A CONJECTURE ON THE 'NEW APULEIUS'

Lines 27.14–17 of the text published by Justin Stover as Apuleius, *De Platone* 3[1] are printed by him as follows:

quorum [*sc*. animalium] inmortalia esse quae in caelo sint; idcirco illa ordine cieri et eodem semper modo et alioquin esse prudentia.

Of them [*sc*. animals], the immortal animals are those which are in the heavens; thus they move in an ordered pattern in the same way, and in addition, they are rational. (trans. J. Stover)

As Stover notes,[2] this passage is based on *Epinomis* 981e–982a and 982d–e:

… νομίσαι δὲ δὴ δεῖ πάλιν τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν ζῴων γένη [cf. *quae in caelo sint*], ὃ δὴ πᾶν χρὴ φάναι θεῖον γένος ἄστρων γεγονέναι, σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δ' εὐδαιμονεστάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης. δυοῖν δὲ αὐτοῖς μοιρῶν τὴν ἑτέραν χρὴ δόξῃ μεταδιδόναι σχεδόν· ἢ γὰρ ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶναι [cf. *inmortalia esse*] καὶ θεῖον τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἁπάσης ἀνάγκης, ἤ τινα μακραίωνα βίον ἔχειν ἱκανὸν ἑκάστῳ ζωῆς, ἧς οὐδέν τι πλείονος ἂν προσδεῖσθαί ποτε.

… and these [*sc*. creatures with fiery bodies] again we must conceive to be heavenly kinds of creatures [lit. 'animals'], which altogether, we must agree, have been born of the divine race of stars, endowed with the fairest body as also with the happiest and best soul. One or other of two lots we may very well, in our opinion, assign to them: for each of them is either imperishable and immortal, and by all necessity wholly divine, or has a certain longevity sufficient for the life of each, such that nothing could ever require a longer one. (trans. W.R.M. Lamb)

τοῦθ' ἡμῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως πράττει, ψυχὴν οὐκ ἔχειν· οὕτω τοῖς ἄφροσι συνεφέσπετο τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον ἔμφρον καὶ ζῶν ὡς κινούμενον ὑπολαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἄφρον ὡς μένον ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς φοραῖς [cf. *ordine*]· ἐξῆν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ γε ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω καὶ βελτίω καὶ φίλα τιθεμένῳ λαμβάνειν ὡς διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἔμφρον [cf. *prudentia*] δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ διὰ ταὐτὰ πρᾶττον ἀεί [cf. *semper eodem modo*], τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν …

Most of us have thought just the opposite—that because they [*sc*. the stars] do the same things in the same way they have no soul: the multitude followed the lead of the unintelligent so far as to suppose that, whereas humanity was intelligent and living because it moved about, divinity was unintelligent because it abode in the same courses. But if man had sided with the fairer and better and friendly part, he might have concluded that he ought to regard as intelligent—and for this very reason—that which acts always in the same respects, in the same way, and from the same causes; and that this is the nature of the stars … (trans. W.R.M. Lamb)

ordine cieri is Stover's conjecture for the manuscript reading *ordinem queri*; he translates 'thus they move in an ordered pattern'. In his note[3] Stover makes it clear that he considers *cieri* here an equivalent of κινούμενον in the Greek text (though applied there to a different object), and points out that Cicero uses *cieri* of motion in his *Timaeus* (cf. Cic. *Tim*. 24: *orbis semper in eodem erat eodemque modo ciebatur*).

[1] J.A. Stover, *A New Work by Apuleius: The Lost Third Book of the* De Platone (Oxford, 2016).
[2] Stover (n. 1), 124 and 170.
[3] Stover (n. 1), 170.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838818000186 Published online by Cambridge University Press

But, whether the text is really by Apuleius or not and whatever its date,[4] the manuscript reading shows that what should be read there is definitely *ordine moueri*, the corruption being due to incorrect word division.[5] *moueri* is also a much more expected word choice for the author of the 'new Apuleius': elsewhere in this text he uses *moueo* four times (thrice in passive; for example, cf. 32.15 *moueri autem eum* [*sc*. *mundum*] *in orbem*) and never uses *cieo*.[6]

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doi:10.1017/S0009838818000186

A TESTIMONIUM ON PROCLUS' VIEWS ABOUT THE RATIONALITY OF ANIMALS

In this brief note, I wish to highlight Proclus' unappreciated contribution to a well-documented debate in antiquity that continues to hold great contemporary interest: what psychological characteristics (such as deliberation, purposiveness, practical intelligence, but also emotions, memory and self-awareness), if any, distinguish humans from non-human animals?[1]

In a fragment from his lost commentary[2] on Plato's *Phaedo*, quoted by the Aristotelian commentator Elias (active in the sixth century A.D.), Proclus puts forward the idea that, although animal behaviour displays some signs of rationality, it lacks a feature that is specific to human rationality, namely self-awareness. The immediate context in Elias' commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* concerns the nature of philosophy: he aims to show that the good of philosophy can be identified with the good for humans, rather than the good for some other creature, such as a dog or a horse.[3] Elias' own view is that animals have memory but not recollection (*In Isag*. 2.6–10 Busse):

[4] I hope to treat this question in a separate paper.

[5] For other instances of incorrect word-division in this text, see Stover (n. 1), 57.

[6] *moueor* is, of course, a much more standard equivalent for κινοῦμαι than *cieor*, but I do not really believe that κινούμενον is supposed to be rendered in the passage under discussion.

[1] For an overview of the debate in antiquity, see R. Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals* (Ithaca, NY, 1993), and the classic study by U. Dierauer, *Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike* (Amsterdam, 1977). For a useful collection of ancient texts in translation, see S. Newmyer, *Animals in Greek and Roman Thought* (London, 2011).

[2] Much of the content of Proclus' commentary on the *Phaedo* is preserved in the notes from *Phaedo* courses held by Olympiodorus and Damascius. See L.G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's* Phaedo. *Vols. I–II* (Amsterdam, 1976–1977) for an edition of these lecture courses, and S.R.P. Gertz, *Death and Immortality in Late Neoplatonism* (Leiden, 2011), 7–14 for their relation to Proclus.

[3] Cf. Elias, *In Isag*. 2.2–6.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838818000186 Published online by Cambridge University Press