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INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO U.N.S.C. RESOLUTIONS ON THE INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT IN SUDAN

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[Various Dates, 2024]

Introduction

Despite its greater human cost, the war in Sudan has not captured the global public consciousness or the attention of international organizations to nearly the same degree as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.[1] The conflict erupted on April 15, 2023, with the collapse of a fragile power-sharing arrangement between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the successor to the Janjaweed militias that terrorized Darfur two decades ago.[2] In May 2023, the United States and Saudi Arabia brokered an arrangement known as the Jeddah Declaration in which the SAF and RSF pledged to respect international humanitarian law (IHL) and protect civilians and humanitarian workers.[3] Neither side complied and the fighting intensified. Some estimates now put the number of dead at over 150,000 and the number of displaced at fourteen million.[4] Sexual violence is rampant.[5] Aid groups have largely been unable to access populations in need and thousands have died of starvation.[6] Both sides have been credibly accused of atrocities.[7] The RSF began a siege of the North Darfuri capital El Fasher in April 2024, shelling civilian infrastructure and blocking food and aid to hundreds of thousands of trapped civilians[8] before descending upon the city in a murderous spree in October 2025.[9] Outside powers, such as Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have supplied weapons and other support to their favored side throughout the conflict, helping to prolong it.[10]

The UN Security Council has been actively seized with the broader situation in the Sudans for most of this century, adopting significant measures concerning Darfur in the early 2000s;[11] the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Sudan, South Sudan, and the border region;[12] and arms embargoes and sanctions.[13] The Council's response to the conflict between the SAF and the RSF has been decidedly less impressive and has failed to significantly influence the parties' behavior. While it has issued frequent press statements condemning the violence and urging the parties to respect IHL, protect civilians, and allow humanitarian access,[14] the Council has only managed to adopt two resolutions calling for concrete action, in March and June 2004. While no member state voted against these resolutions, Russia abstained both times and implementation has been poor. Russia thwarted further momentum by vetoing a third resolution in November 2024.

Other international actors, such as the African Union (AU), the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, and a grouping of countries known as the "Quad" (the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt), have been more active. As of the time this note went to publication, their efforts have fared little better in mitigating the war's terrible toll.

Resolution 2724 (March 2024)

The Security Council adopted its first resolution on the Sudan conflict in March 2024, nearly a year into the fighting. Drafted by the United Kingdom, Resolution 2724 reaffirmed the Council's support for Sudan's democratic transition and called for a ceasefire during Ramadan.[15] It also called for the removal of obstructions to humanitarian access and for the parties to comply with their IHL obligations and Jeddah Declaration commitments.[16] The resolution welcomed statements and resolutions by several entities, including the AU Peace and Security Council, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Quartet—consisting of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and South Sudan—and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.[17] It also encouraged the Secretary-General's Sudan envoy to use his good offices to help resolve the conflict.[18]

Fourteen members voted for Resolution 2724. Russia abstained over professed concerns about Western-imposed interference in Sudan's sovereign affairs,[19] despite the preamble's "strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Sudan."[20] Russia accused the West of "double standards" that "look particularly egregious in view of the fact that those same countries are delaying the adoption of a draft resolution on a

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ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, where a genuine massacre is taking place . . . "[21] While it would have preferred a presidential or press statement on the subject,[22] Russia emphasized that it had nonetheless "decided to allow the resolution to pass, as it is a question of the lives for the Sudanese people, who are suffering from the consequences of the conflict throughout the country."[23]

Resolution 2736 (June 2024)

Three months later, the United Kingdom again took the pen on a second resolution, Resolution 2736, centered around a demand for the RSF to halt its siege of El Fasher.[24] The resolution called on both sides to facilitate humanitarian relief for civilians, including by providing required visas and travel authorizations, giving credit to the SAF-controlled "Sudanese authorities in this regard," and "urg[ing] further cooperation."[25] It called on "all parties" to reopen Adré, a Sudan–Chad border crossing key to the entry of humanitarian assistance into Darfur. At Russia's insistence,[26] the resolution specified that opening the border be done "with the prior agreement and coordination of the Sudanese authorities."[27]

Resolution 2736 went beyond Resolution 2724 in several ways, including by expressing concern over "the imminent risk of famine, particularly in Darfur";[28] and calling on all UN member states "to refrain from external interference which seeks to foment conflict and instability."[29] During the negotiations, Russia joined Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana in proposing a requirement for the Secretary-General to specifically report on external meddling.[30] The United Kingdom accommodated this proposal with language requesting reporting on implementation of "all elements" of the resolution.[31] It did not, however, incorporate other proposals by these five members to expand the resolution's scope to include conflict areas elsewhere in the country.[32]

As with Resolution 2724, the vote would have been unanimous but for Russia's abstention. This time, Russia's explanation was more acerbic. It accused the West of exploiting El Fasher as "nothing more than a pretext," intended "to keep the eye of the United Nations on the situation and to propose decisions that are questionable from the point of view of respect for the sovereignty and unity of the country."[33] Despite securing the language about Sudanese government consent to the opening of Adré, Russia apparently felt the need to emphasize that "questions of national border control" are "a sovereign matter" and "[a]ny attempt to impose artificial exceptions to that fundamental principle, and even delegate authority to a non-State actor, is a flagrant infringement" on Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[34] It likewise objected to the new reporting requirement and criticized the resolution for "artificially instrumentalizing the topic of famine."[35]

Failed Third Resolution (November 2024)

Sierra Leone joined the United Kingdom to draft a third resolution in November 2024. This resolution would have condemned RSF atrocities in Darfur and elsewhere, and would have called for a nationwide ceasefire.[36] It would have demanded that both sides implement their Jeddah Declaration commitments; refrain from using civilians as human shields; ensure civilians' "protection against looting, ransacking and ravaging"; refrain from the recruitment and use of children in hostilities; and comply with IHL and human rights law, among other measures.[37] The resolution would have called on both sides to ensure that sexual violence "is not used as a tactic of war,"[38] and it would have tasked the Secretary-General with developing a "compliance mechanism" to facilitate Jeddah Declaration implementation.[39] It would have called for accountability for perpetrators of violations and abuses,[40] and would again have urged UN member states to refrain from external interference.[41]

Instead of merely abstaining as it had in the past, and despite changes made by the penholders to accommodate Russia's requests,[42] Russia vetoed this resolution. U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy gave an impassioned intervention excoriating Russia for its "mean, nasty, and cynical veto" that "sends a message to the warring parties that they can now act with impunity."[43] He branded Russia "the enemy of peace" and declared "shame on Putin for using his mercenaries to spread conflict and violence across the African continent" and "pretending to be a partner of the global South, while condemning black Africans to further killing, further rape and further starvation in a brutal war."[44] As Russia's First Deputy UN Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy stared into his phone with measured indifference, Lammy continued: "I ask the Russian representative in all conscience, sitting there on his phone: How many more Sudanese have to be killed? How many more women have to be raped? How many more children have to

go without food before Russia will act?"[45] U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield expressed similar indignation: "It is unconscionable that Russia would callously and cynically stand in the way of demanding [a ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian aid] to save lives in the world's worst humanitarian crisis."[46]

Polyanskiy delivered a lengthy response, beginning with a sardonic "thank you" to Lammy "for the excellent demonstration of British neo-colonialism and snobbery."[47] He accused the United Kingdom of "trying to deny the Sudan"—by which he meant the SAF-controlled government—the right to control its borders and decide whether to "invit[e] foreign forces."[48] He accused the West of hypocrisy for demanding accountability in Sudan while giving Israel a free pass in Gaza.[49] Polyanskiy made it clear that Russia would "not hesitate to continue using its veto to prevent such calamitous events afflicting our African brothers,"[50] even though Sierra Leone was a co-drafter of the resolution and the other two African members—Algeria and Mozambique—had voted in favor.

Russia's veto of this November 2024 resolution stopped any momentum that Resolutions 2724 and 2736 may have created. As of the time this note went to publication, the Council had not adopted any further resolutions to address the conflict in Sudan, or even a presidential statement, with press statements apparently being the most that Russia will tolerate.[51]

Efforts by Other International Actors

The Security Council's modest and disappointing efforts have been complemented by more robust attempts by other international actors. The AU has been particularly active,[52] with the AU Peace and Security Council adopting several communiqués condemning the fighting and external interference, calling for ceasefires, and urging both sides to comply with IHL and human rights law.[53] The AU Commission expanded an existing multilateral mechanism and tasked it with coordinating regional and international efforts to end the conflict.[54]

The African Commission on Human and People's Rights has similarly adopted resolutions condemning rights violations and urging compliance with IHL and human rights law.[55] It established a joint factfinding mission with the AU to conduct on-site investigations and remote work for purposes of an eventual report.[56] As the mission was unable to enter Sudan due to the security situation, it compiled its July 2025 report from evidence gathered remotely.[57] The report detailed many human rights violations and warned that "the situation faced by the civilian population in the Sudan remain[s] grievous."[58] It recommended, among other things, a cessation of hostilities and a halt to the RSF siege of El Fasher, along with an AU peacekeeping mission to Sudan.[59]

International organizations outside of Africa have also weighed in. For example, the UN Human Rights Council has adopted resolutions on the human rights situation and established its own fact-finding mission that has managed to gather and publicize evidence of widespread violations despite a lack of access to Sudan.[60] The European Union has condemned the conflict and imposed sanctions, including asset freezes and travel bans on those involved in human rights abuses or who threaten peace and security in Sudan.[61]

In addition, more informal groupings of states have coordinated statements and action seeking an end to the conflict. The IGAD Quartet of East African states issued a roadmap in June 2023 aimed at securing face-to-face meetings between the leaders of the SAF and RSF, establishing a humanitarian corridor, and initiating a peace process.[62] The Quad presented its own roadmap in September 2025, pressing for a ceasefire and negotiations to end what it labeled "the world's worst humanitarian crisis."[63] The Sudanese government has thus far largely rebuffed efforts by the IGAD Quartet and the Quad.[64] Yet another grouping known as the ALPS Group—the United States, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, together with the AU and UN—has called on the SAF and RSF to open humanitarian corridors and appears to have made some modest progress.[65]

Finally, some states have taken unilateral action aimed at influencing the parties' behavior. Most notably, the United States determined in late 2023 that the SAF and RSF had each committed war crimes and the RSF had additionally committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.[66] In early 2025, it determined that the RSF and associated militias had also committed genocide by "systematically murder[ing] men and boys—even infants—on an ethnic basis, and deliberately target[ing] women and girls from certain ethnic groups for rape and other forms of brutal sexual violence."[67] That same day, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed asset blocking sanctions on the RSF commander along with several UAE-based companies that profited from arms sales to the RSF.[68] A week later, it

imposed asset blocking sanctions on the SAF commander and an SAF arms supplier.[69] The United Kingdom and Canada have imposed similar unilateral sanctions.[70]

Conclusion

As Sudan's internal armed conflict grinds through a third year, bringing untold ruin and suffering, hopes are dimming that the international community can make a real difference in the current geopolitical environment. Despite the SAF controlling much of Sudan's east and regaining Khartoum in March 2025, as this note went to publication the RSF continued to advance and consolidate power in the west and northwest, raising the specter of a second Sudanese secession. Foreign meddling helped both sides prolong their campaigns despite widespread condemnation.

The RSF continued to besiege El Fasher for sixteen months after Resolution 2736, with trapped residents eating animal feed to keep from starving to death.[71] The siege finally ended in late October 2025, not with the RSF withdrawing as the Security Council had demanded, but with RSF fighters overrunning the city and committing mass atrocities against the civilian population.[72] As this note went to publication, the most the Security Council seemed able to muster was a press statement in which it condemned the atrocities, called for accountability for perpetrators, and repeated its demand for "all parties to the conflict" to abide by their international law obligations and Jeddah Declaration commitments.[73]

Russia's abstention from and ultimate veto of decisive Security Council action is likely attributable to its historical support for the SAF but also reflects broader P-5 dysfunction exacerbated by tensions over Russia's aggression against Ukraine. This dysfunction was on full display with the bitter verbal sparring between the United Kingdom and Russia following the November 2024 veto. With the exception of press statements, the Council remains deadlocked on yet another dire crisis at the heart of its *raison d'être*. While most of the broader international community fails to give this conflict the attention it deserves—whether due to ignorance, indifference, distraction by other crises, or an active stake in allowing the fighting to continue—Sudan's future looks increasingly bleak.

NOTES

1 *Why Sudan's War is the World's Problem*, ECONOMIST (Aug. 31, 2024), at 9. As of the time this note went to publication, a ceasefire in Gaza had recently been implemented. *See A New Beginning*, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2025), at 9.

2 Natasha Booty & Farouk Chothia, *Sudan War: A Simple Guide to What Is Happening*, BBC, Oct. 29, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjel2nn22z9o.

3 Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan (May 11, 2023), https://2021-2025.state.gov/jeddah-declaration-of-commitment-to-protect-the-civilians-of-sudan/.

4 *Misery, Expanded*, ECONOMIST (June 21, 2025), at 46; Booty & Chothia, *supra* note 2.

5 Clémence Chbat, "The Hidden Wounds of Sexual Violence in Sudan's War," DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Apr. 17, 2024), https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/hidden-wounds-sexual-violence-sudans-war.

6 Press Release, U.N. Food & Agric. Org., FAO Calls for Urgent Action to Address Widening Famine in Sudan (Jan. 6, 2025), https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-calls-for-urgent-action-to-address-widening-famine-in-sudan/en?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

7 *See* Jacob Katz Cogan (ed.), *Secretary of State Blinken Concludes that the Rapid Support Forces Have Committed Genocide in Sudan*, 119 AM. J. INT'L L. 338 (2025).

8 *The Other Hunger Crisis*, ECONOMIST (Aug. 7, 2025), at 45; *see also infra* text accompanying notes 24–35.

9 *See infra* text accompanying notes 72–73.

10 *Misery, Expanded*, *supra* note 4, at 46 (discussing UAE, Chad, South Sudan, and Kenya support for RSF and Egypt, Russia, Turkey, and Iran support for SAF).

11 *See, e.g.*, U.N.S.C. Res. 1556, ¶¶ 6–9 (July 30, 2004) (demanding disarmament of Janjaweed militias and imposing arms embargo); U.N.S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2005) (referring Darfur situation to International Criminal Court).

12 *See, e.g.*, U.N.S.C. Res. 1590, ¶ 1 (Mar. 25, 2005) (establishing peacekeeping mission in Sudan); U.N.S.C. Res. 1997, ¶ 1 (July 11, 2011) (withdrawing mission); U.N.S.C. Res. 1990, ¶ 1 (June 27, 2011) (establishing peacekeeping mission in Sudan–South Sudan disputed border region); U.N.S.C. Res. 2760, ¶ 1 (Nov. 14, 2024) (renewing mandate); U.N.S.C. Res. 1996, ¶ 1 (July 8, 2011) (establishing peacekeeping mission in post-independence South Sudan); U.N.S.C. Res. 2799, ¶ 1 (May 8, 2025) (renewing mandate).

13 *See, e.g.*, U.N.S.C. Res. 1591, ¶ 3 (Mar. 29, 2025) (expanding arms embargo in Darfur and establishing monitoring committee); U.N.S.C Res. 2791, ¶ 1 (Sept. 12, 2025) (latest extension of Resolution 1591 sanctions); U.N.S.C. Res. 2206, ¶¶ 6, 9, 12, 16 (Mar. 3, 2015) (imposing targeted sanctions in South Sudan and establishing monitoring committee); U.N.S.C. Res. 2428, ¶¶ 4, 12 (July 13, 2018) (extending Resolution 2206 sanctions and imposing arms embargo on South Sudan); U.N.S.C. Res. 2781, ¶ 1 (May 30, 2025) (latest extension of Resolution 2206 and 2428 sanctions).

14 *See, e.g.*, Security Council Press Statement on Sudan, SC/16144 (Aug. 13, 2025) [hereinafter Aug. 2025 U.N.S.C. Press Statement]; Security Council Press Statement on Sudan, SC/16086 (June 12, 2025); Security Council Press Statement on Sudan, SC/16046 (Apr. 17, 2025); Security Council Press Statement on Sudan, SC/16012 (Mar. 5, 2025).

15 U.N.S.C. Res. 2724, pmbl. ¶ 5, ¶ 1 (Mar. 8, 2024).

16 *Id.* ¶ 2.

17 *Id.* pmbl. ¶ 6. For more on these entities' involvement, see *infra* text accompanying notes 52–62.

18 *Id.* ¶ 3.

19 U.N. SCOR, 9568th Mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.9568 (Mar. 8, 2024).

20 U.N.S.C. Res. 2724, *supra* note 15, pmbl. ¶ 1.

21 U.N. SCOR, 9568th Mtg., *supra* note 19, at 2.

22 *Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution*, SEC. COUNCIL REP. (Mar. 8, 2024), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/03/sudan-vote-on-a-draft-resolution.php.

23 U.N. SCOR, 9568th Mtg., *supra* note 19, at 3.

24 U.N.S.C. Res. 2736, June 13, 2024, ¶ 1.

25 *Id.* ¶ 3.

26 *See Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution*, *supra* note 22.

27 U.N.S.C. Res. 2736, *supra* note 24, ¶ 3.

28 *Id.* pmbl. ¶ 5.

29 *Id.* ¶ 6.

30 *Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution*, *supra* note 22.

31 U.N.S.C. Res. 2736, *supra* note 24, ¶ 9.

32 *Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution*, SEC. COUNCIL REP. (June 13, 2024), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/06/sudan-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-2.php.

33 U.N. SCOR, 9655th Mtg. at 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.9655 (Jun. 13, 2024).

34 *Id.* at 6.

35 *Id.*

36 Sierra Leone and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/2024/826 (Nov. 18, 2024).

37 *Id.* ¶ 2.

38 *Id.* ¶ 4.

39 *Id.* ¶ 5.

40 *Id.* ¶ 13.

41 *Id.* ¶ 14.

42 *See Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution*, SEC. COUNCIL REP. (Nov. 17, 2024), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/103323.php (detailing these negotiations).

43 U.N. SCOR, 9786th Mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.9786 (Nov. 18, 2024).

44 *Id.* at 2.

45 *Id.* Lammy's strident disposition and Polyanskiy's disdainful reaction are evident in the video of the meeting, https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ujdmywhg at 2:30.

46 U.N. SCOR, 9786th Mtg., *supra* note 43, at 8.

47 *Id.* at 5.

48 *Id.* at 6.

49 *Id.* at 7.

50 *Id.* at 5–6.

51 *See supra* note 14 (citing press statements).

52 *See generally* Afr. Union, Timeline of Diplomatic Efforts, at https://amaniafrica-et.org/au-timeline-of-diplomatic-efforts/.

53 *See, e.g.*, Afr. Union, Communiqué of the 1261st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the Consideration of the Situation in Sudan (Feb. 14, 2025), https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1261st-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-held-on-14-february-2025-on-the-consideration-of-the-situation-in-sudan.

54 Afr. Union, Communiqué, ¶ 10 (Apr. 20, 2023), https://peaceau.org/uploads/com-the-ministerial-special-session-on-sudan-20-april-2023.pdf.

55 *See, e.g.*, Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the Republic of Sudan, ACHPR.Res.588 (LXXIX) (June 3, 2024), https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/human-rights-situation-republic-sudan-achprres588lxxix-2024.

56 Resolution ACHPR/Res. 590 (LXXX) 2024 on the Joint Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Sudan, pmbl. ¶ 4, ACHPR/Res.590 (LXXX) (Aug. 2, 2024), https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/achprres590-lxxx-2024-resolution-achprres590-lxxx-2024-joint-fact-finding (noting prior resolutions since beginning of Sudan conflict), pmbl. ¶¶ 9–10 (noting concerns about gross human rights violations); *id.* ¶ 1 (establishing joint factfinding mission with AU Department of Political Affairs, Peace, and Security); Resolution on the Extension of the Mandate of the Joint Fact-Finding Mission (JFM) on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan, pmbl. ¶ 1, ACHPR/Res.635 (LXXXIII) (May 22, 2025), https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/635-achprres635-lxxxiii2025 (extending mandate to November 2025).

57 Afr. Comm'n on Hum. & Peoples' Rts., Report of the Virtual Joint Fact-Finding Mission on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, ¶ 11 (July 16, 2025), https://achpr.au.int/en/documents/2025-10-21/fact-finding-mission-human-rights-situation-sudan.

58 *Id*. ¶ 256.

59 *Id*. at 99, ¶¶ 1, 6.

60 H.R.C. Res. 54/2, Responding to the Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis Caused by the Ongoing Armed Conflict in the Sudan, ¶ 18 (Oct. 11, 2023) (appointing three-member factfinding mission to investigate human rights and IHL violations in Sudan); H.R.C. Res. 57/2, Responding to the Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis Caused by the Ongoing Armed Conflict in the Sudan, ¶ 15 (Oct. 14, 2024) (renewing factfinding mission); Mohamed Othman, Chair of the Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan, "Oral Update by the Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan" (June 17, 2025), https://gchragd.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Fact-Finding-Mission-on-Sudan.pdf.

61 *See, e.g.*, Eur. Council Decision 2023/2135, Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of Activities Undermining the Stability and Political Transition of Sudan (Oct. 9, 2023) (establishing framework for asset freezes and travel bans); Eur.

Council Decision 2025/1481, Amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of Activities Undermining the Stability and Political Transition of Sudan (July 18, 2025) (latest amendments to sanctions regime adding sanctioned entities).

62 Intergovernmental Auth. on Dev., Final Communiqué of the 14th IGAD Ordinary Assembly of Heads of State and Government (June 12, 2023), https://igad.int/final-communique-of-the-14th-ordinary-session-of-the-igad-assembly-of-heads-of-state-and-government-djibouti-republic-of-djibouti-12th-june-2023/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

63 *See, e.g.*, Media Note, U.S. State Dep't, Joint Statement on Restoring Peace and Security in Sudan (Sept. 12, 2025), https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/joint-statement-on-restoring-peace-and-security-in-sudan. The AU Commission and IGAD Quartet have endorsed the Quad's efforts. Press Release, Afr. Union, Afr. Union Com'n (UAC) and Intergovernmental Auth. on Dev. (IGAD) Welcome the QUAD Outcome on Sudan (Sept. 14, 2025), https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20250914/auc-and-igad-welcome-quad-outcome-sudan?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

64 *See, e.g.*, *Sudan's Burhan Rejects Quad Ceasefire Call, Vows to Keep Fighting*, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Sept. 18, 2025), https://sudantribune.com/article305175/; *Sudan Suspends Ties with East African Bloc for Inviting Paramilitary Leader to Summit*, ASSOC. PRESS (Jan. 16, 2024), https://apnews.com/article/sudan-burhan-dagalo-war-africa-e8fd4600ea0dc83e916958a3edfcd4bb.

65 *See* U.S. Mission Geneva, Joint Statement by the ALPS Group Regarding Talks in Switzerland & Progress in Addressing the Crisis in Sudan (Aug. 23, 2024), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2024/08/23/joint-statement-from-the-alps-group-regarding-talks-in-switzerland-and-progress-in-addressing-the-crisis-in-sudan/. *See also, e.g.*, UAE Ministry of Foreign Aff., Joint Statement from the ALPS Group on the Humanitarian Situation in Sudan (Aug. 20, 2025), https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/8/20/20-8-2025-uae-sudan?utm_source=chatgpt.com (calling on warring parties to allow humanitarian access). ALPS stands for Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan.

66 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and Ethnic Cleansing Determination in Sudan (Dec. 6, 2023), https://2021-2025.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-determination-in-sudan.

67 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Genocide Determination in Sudan and Imposing Accountability Measures (Jan. 7, 2025), https://2021-2025.state.gov/genocide-determination-in-sudan-and-imposing-accountability-measures.

68 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Paramilitary Leader, Weapons Supplier, and Related Companies (Jan. 7, 2025), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2772.

69 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Leader of Sudanese Armed Forces and Weapons Supplier (Jan. 16, 2025), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789. For more on these U.S. designations and U.S. efforts to impose accountability and provide humanitarian aid, see generally Cogan, *supra* note 7.

70 *See, e.g.*, Press Release, U.K. Foreign, Commw. & Dev. Off., UK Sanctions Businesses Funding Sudan War (Apr. 15, 2024), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-businesses-funding-sudan-war-15-april-2024; News Release, Global Aff. Can., Minister Joly Announces Sanctions in Response to Ongoing Conflict in Sudan (Apr. 15, 2024), https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/04/minister-joly-announces-sanctions-in-response-to-ongoing-conflict-in-sudan.html.

71 *The Other Hunger Crisis*, *supra* note 8, at 45; *see also* Aug. 2025 U.N.S.C. Press Statement, *supra* note 14 (expressing grave concerns about renewed RSF offensive in El Fasher and urging it to allow unhindered humanitarian access).

72 *See* Press Release, UN Off. High Comm'r Hum. Rts., Sudan: Appalling Reports of Summary Executions and Other Serious Violations, as RSF Makes Major Territorial Gains in El Fasher and North Kordofan (Oct. 27, 2025), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/sudan-appalling-reports-summary-executions-and-other-serious-violations-rsf.

73 Security Council Press Statement on Sudan, SC/16204 (Oct. 30, 2025). *See also Sudan: Briefing and Consultations*, SEC. COUNCIL REP. (Oct. 29, 2025), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/10/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-12.php.

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RES. 2724 (2024) (U.N.S.C.)*
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United Nations S/RES/2724 (2024)

Security Council

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Resolution 2724 (2024)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 9568th meeting, on 8 March 2024

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions, presidential statements and press statements concerning the situation in Sudan, and reiterating its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Sudan,

Expressing grave concern over the spreading violence and the catastrophic and deteriorating humanitarian situation, including crisis levels or worse of acute food insecurity, particularly in Darfur, and further concern at ongoing reports of violations of international humanitarian law, and violations and abuses of human rights law, including cases of sexual violence in conflict,

Noting the need for unhindered cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance into Darfur and encouraging the parties to the conflict to continue to work in close partnership with OCHA and INGOs to ensure life-saving humanitarian assistance reaches those in need,

Welcoming as a positive step, the announcement of the Sudanese authorities' decision to facilitate humanitarian access through the Tina and Renk border crossings, as well as via aerial transport accessing Sudanese airports in Al Fasher, Kadugli and Al Obeid,

Urging continuation and strengthened coordination of regional and international efforts to facilitate an end to the conflict and to restore a lasting inclusive civilian-led democratic transition, and in this regard *welcoming* the appointment of an African Union High-Level Panel for Sudan and the African Union's commitment to working with the people of Sudan to end the fighting and put in place a process towards a lasting and inclusive peace, democracy and justice in Sudan,

Noting the various communiques and resolutions issued since the beginning of the conflict in Sudan by the African Union Peace and Security Council, IGAD Quartet Group of Countries for the Resolution of the Situation in the Republic of Sudan, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which inter alia condemned the ongoing fighting and called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire between the warring parties, and the scaling-up of humanitarian assistance to Sudan and neighbouring states,

1. *Calls* for an immediate cessation of hostilities during the month of Ramadan, and for all parties to the conflict to seek a sustainable resolution to the conflict through dialogue;
2. *Calls on* all parties to ensure the removal of any obstructions and enable full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access, including cross-border and cross-line, and comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, including to protect civilians and civilian objects, and their commitments under the Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan ("Jeddah Declaration");

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3. *Encourages* the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy on Sudan Ramtane Lamamra to use his good offices with the parties and the neighbouring States, complementing and coordinating regional peace efforts;
4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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RES. 2736 (2024) (U.N.S.C.)*
[June 13, 2024]

United Nations S/RES/2736 (2024)

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 June 2024

Resolution 2736 (2024)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 9655th meeting, on 13 June 2024

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions, presidential statements and press statements concerning the situation in Sudan, and reiterating its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Sudan,

Expressing deep concern at the outbreak of fighting in El Fasher with the potential for further escalation and the risk of harm to civilians, most of whom need urgent humanitarian assistance and protection,

Expressing grave concern over the spreading violence, including credible reports of ethnically motivated violence, including inter alia the violence perpetrated by the Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher, and in El Geneina in West Darfur between 24 April and 19 June 2023, *condemning* the use of all force in populated areas against civilians and critical civilian infrastructure, including attacks on medical and humanitarian facilities, *reaffirming* the obligations of all parties to the conflict under international humanitarian law, including with regard to respecting and protecting civilians and taking constant care to spare civilian objects including such objects critical to the delivery of essential services to the civilian population, and with regard to refraining from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, as well as respecting and protecting humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations, and *urging* all parties to the conflict to protect civilian infrastructure, which is critical to the delivery of humanitarian aid, including for the provision of essential services in line with resolution 2573 (2021),

Expressing alarm at the ongoing reports of violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, including cases of sexual and gender-based violence, and *calling* for accountability for such violations,

Expressing concern over the catastrophic and deteriorating humanitarian situation, including crisis-level or worse acute food insecurity, and the imminent risk of famine, particularly in Darfur,

Noting the need for full, rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance into Darfur, and other conflict affected areas, *urging* the Sudanese authorities to allow and facilitate humanitarian access for UN agencies and other humanitarian actors, *urging* the parties to the conflict to ensure humanitarian assistance safely reaches those in need, and *welcoming* in this regard the recent commitment by Sudanese authorities to facilitate access, including visa and travel authorizations,

Condemning the looting of humanitarian stockpiles, *expressing concern* at the increasing mobilization of armed groups or militia, and *calling* on all sides to exercise strict command and control on their forces,

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Recognizing the importance of de-escalatory measures and the role of local dispute resolution and ceasefire efforts in Darfur, in line with Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts, and *encouraging* the parties to the conflict to empower Sudanese elders and community leaders to secure local conflict mitigation and ceasefire arrangements including monitoring, coordination, and liaison mechanisms,

1. *Demands* that the Rapid Support Forces halt the siege of El Fasher; and *calls for* an immediate halt to the fighting and for de-escalation in and around El Fasher, and *further calls for* the withdrawal of all fighters that threaten the safety and security of civilians, with the support of local mediation mechanisms, where appropriate;
2. *Demands* that all parties to the conflict ensure the protection of civilians, including by allowing civilians wishing to move within and out of El Fasher to safer areas to do so, and recalling that all civilians must be protected in accordance with international law, and *requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Sudanese authorities and regional stakeholders, to make further recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, building on the existing mediation and good offices mechanisms;
3. *Calls* for the full implementation of the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, and *requests* that parties to the conflict allow and facilitate the rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, including by removing bureaucratic and other impediments, the rapid provision of the required visas and travel authorizations for humanitarian personnel and essential supplies, *notes* the measures taken by the Sudanese authorities in this regard and *urges* their further cooperation, *reiterates its calls* for all parties to work in close partnership with UN agencies and other humanitarian actors to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches those in need and, with the prior agreement and coordination of the Sudanese authorities, *calls* for them to reopen the Adre border crossing for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and further *calls* for the parties to withdraw fighters as necessary to enable agricultural activities throughout the planting season to avoid compounding the risk of famine;
4. *Underscores* the urgency of addressing the funding shortfall of the Humanitarian Response Plan and the Regional Refugee Response Plan and *encourages* Member States, international donors and partners to ensure that all pledges are honored in full and in a timely manner, and to step up contributions to enable the scaling-up of humanitarian assistance needed to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation;
5. *Demands* that all parties to the conflict comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, as applicable, and international humanitarian law including with regard to the conduct of hostilities and the protection of civilians and civilian objects, recalling that civilian facilities, including hospitals, medical facilities, schools, places of worship, and facilities of the UN, as well as humanitarian personnel, and UN and associated personnel, including national and locally recruited personnel, as well as medical personnel, and their means of transport, must be respected and protected, in accordance with international humanitarian law;
6. *Calls on* all Member States to refrain from external interference which seeks to foment conflict and instability and instead to support efforts for a durable peace, and *reminds* all parties to the conflict and Member States who facilitate the transfers of arms and military material to Darfur of their obligations to comply with the arms embargo measures as stipulated in paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), and *reiterates* that those who violate the arms embargo may be designated for targeted measures in accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005);
7. *Calls on* the parties to the conflict to seek an immediate cessation of hostilities, leading to a sustainable resolution to the conflict, through dialogue, with the continued support of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy on Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and the African Union High-Level Panel on Sudan;
8. *Encourages* the coordinated engagement of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy on Sudan Ramtane Lamamra, with the African Union, the League of Arab States and other key regional actors, to help advance peace and an inclusive and comprehensive Sudanese-led political process, with the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women, that reflects the aspirations of the Sudanese people;
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of all elements of this resolution within his regular updates as stipulated in resolution 2715 (2023);
10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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DRAFT U.N.S.C. RES. (SIERRA LEONE AND UK)*
[November 18, 2024]

United Nations S/2024/826

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 November 2024
Original: English

Sierra Leone and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions, presidential statements and press statements concerning the situation in Sudan, and *reiterating* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Sudan,

Expressing concern and *condemning* reports of human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including those referenced in the Secretary-General's report on recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan (S/2024/759),

Condemning attacks perpetrated against civilians, as well as reports of armed violence and atrocities, ethnically motivated killings, sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, and the destruction and looting of livelihoods and homes by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in and around Al Jazirah State, El Fasher in North Darfur, Khartoum and El Geneina in West Darfur,

Expressing concern at all attacks against civilians and civilian objects and infrastructure, including hospitals and other medical and humanitarian facilities, and *underscoring* the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises and United Nations (UN) premises, and *underlining* that an immediate nationwide cessation of hostilities is the most effective way to protect civilians, as envisaged in the Jeddah talks,

Recalling the importance of the protection of children, as set out in relevant Security Council resolutions, and *expressing* deep concern at the reported increase in verified violations and abuses against children in Sudan, including killing and maiming, recruitment and use, abduction, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and child detention as documented in the Secretary-General's annual report on children and armed conflict (S/2024/384), and *urging* all parties to the conflict to end and prevent all violations and abuses against children,

Expressing concern over the dire humanitarian situation in Sudan, including reports of food insecurity at the most acute levels and the risk of it spreading across further parts of the country, *reaffirming* the obligations of all parties to the conflict to comply with international humanitarian law and, as applicable, human rights law including with regard to the protection of civilians, including respecting and protecting humanitarian personnel and consignments used for humanitarian relief operations, and *urging* all parties to the conflict to protect civilian infrastructure, which is critical to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including for the provision of essential services in line with resolution 2573 (2021), *reiterating* the obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unhindered humanitarian access in accordance with international humanitarian law, *recalling* the UN guiding principles of humanitarian assistance including humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence,

Welcoming collective efforts to date, including by the UN and African Union, as well as key local, regional and international partners, to press the parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian

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and, as applicable, human rights law to protect civilians, and to decisively advance the shared goal of reaching an agreement on a comprehensive, nationwide ceasefire,

Recognising the importance of building the conditions on the ground for a ceasefire and sustainable peace, and the need for immediate action to reduce the impact of the conflict on civilians, *taking note* of the conclusions in the Secretary- General's report and his assessment of the conditions on the ground,

1. *Condemns* the continued assault by the RSF in El Fasher, and *demands* that the RSF immediately halt all its attacks against civilians in Darfur, Al Jazirah State and Sennar State and elsewhere in Sudan, and *calls on* the parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and engage, in good faith, in dialogue to agree steps to de-escalate the conflict with the aim of urgently agreeing a national ceasefire;
2. *Demands* that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF honour and fully implement their commitments made in the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, including, inter alia, to take all feasible precautions to avoid and minimise civilian harm, with an aim to vacate urban centers, including civilian houses, to refrain from using civilians as human shields, to safeguard the needs and necessities indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and to ensure their protection against looting, ransacking and ravaging, to ensure checkpoints are not used to infringe the freedom of movement of civilians and humanitarian actors, to refrain from the recruitment and the use of children in hostilities, to refrain from the attacking, destroying, misappropriating or looting of relief supplies, installations, material, units and vehicles, and *demands* that the parties to the conflict urgently comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and, as applicable, human rights law;
3. *Calls on* the parties to the conflict to ensure that civilian objects, including hospitals and other medical facilities, schools, places of worship and humanitarian facilities, as well as humanitarian and medical personnel, including UN and associated personnel, and their means of transport, are protected from attack, consistent with international humanitarian law, and *further calls on* the parties to the conflict to refrain from attacks targeted at the facilities of the UN and associated UN personnel, including both national and locally recruited personnel;
4. *Calls on* the parties to take urgent steps to halt and prevent conflict-related sexual violence and to ensure that this is not used as a tactic of war and to improve protection and access to services for survivors;
5. *Requests* that the Secretary-General, informed by consultations with the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council and other parties to the conflict, as appropriate, as well as the African Union, develops a proposal for a compliance mechanism to facilitate the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments, *calls on* the parties to the conflict to engage fully in this effort, and *requests* that, the Secretary-General provide a written update ahead of the next Sudan briefing pursuant to resolution 2715 (2023) on practical steps to support mediation efforts, including local-level cessation of hostilities and de-escalation measures, the implementation of Jeddah Declaration commitments and the development of the compliance mechanism referred to in this paragraph;
6. *Calls on* the parties to the conflict to engage in dialogue, in good faith, to agree humanitarian pauses and arrangements, on a sustained basis, to ensure the safe passage of civilians and the delivery of adequate humanitarian aid, and the repair and restoration of civilian infrastructure and essential services, and *urges* them to restore telecommunications infrastructure and services to ensure that civilians can access emergency and essential services;
7. *Welcomes* continued mediation efforts by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for the Sudan, Mr Ramtane Lamamra, to help advance peace and an inclusive and comprehensive Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned political process, that reflects the aspirations of the Sudanese people, and *encourages* the Personal Envoy to sustain engagements with the parties to the conflict to contribute to achieving the protection of civilians, and *further encourages* him to continue his coordination with the African Union and other key stakeholders to ensure complementarity between the international efforts on Sudan;
8. *Calls on* all stakeholders to support and promote the full, equal, meaningful, and safe participation of women in all levels and stages of political dialogue and decision making, and engage with diverse Sudanese women's organizations and networks;
9. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to step up planning for support to sustain any ceasefire agreement once agreed, including through monitoring and verification of any agreement, and *encourages* his further engagement with the African Union and the parties to the conflict in this regard;
10. *Calls on* the parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate the full, rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained crossline and cross-border humanitarian access into and throughout Sudan in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law,

including through promoting the safety, security and freedom of movement of all humanitarian personnel and commodities without bureaucratic and other impediments;

11. *Welcomes* the agreement by all relevant parties to allow humanitarian air operations in South Kordofan and the decision of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council to open additional entry points and to maintain the opening of the Adre border crossing, and with the prior agreement and coordination of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council, *calls* on them to maintain the opening, and *stresses* the need to sustain humanitarian access through border crossings, while humanitarian needs persist, *reiterates* its calls for all parties to the conflict to work in close partnership with UN agencies and other humanitarian actors, including local organisations, to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches those in need, and *urges* the withdrawal of fighters to enable agricultural activities throughout the planting season to avoid the worsening of already acute food insecurity;
12. *Encourages* the international community to urgently provide the necessary support for the scaling-up of humanitarian assistance needed to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Sudan and for people displaced from Sudan across the region, *encourages* Member States to consider providing greater funding and support for local and community-based initiatives and mutual aid groups, and *calls on* all parties to the conflict to ensure their protection;
13. *Urges* concrete steps to ensure that perpetrators of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, are held accountable, including through adequate, transparent, independent and credible accountability mechanisms, including domestic mechanisms, and that all investigations into violations and abuses are conducted in an independent, transparent and impartial manner;
14. *Calls on* all Member States to refrain from external interference which foments conflict and instability and instead to support mediation efforts for a durable peace, *reminds* all parties to the conflict and Member States who facilitate the transfers of arms and military material to Darfur of their obligations to comply with the arms embargo measures as stipulated in paragraphs 7 and 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) and *reiterates* that those who violate the arms embargo may be designated for targeted measures in accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005);
15. *Encourages* international cooperation, as appropriate, to help prevent violations of the arms embargo as stipulated in paragraphs 7 and 8 of UN Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004);
16. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.