4

The road to war

The eschatological Protestant and classical republican contexts in which the ambassadors and the Rump placed the mission to the United Provinces makes it difficult to accept economic historians' explanation of the passage of the Navigation Act. Certainly it is hard to imagine that the calm, cool, and rational calculators of economic self-interest inhabited the same world as Walter Strickland, John Thurloe and Oliver St. John. Closer examination of the context of English politics in late 1651 makes it even harder to see the Navigation Act as the product of a group of merchant-interlopers.

The contemporary evidence which economic historians have adduced to demonstrate the political power of the colonial interlopers is of questionable quality. The material – a Royalist newsletter, the report of a Venetian ambassador based in Spain, and the account of the Dutch ambassadors to England in 1654 – all reflects the official Dutch and Royalist interpretation of English motivation. Not only does none of it come from sources who were in England in the summer and autumn of 1651, but it reflects the view of those who were unable and unwilling to understand the motivations for the English proposals to the Dutch in the spring of 1651.[1] In fact, there is a good deal of evidence that the merchant-interlopers had little support in the government. The East India Company retained its control over exports of bullion. The Leveller William Walwyn's attempt to break the Levant Company's monopoly failed. The Greenland Company retained most of its

[1] Robert Brenner, "The Civil War Politics of London's Merchant Community," in *Past and Present* No. 58 (February 1973), pp. 104–105; repeated in his *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653* (Princeton, 1993), p. 625; Thurloe's Review PRO, SP 103/46; Dutch account, August 1652, PRO, SP 103/46, ff. 207–211; *CSPV*, pp. 187–188. The Royalist newsletter in question is to be found at Bod., Clar. 45, f. 142. Hyde himself refused to trust the Royalist newsletter-writers. "It is very hard to make any conclusion from the intelligence we get from England," he explained to Lord Rochester, "which can be but the guesses of people there who though upon the place, must see at a great distance, and many untruths are purposely divulged to amuse the people." 9/19 December 1653, Bod., Clar. 47, f. 147r. Similar points have been made by Blair Worden, *The Rump Parliament, 1648–1653* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 257 and J. P. Cooper, "Social and Economic Policies under the Commonwealth," in G. E. Aylmer (editor), *The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement 1646–1660* (London, 1972), p. 122.

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exclusive rights. Dr. Loughead has shown that "there is no evidence" that even the East India Company "at any time" "suffered from political prejudice despite the personal disfavor with which some of its leading members were viewed."[2] Nor was the Navigation Act especially drafted in the interest of Maurice Thompson and his interloping interests. Indeed, Loughead has found that Thompson was hardly an economic radical. He "did not advocate an open trade at any stage" and in the period prior to the Dutch War "he appears to have had little difficulty in operating within the company's joint stock framework."[3] There is certainly no evidence that the big London chartered companies perceived the Act as an attack on their privileges.[4] Consequently there is little reason to reject Dr. Worden's assessment that although the "Rump worked closely with merchants who were prepared to assist it," those "negotiations were conducted strictly on the government's terms."[5]

There were, of course, economic grievances in 1651. The economic community was well aware of the "deadness of trade," a situation so bad that it "makes all trade at a stand."[6] Yet the merchant community, in

2 *CSPD*, 7 May 1652, p. 235; PRO, SP 105/144, ff. 35 ff; *CSPD*, 12 March 1652, pp. 177–178; *CJ*, 24 December 1650, pp. 513–514; Peter Loughead, 'The East India Company in English Domestic Politics, 1657–1688' (Oxford, D.Phil. thesis, 1980), pp. 12–13. All of this has been discussed perceptively by Cooper, "Social and Economic Policies," p. 132.

3 *CJ*, 17 February 1652, p. 90; Loughead, "East India Company," pp. 17–18, 20, 61; Cooper, "Social and Economic Policies," p. 135. Cooper and Loughead have both offered reasons why the Navigation Act ran counter to Thompson's interests. I am also skeptical of Brenner's characterization of Maurice Thompson's ideological convictions in a broader sense. The same Restoration report which Brenner quotes approvingly (*Merchants and Revolution*, [Princeton, 1993], p. 622) also reports that Thompson was "intimate with the Protector" – certainly something that could be said of very few republicans and even fewer of the religious radicals: L. Hugh Squire to Earl of Arlington, 24 June 1666, PRO, SP 29/159/108 I. While Thompson was able to make common cause with religious radicals and extreme republicans in the early 1650s (and might have been very close to them ideologically as well as politically) – and I am absolutely convinced that he was a bitter opponent of the Restored Monarchy – he seems to have followed Cromwell in his rejection of extreme religious and political radicalism in the later 1650s. It should also be noted that Thompson's willingness to aid the Dutch in the second Dutch War suggests that when his political or religious convictions came into conflict with his economic nationalism, he chose to follow the former rather than the latter.

4 Cooper, "Economic and Social Policies," pp. 134–135; Loughead, p. 62. The feeling that this was so comes from a reading of R. W. K. Hinton, *The Eastland Trade and the Common Weal* (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 90–92. Hinton has read the Levant Company papers in the PRO, and by claiming that "their only recorded desires were for privileges" means only that they did not argue for across-the-board restrictions of imports. Their petition for a prohibition of Dutch importation of Levant goods is at PRO, SP 105/44, f. 55. Apparently this petition was drawn up in response to a request from the Council of Trade which was concerned about "the prejudice likely to befall the Commonwealth by the importation of Turkey goods from Holland." PRO, SP 105/151, f. 50. This demand was probably aired before the mission to the United Provinces was approved.

5 Worden, *Rump*, p. 258; Hinton, *Eastland Trade* reached the same conclusion, p. 90.

6 Court minutes of Fishmongers Company, 26 May 1651, Guildhall, 5570/4, f. 271; Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 8 April 1651, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 39; Paige to Paynter and Clerke,

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private letters, pamphlets, and newspaper accounts, overwhelmingly blamed its troubles on Royalist pirates and the French, not on Dutch competition.[7] The situation in the Channel was so hostile that the French agent could "see no difference between a declared war, and that which they are now doing." The Spanish merchant John Paige moaned that the French "give commissions to take English ships, and our states give the like to take theirs" with the result that "the poor merchant suffers on both sides." "We find that [the Venetians] privately, as the French openly, have endeavored for a long time to destroy our trade," wrote the English ambassador Thomas Bendish from Constantinople, "and had very nearly attained their desires therein."[8] The Levant Company, whose ships were better suited to fight off the attacks of French men-of-war than most, declared to the Council of State "that this ample trade into Turkey and the Levant ... must needs be totally lost, unless some speedy redress be made."[9] The redress they envisaged was clearly not a Dutch war; for should such a war break out, at least one Levant merchant knew that it would mean "adieu to all trade."[10] The activities of Prince Rupert and other Royalist privateers, now armed with an entire fleet of revolted English ships, struck fear into the hearts of English merchants. The *Bloudy Almanack*, always a good gauge of popular opinion, predicted that in June 1651 "many pirates [would] range greatly abroad to the London merchants' damage." "The times are now very dangerous" because of privateering activities, wrote John Paige in 1649, so that "insurers will hardly underwrite upon any ship under sixteen or eighteen guns." Even Charles II's reverses did not put an end to privateering activities. The *Mercurius Bellonius* lamented in 1652 that the activities of the Royalists "causeth our merchants to cease trafficking except they have

6 May 1651, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 40; Orders of court assistants, Grocers Company, Guildhall, 2 April 1652, 11588/4, f. 285; Thomas Merry, Edwin Pearce, and George Oxinden to East India Company, 24 October 1650, IOL, E/3/22, f. 49r; Cooper, "Social and Economic Policies," p. 123. In my survey of the court minutes of the London livery companies I found no evidence of anti-Dutch sentiment. They were not blaming their difficulties on the Dutch.

7 There were, of course, occasional pamphlets which mentioned the Dutch; but they were frequently reprinted pamphlets for political purposes or pamphlets which referred to Dutch successes as models for emulation.

8 Thomas Bendish to Council of State, 1 March 1651, PRO, SP 97/17, f. 64r.

9 Croullé to Mazarin, 19 September 1650, PRO, PRO 31/3/90, f. 299; Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 16 January 1650, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 8; Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 22 March 1650, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 18; Paige to Clerke, 20 September 1650, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 27; Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 15 November 1650, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 29; Morosini to Doge, 4 July 1651, *CSPV*, p. 190; Basadona to Doge, 15 July 1651, *CSPV*, p. 192; petition of Levant Company to Council of State, 17 September 1650, PRO, SP 105/144, f. 26. The number of notices of individual incidents of French attacks on English merchant shipping reported in the newspapers is too vast to be given full play here.

10 Thomas Banckes (Leghorn) to Sir Ralph Verney, 19 February 1652, HMC *7th Report*, p. 457.

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convoys."[11] It was consequently "very dangerous for any ships to pass securely without a strong convoy."[12] It was this situation which many merchants blamed for their losing markets to the Dutch. The Levant Company knew that its Dutch competitors were "not so subject to those difficulties and surprisals which we are subject to, as well from the French fleet, as our own revolted ships." "Our trade is at present very small, and if we cannot get convoy the trade will be lost," wrote the Rumper and City merchant Edward Ashe to Colonel Popham, "for the Dutch have convoys to supply their markets daily."[13] While there was more direct competition with the Dutch in the East Indies, the East India Company refused to countenance belligerent means to ameliorate the commercial situation. Indeed the East India Company gave strict instructions to its factors never – even if they were at a comparative advatage – to molest the Dutch in the Indies.[14]

Far from attacking the Dutch, the English merchants soon realized that they alone could maintain their livelihoods. The work of Professor Knachel on Anglo-French relations during the Fronde has revealed that English merchants were using "Dutch carriers almost exclusively for trade" through the Channel. If anything, then, many merchants had powerful economic incentive *not* to want the Navigation Act.[15] The Dutch correspondent to *A Perfect Account* was apparently right to predict that "your London merchants ... will be great losers" from the Act.[16] It was probably opposition to the Navigation Act in certain sectors of the merchant community which prompted Benjamin Worsley to write "the *Advocate* in defense of it."[17] The veritable plethora of mercantile petitions demanding relief from the terms of the Navigation Act do not prove that the merchant community violently disapproved of the Act, but they do at least suggest that some merchants were unprepared for the measure.[18]

11 *The Bloudy Almanack: Or Englands Looking Glass* (London, 1650), Thomason: 18 November 1650, p. 4; Paige to Paynter, 25 May 1649, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 2; Paige to Clerke, 22 January 1650, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 10; *Mercurius Bellonius*, 25 February–3 March 1652, p. 26. There is also a vast amount of material in the newspapers dealing with particular incidents.

12 *Faithful Scout*, 26 March–2 April 1652, p. 491. The result was that a number of insurers were devastated and small mercantile shipping became impossible. Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 3 September 1650, Steckley, *John Paige*, pp. 24–25; Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 15 November 1650, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 29.

13 Levant Company to Council of Trade, 30 December 1650, PRO, SP 105/144, f. 30; Edward Ashe to Colonel Edward Popham, HMC, *Leyborne-Popham*, 28 March 1651, p. 82.

14 East India Company to president and Council in Surat, 30 January 1650, IOL, E/3/84, f. 104v. Apparently they did not believe they were involved in a "commercial struggle with the Dutch." Brenner's phrase in *Merchants and Revolution*, p. 599.

15 P. A. Knachel, *England and the Fronde* (Ithaca, NY, 1967), p. 157.

16 *A Perfect Account*, 3–10 December 1651, pp. 385, 391; newsletter from Westminster, 30 December 1651, Worcester College, Clarke MSS 20, f. 79v.

17 Worsley to Lady Clarendon, 8 November 1661, Bod., Clar. 75, f. 300.

18 Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 30 December 1651, f. 174; "Narrative ... of

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Finally, the account provided by Farnell and Brenner cannot explain the timing of the Navigation Act. If the Independents gained control of legislation in 1649, and "placed commercial and colonial expansion near the top of [their] agenda," as Brenner asserts,[19] why did it take them until October 1651 to pass legislation so vital to their economic program? L. A. Harper has shown that it was not for want of effort. From December 1649 various proposals were advanced to exclude foreigners from English trade routes, but the Council of State denounced those propositions as "dishonorable in Council." It was only in the summer of 1651, after the attempt at Protestant republican union had ignominiously failed, that the Navigation Act began to move quickly through Parliament.[20]

Why then was the Navigation Act passed? Two well-informed contemporaries, from exactly opposite political perspectives, seemed to know quite well. Oliver St. John returned from The Hague with "extreme indignation," according to Edward Hyde, "which he manifested as he soon as he returned to the Parliament; who, disdaining likewise to find themselves undervalued (that is, not valued above all the world besides,) presently entered upon counsels how they might discountenance and control the trade of Holland, and increase their own."[21] The disappointment of the Dutch negotiations "sat so heavy upon the haughty spirit of the Lord Chief Justice St. Johns," the apocalyptic republican Edmund Ludlow recalled, "that he reported these transactions with the highest aggravations against the States and thereby was a principal instrument to prevail with the Council of State to pass" the Navigation Act.[22] Significantly, Sir Josiah Child, whose memory might well reflect that of the East India Company as a whole, recalled that

Councell for Trade," PRO, SP 18/16, f. 206 (dated 20 November 1651); minutes of Committee of Foreign Affairs, 7, 12 May 1652, PRO, SP 25/131, ff. 2–3; petition by Sam. Misselden, 18 November 1651, PRO, SP 46/96, f. 110; *CSPD*, 14 April 1652, pp. 217–218; *CJ*, 9 January 1652, p. 65; *CJ*, 3 February 1652, pp. 80–83; *CJ*, 17 February 1652, pp. 89–90; *CJ*, 2 March 1652, pp. 100–101; J. Ivemey (editor), *Life of Mr. William Kiffin* (London, 1883), pp. 24–25.

19 Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, p. 577.

20 L. A. Harper, *The English Navigation Laws* (New York, 1939), pp. 39–45. Certainly it is odd that the Act was passed at a time when the influence of the radicals in London city politics was on the decline. See Worden, *Rump*, pp. 290–291.

21 Edward Hyde, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, pp. 784–785. Hyde came to this conclusion despite having read both the Royalist newsletter which Farnell and Brenner (*Merchants and Revolution*) make so much of, and despite having received Benjamin Worsley's letter in which he proclaims himself author of the Navigation Act. Another Royalist, Sir Philip Warwick, substantially supported this account. Although he did not specify St. John as the author, he did insist that the Navigation Act was passed out of resentment for the Dutch treatment of St. John and Strickland at The Hague. Sir Philip Warwick, "Memoirs," HL, HM 41956, p. 103.

22 Edmund Ludlow in C. H. Firth (editor), *The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow* (Oxford, 1894), p. 267. John Toland would have little motive to rewrite this story. Obviously neither Hyde nor Ludlow were in fact in England in the summer of 1651; but, both had better information (especially Ludlow) about the goings on inside the Council of State than foreign ambassadors in hostile European cities.

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"lord Chief Justice St. John ... was a principle engineer in the first Act of Navigation."[23] There is quite good reason to accept this interpretation. While still in the Netherlands St. John and Strickland complained that the Dutch were violating the terms of the *Intercursus Magnus*. The Dutch, they claimed, were "in the full possession of what is of greatest advantage by that treaty unto them [free trade]," while "the Commonwealth of England ... is out of possession of what they ought to enjoy by the treaty of 1495 [aid against and expulsion of rebels]."[24] The Navigation Act served to rectify the imbalance. It was only after the failure of English attempts at alliance, Thurloe later recalled, that "the considerations of preserving the commerce and navigation of the States as well in Europe as India were applied to."[25] In this context the complaints of Samuel Avery, the governor of the merchant adventurers and host of the English ambassadors while they were in the United Provinces, before the Council of State in July is surely significant. After cataloguing Dutch violations of the treaty of 1495 he recommended that England refuse to grant Dutch fishermen freedom of commerce on the English coast, which would surely "produce a fair treaty."[26]

St. John's newfound detestation for the Dutch, increasingly evident in the ambassadors' letters to the Council of State, was clear to all by late June. No one could misunderstand St. John's promise to the Dutch commissioners that "you will ... repent of having rejected our offers."[27] The idea of punishment for sin was not new to the thought of the Chief Justice. In the previous autumn he had told Oliver Cromwell that "we ought to seek God" because of the Scots' sins, so "that they may see the rod." The English, he said, "must not insult over them, but still endeavor to heap coals of fire upon their heads."[28] Punishment could only do the Dutch a deal of good.

Developments in the war against the Scots served to conflate the two English concerns about the *Intercursus Magnus*. The Dutch, the Council of

[23] [Josiah Child], *A Treatise* (London, 1681), p. 1. It is surely damaging for the arguments of Farnell ("Navigation Act") and Brenner (*Merchants and Revolution*) that St. John was known to oppose mercantile involvement in the creation of national economic policy. According to Child, St. John was convinced "that trading merchants while they are in the busy and eager prosecution of their particular trades, although they be very wise and good men, are not always the best judges of trade, as it relates to the profit or power of a kingdom. The reason may be, because their eyes are so continuously fixed, and their minds intent upon what makes for their particular gain or loss, that they have not leisure to expatiate or turn their thoughts to what is most advantageous to the kingdom in general."

[24] Ambassadors to States General, 28 June 1651, Bod., Rawl. C129, f. 59.

[25] "Thurloe's Review," PRO, SP 103/46, f. 226.

[26] Samuel Avery at Council of State, 16 July 1651, PRO, SP 46/76, ff. 57–58; Samuel Avery petition to Council of State, 30 July 1651, PRO, SP 46/96, f. 60.

[27] Morosini to Doge and Senate, 18 July 1651, *CSPV*, p. 193; quoted in Samuel Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649–1656* (New York, 1965), Vol. I, p. 365.

[28] St. John to Cromwell, 26 September 1650, Nickolls, *Original Letters*, p. 26.

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State now knew, were causing "great inconveniences and mischiefs upon this Commonwealth." The Council of State informed Cromwell that the Dutch were sailing "with bills of lading from Leith, to show if they be examined at sea, but if they meet none of our ships, they easily put into the enemy's ports." They recommended prohibiting all trade in Dutch bottoms, whereby "all color will be taken away from them of giving supplies to the enemies of any provisions of war."[29] This was the same reasoning used the previous year when the Rump had prohibited trade with Barbados, Virginia, Bermuda and Antigua. Far from being intended to line the pockets of a favored group of interloping merchants, that precursor of the Navigation Act was passed because Lord Willoughby had inclined "to the lost Cavalier party." Willoughby was using commerce with the Dutch "to fortify himself against his enemies." Not surprisingly, then, the Council of State described the purpose of the Act to be for "settling, reducing, and governing the said islands." The reasoning behind the Act, the Canary merchant John Paige told his trading partners, was that "the Barbadians are proclaimed rebels to our State for revolting and not being subordinate to the present government."[30] The Dutch, it was becoming clear to the English, were seeking profit to the benefit of Royalists. Mammon, Charles Stuart and the Antichrist were working hand in hand.

In this context the legislative history of the Navigation Act becomes more easily explicable. The Council of Trade presented a report to the Council of State "concerning restraint of goods of foreign growth to be imported in foreign bottoms" on 31 July. Bulstrode Whitelocke, one of the Rump's specialists on Anglo-Dutch relations, then reported the bill to the Rump on 5 August. After this the bill was committed to a Committee of the Whole House, where it was extensively debated and presumably amended from 21

[29] Council of State to Cromwell, 30 July 1651, PRO, SP 25/96, f. 317. The letter also mentions the economic advantages, but this might be less important given the ideological context. In fact, Parliament ships were capturing Dutch ships bringing supplies to the Scots. See Whitelocke's *Annals*, 20 August 1651, BL, Add. 37345, f. 143.

[30] "Instructions for Captain Robert Davies, Mr. Richard Bennet, Mr. Thomas Stagge, and Captain William Clabourne," 26 September 1651, Thomas Birch (editor), *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esq.* (London, 1742), Vol. I, p. 197; A. B., *A Brief Relation of the Beginning and Ending of the Troubles of the Barbados* (London, 1653), Thomason: 29 July 1653, p. 1; Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 15 November 1650, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 30; *CJ*, 27 September 1650, p. 474; *CJ*, 3 October 1650, p. 478; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 5 October 1650, f. 103. The merchant community, especially the New England merchant community, were not terribly happy about the Act. Their complaints are registered in the Admiralty Committee Book, Bod., Rawl. A.225, ff. 6, 13. There was also an Act passed prohibiting trade to Scotland for similar reasons. *CJ*, 18 September 1650, p. 470. Apparently as areas came under control of Cromwell's armies they were relieved of the restrictions on trade placed upon them by the Act. Brenner is certainly right to point out the involvement of Maurice Thompson and others in the formulation of the Act (*Merchants and Revolution*, pp. 591–592); this merely reinforces my point that their program could only be implemented insofar as it accorded with the government's political concerns.

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August to 9 October. In any case, after a month of discussion and revision, the Act probably bore little resemblance to the draft originally presented by the Council of Trade.[31] It was probably in the committee stage that Oliver St. John made his contribution to the Navigation Act. The legal historian L. A. Harper has also found reason to suppose St. John's authorship. The language of the Act, he comments, "is characterized by a theoretical approach to problems of commerce, an attempt to evolve comprehensive formulae, a clarity of statement, and a disregard of the complexities of trade or practical consideration of administrability, which might be expected from a Chief Justice of the Common Pleas who had had a legal rather than a mercantile or administrative training."[32]

In all likelihood, a large group within the Council of Trade was not terribly happy with the final form which the Navigation Act had taken. The Council, as Dr. Cooper has shown, had a very large representation of provincial merchants. It was precisely these merchants who were most upset with the Act, proclaiming that it had "upon it only a London stamp." Here they were almost certainly mistaken. The *Journal of the London Common Council*, usually so full of debates regarding trading measures, records absolutely nothing about the Navigation Act. Indeed, that Thomas Challoner felt obliged to divide against the committed defenders of the Protestant cause, Carew Raleigh and Sir Henry Mildmay, in order to grant merchants relief from the penalties of the Act, shows just how little the merchant community, and the Council of Trade had to do with the final version of the Act.[33] These developments only become explicable if the measure was passed for political rather than economic reasons. Even the Masters of Trinity House knew that the Navigation Act "was made when there was inclination to have wars with the Dutch."[34]

Although Oliver St. John almost certainly wrote the final draft of the Navigation Act and used his political capital to maneuver the Act through Parliament, Benjamin Worsley did defend it. Can he be fitted into this ideological context? The pioneering work of Dr. Charles Webster on the "Spiritual Brotherhood" has done much to recover the intellectual milieu of the Commonwealth's economic theorists. Far from being the economically motivated imperialists described by Brenner, Webster has found that Worsley and his friends were devotees of Baconian eschatological science.

[31] "Narrative of What Things Have Been Reported From the Councell of Trade," PRO, SP 18/16, f. 206; *CJ*, 5 August 1651, p. 617; *CJ*, 19 August 1651, p. 2; *CJ*, 21 August 1651, p. 4; *CJ*, 28 August 1651, p. 7; *CJ*, 4 September 1651, p. 11; *CJ*, 11 September 1651, p. 15; *CJ*, 18 September 1651, p. 19; *CJ*, 26 September 1651, p. 21; passed *CJ*, 9 October 1651, p. 27.

[32] Harper, *English Navigation Laws*, p. 47.

[33] Cooper, "Social and Economic Policies," pp. 133, 138; *CJ*, 3 February 1652, pp. 80–83. For more discussion of the Council of Trade see Worden, *Rump*, pp. 254–257.

[34] Quoted in Harper, *English Navigation Laws*, p. 48.

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Indeed, upon reading Worsley's imperial program, Sir Cheney Culpeper ecstatically praised this outline which would glorify God "throughout the whole world ... not the family, country, nation, but whole mankind."[35] Worsley himself claimed that the ultimate end of his colonial plans was "the endeavoring an union and reconciliation throughout all the Christian at least all the Protestant Churches."[36] Worsley's *Advocate,* which Hinton has suggested directly reflects the opinions of the Council of Trade, is another application of apocalyptic economics. Worsley wrote in the full confidence of "the breaking forth, very shortly, of [God's] Glory." Since we have now "recovered our liberties," Worsley explained, we can now "see the necessity of providing for the defense of this Commonwealth by shipping." The anti-Dutch nature of the Navigation Act Worsley explained in ominously familiar language. "The design of Spain," he reflected, "is, to get the universal monarchy of Christendom. Nor is it a thing less true (how little soever observed) that our neighbors [the Dutch] (after they had settled their liberty, and been a while encouraged by prosperity) have, likewise, for some years, aimed to lay a foundation to themselves by engrossing the universal trade, not only in Christendom, but indeed of the greater part of the known world."[37] For Worsley, then, the Navigation Act was necessary to prevent the Dutch from achieveing universal economic dominion – not an attempt to promote particular economic interests.

There is good reason to believe that Worsley truly was airing the ideas of a significant portion of the Council of Trade. Cooper has documented the extremely close links between the Council and the "Spiritual Brotherhood." Tom Challoner, for all his Socinianism, praised the very Protestant achievements of "worthy Hawkins and the famous Drake." Sir Balthazar Gerbier, by the 1650s a committed Protestant internationalist, mentioned the imperialist plans of the Rumper's ancestor "Baronet Challoner" in the same breath with those of Sir Walter Ralegh and the Earl of Warwick.[38] Richard

[35] Quoted in Charles Webster *The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform 1626–1660* (London, 1975), p. 357. The argument of much of this paragraph is given substance by the exhaustive research which Webster has presented in his exciting book.

[36] Webster has reprinted in its entirety Worsley's "Proffits humbly presented to the Kingdom," in Appendix V of his book. Webster, *Great Instauration*, p. 546.

[37] [Benjamin Worsley], *The Advocate* (London, 1652), Thomason: 11 February 1652, sig. B1, pp. 1–2, 11. For Worsley one of the signs of the coming of Christ was to be, significantly, "the detection, by little and little, of all imposture, and the laying of all things low, naked, and mean before him; the stripping men of that honor, credit, and repute, that they had by several means been gaining with themselves (and by themselves with others, either through a not-knowledge, or through an artificial concealing of themselves." In this circumstance this almost certainly refers to the Dutch. Hinton, *Eastland Trade*, pp. 90–93.

[38] Cooper, "Social and Economic Policies," pp. 125, 133–134; Worden, "Classical Republicanism," p. 195; Worden, *The Rump*, p. 254; Scott, *Algernon Sidney*, pp. 50–51; Balthazar Gerbier to Oliver Cromwell, 1 March 1652 [1653], BL, Add. 35838, ff. 306–307.

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Salwey, another Rumper and member of the Council of Trade, was later proposed as ambassador to Sweden in order to carry out yet another aspect of England's Protestant foreign policy. He was sufficiently apocalyptic to be approved by the millenarian Colonel John Jones, and to describe English successes in the war against the Dutch as "miraculous workings" of God's power which pointed to "the more spiritual appearance of our Lord Jesus in his kingdom."[39] Hartlib himself might possibly have provided the links with the political ideas of his former patron Oliver St. John. Hartlib's circle was certainly in close contact at just this time with St. John's friend and fellow apocalyptic James Ussher.[40]

The similarity between Worsley's imperial plans and those of Maurice Thompson, so carefully described by Farnell, coupled with the similarity of their religious outlook, suggests that Thompson as well might have been motivated by an eschatological vision. He was after all quite involved in the activities of the vestry of St. Dunstan in the East, a vestry which apparently requested that the future fifth monarchist John Simpson be their lecturer.[41] Dr. Loughead has shown that Thompson's Assada scheme was "rested on a straight-forward revival of ideas current at court before the Civil War." The ideological context of those ideas, which centered on a proposal to colonize Madagascar, was that of the forward Protestant foreign policy advocated by the group surrounding Queen Henrietta Maria.[42] Significantly the Assada scheme was set up by a group known as the "Independent Brotherhood," with the intention, according to one hostile witness, of providing "shelter for traitors" in case of Charles II's "coming in a conqueror."[43] In fact, the first Governor of Assada, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Hunt, described his own and his fellow adventurers' first priority as making "known the Lord Jesus Christ to the poor heathen in these Eastern parts of the world, and I shall much rejoice if the Lord shall please by me to open a door for that purpose."[44] But it was only after Oliver St. John and the rest

[39] John Jones to Thomas Scot, 16 September 1651, in Joseph Mayer (editor), "Inedited Letters of Cromwell, Colonel Jones, Bradshaw, and other Regicides," in *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, new series, Vol. 1 (1861), p. 188; Cromwell to Salwey, 11 August 1653, in Thomas Salwey, *Occasional Poems* (privately published, 1882), p. 123; Salwey to Cromwell, 13 August 1653, in Thomas Salwey, *Poems*, pp. 124–125; see also Worden, *Rump*, p. 128.

[40] The occasion was a scheme to provide a new translation of the Bible. The contacts are fleshed out in Ussher's correspondence. See especially the letter from Arnold Boate to Ussher, 17 November 1650, in C. R. Elrington and J. M. Todd (editors), *The Whole Works of James Ussher with a Life of the Author* (Dublin, 1864), Vol. XVI, p. 168.

[41] Tai Liu, *Puritan London* (Newark DE, 1986), pp. 107–108.

[42] Loughead, "East India Company," pp. 50–52; Kevin Sharpe, *Criticism and Compliment* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 94–97; Martin Butler, *Theatre and Crisis 1632–1642* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 25–35.

[43] Deposition of W. Fairfax, 13 October 1651, PRO, Kew CO 77/7, f. 87v.

[44] Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Hunt, *The Island of Assada* (London, 1650), Thomason: 12 August 1650, pp. 1–2.

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of the political nation became convinced that the Dutch were neither good Protestants nor good republicans that the Hollandophobe aspects of Worsley's economic vision could be adopted by the Rump.

The Navigation Act, then, was not the result of special pleading of merchants who were temporarily able to achieve power in the Rump. In fact, in the short term – in many ways the only economic planning possible for merchants in a period of deep depression – many merchants felt the Act ran contrary to their economic interests. Nor was the Act the result of purely pragmatic calculation. Instead the Rump passed the Navigation Act when it did in order to punish the Dutch for apostatizing, for abandoning the Protestant and republican cause, and consequently violating the terms of the *Intercursus Magnus*. If the Dutch were not prepared to join them, the Rump must have reasoned, they would have to prepare to carry on the ideological struggle without them.

Much of the recent scholarly debate about the Anglo-Dutch War has focused upon whether or not the Navigation Act made it inevitable. In light of the intense anti-Dutch feeling which developed in England after the failure of the St. John–Strickland mission, this question seems misguided. It was hostility to the Dutch which provoked the Navigation Act, not the Navigation Act which provoked hostility toward the Dutch.

The Dutch were at first only dimly aware of the increasing English Hollandophobia. Though the States General had decided to send ambassadors to England in July, it was not until December that Cats, Schaep, and Van de Perre sailed for England. The primary aim of the mission had not changed in the intervening months. The Dutch ambassadors wanted above all else to "return with an olive-branch in their mouths," believing that "the Low Countries cannot subsist without a peace established with England."[45] The knowledge that the Queen of Sweden was also sending an ambassador to Westminster no doubt encouraged haste at The Hague. In the context of increasing Anglo-Dutch hostility, rumors that "England and Sweden by joint force" intended to take control of the Danish Sound "and lay hold of those keys of our cupboard, which now we wear at our own girdle" were too plausible to be ignored.[46]

Although it is true that "repeal of the [Navigation] Act and related measures was the first point to be discussed" by the Dutch ambassadors, one should not overestimate the economic importance of the act. In the United Provinces the act was "little regarded." The Amsterdammers knew full well that it "would be more prejudicial to England than it can be to

[45] Herbert H. Rowen, *John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625–1672* (Princeton, 1978), pp. 55, 64–65; *Mercurius Politicus*, 4–11 December 1651, pp. 1267–1268; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 2–9 December 1651, pp. 277–278.

[46] *Mercurius Politicus*, 27 November–4 December 1651, pp. 1250–1251; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 2–9 December 1651, p. 277; *French Intelligencer*, 2–9 December 1651, p. 19.

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Holland." Although the Dutch preferred the repeal of the measure, they would not go to war over it, preferring to "shake hands with us upon some honorable design."[47] The Dutch were more concerned with what the Navigation Act revealed about the state of Anglo-Dutch relations than about its direct economic implications. The Dutch correctly perceived the Act as "a breach of the Eternal League made with them in the year 1605," as "a breach of commerce and amity, which could not consist with the peace between the two nations."[48] It was in this context that the Dutch ambassadorial team hoped to restore good relations between the two republics.

The Dutch arrived in a very hostile England. Members of the Rump were convinced that there had been no reformation since the death of William II. Old grievances against the Dutch were being unearthed and acted upon. The heirs of John Paulet, an English merchant whose ship the Dutch had seized in 1630, were granted letters of reprisal in July.[49] The Rump was entertained with accounts of the brutal Dutch massacre of English merchants at Amboyna as well as the more recent assassination of Dr. Dorislaus at The Hague.[50] Petitions from English merchants came pouring in complaining of Dutch commercial abuses. More importantly, perhaps, Thomas Scot's intelligence network chose this moment to reveal that the Dutch were sending ammunition to Catholic rebels in Ireland.[51] Even the great Protestant internationalist Hugh Peter "inveighed against the Dutch because of their pride."[52] The press was full of rumors that the Dutch ambassadors had come with "very high terms" and "bold propositions." "It is a great folly to lose what is our own, if we are able to keep it, as it as an offense to intrude upon others through too much ambition," commented the *Perfect Passages* reflecting the views of many Rumpers, "if the Hollander make not a peace, why should we any longer suffer injuries by them, seeing God hath put in our hands means to remedy the same." "The English and Dutch are

[47] Simon Groenveld, "The English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1640–1652," *The Historical Journal* Vol. 30 No. 3 (1987), p. 564; *Faithful Scout*, 17–24 October 1651, pp. 310–311; *Mercurius Politicus*, 16–23 October 1651, p. 1155; *Mercurius Politicus*, 30 October–6 November 1651, p. 1186; *A Perfect Account*, 21–28 April 1652, p. 550; G. N. Clark, "The Navigation Act of 1651," *History* Vol. 7 (1922–1923), pp. 283–284.

[48] *Mercurius Politicus*, 25 December–1 January 1652, pp. 1312–1313; Hyde, *History*, p. 785; "States Declaration," August 1652, PRO, SP 103/46, ff. 205–206.

[49] Committee of the Admiralty report, 8 October 1651, PRO, SP 46/96, f. 66; Dutch Ambassadors to States General, 30 January 1652, in Gardiner (editor), *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 74–75.

[50] *CSPD*, 13 November 1651, p. 16; *CSPD*, 9 January 1652, p. 95; petition of Thomas Billingsby, 6 January 1652, PRO, SP 84/159, f. 107; petition of Sarah Collins, 8 January 1652, PRO, SP 84/159, f. 109; see also Richard Bradshaw to John Bradshaw, 1 July 1651, PRO, SP 82/8, f. 116v.

[51] *CJ*, 28 November 1651, p. 45; *CJ*, 30 December 1651, p. 59; *CSPD*, 1 December 1651, p. 42.

[52] Hugh Peter in conversation with Mylius, 26 December 1651, quoted in Leo Miller, *John Milton and the Oldenburg Safeguard* (New York, 1985), pp. 118–119.

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likely to quarrel and fight," the Guinea merchant Thomas Wall sensibly advised his brother John, "if matters be not composed between them by the interpositions of their ambassadors." It is hardly surprising that a large part of the merchant community "feared they will not agree."[53]

Nevertheless it would be wrong to assume that Rump foreign policy-making was motivated by a different set of ideological assumptions from those which had prompted the embassy to the United Provinces in March. Only the Rump's image of the Dutch had changed. For all of their expertise in commerce and diplomacy, the group centered upon Henry Marten, Herbert Morley, and Tom Challoner played a very small role in the negotiations with the Dutch. The negotiations were instead placed in the hands of men known to be committed to the Protestant cause. The ambassadors were initially received by the Protestant apocalyptic Earl of Pembroke, Milton's friend Sir Peter Wentworth, and Viscount Lisle. The Rump later added the religious radical Sir Henry Mildmay and two of Henry Marten's enemies, the Earl of Salisbury and Sir John Danvers, to the reception committee.[54]

After the Dutch ambassadors had arrived, the Council of State appointed Bulstrode Whitelocke, John Lisle, Thomas Scot, William Purefoy, Dennis Bond, and Viscount Lisle to handle the negotiations.[55] These men were no less committed to the Protestant cause than the reception committee. Bulstrode Whitelocke, who had played an important role in the earlier negotiations, was perhaps the most important figure. He was almost always present at the discussions with the Dutch, was the last man to proofread drafts of proposals, and frequently reported the results to the Council of State and the Rump. It was no exaggeration for him to claim that "my attendance and labor was not small or easy."[56] For all of his "moderation" Whitelocke was a committed Protestant. His only regret after Worcester – a battle which he thought was won because of God's "wonderful appearance for us" – was that "so many of our countrymen and Protestants" had been

[53] *A Perfect Account*, 3–10 December 1651, p. 391; *Perfect Passages*, 9–16 January 1652, p. 355; Thomas Wall to John Wall, 19 December 1651, BL Loan MSS 29/240 (unfoliated); Paige to Paynter and Clerke, Steckley, *John Paige*, 8 January 1652, pp. 57–58; 16 February 1652, p. 62.

[54] *CSPD*, 4 December 1651, p. 46; *CJ*, 18 December 1651, p. 53. This evidence, and that of the next paragraph would appear to be inconsistent with Brenner's claim that "the Commonwealth's imperialist republican leaders, most prominently Marten, Challoner, Neville, and Morley, bent on aggression, controlled overseas policy in the period of growing tension between mid-1651 and mid-1652, during which the Anglo-Dutch negotiations disintegrated and ultimately collapsed." *Merchants and Revolution*, p. 630.

[55] *CSPD*, 7 January 1652, p. 94; 14 January 1652, p. 102; 16 January 1652, pp. 105–106. John Bradshaw was originally named as well but withdrew. *CSPD*, 8 January 1652, pp. 94–95.

[56] *CSPD*, 28 April 1652, p. 228; *CSPD*, 10 May 1652, p. 236; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 25 March 1652, f. 188; 14 April 1652, ff. 198–199. Whitelocke's name appears at every stage of the negotiation process.

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killed. John Dury, the most fervent ideologue of the international Protestant cause, later lauded the selection of Whitelocke for negotiations with German Protestants, an opportunity for Whitelocke's "excellent abilities" to be "most usefully and gloriously set a work."[57] At this point in time Whitelocke's Protestantism was at its most committed. George Cockayne, whom Bernard Capp has identified as one of the earliest fifth monarchists, lived in Whitelocke's house "and Mr. Cockayne constantly prayed twice a day in my family." It is just possible that Whitelocke was present at one of the meetings in which the fifth monarchists attempted to persuade Cromwell to accept their reading of Providence. If so, Whitelocke approved, commenting that they preached "excellently well." In any case, Whitelocke's religious views were quite pronounced. He supported lay preaching – "any man, whom God hath enabled thereunto by his spirit and gifts, may (if not ought) to preach unto and exhort his Christian brethren met together" – advocated gadding to godly sermons beyond one's own parish, sneered at ordination, and condemned Presbyterian discipline for "too too much invading the honor and authority of our great High Priest and Saviour."[58] Clearly there was an ideological element to Whitelocke's interest in Anglo-Dutch relations.

The other men involved in the negotiations with the Dutch were no less committed to the cause. John Lisle's views in this period are difficult to discern, but he had been a regicide, Professor Underdown has called him a "radical Independent," and he was murdered after the Restoration as he was leaving a Gathered Church in Switzerland.[59] Thomas Scot, though he would later celebrate English victories over the Dutch, would also later declare that the aim of the war had been to bring the Dutch "to oneness with us."[60] Dr. Worden has called called William Purefoy one of the Rump's "experts on religion."[61] Dennis Bond, despite his activity on numerous committees, remains a shadowy figure.[62] But Viscount Lisle's

[57] Whitelocke's *Annals*, 7 September 1651, BL, Add. 37345, f. 153; Dury to Whitelocke, 15 April 1656, BL, Add. 32093, f. 341.

[58] Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 14 September 1651, ff. 156–158; 29 February 1652, f. 181; 12 June 1653, ff. 276–279; 18 June 1653, f. 280v; BL, Add. 4992, 20 August 1653, f. 28v; 25 September 1653, f. 36v; 23 October 1653, ff. 44–45; Bernard Capp, pp. 58–60; for a different view of Whitelocke's religious beliefs see Worden, *The Rump*, pp. 131–136.

[59] David Underdown, *Pride's Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution* (London, 1971), p. 86; Edmund Ludlow, "A Voyce from the Watchtower," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1030. I am grateful to Blair Worden for pointing out Ludlow's discussion of Lisle's post-Restoration activities to me.

[60] John Towill Rutt (editor), *Diary of Thomas Burton* (London, 1828), Vol. III, 7 February 1659, p. 111.

[61] Worden, *Rump*, p. 126.

[62] Though of his republican commitment there was little contemporary doubt. Anthony Wood knew him to be an "antimonarchist." See Andrew Clark (editor) *The Life and Times of Anthony Wood* (Oxford, 1891), 30 August 1658, Vol. I, p. 258.

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anti-Catholicism and family relationship with the Dutch must have been well known. The negotiations, then, were left in the hands of men who were ideologically sound Rumpers, not in those of calculating capitalists.

The Dutch understood very well, if belatedly, the nature of the men they were dealing with. Lord Cats, the leader of the Dutch diplomatic team and former Pensionary of Holland, immediately sought to soothe English feelings. He emphasized that the Dutch very much wanted a "firm league of amity and union" which would include assisting each other "both in the offensive and defensive war, against any common enemy whatsoever." Just as importantly for the English he reiterated the religious nature of the mission. "Out of the band of religion," Cats pointed out, "deriveth the true soul of hearts for to keep society amongst men, so are confederacies made amongst those of differing religions very seldom stable or durable." In this case, both England and the United Provinces "have not only the profession of the true religion, but also that the same on both sides is confirmed with numerous martyrdoms."[63] Cats had struck the right note for on Christmas Eve the Rump declared "an ardent affection for the ent[er]ing into a league and unity, with the Lords, the Estates General of the United Provinces."[64] The ambassadors had done a great deal to reassert the image of the United Provinces as a Christian republic.

Appreciation for the Dutch attitude was soon reflected in English actions. The letters of marque awarded to the heirs of the merchant Paulet were called in, along with all other letters of marque granted against the Dutch.[65] The Council of State made certain that illegally seized Dutch prizes were released. Customs officers were reminded not to exceed the letter of the law, to seize salted but not fresh fish, the Council of State "being unwilling that there should be any just cause for dissatisfaction from any of the people of the United Provinces."[66] The *Mercurius Politicus* could again describe the Dutch as an example of a people that "ever grow magnanimous and gallant upon a recovery" of their liberty.[67]

[63] Cats's speech before Parliament, 19 December 1651, Bod., Clar. Dep. C172, Nalson Papers XVIII, ff. 318–319; *A Declaration and Narrative of the Proceedings of the Parliament of England, Touching the Message and Letters of Credence, sent from the Estates General of the United Provinces; and Presented to the Parliament of the Lord Ambassador Cats* (London, 1651), Thomason: 29 December 1651, pp. 6–7; *Mercurius Politicus*, 13–20 November 1651, p. 1210; *Mercurius Politicus* 27 November–4 December 1651, p. 1251.

[64] *French Intelligencer*, 23–31 December 1651, p. 43.

[64] *French Intelligencer*, 23–31 December 1651, p. 43.

[66] Council of State to Captain Boreman, 13 February 1652, *CSPD*, p. 142; Council of State to Thomas Bendish, 19 February 1652, *CSPD*, p. 148.

[67] *Mercurius Politicus*, 15–22 January 1652, p. 1352; see also *A Perswasive to A Mutuall Compliance Under the Present Government. Together with a Plea For a Free State Compared with Monarchy* (Oxford, 1652), Thomason: 18 February 1652, p. 23. "I rather think we shall agree than fall out," wrote one army newsletter-writer at the end of January: newsletter from Westminster, 31 January 1652, Worcester College, Clarke MSS 22, f. 19v.

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In this situation it was possible for serious negotiations to take place. By the end of January the Council of State had drawn up and delivered answers to the initial Dutch propositions, separating specific claims from the items of principle.[68] The Dutch, evidently pleased with the English answer, rehabilitated the 36 Articles which had been discussed while Strickland and St. John were in the United Provinces. The Articles clearly raised complicated legal issues, requiring over a month of debate before the Council of State could deliver an answer to the Dutch propositions. This delay should not, however, be read as an attempt to derail the negotiations. During this period the Council of State allowed the Dutch free access to the negotiating committee, a committee which was supplemented by the pro-Dutch Henry Vane and Cromwell's old friend Sir William Masham.[69] After a conference in early April, both sides spent the rest of the month fine-tuning the treaty. On 26 April "the business of Holland, France, and Ireland" were given top priority on the Council of State's agenda. "Equal liberty" was given to both sides "to make further propositions in carrying on the treaty." Finally on 5 May thirty copies of the 36 Articles, including the Dutch demands and English answers, were to be written out in English. The basis for a treaty had been reached.[70]

The terms debated clearly reveal that the economic problems were minimal. Although it is true that the English did not explicitly repeal the Navigation Act – that would have gone "against the grain of true Englishmen" – they did minimize its effect. The Dutch were allowed to "come by water or by land" into "towns or villages, walled or unwalled, fortified or unfortified" in "all dominions in England Scotland and Ireland ... with freedom and security" to "trade and traffic, and have commerce in any goods or commodities they please." The English emphasized that merchants "may not be seized or arrested in the lands, ports, havens, rivers of the other by virtue of any general or particular commands." Only the plantations and colonies were to be excepted because the "the people of the Commonwealth

[68] *CSPD*, 19 January 1652, p. 109; *CSPD*, 20 January 1652, p. 111; *CSPD*, 23 January 1652, p. 117; *CSPD*, 26 January 1652, p. 119; *CSPD*, 28 January 1652, pp. 121–122; *CSPD*, 29 January 1652, pp. 122–123; "Advice from London," [30 January] 1652, *CSPV*, p. 214; *Mercurius Politicus*, 1–8 January 1652, p. 1332; *French Intelligencer*, 13–20 January 1652, p. 60.

[69] *CSPD*, 12 February 1652, pp. 140–141; *CSPD*, 25 February 1652, p. 151; *CSPD*, 5 March 1652, p. 169; *CSPD*, 8 March 1652, p. 172; *CSPD*, 9 March 1652, p. 172; *CSPD*, 11 March 1652, p. 175; "Advices from London," 15 February 1652, *CSPV*, p. 215; *CJ*, 10 March 1652, p. 103; for evidence of friendliness toward the Dutch see *CSPD*, 24 February 1652, p. 151; *CSPD*, 2 April 1652, p. 205 (addition of Vane and Masham).

[70] *CSPD*, 5 April 1652, p. 209; *CSPD*, 7 April 1652, p. 212; *CSPD*, 12 April 1652, p. 215; *CSPD*, 14 April 1652, p. 217; *CSPD*, 15 April 1652, p. 218; *CSPD*, 22 April 1652, p. 224; *CSPD*, 26 April 1652, p. 227; *CSPD*, 27 April 1652, pp. 227–228; *CSPD*, 5 May 1652, p. 233; newsletter from Westminster, 16 March 1652, Worcester College, Clarke MSS 22, f. 52; newsletter from Westminster, 17 April 1652, Worcester College, Clarke MSS 22, f. 76.

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of England hav[e] been always strictly forbidden to trade in all plantations and places belonging to the people of the United Provinces that are not within the United Netherlands."[71] The issues of fishing and reparations for Amboyna were settled separately. By February it was known that the English and Dutch had agreed upon "the yearly revenue for fishing." In May the Canary merchant John Paige was able to assert that the Dutch "proffer £700,000 to the state in satisfaction to the injuries they did us 30 years since at Amboyna."[72]

In other respects as well the negotiations of 1652 closely resemble those of 1651. In order to guarantee "a nearer union and confederacy between both Commonwealths than hath formerly been," any citizen of the United Provinces "being of the reformed religion" was allowed to "freely dwell and inhabit, exercise trade and commerce" in the British Commonwealth "as any of the native people of this nation may or ought to enjoy by virtue of their birth."[73] The English were still adamant that no citizens of the United Provinces "nor any abiding or being within their power, shall give any aid, counsel or favor to the enemies and rebels of either Commonwealth." Despite some resistance from the Dutch, both sides seem to have agreed to include non-military supplies in the list of prohibited goods.[74] In short, the treaty would have been the first step to a union of the Protestant republics. In the meantime potential areas of disagreement were settled. English "dominion of the sea will be acknowledged," wrote the Venetian agent in London; in return the English "will grant the Dutch free navigation."[75]

Everyone believed that an Anglo-Dutch alliance was imminent. By the middle of March the conveyers of political gossip were confident that an agreement would soon be reached. "Good results are expected from the negotiations of the Dutch ambassadors," wrote one correspondent of the Venetian ambassador in Paris. Ralph Josselin heard that there was "some likelihood of agreement with the Hollander." "After much tugging and struggling with the Dutch Ambassadors," reported the *Perfect Account*,

[71] Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 16 February 1652, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 62; "Response of the Councell to the 36 Articles," BL, Add. 4211, ff. 13, 14, 19. This document is almost certainly one of the thirty copies ordered to be written by the Council of State.

[72] *French Intelligencer*, 23–31 December 1651, p. 48; 27 January–4 February 1652, p. 73; *The Faithful Scout*, 30 January–6 February 1652, p. 427; *Perfect Passages*, 9–16 January 1652, p. 602; Paige to Paynter and Clerke, 12 May 1652, Steckley, *John Paige*, p. 74.

[73] BL, Add. 4211, f. 11; "Thurloe's Review," PRO, SP 103/46, f. 222.

[74] BL, Add. 4211, ff. 3, 4, 11.

[75] Paulucci to Morosini, 14 May 1652, *CSPV*, p. 234. It is true that Paulucci also believed the English would not allow the Dutch "to import foreign produce into England." But, this seems to be inconsistent with the English response to the 36 Articles. He probably misinterpreted the English reticence to explicitly repeal the Navigation Act. Paulucci later reported "that the Commonwealth will make some concessions and permit transit and shelter to Dutch bottoms freighted with foreign produce in the ports of England, Scotland and Ireland, whereas it had been originally intended to exclude them entirely." *CSPV*, 20 May 1652, p. 240.

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"there are now fair hopes that the treaty will produce a happy conclusion."[76] Developments in the United Provinces appeared to confirm this assessment. The States of Holland released the English ships which had been embargoed, leading the *Mercurius Politicus* to conclude that the Dutch "(especially Holland) hath some good satisfaction in your answer to those proposals of their ambassadors, or else your ships had not been so freed and befriended with a convoy."[77] After considering the English answer to the 36 Articles, the vroedschap (town council) of Amsterdam "declared that they heartily desired peace with England." When the Dutch decided to send yet another ambassador to England to encourage "a firm league and amity between the two nations," there seemed no reason to doubt that the negotiations would "in due time draw forth the blessed plants of peace and amity, and open a way of trade and commerce, to the cheering of the hearts of many thousands in each nation."[78] Perhaps the surest sign that a treaty was about to be concluded is that merchants again delivered petition after petition to the Rump, hoping to have their particular grievances included in the general settlement.[79]

Diplomats were confident in May, the very month that the English and Dutch fleets under admirals Blake and Van Tromp clashed in the Downs, that a treaty would be concluded. Despite the differences between the English and Dutch, the Venetian agent Paulucci wrote, all "will be adjusted successfully because of interest and national sympathies." The Dutch ambassadors themselves were sure that a treaty was about to be concluded. "We were confident," they wrote angrily to Van Tromp after the battle with Blake, "of bringing our negotiations before long to a satisfactory conclusion." "Who should ever believe that so noble a work, and one desired with so many wishes of all honest men, and especially of all the churches of the reformed Christian religion," asked the ambassadors rhetorically, "should be cut off or hindered by any imprudent and turbulent man ... without the knowledge and against the will of the States of the United Netherlands?"[80]

The Navigation Act, then, did not make war between England and the

[76] "Advice from Holland," 20 March 1'652, *CSPV*, p. 219; Josselin, *Diary*, 21 March 1652, p. 275; *A Perfect Account*, 17–24 March 1652, pp. 507–508.

[77] *Weekly Intelligencer*, 30 March–6 April 1652, p. 414; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 13–20 April 1652, p. 430; *Dutch Spy*, 31 March - 7 April 1652, pp. 17–18, 22; *Faithful Scout*, 2–9 April 1652, p. 499; *Mercurius Politicus*, 8–15 April 1652, p. 1536; *Perfect Passages*, 9–16 April 1652, pp. 433–434.

[78] *Perfect Passages*, 16–30 April 1652, p. [448]; *A Perfect Account*, 28 April–5 May 1652, p. 560; *A Perfect Account*, 12–19 May 1652, pp. 572, 575; *Mercurius Politicus*, 29 April–6 May 1652, p. 1578; *French Occurrences*, 10–17 May 1652, p. 107.

[79] *CSPD*, 5 May 1652, p. 232; *CSPD*, 6 May 1652, p. 234; *CSPD*, 12 May 1652, p. 239; *CSPD*, 19 May 1652, p. 298.

[80] Paulucci to Morosini, 8 May 1652, *CSPV*, p. 231; 13 May 1652, *CSPV*, p. 237; Dutch Ambassadors to Tromp, 23 May 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 238–239; Dutch Ambassadors to the Council of State, 24 May 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 230–232.

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United Provinces inevitable. Instead it reflected an image of the Dutch as false Protestants and insincere republicans who were only interested in profit, an image which the Dutch ambassadorial team did much to eviscerate. Once the Dutch had reemerged as liberty-loving Protestants the English were quite ready to remove the teeth from the Navigation Act and to pave the way for a closer alliance between the two nations. That this treaty was not completed, that the Protestant cause was not advanced, must be explained by factors other than economic competition.

Why then were negotiations aborted? Why did two nations which had looked to be on the brink of concluding an offensive and defensive alliance in May end up fighting each other by the summer of 1652? In order to answer these questions one must examine developments in Anglo-Dutch relations at the popular level. What did the English think of the Dutch?

As soon as St. John and Strickland returned from the United Provinces in July 1651, the press began to spew forth anti-Dutch propaganda.[81] The Dutch, "from the Hogen to the Boor," were found to be the "greatest sticklers" in support of the young King of Scots. Not only was the Orangist party found hoping for a Stuart victory against the Rump's armies, but even the "truly honest" "were hurried away with the cry of the pack." There were recurrent rumors that the "Dutch butter-boxes" were about to appoint Charles Stuart their protector.[82] Each new rumor of a Royalist victory in England produced new celebrations in the United Provinces. "Swarms of hacksters flocked hither to give and receive news," reported the correspondent of the *Mercurius Politicus* from The Hague. The people were "in the heat and height of jollity, upon mere chimaeras of their own brains that the king had got victories, divided the spoil, and triumphed in the city and capitol of London, before ever a sword was drawn, or stroke struck."[83] Even after the battles which the pamphleteers had won for Charles at "Hereford, Gloucester, Bristol and all" were refuted by the reality of Worcester, the Dutch continued to "hide their shame, and their eyes from beholding the works and wonders of God." "After our good God had broke their swords, and [s]napt their spears in sunder," snorted one polemicist at

[81] Relations between the press and the government during the Interregnum are quite murky. I think it quite likely that St. John, Strickland, and their political allies leaked information which spurred a reimagination of the Dutch polity. Indeed much of the material about the Dutch polity printed in Nedham's *Mercurius Politicus* is taken from correspondence now among Thurloe's papers. However, once the process of reimagination had begun it took on a life of its own – a life deeply informed by the political and religious convictions of the various newspapers and astrologers.

[82] William Lilly, *Annus Tenebrous: or the Dark Year* (London, 1652), p. 36; *Mercurius Politicus*, 25 September–2 October, 1651, pp. 1100–1101; *A Perfect Account*, 17–24 September 1651, p. 292; *Faithful Scout*, 13–20 February 1652, p. 443; *French Intelligencer*, 30 March–6 April 1652, p. 150.

[83] *Mercurius Politicus*, 25 September–2 October 1651, p. 1101; *Mercurius Politicus*, 2–9 October 1651, p. 114.

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the Dutch, "you let the ribald pen vomit out floods of reproaches, in hope to destroy this nation, who was then in strong labor with peace, amongst a wilderness of distractions."[84] Of course Dutch support of Charles II came not out of any ideological commitment, "not out of any love to him, but for fear the Parliament grow powerful, and so obscure the future of Hoghen Moghen."[85]

Naturally, the English were convinced that the Lord did not take kindly to anyone who betrayed his people, who attempted to contravene Providence. "The Dutch may too late repent what they have done," threatened *The Diary*. "The Lord is to be feared for his judgments which he executeth," mused Ralph Josselin ominously, "when the Hollander rejoiced in the false news of our fall, the enemy fell at Worcester."[86]

Just before the arrival of the Dutch ambassadors, the English press rehabilitated the most sensational tale of Dutch perfidy: the massacre at Amboyna. The newspapers reprinted testimonies of the "English-men who lately suffered martyrdom at Amboyna."[87] Two pamphlets soon appeared retelling the atrocity in full. One of them, that written by the republican friend of Samuel Hartlib, Benjamin Worsley, and admirer of Milton, John Hall, was commissioned by the Council of State.[88] The bloody tale of torture and murder was written in the language of Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, the "martyred" Englishmen were all extremely pious men conferring with the preacher provided by the Dutch in their last moments, demanding forgiveness for their sins. At the instant of the execution "there arose a great darkness, with a sudden and violent gust of wind and tempest" which tore two of the Dutch ships from their anchors. A few days later God made his displeasure evident to all. William Dunckin, who had invented the story of English betrayal and informed the Dutch, fell on the grave of the Englishmen, and only rose three days later having gone insane. "A new sickness" befell Amboyna "which swept away about a thousand people," a sickness predicted by one of the martyred English, which could only be interpreted as "a token of the wrath of God for the barbarous tyranny of the Hollanders."[89] John Hall demanded retribution. "The breach being so

[84] *Mercurius Politicus*, 25 September–2 October 1651, pp. 1101–1102; *A Seasonable Expostulation with the Netherlands* (Oxford, 1652), Thomason: 12 June 1652, p. 7.

[85] *Mercurius Politicus*, 28 August–4 September 1651, pp. 1036–1037; *Mercurius Politicus*, 11–18 September 1651, p. 1067.

[86] *The Diary*, 13–20 October 1651, p. 132; Josselin, *Diary*, 21 September 1651, p. 257; *Mercurius Politicus*, 25 September–2 October 1651, pp. 1100–1101.

[87] *French Intelligencer*, 16–23 December 1651, p. 39; *Faithful Scout*, 5–12 December 1651, pp. 364–365.

[88] Wilbur Cortez Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (Cambridge MA, 1939), Vol. II, p. 547. These pamphlets probably reflect the anti-Dutch feeling in the Council before the negotiations began. My claim here is that their propagandistic effect lasted longer than the Hollandophobia of the Council of State.

[89] Thomas Ramsey, *Bloudy Newes from the East-Indies* (London, 1651), Thomason: 12 December 1651, pp. 5–8; *A Declaration and Narrative of the Proceedings of the*

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national, and to this day unsatisfied," Hall reminded his readers, "and the blood there spilt no doubt crying loud, it had been injustice to have buried it in silence." "Now, since that yoke of kingship is taken off our necks," he implored his readers using typically republican language, "we should like men, whose shackles are taken off them while they are asleep, [to] leap up nimbly and make use of our liberty."[90]

Confrontations at sea soon provided the press with new atrocity stories. The Dutch, reported one newspaper, "have stript, whipped, and then hanged on the main mast an English man who was master of a ship they took, and threw all the men over board."[91] But it was the unfortunate story of Captain Henry Greene which truly captured the popular imagination. After taking a French ship, for which he had letters of marque, Greene and his crew were captured by a Dutch man-of-war. Despite their official papers, the Dutch captain insisted on calling the English "rogues, villains, and pirates," "cruelly beat Capt[ain] Green and his company, and said he would throw them all overboard." The English sailors were eventually taken to Amsterdam where they were held "for the space of about seven weeks in fetters and chains and in that time suffered much misery and want both of food and lodging."[92] The newspapers added an element to the tale – an element serving no doubt as a parable – which did not appear in the judicial proceedings. In this version the ship was blessed with the presence of a first officer called Oliver. Faced with a horrible storm which threatened to wreck the ship on the rocks, almost certainly an allegory for the Civil War, the ship was saved "by the blessing of God, and the care of the said Oliver." It was only after the ship/England had survived this travail with divine intervention that it was set upon by the treacherous Dutch. Oliver was "turned a drift in the boat; but providence protected him to the harbor of Portsmouth, from the violence and bloodthirstiness of the barbarous Hollander."[93]

The Dutch were clearly "an unthankful people," a people whose "want of gratitude and civility" to a nation "who next to God, may justly be styled her maker" was fickle at best. "O horrible ingratitude!" wailed the *Faithful Scout*, "what have you forgotten the days of old?" "Though we have done

Parliament of England, pp. 7–8; *Faithful Scout*, 5–12 December 1651, pp. 364–366; *French Intelligencer*, 16–23 December 1651, p. 39. John Hall's pamphlet was advertised in *A Perfect Diurnall*, 15–22 December 1651, p. 1550; *Mercurius Politicus*, 20–27 November 1651, p. 1236.

90 [John Hall], *A True Relation of the Unjust, Cruel, and Barbarous Proceedings against the English at Amboyna In the East-Indies, by the Netherlandish Governour and Council There* (London, 1651), Thomason: 29 November 1651, pp. i–viii.

91 *Perfect Passages*, 2–9 January 1652, p. 349.

92 Judges of court of Admiralty to Council of State, 19 May 1652, PRO, SP 46/96, f. 178; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 30 December 1651, f. 174.

93 *French Intelligencer*, 30 December – 6 January 1652, p. 56; *Faithful Scout*, 2–9 January 1652, pp. 396–397.

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both the Dutch and Scots so many civilities, and enriched both those unthankful people, and thereby have deserved so much at both their hands," England's most popular author, William Lilly, commented, "yet they never did, nor they ever will affect us, nor will be ever any perfect friendship or league betwixt us."[94] In the wake of Worcester this was an ominous comparison indeed.

The image of the Dutch full of "domineering pride" had become a commonplace. "It is the nature of the Dutchmen to strike sail for their own profit, to offer any kindness where they perceive they may be any way the gainer," commented the author of one of the popular chapbooks describing the exploits of the thief James Hind. "We are high, blown up with wealth," observed the Dutch correspondent of the *Mercurius Politicus*, "therefore we vapor, and love our money better then the remembrance of all those ancient courtesies that are received from England."[95] Dutch treachery, pride, and self-interest naturally had religious implications. Although the Dutch still spoke in the accents of the godly, this was not to be confused with real religiosity. For the Dutch "hold Popish ... all that help them not." The Dutch were "bred statesmen, none of them being so nice of conscience, but they can turn out religion, to let in policy." Balthazar Gerbier, whose imperial projects were treated seriously by the Council of State at this time, attributed the Dutch behavior to a "strategem (hatched by a[n] Italian Devil, fostered by the Antichristian Father the Pope, and fomented by a world of malignants to boot)" which aimed to divide the Protestant cause. "Thou growest proud, and hast forgotten thy God," the popular almanac writer Nicholas Culpeper warned the Dutch, "mindest thy self; thy God knows how to bring thee poor again."[96]

All of this demanded retribution. The calls for punishment were issued forth in the most violent terms and with the most frequency by astrologers, who were enjoying an unprecedented popularity. William Lilly promised that "the vengeance of Almighty God is ready to be poured forth upon the Dutch for their too too much unthankfulness." He predicted that the English would "be a scourge unto the Dutch, for their pride and injuries

[94] William Lilly, *Merlini Anglici Ephemeris* (London, 1651), sig. B3 (unpaginated); *A Seasonable Expostulation with the Netherlands*, p. 3; *Faithful Scout*, 13–20 February 1652, p. 444.

[95] *A Perfect Account*, 25 February–3 March 1652, p. 481; *A Second Discovery of Hind's Exploits: or a Fuller Relation of his Ramble, Robberies, and Cheats in England, Ireland, Scotland with his Voyage to Holland* (London, 1652), Thomason: 19 November 1651, pp. 12–13; *A Perfect Account*, 25 February - 3 March 1652, p. 481; *Mercurius Politicus*, 12–19 February 1652, p. 1422.

[96] *A True and Exact Character of the Lowe Countreys; Especially Holland: Or, The Dutchman Anatomized and Truly Dissected.* (London, 1652), Thomason: 15 March 1652, pp. 11–17; Gerbier, *A Discovery of Certain Notorious Stumbling-Blocks Which the Devill, the Pope, and the Malignants have Raised to put Nations at Variance.* (London, 1652), Thomason, 12 March 1652, pp. 1–2; Nicholas Culpeper, *An Ephemeris for the Year 1652* (London, 1652), Thomason: November 1651, sig. C3.

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offered us these many years." Should the Dutch "justly provoke our state," the English would soon be "taking down their pride in all parts of the world, and in time making Amsterdam a synagogue of sinners, and Flushing an habitation of herring fishermen."[97] "Let the Hollander beware how he meddles with us," warned Culpeper, "until such time as he longs to be beaten." A war against England would make the Dutch "sensible of an invasion to better purpose than that of Alva." "The Dutch will be troublesome this year at sea," predicted another prognosticator, "but we shall make them tame enough quickly." "A dreadful judgement I know is hanging over all their heads," prophesied William Lilly, "less than half an age will make them despicable."[98]

Despite these vituperative attacks upon the Dutch character, most in England did not want to give them up for lost. "Nor can it be forgotten," the *Mercurius Politicus* reminded its readers, "how much of monarchy of late crept into the United Provinces, the relics of which are not yet extinct." "A republic [cannot] decline sooner into a tyranny," explained another pamphleteer, "than by continuing that shadow which decency constrains free governments to retain of monarchy, too long in one family (as the Dutch did)."[99] The reports of Dutch officials being punished for embezzlement only served to confirm English suspicions. Someone merely needed "to play the physician, to administer a strong purge to evacuate the corrupted humors; and like a good surgeon, rather than the whole body should perish, to cut off those rotten members, that have laboured to fell and ruin the state." The possibility of such a reformation allowed Balthazar Gerbier to continue to hope for "amity between two such potent nations, who are of one profession in matters of religion; of one and the self same strength by sea; and who being in peace may counterpoise all other parts of Europe."[100]

It is always difficult to measure the effect of printed material on the ideas and actions of the general public.[101] Nevertheless there is good evidence to suggest that English antipathy for the Dutch was on the increase after the

[97] Lilly, *Annus Tenebrous*, pp. 18–19; William Lilly, *Merlini Anglici Ephemeris* (London, 1653), (unpaginated).

[98] Lilly, *Annus Tenebrous*, p. 12; Lilly, *Merlini Anglici Ephemeris*, "To the Reader," sig. B3 (unpaginated); Nicholas Culpeper, *Catastrophe Magnatum: Or The Fall of Monarchie* (London, 1652), Thomason: 31 March 1652, p. 56; *A New Remonstrance of the Free-Born People of England* (London, 1651), Thomason: 14 November 1651, p. 5.

[99] *Mercurius Politicus*, 29 April–6 May 1652, p. 1573; *A Perswasive to A Mutuall Compliance*, p. 24.

[100] *French Intelligencer*, 4–11 February 1652, p. 83; *Mercurius Politicus*, 2–9 October 1651, p. 1118; 8–15 January 1652, p. 1337; 29 January–5 February 1652, pp. [1392–1393]; Gerbier, *A Discovery*, p. 3.

[101] I realize that I am finessing a thorny methodological problem. There is simply limited material with which to assess the reading habits of the English during the revolutionary period. However, I think that the temporal correspondence of the new-found popular animosity and the lingual similarity to the press campaign suggests that many in England were deeply influenced by its arguments.

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failure of the embassy of Strickland and St. John. John Donne's assessment that "we are content to be assured that the Devil has got the Dutchman" is confirmed by a variety of tangible manifestations of Hollandophobia.[102] Dr. Groenveld has shown that in the year 1651 English seizures of Dutch shipping more than doubled those of the previous year. The English Admiralty courts and the Council of State were deluged with petitions from Dutch merchants demanding release of their ships. But instead of restoring the ships the English responded with praise for their privateers in the popular press. "Here is news that the English have taken a Dutch vessel or two," admitted the *Perfect Account*, "but what is that unto those they have taken of the English." "The English ... are very successful and victorious, and have taken sundry rich prizes," crowed *The Faithful Scout*, "Gallant news! 'tis richly worth a penny."[103] When the Dutch ambassador extraordinary Adrian Pauw took his leave of England in June 1652, he particularly complained about English seizures of Dutch ships under pretext of letters of reprisal awarded against the French.[104]

More telling, perhaps, than the numerical evidence of ship seizures, is the evidence of personal malice that English sailors had for the Dutch. "The English master and his crew uttered all manner of abusive words and insults against us," complained the Dutch vice-admiral Jan Evertsen. Each time he came across an English ship in the Channel he was greeted with "many insolent speeches."[105] Verbal harassment was only the beginning. There were rumors in the United Provinces that English seamen had "cast above seventy Zeelanders overboard." In February 1652 the Zeeland Board of Admiralty insisted that the "exorbitant excesses of the English have grown worse" and that they "increase daily." Things had become so bad that the judges of the English High Court of Admiralty encouraged the Dutch victims of "the many cruel and barbarous acts of punishment and torture" to bring in their complaints. The Council of State tried in vain to stop the"cruelty and inhumanity of the people of this nation inhabiting on the maritime coast."[106] This was almost certainly a response to the anti-Dutch

[102] John Donne to Lord Conway, [July 1652], PRO, SP 46/95, f. 376.

[103] Groenveld, "English Civil Wars," p. 561; Rowen, *John De Witt*, pp. 65–66; Bod., Clar., Dep. C.172, Nalson Papers XVIII, ff. 308–309; Bod., Tanner MSS 54, f. 122; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 20 December 1651, f. 172; 12 January 1652, f. 175; "Advices from London," 22 February 1652, *CSPV*, p. 216; *Faithful Scout*, 5–12 December 1651, p. 364; *A Perfect Account*, 6–13 February 1652, p. 440; 1–8 October 1651, p. 311; *French Intelligencer*, 23–30 March 1652, p. 141; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 10–17 February 1652, p. 357; *Mercurius Politicus*, 4–11 December 1651, p. 1267; 12–19 February 1652, p. 1421. The relevant Admiralty records are in the PRO, at HCA 30/495–500.

[104] Adrian Pauw to Council of State, 27 June 1652, in Birch, *Thurloe State Papers*, Vol. I, p. 210.

[105] Evertsen to States General, 29 March 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 134–135.

[106] Zeeland Board of Admiralty to States General, 4 February 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, p. 76; *Mercurius Politicus*, 16–23 October 1651, p. 1145; "Declaration of

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campaign conducted in the press. "We are told," averred the Dutch correspondent of the *Mercurius Politicus*, "yours do not only search our ships for French commodities ... and abuse our men, but they talk of torturing, and tying them up by the thumbs, to make them confess, *as if you meant to be even with us for Amboyna.*" After the attack on Captain Greene had received full play in the press, *The French Intelligencer* reported that "Cap[tain] Smith met with some of the Hollanders, and hath meted the same measure to them again."[107] Anti-Dutch feeling was reaching new heights at just the moment that the negotiators in Westminster were beginning to hope for a mutually agreeable settlement and a Protestant alliance.

It is not surprising that English seagoing men and the inhabitants of the maritime towns reacted so quickly to the press campaign. Bernard Capp has shown that religious enthusiasts tended to congregate in towns "close to or on the sea." The navy was a "center of millenarian enthusiasm." Admiral Robert Blake was a committed republican, reportedly having proclaimed in Cadiz that "with the example afforded by London all kingdoms will annihilate tyranny and become republics."[108] The most recent students of the Commonwealth navy have also concluded that "the navy was a highly politicized, partisan force."[109]

The Dutch could not help but react to the English insults, tortures, and ship seizures. The "daily reports" of attacks by the English at sea led the Dutch "to murmur and surmise the worst, that you have a mind to break with this state." "Owing to the constant reprisals of the English," the Venetian diplomat in Paris observed upon the arrival of the Dutch ambassadors at Westminster, "at present the Dutch are more disposed to a breach." The *Mercurius Politicus* was right to say of the Dutch maritime provinces that "if you touch their ships, you take away their lives."[110]

Seagoing men were especially angry. "Above and under deck among the shippers," observed the Dutch correspondent to the *Mercurius Politicus*, "the blood and humors begin to boil ... these testy men you have so much stirred by your proceed[ing]s, like as the vintner with a stick at the bottom

the High Court of Admiralty of England," 16 February 1652, PRO, SP 46/96, ff. 180–181; Judges of the Admiralty to Council of State, 19 May 1652, PRO, SP 46/96, ff. 178–179; Council of State to Vice Admiral of Cornwall, 13 February 1652, PRO, SP 25/97, f. 129.

107 *Mercurius Politicus*, 12–19 February 1652, p. 1422 (my emphasis); *French Intelligencer*, 6–13 January 1652, p. 54.

108 Bernard Capp, *The Fifth Monarchy Men* (London, 1972), pp. 77, 80–81; Basadonna to Doge, 8 February 1651, *CSPV*, pp. 169–170.

109 Bernard Capp, *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648–1660* (Oxford, 1989), p. 2. William Bennet Cogar, "The Politics of Naval Administration, 1649–1660" (Oxford, D.Phil. thesis, 1983), p. 7.

110 *Mercurius Politicus*, 30 October–6 November 1651, p. 1185; 1–8 January 1652, p. 1327; 15–22 January 1652, p. 1359; 29 January–5 February 1652, pp. [1390–1391]; Morosini to Doge, 19 December 1651, *CSPV*, p. 207.

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of the Rhenish wine barrel." The "Dutch capt[ains] talk much of a war ... and despise your sea capt[ains] as they do them again." By early 1652, when the negotiations in Westminster were going along well, a naval correspondent to the *Perfect Diurnall* could "observe a far rougher temper in these Dutch captains then formerly." Bulstrode Whitelocke noted that "the Dutch captains were rough against the English and demanded restitution of their ships taken by the English."[111]

The merchant community in the Dutch maritime provinces was no less agitated. "The people of this nation are generally extremely mad with you," observed one of the Rump's political informers in Rotterdam, "the more because of your granting letters of mart to take their ships. Hereupon, many Zeelanders, Amsterdammers, and Rotterdammers, have this week been with the States General to present their grievances." Demands for retribution were most frequent and most violent in Zeeland, formerly one of the provinces most sympathetic to England. Now "the communality of Zeeland are stark mad," claiming "that things were come to such a pass, that the States durst not any longer deny it." "The great excitement of the most respectable merchants" in Zeeland soon forced an official response. A petition from the merchants of the major Zeeland towns demanded that "before they treated of any other matters" the provincial government "would have letters of mart granted them to take upon the English." When the provincial government hesitated, at least some merchants took out their letters of marque in the name of the Duke of York.[112] When reports began to arrive that the English had seized many Dutch ships in the Caribbean, an attack planned long before the Dutch diplomats arrived in England, it provoked a "great rage." The English seizures, wrote Edward Nicholas from The Hague, "hath much incensed the merchants of Amsterdam. In Zeeland the people from there come in great numbers tumultuously to [get] letters of reprisal against the English."[113]

Dutch Anglophobia was not limited to those who had direct experience of English malice. Polemicists who "print and publish what they please against England" were to be found throughout the United Provinces. Even in Amsterdam a broadside was printed "and dispersed up and down the

[111] *Mercurius Politicus*, 6–13 November 1651, p. 1200; 19–26 February 1652, pp. 1434–1435; *Perfect Diurnall*, 9–16 February 1652, p. 1671; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 11 February 1652, f. 178.

[112] Intelligence from Rotterdam, 9 January 1652, Nickolls, *Original Letters*, p. 80; *Mercurius Bellonius*, 9–16 February 1652, pp. 9, 12; *A Perfect Diurnall*, 23 February–1 March 1652, p. 1705; *Faithful Scout*, 30 January–6 February 1652, p. 432; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 13–20 January 1652, p. 323; , 6–13 February 1652, p. 377; *Mercurius Politicus*, 23–30 October 1651, p. 1167; 29 January–5 February 1652, p. [1393]; 4–11 March 1652, pp. 1471–1472; *CSPD*, 21 April 1652, p. 223; Zeeland Board of Admiralty to States General, 4 February 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 75–78.

[113] *Mercurius Politicus*, 28 February–4 March 1652, pp. 1451–1452; Nicholas to Hyde, 12 February 1652, Bod., Clar. 42, f. 385.

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city, full of invectives against the Parliament of England, calling them rebels, traitors and bloodsuckers."[114] The effect was tremendous. "The whole population clamor loudly," reported a Venetian observer. It was well known that "the Hollander[s] in general express great hatred against England." There were even rumors that the Dutch were planning a lightning strike against England in which they would block up the Thames. "They give out high Dutch," announced the *Faithful Scout*, "as if they intend to bring us to low English."[115] The Dutch were not content with mere words. "There is nothing but threatenings of fire and sword against the English," ran one frequently printed account, "that they go in danger of their lives." There were reports of physical assaults in many of the major Dutch cities. "So enraged are the boors against the English," wrote the *Faithful Scout*, "that they do nothing but grin and show their tusks in the open streets."[116]

It would, of course, be a mistake to see Dutch political culture as monolithic. In fact, Dutch politics in the early modern period was dominated by intense party divisions, party divisions at the national, provincial, and local level. While there were moments of party quiescence, it only took a small spark to rekindle the fires of party warfare. Relations with England was just such a spark, and 1652 was just such a time.

Naturally the English popular press simplistically distinguished between the "tumultuous rabble" and the "wisdom and prudence of the States," "the desperate unsettled brains" and the "grave and solid party," "the giddy sort" and "the more sage people," in short between those agitating for war against England and those in favor of peace.[117] In fact, of course, the coalitions were much less clear cut. But there was a good deal of truth in the *Faithful Scout*'s isolation of the Dutch "sea-towns and royal butter-boxes" as those who would "rather dissolve in heat and fury, then condescend upon terms of peace and unity."[118] Popular Orangist sentiment demanded a war against republican England.

English actions coupled with effective Orangist propaganda had done a great deal to destroy the support for an English alliance which had once existed in Zeeland. When the States of Holland declared their support for

[114] *Perfect Passages*, 13–27 February 1652, p. 390; *The French Intelligencer*, 6–13 January 1652, p. 54.

[115] Paulucci to Morosini, 19 June 1652, *CSPV*, p. 253; *A Perfect Account*, 18–25 February 1652, p. 480; 7–14 April 1652, p. 536; *Faithful Scout*, 20–27 February 1652, p. 454; *Faithful Scout*, 27 February–5 March 1652, [p. 464]; *French Intelligencer*, 2–9 March 1652, p. 118.

[116] *Faithful Scout*, 5–12 March 1652, p. 468; *Faithful Scout*, 19–26 March 1652, p. 485; *Faithful Scout*, 26 March–2 April 1652, p. 494; *French Intelligencer*, 9–16 March 1652, p.122; *Faithful Scout*, 30 March–6 April 1652, p. 146; *A Perfect Account*, 24–31 March 1652, p. 513; *Mercurius Politicus*, 12–19 February 1652, p. 1417; *Mercurius Politicus*, 4–11 March 1652, pp. 1468–1469.

[117] *Faithful Scout*, 9–16 April 1652, p. 509; *A Perfect Account*, 5–12 November 1651, p. 353; *A Perfect Account*, 25 February–3 March 1652, p. 487.

[118] *Faithful Scout*, 28 November–5 December 1651, p. 346.

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an English alliance in the States General in early April, "the States and merchants of Zeeland rose up in angry fury, dissolved the Assembly, and vowed revenge upon the English." Attacks on English merchants were at their most frequent in Middleburgh and Flushing. Indeed, in Orangist Zeeland the States of Holland were popularly called "little better than traitors" for pursuing negotiations with England.[119]

The States of Holland, and presumably the governments of other provinces as well, were also less committed in their support of an English alliance than they had been the previous year. But, perhaps because of the republicanism they shared with the English Commonwealth, perhaps out of a sincere desire for a Protestant alliance, or perhaps merely because they felt it was "almost impossible for Holland to subsist without the friendship of England" the States continued to support an English alliance. As a result of the powerful role that Holland played in national politics, it did seem as if there was a split between the attitudes of the governed and those of the governors. There were "divers that covet after war; justifying it to be both necessary and lawful." Yet "the care and industry of their governors" was also "remarkable," doing everything "almost beyond their power to suppress" the popular Anglophobia. "The States Gen[eral]," it appeared, were "more prudent and wise then to hearken to the ayes of the scum of their nation." Should there be a war between England and the United Provinces, the *Perfect Passages* predicted it would "set all at difference at Amsterdam, and other places of chiefest importance."[120] So deep was anti-English sentiment among the people that there was "evident danger of mutiny." "The people in all the sea towns continue very mutinous," reported the *Weekly Intelligencer*, "and are no less angry with their own Governors then with the English." There were actually "tumults and risings" in Zeeland and the Holland towns of Rotterdam, Delft, Dordrecht, and The Hague, in which the English were labeled "traitors and conspirators to their religion and liberties." It was in this context that William Lilly could predict that the "unruly multitude and giddy people" would "let loose the reins of government, and become disobedient unto authority."[121]

[119] *A Declaration of the High and Mighty Lords, The States of Holland, Concerning the Parliament and Commonwealth of England* ... (London, 1652), Thomason: 5 April 1652. TT: E659(3), pp. 3–4; *Faithful Scout*, 27 February–5 March 1652, pp. 459, [464]; *Mercurius Politicus*, 18–25 March 1652, p. 1488; *Mercurius Politicus*, 17–24 June 1652, p. 1683.

[120] *Perfect Passages*, 2–9 January 1652, p. 349; *Perfect Passages*, 9–16 January 1652, p. 361; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 23–30 March 1652, p. 403; *Severall Proceedings*, 8–15 April 1652, p. 2076; *A Perfect Account*, 10–16 March 1652, p. 503; *Faithful Scout*, 23–30 April 1652, pp. 523–524; *Mercurius Politicus*, 30 October – 6 November 1651, p. 1186; 29 January – 5 February 1652, p. [1391]; 26 February – 4 March 1652, p. 1449.

[121] *A Declaration of the High and Mighty Lords*, pp. 4–5; *Mercurius Politicus*, 29 January – 5 February 1652, p. [1393]; *Mercurius Politicus*, 26 February–4 March 1652, p. 1452; *Dutch Spy*, 17–25 March 1652, pp. 1–2; Lilly, *Annus Tenebrous*, pp. 4–5; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 9–16 March 1652, p. 384.

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The death of William II had unleashed the full force of party play in the United Provinces. Naturally local factions attempted to gain support from more powerful national groupings. In the wake of William's death it was the republican States party – "Barnvelt's faction" – which had largely succeeded in gaining control in Zeeland and Holland. But its opponents, the supporters of the Prince of Orange, were actively using antipathy to the English to revive their political position. "Being troubled in mind" by the English attacks on Dutch shipping, the Dutch correspondent to the *Mercurius Politicus* explained, the Dutch "now reckon up all grievances, and say, the State is some millions in debt, which how it should come about, they do not understand; and therefore talk of having an account." The "good patriots and Republicans" were anxious for peace with England, "knowing that war would only bring misery and tribulation," the Dutch ambassadors in England were informed, but the Orangist "boutefeus" were doing all they could "to spark a war."[122]

Faced with English attacks on their shipping and violent criticism from their political opponents the governors of the United Provinces had to take action. They adopted two complementary strategies. First, they prohibited all commerce with England. This was done, presumably, to prevent Dutch ships being taken as a consequence of the English Navigation Act and as the least provocative way to register their official disapproval of the seizure of Dutch ships by English seamen. As a treaty of alliance with England began to look increasingly probable, the Dutch withdrew this embargo. But within a fortnight official reports came in of the English fleet's taking large numbers of Dutch ships off Barbados. Not only did the Dutch reinstate the embargo but "in retaliation" for the English attack they gave "strict charge and command, that all ships and goods whatsoever belonging to the English Nation, be forthwith seized upon." "There is nothing more to be feared, then a war," wrote the *French Intelligencer* echoing the sentiments of the merchant community.[123] Second, the States General decided to equip a large fleet of 150 men-of-war "to restore the freedom of commerce." Seamen had demanded such a fleet as early as December 1651. Given the frequency of riots in the Dutch sea towns there seems little reason to doubt that this move was in fact an attempt "to appease the common people." The preparation of this huge fleet, "their great Armada, which they say will be accounted, the world's wonder" accentuated national feeling in the United

[122] Nicholas to Ormonde, 11 July 1651, Carte, *Collection*, Vol. II, pp. 44–45; *Mercurius Politicus*, 4–11 March 1652, p. 1472; intelligence from The Hague addressed to Dutch ambassadors, Longleat House, Whitelocke MSS XI, ff. 89–90.

[123] *A Perfect Account*, 7–15 January 1652, p. 425; *Perfect Diurnall*, 12–19 January 1652, p. 1606; *French Intelligencer*, 30 March–6 April 1652, p. 151; *Mercurius Politicus*, 11–18 December 1651, p. 1184; *A Declaration of the High and Mighty Lords*, pp. 3–4; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 30 March–6 April 1652, pp. 407–408; Paige to Paynter and Clerke, Steckley, *John Paige*, 6 March 1652, p. 66.

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Provinces. Despite official Dutch statements, "to prevent all misinterpretations, evil thoughts, and mistrusts," that "they would not act anything that should be prejudicial to the Commonwealth of England," the English could not but be apprehensive. Bulstrode Whitelocke was not alone in musing that the embargo and the huge Dutch fleet "raiseth thoughts that they intend a war against England."[124]

At the same time, then, that talks between English politicians and Dutch diplomats were inching towards a mutually acceptable treaty of alliance, popular polemics were fanning the flames of popular hatred.[125] Despite government-inspired pleas in the English press to leave foreign policy "to those that are in place, which stand upon giants' shoulders, see with many eyes, and hear with many ears," Anglo-Dutch maritime hostility was at its worst in the first half of 1652. While informed of the apparent success of the Westminster negotiations, the Venetian diplomat Michiel Morosini was sure that "the constant maritime aggressions" would lead ineluctably to "an open declaration of war later on." "The damages and indignities offered to each other," commented that always perceptive political observer Edward Hyde, "may possibly not be so easily reconciled as is apprehended."[126] Both sides were armed to the teeth, imbued with deep hatred for the other, only waiting for a spark to ignite a war.

What, then, was the catalyst which finally precipitated the war? What destroyed the negotiation process just as it was on the brink of succeeding? Ostensibly it was a revival of the age-old dispute over sovereignty of the sea. On 19 May the English and Dutch admirals, both supported by newly reinforced fleets, faced each other in the Downs. When Admiral Blake saluted the Dutch admiral Van Tromp in the customary manner,

[124] *Weekly Intelligencer*, 23–30 December 1651, p. 304; 24 February–2 March 1652, p. 370; *Mercurius Politicus*, 25 December–1 January 1652, p. 1316; *Mercurius Politicus*, 29 January–5 February 1652, p. [1393]; *Mercurius Politicus*, 12–19 February 1652, p. 1422; *French Intelligencer*, 24 February–2 March 1652, p.112; *Perfect Passages*, 26 December–2 January 1652, p. 395; *Perfect Passages*, 13–20 February 1652, p. 385; *A Perfect Account*, 11–18 February 1652, p. 490; *A Perfect Account*, 17–24 March 1652, pp. 509–510; *Mercurius Bellonius*, 25 February–3 March 1652, pp. 26–27; *Faithful Scout*, 12–19 March 1652, p. [480]; Dutch Ambassadors to States General, 10 March 1652, Bod., Tanner MSS 55, f. 164; "Thurloe's Review," PRO, SP 103/46, f. 223; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, f. 188.

[125] Despite its military might, the Rump was a regime with limited political and cultural resources. Woolrych has pointed out that it was a regime which was unpopular among many in the political nation, and knew it. Austin Woolrych, *Commonwealth to Protecorate* (Oxford, 1982), p. 7. Many of its leaders were also committed to notions of providence which limited their will to attempt to stem the tide of events with which they might not have been completely sympathetic. As a result, the press campaign and the resultant popular hatred of the Dutch took on a force of their own, a force which other seventeenth-century English political regimes might have been able to limit.

[126] *A Perfect Account*, 17–24 March 1652, p. 512; Morosini to Doge, 18 March 1652, *CSPV*, p. 217; Hyde to Nicholas, 29 March 1652, Bod., Clar. 43, f. 48.

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requesting the usual striking of the topsail in deference to English sovereignty, "Van Tromp saluted with a broad side." The Dutch were denying that they were in a "private Channel belonging to England."[127] The ensuing battle ultimately ended the negotiations then on the verge of conclusion in Westminster, leading within a month to a declaration of war. The Dutch "have laid it as their settled design to obtain to themselves the dominion and sovereignty of those seas," declared the English Council of State, "thereby not only give what rules of commerce they please, but to destroy the trade and shipping of this Commonwealth, as inconsistent (in their apprehension) with absoluteness and command at sea which they aspire after."[128]

It is true, of course, that there had been repeated minor clashes between Commonwealth navy and Dutch seamen. The English press did reissue John Selden's *Mare Clausum*, newly translated by Marchamont Nedham, and John Boroughs' *The Soveraignty of the British Seas*. The Dutch admiralty courts did once again listen to legal arguments surrounding the classic dispute.[129] But this merely begs the question. Why did this dispute flare up into a war only in 1652?

Naturally the popular antagonism and the naval armaments race between the English and the Dutch greatly increased tensions at sea, making a confrontation all the more likely. But the battle seems to have been fought over an issue of principle, an issue that was quite new. Dutch seamen were being accused of exciting "contempt and disdain for the English nation and government." They were calling the Commonwealth navy "traitors." "If there was a king" in England they would strike sail, claimed Van Tromp, "but being the oldest States they would not." When one Captain Johnson required another group of Dutch naval vessels "to strike sail, in obedience and honor to the States of England," the Dutch admiral responded, "that although they never cut off a king's head yet they were the ancientest

[127] *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, 18–25 May 1652, pp. 7–8; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 18–25 May 1652, p. 468.

[128] Council of State to Levant Company, 23 July 1652, PRO, SP 105/144, f. 47.

[129] For conflicts over the flag see: *Weekly Intelligencer*, 25 March–1 April 1651, p. 111; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 10–17 February 1652, pp. 358–359; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 23–30 March 1652, p. [406]; *Dutch Spy*, 24–31 March 1652, pp. 12–13; *The Diary*, 13–20 October 1651, p. 32; *Mercurius Politicus*, 16–23 October 1651, pp. 1148–1149; 27 May–3 June 1652, p. 1640; *Faithful Scout*, 17–24 October 1651, p. 310; *Faithful Scout*, 26 March–2 April 1652, p. 490; *Perfect Passages*, 28 November–5 December 1651, p. 341; *French Occurrences*, 17–24 May 1652, pp. 14–15; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 20 October 1651, f. 164; BL, Add. 37345, 27 March 1652, f. 188; Evertsen to States General, 29 March 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, pp. 134–135. For the reprinting of the pamphlets see the advertisements in *Perfect Diurnall*, 26 January–2 February 1652, p. [1646]; *Mercurius Politicus*, 12–19 February 1652, p. 1424; and the comment in Oxenden's commonplace book, BL, Add. 54332, f. 38. For the Dutch Admiralty courts see *Mercurius Politicus*, 13 November 1651, p. 1200; *Faithful Scout*, 7–14 November 1651, p. 330; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 11–18 November 1651, p. 351.

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States."[130] This attitude of the Dutch navy was not altogether surprising. Van Tromp, who "hath so great an influence upon the mariners and seamen, that what way soever he bears up his helm, they will steer after him," was a well-known Orangist. He "hath declared for the Royal-party," reported the *French Occurrences*, "and, its said, is much inclined to the cause of the K[ing] of Scots, who hath often times solicited him to the quarrel." By negotiating with the English, Van Tromp had long maintained, "we tread under our feet the lion and honor of our country." In this context, the rumors that Van Tromp wanted "nothing more then to beget a war betwixt the two States" is quite understandable.[131]

The ritual and symbolism of the Dutch fleet confirms that it had taken up the cause of monarchy. Dutch men-of-war were spotted with "the King of Scot's colors on their topsails." Despite demands from the States General that the colors of the House of Orange be withdrawn from all public places, Van Tromp insisted that his fleet fly the Orangist flag. At the battle of the Downs, the colors of the House of Orange were clearly visible on the "admiral's main-mast."[132] Apparently the Dutch admiralty had accepted the arguments of the Scots agent William MacDowell that "all contracts have been made betwixt the successive kings of England, their lawful heirs, and the High and Mighty States General, and not with England." "The respect they had formerly shewed upon those encounters [with English ships of war], was because the ships were the king's, and for the good intelligence they had with the crown," the admiralty instructed Van Tromp, "but they had no reason to continue the same in this alteration of government." Van Tromp had no objections, ordering his fleet "not to strike sail to the English, upon pain of death, unless they have the Scotch king's colors."[133]

[130] Evertsen to States General, 29 March 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, p. 133; *Bloudy Newes from Holland* (London, 1652), Thomason: 17 March 1652, pp. 3–4; *French Occurrences*, 17–24 May 1652, p. 16.

[131] *A Declaration of the L. Admiral Vantrump Concerning The King of Scots, and the Parliament of England* ... (London, 1652), Thomason: 25 June 1652, p. 5; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 27 May–2 June 1651, pp. 182–183; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 22–28 June 1652, p. 506; *French Occurrences*, 24–31 May 1652, p. 24; *French Occurrences*, 7–14 June 1652, p. 35; *French Occurrences*, 21–28 June 1652, pp. 54–56; newsletter from London, 31 May 1651, Worcester College, Clarke MSS 19, f. 13v; Sir Philip Warwick, "Memoirs," HL, HM 41956, p. 103.

[132] *Faithful Scout*, 19–26 March 1652, p. 488; *Mercurius Politicus*, 18–25 March 1652, p. 1487; Van Tromp's instructions to his fleet, 15 May 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 167–168. See also Gardiner's perceptive comments on p. 167. For the decree against the Prince of Orange's colors and the popular response, see *Weekly Intelligencer*, 4–11 May 1652, p. 451; *Mercurius Politicus*, 29 April–6 May 1652, p. 1578, 1581; *Perfect Passages*, 7–14 May 1652, p. 264.

[133] *Anglia Liberata: or, The Rights of the People of England Maintained Against the Pretences of the Scottish King, As They Are Set Forth in an Answer to the Lords Ambassadors Propositions of England* (London, 1651), Thomason: 4 October 1651, pp. 2–3; Hyde, *History*, p. 785 (he is quoting from an official document); Anthony Young to Lenthall, 14 May 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, p. 181; *Faithful Scout*, 18–25 June 1652,

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The issue then was not the old dispute over sovereignty of the sea, but an argument about whether the Commonwealth had the same rights as the English Monarchy had had. Selden and Boroughs, for all of their learned argumentation, were not relevant in this context. They had written under the monarchy, and were defending the rights of the kings of England. Even the republication of the Venetian tract *Dominium Maris* did not completely serve the purpose because the author of the preface had ineptly compared the claims to those of monarchies, failing to make an argument based on national sovereignty. Belatedly the Rump understood the issue at stake. "The late clash that broke out 'twixt us and Holland," explained the future poet laureate James Howell, occurred because "upon this change of government and devolution of interest from kingly power to a Commonwealth there may happen some question touching the primitive and inalienable right that Great Britain claims to the sovereignty of her own seas." Though Howell did not receive the commission to pen the new treatise as he would have liked, the Council of State did ask Bulstrode Whitelocke to do the job. Whitelocke soon found a case for "maintaining the right of the Commonwealth in the dominion of the British Seas." Not surprisingly he declared the sovereignty "to be in the nation of England."[134] The dispute between England and the United Provinces had returned to a question of recognition of the regicide republic.

As soon as the Rump heard of the battle between Van Tromp and Blake in the Downs it despatched the naval expert Dennis Bond and the pro-Dutch Cromwell to the Cinque Ports to investigate the situation. After interviewing Dutch prisoners of war as well as the English naval commanders Cromwell was convinced that the Dutch had precipitated the conflict. "The imperiousness of the Hollander was so great," he told the Rump on 25 May, "that satisfaction must be given for that unhappy breach."[135]

The battle in the Downs freed the English popular press to print all sorts

p. 588; *French Occurrences*, 14–21 June 1651, p. 40; *A Perfect Account*, 2–9 June 1652, p. 600.

134 *Dominium Maris: Or, the Dominion of the Sea. Expressing the Title, which the Venetians Pretend unto the Sole Dominion, and Absolute Sovereignty of the Adriatick Sea, Commonly called The Gulph of Venice* (London, 1652), Thomason: 15 May 1652. TT:E795(1), sigs. A4–B; James Howell to Council of State, May 1652, BL, Add. 35838, f. 370; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 23 June 1652, f. 206; BL, Add. 37345, 24 June 1652, f. 206. Howell's letter is also noticed by Daniel Woolf in his "Conscience, Constancy and Ambition in the Career and Writings of James Howell," in John Morril, Paul Slack, and Daniel Woolf (eds.), *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 270–271. Given that Whitelocke took up the proposal before the war broke out, I am not convinced by Woolf's claim that Howell made his proposal "at some point after the start of the first Dutch War in 1652."

135 Paulucci to Morosini, 8 May 1652, *CSPV*, p. 231; 27 May 1652, p. 243; *CSPD*, 24 May 1652, p. 256; examinations before Cromwell and Bond, 22 May 1652, Bod., Clar. Dep. c172N, Nalson Papers XVIII, f. 336; *French Occurrences*, 24–31 May 1652, p. 24; newsletter from Westminster, 22 May 1652, Worcester College, Clarke MSS 22, ff. 94–95; newsletter from Westminster, 25 May 1652, Worcester College, Clarke MSS 22, f. 17; Co. Thompson, "Notes Upon the Dutch War," Bod., Clar. 47, f. 178r. For Cromwell's earlier

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of anti-Dutch propaganda. Dutch versions of the conflict at sea were quickly denounced as mere "legend" which could be easily contradicted by "the inhabitants in Dover, and hundreds of the country, then present on the shore."[136] Far from punishing the nefarious Van Tromp, the States General were said to have declared "that he had not done anything but what tended to the freedom of the people, and the honor of his country." He was ostensibly received in Amsterdam with such "abundance of solemnity and ceremony that Augustus Caesar himself never return'd more regally laden with victorious palms into the Senate of Rome." If there was any remorse, it was not for "what late was done, but rather for the ill success." "The boors begin to be much exasperated against the English," reported the *French Occurrences*, "belching forth many imprecations and oaths, for an open war with England." The only issue in dispute was "whether their fear and hate be greater towards us, or the Spaniard."[137]

News of the battle and the subsequent expositions of Dutch attitudes had an immediate effect. Concerned that "many people" were "highly incensed" the Council of State granted a protective guard to the Dutch ambassadors. Proposals to declare war immediately and to dismiss the Dutch ambassadors without allowing for any further audience were defeated in the Rump by only two votes. Most people suspected that "the orders of General Tromp were at variance with the instructions given to the Dutch ambassadors." The Venetian agent claimed that the Rumpers were "clamorous ... in their demands for satisfaction." "There has been a hot and sharp debate in Parliament on the late occurrence, which is regarded here as a settled design and undertaking," wrote the Dutch ambassadors, "they appear to be determined on a formal revenge."[138] In its official answer to the Dutch ambassadors, the Rump declared that the "Dutch have an intention by force to usurp the known rights of England in the Seas, to destroy the fleets that are under God, their walls and bulwarks, and thereby to expose the Commonwealth to invasion at their pleasure."[139]

pro-Dutch attitude, which was typical rather than exceptional, see Rowen, *John De Witt*, p. 65; Groenveld, "English Civil Wars," p. 557.

136 *Weekly Intelligencer*, 18–25 May 1652, p. 470; 8–15 June 1652, p.491; 22–28 June 1652, pp. 505–506.

137 *French Occurrences* 31 May–7 June 1652, p. 32; *French Occurrences*, 14–21 June 1652, p. 48; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, 25 May–1 June 1652, pp. 15–16; *A Perfect Account*, 26 May–2 June 1652, pp. 591–[592]; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 8–15 June 1652, p. 487; *The Declaration and Resolution of the States of Holland, Touching the Parliament and Commonwealth of England* ... (London, 1652), Thomason: 28 May 1652, p. 8. The analogy between Van Tromp and Augustus captures his perceived anti-republican fervor.

138 Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 22 May 1652, f. 203; *CSPD*, 20 May 1652, p. 250; Paulucci to Morosini, 27 May 1652, *CSPV*, p. 243; *CSPV*, 3 June 1652, p. 245; Dutch ambassadors to Van Tromp, 26 May 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 239–240.

139 Whitelocke's *Annals*, 10 June 1652, BL, Add. 37345, f. 205; *French Occurrences*, 7–14 June 1652, p. 39.

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There were of course some both within the Rump and outside it who wanted very much to avoid a war with the Dutch. The Amsterdam merchant Henry May was no doubt right to predict that "there will be many in this cause troubled in conscience." One should not, however, overestimate Protestant opposition to the war. Hugh Peter and Henry Vane did find it difficult to accept the conflict, but the more apocalyptic Thomas Harrison had opposed negotiating with the Dutch as early as March. Not everyone interpreted the workings of Providence in the same way. What is perhaps more significant is that a majority of Rumpers appeared willing to accept the terms set forth in the treaty before the battle in the Downs whereas after that battle most Rumpers demanded satisfaction from the Dutch.[140] Attitudes towards the Dutch polity were not monolithic, but in 1652 most Rumpers were firmly committed to a Protestant and a republican foreign policy.

As soon as Cromwell and Bond returned from the Cinque Ports the Rump began its preparations for war. Thurloe was ordered to prepare an official account of the battle between Van Tromp and Blake for the press. The Council of State instructed the Committee of Foreign Affairs to prepare for a general embargo of all shipping. The English navy was ordered "to lose no time" in attacking the Dutch fishery and in disrupting their Eastland trade.[141] Not surprisingly the press was soon filled with reports of new battles off the English coasts, of new seizures of huge numbers of Dutch ships.[142] The Dutch ambassadors were right to warn Van Tromp that "preparations and arrangements are being made as though an open rupture had taken place."[143]

It was in a situation full of "irritation and excitement" that the Dutch

[140] Violet Rowe, *Sir Henry Vane the Younger* (London, 1970), p. 147; R. P. Stearns, *The Strenuous Puritan: Hugh Peter 1598–1660* (Urbana, 1954), p. 389; Henry May, *XXX Christian and Politick Reasons Wherefore England and the Low-Countries May not have Warres with Each Other* (London, 1652), Thomason: 15 June 1652, pp. 3–5. There is, of course, a venerable tradition which claims that there was a peace party in the Rump (Worden, *Rump*, p. 302; Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 192–193). Advocates of alliance with the Dutch obviously existed, but the discomfort which some Rumpers displayed was with the high terms demanded of the Dutch ambassadors not with the demands for satisfaction. See Whitelocke's *Annals* 1 July (BL, Add. 37345) in which he notes the displeasure of some that "so high terms were insisted upon by the Parliament," f. 208; and *CJ*, 24 June 1652, p. 145. But, the very next day, the Rump did vote for demands for satisfaction.

[141] *CSPD*, 20 May 1652, p. 249; *CSPD*, 24 May 1652, pp. 255–256; *CSPD*, 25 May 1652, p. 258; instructions to Blake, Bod., Clar. 43, f. 159.

[142] *Weekly Intelligencer*, 25 May–1 June 1652, p. 478; *Faithful Scout*, 4–11 June 1652, p. 572; *Mercurius Politicus*, 3–10 June 1652, p. 1645; 10–17 June 1652, pp. 1671–1672; *A Perfect Account*, 9–16 June 1652, p. 601; *Weekly Intelligencer*, 8–15 June 1652, p. 493; *Mercurius Pragmaticus*, 18–25 May 1652, p. 8; Whitelocke's *Annals*, BL, Add. 37345, 12 June 1652, f. 205.

[143] Dutch Ambassadors to Van Tromp, 23 May 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, Vol. I, p. 239.

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sent Lord Pauw as ambassador extraordinary. Though his words were soothing – he duly reminded the Rump of "the common religion and liberty" they shared with the Dutch – his mission was hopeless. It soon appeared that he was powerless to negotiate. Pauw was only able to provide "dilatory excuses" according to one hostile commentator. "It's conceived [Pauw] comes to spin out time, and thereby to gain advantages," warned one army newsletter. "Intelligent persons" knew "for certain there will be a war between the two states." After more than a month of fruitless diplomatic activity the Dutch found themselves unable to explain away the confrontation in the Downs. "War may now be considered as declared" was the Venetian agent's correct assessment as the Dutch ambassadors left London.[144]

War between England and the United Provinces broke out not because of their irreconcilable economic differences, but because popular images had been created on each side of the North Sea which made it impossible to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Algernon Sidney, who as a member of the Council of State was in a position to know, later recalled that the "war was not brought on by a contrariety of interests."[145] Dutch Orangists saw the English as perfidious regicides whose very state was illegitimate and whose religion was heresy. The English, by contrast, had come to see the Dutch as fallen brethren, men who had been seduced by Mammon and monarchy. Although the Dutch diplomats in Westminster were doing much to change the Council of State's image of the United Provinces, their negotiations were overtaken by events. Popular antipathy – Providence in the eyes of many Rumpers – was ultimately more powerful than diplomacy.

[144] Paulucci to Morosini, 11 June 1652, *CSPV*, p. 249; 19 June 1652, *CSPV*, p. 253; 2 July 1652, p. 255; Dutch Ambassadors to Council of State, 3 June 1652, Gardiner, *Letters and Papers*, pp. 270–271; newsletter from Westminster, 12 June 1652, Worcester College, Clarke MSS 22, ff. 104v–105; *French Occurrences*, 7–14 June 1652, pp. 34–35; newsletter, 18 June 1652, Bod., Clar. 43, f. 190. Pauw apparently called the clash in the Downs "an accidental chance" and blamed the English for acting so precipitately: Edward Conway to George Rawdon, 30 June 1652, HL, HA 14355.

[145] Algernon Sidney, "Court Maxims," Warwickshire Record Office, [f. 172].

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