Emotion in Motion: The *Nāṭyashāstra*, Darwin, and Affect Theory

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The Locus of the Classical

READING THE *NĀṬYASHĀSTRA* IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY produces a version of what classical Indian grammarians call "explosive hermeneutical shock."[1] Attributed to Bharata, a legendary spiritual master of the arts, this Sanskrit work probably began to circulate in manuscript about two centuries before the onset of India's classical period (roughly 400–1200 CE). Bharata's text formulated a comprehensive theory of emotion, which, eighteen hundred years later, intersects in deeply unsettling ways with accounts of emotion in such modern Euro-American classics as Charles Darwin's *Descent of Man* (1871) and *Expression of the Emotions* (1890) and William James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890), as well as in recent expositions like Silvan Tomkins's *Affect Imagery Consciousness* (1962–92). The crosscuts are neither slight nor superficial. The forty-nine stable emotional states, auxiliary emotions, and psychosomatic symptoms that Bharata classifies for the arts coincide in exquisite detail with most of the thirty-four emotions that Darwin, in his final years, maps out in common for human beings and animals (table 3 [see p. 1400]). Bharata's conception of emotion and its relation to mind also counterpoints James's position that consciousness is constitutively cognitive and discursive and that emotions resist not only rationalization but also enumeration and classification. Moreover, Bharata's typology of eight stable emotional states that frame all secondary feelings and emotions interlocks firmly with Tomkins's hierarchy of nine primary affects; but where the third-century thinker theorizes emotions with cosmopolitan neutrality, the twentieth-century psychologist projects them as predominantly "negative" (table 4).

These intersections across time and space are not the result of accidental or idiosyncratic textual juxtaposition. For reasons that

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we still cannot formulate after nearly three centuries of intellectual excavation, the fabric of thought in several modern European languages, as in Latin and Greek previously, is thickly interwoven with the thought that started to emerge in Sanskrit early in the first millennium BCE. Far from being foreign, Bharata's concepts and categories have been domesticated in European culture for a long time, in the intertextures of word and idea beneath the visible tissues of textuality. As Roman Jakobson points out, even the general concept of the "arbitrariness" of linguistic signs comes to us from Sanskrit, via Dwight Whitney and Ferdinand de Saussure (416; see also Pollock, *Language* 164).

Any analysis of the *Nāṭyashāstra* has to move in two directions simultaneously. In one, we have to engage with its world on its own terms, though that world is unfamiliar to a disorienting degree. As a *shāstra*, Bharata's text represents a discipline and a body of knowledge in a systematic, authoritative form, but it is also a practical manual for performers, poets, directors, choreographers, composers, managers, teachers, and connoisseurs in the field of *nāṭya*, conceived inclusively as the verbal and performing arts. It is the only such comprehensive work to survive from the classical world in any language, and it seeks conceptually to integrate literature, theater, dance, and music on a scale that foreshadows modern attempts to integrate the arts and humanities in classroom, workshop, auditorium, and public sphere. It unites the arts by placing emotion (as distinct from, say, perception and judgment) at the center of aesthetic theory and practice and by proposing that emotion (rather than reason, ethics, or morality) is the key to the social formation of taste and to the education of citizens in a cosmopolis (see Pollock, *Language*). In the other direction, we have to explore the reciprocal questions of how the *Nāṭyashāstra* interrupts constructions of emotion in modern science—from evolutionary biology to psychiatric medicine—and how Darwin, James, and Tomkins, in turn, unwittingly intercept an ancient Indian text rarely read outside Asia.

In this essay, I look closely at how Bharata conceives of emotion, differentiates and classifies several kinds of emotion, and theorizes the production, communication, and reception of representations of emotion in the verbal and performing arts. I then consider various points of convergence and divergence linking Bharata's general map of human emotional life and its artistic representation with Darwin's differently drawn yet remarkably concordant map of the "involuntary expressions" of emotion in human beings and animals; with James's picture of emotions in "the stream of consciousness," as flagged by bodily sensation, language, and cognition; and with Tomkins's atlas of primary affects, generated by neurobiological mechanisms and scripted by cybernetics but still occupying a terrain traversed originally by the *Nāṭyashāstra*. When charted analytically and comparatively, this material raises several questions of immediate theoretical and cultural significance. Do emotion and cognition belong to the same class of phenomena, or should they be placed at different sites in relation to consciousness and will? Do emotions obey deterministic laws of cause and effect, or do they contravene the criteria of necessity and sufficiency? What are the philosophical implications of Bharata's and Darwin's independent discoveries more than fifteen hundred years apart, that emotions as well as their expressions in the body are constituted combinatorially? When set beside Aristotle's *Poetics*, does Bharata's treatment of emotion and its representation in the arts generate an alternative model of mimesis?

Emotion in the *Nāṭyashāstra*

Bharata's word for emotion is *bhāva*, which comes from *bhū*, a verbal root literally meaning "to be; being; to come into existence, become." But *bhū* is a polysemic hub, and the

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Nāṭyashāstra expands it by invoking one of its other primary designations, "to cause to soak, infuse, or pervade"—which parallels the Latin *emovere* 'move,' where the prefix *e-* implies "to move thoroughly, into or out of a state" (7.1–3; *SOED*). In its long history involving specialized usage in metaphysics, logic, grammar, theology, ritual, mythology, literature, and aesthetics, the noun *bhāva* develops over three dozen denotations and connotations (Apte). From the wide array of meanings available by the beginning of the Common Era, Bharata travels along a spectrum spanning eight points of semantic reference. Thus *bhāva*, for him, names: a state of being in general; an enduring and encompassing emotional state, a state of being pervaded by an emotion; a particular, short-lived emotion that comes and goes; a concrete feeling correlated to one or more definite physical sensations; a psychosomatic condition that also is transitory and in which physical and mental components are interspersed and appear indistinguishable; a state of the body, with little or no concomitant mental activity; an existent, a concrete entity, a thing; and the nature of any entity, especially as in *svabhāva* 'one's own nature.' As Bharata employs these multiple significations, a *bhāva* remains and can be only existential: it is a condition that is manifested and embodied in a specific individual, a condition that he or she hosts and experiences directly as a subjective state. The phenomenological constitution of this subjectivity—along the basic lines of Edmund Husserl's "natural attitude" at the turn of the twentieth century—is anchored by *anubhava*, the principal Sanskrit term for "experience," which has the same origin as *bhāva* but designates what "follows after" the process of being, becoming, and having been, in sequence, form, and content (Welton 61–65; Apte).[2]

Bhū, which gives the *Nāṭyashāstra* this range of precisely conceived, finely graded designations, is also historically an origin of modern English "to be; being; becoming." Well before the birth of English, *bhū* was cognate with Greek *phu*, which provided Aristotle with *phusis* 'nature' and *ta phusika* 'the natural, the physical,' and cognate with Latin *physica* and *physicalis*, which yielded "physics" and "physical," respectively, along with their Cartesian and Newtonian overtones. *Bhū* is intimately connected to *as*—a second source of English "to be"—which is the most common verb in the *Nāṭyashāstra* and in Sanskrit discourse generally. Historically, *as* is the antecedent of Aristotle's *ousia* 'being'; and its conjugation *santi* (third-person "are") is cognate with *enti*, the principal Greek word for "is," which leads to *ontos* 'existence' as well as to the modern "ontology" (Apte; *SOED*). In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger retrieves *ousia* as the origin of his German *Sein* 'being' (cognate with both *santi* and *as*) and *Dasein* 'being there' or 'being in the world'—and also as the source of *parousia* 'presence' and *apousia* 'absence,' which Jacques Derrida gives wider currency in poststructuralism ("Différance" and "*Ousia*"; Spivak). This spread of references over time in the European languages—from objective physical states to subjective states of being and from bodily conditions to *being* in its abstract sense—is indistinguishable from the gradation that the *Nāṭyashāstra* establishes in its conceptualization of *bhāva* around the third century.

Bharata uses this semantic matrix to develop a theory that simultaneously explains emotional experience in everyday human life, the process of representing emotions in an artistic medium, and the aesthetic pleasure produced by artworks. His starting point is that our emotions phenomenologically compose an enumerable and classifiable plurality: some are well defined while others are not, some persist while others are transitory, some always accompany others while some come and go independently, and so on. He uses the various meanings of *bhāva* to create categories that separate and regroup emotions according to duration, quality, import,

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and function, among other measures. One of his most important categorical distinctions is between larger emotions, which endure and contain other emotions, and smaller emotions, which appear and disappear quickly but contribute to the articulation of other emotions. Another significant distinction is between emotions that cause other emotions and those that emerge only as outcomes. Bharata utilizes his classification to construct a comprehensive hierarchy in which the emotions not only are qualitatively distinct but also perform different functions in relation to one another. The purpose of these hierarchical categories and functions is to explicate the phenomenological differences among emotions, to explain their temporality, and to provide poets, actors, dancers, and musicians with the aesthetic means to represent their dynamics in texts and performances.

Stable Emotional States

Bharata's first category for the emotions is *sthāyī bhāva*, where the qualifier *sthāyī* is cognate and shares its core sound shape with "state, station, stasis, stance, stability" (6.17, 7.8; Apte).[3] As its name indicates, this class contains entire states of being or existential emotional states that are stable, established, or relatively static or stationary. Compared with other kinds of emotion, such an emotional state endures in everyday life for an extended period, ranging from days to decades. Bharata asserts that there are eight *sthāyī bhāva*s: *rati* 'sexual love, desire,' *hāsa* 'laughter, merriment,' *shoka* 'sorrow, grief,' *krodha* 'anger, rage,' *utsāha* 'enthusiasm, courage,' *bhaya* 'fear, terror,' *jugupsā* 'disgust, horror, hatred,' and *vismaya* 'astonishment, wonder' (6.17, 7.9–27; table 3). In some passages, Bharata suggests that these *sthāyī bhāva*s are major or dominant emotions; commentators have interpreted them also as general or permanent dispositions that are latent in the human psyche and become manifest to a subject's consciousness when they are actualized phenomenologically (7.8, 7.119–20; Masson and Patwardhan, vol. 1; Pollock, "From Rasa").[4] The *Nāṭyashāstra*'s boldest implication is that the *sthāyī bhāva*s comprise an individual subject's fundamental modes of existence in the world—that a self exists only in one or another of these long-lasting states at any given time, persists over time in a succession of such states, and has no other mode of existence.

A *sthāyī bhāva* is characterized as persistent and pervasive, but it always retains a constitutive temporality, a discernible beginning, middle, and end. In fact, the temporal dimension of an emotional state that persists in a subject provides a poet, a dancer, or an actor with the basic structural principle of plot and narrative whenever he or she seeks to represent feelings and emotions aesthetically in a text or performance. A state of being that stays in place for a long time, however, does not amount to emotional stasis; the protracted middle of any *sthāyī bhāva* is actually a turbulent phase in which many short-lived sensations, feelings, and emotions come and go constantly over an established undertone (chs. 20–21).

Causes: Triggers and Intensifiers

Bharata's second category of existential emotions is *vibhāva* 'causes' that bring an enduring emotional state into existence (7.4). Bharata specifies the causes of the enduring phenomenological state of sexual love and desire, for example, as "men and women and . . . the fullness of youth"; the "pleasures" of weather and season, walks in gardens, and fine homes; garlands of fresh flowers; cosmetics and fragrances; the company of dear friends, the sight of a loved one, the sound of his or her words; the absence of impediments; and games, playfulness, and erotic play (6.46–48, 7.9; on social context, see the extensive commentary in Doniger and Kakar). Late-classical commentators reinforce the dynamism of emotional condi-

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tions by distinguishing further between two subcategories of *vibhāva*s. One kind is an efficient cause: an object, person, or event that directly triggers the onset of an emotional state that ends up pervading a subject for a long time. The other kind is an intensifying cause: any element in the subject's field of experience that heightens and strengthens the emotional state that has begun to infuse his or her being.[5] Acting separately or in selections and combinations, the triggers and intensifiers belonging to the category of *vibhāva* initiate and stabilize a general state in the subject who hosts them, and they seem to set off a series of related emotional effects, even though that causality is not deterministic.

Ensuing Expressions of Emotion

Bharata's third category is *anubhāva*. Related etymologically to *anubhava*, the older Sanskrit term for "experience"—but not to be confused with it—*anubhāva* refers to any feeling, emotion, transient condition, or emotional response that "ensues" from the triggering, intensification, and stabilization of an encompassing emotional state (7.5). If the efficient causes of the preceding category were stitched into a deterministic sequence, they would generate predictable consequences and inevitable outcomes, governed by necessity and sufficiency. But the *Nāṭyashāstra* indicates quite clearly that the emotions do not work deterministically: neither the things that trigger and intensify them nor the things that ensue from a given emotional situation can be calculated in advance with certainty. In fact, in insisting on the name *anubhāva* for a category where we might expect to find mechanically determined outcomes, it adopts a position that is close to David Hume's skeptical stance that what we have empirically, at best, is "constant concomitance" rather than "necessary connexion" between so-called cause and effect (sec. 7, pars. 58–61). Bharata suggests that, even when definite efficient and intensifying causes act on the emotions, what ensues in the actual behavior of the subject experiencing them is only a set of frequent concomitants. In sexual love, for example, ensuing glances and looks, movements of eyebrows, gentle movements of the body, verbal sweet nothings, smiles, and flirtatious gestures become concrete only when the circumscribing situation has materialized existentially (6.46–48, 7.9).

Particular Emotions: Phenomenology

In contrast, the elements of the fourth category, called *vyabhichārī bhāva*, are particular, relatively short-lived emotions that can be pinpointed, enumerated, and described phenomenologically. In Bharata's fine-tuned taxonomy, there are thirty-three auxiliary emotions of this kind that are manifested, in selections and combinations, once a general emotional condition has infused a person's state of being (7.28–93; table 1).

The qualifier *vyabhichārī* describes something that assists, supports, nourishes, or strengthens and hence serves as an auxiliary to something else (Apte). Most of the delimited, transitory feelings and emotions that we routinely experience in everyday life are auxiliary *bhāva*s that feed whatever larger emotional zone we happen to be occupying. Bharata implies that a larger zone or *sthāyī bhāva* is just an empty modal frame, an underlying host platform that has no content of its own. It is a grid that is established by the triggers and intensifiers, and it begins to fill out with whatever content ensues from them; it is then fleshed out by various auxiliary emotions that actualize it as an object of experience (6.32, 7.1–27). Thus, a given enduring emotional state is elaborated by a characteristic subset of auxiliary emotions from the thirty-three belonging to this category: these definite, smaller emotions manifest themselves in various selections, sequences, and combinations, which in the process come to

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constitute the experiential stuff as well as the temporal realization of the condition (Krishnamoorthy 7.119–20; Ghosh [text] 7.119–22).

This articulation of a *sthāyī bhāva* by a series of *vyabhichārī bhāva*s is strictly dynamic: each ancillary emotion in an individual subject comes into being and passes out of existence autonomously, without inhering in the underlying emotional state the way a quality is supposed to inhere in a substrate substance in Aristotle's physics and metaphysics. The innovative ontology of general emotional states and particular emotions makes Bharata a protoprecursor not only of Husserl and phenomenology but also of Jean-Paul Sartre and existentialism, which gives states of existence ontological priority over essences (Sartre 67–69). Bharata's *sthāyī bhāva*s are like commodious Sartrean existential states without predetermined qualities. By definition they lie beneath the particular emotions we experience, but they are not substances in Aristotle's sense, coming into being only as and when their permutations and combinations of smaller, short-lived auxiliaries appear independently inside them. The *Nāṭyashāstra*'s conception, thus, is consistent with a nondeterministic causality, in which frequent concomitance, validated by experience and observation rather than by necessary connection, energizes the mutual interaction of emotions distributed among different categories.

Psychosomatic Symptoms

The fifth and final category of emotions—the one most neglected and misrepresented by translators and commentators—is *sāttvika bhāva* and consists of states very different from those in the other divisions (7.94–118). The word *sāttvika* is an adjective formed from *sattva*, a multivalent term that, in this context, denotes the mind (Apte). But *sāttvika bhāva*s emphatically are not identical to mental states; rather, they are a person's outwardly perceptible states of being that can only be understood as signifiers of his or her otherwise inaccessible mental states. Bharata catalogs eight conditions of this sort: bodily immobilization, sweating, horripilation, change of voice, trembling, change of color, weeping, and fainting (table 2). He clearly conceives of the conditions themselves as psychosomatic states, with perceptible physical manifestations that have to be interpreted semiotically. Borrowing an exact equivalent from C. S. Peirce, we might say that a *sāttvika bhāva* is an outwardly observable phenomenon that is linked to a person's psychosomatic state and that serves as an indexical sign or symptom pointing to an otherwise unobservable interior state. One can interpret the sign, then, the way one interprets visible smoke as an index of unseen fire.[6]

Bharata's categorization does not fix a unique emotional signification for each psychosomatic symptom, because its semiotics depends entirely on context: for instance, a child may tremble and quake in fear at night, a young woman may quiver and tremble in anticipation of a lover, and an old man may shiver and shake in despair. What distinguishes a psychosomatic symptom from other kinds of *bhāva*s is that it functions as a sliding signifier, points to an emotion rather than being one, and opens up intriguing possibilities as a representational device in performance.

For Bharata, the separation of psychosomatic states as a group is vital because they can appear existentially as signifiers, accompanying conditions, or components of an emotion belonging to any of the other four categories. For example, weeping may play multiple roles in a single emotional situation: if you step out of a room in a hospital, where you and I are visiting an ailing friend, and I see tears in your eyes and agitation in your face, the tears may trigger a sympathetic sorrow in me, which is intensified when I put my arms around you and you burst into sobs. What may ensue then are my own tears, expressing a general state of grief that has

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already set in. As both of us give in to our feelings over the next few days, my grief begins to unfold as a concatenation of several other, ancillary emotions—apprehension and uncertainty, anxiety, remembrance and nostalgia, dejection, reflection, determination, and so on—all of which may be mixed periodically with uncontrollable tears (tables 1–3).[7]

The Aesthetic Representation of Emotion

If the emotions that human beings experience in their lives can be differentiated and classified as above, then an artist has to decide which class or classes of emotions to represent in his or her work and how to use the categories and their interrelations to ensure its aesthetic success. The *Nāṭyashāstra*'s stance is that an artwork should make a protagonist's *sthāyī bhāva* or enduring emotional state, not one or more transitory emotions, its primary object of representation. However, even in a particular hero or heroine in a plot, this state has no existential content of its own and hence cannot be represented as such; it is an empty frame that acquires discernible features and qualities only when it is triggered into existence, stabilized by intensifying causes, and then articulated and actualized, first by the emotions that ensue immediately and then by auxiliary emotions. Thus, the artist's task of representing a protagonist's stable emotional state breaks down into a process of representing the causes, outcomes, and ancillary constituents of his or her condition (6.32, prose; 6.33–38). But such a process poses a problem of scale of representation, since the emotions of everyday life usually play out in many places and over extended periods, whereas their representations in poetry or drama are confined to the time and space of a text or theater. Any representation of an emotion in an artwork can be only a scaled version of its existential object—an enduring emotional state, especially, cannot be reproduced in its phenomenological temporality.

For the *Nāṭyashāstra*, the device that accomplishes aesthetic scaling in representation is *rasa*: an artwork should, and a successful artwork does, represent only a "taste" or "flavor" of a principal character's stable emotional state. In order to produce the *rasa* of a *sthāyī bhāva*, a poet or performer should "extract" all the state's elements that constitute its "essence"—not in the philosophical but in the culinary sense—and to present them so that a reader or spectator can "savor" it fully, the way a gourmand savors a fine dish (6.32, prose; 6.37). Since a protagonist's enduring emotional state consists of what its causes, ensuing emotions, and auxiliaries put into it, the flavor that the artist extracts from that state is nothing but the gustatory essence of these three types of ingredients. The *Nāṭyashāstra*'s famous formula or *sūtra* reads, "As represented in an artwork, the *rasa* or concentrated form of a stable emotional state is nothing but a combination of aesthetic representations of its existential causes, ensuing emotions, and auxiliary emotions" (6.32, prose). The practical consequence of this *rasa-sūtra* is that the training of an actor, dancer, musician, or poet needs to focus on the art and craft of representing all these ingredients together in a particular central character. Bharata's pedagogical goal is to equip the poet or performer with the skills that are necessary to aesthetically capture the "concentrated flavor" of a specific state and communicate that *rasa* in a text or performance in such a way that an audience experiences extraordinary pleasure in "relishing" it. Since artworks pursue the representation of the major emotional states and there are eight, the *Nāṭyashāstra* furnishes an artist with eight corresponding *rasa*s to convey them: *shṛṅgāra* 'eros,' *hāsya* 'mirth,' *karuṇa* 'compassion,' *raudra* 'fury,' *vīra* 'heroism,' *bhayānaka* 'terror,' *bībhatsa* 'revulsion,' and *adbhuta* 'wonder' (6.15, 6.44–76; table 3).[8]

The production of *rasa* in a text or performance involves three distinct stages. The first is poiesis, which Bharata encapsulates in

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his concept of *abhinaya* 'acting, enactment, or performance.' Along with its textual counterpart in the poet's act of composition (*anukṛti*, *anukaraṇa*, *anukīrtana* 'verbal imitation, verbal mimicry'), *abhinaya* requires the use of conventional devices and techniques, such as stylized gesture and figuration, to construct an aesthetic yet mimetic representation of a chosen emotional state (Krishnamoorthy 1.106–19, 6.23–26; Ghosh [text] 1.106–21, 6.23–26, 8.4–9; Apte). The second stage is a generalized semiosis, which Bharata characterizes as *abhivyakti*—the process as well as the outcome of "remanifesting," in a secondary medium or form, an object's original existential manifestation (Apte). This semiosis spans the full process of communication and conveys a representation of a lead character's emotion meaningfully from author or actor to audience.[9] The third stage is aesthesis, understood as the general process of reception and response in an audience, which Bharata signifies with the culinary metaphor of *āsvāda* 'tasting and savoring in the act of ingestion' (6.32–38). In modern terms, *āsvāda* proceeds by decoding the artist's representation, reexperiencing or reliving what it represents, and responding to these components (the representation, its object, and the induced reexperience of the object). The pleasure produced by an artwork arises from this manifold reception and response at the third stage; it is called *rasa-āsvāda* 'relishing of the concentrated emotion,' embodied in a hero or heroine and conveyed by a poem or performance. Over the entire arc culminating in such a savoring, a *rasa* is neither a substance nor a quality inhering in an artwork; as elusive and insubstantial as the underlying emotional state whose flavor it extracts, concentrates, and conveys, it becomes manifest only in the active experiencing of *rasa-āsvāda*, which is nothing but the temporality of poiesis–semiosis–aesthesis in dynamic process. As the philosopher-critic Abhinavagupta puts it around 1000 CE, a *rasa* is not an object of cognition: we do not and cannot know a *rasa* because we can only savor it, and we can savor it only while experiencing an artwork—it is never an object that can be separated from an act of reading, listening, or viewing (Gnoli 62–87; Masson and Patwardhan 1: 72–75; cf. Pollock, "From Rasa"). Bharata's dynamics of poiesis–semiosis–aesthesis is emotion in motion between the twin domains of life and representation.

Combinatorial Creativity

Bharata's definition projects the relation of *rasa* and *bhāva* as mimetic, but the pragmatic implication of his theory is that no two imitations of an existential emotion are ever exactly the same. His elaborate and intricate hierarchy of emotions, categories, and functions is schematic, but it transforms the likelihood of mere mimicry into the potential of innovative representation. In such an account of *bhāva* and *rasa*, the opening for imagination and originality lies in the fact that any emotion can be analyzed into a combination of phenomenological constituents of different kinds and that any representation of emotion can be composed as a corresponding combination of several different aesthetic constituents. On this continuum of theory and practice, any mimesis of emotion is always mediated by the creativity of combination.

The *Nāṭyashāstra*'s dynamics of emotion works combinatorially. Its Sanskrit term for combination is *yugama* 'yoking,' from the same root as *yoga*; its Middle English cognate is *yoke* (6.32, prose; *SOED*). When a *rasa* emerges as a yoking together of representations of various constituents of a protagonist's established emotional state, the elements of the combination are drawn from three mutually exclusive sets: the set of particular causes, which trigger and intensify that emotional state; the set of early expressions of emotion, which ensue soon after the state is stabilized; and the set of ancillary emotions, which flesh it out over time. The auxiliary emotions are at the heart of *rasa*'s

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combinatorics, since each long-lasting state can be realized existentially by many different combinations of short-lived emotions from the thirty-three auxiliaries in Bharata's inventory (Krishnamoorthy 7.119–20; Ghosh [text] 7.119–24; table 1). That such combinations generate an endless variety of representations of emotion links the *Nāṭyashāstra* directly to the modern paradigm—invoked from Wilhelm von Humboldt to Noam Chomsky—in which artistic practice, like language, makes "infinite use of finite means" (Chomsky v).

Movements in Modernity

Darwin's Emotions

A juxtaposition of the *Nāṭyashāstra* and Charles Darwin's work is unsettling on two fronts: on one, we experience the hermeneutical shock of recognizing the Sanskrit text from a fresh angle; on the other, we experience a comparable shock in relation to the evolutionist in Victorian England. We may ask, for instance, whether the *Nāṭyashāstra*'s hierarchy of emotions is arbitrary and merely conventional, or whether the work's taxonomy has a basis in empirical observation. Likewise, we may question the conviction Darwin had that he discovered something new on a global scale about "the structure of the human" and his perception that, if human beings had come to understand, in an earlier period of history, how the emotions work in nature, then "authors and artists would not have found it so difficult, as is notoriously the case, to describe and depict the characteristic signs of each particular state of mind" (*Expression* 280). He remained unaware that the whole point of Bharata's classical theory of emotion was to provide poets and performers with the means to describe and depict the characteristic signs of each emotional state with great precision.

In the second chapter of *Descent of Man*, Darwin summarizes empirical evidence from around the world to show that "the lower animals are excited by the same emotions as ourselves" (39). He suggests that these emotions can be divided into three loosely defined classes. The first consists of basic emotions (such as fear, suspicion, rage, and maternal affection), which appear in species ranging from cats, dogs, and horses to monkeys and human beings; the second and third classes, respectively, contain "the more complex emotions" (such as jealousy, pride, and shame), which are "common to the higher animals and ourselves," and "the more intellectual emotions and faculties" (such as excitement, ennui, wonder, curiosity, and dread), which provide "the basis for the development of the higher mental powers" (41, 42). Using a pastiche of anecdotes rather than a systematic inventory to review the behavior of animals, the emotions they express, and the circumstances of expression, he ends up naming some fifty-five emotions, which to an astonishing degree match a majority of the forty-nine emotional states, auxiliary emotions, and psychosomatic symptoms that Bharata catalogs for the verbal and performing arts.

The threads of correspondence between *Descent of Man* and the *Nāṭyashāstra*, however, become knotted and gnarled when we turn to *Expression of the Emotions*, the corrected and revised edition of which appeared posthumously in 1890. In this final work, Darwin seeks to "account for most of the expressions and gestures involuntarily used by man and the lower animals, under the influence of various emotions and sensations" (20). The paired terms *involuntary* and *expression* turn out to be his methodological nodes and define his distinctive epistemology of emotion, which distinguishes between two main types of involuntary expressions. The first type is bodily movement that becomes an expression of emotion in "actions due to the constitution of the nervous system," independent of both will and habit (21). An example is horripilation:

> Hardly any expressive movement is so general as the involuntary erection of the hairs,

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> feathers and other dermal appendages; for it is common throughout three of the great vertebrate classes. These appendages are erected under the excitement of anger or terror; more especially when these emotions are combined, or quickly succeed each other. (71)

The second type is movement of human and animal bodies that occurs by "force of habit and association" and without "effort or consciousness" (21) in response to particular situations and stimuli. Before becoming habitual, however, such movement is of "direct or indirect service under certain states of mind" (20–21) and enables an organism "to escape some danger, to relieve some distress, or to gratify some desire" (276). Among Darwin's many observations of "serviceable associated habits" that serve as involuntary expressions of mental states is this passage:

> I have noticed that persons in describing a horrid sight often shut their eyes momentarily and firmly, or shake their heads, as if not to see or to drive away something disagreeable; and I have caught myself, when in thinking in the dark of a horrid spectacle, closing my eyes firmly. In looking suddenly at any object, or in looking all around, everyone raises his eyebrows, so that the eyes may be quickly and widely opened. (24)

The complexity of this type of emotional expression lies in its connection to movements that are acquired through habit and association, that may then be transmitted from one generation to the next and hence become hereditary. Horses, for example, exhibit "certain transmitted paces, such as cantering or ambling, which are not natural to them." The "most striking instance of the perfection" of an inherited action that was originally a result of individual habit and association is the hummingbird's ability to be "poised stationary in the air," with its beak "inserted into the minute orifices of flowers . . . which requires such unerring aim" (22). Whether a bodily movement is a neurobiological reflex or a serviceable associated habit, Darwin's consistent methodological position is that it is something that "we recognize as expressive" (21).

As these two scientific definitions come to dominate *Expression of the Emotions*, Darwin's conceptualization of the object of analysis diverges sharply from Bharata's: involuntary expressions of emotion that are outwardly observable among human beings and animals are not the same thing as the *bhāva*s, various categories of emotion that individuals experience subjectively and that others observe in them as states of being. Although this difference appears to be fundamental, it masks a more complicated interpenetration of the texts that can be explicated along separate axes.

Along one axis, as summarized in tables 2 and 3, *Expression of the Emotions* supersedes the initial match between Darwin's fifty-five emotions in *Descent of Man* and Bharata's forty-nine *bhāva*s of various kinds and transmutes the correspondence into a deeper, manifold consensus of themes. Darwin remaps his observed objects into a new list of thirty-four emotions—labeled separately, in pairs, or in larger groups—while accommodating another twenty or so in the margins, as smaller calibrations in black and white and many shades of gray. He no longer classifies these emotions by their domains in nature (i.e., according to the species that express them) but instead divides them into eight clusters by their existential and hermeneutical connections. Like the three loosely defined, empirical classes of emotion in *Descent of Man*, the eight clusters in the later book remain pragmatic and phenomenological in their formulation, having no broader theoretical explanation or justification.

This remapping contrasts obviously with Bharata's organization of the emotions into five clearly conceptualized categories, where the hierarchical functions of the emotions are defined in relation to one another and also to the system as a whole. When several short-lived emotions appear together in the

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Nāṭyashāstra, their grouping is determined categorically—but not causally—by the phenomenological fact that, as particular emotions, they unfold inside an encompassing emotional state. However, as tables 2 and 3 show, even without a theoretical justification for his groupings, Darwin generates a list in which seven of the emotions that he considers fundamental to human beings and animals correspond to seven of Bharata's *sthāyī bhāva*s; eight of the psychosomatic symptoms he observes line up one-to-one with Bharata's eight *sāttvika bhāva*s; and twenty of his other labeled emotions are fine-tuned equivalents of twenty of Bharata's *vyabhichārī bhāva*s. Table 3 also indicates that the remaining emotions in Darwin's and Bharata's respective catalogs, which do not seem to match in their given forms, can be easily equated in appropriate combinations. The result carries an authority that cannot be overemphasized: the inventory of emotions and their clusters in *Expression of the Emotions*, a work produced late in the nineteenth century using planet-wide empirical observations of human beings and animals, and the inventory of emotions and their categories in the *Nāṭyashāstra*, a work produced in the third century primarily for the practice of the verbal and performing arts, are fully translatable into each other. The only significant remainder in this massive cross-cultural, transhistorical, and interdisciplinary equation is the difference of categorical paradigm and explanatory mode, which pales in comparison with the magnitude of the overarching thematic consensus.

The second axis displaying the interpenetration of the *Nāṭyashāstra* and *Expression of the Emotions* leads to the ontology of emotion. In the course of his thick phenomenological description of the whole range of observable human and animal emotions, Darwin repeatedly discovers that outward bodily signifiers and the inner states they supposedly express do not stand in a one-to-one relation to each other. Thus, a single feeling or emotional condition may be associated with several symptoms at once, and any given symptom may, under varying circumstances, point to several distinct emotions. Darwin's description of a state of terror in animals provides a memorable picture of a single complex emotion that is naturally expressed in a multiplicity of physical movements and conditions:

> With all or almost all animals, even with birds, terror causes the body to tremble. The skin becomes pale, sweat breaks out, and the hair bristles. The secretions of the alimentary canal and of the kidneys increase. . . . The breathing is hurried. The heart beats quickly, wildly, and violently. . . . The mental faculties are much disturbed. Utter prostration soon follows, and even fainting. . . . I once caught a robin in a room, which fainted so completely, that for a time I thought it dead. (58–59)

Likewise, his observations show how a single response such as weeping can appear in states as disparate as bodily pain, mental stress, fear, rage, and grief (117).

In dealing with this phenomenology, Darwin implicitly lays out a multilayered principle. On one plane, he converges unawares with the *Nāṭyashāstra*'s combinatorics, in which any emotional state is made up of several constituents and several types of constituents and any given building block (specified in the hierarchy of *bhāva*s) can serve as a component of several emotional states. In the process, he also segues into Tomkins's position three-quarters of a century later, that stimuli that instigate an affective response in an organism and the multiplicity of affects with which an organism may respond to a stimulus are characterized by many-one and one-many relations, respectively. In Tomkins's combinatorics, "[i]t is this differentiated coupling and uncoupling characteristic which permits the affect system"—in his conception, the neurophysiological "assembly" that governs human emotional life—"to assume a central position in the motivation of man" (1: 23).

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On another plane, Darwin holds that any involuntary bodily response to a stimulus is an expression of an emotion only because it is something that we recognize as expressive. So-called involuntary expressions are what we say they are only when we interpret them semiotically, reading outwardly observable movements of the body as Peircean indexical signs or symptoms of interior states that are otherwise inaccessible. Darwin's principle of interpretation, which he calls "inference," thus is identical to Bharata's semiotics of eight psychosomatic states, but the Victorian scientist extends it to all empirically observable signals of emotion.

On yet another plane, as the instance of the terrified bird indicates, Darwin concludes that the semiotic signifiers are the signified emotion itself. So what we as observers designate as someone else's emotion is nothing but the sum of outward signs that we perceive in the person. Even when I subjectively experience an emotion of my own as a phenomenological state of interiority, it appears in my self-consciousness as nothing but a series of indexical sings that I myself observe—such as "closing my eyes firmly" while "thinking in the dark about a horrid spectacle." As Darwin verges on a conception of emotion as something composed of its involuntary expressions—and not as a referent separable from its signifiers—he generalizes and applies to all emotions the ontology that Bharata reserves solely for *sthāyī bhāva*s or stable emotional states. In the *Nāṭyashāstra*'s phenomenology, an enduring emotional condition is the only kind that has no content of its own, but in Darwin's phenomenology all emotion is contentless, so that, in Gertrude Stein's later modernist phrase, "there is no there there" (298).

James's Cognition and Tomkins's Affects

In his closing chapter, Darwin admits that "throughout" *Expression of the Emotions* he "felt much difficulty about the proper application of the terms, will, consciousness, and intention" (278). As he avoids them, their troubling relations with emotion surface only when we juxtapose the *Nāṭyashāstra*; James's three-volume *Principles of Psychology*, published the same year as Darwin's book; and Tomkins's four-volume *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, which grows as much out of James's as Darwin's legacy.

For James, feelings and emotions—to the extent that they can be isolated and distinguished, about which he remains ambivalent—are located in the mind and arise and cease inside what he was the first to call the stream of consciousness. Consciousness itself is continuous, though its particular objects may not be and usually are not; and it is constitutively cognitive, in the sense that its constant motivation is to know, so that any object of consciousness, including a feeling or an emotion, is always an object of its cognition. Moreover, in James's perspective, cognition in turn is fundamentally linguistic, because to know something is to know it verbally, to capture it in words. Consciousness therefore is coextensive with language, so that its stream is identical to the stream of words of the "inner voice" that we never can switch off when conscious and awake (vol. 1, chs. 7–10; vol. 2, ch. 25). In *Principles of Psychology*, all emotion, general and particular, is enmeshed in thought and words and cannot be extricated from the actions of knowing, thinking, and saying. James's empiricism and pragmatism firmly exclude the converse of this conception, since there is no form of consciousness other than this cognitive manifold, and emotion has no locus outside thought and language.

This is the issue that James's work presses upon the *Nāṭyashāstra*, for the Sanskrit text refuses to say whether an emotional state or an emotion exists, or can exist, only inside language, cognition, intellect, mind, or consciousness. The Sanskrit text also refuses to claim that an emotion can be an object of cognition: Abhinavagupta argues that *rasa*,

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which is made up solely of representations of *bhāva*s and which induces a *bhāva*, in turn, at the end of aesthesis, cannot be cognized (Gnoli 62–87; cf. Pollock, "From Rasa"). Bharata's silence on the true ontological status of emotion is deafeningly eloquent. In its very naming, *bhāva* is a "state of being," a condition that we directly apprehend or feel (without cognition), one that "pervades" our subjective existence in the world (7.1–3). Since Bharata does not define *bhāva* as a state of mind or consciousness as such, it is neither a mental state nor an object of consciousness, in any ordinary sense. The *Nāṭyashāstra*, quite possibly, adopts the position that *bhāva* is a subject's state of being or existence fundamentally other than consciousness, mind, intellect, and cognition. In relation to James's narrow characterization of consciousness, the *Nāṭyashāstra* appears to conceive especially of a *sthāyī bhāva* as a noncognitive and nonlinguistic state of being that we apprehend directly in a mode outside the everyday stream of consciousness. For the Sanskrit text, thinking and feeling seem to demarcate two distinct, coexisting modes of a subject's existence in the world, modes that cannot be collapsed into each other without remainder.

This is the closest historical precedent of the position that Tomkins reaches at the end of his five-decade investment in the theory of affects. Approaching the organization of the human being as a whole in the disciplinary perspective of psychology, but also in that of cybernetics and artificial intelligence, he concludes that a human subject has two matched but clearly distinguishable lives: an affective life and a cognitive life. Each is organized by its own subsystem, and the two subsystems, in turn, are organized by a "central assembly system" (1: 151, 248; 4: 9–17). For Tomkins, the connection between the cognitive and affective subsystems is "a set of relations of partial independence, partial dependence, and partial interdependence that vary in their interrelationships, conditional upon the specific state of the whole system at any one moment" (4: 7). This model appears to reproduce cybernetically what the *Nāṭyashāstra* asserts ontologically: "I think" and "I feel" define two distinct modes of being in the world, and they do not occur in the same locus of interiority, even though they both take place inside the "unitary totality" of the same embodied subject (8, 14).

This position is not Tomkins's idiosyncrasy: it persists at the core of affect theory today. Gregory Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, for instance, tell us:

> Affect . . . is the name we give to those forces—visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally *other than* conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral [gear]) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can leave us overwhelmed by the world's apparent intractability. (1)

But, like Tomkins—who was a mid-twentieth-century playwright manqué—and Darwin and James earlier, Seigworth and Gregg remain unaware of the *Nāṭyashāstra*, and their conception is unduly restricted by metaphors from Newtonian physics and early modern physiology (Alexander 251–52). The intersection of Tomkins's ideas with those of the Sanskrit text begins and ends with the mutual distinction and interrelation of cognition and emotion that he describes above. It is impossible, for example, to proceed further and construe either *bhāva*s or *rasa*s as affects in his technical sense of *affect*:

> Affects are sets of muscles and glandular responses located in the face and also widely distributed through the body, which generate sensory feedback which is either inherently "acceptable" or "unacceptable." These organized sets of responses are triggered at subcortical centers where specific "programs" for each distinct affect are stored. These programs are innately endowed and have been

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> genetically inherited. They are capable when activated of simultaneously capturing such widely distributed organs as the face, the heart, and the endocrines and imposing on them a specific pattern of correlated responses. One does not learn to be afraid, or to cry, or to startle any more than one learns to feel pain or to gasp for air. (1: 243–44)

It is also impossible to resolve the conflict between Bharata's method of combinatorial composition, which cannot be converted to algorithms, and Tomkins's attempt to reduce both affect and emotion to a digital code: this is the hard division between context-sensitive combinatorial logic and context-insensitive binary logic, or between if-then and either-or. Moreover, Tomkins modifies the determinism of causality in the natural sciences, but his affects still seek to generate emotional and cognitive outcomes—and even consciousness itself—from neurochemical processes and scripts that operate impossibly across a Cartesian gulf between body and mind (1: 112, 248; 4: 17).[10] In contrast, Bharata's frequent concomitance of *bhāva*s and *rasa*s bypasses necessary and sufficient connections and constructs a combinatorics of emotion in which relatively small sets of elements engender an infinite use of finite means on a continuum of consciousness and embodiment.

Emotion and Mimesis

Like Darwin, neither James nor Tomkins is concerned with the voluntary representation of emotion in the aesthetic modes of the verbal and performing arts. The *Nāṭyashāstra* develops a comprehensive account of emotion, but it does not establish a general science of psychology: it seeks to provide artists and audiences with a repertoire for the production and reception of artworks. In this fundamental disjunction of paradigms, Bharata's conception of human poiesis remains antithetical to Darwin's conceptualization of involuntary expression in human and animal life. For the *Nāṭyashāstra*, the arc of poiesis–semiosis–aesthesis defines the generalized space of *kāvya* 'aesthetically heightened representation,' which divides into two complementary domains: *shravya kāvya* 'verbal and musical art,' in which the radical or basis of presentation and reception is orality-aurality or the channel of the oral and the auditory together, and *dṛshya kāvya* 'the visual performing arts,' in which the defining radical is the spectacular or the channel of "the moving image" in body and word (1.11; Pollock, *Language* 84; see also Pollock, *Language* 664; cf. Frye 246–47 on radical of presentation). While *kāvya* becomes a general synecdoche of culture and cultivation in the Indian classical period, staged drama brings together text, narration, plot, character, enactment, dance, and music in the public sphere to emerge as the dominant synecdoche of *kāvya* itself (a point that becomes canonical with Abhinavagupta). The scope of *nāṭya* 'theatrical art,' then, is literally universal in the Sanskrit text:

> Theater is the narrative enactment and
> public staging
> of any state of affairs in any place
> in heaven, on earth, in the underworld.
> (Krishnamoorthy 1.107, line 2;
> Ghosh [text] 1.106, line 2)

Theater's universality manifests itself in the range of theater's themes and concerns, in the scope and diversity of its genres (from high to low), and in the variety of its functions:

> Sometimes it depicts law and order, religion
> and morality,
> sometimes fun and games;
> sometimes it shows us money and wealth,
> sometimes home and family;
> sometimes it gives us mirth, sometimes war,
> sometimes love and sex, sometimes murder.
> (Krishnamoorthy 1.108; Ghosh [text] 1.107)

The extraordinary power of the stage has its origins in its mimetic constitution and cos-

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mopolitan inclusiveness. The *shāstra*'s patron-god, Lord Brahmā, asserts early in the text:

> The theater that I have created
> is a copy of the world as it is lived,
> replete with every kind of existing thing,
> every state of existence, every sort of
> interiority.
>
> It will be a hospitable host to the deeds of
> men—
> the best, the worst, the middling—
> including everything and leaving nothing out;
> it will teach people what is to their good,
> strengthen their commitments, bring them
> entertainment,
> promote their happiness, among other things.
> (Krishnamoorthy 1.112–13;
> Ghosh [text] 1.111–12)

The mimetic connection of theater to life is thoroughly mediated by aesthetics. In the perspective of an artist in action, the *rasa-sūtra* (6.32, prose) offers a double vision of poiesis, the two halves of which are consistent with each other: an existential *bhāva* and its representation in a *rasa* are inextricably interlinked by *anukaraṇa*, the action of "repeating after" or, more generally (together with *abhinaya* 'enactment'), the process of imitation or mimesis. But such an imitation cannot be a slavish copy, a merely mechanical reproduction of "things as they are"—it is inevitably an aesthetically scaled representation. The artist's poiesis mediates mimesis by choosing to convey the "concentrated flavor" of an enduring state of being. Consequently, what an audience relishes in an artwork is not a phenomenological *bhāva* but only the *rasa* that re-presents it aesthetically (cf. Chari 33–34, 208–14; Masson and Patwardhan 1: 35–42).

The difference between Bharata's model of mimesis and Aristotle's emerges at this intersection of emotion and representation. Aristotle's *Poetics*, for example, restricts itself largely to the emotions of pity and fear in tragedy and approaches them through Plato's charge that they are dangerous to the spectator's well-being, and that the spectator is vulnerable to them in both poetry and life. Despite his emphasis on artistry, Aristotle assumes that there is no ontological difference between an existential emotion and its aestheticized representation and that emotions in both categories need to be purged or cleansed; he therefore proposes that an imitation of tragic action be structured to produce a catharsis of the very emotions that it produces in its viewers (17–18, 46–49). Observing that "we enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is painful to us," he acknowledges that mimesis generates pleasure independent of the qualities of the emotions represented, but he does not explore this effect systematically. Instead, he locates the origins of both the desire to imitate and the pleasures of imitation in the domain of nature: it is "natural" for "human beings, from childhood, to engage in mimesis . . . and equally natural that everyone enjoys mimetic objects," because "man is the most mimetic of all [animals], and it is through mimesis that he develops his earliest understanding" (19, 36–37, 72–75).

The *Nāṭyashāstra*'s divergence from the *Poetics* is unmistakable. Bharata deals with the entire spectrum of emotions and the process of representing them mimetically across the verbal and performing arts and their genres; he steers clear of moral and qualitative judgments, treating all emotions equitably, whether as realia or as artefactual imitations. He maintains that any emotion mediated by artistic mimesis (*rasa*) is ontologically distinct from its unmediated counterpart (*bhāva*), and he projects the spectator as a robust connoisseur who savors representations skillfully in the combination of emotional immersion and aesthetic distance that characterizes *āsvāda*. These features of Bharata's model make a mechanism such as catharsis redundant even for the *karuṇa* and *bhayānaka rasa*s, which

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


FIG. 1
Illustration of the involuntary expression of terror in Darwin's *Expression of the Emotions* (1890), a woodcut based on a photograph taken by Duchenne during an empirical investigation in France in 1862. The surrounding text explains important aspects of the original experiment. Photo: Sachin Dharwadker.

correspond exactly to Aristotelian pity and fear. Most important, the Sanskrit text holds that mimesis draws on an enormous range of artistic devices, without which "the most precise images of things" cannot be crafted: *anukaraṇa* 'imitation' and its correlates of *abhinaya* 'enactment' (poiesis), *abhivyakti* 'remanifestation' (semiosis), and *āsvāda* 'savoring' (aesthesis) belong to the domain of culture, not of nature. As a comprehensive handbook of practice, it shows that the rigor of imitation is directly proportional to imitation's ability to enrapture an audience; it differs from the *Poetics* in regarding this ratio as fundamental to the commensuration of mimesis and aesthetic pleasure across the arts. Conceiving of mimesis as poiesis in the fullest sense and situating it at the heart of culture, the *Nāṭyashāstra* invests imitation with inalienable creative power—not only to transform the emotions it mediates but also to set them in motion as extraordinary instruments of civilization.[11]

The mimetic force of this theory of emotion and representation becomes palpable when we set the *Nāṭyashāstra* beside *Expression of the Emotions*. As we turn the pages of Darwin's book, passage after passage reads like a point-wise commentary on Bharata's Sanskrit text, then practically unknown outside India. The striking difference is that the movements of the eyes, eyebrows, eyelids, cheeks, nose, lips, mouth, and chin, for example, that Darwin records as invol-

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FIG. 2

Bhayānaka rasa 'terror' as enacted by Vinitha Nedungadi in the Mohiniyattam classical dance style, in a performance at Alva's Education Foundation, Moodubidire, Karnataka, India, 2 April 2010. The style is based on the *Nāṭyashāstra*, and the dancer's posture and expression combine about twenty *mudrā*s 'gestures' from Bharata's chs. 4 and 8–9. Photo: Krishna Mohan. Reproduced under license from Krishna Mohan Photography.

untary expressions appear in the Sanskrit text as voluntary gestures that an actor or dancer can discipline the body to perform at will and to call up instantaneously in its fluid dynamics on stage. The result of this disciplined human transformation is that, as figures 1 and 2 show, a contemporary Indian dancer, using a combination of about twenty *mudrā*s 'gestures' from the *Nāṭyashāstra* in her *abhinaya* of the *bhayānaka rasa* 'terror,' produces—unawares—exactly the same image of the emotion that Darwin discovers in a French laboratory setting one and a half centuries earlier.

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Table 1
The Thirty-Three Transient Auxiliary Emotions (*Vyabhichārī Bhāvas*) in Bharata's *Nāṭyashāstra*

1. *Nirveda*	(a) Despair, despondency, world-weariness; (b) alienation, disgust, loathing; (c) self-disparagement, self-hatred, humiliation, guilt
2. *Glāni*	(a) Debility, debilitation; (b) aversion, dislike, hence disinclination to do anything; (c) physical weakness
3. *Shaṅkā*	(a) Doubt, uncertainty; (b) suspicion, mistrust; (c) apprehension
4. *Asūyā*	(a) Envy, especially of others' happiness; jealousy; (b) nitpicking, criticism of others, calumny
5. *Mada*	(a) Intoxication; (b) drunken merriment, derangement, noxiousness, etc.
6. *Shrama*	Exhaustion or weariness, from toil, labor, exertion
7. *Ālasya*	(a) Idleness, indolence; (b) lack of energy or interest, state of being apathetic
8. *Dainya*	(a) Misery; (b) poor or pitiable condition, "meanness of station"; (c) wretchedness, enfeeblement; (d) humbleness, humility
9. *Chintā*	Anxiety, worry, concern
10. *Moha*	(a) Infatuation, attachment; (b) swooning, fainting; (c) disorientation, confusion
11. *Smṛti*	(a) Recollection, remembrance; (b) nostalgia
12. *Dhṛti*	(a) Steadiness, constancy; (b) self-possession, confidence; (c) fortitude
13. *Vrīḍā*	(a) Shame; (b) embarrassment; (c) modesty, bashfulness
14. *Chapalatā*	(a) Trembling, unsteadiness; (b) fickleness, wavering; (c) restlessness; (d) swiftness, nimbleness, agility
15. *Harsha*	(a) Joy; (b) merriment, exuberance, high spirits
16. *Āvega*	(a) Flurry, haste; (b) unease, nervousness, agitation, panic
17. *Jaḍatā*	(a) Immobility, inertia; (b) being frozen or benumbed, numbness, stupefaction
18. *Garva*	(a) Pride, in oneself or in something or someone else; (b) self-esteem, arrogance, conceit, vanity
19. *Vishāda*	(a) Low spirits, dejection; (b) sadness, sorrow, affliction
20. *Autsukya*	(a) Enthusiasm, spiritedness, eagerness; (b) ardent desire, zeal
21. *Nidrā*	Sleep, state of being asleep
22. *Apasmāra*	(a) Forgetfulness, loss of memory; (b) fit, seizure
23. *Supta*	State of dreaming; by extension, dreaminess, daydreaming
24. *Vibodha*	(a) Awaking, awakening; (b) becoming conscious, regaining consciousness, as after a faint or a fit
25. *Amarsha*	(a) Impatience, intolerance; (b) indignation, jealous and unforgiving anger; (c) scorn, disdain; (d) vengefulness
26. *Avahitthā*	Concealment of true feelings, dissimulation; slyness, deceit
27. *Ugratā*	(a) Fierceness, ferociousness, frightfulness; (b) cruelty; (c) rudeness, roughness, aggression, violence
28. *Mati*	(a) Purposefulness, determination, resolution; (b) attentiveness, focused attention
29. *Vyādhi*	(a) Sickliness, physical illness; (b) ailing condition, hence disorientation, pallor, feebleness, etc.
30. *Unmāda*	(a) Madness, insanity; (b) extravagance of feeling, intense passion, mania, crazedness
31. *Maraṇa*	Process or condition of dying; deathliness
32. *Trāsa*	(a) Fright, alarm; (b) fearfulness, timidity
33. *Vitarka*	(a) Perplexity, curiosity; (b) thinking, reflecting, ascertaining, discovering; (c) reasoning, deliberation

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Table 2
The Eight Psychosomatic Symptoms (*Sāttvika Bhāvas*) in Bharata's *Nāṭyashāstra*

Stambha	Being temporarily frozen, immobilized, or paralyzed; being rooted on one spot, unable to move
Sveda	Sweating, perspiring
Romāñcha	Horripilating, having goose flesh; bristling of body hair
Svarasāda	Change of voice, of ability to voice
Vepathu	Trembling, shaking, quaking; quivering, shivering
Vaivarṇyam	Change of color, including facial color, color of body or skin, color of costume
Ashru	Shedding tears, weeping
Pralaya	Swooning, fainting; losing consciousness, becoming insensate, falling into a coma

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Table 3
Correspondences between the Taxonomies of Emotion in Bharata's *Nāṭyashāstra* and Darwin's *Expression of the Emotions* (2nd ed.)

Bharata's Categories and Labels		Darwin's Labels
Enduring Emotional State (*sthāyī bhāva*)	Corresponding *Rasa*	
Rati (sexual love, desire)	*Shṛṅgāra* (eros)	Love
Hāsa (laughter and merriment)	*Hāsya* (mirth)	High Spirits
Shoka (sorrow and grief, suffering)	*Karuṇa* (compassion)	Grief, Sympathy
Krodha (anger and rage)	*Raudra* (fury)	Anger, Rage
Utsāha (enthusiasm and courage)	*Vīra* (heroism)	—*
Bhaya (fear and terror)	*Bhayānaka* (terror)	Fear-Horror
Jugupsā (disgust, horror, and hatred)	*Bībhatsa* (revulsion)	Disgust
Vismaya (astonishment and wonder)	*Adbhuta* (wonder)	Surprise-Astonishment
Transient Auxiliary Emotion (*vyabhichārī bhāva*)		
1. *Nirveda* (despair, despondency, humiliation)		Despair, Guilt
2. *Glāni* (debilitation, aversion, disinclination)		Depression, Helplessness, Impotence
3. *Shaṅkā* (doubt, suspicion, apprehension)		Suspicion
4. *Asūyā* (envy, jealousy, criticism)		Jealousy, Envy
8. *Dainya* (misery, pitiable condition, enfeeblement, humility)		Helplessness
9. *Chintā* (anxiety, worry, concern)		Anxiety
12. *Dhṛti* (steadiness, constancy)		Patience
13. *Vrīḍā* (shame, embarrassment, bashfulness)		Shame-Shyness-Modesty: Blushing
15. *Harsha* (joy, merriment, exuberance)		Joy, High Spirits
18. *Garva* (pride, self-esteem, arrogance)		Pride, Self-Attention, Vanity, Conceit
19. *Vishāda* (dejection, sorrow, affliction)		Low Spirits, Dejection
20. *Autsukya* (enthusiasm, eagerness, ardent desire)		High Spirits
25. *Amarsha* (intolerance, indignation, scorn, lack of forgiveness)		Disdain, Contempt, Indignation, Revenge
26. *Avahitthā* (dissimulation, deceit)		Deceit, Slyness
27. *Ugratā* (rudeness, fierceness, cruelty, aggression)		Ill Temper
28. *Mati* (purposefulness, resolution, attentiveness)		Determination
32. *Trāsa* (fright, alarm, fearfulness)		Fear-Horror
33. *Vitarka* (thinking, reflecting, ascertaining, deliberating)		Reflection-Meditation

Numbers are those for the auxiliary emotions given in table 1.

Fifteen (auxiliary) emotions in Bharata without clear correspondences in Darwin's list:
5. *Mada*, 6. *Shrama*, 7. *Ālasya*, 10. *Moha*, 11. *Smṛti*, 14. *Chapalatā*, 16. *Āvega*, 17. *Jaḍatā*, 21. *Nidrā*, 22. *Apasmāra*, 23. *Supta*, 24. *Vibodha*, 29. *Vyādhi*, 30. *Unmāda*, 31. *Maraṇa*

Six emotions and groupings in Darwin that can be produced only as combinations of Bharata's *bhāvas*: tender feelings (maternal affection, protectiveness), devotion, sulkiness, avarice, ambition, affirmation, and negation

*Darwin lists "courage" in *Descent of Man* but not in *Expression of the Emotions*.

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Table 4
Correspondences between Emotions in Bharata's *Nāṭyashāstra* and Silvan Tomkins's *Affect Imagery Consciousness*

Bharata's Categories and Labels	Tomkins's Primary Affects and Categories
Categorical causality of *vibhāva* 'cause' per se: *ālambana* (trigger) + *uddīpana* (intensifier)	Interest-Excitement (positive affect)
Rati (enduring state: love) + *Harsha* (auxiliary emotion: joy)	Enjoyment-Joy (positive affect)
Moha + *Jaḍatā* + *Vitarka* + *Āvega* + *Chapalatā* + *Mati* (disorientation, confusion + immobility, stupefaction + perplexity, conjecturing, ascertaining + unease, nervousness + wavering, nimbleness + focused attention, resolution)*	Surprise-Startle (resetting affect)
Vishāda + *Glāni* + *Shaṅkā* + *Chintā* + *Āvega* (dejection, sadness, affliction + debilitation + uncertainty, apprehension + anxiety, concern + agitation),* with two concomitant psychosomatic symptoms: *Svarasāda* + *Ashru* (cry + weeping)	Distress-Anguish (negative affect)
Bhaya (enduring state: fear) + *Trāsa* (auxiliary emotion: fright), with five concomitant psychosomatic symptoms: *Stambha* + *Vaivarṇyam* + *Sveda* + *Vepathu* + *Romāñcha* (immobility + change of color + perspiration + trembling + horripilation)	Fear-Terror (negative affect)
Vrīḍā + *Nirveda* + *Dainya* + *Vishāda* + *Avahitthā* (shame, embarrassment + self-disparagement, humiliation + misery, enfeeblement + dejection + dissimulation)*	Shame-Humiliation (negative affect)
Jugupsā (enduring state: disgust, hatred) + *Amarsha* + *Garva* (auxiliary emotions: intolerance, disdain, lack of forgiveness + self-esteem, arrogance)*	Contempt-Disgust (negative affect)
Krodha (enduring state: anger and rage), with two concomitant psychosomatic symptoms: *Stambha* + *Vaivarṇyam* (immobility + change of color)	Anger-Rage (negative affect)

*More than one ancillary emotion, in an ensemble or a sequence; other combinations possible, depending on *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* (causes and ensuing emotions) of evolving emotional event.

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Notes

1. For nonspecialists, I discuss the *Nāṭyashāstra* without debating date, authorship, composition, or transmission. For background, see Ingalls; Masson and Patwardhan 1: 1–42; Ghosh [trans.] iii–lxix. For the Sanskrit text, I cite both Krishnamoorthy's and Ghosh's editions; Ghosh's edition corresponds exactly to his English translation. All three sources are cited by chapter and verse or only chapter (standard practice in this field), and I distinguish between Krishnamoorthy and Ghosh whenever their verse numbers differ. Bharata's prose expositions usually precede the numbered verses in which they culminate but are cited in the form "6.32, prose"—i.e., the prose passage attached to verse 32 of chapter 6. I use standard Sanskrit transcription (for examples of the transcription, see Pollock, *Literary Cultures* xxi–xxii; Miller xiii–xiv), making simplifications for legibility and pronunciation: *ch* instead of *c* for the unvoiced, unaspirated palatal (*ch*in) and *sh* for two sibilants (distinguished morphologically as *ś* and *ṣ* but both pronounced as *sh* in *ship*). All translations are mine from Ghosh's Sanskrit edition, unless noted otherwise. I take definitions for Sanskrit terms from Apte (for my divergence from standard practice, see note 3) and definitions for English terms and their Greek and Latin antecedents from the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (*SOED*). Throughout, *Bharata* designates the ethos or implied author of the *Nāṭyashāstra* and not a flesh-and-blood individual with authorial intentions. "Explosive hermeneutical shock" renders *sphoṭa*; in the Bhartṭhari tradition, the word designates the way a sentence, once completed, conveys its meaning as a semantic unity by "exploding" in an auditor's consciousness (see Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan 824, 172n3, 129).

2. I use *phenomenological* for anything "dealing with the description and classification of phenomena," where a phenomenon is "an immediate object of perception" or "a fact or event that appears or is perceived by one of the senses or by the mind, *esp.* one whose cause or explanation is in question" (*SOED*). Bharata's and Darwin's respective phenomenologies are modes of dealing with phenomena and the phenomenological in these senses; they cover everything that Husserl places in "the natural attitude" *before* "the phenomenological epoché" (Welton 61–65).

3. For three key terms, Bharata uses the Sanskrit compounds *sthāyibhāva*, *vyabhichāribhāva*, and *sāttvikabhāva*, which nonspecialists often find illegible and alienating in roman transcription. For user-friendliness, I have replaced them with exact equivalents in modern Hindi (*sthāyī bhāva*, *vyabhichārī bhāva*, and *sāttvika bhāva*), which are more tractable in an English context.

4. Chari provides a balanced, comprehensive account of Sanskrit theory and criticism. For a useful chronology of schools and critics, see Chari xi–xii. On specific critical issues and on Abhinavagupta, cited later, see Gnoli; Masson and Patwardhan; Ingalls; Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan. For a fresh critical look at Sanskrit theory and criticism, see Pollock, "From Rasa."

5. Abhinavagupta takes the triggers-intensifiers distinction for granted but acknowledges its absence in Bharata (Masson and Patwardhan 1: 79–80).

6. For Peirce, an indexical signifier is related to its signification by what Jakobson calls "a factual, existential contiguity" (effect often following from cause); in Peirce's words, "psychologically, the action of indices depends upon association by contiguity" (Jakobson 415). See Jakobson 414–16, 441–44.

7. Bharata's five categories of emotion and the *bhāva-rasa* distinction provoked great debates over the centuries in Indian ontology, epistemology, theology, psychology, aesthetics, and hermeneutics. For rich documentation of this history, see Raghavan, *Number*; Pollock, "From Rasa."

8. Around 300 CE, the *Nāṭyashāstra* unambiguously developed a theory of eight *sthāyī bhāva*s and eight corresponding *rasa*s (collectively called *ashṭa-rasa*); a century later, the works of Kālidāsa put this paradigm into poetic practice (see commentaries in Miller; Dharwadker). The argument for nine *rasa*s (*nava-rasa*) is fully formulated five to six centuries later by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. In a proto-Derridean move, they construct the ninth *rasa* (*shānta* 'peace, stillness') as the aesthetic concentrate of the absence of all *bhāva* or as the cessation of all emotion, which is exemplified in the *Mahābhārata*. They view the *shānta rasa* as a "negation" of the *ashṭa-rasa* and hence as the rigorous completion of Bharata's system, which is based exclusively on phenomenologically present *bhāva*s. See Raghavan, *Bhoja's* Sṛngāra Prakāśa and *Number*; Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan; Masson and Patwardhan, vol. 1; Chari.

9. My account of poetics, semiosis, and communication resonates with Abhinavagupta's observation that "representation (*abhinayana*), indeed, is nothing but a power of communication (*āvāgamanaśakti*)—this power differing from the one of verbal expression" (Gnoli 31).

10. Tomkins's legacy remains ambivalent. Sedgwick and Frank are wary of his "self-ignorance," internal contradictions, and "speculative science," but they defer the "confrontation between any cross-cultural perspective and Tomkins' hypothesis that there is a kind of affective table of the elements, comprising nine components, infinitely recombinable but rooted in the human body in nine distinctive and irreducible ways" ("Shame" 23), and do not relate his inventory to Darwin's. Ahmed also shifts away from Tomkins.

11. Overall, my discussion diverges from Pollock, "From Rasa," which appeared after I completed this essay. My essay should be read alongside his. More specialized, it "reconstruct[s] the history of the extension of aesthetical analysis from the dramatic to the non-dramatic" in Sanskrit poetics (189) and briefly analyzes Darwin's *Expression of Emotions*, but only the first edition of 1872, not the recast second edition of 1890. Both Pollock's es-

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say and mine are antithetical to Schechner's, which is influential in performance theory, even though it avoids Sanskrit sources; fails to be historically, philosophically, and hermeneutically rigorous with Indian material; and hence offers an unreliable account of Bharata. Schechner's misconstrual of *bhaktah* ("devotee," from *bhaj*) for *bhaktam* ("food," from *bhuj*), for example, is egregious but typical (340).

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