JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J.

American Catholicism, Catholic Charities U.S.A., and Welfare Reform

In this article I want to give at least a thumbnail sense of the background assumptions, policy contours, and vehicles for American Catholicism in engaging in public policy discussions. To do so, I will eventually concentrate on one major recent public policy discussion in the United States: the debates on welfare reform that led up to, and continue vigorously even after, the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. I do so because American Catholic institutions, including the United States Catholic Conference and Catholic Charities U.S.A., played a crucial and continuous role in these debates about welfare reform.[1] Indeed, New York's Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, a vigorous opponent of the proposed welfare reform bill, in excoriating his fellow liberals for signing on to the bill, could lift up the example of the Catholic bishops' lobbying and exclaim: "The bishops admittedly have an easier time with matters of this sort. When principles are at stake, they simply look them up. Too many liberals, alas, make them up!"[2] This particular debate (which is not, by any means, over) also helps to show some of the unique assumptions behind proposals found in Catholic interventions in the policy sector. In what follows, I will develop, briefly, four sections or subthemes to the paper:

1. Catholic Social Thought: Five Background Assumptions for Policy: Human Dignity; The Common Good; Solidarity; Subsidiarity; Justice
2. The Move from Background Assumptions to Policy
3. Catholic Policy Proposals: Their Style and Instrumentalities
4. Catholicism and Welfare Policy

JOURNAL OF POLICY HISTORY, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2001.
Copyright © 2001 The Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D. C.

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

To be sure, Catholics have significantly engaged in any number of diverse policy discussions for many years. The scope covers issues of foreign policy (ranging from concern in the 1930s about the Spanish Civil War to later support for a policy of anticommunism; to disputes with the Reagan and Bush administrations about El Salvador and Nicaragua); interpretations of the First Amendment; abortion, euthanasia, and policies concerning sexual orientation and marriage; immigration policy; health-care issues; vouchers or government funding for programs in parochial schools; American nuclear policy; and family policy issues.[3] But perhaps nowhere else can one better see certain Catholic strengths and weaknesses in the policy arena than by taking a fresh look at the Catholic role in the welfare-reform debate. Moreover, at least since the latter part of the nineteenth century, American Catholics have been rather continuously involved in the salient shifts in American welfare policy.[4] No other policy issue has such a long history of Catholic engagement.

Catholic forays into public policy remain a puzzle to many, both inside and outside the church. On some issues (e.g., abortion), Catholics seem closely aligned with segments from the conservative evangelical community. On others (e.g., opposition to capital punishment), they are more likely to build coalitions with the American Civic Liberties Union. On still others, they are in close contact with welfare professionals. The so-called Catholic "Consistent Ethic of Life" does not fit neatly into any of the more secular or religious ideological divisions.[5] On nuclear and military policy, Catholic policy stands with the doves. With abortion, it stands with the pro-life lobby. On welfare, it takes its position on the left side of the spectrum.

Moreover, different units and levels of the national Catholic Church (the Bishops' Conference; the thirty state conferences that serve a statewide group of bishops; diocesan bishops and their peace and justice or public policy committees; separately incorporated groups such as Catholic Charities U.S.A.; Network, a lobbying group concerned with poverty founded by Roman Catholic sisters; the National Catholic Educational Association or the Catholic Health Association) engage in public policy discussions and proposals and lobbying. They do not all always sing from the same songbook.

Peter and Josephina Figueira-McDonough, focusing their research mainly on Catholic family policy, comment on some anomalies in Catholic public policy behavior:

> Catholic family policy is an amalgam of morally conservative and socially progressive tenets, with an eclectic middle-ground driven by trial and error, professional norms and improvisation. . . . Catholic

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

family policy is part dogma, part pragmatism, part social critique, and part ethos. The family has been the nexus binding together Catholic social and political thought as it ranges over a variety of topics. The family has been to Catholic social order what class has been to social conflicts in Marxism, and what the individual has been to the capitalist market, and the voluntary association to democratic theory.[6]

I. Catholic Social Thought: Five Background Assumptions for Policy: Human Dignity; The Common Good; Solidarity; Subsidiarity; Justice

Catholic Social Thought constitutes the essential intellectual armory to which the Catholic Church and its major institutions (networks of schools, hospitals, and welfare agencies) have recourse when thinking about and generating public policy proposals.[7] To be sure, like any other institution, Catholic institutions also draw upon a more naked self-interest. Thus, some American Catholic policy proposals may stem primarily from institutional self-interests (e.g., vouchers for parochial schools; religious exemptions from taxation or from federal labor union regulations; the charitable-choice option). No one should do a purely altruistic reading of institutional churches' engagement in policy formation. Like any organization, much of their behavior is interest-driven. But only a cynical reading of the practice of Catholicism in the arena of policy would reduce its policy proposals to *mere* or *only* institutional interests. A long tradition exists in Catholicism of periodically promulgating papal and Episcopal documents whose purpose is to "provide moral wisdom to assist in the formation of conscience" and political and civil behavior in the light of new economic, cultural, or technological developments.[8] This tradition of Catholic social thought addresses political, cultural, economic, religious, and family issues. It exhibits a unique set of presuppositions and assumptions about the human person and the social order.

Human Dignity and the Common Good

The concept of human dignity and the core notion of "a common good" represent two of the key components in this intellectual tradition. Human dignity is grounded in both biblical warrants that see the person as the *imago dei* and in rational natural-law assumptions about the person as a rational and voluntary moral agent, endowed with inalienability and rights. To speak of the human dignity of the person is to appeal to his or her

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

"sacred" worth or value as a concrete existing human being. Dignity asserts that human beings have a value or a worth qualitatively different from that of anything else in the world; that this dignity is inalienable and that it is never permissible to use a human being merely as a means toward some ulterior aim or purpose. Human dignity evokes corollary concepts of human responsibility, moral agency, and freedom. To root its meaning concretely, Catholic social thought anchors it in appeals both to the concepts of *human rights* and *human needs*.[9]

In his 1963 encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*, John XXIII, basing his argument on both the philosophy of natural law and biblical theology, defined the scope and range of human rights in a most extensive way. He was clearly veering his text closely toward the human-rights demands that have been formulated in the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights (in the development of which declaration European Catholics, including the pontiff, contributed). Thus, the Catholic theory of human rights—much like the UN Declaration—contains both a liberal or personalist and a social dimension. In Catholic social thought, following the pope in this, there is no unbridgeable chasm between personal, civil, and social rights or subsistence rights.

Among the individual human-rights demands, John XXIII lays emphasis on the right to life and to freedom from bodily harm as well as on the right to those commodities necessary for an appropriate standard of living (food, clothing, a home, education, health care, unemployment aid, help in old age), consonant with human dignity. Rights flow from needs as much as from human moral agency and freedom. *Pacem in Terris* also stresses the right to freedom of religion and conscience; to freedom of opinion and information; freedom of migration; the freedom to choose one's profession or life-partner in marriage, and the right to an impartial legal guarantee and juridical protection for these rights. In referring to political participation, the pope stresses freedom of assembly and freedom of association. The pope sees the right to private property as derived from the nature of humankind—although he urges consideration be given to the social obligations of holding any property.[10]

Many disputes in public policy stem from debates about the legitimacy of any extension of the rights to freedom seen as rights of defense against state intervention in certain areas of private life (*negative* freedoms) to further claims to social rights to a minimum provision of commodities (a decent floor of subsistence) that permit any genuine participation in the life of society and, thus, *effective* freedom (*positive* rights). Catholic social thought embraces both and adds a third right to participatory access to political and cultural life, that is, rights to take genuine part in the process

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of work and the formation of political opinion. With others, Catholicism argues that the guarantee of elementary social rights (based on need) anchor, as the indispensable condition, any individual possibility to develop true moral agency and freedom.[11]

The question of how social claims to certain rights can be adequately met, given the differing economic capability of countries, is of course much more complex than simply guaranteeing negative rights to freedom. But this by no means detracts, in the Catholic view, from the fundamental human rights' character of such claims. Rather, it demonstrates the need to change those economic conditions, if possible and need be, toward more just divisions of wealth and to change the conditions governing opportunity, access, and competition operating in the world market. Finally, the Catholic demand for a democratic constitutional order with basic rights, guaranteed independent of political party interests, is based on the claimed right of the individual (as a rational being and essentially called to be a moral agent) to be heard in matters that affect him or her and, thus, to participate, in some real sense, in the political decision-making and -taking process.

The Catholic notion of a common good reflects its belief about the essentially communitarian character of human existence. Persons flourish only in community and the good of each person is bound up with the good of community. "The common good is a social reality in which all persons should share through their participation in it. It is not simply the arithmetic aggregate of individual goods suggested by the utilitarian formula "the greatest good for the greatest number."[12] Recent Catholic formulations anchor the common good in structural terms: "the sum total of conditions of social living whereby persons are enabled more fully and readily to achieve their own perfection."[13] In *Pacem in Terris* the common good is linked closely to the discussion there of human rights. Human rights, *Pacem in Terris* claims, specify *the minimum* standard for any society that is "well ordered and productive" and in which the dignity of each person is realized.[14] Promoting the common good, in this view, entails the duty to protect the human rights of all.

Commitment to the common good rejects individualistic presuppositions in some forms of modern liberal thought with their one-sided emphasis on human autonomy. It skews Catholic policy thinking in directions that diverge from a consensus among many political liberals who follow John Stuart Mill when he asserts that "the only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it."[15] Catholic social thought assumes, against Isaiah Ber-

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

lin and John Rawls, that we *can* meaningfully deliberate together about the essentially public goods we must share in common and about the substantive goods we *will* pursue in common. The common good is not imposed or read off a preexisting blueprint.[16] Unlike Rawls and Berlin (but in consort with some liberal thinkers, such as William Galston), Catholicism desires a thicker and more substantive (not merely procedural) notion of the human and social good.[17] The common good, with its concomitant notion of a deliberative democracy, impels Catholics in society to cooperate with all men and women of goodwill. Catholic social documents, in the past forty or so years, typically address themselves not only to believers but to all fellow citizens engaged in deliberative democracy. They also, typically, mix genres by including references to biblical warrants and expressions couched in nonrevelatory human, rational argument.

Catholics argue that "the common good," as sociologist Philip Selznick has insisted, "is the state of the system, not an attribute of individuals."[18] The common good is an *institutional* reality. It looks to creating the societal conditions to enhance and justly distribute common or public goods. The common good is the institutional face and indispensable font of a society's commitment to distributive and social justice. Even the good of individuals and small groups depends on the societal flourishing of the common good. While the common good is not the mere additive sum of individual properties, it looks, nonetheless, to the dignity and well-being of individuals. The common good is *personalistic* inasmuch as it redounds back on persons. Selznick captures this same sense when he asks us to think of the common good as profoundly *systemic,* "not reducible to individual attributes or interests, yet *testable* by its contribution to personal well being":

> The common good is served . . . by institutions that provide collective goods, such as education or public safety. The strength or weakness of these institutions is a communal attribute, not an individual one. Furthermore, it is not necessarily in every individual's interest to support such institutions. They may be better off, as individuals, if they can avoid paying taxes for schools or other services they do not use but which are important to society as a whole.
> Similarly, a major collective good is social integration. When social integration is measured, the measure will take into account, at least indirectly, individual attitudes, behaviors, opportunities and affiliations. And a connection is likely between personal and social integration. People can live more coherent lives and have more coherent personalities when they belong to coherent social worlds.[19]

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

As Jacques Maritain argued, the common good is an analogical notion. It is also *pluralist* in intent. In Maritain's view, humans are always persons in relation. The *full* common good, in the Catholic theological vision, exists supremely in the communion of all persons with God and with each other in God. Catholic social thought rejects, then, any theory that makes the good of a state or nation the highest good or that grants *absolute* sovereignty to the state.[20] This analogical notion of the common good is antitotalitarian without being antistatist. Human beings are destined to a good that is beyond both civil society and the state. Both civil society and the state have an obligation to respect the person and his or her transcendence. But since the freedom and dignity of persons are achieved in communal relationship with other persons, not in isolation, respect for their freedom and dignity demands support for *the many* forms of relationship in which personhood is realized: friendships, families, voluntary associations, civil society, politics, the state. Each has a role to play.

The state, to be sure, has a proper and indispensable role in both defining and enacting the common good. It does not, however, have any monopoly on either definition or enactment. David Hollenbach speaks to this limited yet absolutely indispensable and active role of the state in the furtherance of the common good:

> Government has a limited but nonetheless indispensable role in the pursuit of the common good. Subsidiarity does not mean that a government that governs least governs best. It calls for as much government intervention as necessary to enable the other parts of civil society to contribute to the common good. Government, therefore, does not have the responsibility for promoting the full common good of the people, for doing so would lead to massive intervention in spheres such as family life, the arts, education and religion. Each of these sectors of civil society has its own proper contribution to make to the common good, and government must respect and encourage these contributions. But government is responsible for the achievement of that part of the common good that enables society to function as a community of fellow citizens.[21]

Solidarity, Justice, Subsidiarity

Hollenbach has already evoked for us the concept of subsidiarity. It and two other concepts round out the salient background assumptions and essential social lexicon that Catholics tend to bring to social debates about policy: solidarity, justice, and subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is relatively easy to

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

define. It flows from the analogical character of the differing relationships that make for human flourishing for the person-in-relationship. The principle of subsidiarity states that the more extensive or larger forms of community such as political society should not replace or absorb those that are smaller but rather should provide help (*subsidium*) to them when they are unable or unwilling to make their own proper contribution to the common good. The government, in these cases, directs, coordinates, restrains, and partially regulates the activities of these other voluntary associations or smaller units "as occasion requires and necessity demands" to make sure that they do contribute to the common good rather than undermine it.[22] Interestingly, this quintessentially Catholic concept of subsidiarity has begun to shed its sectarian provenance as it becomes a "secular" slogan for policies of devolution in the European Union and gets increasingly adopted by American evangelical groups in politics that champion, somewhat onesidedly, its decentralization emphasis (while neglecting the crucial role the principle gives in Catholic thought to the state).

The triad of subsidiarity, solidarity, and justice are given comparable prominence in the tradition. They are repeatedly evoked and stand at the center of almost all of the standard expositions of Catholic Social Thought. Even when the main emphases are on the primary concepts of "person" and "the common good," ideas related to justice, subsidiarity, and solidarity almost always find their way back into the heart of the conversation. It can be argued that solidarity is a key concept that redefines Catholic notions of rights and justice in ways that differ from seemingly cognate notions found elsewhere. Solidarity (a concept much cited in the social documents of Pope John Paul II) is both a moral and a theological virtue. Morally, solidarity is a habitual disposition of mind and heart by which the interdependence of human beings is recognized as both an empirical fact and as a moral demand. Solidarity places on us duties to build up the bonds of relationship and mutuality. The good of persons is attained when they are able to participate in the rich diversity of communal relationships, ranging from those as small as the family to those as large as the nation-state and global interaction. Solidarity, John Paul II says in one place, "is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good."[23]

The dominant secular liberal ideologies consign solidarity to an exile or to some Cinderella status. In Catholic social thought it plays a crucial theological, moral, and affective role. Theologically, solidarity, while distinct from and less exalted than "love," nevertheless opens us in the direction of love. Solidarity includes the many pale approximations to "love"

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

(*agape*—God's love of solidarity with the created universe—and *caritas*—the love by which we love God in return and love his creation as he does), which are seen as *vestigiae trinitatis* (Saint Augustine's evocation of vestiges of the Trinity). These can be found in relationships of community, sociability, civility and civic friendship, social consciousness, and public spirit. Family, locality, workplace, random encounter—all serve as testing grounds of solidarity. So, too, do civic life, politics, and international and global encounters. Jonathon Boswell reflects on the way solidarity colors almost every other Catholic social concept:

> It is important to realise that complex solidarity in Catholic social thought goes further than a first order descriptive acceptance of humanity as "socially constituted" (as stated almost tritely by some communitarian thinkers). Rather, it is a para-norm for personal life and society. It plainly goes much wider than the "given," "tight," often parochial or conservative groupings of blood, place, memory, religion. As for reading solidarity as simple homogeneity or identity, there lies perhaps the greatest travesty, for its essence is to be unity in diversity, difference not flattened but bridged or mutualized. . . . At almost every turn solidarity in social Catholic terms imparts to these other values a distinctive character, to the extent that it is not too much to say that without it an understanding of the values of justice, human rights, freedom, subsidiarity etc. in Catholic thought is impossible. Torn away from solidarity, a plausible similarity, perhaps even a superficial equivalence, may exist with understandings of the same terms in other traditions; impelled and contoured by it, however, they take a quite different turn.
>
> Take the Catholic social interpretations of "freedom," "power-sharing," "subsidiarity" and related ideas. They are emphatically not individualistic. The freedoms to which every person is entitled are to guarantee human dignity, to protect against slavery, above all to make room for growth through responsibilities and relationships. Indefinite "rights-ism" is off bounds. Degrees of freedom are to attach also to associations of the varied forms of sociality, needed for people's development. It was not for nothing that Christian movements worked hard to get this incorporated into some post-war European constitutions. Power is to be diffused, spreading out both vertically (from citizen, through locality or region, to nation state, and supranationally) and horizontally (in terms of a plurality of political, cultural and economic forms). The term "subsidiarity" seeks to capture this idea of power-sharing.[24]

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Michael Schuck, similarly, raises up solidarity to stress that even quite divergent views within Catholic social thought (progressive, liberal, neoconservative, and radical) tend to endorse a communitarian perspective:

> In their own ways, each has accented the socially embedded character of human existence, each has insisted that humans are defined by the totality of their relations with other selves. Thus, Catholic conservatives, liberals and radicals have again been joined: none of them has reduced the human person to an unencumbered chooser of autonomous ends. If this communitarian impulse is correct, it explains why Catholic social thinkers, as a whole, have retained a distinct understanding of freedom, equality, rights and justice in the modern world.[25]

The dominant American view attaches a premium to individual liberty while maintaining deep misgivings about any social welfare initiatives.[26] Catholic teaching stresses the reverse combination, giving greater weight to communal bonds. In practice, communitarianism has often been bound up with repressive regimes and can impose conformity on members of the community.[27] From this perspective, institutional Catholicism is often suspect in American policy discussions. But as the McDonoughs point out, at the grassroots level, Catholic communitarianism is less an ideological position than a concern for reinforcing the fabric of social relations and a commitment to ingenuity in problem-solving and community participation: "Catholic communitarianism is not a philosophical system but a tacit mutuality articulated through a combination of tangible, affective commitments and practical, organized services."[28]

II. The Move from Background Assumptions to Policy

There are both prerequisites and obstacles toward turning these five background assumptions into accessible principles for social policy. Policy generation has not, in the past, been the main strong suit of Catholic social thought. "Catholic social thought mainly suffers . . . in contingent thinking about policy."[29] David Hollenbach echoes this point. "The strategic moral priorities of the Catholic rights theory are less developed than are its ultimate foundations."[30] Moreover, its relation to policy has been, historically, primarily reactive. This is perhaps best described in the terms chosen by the McDonoughs: "The Catholic church as an interest group

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

appears to have had almost no impact on the formulation of Great Society programs. But it has played an enormous role in the management and evaluation of such programs."[31]

Obstacles to the Move Toward Policy

The principal obstacles to the move toward policy are the following: (1) the intellectual complexity of the tradition makes easy integration or accessible simplification of its many elements difficult to achieve; (2) Catholic social thought largely emanates from or gains legitimacy under the sponsorship of the hierarchy. The bishops are, naturally, loathe to move from more universal and perennial principles (the high moral ground) toward contingent and prudential discernments about "the better and concretely feasible" directions and reforms that drive most of secular social policy. Moreover, bishops are chary about bringing the kinds of political controversies, ingredient in struggles over competing policy proposals, into the heart of the church.

Let us look for a moment at each of these two obstacles.

(1) *The Complexity of the Intellectual Tradition:* The five background assumptions and other closely cognate notions such as "the preferential option for the poor" and "work as a vocation and participatory way of entering culture and society" remain somewhat abstract, general, quasi-metaphysical, airy.[32] "The preferential option for the poor" is, arguably, a subset of solidarity and a conclusion flowing from a lexical ordering of human rights that privileges subsistence rights as having a priority as the very preconditions for an effective exercise of moral agency and freedom. But the preferential option also rests on distinctively biblical visions of God's care for the poor and the Christian criteria for undergoing the last judgment as found in Matthew 25. In the end, when it is invoked in Catholic policy documents such as the U.S. bishops' letter on the economy, it is given a secular-sounding rhetorical ring, such as the formulation Governor Mario Cuomo used to employ: "The litmus test for the health of any society is the way it treats its poor."

Each of these core and cognate notions are, however, sometimes dense, thick, and diffusely multivalent. Frequently they are grounded in both theological and secular warrants (which complicates their easy understanding). As a consequence, they lend themselves readily to very divergent interpretations. Subsidiarity, for example, looks in two directions. One emphasis stresses the conservative protection of existing intermediate associations and urges the restriction of governmental intrusion on their life. Another emphasizes the essential and indispensable role of government to help

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

coordinate, regulate, stimulate, and, if need be, subsidize these associations. The policy implications of each emphasis diverge widely. In part, the second emphasis links subsidiarity to a wider solidarity (called socialization in the social thought of John XXIII) and to the Catholic basic need strategy in its theory of rights. Thus, the American bishops, in their appeals to subsidiarity, come to quite different conclusions about policies for the economy or nuclear weapons than do Michael Novak and his lay Catholic associates, who wrote their own alternate letters of both topics.[33]

A second example flows from the Catholic theory of private property. On the one hand, property ownership is seen as a fundamental human right. On the other, this right is hedged by a social mortgage on property based on the original commonality of all earthly goods in creation. Depending on which face is emphasized, the Catholic doctrine of property has more conservative and more progressive applications. In fact, Catholic social thought has spawned in the past (and probably continues to generate) more reactionary, neo-conservative, moderate reformist, liberal and radical variants.[34]

(2) *The Allergy of the Hierarchy Against Bringing Secular Conflicts into the Heart of the Church:* Three things are crucial for overcoming the penchant of bishops to remain at the level of appealing generalities and general principles of the moral high road. First is a renewed emphasis on the prophetic mission of the church. This theme has grown in salience since Vatican II, leading to what some may find as an oxymoron—language among the American bishops about the essentially prophetic role of the episcopacy!

Second, Catholic institutional networks of educators, social workers, service providers, and health-care professionals frequently push the bishops to address policy options that have an impact on their clientele and their own social work. Here one can never underestimate the role of the networks of schools, hospitals, and Catholic Charities agencies for impelling the Catholic move toward policy. In these networks church workers know firsthand the impact on their work because of policy decisions of the government.

Finally, the bishops can find ways to distinguish between the levels of moral authority ingredient in firmly grounded theological and relatively perennial moral principles, on the one hand, and that authority which accrues to prudential and specific applications of Catholic moral principles to concrete cases and policy, on the other. The American bishops followed this road in their episcopal letters on nuclear weapons policy and their letter on the American economy:

> We believe that the recommendations [e.g., for a full employment

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

> policy; for welfare policy; for measures to halt the loss of family farms, etc.] are reasonable and balanced. In analyzing the economy, we reject ideological extremes and start from the fact that ours is a "mixed economy," the product of a long reform and adjustment. We know that some of our specific recommendations are controversial. As bishops, *we do not claim to make these prudential judgments with the same kind of authority that marks our declarations of principle.* But we feel obliged to teach by example how Christians can undertake concrete analysis and make specific judgments on economic issues. *The church's teaching cannot be left at the level of appealing generalities.*[35]

The bishops hedge any morally binding claims when they move toward policy. In so doing, they try to diffuse extreme controversy as a result of their turn toward policy. They claim for it only contingent and prudential warrants. Elsewhere in the letter on the American economy, the bishops eschew utopian visions and come closer to an American ethos of policy discussion. "It is in the spirit of the American pragmatic tradition of reform that we seek to continue the search for a more just economy."[36]

Two Prerequisites for Turning Catholic Social Teaching into Policy

Two prerequisites also seem necessary to turn the background assumptions into policy: (1) A church that argues—in modern terms—for its right and competence to speak to policy issues and sees itself as compelled, even by theological considerations, to care about the quality of the structures of society. The Catholic set of institutional arenas, willy-nilly, force the church to deal with issues of social policy and enable experience and even expertise in the issues of policy. Catholics are very strong in arguing for the need to appeal to mediating principles to translate the biblical vision to a more secular notion of a common good. They can derive these mediating principles, among other sources, from lived experience in church institutions that deal with education, health care, social welfare, housing, etc. (2) A rationale for the turn to policy which suggests that the tradition can both enrich and be enriched by this turn. Let us look at each of these in turn.

(1) A Theological Rationale for the Right and Competence of the Church to Address Social Policy

Recent Catholic thought has been quite explicit about seeing itself as a legitimate actor in the public arena. Indeed, as Bryan Hehir has argued, since the nineteenth century the church has claimed the right and competence to annunciate its vision for the social order in public debate and discussions in pluralistic societies.[37] At Vatican II, two documents espe-

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

cially address this issue. The Pastoral Constitution, *The Church in the Modern World* (*Gaudium et Spes*), forthrightly declared that the most eloquent proof of the church's solidarity as a fellow journeyer through history with the entire human family consists in its engaging the world in conversation about the "anxious" questions about current trends in the world.[38] *The Declaration on Religious Freedom* (*Dignitatis Humanae*) makes it a very element of religious liberty that churches can engage (not as proselytizers or as those who can command assent or obedience but as conversation partners in civil society) in public explanations of their social teaching and its implications for policy:

> In addition, it comes within the meaning of religious freedom that religious bodies should not be prohibited from freely undertaking to show the special value of their doctrine in what concerns the organization of society and the inspiration of the whole of human activity. Finally, the social nature of man and the very nature of religion afford the right of men freely to hold meetings and to establish educational, cultural, charitable and social organizations, under the impulse of their religious sense.[39]

For the Catholic self-understanding, the issues involved in policy discussions contain, irretrievably, a moral, often at times religious dimension. Justice movements, discussions, and legislation to further justice are not seen as purely secular. They are linked to the church's prophetic mission to announce and enable the kingdom of God. As the Synod of Bishops of 1971 famously put it: "Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us *as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the gospel* or, in other words, of the church's mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation."[40] This position contains a strong animus against any attempts to segregate the church from participation in the formulation of the moral aspects of political and social questions and to be relegated to the sacristy.

It is important to remember here the evolution of Catholicism toward a public role of the church during the late nineteenth and into the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, besieged in Europe by liberal yet anticlerical governments, the church stood its ground against the liberal civil liberties and did not in any sense privilege democracy as a form of government. Until the eve of World War II, Catholic social thought still espoused a version of what it then called "a third" way between socialism and capitalism that envisioned a "corporatist" order. Often this earlier variant of social Catholicism was seen to have some affinities with fas-

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

cism. Since World War II, however, the church shifted ground dramatically. Itself a major actor in debates about human rights in the United Nations in the aftermath of the war, the Catholic position came to favor forms of social democracy, premised no longer on any especial confessional claims, but on a more "universalistic" appeal, beyond confessional warrants, to modern democratic theory. It appeals to a notion of "civil society" and links its public claims less to direct power moves and more to a cooperative stance within civil society for a public good.[41]

In a similar way, in the American setting, the church underwent massive changes in its view of its role in society (and its view of the world as an arena for churchly action) during the twentieth century. The immigrants who built up American Catholicism came to a setting where anti-Catholicism was coin of the realm. Catholics reacted in two disparate ways. One strand sought to build a separated enclave of Catholic institutions that would act as a buffer, a kind of ghetto, against the values of a more liberal, pluralist (but prejudiced against Catholics, for all its vaunted liberalism!) society. Another strand (most represented by the so-called Americanists at the turn of the century who sought to accommodate Catholicism to the best values of American democracy) sought to enter fully into public debates about American society and take their place, not with any appeal to sectarian special status or confessionally based arguments, relying on papal authority or biblical text, but by an appeal to "the common good." To be sure, Catholic Americanists attempted to show the affinities between their more "secular" (or perhaps better, universalistic) positions and Catholic theology. They could appeal to a kind of "worldly" autonomy in God's designs, to doctrines of a dyadic relation between church and state, where the state included its own rightful authority. Often accused of not being "truly American," these more modernist American Catholics often struggled to prove they were more American than any WASP. They could not do so by an appeal to the Protestant evangelical language, alien to their own typical language. Instead, they linked up to a more universal heritage of human rights, the dignity of the person. The very anti-Catholic biases, so strong in America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, forced the church to make its appeals to public policy in a public rather than a sectarian language. Otherwise, it would not gain a hearing.[42]

There is a sense in which the Catholic position on public policy now becomes more paradigmatic for other religious groups, Protestant and Jewish. Religious voices have legitimacy in policy debates, but only if they can make their case, at least in the public arena, in language that is not sectarian, which does not depend for its authority *solely* on the bible or papal pronouncements. Modern Catholicism sees itself very much as José

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Casanova describes it, as a public religion in the modern world.[43] It is *public* inasmuch as it claims its rightful voice and place in debates in civil society. It resists moves to force the sheer privatization of the religious voice or denude it of its citizen-like rights to speak. It is *modern* inasmuch as, with *The Declaration of Religious Freedom,* it fully supports separation of church and state and desanctifies the state as such. The proper religious role of the state vis-à-vis religion, according to *The Declaration,* is not to promote any substantive religion or set of religious ideas (which would hamper human freedom and conscience and which lie beyond the competency of the state to adjudicate) but to promote the kind of religious liberty found in the First Amendment. The freedom asserted in *The Declaration* as a limit on state power is more than just the freedom of the church or individual religious conscience. The document joins its case for religious freedom to the rightful freedom of mediating corporate groups in civil society. There is a juridical as well as moral and theological premise behind *The Declaration:* "The demand is also made that constitutional limits be set to the powers of government in order that there be no encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of association."[44]

The church pitches its tent and bets its fortunes on its place in a rightfully constituted sphere of civil society. From that sphere, it claims the same rights and responsibilities as any responsible citizen or group in a pluralist, democratic polity. In that same sphere, it constructs its network of institutions where the church rubs shoulders with issues involving education, health care, and welfare and thus gains experience and competence to address these topics. So the will and desire to engage in public policy is present in contemporary Catholicism. But its will and desire is less to impose a separate sectarian vision on a common policy than to demand the right to be one other voice in pluralist debates about the morally and socially good society. As the United States ceases to be a Protestant (or a Christian) society, the new pluralism would seem to call *all* public religions to become modern in this Catholic sense, to find ways to couch their arguments (however much, in original provenance, they stem from a Christian moral vision) in more neutral, more universalist languages and metaphors. What I have here described is, without much doubt, the normative contemporary Catholic position on Christian engagement in the social order. No theocracy is envisioned. No special privileges are asked. No assumed authority to the church's position is expected. Naturally, like any institution, as a bearer of interests, representatives of the church cheat, from time to time, in the public arena and fall back on earlier and more authoritarian stances. Since these have become generally counterproductive in a pluralist democracy, however, such "slips back" are, increasingly,

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

rare. In any event, they now lack any intrinsic Catholic ideological justification. The latter rests almost entirely on a view of society as an arena of possible moral good and as a desanctified zone of contestation among groups in civil society to forge public policy. The church no longer claims to stand above civil society but places itself squarely within in. It hitches its own privileges to more universal claims for associational life in civil society.

(2) A Rationale Suggesting That the Tradition Can Enrich Policy and Be Enriched by It

The bishops suggested in their economic pastoral that the church's teaching cannot be left at the level of appealing generalities. In an earlier period, Catholic moral theory got tested in case studies (casuistry). Concrete cases helped the tradition to sort out conflicting moral claims and to sift through—if not the trade-offs—the hard cases to uncover the crucial priorities or lexical orderings among moral principles. In his book on Catholic human rights theory, David Hollenbach notes how Catholic social thought now needs to engage what he calls "a strategic morality," that is, a synthesis of historical interpretation and basic value commitments.[45] Hollenbach decries how efforts of Catholic social theory to somehow stand "above ideology" or "beyond any social system" led to a loss of explicit strategic direction

Hollenbach's appeal to a "strategic morality" that engages in priority principles for policy forces Catholics into alliances, beyond the church, in seeking the common good. It also assumes that truth, at least for the social order, is not only "a-historical" or "revelational" but grows out of tested experience and the wisdom of practice. Hence, Hollenbach is making the case that Catholic social thought not only has something to offer to policy but that it can profit from engagement in more concrete discernments of the possible, the morally good, and the better which is achievable. The distinctively Catholic background vision gets concretely mediated not by theology or revelation or appeals to the Bible. It gets mediated into policy by political prudence that is widely shared by nonbelievers and forces believers to a certain humility about the deep authoritative nature of their own concrete policy proposals. Like the bishops, they have to make moral distinctions between the binding character of their universal principles and their concrete application of them to policy, which is decidedly more fallible.

III. Catholic Policy Proposals: Their Style and Instrumentalities

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Almost all the organizations that serve to generate Catholic public policy initiatives are closely aligned with the hierarchy. Only one American Catholic university, Georgetown, has a specialized program in public policy. Catholicism does not sponsor policy think-tanks akin to Brookings, Cato, the American Enterprise Institute, or the Heritage Foundation. A few Catholics in more secular policy-formation settings, such as John DiUlio at the University of Pennsylvania, Gary Ornfield at Harvard, David Hayes-Bautista at the University of California at Los Angeles, and Michael Novak of the American Enterprise Institute seem to draw genuine inspiration or directionality for their policy work from the Catholic social tradition. Yet the lack of a richer ongoing institutional grounding for Catholic public policy dooms it to mainly reactive stances. It largely joins an already constituted "secular" policy conversation more often than it initiates one.

The organizations that make up the relatively finite universe for Catholic generation of policy include:

1. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB)/ The United States Catholic Conference (USCC)—the latter serving as a kind of service bureaucracy for the bishops and specializing, in some departments, on church-world relationships.

2. Some thirty state Catholic Conferences that, like the national organization, maintain public policy outreach and lobbying to state governments and legislatures. Several of the state Catholic Conferences of bishops (e.g., the state Catholic Conferences in New York, California, Texas, Minnesota, and Illinois) are important actors in engaging public policy in their state settings. The Arizona Catholic Conference, for example, led a coalition of nonprofits to oppose, successfully, the turning over of Arizona's welfare-to-work programs to the for-profit Lockheed-Martin Corporation.[46]

3. Some dioceses maintain peace and justice offices that engage broadly in policy and lobbying, although most restrict themselves to educational or activist thrusts.

4. Lobby and policy arms that serve as modest subunits of national federations of Catholic institutions, such as the National Educational Association, the Catholic Health Association, and Catholic Charities U.S.A. Although legally separately incorporated from dioceses or the USCC, these federations keep in close touch with the USCC. Sometimes, as with Catholic Charities U.S.A. on issues of welfare policy or the Catholic Health Association on questions of health-care reforms, these federations may take the national lead from the USCC on a given issue of policy.

5. Nonofficial lobbies associated with the Catholic community but not

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

connected to the episcopacy would include: Network, which lobbies in Washington, D.C., on issues of welfare, housing, human rights, and global development. The Catholic Campaign for America, whose lobbying focuses on issues of abortion, euthanasia, and educational reform. The Catholic Campaign does not advocate on other issues. The Catholic League for Civil Rights serves as a kind of Catholic equivalent of the Jewish Anti-Defamation League. Other nonofficial organizations, such as Pax Christi USA, a Catholic peace group, occasionally lobby on peace and military issues. Pax Christi has been in the forefront of Catholic lobbying efforts to have the United States sign a treaty outlawing soldiers younger than eighteen years old.

By any standards, it is a small universe. Moreover, most of these organizations maintain relatively small staffs, especially in their departments that involve actual lobbying. Almost all are incorporated under a 501C3 status as tax-exempt religious or charitable organizations. Congressional restrictions place severe limits on these organizations' lobbying outreach. By law they may not endorse candidates, be aligned closely to any political party, or devote a "substantial" amount of their resources to lobbying. The legal definition of "substantial" (is it a dollar amount or a proportion of the annual budget?) remains in contention.

The NCCB/USCC

The USCC maintains a Government Liaison Office with four lobbyists and a director. This office monitors legislation that might affect the financial and legal welfare of the NCBB and the Catholic institutional networks. It also closely watches federal legislation that has an impact on issues of importance for Catholic social teaching. The office looks at forthcoming legislation on taxes, welfare, immigration (the church's membership includes a significant new immigration population of Asians and Hispanics), civil rights, education, labor, pro-life concerns, and health.[47]

The small office does not have to do all of its own background research. It can rely on larger USCC departments such as the Department of Domestic Social Development, the Pro-Life Department, the Department of International Justice and Peace, the Department of Migration and Refugee Services, and the Department of Education for ideas and suggestions about both pending legislation and policy directives. No USCC department, however, can sign off on a policy initiative without the explicit approval of the bishops (usually through the Administrative Committee of the bishops). In that sense, the bishops are ultimately responsible for the policy

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

directions taken by the USCC (although they often defer to their service experts). A decided attempt is made in proposals from the USCC staff to the bishops to link their reactions to concrete pieces of legislation or debated policy initiatives to elements from the Catholic social teaching. The USCC, unlike some other denominational or religious lobbies, is not an arena for pure policy wonks with few links to the theological tradition on social thought.[48] Catholic social teaching may remain our best kept secret for people in the pews, but it can be no secret for USCC policy professionals, who must know it well.

The USCC staff sets out annually a set of policy priorities. Any proposed action must involve something "substantively important" to the Catholic organizational interests or the social Catholic vision. Over the years, the USCC has stated positions or testified before Congress on issues ranging from abortion, civil rights, communications policy, criminal law, family policy, welfare reform, farm policy, labor legislation (e.g., in strong support of minimum-wage legislation), military issues, and foreign policy. Since 1976, every four years, in the year before the presidential elections so as not to seem to be partisan, the NCCB issues a pastoral letter on political responsibility, outlining the range of its concerns pertinent to the upcoming presidential campaign and debates.

Direct lobbying takes many forms. It can involve: (1) a kind of "white paper" position of the conference on issues such as welfare reform, health care, and immigration policy, which is published and disseminated to congressional staff and governmental officials and through the Catholic network. (2) testifying before congressional committees. (3) sending letters to government officials (whether in the Executive Branch or the Congress). Such letters to congressional committees can be quite specific in proposing revised wording or amendments to a bill to cover a salient Catholic concern.

The Catholic Conference's main strengths as a policy and lobbying organization lie in its moral authority and the sense that any position taken by it has the backing of the collective bishops. "They know we speak for the bishops," the USCC's John Carr told Reese.[49] Some other Washington-based religious lobbies lack this tight link to denominational officers. It is not clear for whom they speak. The USCC's strength also lies in the quality of its position papers, testimony, and letters. The USCC has a long procedural process in place before it comes to any decided position that will gain the backing of the bishops. As a result, its presentations tend to have been hashed out and carefully crafted and documented. Another strength is the access many of the USCC staff have (or through a bishop they call upon) to influential legislators in both political parties.

The main weakness of the USCC as a lobbying unit is its relative fail-

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

ure to engage grassroots support for its positions, to mobilize local Catholic groups to write to Congress. The NCCB is wary of trying any tactic that might suggest Catholics represent a voting bloc. Bishops are quick to deny that they expect the Catholic population to be or become a single voting bloc.[50] By contrast, Jewish or evangelical lobbying groups are often much better in delivering grassroots reaction and the vote.

Outside social science observers tend to give the USCC high marks for its lobbying efforts. Stephen Johnson and Joseph Tamney in their book, *The Political Role of Religion in the United States,* could claim: "The U.S. Catholic Church is the most effective political force advocating the liberal agenda."[51] On the other hand, the USCC is also a potent force on some issues not considered part of the liberal agenda, for example, pro-life issues and family policy. The Catholic Church on these and some related issues is not perceived by liberals as an ally.

In his study of religious lobby groups, *Representing God in Washington,* Allen Hertzke gave the USCC high marks for its ability to gain access to congressional offices because of the quality of information provided by its staff:

> This fact, combined with the focused agenda of the Conference, has earned it the envy of both liberal and conservative church groups. One conservative congressional aide, who said he wanted the fundamentalists to be more effective, observed that: "They should take a lesson from the Catholic Conference. For example, on fetal experimentation their staff assistant got in touch with moral theologians and medical scientists to put out a position. They had been thinking about it." On the liberal side, while the bishops joined a number of Protestant lobbies in opposing the MX missile, they were able to argue that their opposition flowed out of their "carefully delineated' position in the Peace Pastoral on nuclear arms. Moreover, none of the liberal church groups has produced a document of comparable length and complexity to the bishops' draft letter on the U.S. economy and it is widely used by liberal Protestants.[52]

U.S. Catholicism is also a major provider of services. Its social message is embodied not just in pastorals or lobbying positions but in the schools and hospitals it runs, the food pantries and homeless shelters it provides, in its outreach to immigrants and refugees. Another major actor in developing Catholic social policy is Catholic Charities U.S.A., especially in the arena of welfare policy, where its influence has historically been quite strong.

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Catholic Charities U.S.A.

Founded in 1910 (thus predating the USCC's existence by a decade), Catholic Charities U.S.A. is far and away the largest single nongovernmental provider of social services in the United States. With an annual budget of two and a half billion dollars, Catholic Charities serves 10.6 million clients a year through emergency services (food pantries, shelter, housing assistance); counseling; family, youth, and elderly services (including residential facilities); job training; refugee and immigration assistance; disaster relief; community development; child care; adoption; and prison outreach. At the national and diocesan levels, Catholic Charities' agencies are separately incorporated as public charitable trusts (not explicitly as religious institutions). They have an organizational autonomy from the USCC and the dioceses. Two-thirds of the Charities budget comes from governmental funds from outsourcing for welfare programs: municipal, county, state, and federal funds. As a public charitable trust, Charities is bound to a nondiscrimination policy in hiring, staffing, and serving clientele. Seventy percent of its clients are non-Catholic poor. Since the 1960s, Catholic Charities has opened its doors to all in need from all religions (and none).

Charities sees its nonproselytizing service to those in need (regardless of creed) as an outgrowth of its own religious mission. The primary way Catholic Charities identifies itself as Catholic is through its adherence to the Catholic social tradition, which it inculcates in its staff. The president of Catholic Charities U.S.A., Fred Kammer, has written a widely read book on Catholic social teaching.[53] Charities sees itself, then, not as the whole church but as the social service and advocacy outreach of the church in a pluralist, democratic society. This focus on the church "in the world" "differentiates [and brackets?] the objectives of the church as servant and healer in the world from its full mission of teaching, evangelizing, sanctifying and governing a bonded-faith community."[54]

With a paid staff of 47,532 and a cadre of volunteers and board members numbering 262,622, Catholic Charities reaches out through 1,400 agencies to deliver social services. It commits itself to a threefold mission of direct service to those in need, public policy and advocacy, and the convening of like groups and community organization. Located in Alexandria, Virginia, the national service bureaucracy for the Charities' federation engages in policy formulation, advocacy, and lobbying. With a lobbying staff of six, it uses its limited resources to focus on priority policy areas. Thus, for the year 2000, its level-one priorities (which involve "a leadership in Washington, pressing and pro-active, involving research, testimony

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and active lobbying") focus on child care, child welfare, housing/homelessness/housing counseling, the minimum wage, and the restoration of funding for the Social Services Block Grant. Second-level priorities (which involve policy formulations and some proactive coalition building and lobbying) focus on children's health insurance, juvenile justice, the Older American Act, and the Violence Against Women Act. Other priorities include attention to an increase for the food stamps program and the development of proposals to continue benefits for the working poor.

The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 involved a wide devolution of federal welfare programs, through block grants, back to the states. The individual states now become an important arena for welfare policy and decisions. Hence, there is a new importance for the network of state Catholic Conferences, almost all of whom target welfare-reform measures for their advocacy efforts. Catholic Charities plays a key role at the state Conference levels. Its own evolution has moved it to statewide coordination and federation of the separately incorporated diocesan agencies as Charities competes with other nonprofits and for-profits for outsourced programs and projects (and, of course, moneys!). At the same time, Catholic Charities frequently serves as the umbrella organization for other nonprofits' funding and as a convenor of them. Diocesan Charities agencies often maintain a staff position on public policy. One diocese, Oakland, California, has an annual breakfast for local political figures focused on the relevance of Catholic social thought for policy. So throughout the Charities network there exists a broader band of Catholic policy experts than found typically in the USCC or in a diocesan bishop's staff structure. At the annual Convention of Catholic Charities a long—several days—open-hearings session treats legislative policy across the spectrum of welfare issues. Out of these sessions, the national priorities emerge and models of policy initiatives get disseminated. Charities U.S.A. also maintains a weekly Adfax service that alerts members to legislation pertinent to welfare providers.

Throughout its long history, Charities U.S.A. has been engaged at municipal, state, and federal levels with the articulation of welfare policy. More than the USCC, it is closely in touch with grassroots groups. A recent well-received history of the organization and movement could claim that "Catholics have played a critical but largely undocumented role in the evolution of American welfare."[55] As a movement, Catholic Charities began in this country as an attempt by Catholics to care for their own poor and needy (in orphanages and foundling homes, for example) and then to leverage this position as service providers to win a voice in local, state, and national policymaking, including gaining access to public moneys for their programs. Soon officers of Catholic Charities joined local federations of

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

charities (which in time became the United Way) and served prominently on city and state welfare boards. By 1909, Catholic social service agencies served as co-organizers of the White House Conference on the Care of Dependent Children and have played analogous roles for all such White House Conferences on family, child care, and welfare issues ever since.

Catholic Charities was a key supporter of New Deal legislation, especially the provisions for aid to dependent children (ADC) and child welfare services. Catholic social worker Jane Hoey (who rose from the Charities' ranks) administered the ADC program over its first two decades. Charities actually had much more influence on shaping the Social Security Act of 1934 than did the USCC. It was probably not by chance that the roster of keynote speakers at the 1933 National Charities Convention included President Roosevelt, Frances Perkins, his Secretary for Labor, Harry Hopkins, James Farley, and New York's Senator Robert Wagner.

In the context of the War on Poverty of the 1960s (inspired in part by former Catholic Worker member Michael Harrington's book *The Other America*), Charities agencies took major steps to reconfigure themselves as "justice" workers, committed to advocacy as well as service to the poor, regardless of race or creed.[56] But as early as its 1912 meeting, the National Conference on Catholic Charities was pressing the importance of preventing poverty as against only giving relief.[57] Poverty, not welfare, was the primary problem. Charities' slice of the nonprofit welfare sector increased dramatically during those years, especially after federal regulations in 1969 strongly encouraged state welfare agencies to purchase services for ADC families from private nonprofits such as Catholic Charities.

When a further move toward outsourcing government social service programs took place in the 1980s, Catholic agencies once again expanded their budgets and programs, moving into new areas such as low-cost housing. Throughout its history, Catholic Charities (mirroring the Catholic theory of subsidiarity) has always championed a public-private partnership that stresses the role of private agencies as intermediaries (providing human contact and room for flexibility and experimentation and community building) between the resources of the state and the distress of the poor. Yet it also stresses the public obligation to care for those in true need and the government's inalienable role to contribute to the common good. Charities finds itself in the dilemma of both opposing the total secularization of charity and its simultaneous and deliberate accommodation to the modern welfare state.

We can now turn to a brief rehearsal of Catholic policy efforts before and after the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. Our main concern is to show: (1) what moves the USCC and

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Catholic Charities USA took to contest, amend the legislation, or provide alternative policy proposals than those in the 1996 act; (2) how these moves can be seen as policy consequences of the background view of the human person and society in Catholic social thought, and (3) how, in its monitoring of welfare reform, Catholic social thought returns to the table with an agenda fueled by its distinctive tradition of social thought.

IV. Catholicism and Welfare Policy: Through the Lens of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act

In a sense, Catholics already began to engage the welfare-reform debate in a new way in 1986 in the bishops' economic pastoral, *Economic Justice for All*. Paragraphs 186–214 of that document dealt with guidelines to treat the problem of structural poverty. Note that the bishops define the underlining problem as one of *poverty* rather than one of *welfare dependency*. The seventh and final guideline in that section of the Pastoral called for "a thorough reform of the nation's welfare and income support programs." In the brief discursus on welfare reform in the document, the bishops suggest two major changes: (1) they call for national eligibility standards and uniform minimum benefit levels for recipients of AFDC in order to eliminate state-by-state disparities, unrelated to the level of real need in low-income families; (2) the bishops call for a redesigning of public assistance programs to "assist recipients, wherever possible, to become self-sufficient through gainful employment."[58]

Under the rubric of welfare reform, the 1986 Pastoral issues several caveats. A work strategy to overcome dependency would need a serious job-creation program when work was lacking and also need to provide services for job training, counseling, and child care. It would also have to address the so-called "notch" effects such that entering the workforce actually penalized those who had been on assistance. "Under current rules, people who give up welfare benefits to work in low-paying jobs, soon lose their Medicare benefits."[59] In a throwaway line of great common sense, the bishops note: "Individuals should not be worse off economically when they get jobs than when they rely on public assistance."[60] Not every recourse to work, the bishops suggest, addresses the root problems of structural or personal poverty.

Between 1988 and 1992, when President Clinton famously promised "to end welfare as we know it," the welfare-policy debate focused increasingly on issues of family values (does welfare discourage intact families and reward out-of-wedlock pregnancies?); welfare dependency; the need for a

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

work *obligation* and not just an *incentive* to work; and issues of teen and welfare pregnancies. In 1994, the new Republican Congress moved toward its equally famous "Contract with America," which put welfare reform at the top of the agenda. To the bishops and Catholic policymakers, some of the voices in the welfare-policy debate seemed reductionist in their appeal to punitive measures as a prod for "rational actor" responses. In tying welfare dependence entirely to economic incentives and arguing that taking those incentives away would lead to work responsibility for all welfare dependents, these voices seemed to Catholic Charities' case workers to oversimplify the issue. Some seemed too willing to sacrifice innocent children and needy others, in the short run, to gain a long-term breaking of the cycle of dependency and poverty. There was a kind of utilitarian argument fueling the debate that scouted Catholic core notions of dignity and rights. Rigid time limits seemed to offer little flexibility or attention to the different kinds of people who are welfare-dependent. Nor was enough attention being given by many of the welfare-reform proponents to the commitment of new resources for job preparation for those who would run up against newly imposed time limits. Some suggested provisions (a family cap on assistance; refusal to provide welfare for children of teenage mothers or of legal immigrants) struck many Catholic policymakers as incentives to abortion or just downright punitive.

In what almost amounts to a barrage, Catholic voices joined the welfare-reform debate early on. Merely to list the documents and actions generated in a two-year flurry period tells part of the story. Catholic Charities U.S.A. published its eighteen-page white paper, "Transforming the Welfare System," on 24 January 1994, five months before President Clinton unfurled his own welfare-reform proposals of 1994.[61] In December 1994, the bishops of Connecticut wrote a short piece entitled "Welfare Reform and Basic Human Needs," in which they conceded the need for welfare reform but insisted that "the end result must not harm the vulnerable." The Connecticut bishops insisted on the legitimacy of need as a moral claim to support. They also stressed the government's proper role in furthering the common good. Concern for the common good could not be left only to the churches and private charities.[62]

In early January 1995, Bishop John Ricard of Baltimore, in his capacity as chair of the NCCB's Domestic Policy Committee, sent a letter to the members of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and to the Department of Health and Human Services expressing his objections to the Personal Responsibility Act, then being discussed in Congress. Many of the salient Catholic themes in the welfare-policy debate emerge with Ricard's early testimony. He appeals to the cred-

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

ibility of the Catholic experience "as the largest non-public provider of human services to poor families." Ricard states the nub of the debate as he sees it:

> We are not defenders of the welfare *status quo* which too often relies on bureaucratic approaches, discourages work and breaks up families. However, we oppose abandonment of the federal government's role in helping families overcome poverty and meet their children's basic needs. Genuine welfare reform should rely on incentives more than harsh penalties, for example, denying needed benefits to children born to mothers on welfare can hurt the children and pressure their mothers toward abortion.

In his statement of the aims of welfare reform, a formula that soon became a kind of slogan throughout the Catholic network, Ricard says that the Catholic Church sought the following aims: it sought a welfare reform that supports family life, encourages and rewards work, preserves a safety net for the vulnerable, builds public-private partnership to overcome poverty, and invests in human dignity. The policy target, argued Ricard, "ought to be poverty, not poor families."

Another refrain in Ricard's testimony echoes again and again in Catholic policy papers. It responds to proponents of welfare reform who would take government entirely out of welfare and relegate welfare to the nonprofit and religious sectors. "Private and religious efforts to serve those in need are being severely stretched. They cannot and should not be seen as a substitute that promotes effective public-private partnerships in overcoming poverty and dependency."

Ricard opposed rigid time limits and called for a targeted and flexible policy in place of attempts to get a policy where one size fits all. He supported a move toward responsibility and work but cautioned that what must be sought is "work with wages and benefits that permit a family to live in dignity." Finally, Ricard attacked the punitive approach of some welfare reformers. "We cannot support punitive approaches that target immigrants and propose to take away the minimal benefits they now receive, such as emergency medical care and nutrition programs, especially those targeted to pregnant women."[63]

In February 1995, the bishops of Florida, in their turn, wrote a letter, "Promoting Meaningful Welfare Reform," addressed to state and federal officials.[64] In March 1995 the USCC published a nine-page bishops' statement, "Moral Principles and Policy Priorities for Welfare Reform," which mainly reechoed the points in Ricard's testimony and took over his formu-

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

lation of the aims of reform. "Moral Principle and Policy Priorities" links these aims to the Catholic principles of subsidiarity, solidarity, the option for the poor, human dignity and the common good, and the value of work. Again in this document was the refrain: "As the largest non-public provider of human services to poor families."[65]

Throughout 1995, Catholic voices continued to engage the welfare debate. Catholic Charities' President Fred Kammer testified before the House Ways and Means Committee with an echo of Ricard: "Proposals which hurt the children without necessarily changing the behavior of parents cannot gain Catholic support." The family cap, Kammer suggested, hurts children and encourages abortion. Private charity could not and should not replace the government's rightful role. Subsidiarity does not mean that the government steps out of care for the common good. "We cannot support proposals that would deny aid to parents for whom there are no jobs."[66]

Meanwhile, welfare-reform measures were also moving forward at the state levels. Boston's Cardinal Law reproached Governor William Weld's proposal to eliminate any benefits to teenage mothers. In a pastoral response addressing "The Catholic Alliance," a wholly owned subsidiary of the Christian Coalition, seen as a kind of cognate Catholic branch, Law faulted the attempts to turn Catholics into a visible voting bloc. He also noted that Catholics needed to avoid this group because the Christian Coalition held positions on welfare reform at deep variance with Catholic social teaching.[67] At state levels, Catholic Charities agencies got into the act to work for increases from the states in supplemental state programs for food stamps, aid to immigrant children, and to block more narrowly construed welfare options in the federal bill.

The two major documents that seem to have guided most of the Catholic voices in the policy debate are the Catholic Charities paper "Transforming the Welfare System" and the USCC's statement, "Moral Principles and Policy Priorities for Welfare Reform." I have found it helpful in reading through this material to make a list from these disparate documents of what the Catholic voices were *for* in the welfare debates, what they were *against*, and what *alternatives* they offered to the bill. In a schematic way, I list the elements I found in the documents and policy papers from Catholic sources on these three points.

What the Catholic Voices Were for in the Welfare Reform Bill

1. They were, in general, for a welfare reform that called for more responsibility on the part of welfare recipients and that reduced waste, corruption, and fraud.

2. They were for an emphasis on work, with the caveat that work must

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

"be judged by standards of justice in wages, fair expectations and support for family life." As the USCC's "Moral Principles and Policy Priorities" put it: "Those who can work ought to work. Employment is the expected means to support a family and make a contribution to the common good."[68]

3. They were for a new kind of language that called for responsibility and accountability. But as the Catholic Charities' white paper put it: "We must be willing to build into our welfare system responsibility and accountability on the part of *both* the recipient *and* the giver of public assistance."[69]

4. They were for policies that promised to reduce welfare dependency and move people into productive participation both in work and in civic society.

5. They favored new flexibility in the welfare system. They were at least not in principle against all forms of devolution schemes to move welfare back to the states, provided federal responsibilities for a safety net were maintained and some federal oversight continued.

6. They favored the new openness to partnership with churches and nonprofits, so long as this was not seen as an unrealistic move to ask them to shoulder a burden of welfare they could not sustain. They were in favor of tax benefits for charitable choice for charities that work with the poor. As Kammer put it in his testimony to Congress: "The religious groups and non-profits that shoulder the bulk of charity and services to the poor have all indicated that the magnitude of cuts contemplated in the Personal Responsibility Act would bankrupt their institutions."[70]

What the Catholic Voices Were Against in the Welfare Reform Bill

1. They were against couching the debate as primarily an issue of welfare rather than a larger context of often structural poverty. "Targeting poverty and not just welfare dependency," a slogan taken from the USCC's "Moral Principles and Policy Priorities," was much bandied about.

2. They were decidedly against sacrificing innocents (especially children) in the short term for any long-term hopes of achieving an antidependency work-based strategy. On the issues of family caps and teenage-mother exclusions (which the new welfare law allows states to adopt), the bishops were adamant in their opposition. They cited the potential harm these measures might cause to innocent children, both those who might be aborted and those who will be deprived of human necessities because of the policy innovations. "No attempt to justify them in terms of long-term social benefits (such as fighting the root cause of dependency by

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

changing the social landscape of behavioral expectations) could ever override those moral objections to the short-term human impact of such policies."[71] "Do no harm to children or other innocent humans" was the moral maxim. "Society has a responsibility to meet the needs of those who cannot care for themselves, especially young children."[72] It may be that religious voices have a major role in policy debates (usually fueled by a utilitarian cost-benefit calculus) to bring us back to deontological principles. There are some absolute moral prohibitions even in politics. In the Catholic case, the roots for the prohibition of experimenting with welfare children is the Catholic theory of human dignity as linked to subsistence rights and its preferential option for the poor.

3. They were against a one-sided employment strategy, not balanced by an income maintenance strategy: "Maintaining a social safety net" was the slogan. As the Catholic Charities' white paper detailed, AFDC recipients could be divided into recognizable groups, one of which consists of the approximately "30 percent who are chronic or persistent users. Many of these long-term drug and alcohol users have severe learning disabilities or serious health problems. Policies or programs of intervention must take into account the differences."[73] To be blunt, some welfare recipients were very unlikely candidates (at least in the short run) for the workforce. Work is a legitimate criterion for a welfare policy, but genuine human need has its legitimate moral claim as well. Indeed, the bishops seemed outraged that, for the first time since American welfare policy evolved in the post–Civil War period, need had no persistent legitimate moral claim.[74]

4. They were against rigid work requirements (which might penalize, for example, education as a route out of welfare) and rigid time requirements as a "one size fits all category." Here the Catholics were resonating with research done by Mary Jo Bane before she became an Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Resources in the Clinton cabinet. Bane's research showed a cycle by which welfare recipients were not all simply "long-termers" or "short termers." Many single mothers try to make "work exits" only to find themselves back on the welfare rolls. Research data showed how hard it is to make work exits stick. Bane argues that it is not realistic to expect labor markets entirely to replace government programs as reliable sources of income for all single mothers with children.[75] Bane, a Catholic, resigned from the Clinton administration the day Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 into law.

5. They were against family caps. Indeed, they succeeded in having them removed as mandates from the final bill.

6. They fought (successfully it turns out) provisions of the original bill

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

that would have block-granted nutrition dollars from the WIC nutrition program for pregnant and recent mothers and babies, or that would have removed Medicaid coverage from families forced off AFDC (or as it is now called in its time-capped form, TANF, i.e., temporary assistance to needy families).

7. They were against penalizing those who sought work and, for structural reasons, could not find it.

What Alternatives Did the Catholic Policymakers Suggest?

1. Fred Kammer in his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee expressed surprise at the lack of child-care support that would seem necessary to get welfare mothers into the workforce. The bishops sought increased child-care funding. The final bill reflected this consensus, which Catholics shared with a broad range of nonprofit groups.

2. They suggested that real welfare reform would demand educational resources, job-skill training, and transitional help. The Catholic Charities white paper called for "tailored investments in families," which would include a series of initiatives: better child-care support and an expanded earned-income tax so that work really does pay. Both the USCC and the Charities' document evoke the Catholic notion of community and solidarity and propose that we think of welfare as part of a "social contract" in which government, as well as the private sector (including industry) become partners with recipients.

3. They suggested, in opposing amendments to the contrary, that welfare-to-work clients be paid the same minimum wage the law enacts for other employment. They wanted to avoid a situation whereby welfare-to-work transistors brought unfair wage competition to the already working poor. Indeed, they suggested increasing the minimum wage.

4. They suggest the need for direct interpersonal contacts (beyond bureaucratic paternalistic schemes) and mentoring of welfare recipients. As the USCC's "Moral Principles and Policy Priorities" puts it: "Increased accountability and incentives should be tailored to a particular family's needs and circumstances, not one size fits all requirements. Top down reform with rigid national rules cannot meet the needs of a population as diverse as poor families.[76]

After the Welfare Bill Passed

The welfare-reform debate did not simply go away after the 1996 bill passed. The Catholic Charities network especially and state Catholic conferences went to state legislatures and county and municipal governments to pro-

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

vide a "softer welfare landing" by extending deadlines, choosing more generous options offered to them by the federal legislation, and offering vouchers and noncash assistance for needy families. At state levels Catholic Charities worked for the following options:

1. Time Limits: Federal law allows recipients to receive assistance for up to sixty months of their lifetimes but states may set shorter limits. Charities' agencies urged states to adopt the maximum time limit and to set aside state money to aid families in need of longer-term help. Thirty-seven states have adopted the more permissive sixty-month limit.
2. Work Requirements: Federal law requires able-bodied welfare recipients to work at least part-time within two years. Catholic Charities urged states to allow hours spent in training to fulfill work requirements.
3. Child Care: States that continue their previous investment in child-care provisions are eligible for full federal subsidies. Charities urged states to provide child-care subsidies to families for the allowable two years after employment.
4. Food Stamps: Charities recommended that states request waivers of time limits in areas with an unemployment rate above 10 percent or for those residing in a labor surplus.

Among the lobbying efforts at state levels undertaken by Catholic Charities or state Catholic conferences was a bill (drafted by Catholic Charities of Maine) passed by the state legislature that enables the Department of Human Services in Maine to provide TANF benefits, using state money, after the five-year federal time limit has passed. Catholic Charities in Maryland and Kansas were successful in lobbying for state versions of the earned income-tax credit. In Maryland, Catholic Charities was also instrumental in passage of a bill requiring Maryland to reinvest all welfare savings back into the TANF program. In California, the Charities agencies did a welfare-reform monitoring project in five metropolitan areas to track the increased populations coming to food pantries and soup kitchens since the passage of welfare reform. Through strategic press conferences announcing the results and lobbying efforts, they gained passage of a state supplemental food-stamp program.[77]

Any visitor to the Web sites of state Catholic conferences, local Catholic Charities' agencies, and the national Catholic Charities home page can uncover page after page of welfare-reform initiatives aimed at restoring, minimizing, or finding alternatives for the 1996 welfare-reform bill. Charities sponsors a national welfare monitoring project that tracks, through member agencies, the increases in clientele for emergency services and its relation to being removed from the welfare rolls. As it continues its voice

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

in the welfare debate, the USCC and Catholic Charities U.S.A. can be expected to root policy proposals in the background assumptions of Catholic social thought: human dignity; human rights and subsistence as a right; the common good, and the government's indispensable role in both defining, enabling, and producing it; subsidiarity and its impact on the sense of public-private partnerships in working for the common good; and the preferential option for the poor. The Catholic agencies link these background assumptions to policy principles that can be translated into a larger discussion in a pluralistic society.

Thomas Massaro in his book *Catholic Social Teaching and United States Welfare Reform* links the Catholic policy initiatives to the Catholic theological anthropology of the human and society. Massaro suggests that policy principles, originally rooted in the Catholic social tradition, can indeed (if not without remainder, at least substantively) be translated into more secular warrants that might garner a broader overlapping consensus between Catholics and other citizens. Massaro suggests the following "secularly" translated Catholic principles or maxims for welfare policy:

1. Focus on the struggle against poverty itself, not merely against welfare dependency.
2. Acknowledge insuperable barriers to employment where they exist and compensate for them by some form of a safety net or job-creation program.
3. Respect some absolute moral prohibitions for politics—especially, do no harm to the innocent poor, whether children or those who are victims of structural unemployment.
4. Recognize both "carrots" and "sticks" (incentives and obligations), without subscribing to a reductionist view of the human person as simply a rational actor maximizing economic rewards.
5. Avoid fostering the demonization or marginalization of recipients of public assistance, i.e., respect their human dignity and call them to justice as participation in work and civic life.
6. Social policy cannot be successful in ushering people to self-sufficiency unless it commits adequate resources to empowering low-income citizens to move into work on reasonable terms. An underlying principal must be that welfare reform is not primarily punitive or principally a cost-saving device but a sincere effort to move from welfare dependency to sustainable work.
7. The well-being of family life deserves special policy attention because children represent the future of the nation.
8. There is no practical substitute for the federal government in serving as the primary conduit of social assistance to low-income families.[78]

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

As long as Catholic Charities U.S.A. remains the "largest, non-governmental provider of social services" in the United States, some variant of these policy principles will continue to be urged at federal, state, county, and municipal levels. Whether Catholics will succeed in injecting a more communitarian ethos into the American policy discussion, of course, remains to be seen. But it strikes me that more than their success or failure in working for any given policy issue is at stake in this case. Catholic public-policy formation does present an important case of a relatively conservative religious group that (despite some anomalies) has found a way to become and operate as a public citizen church in the modern world.

Loyola Marymount University

Notes

1. Thomas Massaro, *Catholic Social Teaching and United States Welfare Reform* (Collegeville, Minn., 1998).

2. Cited in R. W. Apple, "His Battle Now Lost: Moynihan Still Cries Out," *New York Times,* 2 August 1996, A16.

3. This list can be found in Thomas Reese, *A Flock of Shepherds: The National Conference of Catholic Bishops* (Kansas City, Mo., 1992), 187–88.

4. For the history, see Dorothy Brown and Elizabeth McKeown, *The Poor Belong to Us: Catholic Charities and American Welfare* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

5. Joseph Cardinal Bernadin, *Consistent Ethic of Life* (Kansas City, Mo., 1988).

6. Peter McDonough and Josephina Figueira-McDonough, "The Evolution of Catholic Family Policy," unpublished research proposal, Arizona State University, Department of Political Science, p. 35.

7. For several reliable introductions to Catholic social thought, see David Hollenbach, *Claims in Conflict* (New York, 1979); Jean Calvez, *The Church and Social Justice* (Chicago, 1961); Donal Dorr, *Option for the Poor* (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1992); Michael J. Schuck, *That They be One: The Social Teaching of the Papal Encyclicals* (Washington, D.C., 1991).

8. For the citation from John Paul II's *On Social Concerns* #41, see David O'Brien and Thomas Shannon, eds., *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage* (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1992).

9. Thomas Hoppe, "Human Rights," in Judith Dwyer, ed., *A New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought* (Collegeville, Minn., 1994). The concept of a Catholic appeal to needs is developed in William O'Neil, "Commonweal or Woe? The Ethics of Welfare Reform," *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy* 11, no. 2 (1997): 487–505.

10. *Pacem in Terris,* in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 137–57.

11. For a more "secular" public-policy argument, cognate to the Catholic case, to subsistence needs as grounding rights, see Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1996).

12. David Hollenbach, "The Common Good," in Dwyer, *New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought*, 193.

13. *Mater et Magistra* #60, "Christianity and Social Progress," in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 146.

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

14. *Pacem in Terris,* in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 141.

15. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty,* ed. John Gray (New York, 199), 72.

16. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in *Four Essays on Liberty* (New York, 1969), 118, 122; John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York, 1993), 99–107.

17. William Galston, *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State* (New York, 1991).

18. Philip Selznick, *The Moral Commonwealth* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992), 537.

19. Selznick, *The Moral Commonwealth*, 537. See John A. Coleman, S.J., "A Common Good Primer," *Dialog* 34 (Fall 1995), 249–54.

20. For a denial of the sovereignty of the state, see Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago, 1951), 194–95.

21. Hollenbach, "The Common Good," 195–96.

22. The citation from *Quadragesimo Anno,* "Forty Years Afterwards," #80 in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 60.

23. John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,* "On Social Concern," #40 in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 421.

24. Jonathan Boswell, "Catholic Social Thinking: Is It Underdeveloped?" manuscript for a Cambridge University conference on the Future of Catholic Social Teaching, 9–10.

25. Michael Schuck, "Modern Catholic Social Thought," in Dwyer, *Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought*, 630–31.

26. See Hugh Heclo, "General Welfare and Two American Traditions," *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (1986): 179–96.

27. Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984).

28. Peter McDonough and Josephina Figueira-McDonough, "The Evolution of Catholic Family Policy," 12.

29. Boswell, "Catholic Social Thinking: Is It Underdeveloped?" 8.

30. Hollenbach, *Claims in Conflict*, 187.

31. McDonough and Figueira-McDonough, "The Evolution of Catholic Family Policy," 7.

32. For the preferential option for the poor, see Donal Dorr, *Option for the Poor*, 1–7, 193–95, 376–77. On Catholic concepts of work as a vocation, see William May, "The Theology of Work," in Dwyer, *The Dictionary of Catholic Thought*, 991–1002, and John Paul II's encyclical on Human Work, in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 352–92.

33. The American bishops' letters on nuclear weapons and economic justice are in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 492–571, 572–680. Michael Novak, *Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age* (Nashville, 1983); idem, *Freedom with Justice: Catholic Social Thought and Liberal Institutions* (San Francisco, 1984).

34. I treat some of this range in my "Neither Liberal nor Socialist," in John Coleman, S.J., ed., *One Hundred Years of Catholic Social Thought* (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1991), 25–42.

35. "Economic Justice for All," #20 in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 576.

36. "Economic Justice for All," #131 in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 609.

37. Bryan Hehir, "The Right and Competence of the Church in the American Case," in Coleman, *One Hundred Years of Catholic Social Thought*, 55–71.

38. *Gaudium et Spes* #3, in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 167.

39. *Dignitatis Humanae,* in David O'Brien and Thomas Shannon, eds., *Renewing the Earth* (Garden City, N.Y., 1977), 295.

40. O'Brien and Shannon, eds., *Renewing the Earth,* 391.

41. I treat this evolution in my "Neither Liberal nor Socialist."

42. For the evolution in American Catholicism in attitudes toward the state and public policy, see David O'Brien, *Public Catholicism* (New York, 1989).

43. José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago, 1994).

44. In O'Brien and Shannon, *Renewing the Earth*, 297.

45. Hollenbach, *Claims in Conflict*, 189.

46. For the new competition (or threat?) to religious and nonreligious nonprofit welfare providers by for-profit providers, see William P. Ryan, "The New Landscape for Nonprofits,"

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Harvard Business Review (January–February 1999): 127–36.

47. For a treatment of USCC and policy, see Reese, *A Flock of Shepherds*, 187–224.

48. For a complaint about theologically untutored policy workers driving some Protestant denominational policy in the United Methodist Church, see Robert Bellah et al., *The Good Society* (New York, 1991), 196.

49. Reese, *A Flock of Shepherds*, 210.

50. A rejection of trying to make Catholics into a voting block is found in Bernard Cardinal Law, "Christian Coalition's Catholic Alliance," in *Origins* 25 (15 February 1996): 574–77.

51. Stephen Johnson and Joseph Tamney, eds., *The Political Role of Religion in the United States* (Boulder, 1986), 223.

52. Allan Hertzke, *Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity* (Knoxville, 1988), 81.

53. Fred Kammer, *Salted with Fire* (New York, 1995).

54. Melanie diPietro, "Organizational Overview," in *Catholic Charities U.S.A.: Who Do You Say We Are?–Perspectives on Catholic Identity in Catholic Charities* (Alexandria, Va., 1998), 29.

55. Brown and McKeown, *The Poor Belong to Us*, 11.

56. Edward Ryle, "Catholic Charities: The American Experience," *Catholic Charities U.S.A.* (January–February 1987): 14 (the whole two-part article, pp. 8–24, is a good overview of the history and organizational development of Catholic Charities U.S.A.

57. Cited in *The Poor Belong to Us*, 197.

58. "Economic Justice for All," #210 in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 625.

59. "Economic Justice for All," #211 in O'Brien and Shannon, *Catholic Social Thought*, 626.

60. Ibid.

61. "Transforming the Welfare State," Catholic Charities U.S.A., 24 January 1994.

62. "Connecticut Bishops' Welfare Reform and Basic Human Needs," *Origins* 24 (8 December 1994): 435.

63. Bishop John Ricard, "The Factors of Genuine Welfare Reform," *Origins* 24 (9 February 1995): 564.

64. Bishops of Florida, "Promoting Meaningful Welfare Reform," *Origins* 24 (2 March 1995): 610–12.

65. "Moral Principles and Policy Priorities for Welfare Reform,", *Origins* 24 (30 March 1995): 673–77.

66. Fred Kammer, "Why Some Welfare Reform Proposals Can Backfire," *Origins* 24 (30 March 1995): 565–70.

67. Bernard Cardinal Law, "Christian Coalition's Catholic Alliance," 574.

68. "Moral Principles and Priorities," #6–7.

69. "Transforming the Welfare System," 12.

70. Kammer, "Why Some Welfare Reform Proposals Can Backfire," 567.

71. Massaro, *Catholic Social Teaching and United States Welfare Reform*, 159.

72. "Moral Principles and Priorities," #5.

73. "Transforming the Welfare System," 7.

74. For the history of American welfare policy and its earlier recognition of need as a moral claim, see Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).

75. Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood, *Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). Mary Jo Bane, "Poverty, Welfare, and the Role of the Churches," *America* (4 December 1999): 8–11.

76. "Moral Principles and Policy Priorities," #4.

77. See "Responding to Welfare Reform: A Report from Catholic Charities USA," Catholic Charities U.S.A., Alexandria, Va., September 1998.

78. For these principles, see Massaro, *Catholic Social Teaching and United States' Welfare Reform*, 181–88.

https://doi.org/10.1353/jph.2001.0021 Published online by Cambridge University Press