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The New Security Dilemma: divisibility, defection and disorder in the global era

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Abstract. Traditionally, the central problematic of the Westphalian states system has been how to counteract the so-called 'security dilemma', the tendency for states in a context of uncertainty to defect from cooperative arrangements if they perceive other states' security preparations as threatening (misperception; arms racing). As the states system became more centralized and the number of major players declined in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nondivisibility of benefits—the dangers of potential defection (world wars; nuclear annihilation)—grew while states' incentives to defect increasingly necessitated control from the centre. The end of the Cold War, however, has reflected not a further centralization (nondivisibility) of benefits in the international system but (1) an increasing divisibility of benefits in a globalizing world economy and (2) the declining effectiveness of interstate mechanisms at preventing defection not only by states ('defection from above') but also by non-state, sub-state and trans-state actors ('defection from below'). In this 'new security dilemma', the range of incentives grows for the latter to defect from the states system itself—unless coopted through the increased availability of divisible benefits. Furthermore, attempts to impose security from above (intervention) can create backlashes which interact with complex globalization processes to create new sources of uncertainty: overlapping and competing cross-border networks of power, shifting loyalties and identities, and new sources of endemic low-level conflict. In this context, emerging mechanisms of stabilization will be uneven, characterized by structural tensions and suboptimal performance.

Introduction: beyond the traditional security dilemma

In the modern era—broadly speaking, over the past 300 years—world politics has been characterized by the structural dominance of one level of political organization, the nation-state. Other levels of political organization, whether endogenous (that is domestic political systems) or exogenous (that is the international or interstate system), have crystallized around or through the state, rooted in the perception that people and cultures were somehow naturally divided along state-compatible national lines and that the most efficient arena of collective political action was the nation-state. Among the social sciences, this framework has been most deeply embedded in Political Science and International Relations, which focus respectively on the contrasting structuring principles of two distinct but overlapping levels of analysis, endogenous hierarchy versus exogenous anarchy. Thus International Relations specialists have generally resisted attempts to translate into the

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international arena the kind of relations and structures of power, interest group politics, democratic (or authoritarian) principles, notions of social justice and the like, characteristic of the domestic political sphere. They have overwhelmingly believed that, unlike in domestic politics where political obligation is more deeply embedded in collective cultural and institutional structures, the self-interest and self-help imperatives dominant in a world of states would cause those states to defect from cooperative agreements at key times, causing the whole structure to revert to a state of nature if not a state of outright war. In this context, only the maintenance of ongoing interstate diplomatic relationships, underpinned by an uneven and often fluid balance of power among states, has been thought capable of providing the kind of exogenous stability necessary not only for international order but also for *domestic* political systems to develop and domestic actors to pursue endogenous collective goals.

The central ordering mechanism in the international system has been rooted in the way balances of power operate to permit basic stability in a highly fragile environment. That environment itself, however, is seen to contain the seeds of its own breakdown—i.e. deeply embedded processes the underlying logic of which is to destabilize balances of power and confound the efforts of statesmen and diplomats to maintain a secure international order. The most important of these processes is the so-called 'security dilemma', frequently seen as probably the most crucial dynamic of international relations as a whole, one which must be monitored and managed vigorously if the international system is to be protected from instability and war. The Security Dilemma is the notion that *in a context of uncertainty and bounded rationality* (1) perceived external threats (real or imagined) generate feelings of insecurity in those states that believe themselves to be the targets of such threats, thereby (2) leading those states to adopt measures to increase their power and capability to counteract those threats (alliance creation, arms buildups, and so on). In other words, the very attempts of individual states to strengthen their own security in an anarchic world lead other states to try to ratchet up their own power, thus making the first state to start this process feel even *less* secure, not more so, by its efforts. These countermeasures in turn are (3) perceived (or misperceived) as threatening by yet other states, leading to further counter-countermeasures and more—potentially undermining existing power balances and creating a vicious and even tragic circle of ever-increasing insecurity.[1]

Only by creating, maintaining and recreating balances of power internationally—whether through war, manipulation of power resources, interstate diplomatic mediation or politically effective foreign policy—can this underlying tendency to system breakdown be counteracted. In game-theoretic terms, the payoff matrices built into the international system create incentives for states to 'defect' rather than cooperate, unless restrained by the operation of the balance of power and its institutionalized instances.[2] Such an analysis has been at the heart of both classical

[1] John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 3:2 (January 1950), pp. 157–80; Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 30:2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214; Barry Buzan, 'Change and Insecurity: A Critique of Strategic Studies', in Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones (eds.), *Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension* (London: Pinter, 1981), pp. 155–172.

[2] See Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose, *The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

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realism and neorealism.[3] Furthermore, paradoxically, at the domestic level too, without an exogenous balance of power—a quasi-Hobbesian stabilization mechanism with neither a sovereign nor even a proper social contract[4]—the capacity of societies to maintain stable political systems would be fatally undermined as well.

The central question today is whether this mechanism retains both its internal logic and its wider stabilizing capacity in a changing structural context. In a world widely seen to be more and more characterized by so-called 'globalization'—essentially the dynamic intersection and interaction (or even synergy) among a wide range of expanding social, economic and political processes of internationalization and transnationalization[5]—how do such changes affect the nation-state itself and, in turn, the structural coherence of the states system? Do new sources of uncertainty alter the underlying logic of the Security Dilemma? Are there other ordering mechanisms in the process of evolving? And how might these embryonic changes affect the bottom-line imperative of the international system, i.e. the provision of order and security—as distinct from, for example, economic prosperity, cultural values or social justice? This article argues that there is indeed such a process of reconfiguring power going on, that it is integrally rooted in and arising from globalization, that it does involve different sources of insecurity (or at least the reconfiguration of those sources) and that it is making traditional balances of power, along with the old Security Dilemma, increasingly redundant. These changes involve the very *raison d'être* of the states system itself, along two dimensions.

The first dimension concerns the nature of the benefits confronting the states system itself in the security area, i.e. whether benefits must be provided centrally in the way of indivisible public goods (through hegemony and/or alliances), on the one hand, or whether they permit a greater degree of divisibility and therefore can be provided privately or through more spontaneous cooperation, whether by states or by non-state actors, on the other. The second dimension concerns the nature of the states system *per se*. As noted above, the history of the states system was not just about providing international order but also about ensuring favourable exogenous conditions for domestic collective action. In other words, it was also necessary to ensure that other sub-state and trans-state actors—originally the feudal nobility, the Church, bandits, potential political and economic rebels in both town and country, the urban bourgeoisie, and so on—be integrated into the domestic state and thus subordinated to the overarching discipline of the states system as such. Thus the Security Dilemma has always been challenged not only by the possibility of defection by particular *states* ('defection from above') but also with that of defection by a range of *social forces*, whether ideological, economic, cultural, ethnic or purely political ('defection from below'). I argue here that fundamental changes along both dimensions are undermining the Traditional Security Dilemma (TSD) and subsuming it in a wider and more complex New Security Dilemma (NSD). Finally, the

[3] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979); Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[4] Marcel Merle, *The Sociology of International Relations* (London: Berg, 1987).

[5] As expressed in the equation $G=i+t+(i\times t)$; for a further discursive exploration of this definition and related issues, see P.G. Cerny, 'Globalizing the Political and Politicizing the Global: Concluding Reflections on International Political Economy as a Vocation', *New Political Economy*, 4:1 (January 1999), pp. 147–62.

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New Security Dilemma, like the old, also involves a potentially damaging logic of vicious spiralling—a logic rooted in the complexity and uncertainty of the post-modern world and the uneven and multilayered nature of globalization itself.

Divisibility, defection and the dynamics of international security orders

Divisibility and defection are commonly used concepts in the international cooperation literature on a wide range of issues.[6] The interaction of the two can provide the analyst with a hypothetical set of alternative pathways for patterns of change and institutionalization. When benefits are highly divisible in an ideal-type collective action problem, a wide range of actors acting autonomously can gain those benefits through spontaneous action or with some sort of minimal, even informal agreement on rules of the game, as in an ideal-type neoclassical market; they need not depend upon the existence of hierarchical governance institutions to reap those benefits. Other players do not need to be brought on board. This is analogous to the notions of private goods or non-specific assets in the collective action and New Institutional Economics literature.[7] Indeed, in the latter, it may be the case that attempting to negotiate more complex cooperation agreements with additional participants will raise negotiating costs (transactions costs) and/or make it more possible for actors to avoid compliance with the rules. As Simmons writes:

> The marginal cost of including any given actor [in an international arrangement] must be justified by the expected benefit of bringing that jurisdiction into the agreement. Where expected benefits are construed as highly divisible, and the costs of negotiating and enforcing cooperative arrangements among large numbers of participants exceeds the sum of the transactions costs for bilateral agreements, multilateral processes are unlikely. Bilateral agreements or even unilateral actions are likely to prevail.[8]

In other words, where benefits are highly divisible, the system could be either be stably pluralistic and self-regulating or relatively unstable and centrifugal. Where temptations to defect are low, we would expect the former; where they are high, we would expect the latter.

On the other hand, where benefits are highly nondivisible, one would expect the same sorts of criteria to come into play as with public goods and specific assets. Benefits can only be gained if a wide range of actors can be brought on board. High transactions and related costs would be justified in order to benefit from cooperation—and to avoid the potential dangers of noncooperation, especially, in the security issue-area, the destructiveness of war. Local or limited agreements will be ineffective and may even be costly if they lead to conflicts between participants and outsiders. In terms of security, for example, limited agreements might anta-

[6] The particular formulation used here draws from Beth A. Simmons, 'Divisibility, Defection and the Emerging Regulatory Framework for International Capital Markets', paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 31 August 1996.

[7] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971 [1965]), Oliver P. Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* (New York: Free Press, 1985), and P.G. Cerny, 'Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action', *International Organization*, 49:4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 595–625.

[8] Simmons, 'Divisibility, Defection', p. 5.

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gonize other actors and cause them to take preventive action. In other words, where benefits are highly nondivisible and where temptations to defect are high, the system could be chaotic and negative-sum, requiring top-down authoritative imposition to prevent 'free-riding' on any agreements. But where temptations to defect are low, the result would be more likely to involve a form of leadership, in which 'major players at the centre of the issue agree to central rules to which peripheral players tacitly or explicitly sign on with minimal political pressure.'[9]

In this framework, the problematic of unpacking different kinds of security orders is eased. Given that the states system is seen as fundamentally anarchic and the main issue is the threat or danger of war, the main 'benefits' involve not the kind of public goals which are normally attributed to the domestic politics of states, but goals of preventing war and maintaining a certain relative stability in the international system. We can identify four kinds of dynamics at work in different security orders. Two of the types, those with low temptations to defect, can be characterized as 'centripetal'; the others, with high temptations to defect, can be characterized as 'centrifugal'. These basic tendencies vary in their outcome depending on whether the perceived benefits of agreement (or the perceived dangers of disagreement) are high or low. Of course, all these hypothesized outcomes are subject to *caveats* of uncertainty and bounded rationality, which cannot effectively be controlled for but which institutionalized mechanisms are intended to minimize.[10]

The first category consists of the case where nondivisible benefits are high and the temptation to defect is low (Centripetal I). In this case, a set (or subset) of Great Powers or superpowers provides proactive *leadership* in institutionalizing cooperative security arrangements. This can be seen in a 'concert' system, such as the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century (reacting *ex post* to the Napoleonic Wars), or in a 'balance of power' system in which relatively evenly balanced antagonists act in condominium (and peripheral actors perceive gains from defection to be low also), or within particular alliances where both the external danger and the potential benefits from internal cooperation on other levels (for example, economic or political stability) are perceived to be high. Non-state actors such as business firms, trades unions and/or ethnic groups may also be kept on board if the benefits of cooperation and dangers of non-cooperation are seen to be high (for example, through anti-communism or anti-imperialism in the Cold War).

The second category is where nondivisible benefits are high but temptations to defect are also high (Centrifugal I). This can be the case where higher potential benefits are perceived as accruable outside the arrangement, in particular where peripheral actors—whether state or non-state actors—perceive larger benefits from non-alignment, revolution, delinked development or the like. In such cases, if either the danger from a widening of the conflict (say, a domino effect) and/or the benefits of keeping everyone on board (capitalist prosperity or socialist planning) are seen to be high, then the central actors will be tempted to coercively impose the norms of the order on potential defectors, mainly through military intervention or other forms of pressure. The process is therefore likely to be one of attempted or real *central coercion*.

[9] Ibid., p. 7.
[10] Such institutionalized mechanisms can, of course, be the product either of deductive design or of inductive trial-and-error (iterative game) processes.

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The third alternative pathway is where benefits are divisible and temptations to defect low (Centripetal II). This is often seen to be the case, for example, where economic prosperity and/or the so-called 'democratic peace' reduce the aggressive drive of actors and potential opponents alike by diminishing the perceived benefits of traditional international power politics, i.e. where a nonviolent positive-sum game is perceived to arise out of the autonomous actions of the various actors at different levels. In such a more perfect world, cooperation agreements *per se* might not be seen to be necessary to the establishment and maintenance of a stable security order. However, where agreements do arise they would do so in a relatively bottom-up fashion, where arrangements on a local, regional or specific issue-based level may emerge, gaining and/or losing adherents depending on shifting perceptions of benefit. The process here is one of *shifting centripetal pluralism*, a sort of self-regulating system in which dangers are low and benefits incremental.

The final pathway occurs where benefits are divisible but temptations to defect high (Centrifugal II). This is the case when defectors can carve out private or public fiefdoms which can increase their private benefits in a situation because potential dangers resulting from defection are perceived to be low and control mechanisms to be weak. Indeed, there is an assumption here on the part of certain actors that those private benefits can *only* be gained by defection, i.e. that despite high ostensible divisibility they are still essentially involved in a zero-sum game. This might involve states engaging in trade wars, monopolistic or oligopolistic multinational firms allying with local warlords, regional revolts against central control and the whole gamut of civil and cross-border wars, including tribal and ethnic wars but also involving economic backlashes among globally deprived groups. The main process here is one of *uneven disorder*, characterized by multilayered and asymmetric conflict and coalition-building, whether under the aegis of the state or outside it, leading to piecemeal and potentially unstable agreements.

We can schematize these four pathways in this fashion:

Table 1. *Divisibility, defection and Security Dilemmas.*

	Traditional Security Dilemma	New Security Dilemma
Divisibility:	Nondivisible	Divisible
Defection:		
Low temptation	Centripetal I: LEADERSHIP	Centripetal II: SHIFTING CENTRIPETAL PLURALISM
High temptation	Centrifugal I: CENTRAL COERCION	Centrifugal II: UNEVEN DISORDER

In this context, the strength of the Westphalian order can be seen to have been rooted in the increasing nondivisibility of benefits in the system in the transition from feudalism to the modern state.[11] As the number of core states declined from

[11] Unlike feudalism itself, under which benefits were seen to be highly divisible.

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many real and potential units in the seventeenth century, to a few Great Powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to only two superpowers in the Cold War, and as the absolute and relative military power and industrial strength of those core units increased with the Second Industrial Revolution, the potential dangers of defection also increased dramatically, as evidenced by two World Wars and the subsequent threat of nuclear annihilation. This nondivisibility led to two linked developments in what might be called the control mechanisms of the international system. At one level was a two-step move away from unstable and shifting patterns of interstate conflict—initially to a more stable European balance of power system between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War and later to a more centralized alliance system in the Cold War (Centripetal I). At a second level was a three-step move involving the external extension of those control mechanisms to the rest of the world—starting with European imperialism, continuing with the incorporation of other Great Powers such as the United States and Japan, and culminating in the attempt by the superpowers after the Second World War to coopt not only small powers in the core but also the decolonized Third World into the competing Cold War alliance systems (Centrifugal I).

It was clear in the Cold War context that two types of temptation to defect existed. In the first place, certain states within the two alliance systems periodically attempted to gain greater autonomy and sometimes form a *rapprochement* with states in the other alliance; France was the main 'maverick' in the North Atlantic alliance, whereas the Soviet-led 'communist' alliance was continually faced with defections, whether from China or its European satellites. The Western alliance was maintained by the carrot of capitalist prosperity and the ideological stick of the 'communist threat'. But the Eastern alliance was shored up more and more uneasily by force, as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Secondly, however, the Third World constituted a double defection threat. On the one hand, the rise of the Nonaligned Movement, along with potential alliance switching linked to frequent domestic regime changes and development crises, undercut the ability of the core alliances to integrate Third World states; while on the other hand, domestic instability, revolutionary movements, tribal and ethnic loyalties and other endogenous and cross-border sources of conflict challenged the states system itself as an effective control mechanism. Ultimately both superpowers came to grief in this way, as exemplified in the American defeat in Vietnam and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Western alliance with its core of capitalist prosperity was better able to employ carrots, while the Soviet alliance system, in economic decline from the 1970s onwards and only able to employ less-and-less effective sticks, found its relative power both in core and periphery declining rapidly.

In this context, the post-Cold War era has seen several crucial developments which have changed the nature of the international game.[12] In the first place, I would argue that globalization, whether economic, social or political, actually represents a much wider evolution towards an increasing divisibility of benefits in the international system. Participation in a more open world trading system or more integrated international financial markets, to name but two dimensions of this

[12] Although I am for the sake of convenience using the category of the 'post-Cold War era', the chronological end of the Cold War *per se* (usually dated around 1989) is merely a label for a wider set of multi-level changes which can be traced back years and even decades earlier.

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complex process, involve the growing provision of public goods in non-security issue areas through forms of private or mixed public/private governance organized around and through transnational and transgovernmental networks rather than just through the states system as such. Secondly, states and other actors are not so dependent as before on the centralized structure of the states system to be the sole provider of international security *per se* as an indivisible public good, as in Weber's famous 'monopoly of legitimate violence' (Centripetal II). When security is provided by states *per se* today, it is increasingly through shifting alliances, as with the 29-member *ad hoc* alliance that confronted Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, through cooperative multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations, or through a plurality of overlapping organizations (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Western European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe within Europe alone).[13] Perhaps most importantly, however, the control mechanisms which the core exercises with regard to the periphery have changed. Neither imperialism nor interventionism works any longer as an integrative mechanism, except for limited and often failed attempts, usually by directionless international institutions or shaky *ad hoc* alliances around former imperial powers; the costs of such intervention are now seen as prohibitive and the benefits of control few (Centrifugal II).

Consequently, resort to different forms of *exit* from the predominant security order, especially the temptation to defect from the states system itself—rather than participation, i.e. voice or loyalty[14]—becomes attractive to an increasing number of actors, whether private and quasi-private governance structures in the more prosperous capitalist world,[15] new mafias in Russia, or private armies, tribal militias and 'archipelago states' in Africa. In seeking to exit the constraints of the states system, actors (whether state actors or non-state actors, and whether seeking economic gain, power or justice as well as security) can further undermine and erode the capacity of the states in the system, individually or collectively, to provide *either* external or internal security or both, in a vicious circle. Such a vicious circle in turn increases the element of uncertainty and worsens the boundedness of rationality, increasing the dangers of misperception. Thus actors are rationally induced to resort to non-state forms of power, decision-making and/or institutional mechanisms in order to provide security (and other goals and values which security is thought to make possible). On the one hand, this process can lead to the emergence and development of a range of newly-embedded, but originally *ad hoc*, private or quasi-private regimes and circuits of power, both formal and informal, surrounding and crosscutting the state in a new web of complex relationships. Thus the NSD is inextricably intertwined with processes of internationalization and transnationalization which comprise our wider notion of globalization and would reflect any synergies stemming from their intersection. On the other hand, however, given uncertainty and bounded rationality, the same process can lead to the breakdown of existing bulwarks of order *without* replacing them with effective new institu-

[13] P.G. Cerny, 'European Defence and the New Détente: The Collapse of the Cold War System', *West European Politics*, 13:4 (October 1990), pp. 139–51.

[14] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[15] See Karsten Ronit and Volker Schneider (eds.), *Private Organizations in Global Politics* (London: Routledge, 2000).

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tionalized mechanisms, leading to a self-feeding expansion of endemic, low-level conflict and spreading violence. In this sense, therefore, the reconfiguring of power in a globalizing world, the security dimension of twentieth-first century world politics, may lead not to a new world order but to a new world *disorder*, a vicious circle which potentially might not be easily or effectively counteracted by states (and the states system) at home or abroad.

Divisibility and defection in the two Security Dilemmas

In this context, therefore, the emergence of the New Security Dilemma represents a fundamental change in the working of the international system. The way the Traditional Security Dilemma worked depended on the presence of two fundamental structural preconditions. In the first place, it required that states, in their relations with each other, were able to function as effective unit actors. In other words, the foreign policies of states—and their respective stances towards each other—had to minimally mimic the thought processes of reified individual decision-makers, making quasi-rational choices on the basis of imperatives derived from the structured relations among the wider constellation of states, and acting in analogous fashion in the international systemic context, not that of domestic politics. Of course, such rationality was bounded in several crucial ways: (1) by imperfect information, leading to misperception;[16] (2) by a highly mistrustful set of preconceptions about the nature of the international, based on the assumption that power was the bottom line of international relations and that altruistic forms of cooperation were therefore inherently counterproductive; (3) by the exogenous and endogenous realities of economic, ideological and cultural interdependence and crosscutting linkages throughout the modern era (*not* just in the current era of globalization); and (4) by the realities of domestic political conflict and coalition-building. Nevertheless, it was not only in the minds of realist academics that these other realities were assumed away. Such a set of assumptions was embedded in the traditions of *Realpolitik*, diplomatic practice and military preparedness throughout the Westphalian era. The TSD reflected real social practices, whatever the deeper structural realities. The second precondition was that domestic state structures had to be hierarchical and self-enclosed enough in their internal sovereignty, political institutions (at least in the foreign policy issue-area generally) and, in particular, in times of crisis where elites in that issue-area assumed an even more reified holistic role. In other words, the external Leviathan had to be underpinned by a sufficiently developed internal Leviathan, involving political culture (especially a cosmopolitan elite culture in the foreign policy and security issue-areas[17]), cross-class social solidarity and a relatively developed and self-sufficient national economy in order to be able to mobilize national resources effectively to counter perceived external threats.

[16] See Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma'.
[17] James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

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In effect, then, the TSD depended crucially upon the perception by states—that is, by state actors who saw themselves as mere agents in a principal-agent relationship with the reified state as the imagined principal—that benefits in the international system were deeply, inherently, structurally nondivisible. This perception reflected both a particular historical/cultural memory and a particular commonly held interpretation of the accepted 'continuing realities' or 'perennial problematics' of international politics *per se*. The historical/cultural memory was of the Middle Ages and the disintegration of the feudal system from the disastrous fourteenth century[18] through to the Wars of Religion (which of course led to the Peace of Westphalia itself). In other words, cosmopolitan elites believed that a breakdown of the states system would threaten a breakdown of civilization itself. And their interpretation of the perennial problems of IR was that war, as a means to establish, maintain and enforce balances of power, was an endemic and essential regulatory mechanism in the international system—i.e. that stable periods rooted in a particular interstate balance of power were inevitably followed by the undermining of that stability as the power capabilities and intentions of states changed over time (whether in an evolutionary or a revolutionary manner). The dangers of the breakdown of the international system were seen as potentially disastrous, and any hoped-for benefits from its erosion as being ephemeral and counterproductive. Thus consensual cooperation was desirable, but, failing that, coercion of potential defectors was necessary for survival itself in such an uncertain environment.

That is not to say that incentives to defect were low in the TSD. Indeed, in elite as well as popular understanding, international defectors such as Napoleon's France, Hitler's Germany and Soviet Russia have provided a template for the dangers of defection among states (defection from above), while Marxist revolution, international business (often represented through anti-semitism) and Third World fragmentation have provided an analogous template for the dangers of defection among sub-state and/or trans-state social, economic, ideological and political forces (defection from below). The possibility of defection has haunted politicians, diplomats, military leaders and professors of History and later International Relations throughout the modern era. Indeed, it has led some of the latter to reify the states system to the virtual exclusion of all other politics.[19] In this context the TSD (both in its specific sense as a phrase used by mid-twentieth century authors and in its virtual sense as an embedded practice of the states system throughout) has played a particularly strong normative role. In the course of the twentieth century it has been at the core of historical understanding. Study of the causes of the First World War in mainstream IR has always focused on the classic TSD problem of arms racing;[20] study of the Second World War has emphasized the dangers of psychologically or ideologically pathological leaders defecting; and study of the Cold War has been rightly obsessed (despite some exceptions among Goldwaterites in the 1960s and

[18] See Barbara W. Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

[19] For example, Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

[20] If not in Marxist and other critical approaches—although Lenin's perspective on imperialism may have more in common with that mainstream than with internationalist strains of Marxism. V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (A Popular Outline)* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947); see also Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism* (London: Routledge, 1982).

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war-fighting theorists in the 1980s) with the nondivisible unthinkability and ultimately unwinnable character of nuclear warfare.

The contrast between the TSD model and the actor mindset which accompanied and reinforced it, on the one hand, and the New Security Dilemma on the other, could therefore not be starker. The NSD depends crucially on the double perception that benefits in the contemporary world are much more (if not wholly[21]) divisible, perhaps even predominantly so, altering the payoffs for defection. In this context, some sources of the temptation to defect may not have changed much in terms of motivations and material sources (e.g. international oil cartels and pseudo-revolutionary states like Ayatolla Khomeini's Iran or Saddam Hussein's Iraq from above, ethnic warfare, mafias and deprivation from below), while others may be newer or involve an intensification of the old (see below). Whether from above or below, however (although especially from below), the very divisibility of benefits is widely seen to loosen both the coercive and the noncoercive imperatives of central control of the international cooperation process, raising the potential payoffs of defection. These developments in turn alter the parameters of uncertainty and bounded rationality, i.e. making outcomes hard to predict in quite different ways.

This increasing divisibility of benefits (and linked changes in the temptation to defect) can be seen to comprise at least four dimensions. The first of these is *economic globalization*, which implies the possibility of positive-sum material gains (in terms of both private and public goods) as a much less costly and less potentially counterproductive alternative type of benefits to war and to wasteful, spiralling defence expenditures. The second is the *death of ideology*, first proclaimed by Daniel Bell in the 1960s[22] and then revived by Francis Fukuyama in the early 1990s.[23] The third involves both social *multiculturalism* and cultural *postmodernism*, in which one of the core conditions for the underpinning of the TSD, i.e. the common imagination from below—or, more accurately, the state-led construction from above—of a common national-state identity and consciousness, is increasingly eroded by demands for cultural or other forms of autonomy, by the rejection of grand narratives and by the crosscutting media linkages of the 'global village'.[24] And the fourth is the emergence of new forms of *transnational governance*—public, private and mixed—and of forms of politicking which cut across states and national territories. I will now deal with each of these trends towards divisibility in turn.

Dimensions of divisibility and the New Security Dilemma

Economic globalization

In the period of the 'high' modern nation-state, the TSD took on ever more inexorable dimensions because of the linkage between state-building, nation-

[21] Especially in terms of nuclear war and proliferation.
[22] Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (New York: Basic Books, 1960).
[23] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
[24] Ronald J. Deibert, *Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

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building and the Second Industrial Revolution. In contrast to the British model, which eventually succeeded in reconciling a seventeenth century liberal state with the more decentralized First Industrial Revolution, the Second Industrial Revolution imposed far greater institutional and policymaking imperatives on states, particularly with regard to government–economy relations. Competition for relative power capabilities in the international system required the achievement of national economic self-sufficiency through 'late industrialization', which in turn required huge Chandleresque investments in large-scale mass production processes, mass marketing of products and an expanded 'scientifically' organized bureaucratic management superstructure.[25] These organizational developments in their turn not only depended upon the development of centralized and government-backed 'finance capital' but also generated the growth of matching Weberian state bureaucracies for the pursuit of a range of public objectives, including the promotion and even management of core multiplier sectors of the economy, infrastructure projects (railways and roads), the coordination of industrial development by sponsoring cartels and corporate expansion (while also coopting trades unions), and acting as a monopsony or oligopsony purchaser of, for example, military and infrastructural goods (effectively promoting the chemicals, textiles, communications, shipbuilding and steel industries, as well as the production of finished armaments). At the same time, in order to embed the newly-legitimated (and often fragile) authority of the state in the social base and the political superstructure, nation-state authorities increasingly coopted the culture of nationalism (originally a form of defection from below from absolutist monarchies) and spread it by means of the ideological apparatuses of the state. Such developments not only fitted but also reinforced and extrapolated the TSD, as the very collective existence of the social body, the economic and social nation, became inextricably intertwined with the nondivisible survival of the state in the evolving international context.

Economic globalization, however, fundamentally challenges the parameters of this fused national security culture by disaggregating the economic benefits of industrial and financial development, dramatically increasing the divisibility of benefits. This shift has been taking place at several levels, levels which increasingly interact with each other.[26] The organizational requirements of mass production can be bypassed, leading to more decentralized structural patterns more reminiscent of the First Industrial Revolution. So-called 'post-Fordist' production processes based on flexible manufacturing systems reduce the optimal economies of scale of production, so that factories and workshops can be not only physically disaggregated but also rapidly adapted to changing production techniques and patterns of consumer demand. Locational incentives increasingly respond to cross-border market pressures and signals; although technological innovations may primarily be generated within national 'architectures of supply', technological diffusion is extremely rapid so gains from technological advances spread quickly across international/transnational spaces. Changes in information and communications technology are revolutionizing management, facilitating strategic and operational decision-making (with regard to

[25] Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

[26] These issues are explored more fully in Cerny, 'Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action'.

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both production and marketing), and intensifying supervision and monitoring of performance (including more exacting application of financial criteria); 'lean management' is the fashion. Markets can be extensively disaggregated too, with flexible production enabling firms to switch rapidly to meet increasingly segmented consumer demands across wider spaces. Furthermore, globalization of financial markets has disaggregated investment, widening the sources of even quite small investments across borders and generating further financial innovation in the process. More controversially, labour processes are being flexibilized as well, feeding into job insecurity and undermining solidaristic identification with the national-political economy; in this context, the growth of the service sector, although usually said to be more closely responsive to domestic economic conditions (involving 'nontradeable' assets), has nevertheless been a global phenomenon. And the state's role has changed from one of protecting business activities and promoting self-sufficiency to one of promoting competitiveness in the international marketplace.[27] Even weapons production and procurement increasingly conform to the norms of 'military post-Fordism'.[28]

This increased divisibility of benefits in the contemporary international political economy has had two sorts of effects on the security environment. In the first place, it has attenuated (if not entirely severed) the link between the state and industrial development that was at the heart of the late nineteenth and twentieth century intensification of the TSD. On the one hand, war can no longer be waged profitably by industrial states, and mass publics know this too. Not only can it not be waged profitably, but social as well as economic losses are more and more evident; while political actors, economic elites and military leaderships are less and less convinced that war plays an effective regulatory role, as evidenced by the role of the Vietnam Syndrome in the US and American awareness of failures in Beirut, Somalia and other places in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, too, the dependence of industry on military and government contracts, while still great for some sectors, is crucial for far fewer industries. Although the development of information technology and communications industries was originally closely linked with government promotion (including sponsorship of the internet), private transnational markets and production processes are increasingly taking over.[29] And in a world in which anti-inflationary policy, embedded financial orthodoxy and the New Public Management have become the touchstones of public policy across a widening spectrum of issue-areas, the built-in structural inflation characteristic of cutting-edge defence industries, along with the tendency of military bureaucracies to spend what is seen to be necessary rather than what can be afforded, as well as the maintenance of a large defence bureaucracy allied with specific domestic constituencies (manifested in political opposition to base closures, and so on), have all

[27] P.G. Cerny, 'Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Globalization', *Government and Opposition*, 32:2 (Spring 1997), pp. 251–74.

[28] Andrew Latham and Nicholas Hooper (eds.), *The Future of the Defence Firm: New Challenges, New Directions* (Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic, 1995).

[29] Volker Leib and Raymund Werle, 'Private Organizations in the Governance of International Telecommunications: The Case of the Internet Society', in Ronit and Schneider, *Private Organizations*; also see Philip E. Steinberg and Stephen D. McDowell, 'The Governance of Global Cyberspace: Spatial Constructivism and its Implications for International Relations Theory', paper delivered at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, 16–20 February 1999.

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come to be seen as luxuries rather than necessities. The military pork-barrel is shrinking.

In the second place, of course, economic globalization has created alternative possibilities for divisible benefits to arise through trading relationships, boundary-crossing production structures and the like. As a result of experience with Germany and Japan after the end of the Second World War—a new kind of cultural memory—it is taken for granted nowadays that the best way to ensure security (whether international, national or personal security[30]) is to integrate past and potential enemies into a prosperous and interdependent capitalist global economy. Potential enemies are not only bought off directly but, more importantly, brought into the very web of the new structure, redistributing *political* resources at both domestic and international levels away from actors seeking the violent expropriation of others' assets towards those who are (relatively) successful at accumulating those assets through economic exchange. Thus the increasing range and scope of alternative, *substitutable* benefits available in a global economy comes to dominate not only the economic issue-area but the security domain as well. So long as the game remains positive-sum, temptations to defect are likely to remain low.

The 'death of ideology'

Ideological conflict played a crucial role in generating nondivisible benefits in the TSD, especially in its later instances. Indeed, universalistic ideologies invested state actions in both domestic and international arenas with identification with a higher mission, thus fusing national solidarity with moral righteousness. It is primarily at this level that the benefits of cooperation and the dangers of defection were internalized by both elites and mass publics, first through the fight against Nazism and Fascism and later in the conflict between Communism and anti-Communism. The prize was confirmation of the immanent superiority of one's own social system; the danger was the defeat of the public interest and civilization itself in the perceived barbarianism of either totalitaritarian Communism or exploitative, oppressive capitalism. In an anarchical world, it was seen as potentially disastrous to fall behind the ideological opponent; both sides presented their stances in such a Manichean fashion. Furthermore, ideology was often the main linkage between central players and peripheral players in the states system itself, generating strong internalized bonds between central players and potential defectors, although as the Cold War dragged on this was more true for the West than for the East.

At the periphery of the Cold War system, however, ideological stances tended increasingly either to be mere add-ons for potential defectors playing the two sides against each other, or else were compounded with local cultural elements to give them indigenous cultural legitimacy and coherence. The particular blend of Communism, nationalism, a localized version of Confucianism and village values which constituted the ideology of Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Revolution was

[30] An analytical distinction further developed in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, 2nd edn. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

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one such hybrid, as was Uhuru Socialism in Tanzania and the attempt of the Czechoslovak leadership under Alexsandr Dubček in 1968 to embody 'Communism with a human face'. Such deviations in the Western sphere tended, in contrast, to involve authoritarian variations, as in Latin America. On both sides, however, the aim of elites was to further imbricate the prevailing ideology with national solidarity, reinforcing and embedding the nondivisible character of the stakes in the wider conflict. As predicted by our model, of course, ideological defection threats—usually generated by challenges from below—attracted increasingly coercive attempts to impose ideological cooperation. Indeed, it was the dwindling success of such attempts as the Cold War dragged on that critically exposed the weaknesses of the TSD in coping with East-West conflict and led to its breakdown in the 1980s.

For in the meantime, the ideological division of the world into Communist and anti-Communist camps was caught in a pincer movement which undermined its credibility and legitimacy both domestically and internationally. In the first place, the range of ideological alternatives widely perceived to be on offer proliferated, with partly successful defections in the Third World and quasi-defections in Western and Eastern Europe. The effect of the various events of the mid-to-late 1960s in diverse parts of the world was to validate alternative models of both capitalism and socialism, even bringing to the fore long-simmering ideological disputes within and among the purer brands of Western Marxism, not to mention African socialism, welfare and corporate capitalism, anti-racist and national liberation movements, extreme right-wing movements, and so on. Ideology swiftly became more divisible, undermining willingness to serve in a limited war where ideological lines were blurred (the Vietnam Syndrome) or to die in a nuclear war for one's beliefs (later catalyzed by the movement against the deployment of American Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe in the 1980s). Increasing ideological divisibility loosened the link between national solidarity and international alliances too. The denouement came when the arch-neo-ideologist, President Ronald Reagan, and the arch-pragmatist, Mikhail Gorbachev, broke the TSD arms race spiral with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987) and other subsequent agreements.

In the New Security Dilemma, this divisibility has manifested itself at several levels. The most benign outcome has been the crystallization of a trend in several parts of the world towards democratization, at least in form. Democratization necessarily involves as a bottom line some considerable defusing of both internal and external ideological conflicts—conflicts once deeply embedded in the social formation of newly independent African countries, for instance. In such cases, temptations to defect have declined (at least to some extent) because of the very perception that a positive-sum game was possible, especially in a world in which the divisibility of economic benefits made democratization potentially a more profitable option. Of course, the main temptation to ideological defection has come not from political ideology but from religious fundamentalism. Nevertheless, even the most intense of these defections, that of Shiite Islam in Khomeini's Iran following the Revolution of 1979, the possibility of a 'clash of civilizations',[31] has foundered not on the rock of Western ideology but on the sands of splits within and between Islamic nations, sects and factions. Temptations to defect have faltered because of the ideological

[31] Huntington, S.P. (1997). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster).

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divisibility of the defection itself! Ideological defection, where it has occurred, has been very much the product of local conditions. In an NSD world, however, where threats as well as benefits are increasingly seen as divisible, the tendency of central actors has been to reduce their intervention—with the exception of limited multilateral peacekeeping and as yet embryonic forms of so-called 'humanitarian intervention'—and merely to tinker around the edges of the more serious defection threats.[32] This *ad hoc* approach has effectively isolated those threats, which are unlikely to ripple out beyond their core local or regional areas except through sporadic outbreaks of terrorism in some more serious cases. Nevertheless, the uncertainty created by those temptations to defect seems to be ensuring their continuation and expansion, in some cases (Sierra Leone, Congo/Rwanda) spiralling out of control.

Multiculturalism and postmodernism

It should be clear from what has already been said that one of the main preconditions of the Traditional Security Dilemma was the development not merely of ideological commitment to nationalism (and later to the ideological division of the Cold War), but also of solidaristic, collective cultural orientations *within* national societies. This *Gemeinschaft* function, so to speak, has been one of the most problematic aspects of nation-building and the states system. The history of class conflict, separatist movements of various types, tribal, ethnic and local conflicts, transnational identities and the like, show just how far 'national culture societies', as Znaniecki called them,[33] or 'imagined communities',[34] as Benedict Anderson called them, have been not established facts but precarious political projects. They have, none the less, left a powerful residual legacy at both mass and elite level. Without people having a holistic sense of naturally belonging to the territorial nation-state to which they are attached as citizens, it is arguable that modern society might have been as rootless and internally fragmented as the late feudal order. Replicating or approximating extended kinship identity at the much wider level of national 'society' is one of the most deeply embedded products of the modern era, and will be one of the last to erode, although this is mainly true of longer established states. Without it, the temptation to defect *internally*, as well as a greater temptation to see state boundaries as permeable and amorphous (and therefore in effect to defect externally even while remaining in geographically the same location), would clearly undermine the nondivisibility of benefits and threats so essential to the TSD.

Nevertheless, cultural nationalism is being eroded from both above and below, and that erosion, predictably, is the result of the increasing divisibility of cultural benefits in the contemporary world. From above, the emergence of a cultural 'global

[32] Britain's proxy intervention in Sierra Leone through the private Sandline organization, although partly successful in the short term on the ground, embarrassed the Labour Government, nearly brought down the Foreign Secretary and led to a greater reluctance to try such adventures again.

[33] Florian Znaniecki, *Modern Nationalities: A Sociological Study* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973 [1952]).

[34] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991).

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village' would seem to imply convergence and therefore greater nondivisibility. However, as Roland Robertson has pointed out, the very constitution of cultural globalization embodies complex diversity—'the universalization of the particular and the particularization of the universal'.[35] At the same time, postmodernism has declared the death of the great narratives of modern society, a focus on micro- and meso-level circuits of power, and on the necessity for resistance to the oppression embedded in these circuits.[36] In this context, the demand among a range of groups for greater autonomy within a multicultural space draws from both of these sources. The desire of religious and ethnic groups for autonomy is not merely the result of their desire for local self-government but is also inextricably intertwined with (1) their transnational identities, whether in history or in space, and (2) their understanding that *in order to be able effectively to fuse their endogenous autonomy with their global identities*, they will have to accept that they cannot be territorially exclusive. They cannot make a claim to domination or homogeneity within a particular territorial space; instead they must accept to operate within a complex, overlapping space characterized by a transnationally crosscutting plurality of groups claiming analogous autonomous status. Multiculturalism and postmodernism, then, while promoting greater endogenous homogeneity at one level, simultaneously puts groups a position where to achieve their internal goals they must accept greater exogenous heterogeneity at another. Cultural benefits, rather than being confined to the territorial cage of the nation-state, are necessarily both particularistic and global at the same time. More holism paradoxically leads to a greater divisibility of cultural benefits.

In this context, multiculturalism acts as a serious constraint to the rather different holism of the state in the states system and the TSD. In the NSD, in contrast, the greater divisibility of benefits means that 'cultural security' is increasingly divorced from the imperatives of the nation-state and the states system. Indeed, the state must be kept at arms' length. The bottom line of sovereignty, as Hobbes noted, was the willingness of individuals to die for the state in battle, i.e. to subordinate their individual survival, through the social contract, to the survival of the state. But where first loyalty is to religion, sect or ethnic group, survival of the state takes second place. Indeed, at this level temptations to defect are particularly high in the NSD, especially in the periphery. It is therefore in the cultural issue-area where the main manifestations of the centrifugal form of the NSD, where the greatest tendencies to endemic violence and civil wars, and where the greatest vulnerability to cross-border mobilization of power rooted in cultural bonds will arise. Indeed, this has already been the case in many parts of the world, but most especially on the periphery where local and regional, tribal and ethnic cultures in earlier periods have been *least* transformed by, eroded through or integrated into the national culture societies of the modern states system. This is where the greatest challenge of the New Security Dilemma will arise—that is, whether to ignore or tolerate ethnic, civil and transnational violence and conflict on the periphery, or whether to attempt to revive the use of force and interventionism. Huge resources and problematic

[35] Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992), p. 102.
[36] Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Henri Goverde, P.G. Ceray, Mark Haugaard and Howard H. Lentner (eds.), *Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations* (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000).

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long-term commitments would be necessary in the latter case, and experience in recent decades indicates that such conflicts are often intractable in the face of external pressures and therefore that such endeavours are likely to be unsuccessful and even counterproductive in terms of wider global/cultural security.[37]

Transnational governance

The entire logic of the Traditional Security Dilemma, as argued above, is rooted in the international system of states. Although organized around the self-help imperatives of individual states, its normative significance, and its tragic potential, lie in the potential success, or not, of attempts to resist or *break* its vicious circle. The abilities of states to generate balances of power, to engage in diplomatic negotiations and, as de Gaulle said of Bismarck, to 'know when to stop', are crucial in resolving the dilemma, however ephemerally. Indeed, as states developed greater and greater absolute power capabilities in the Second Industrial Revolution era, the imperatives of marshalling and deploying such capabilities in order to achieve or retain relative gains inhibited the development of transnational governance structures and international regimes. The story of the failure of the League of Nations as the result of the defection of key states is well known. In contemporary terms, only the capacity of a hegemonic power to provide international public goods (and to pay for them) could counteract the temptation to defect. Although the United States set up a range of international regimes in the post-Second World War era in order to try to transcend this limitation and base the TSD on leadership rather than central coercion, these regimes generally succeeded only insofar as they were limited to the hegemonic sphere of influence of the American superpower. For much of the world, central coercion, whether by the United States in the periphery or the Soviet Union in both core and periphery, was required to resist defection. International regimes in this context were also essentially *interstate* regimes, not 'transnational' regimes.[38] Although such regimes went beyond simple interstate interaction of a self-help kind by saving on transaction costs in terms of cooperation among states,[39] thereby softening the edges of the TSD, they still reinforced the states system by buying off potential defectors.

Nevertheless, interstate regimes constituted a key precursor of transnational governance structures and processes and are still an entrenched part of this wider universe. Today there has been a proliferation of such structures and processes, from the public to the private, and from the formal to the informal. The universe of such structures can be schematized as follows:

[37] At the time of writing, Western policymakers were considering just such a dilemma with regard to Kosovo.

[38] See Stephen Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).

[39] Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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Table 2. *Transnational governance structures and processes*.

	Formal	Informal
Public	International Institutions and Intergovernmental Regimes	Transgovernmental Policy Networks, Policy Communities, etc.
Private	Private Regimes, Self-Regulatory Bodies, Law Merchant, etc.	Transnational Policy Networks, NGOs, Advocacy Coalitions, etc.

Of course, this table does not begin to portray the immense and exploding universe of transnational governance structures and processes. It merely identifies some of the polar types, whereas the main area of growth is in institutional forms that link or cut across these types. Indeed, the recurring concept of 'network' implies that formal and informal linkages intersect and interact with each other in mixed public/private and formal/informal configurations. It is self-evident that the proliferation of such structures and processes engenders an expanding division of benefits, even where state actors are intimately involved.

There is not space here to begin a proper consideration of the wide ramifications of this trend. Nevertheless, two salient examples illustrate that the divisibility of benefits permits a wide range of actors, including informal private actors, to counteract even defection by core states. In 1996, following a campaign by the transnational pressure group Greenpeace to prevent Shell Oil from sinking a disused oil platform in the sea during which the British Government strongly supported Shell's disposal plans,[40] Greenpeace and Shell negotiated privately and settled on an alternative option, bypassing the Government entirely. And in 1998, the private, internet-based campaign for an international ban on the use of landmines succeeded in getting that treaty ratified by 120 countries, effectively isolating the remaining defectors (including the United States). Of course, most transnational governance structures and processes operate in much more mundane ways and involve intense elite networking, and in many areas defection is still the rule rather than the exception, especially where local conditions and coalitions resist both participating in the processes and implementing the outcomes. Nevertheless, the dynamic density of this trend, and its institutional reinforcement not only by the United Nations but also by inclusion in a wide range of cognate processes in both international and domestic arenas, indicates not only that transnational governance structures and processes are the main carriers of increasing divisibility in the contemporary world—including significant and growing niches within the security issue-area—but that they also constitute a fundamental mechanism for coopting and/or disciplining potential defectors. It is also notable that the *private* dimension of such structures and processes (even supposedly spontaneous market processes *per se*[41]) is often

[40] See 'Report Stays Neutral on Deep-Sea Disposal', *Nature*, 381:6581 (30 May 1996), p. 358.
[41] P.G. Cerny, 'Embedding Global Financial Markets: Securitization and the Emerging Web of Governance', in Ronit and Schneider, *Private Organization*.

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crucial to their operation in issue-areas where the role of governments is narrowing or constrained for other reasons. They constitute an essential mechanism in the process of institutionalizing the logic of the NSD.

Uncertainty in the New Security Dilemma

As we have seen, the New Security Dilemma involves a logic which is new in comparison with the Traditional Security Dilemma, but which is not new in history. The feudal era also involved a high divisibility of benefits, but growing temptations to defect led to two centuries of crisis and to the birth of the Westphalian system. The main question today is whether the divisibility of benefits in the twenty-first century will lead to a more stable, pluralistic system in which defection is low, or to a more unstable and even crisis-ridden system in which defection is high. In the latter case, the erosion of the traditional constraints of the states system may lead to a vicious spiral of defection, as different sub-state and trans-state social, cultural and economic actors act to protect their newly autonomous niches in the wider system. These backlashes do not develop in a vacuum; they interact with economic and social processes of complex globalization to create overlapping and competing cross-border networks of power, shifting loyalties and identities, and new sources of endemic low-level conflict—a 'durable disorder' analogous to some of the key characteristics of the medieval world. In this context of increased uncertainty concerning potential defection, especially from below, the states system will not of course evaporate. The United States, for example, still attempts to play the role of hegemon, but is challenged on wider fronts and may be stretched thinner and thinner in the future.[42] Whether a layer of institutionalized power will crystallize and converge to provide effective collective security at a global level is highly problematic. New constraints are also being created by expanding intergovernmental and multilateral cooperation, whether UN peacekeeping or NATO expansion. However, these essentially involve a process of catch-up, and are also vulnerable to micro- and meso-level defection, as in the Balkans. The state, as David Lake has put it, is in the process of 'disarticulation'.[43] Complex globalization may thus create a *governance gap* in which uncertainty and bounded rationality—the inability to predict the future actions of potential defectors—can again lead to tragic consequences.

In this hypothetical environment, the international system could be characterized once again by a number of attributes usually associated with the medieval era.[44] These include: (1) competing institutions with overlapping jurisdictions (states, regimes, transgovernmental networks, private interest governments, etc.); (2) more fluid, nebulous and permeable territorial boundaries (both within and across

[42] It is clearly problematic as to whether the end of the Cold War makes American 'imperial overstretch' less or more of a challenge. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

[43] David A. Lake, 'Global Governance: A Relational Contracting Approach', in Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart (eds.), *Globalization and Governance* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 31–53.

[44] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 254–5; Alain Minc, *Le Nouveau Moyen Âge* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993); P.G. Cerny, 'Neomedievalism, Civil Wars and the New Security Dilemma', *Civil Wars*, 1:1 (Spring 1998), pp. 36–64.

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states[45]); (3) a growing alienation between global innovation, communication and resource nodes (global cities) on the one hand and disfavoured, fragmented hinterlands on the other; (4) increased inequalities and isolation of permanent sub-castes (the underclass); (5) multiple and/or fragmented loyalties and identities (ethnic conflict and unstable multiculturalism); (6) contested property rights and legal boundaries (for example, disregard for rules and dispute resolution procedures, attempts to extend extra-territorial jurisdiction); and (7) the spread of what Alain Minc has called '*zones grises*', or geographical areas and social contexts where the rule of law does not run (both localized ghettoes and international criminal activities). Today we now live in an era of increasing speed, global scale and extremely rapid diffusion of information and technological innovation, characteristics too which seem to be outgrowing the political capacities of the existing institutional order, multiplying the effects of uncertainty and bounded rationality. An extended phase of low-level disorder, punctuated by episodic structural mutations and the uneven maintenance of pockets of pluralism and elements of sectoral hegemony by, for example, international financial markets and multinational corporations, seems the most likely scenario.

The result could well be the crystallization of increasingly suboptimal forms of governance at both the state and transnational/international levels and the threat of growing institutional entropy in world politics generally. The 'hollowing out' of the state may not be matched by any equivalent 'filling in' of multilateral, transnational, regional, or whatever, governance structures—thereby creating not only a 'democratic deficit' but also a wider and deeper governance gap as we move into the twenty-first century.[46] In this context, nation-states will find—weaker states first, stronger states later on—that their *effective* territorial and authoritative boundaries will become more indistinct and changeable, even if legal sovereignty is not formally threatened, state borders still appear as real lines on the map, and guarantees of diplomatic recognition and membership of certain international institutions remain. At another level, the emergence of international or transnational *regions* is playing an increasing role in territorial organization. Indeed, the only institutional development in recent decades loosely analogous to the nation-state has been the European Union, but that may prove relatively stagnant in a world of fragmentary, privatized, and deregulated global economic competition. However, what is most interesting about these regions is not their institutional coherence or suprastate-like structural form; indeed, the European Union is the only region with that sort of quasi-state coherence.[47] What is most interesting is that they are themselves multilevel, asymmetric entities, with crosscutting internal fault lines—sub-regions, cross-border regions, local regions, not merely 'nested' but often including subnational, national and transnational rivalries in uneasy proximity. The main structural fault lines—

[45] For example, see François Přkić, 'End of the Cold War and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Emergence of Transnational Rebel Territories in Today's Conflicts', paper presented to the Workshop on Democratization and the Changing Global Order, Annual Joint Sessions of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research, Bern, Switzerland, 27 February–4 March 1997; see also Robert D. Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (London: Macmillan, 1997).

[46] See P.G. Cerny, 'Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy', *European Journal of Political Research*, 35:5 (July/August 1999), pp. 1–26.

[47] Sylvia Walby, 'The New Regulatory State: The Social Powers of the European Union', *British Journal of Sociology* (forthcoming 1999).

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political, social and economic—in this complex world reflect not clear territorial boundaries enclosing hierarchical authority structures, but new distinctions between different levels of socioeconomic cleavage, urban/rural splits, etc. Sociological and geographical literature on global cities, for example, reflects the concept that a range of 'virtual spaces' in the global political economy will increasingly overlap with, and possibly even replace, the 'real' space of traditional geographical/topological territorities.[48] These new spaces are embodied—and increasingly embedded—in transaction flows, infrastructural nodes of communications and information technology, corporate headquarters, 'edge city' living complexes for 'symbolic analysts',[49] increasingly 'dematerialized' financial markets, and cultural and media centres of activity (and identity). Control of new ideas and innovations will be increasingly concentrated in such areas, protected and secured by a growing panoply of international and transnational intellectual property rights.[50]

On the one hand, therefore, specific spaces which people perceive and identify with are likely to become increasingly localized and/or micro-level in structure, while on the other hand, the very perception of space being partitioned vertically will be eroded. People will have to learn over time to 'navigate' between different overlapping, asymmetric layers of spatial perception and organization. The poorer residents of such areas will find themselves increasingly excluded from decision-making processes. And in those areas where this kind of navigation is more difficult—for example, where such nodes, infrastructure, activities, and so on, do not exist within easy physical or perceptual reach—many will simply be 'out of the loop', country bumpkins or even roaming, deprived bands, like Hobsbawm's primitive rebels[51] (consider contemporary Albania), forced once again to become predators or supplicants on the cities, as in the Middle Ages.

Changes in institutions, the fluidity of territorial boundaries and the increasing hegemony of global cities will interact with new forms of 'flexible' labour processes and economic organization to increase inequalities and turn downwardly mobile workers (especially the less skilled, the ghetto dwellers, and such-like) into a new lumpen proletariat, underclass or sub-caste—a process well underway in the First World and already dominant in large parts of the Third World. In this context, it will not be merely ethnic loyalties and tribal enmities which will undermine the *ersatz Gemeinschaft* of the nation-state. It will be the development of complex new inequalities of both material class and virtual geography. Such inequalities will be far more difficult to counterbalance and neutralize without effective or legitimate state institutions, and are likely to comprise an increasing source of civil and cross-border violence, especially when they are allied to other cleavages. Such a situation will not merely be one of fragmentation, but one of *multiple loyalties and identities*—of social and political schizophrenia—with shifting patchwork boundaries and postmodern cultural images. Any truly global cultural identity structure would have to be not so much homogeneous or unifying as intrinsically multilayered and

[48] Paul L. Knox and Peter J. Taylor (eds.), *World Cities in a World-System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
[49] Robert B. Reich, *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism* (New York: Knopf, 1991).
[50] Christopher May, *Knowing, Owning, Enclosing: A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Nottingham Trent University, 1997.
[51] E.J. Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, revised edn. (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1972).

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flexible, being able to adapt chameleon-like to a wide range of differentiated contexts.

Finally, however, in such a reconfigured world, there will not only be 'niches' for the maintenance of pluralist autonomy for individuals and groups;[52] there will also be increased escape routes—and organizational opportunities—for those operating more or less 'outside the law'. Exit from political society is likely to become a more viable option for a wider range of actors and activities. At one level, such phenomena involve more than just international (and domestic) criminal activities such as the drugs trade or the (semi-transnational) Russian mafia; they also involve the areas where excluded people live—especially urban ghettoes, at one geographical extreme, and enclaves in inaccessible areas (such as jungle, mountains) at another. Indeed, the toughest problem in this area is where different dimensions of extra-legal activities *intersect* with legal or quasi-legal ones, for example where the resources and networks of the drugs trade not only create alternative power structures and social identities for members of the underclass physically located in ghettoes but also extend into state bureaucracies and 'legitimate' private firms, as mafias have always done. Excluded rural hinterlands may also become grey zones. At another level, however, it is likely that many traditionally mainstream social and economic activities will expand as much through grey zones as through legitimate means, as the so-called 'black economy' has done in many areas during the modern era.[53] A transnationalized black economy constitutes a major challenge to the enforcement function of even the residual state, and the inclusion or integration of such areas and activities into the complex governance structures of a globalizing world is likely to be extremely uneven. Finally, as Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky have pointed out, these new cleavages may crystallize into diverging 'zones of peace' and 'zones of turmoil' in the wider world order, further institutionalizing the contrast between centre and periphery and reinforcing centrifugal tendencies in a more salient way in the latter than in the former.[54]

Conclusions: challenges of the New Security Dilemma

The challenges thrown up in the twenty-first century in the form of the New Security Dilemma are likely to significantly reduce the effectiveness of traditional state-based and state-systemic approaches in the stabilization of international politics. Where it is not primarily states that defect from interstate balances of power, but rather a range of transnational and subnational actors and structures, then interstate alliances and other traditional means of reequilibrating the balance will be insufficient to control those defections. Not only will such structural mechanisms prove less effective at playing 'catch up' with exogenous structural changes (and potential

[52] David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), argues for a much more widespread pluralism, on which rests his hopes for the development of a global 'cosmopolitan democracy'.

[53] Diana Coyle, 'The Dark Side of Globalization Where the Black Economy Thrives', *The Independent* (London), 14 May 1998, p. 24.

[54] Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The* Real *World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993).

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defectors), but attempts to actually *use* these mechanisms may in practice be increasingly counterproductive too. States may attempt to regain their lost authority and power, but the result will simply be to spend more and more money and energy to fight against growing system entropy without actually succeeding in fostering genuine systemic stability or building effective governance structures and processes. This is a vicious circle, analogous to, but structurally quite distinct from, the TSD. And in today's globalizing world, as in the medieval world, there is (1) no external threat to the system as a whole which might galvanize a sufficiently hierarchical response to engender the emergence of genuinely 'global governance' and (2) no prospect of a sufficiently autonomous and powerful collective vision—religious, social, economic or political—to transform such a world into a new transnational *res publica*. The world of the NSD, like the Middle Ages, will be one of chronic but durable disorder, riddled with uncertainties, limiting the possibilities of genuine collective action and constraining the ability of actors and institutions to make credible commitments. Consequently, if the international order is eventually to be transformed into a more authoritative global system, capable of effectively pursuing genuinely collective, public values on a wider, global level, then the sources of that transformation must come from *within* its newer, essentially transnational structures. Only complex interdependence can generate sufficiently complex solutions. But at this stage the promise of such a transformation is weak and its form little more than another potential source of uncertainty. Therefore the New Security Dilemma, in which the growing divisibility of benefits uneasily interacts with more and more complex temptations to defect, especially from below, is likely to prove a more robust model of the international system for the foreseeable future.

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