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NOTES AND DISCUSSION

See-in: A case of lexically-governed, non-clausal predication[1]

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The *see-in* construction, exemplified in sentences like *John sees/finds in Mary his best friend* involves a relation of predication between the DPs *Mary* and *his best friend*. It provides evidence against the hypothesis that predication relations are established uniformly within the syntactic context of clausal structure. The empirical facts show that [*in Mary*] and [*his best friend*] in this example are both complements of *see/find*. It follows that *Mary* and *his best friend* could not possibly be syntactically related as the subject and predicate of a clause, despite the fact that they are engaged in a semantic relation of predication.

1. Introduction

The claim that predication relations are established uniformly within the syntactic context of clausal structure has been central (although not undisputed)[2] to work in generative grammar. According to Chomsky (1981: 29–30), this claim follows from the Projection Principle, which insists that lexical properties must be satisfied in the same way at all levels of representation. One reason, among others, why such a view may be considered desirable is the simplicity it confers upon the syntax–semantics interface: Meaning maps transparently into syntactic structure in that the same semantic relation (of predication) always maps onto the same syntactic, configurational relation.[3] The specific construction discussed in this

[1] I am thankful to three anonymous *Journal of Linguistics* referees as well as to the editor Caroline Heycock for many helpful comments and suggestions.

[2] The view of predication as uniformly clausal has been disputed within generative grammar and by researchers working within alternative frameworks, and remains controversial. The debate has concerned cases traditionally analyzed as involving complement small clauses and structures known as instances of 'secondary predication'. A detailed overview of the literature is beyond the scope of this article. For alternative views of complementation structures see e.g. Williams (1994), Pollard & Sag (1994), Bresnan (2001) and Culicover & Jackendoff (2005). Rothstein (2006) is a fairly exhaustive survey of work on secondary predication structures.

[3] A recent statement of (a version of) this view of predication, as being uniformly a clausal relation, can be found in den Dikken (2006).

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article presents a difficulty for this view since it involves two phrases in a semantic, but not syntactic, subject–predicate relation. This discussion concerns the syntax of the predication relation established between *Mary* and *his best friend* in sentences like the following, involving the verbs *see-in* and *find-in*.[4]

(1) John sees/finds [$_{PP}$ in [$_{DP}$ Mary]] [$_{DP}$ his best friend].

Modern Hebrew has an identical construction that involves the verbs *ra'a-bé* 'see-in', *maca-bé* 'find-in', shown in (2) below. The argument advanced here holds equally for the Hebrew construction. Unless specified otherwise, the reader may take all empirical observations made here with regard to the English *see-in* construction as valid also for the corresponding construction found in Hebrew.[5]

(2) Dan ra'a/maca [$_{PP}$ bé [$_{DP}$ Dina]] [$_{DP}$ xavera tova].
Dan saw/found in Dina friend good
'Dan saw/found in Dina a good friend.'

As shown by the brackets in (1) and (2), the main verb in these sentences is followed by two phrases: a PP headed by the preposition *in*/*bé* and a DP. In both sentences it is the DP embedded within the PP (i.e. *Mary*/*Dina*) which is semantically construed as subject of the following predicate DP (*his best friend*/*xavera tova*).

2. Predication

The predicative nature of the second DP and of the construction as a whole, is evident, first of all, from the overall understanding of sentences like (1) and (2): A simple paraphrase of (1) is *John considers Mary his best friend*. Clearly, if the second DP in (1) is used as a predicate then it cannot be referential. Indeed, unlike e.g. *his best friend* in *His best friend visited me yesterday*, this DP in (1) is clearly non-referential.

Additional evidence in favor of viewing the *see-in* construction in (1)–(2) as involving predication comes from contrasts like that in the following Hebrew example.

[4] The labels *see-in* and *find-in* refer to the main verbs in sentences like (1) as lexical items distinct from the verbs *see* and *find* occurring in other constructions. As the arguments advanced here show, these verbs and the preposition *in* in sentences like (1) are strictly separate items both morphologically and syntactically.

[5] The *see-in* construction is attested also in German, including the phenomenon of accusative marking of the second, predicative, DP complement of *see-in*/*find-in*.

(i) Ich sehe/finde in ihm einen Verdächtigen/meinen besten Freund.
I see /find in him.DAT a.ACC suspect.ACC/my.ACC best.ACC friend
'I see/find in him a suspect/my best friend.'

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(3) [Dan$_i$] roé [bé-Dina$_j$] [et ha-'oyev ha-gadol bé-yoter šel *acmo$_i$/acma$_j$].
Dan.MASC sees in-Dina.FEM ACC the-enemy the-big most ŠEL himself/herself
'Dan sees in Dina *his own/her own worst enemy.'

Being the subject of predication, *Dina* in (3) induces an opacity effect as a result of which binding of *acmo* 'himself' by *Dan* becomes impossible. Such an effect is absent in a sentence like (4), which involves no predication relation and is identical to (3) in terms of constituent linear order of (i.e. DP_{Subj} – V – PP – DP).[6]

(4) [$_{DP}$ Dan$_i$] siper [$_{PP}$ le-Dina] [$_{DP}$ et kol ha-sipurim al acmo$_i$].
Dan told to-Dina ACC all the-stories about himself
'Dan told Dina all the stories about himself.'

In making our claim regarding (1)–(2) as involving predication, we have to acknowledge the fact that the form *see-in* can also be employed in sentences which do not involve a relation of predication between the two relevant DPs. The example in (5) is useful as an illustration of this point.

(5) John sees in Mary (a) true genius.

While the DP *a true genius* can be used to refer to an individual who happens to have the property in question (i.e. being a genius), the DP *true genius* can only refer to the property itself and not to the individual. Consequently, when it comes to predicating this property of some individual, only *a true genius*, but not *true genius*, can be used:

(6) Mary is *true genius/a true genius.

It follows that a sentence like *John sees in Mary true genius*, although perfectly acceptable, could not be viewed as involving a predication relation between *Mary* and *true genius*. This (non-predicative) way of employing *see-in* comes out much more sharply in a sentence like (7).

(7) John sees in Mary (only) her good properties/qualities (and ignores the bad ones).

Clearly, a DP like (*only*) *her good properties*/*qualities* could not possibly be viewed as predicated of *Mary* in (7) (compare **Mary is* (*only*) *her good properties*/*qualities*). It follows that the possibility of a non-predicative use of *see-in* must be admitted. However, my claim is that certain DPs – although certainly admitting a non-predicative use (like any DP) – fit into the relevant position in the

[6] The potential relevance of sentences like (3) was urged upon me by an anonymous *JL* referee.

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see-in construction much more naturally and easily as predicates than as non-predicates. DPs such as *his best friend* or the Hebrew *xavera tova* 'a good friend' seem to be good examples of this kind: When embedded within the *see-in* construction in the relevant position, they rule out a non-predicative construal. Therefore, when such DPs occur in the *see-in* construction, this construction is construed as involving a predication relation. A clear implication of this overall picture is that examples like the following should be highly infelicitous.

(8) (a) #John sees in Mary [many good qualities and his best friend].
(b) #John found in Mary [a good friend and good qualities].

The rather extreme strangeness of (8a–b) is the effect of a clash between the two ways of employing *see-in*/*find-in*, each of which being imposed, or strongly favored, by one of the two DPs coordinated in the bracketed position. Specifically, while *his best friend*/*a good friend* strongly favors a predicative construal within the *see-in* construction, the DP (*many*) *good qualities* is only compatible with a non-predicative construal in the context of this construction. Since the most plausible account of what is wrong in such cases is the one based on the idea of a clash between two ways of employing *see-in*/*find-in*, the phenomenon attested in (8a–b) provides further evidence in favor of the view that in sentences like (1) or (2) this verb does indeed give rise to a relation of predication between the two relevant DPs. In other words, if no predication were involved, a clash of the kind observed in (8a–b) would be unexpected.

As (9a–b) show, the effect of conflict between the two ways of employing *ra'a-bé* 'see-in' is just as sharp in the corresponding Hebrew sentences.

(9) (a) #Dan ro'é bé Dina (harbé) txunot tovot ve xavera tova.
Dan sees in Dina many qualities good and friend good
'#Dan sees in Dina many good qualities and a good friend.'
(b) #Dan ro'é bé Dina xavera tova ve (harbé) txunot tovot.
Dan sees in Dina friend good and many qualities good
'#Dan sees in Dina a good friend and many good qualities.'

It follows from the above that the unacceptability attested in (8)–(9) depends on the nature of each of the coordinated DP in the position of the second complement of *see*. Thus, (10) below is fairly acceptable despite the fact that the DP *a husband for Jane* is compatible with a predicative construal, as shown in (11a).

(10) Mrs Bennet saw in Bingley a husband for Jane and the possibility of advancement for the whole family.

(11) (a) I consider Bingley a husband for Jane.
(b) *I consider Bingley the possibility of advancement for the whole family.

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The explanation offered here for this fact is that *a husband for Jane* is more flexible than *his best friend*/*a good friend* and allows for a non-predicative construal in the context of the *see-in* construction. Consequently, it can be conjoined with *the possibility of advancement for the whole family* which, as (11b) shows, is generally compatible only with a non-predicative construal.[7]

I thus conclude that simple *see-in*/*find-in* sentences such as (1) and (2) involve a predication relation between the DP complement of *in* (construed as the subject of predication) and the DP that follows it.

3. AGAINST A CLAUSAL ANALYSIS OF THE PREDICATIVE *SEE-IN* CONSTRUCTION

In what follows, I argue that the PP and the DP following *see*/*find* in the predicative constructions manifest syntactic properties characteristic of complements. Given the correctness of this claim, the two DPs that are semantically related as subject and predicate cannot be viewed as forming a clausal structure. I will consider first the PP and then the DP.

Beginning with the PP (i.e. *in Mary* in (1)), one relevant piece of evidence is the fact that this phrase involves the preposition *in* (or the Hebrew *bé* 'in' in (2)) as the only admissible choice of preposition after the verb *see*. The restriction illustrated in (12), by which other locative prepositions are ruled out, is an instance of subcategorization imposed by the verb.[8]

(12) *John sees **on**/**at**/**about** Mary his best friend.

An additional insight into the nature of the preposition *in*/*bé* in this construction can be gained through a comparison with the English *think-of* construction discussed by Williams (1980). As Williams observes with regard to examples like (13), there is good reason to think that in this sentence '*think-of* has been reanalyzed as a complex verb' (Williams 1980: 204).

[7] The possibility that *see-in* may be compatible with a non-predicative construal was suggested to me by an anonymous *JL* referee. Instances of coordination involving a potential clash, including specifically examples (10)–(11), were pointed out to me by Caroline Heycock. I am grateful to both for the initial suggestion, for discussion, as well as for the examples.

[8] The fact that the same preposition, 'in', is employed in the *see-in* constructions of three languages as different as English, German and Hebrew may be taken to show that this form is not entirely empty semantically. However, *in*/*bé* of the *see-in* construction could not be viewed as semantically locative in any simple sense. This seems obvious given its inability to alternate within this construction with other locative prepositions (see (12)). Moreover, the order of constituents attested in this construction is ruled out in standard locative predications: *John saw* [$_{DP}$ *a book*] [$_{PP}$ *on the table*]/**John saw* [$_{PP}$ *on the table*] [$_{DP}$ *a book*]. This fact rules out the additional possibility of viewing the *see-in* construction as involving a PP complement related as a locative predicate to the following DP, which would be construed as its subject. Quite to the contrary, the understood subject of the construction is the PP-internal DP.

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(13) John thinks of Bill as silly.

In support of this claim, Williams offers the following examples:

(14) (a) Bill was thought of ___ as silly.
(b) Who do you think of ___ as silly?
(c) *Of whom do you think ___ as silly?

As (14a–c) show, in predication structures that involve displacement of the understood subject, the form *of* may remain in place, thus giving rise to the phenomenon known as 'preposition stranding', as in (14a–b). In fact, the form *of* not only may, but actually must, remain in place, as shown by (14c). Williams' (1980) suggestion that the two forms *think* and *of* have been 'reanalyzed as a complex verb' provides a plausible account of this fact.[9] As the examples in (15) demonstrate, the case of *see-in*/*find-in* is radically different.

(15) (a) *Mary is seen/found in ___ a good friend. (compare (14a))
(b) *Who does John see/find in ___ a good friend? (compare (14b))
(c) In whom does John see/find ___ a good friend? (compare (14c))

Specifically, the form *in* in this construction is, undoubtedly, syntactically and morphologically, an entity independent of the verb *see*/*find* and so, unlike with *think* and *of* above, there is no reason to regard *see*/*find* and *in* as reanalyzed as a complex verb. Clear indication to this effect is provided by (15c), where *in* and the following DP form a constituent which undergoes movement. The ungrammatical (15a, b), on the other hand, are cases where the preposition *in* is stranded due to the fronting of its complement.

Finally, that *in* and *Mary* in (1) form a constituent is also demonstrated by (16), where these two items have undergone rightward movement. *Think-of* in (17a, b) contrasts with *see-in*/*find-in* with regard to the admissibility of such movement.

[9] The original paradigm in Williams (1980) includes also (i), in which the predicative *as*-phrase is missing:

(i) Of whom are you thinking?

The contrast between (i) and (14c) is taken as evidence for the c-command restriction on predication. However, to the extent that the *see-in* construction must be analyzed along the lines suggested here, then it must be admitted to violate this restriction. On this analysis the understood subject in this construction is embedded within a PP in a structure that, evidently, involves no process of reanalysis of the kind suggested by Williams for *think-of* in a sentence like (13). My conclusion is that the c-command constraint (or the less restrictive m-command, or mutual m-command, restriction) on predication CAN be violated and what allows such violation in this specific case is the lexically governed nature of the predication relation established in the *see-in* construction.

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
(16) John sees/finds his best friend [in Mary].

(17) (a) I think [of John] as a good friend.
(b) *I think as a good friend [of John].

There is thus another reason to think that, unlike *think-of*, the *see-in* construction does not involve reanalysis. Rather, being syntactically and morphologically an independent entity, the form *in* is a lexically selected head of a PP complement of *see*/*find*.[10] The DP complement of *in* (or *bé*) is construed as subject of the following predicate DP, in violation of the well-known c-command constraint on predication (Williams 1980: 203–204).

The main potential analysis of the *see-in* construction that we wish to rule out can be represented as in (18a), where [*Mary*] and [*his best friend*] from a (small) clause.

(18)



Given the evidence considered so far, one major shortcoming of (18a) is that in this structure the preposition *in* and the DP *Mary* do not form a constituent. However, as the examples in (15c) and (16) above indicate, the *see-in* construction certainly involves such a constituent as part of its structure. An alternative analysis of this construction that DOES involve such a constituent is (18b). However, (18b) is inadequate because it represents the PP *in Mary* as internal to a (small) clause. In this way (18b) is unable to account for the attested effect of the (local) subcategorizational restriction imposed by the verb on the head of this PP, as demonstrated in (12) above. Note that, in any case, if what one wants to defend, when dealing with the *see-in* construction, is the general hypothesis about the uniformity of predication as universally involving a clausal

[10] A phenomenon familiar from English grammar (but which is non-existent in Hebrew) is that of verbal particles such as *on*/*off* in *John turned* (*on*/*off*) *the light* (*on*/*off*). Clearly, *in* in the *see-in* construction is not an element of this kind: **John sees Mary* IN *a good friend*.


Another option is, potentially, that of viewing the form *in* as a morphological manifestation of Case marking/features. On this view, *in Mary* in (1) would be a Case marked DP rather than a PP headed by *in*. This option is ruled out by the fact (pointed out by Neeleman 1997) that there is no complementary distribution of preposition and morphological Case in this construction: *I see in* HIM *a good friend. Ich sehe in* MEINEM *Freund den besten Spieler* 'I see in my friend the best player'.

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structure, then (18b) is evidently not a desirable analysis: In (18b) *Mary* and its understood predicate *his best friend* do not form a clause.

The difficulties pointed out for (18a–b) are avoided by the analyses represented in (19). The structure and derivations represented in (19) are compatible with the hypothesis about the syntactic uniformity of predication, while maintaining the PP *in Mary* as a constituent within the structure.

(19)



In (19), *Mary* functions as the complement within a PP headed by *in*, thus forming a constituent with this preposition, either as the result of movement/Raising into PP (to the extent that a Raising operation into the complement-of-P position is generally admissible), or without such movement, with PRO, instead of a trace, as the subject of a small clause.[11] The DP *his best friend* is analyzed in (19) as the predicate of a small clause whose subject position is occupied by PRO, understood to be controlled by *Mary*, or by a trace of movement that has *Mary* as its antecedent.

Below I will consider facts regarding the predicate DP of the *see-in* construction that can serve as evidence against any clausal approach to this construction, including the two variants represented in (19). First, however, let us consider the specific variant of a clausal analysis involving the choice of PRO as subject of the small clause. Under this analysis, (19) is an extension of a strategy familiar in the generative tradition from the analysis of secondary, or adjunct, predication (see e.g. Chomsky 1981; Stowell 1981, 1982).

(20) (a) John arrived [PRO asleep].
(b) Mary ate the meat [PRO raw].

One obvious difficulty with this analysis is that it is incompatible with familiar generalizations regarding the distribution of PRO (Chomsky 1981). As is well

[11] Both alternatives represented in (19) were suggested to me by anonymous *JL* referees.

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known, PRO is ruled out from the subject position of complement small clauses, as shown by contrasts like the following:

(21) (a) John cannot imagine [Mary drunk].
(b) *John cannot imagine [PRO drunk].

In view of such contrasts (independently of one's favorite theory of the distribution of PRO), one does not expect PRO to be admitted in (19) as subject of the complement of *see*.

Note now that both potential analyses of the *see-in* construction represented in (19) and, indeed, any clausal analysis of this construction, including those represented in (18a–b) and discussed above, encounters considerable difficulties deriving from facts related to the status of the predicate DP.[12] Specifically, under any variant of the clausal approach to the *see-in* construction, this DP is necessarily analyzed as a clause-internal predicate, as opposed to being a complement (i.e. direct object) of *see-in*. However, this is untenable in view of certain clear indications regarding its status as a lexically selected argument and syntactic complement.

Thus, other than its being an obligatory component of the *see-in* construction (compare **John sees in Mary* __), the predicate DP manifests a typical characteristic of selected complements: Its categorial identity is strictly and arbitrarily restricted to DP, as shown in (22).

(22) *John sees/finds in Mary intelligent.

The ungrammaticality of (22) is due to a simple violation of a subcategorization restriction imposed by the main verb (*see*/*find*) on the predicate phrase. The application to this phrase of this strictly local restriction is a clear indication of its status as a complement.[13]

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[12] Thus, the general theoretical question regarding the assumption of movement/Raising from the subject position of a clause to the position of complement of a preposition need not concern us here. Examples like the following (Postal 1974, 2004; Culicover & Jackendoff 2005) can very plausibly be analyzed as involving such movement:

(i) (a) You can count on there to be great outcry when this data comes up.
(b) You can depend/rely on it to be hot in Houston.

However, my concern here is limited to the question whether the *see-in* construction could be viewed as involving such an operation. To the extent that this construction does not involve a clausal structure, it could also not involve a Raising operation. Given the status of the predicate DP as complement, the hypothesis of clausal structure is ruled out.

[13] Potentially, subcategorization restrictions on a predicate are not incompatible with a clausal analysis if one adopts Stowell's (1981, 1983) proposal to analyze a small clause as a projection of its predicate/head, with the subject as its specifier. However, as is well known (see e.g. Bowers 1993), this theory encounters insuperable difficulties exactly with cases where the predicate is a DP: *I consider*/*see in Mary* [$_{DP}$ *my sister's best friend*]. Since *my sister's best friend* is a full DP (including *my sister* as its specifier), no space is left for *Mary* to be construed as the specifier of this DP.

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The Hebrew *see-in* construction lends additional support for this view of the predicative complement, specific to the grammar of Hebrew: When it happens to be a definite DP, this complement must be preceded by the accusative marker *et*, as (23) illustrates. This example contrasts with (2), where the predicative DP complement is indefinite and no Accusative marking by *et* is admissible.

(23) Dan roé/mocé bé Dina *(et) ha-xavera haxi tova šel-o.
Dan sees/finds in Dina ACC the-friend most good his
'Dan sees/finds in Dina his best friend.'

In this respect the predicate phrase in (23) manifests properties typical of direct objects of verbs, thus differing from (definite) DPs functioning as predicates. As (24) shows, the predicate phrase within a clausal structure, if it happens to be a definite DP, can never be associated with accusative marking by *et*.

(24) Dina hi/hayta (*et) ha-xavera haxi tova šel-o.
Dina she/was ACC the-friend most good his
'Dina is/was his best friend.'

One might object that (24) is potentially of limited relevance for this discussion since it involves a non-embedded clause and no potential Case assigner. However, such an objection would miss the simple fact that (24) involves a non-Case marked predicate DP which, given the grammaticality of (24), can be taken to show that a predicate DP in a clausal structure, unlike the predicate DP in the *see-in* construction, DOES NOT NEED to be marked for Accusative Case.

An anonymous *JL* referee alludes to the possibility that the subcategorization restriction on the predicate could be compatible with yet another variant of the clausal approach, which would take the *see-in* construction to involve a PREDICATE PHRASE (PrP, Bowers 1993) whose (abstract) head (i.e. Pr) subcategorizes for a DP complement (i.e. the predicate), to the exclusion of other categories. In this connection, to the extent that any empirical support for such an analysis would be desirable, the least that can be said is that English does not seem to have any overt element that could plausibly be analyzed as the head of PrP, and which is limited to DP only as the complement/predicate. The main candidate from English for an overt element that could POTENTIALLY be analyzed as head of PrP is that of *as*. However, as the following examples show (borrowed from Pollard & Sag 1994: 108), *as* is not restricted with regard to the category of its complement, i.e. the predicate phrase:

(i) We regard/rate/count Kim as [$_{NP}$ an acceptable candidate]/[$_{AP}$ quite acceptable] [$_{PP}$ among the most acceptable candidates].

Note that, in any case, the postulation of a selectional restriction imposed on the predicate phrase by Pr would run into difficulties in an account of Accusative Case marking of the predicate DP discussed below. Given that the only potential Case marker/assigner in the construction is the verb *see*, the above proposal will necessarily involve the theoretically untenable assumption that the predicate DP is engaged in one feature checking relation with Pr, with regard to categorial selection, while being engaged, 'at the same time', in another feature checking relation with the higher verb, for purposes of Case marking.

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Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, it would be useful to consider the corresponding facts in embedded contexts. After all, Accusative Case marking 'into' what may plausibly be viewed as small clause complements is, actually, not impossible. Thus, arguably, (25), with *Dan* preceded by the accusative marker *et*, could be a case of this kind, where *Dan holéx* 'Dan walk/walking' is plausibly analyzed as a small clause complement of *ra'a* 'see'.

(25) Ra'it-i et [Dan holéx].
saw-I ACC Dan walk/walking
'I saw Dan walk/walking.'

What must be considered now are the facts regarding Accusative Case marking of the DP predicate of an embedded small clause.[14]

One verb which can plausibly be assumed to involve a small clause complement, in which a DP can be the predicate of this small clause, is *ti'er le-acmo* 'imagine'.

(26) Ta'ar-u le-acme-xem [et Dina (*et) roš memšala].
imagine.PL ACC Dina ACC prime minister
'Imagine Dina as prime minister.'

In (26) the predicate DP *roš memšala* 'prime minister' (unlike *Dina*) is indefinite and, therefore, could not be preceded by the accusative marker *et*. The question is whether a definite DP in this position can, or must, be preceded by this Case marker. As (27) shows, the answer is negative on both counts (i.e. neither *can* nor *must*).

(27) Ta'ar-u le-acme-xem [et Barak Obama (*et) nesi arcot ha-brit].
imagine.PL ACC Barak Obama ACC the President of the U.S.
'Imagine Barak Obama as President of the U.S.'

Taken together, (24) and (27) provide a simple illustration of the fact that a small clause predicate DP, in either an embedded or a non-embedded context, not only does not need Accusative Case marking by *et* but actually rejects it. On the other hand, the DP predicate in the *see-in* construction MUST be marked by *et* when it is definite.

On the assumption that *see-in* sentences involve an embedded small clause, the question that must be addressed is why the predicate DP of this small clause must be marked for Accusative Case. As just observed, such need for Case marking of the predicate DP is otherwise never attested in clausal structures. The only potential explanation of this fact regarding the *see-in* construction could be that such Case marking is obligatory, not because it satisfies a need of the DP in question

[14] In using the term PREDICATE here, I presuppose a distinction between a syntactic and a semantic notion: A syntactic predicate is a phrase occupying the predicate position within a (small) clausal structure. By contrast, a phrase may be semantically predicative without necessarily occupying a syntactic predicate position.

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(obviously, as observed, such need does not exist), but rather, because it satisfies a need of the higher verb *see-in* to assign (or, 'discharge') its Accusative Case. An account along these lines would, necessarily, have to invoke some principle that would make it obligatory for (certain) verbs to discharge their Accusative Case feature. To the best of my knowledge, such principle has never been suggested, for the good reason that it would have no empirical support.[15]

Thus, as the following example shows, the verb *see*, under a 'transitive' interpretation (i.e. involving an implicit object), is perfectly admissible without the occurrence of a DP complement to which Accusative Case could be assigned.


(28) Dan roé tov afilu ba-xošex.
Dan sees well even in the darkness
'Dan sees well even in the darkness.'

Needless to say, these questions and difficulties would never arise if the DP predicate of the *see-in* construction is viewed as a complement (i.e. a direct object).

4. A NON-CLAUSAL ANALYSIS OF THE PREDICATIVE *SEE-IN* CONSTRUCTION

I conclude that the predicative *see-in* construction is one where the verb *see* or *find* is followed by two complements, a PP headed by *in*/*bé* and a DP understood as predicated of the DP complement of *in*/*bé*. An analysis of (1) (or the Hebrew (2)) compatible with standard assumptions in current minimalist theory, and with the empirical evidence presented in this article, must involve a structure along the lines of (29).

(29)



[15] A potentially relevant proposal in this connection is that of the INVERSE CASE FILTER (Fukui & Speas 1986, Bošković 2002, Epstein & Seely 2006), which stipulates that the assignment of Nominative Case to the subject be obligatory. This proposal was made in an attempt to reduce the EPP to Case theory. No principle of this kind has been suggested, to my knowledge, which would apply to anything other than the subject. As shown by (28) below, such a proposal would have little to support it empirically.

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In this structure, the PP headed by *in* and the predicate DP are both represented as arguments of the main verb *see/find*, both satisfying, in their respective positions, all requirements of subcategorization and selection imposed by the main verb prior to the application of any displacements (such as, for example, the head movement of the verb).[16] On the analysis represented in (29), *see-in/find-in* are, semantically, three-place predicates whose second argument (i.e. the DP complement of *in*) is understood as the subject of the third. Cases of this kind have been noted before and there is no shortage of proposals in the literature regarding how the relation between the two last arguments of these verbs can be formally expressed.[17]

What is special about the *see-in* construction is that the empirical motivation for such an analysis is far stronger in this case than in other cases that have traditionally been analyzed as involving an embedded predication structure (e.g. small clause structures with verbs like *consider*, see e.g. Chomsky 1981; Stowell 1981, 1982). The arguments advanced here concerned, first, the PP headed by *in/bé*. Arbitrarily selected by the main verb, *in/bé* must be viewed as the head of a complement PP. Consequently, the DP complement of *in/bé* could not possibly form a clause with the DP predicated of it. As for the predicate DP, it was shown to be subject to a selectional restriction and Case marking in a way typical of complements rather than clause-internal predicates.

The understood subject of this construction, being internal to PP, does not c-command (or m-command) the predicate DP. This construction thus constitutes a deviation from well-known structural restrictions on predication. As suggested earlier, such deviation is not entirely unnatural given that the predication relation established in the *see-in* construction is an outcome of the individual lexical-semantic content of *see-in/find-in* and is in this sense lexically governed.

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[16] The structure, and derivation, in (29) bear obvious similarities to proposals made originally by Larson (1988).

[17] For one specific proposal see Bresnan (2001: 271–272) on the verb *keep*, as in *Susan kept John doubting himself*. See also Pollard & Sag (1994: Chapter 3) and Williams (1994: Chapter 3) for relevant and very detailed discussion.

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