety and power do not seem extraordinary compared with those of other single rulers. His fear of conspiracies came with the office and its bloody history. I agree with the author that he was not paranoid.

With this said, some of the reservations noted above are a matter of different interpretations of the evidence. This is a book no historian of Alexander's regime and its power structure can afford to ignore.

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