(presumably by procuring many dinner invitations), and having very dark skin fits every part of the traditional description of a parasite. Menander's Androcles is thus perhaps to be connected with the eponymous character in Sophilus' *Androcles*, in which someone demands the election of ὀψονόμοι (fr. 2).[14] In any case, *Samia* 606–8 makes good sense in all regards if λευκός and μέλας are taken to refer to skin colour.

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[14] Cf. van Leeuwen (1908), 149; Capps (1910), 271.

ON A CAUSAL NOTION IN PHILODEMUS' *ON ANGER*

Philodemus of Gadara's *On Anger* represents the only substantially preserved Epicurean treatise explicitly devoted to the topic of a πάθος, or emotion.[1] At the heart of Philodemus' treatment of the subject is a distinction between two types or species of anger, one 'natural' (ἡ φυσικὴ ὀργή),[2] the other 'empty' or 'vain' (ἡ κενὴ ὀργή).[3] Even a sage, maintains Philodemus, is subject to the former, which 'results from a consideration of the actual nature of things, and from having no false beliefs regarding the estimation of the harms suffered and the punishments for those doing the harm'.[4]

The treatise as a whole has been characterized as 'frequently scholastic, baffling, and difficult even to construe'.[5] This characterization seems especially apposite to the treatise's conclusion, which focuses on the anger experienced by a sage. As another recent commentator writes, '[T]he work comes to a rather limp and hurried conclusion. It becomes harder than usual to pin down the references, to say who is saying what about whom. The exposition grows hurried and slapdash, as though the author had lost interest and decided that he had gone on long enough.'[6] This much at

[1] What remains of the treatise, roughly the final fifty columns of text, is preserved in Herculaneum papyrus [*PHerc.*] 182. The most recent edition is G. Indelli, *Filodemo*: *L'ira*; *Edizione*, *Traduzione e Commento* (Naples, 1988). Indelli's edition owes much to K. Wilke's earlier Teubner text, *Philodemi De ira liber* (Leipzig, 1914).

For a bibliography of secondary works concerning *On Anger*, see G. Del Mastro, *Χάρτες*: *Catalogo Multimediale dei Papiri Ercolanesi* (Naples, 2005), a catalogue of the Herculaneum papyri on CD–ROM that incorporates and expands upon earlier, printed editions (= M. Gigante, *Catalogo dei Papiri Ercolanesi* [Naples, 1979]; M. Capasso, 'Primo supplemento al *Catalogo dei Papiri Ercolanesi*', *CErc* 19 [1989], 193–264; and G. Del Mastro, 'Secondo supplemento al *Catalogo dei Papiri Ercolanesi*', *CErc* 30 [2000], 157–242).

[2] See *On Anger*, cols. 38,6; 38,20; 39,26; 39,40; and 40,18.

[3] See e.g. cols. 37,40–38,6.

[4] Col. 37,32–9: *συνίσταται γὰρ ἀπὸ το[ῦ] βλέπειν, ὡς ἡ φύσις ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ μηδὲν ψευδοδοξεῖν ἐν ταῖς σ[υ]μμετρήσεσι τῶν ἐλα[ττ]ωμάτων καὶ ταῖς κολάσεσι τῶν βλαπτόντων*.

[5] J. Annas, 'Epicurean emotions', *GRBS* 30 (1989), 145–64 at 145.

[6] J. Procopé, 'Epicureans on anger', in G.W. Most, H. Petersmann and A.M. Ritter (edd.), *Philanthropia kai Eusebeia*: *Festschrift für Albrecht Dihle zum 70. Geburtstag* (Göttingen, 1993), 363–86 at 385 (repr. in J. Sihvola and T. Engberg–Pederson [edd.], *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* [Dordrecht, 1998], 171–96).

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least is clear: in the final five columns of the papyrus, Philodemus offers a series of three arguments regarding the sage's anger, followed in turn by a separate reply to each. To whom we should credit the original arguments, what conclusions we should draw from the replies, and where Philodemus himself ultimately stands on the matter, however, have all proven points of contention among commentators.[7]

Philodemus' reply to the third of these arguments has proven by the far the most intractable portion of the entire treatise. In this paper, I focus on one particular difficulty associated with this reply that has yet to receive due consideration: the precise sense of the phrase δραστικὸν αἴτιον found in the treatise's final clause. For context, I first offer in its entirety the relevant reply as given in G. Indelli's edition of the treatise, followed by an English translation of Indelli's text from V. Tsouna's recent book, *The Ethics of Philodemus*.

ὁ δ[ὲ] τελευταῖος λόγος ἀπέ|ραντός ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ τὴν | ὀρ[γ]ὴν χωρὶς ὑπολήψεως τοῦ | βε[β]λάφθαι μὴ γίνεσθαι καὶ | τοῦ τὸν σοφὸν ἑκουσίω[ς] βλά|πτεσθαι συνά[γ]ων τὸ καὶ [ὀ]ργί|ζεσθαι, καθάπερ γὰρ χωρὶς | τοῦ γράμματα μαθεῖν οὐχ οἷόν τ[ε] {ΜΑΘΕΙΝΟΥΧΟΙΟΝΤΕ} γε|νέσθαι σοφόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ γράμ|ματά τις ἔμαθεν ἐποισθή|σεται τὸ καὶ σοφὸν αὐ|τὸν ὑπάρχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ | τῶι προ̣τησαμέν[ωι ὑ]πο̣|λήψεσιν τοῦ βεβλάφθαι || (col. 50) τὴν ὀργὴν ἐπακολουθεῖν, | ἄλλως δ' ἀδυνατεῖν, τὸ | [πά]ντως ὀ[ργ]ισθήσεσ[θ]αι | τὸν ἔμφασιν εἰληφότα | βλάβης, ἂμ μή τις ἐπιδ̣ε|ί̣ξηι κ̣[αὶ][8] δραστικὸν αἴ[τι]||ον ὀ̣ρ̣γῆς εἶνα̣ι τ[ὴ]ν̣ ὑπό|ληψιν τ[ῆ]ς [βλ]άβης. (Cols. 49,27–50,8)

The last argument is inconclusive, because from the premisses 'anger does not occur without the belief that one has been harmed' and 'the sage is intentionally harmed', it infers 'the sage does also feel angry'. For just as one cannot become wise without learning the alphabet, but it will not follow that if someone has learned the alphabet, that person is also wise, so the philosopher who has postulated that anger is consequent upon the belief of having been harmed and cannot occur otherwise is not in a position to infer that the man who got the impression that he has been harmed will [necessarily] become angry, unless one can demonstrate [also] that the belief that one has been harmed is an *efficient cause* of anger.[9]

In the Italian translation that accompanies his edition of the text, Indelli himself renders the last clause similarly: 'a meno che non si dimostra che la supposizione del

[7] In addition to Annas (n. 5) and Procopé (n. 6), see especially R. Philippson, 'Philodems Buch über den Zorn. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Wiederherstellung und Auslegung', *RhM* 71 (1916), 425–60; D. Fowler, 'Epicurean anger', in S.M. Braund and C. Gill (edd.), *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature* (Cambridge, 1997), 16–35; and, most recently, V. Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus* (Oxford, 2007), 195–238.

[8] The conjecture κ̣[αὶ] originates with T. Gomperz's edition of the treatise (= *Philodemi Epicurei De ira liber* [Leipzig, 1864]). The paleographic evidence in its favour, however, is negligible. Neither the Oxford apograph (*O*), which can be viewed online at <http://163.1.169.40/gsdl/collect/PHerc/index/assoc/HASH018e/d3bfbbc9.dir/herc.v001.0179.a.01.hires.jpg>, nor the Neapolitan apograph (*N*) show any trace of the letter Indelli prints as κ̣, while the papyrus itself has only the slightest trace of ink, compatible with any number of Greek letters. Gomperz himself put the conjecture entirely within brackets (i.e., [καί]). Indelli follows Wilke's 1914 Teubner edition (n. 1) in printing κ̣[αί] instead. I am personally inclined to accept D. Delattre's conjecture (from a paper forthcoming in *CErc* 39 [2009] that he has generously allowed me to see in advance) of τ̣[ό γ]ε̣ in place of κ̣[αί]. My own autopsy of the papyrus confirms the presence of an additional, slight trace of ink immediately preceding the word δραστικόν that is indeed suggestive of the curvature of an omicron or epsilon. But whether one retains Gomperz's supplement or adopts Delattre's alternative will not affect my argument here, and so, for the sake of convenience and consistency, I shall refer to Indelli's text throughout the main body of the present paper.

[9] Tsouna (n. 7), 237 (emphasis added).

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danno sia anche *causa efficiente* dell'ira'.[10] These translations of δραστικὸν αἴτιον find support in standard, modern lexica of ancient Greek. The entries for the adjective δραστικός in both LSJ and DGE, for example, list this passage from *On Anger* first in support of the meanings '*efficient* (cause)' and 'eficiente' respectively.

I have found no occurrences in extant Greek literature prior to Philodemus of the adjective δραστικός used to modify a word for 'cause';[11] however, both δραστικὸν αἴτιον and δραστικὴ αἰτία do occur with some frequency in philosophical and scientific texts of the imperial period. In many of these occurrences, δραστικός clearly functions as a synonym for ἐνεργητικός or ποιητικός and stands in explicit contrast to ὑλικός or παθητικός.[12] The use of the adjective ποιητικός to distinguish a cause that is dynamic or 'active' as opposed to one that is material or passive reflects in part the enduring influence of Aristotelian philosophical vocabulary and classificatory schemata. There is, of course, a long-standing tradition of rendering as 'efficient cause' that one among Aristotle's four causes which later philosophers, following Aristotle's own occasional practice, frequently designate by the term τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον.[13] These facts together explain how 'efficient' and its equivalents entered modern lexica as one meaning of δραστικός.[14] But, LSJ's and DGE's citations notwithstanding, *On Anger* col. 50,6 does *not* attest to this meaning. On the contrary, the standard translations of δραστικὸν αἴτιον seriously misrepresent the specific causal notion intended by Philodemus' use of the Greek term.[15]

Rather than looking either to Aristotle or to later, imperial authors for insight into Philodemus' causal vocabulary, we would do better to begin with his contemporaries, the Stoics, whose views on causation came to be more or less standard during the

[10] Indelli (n. 1), 130 (emphasis added).

[11] Philodemus also employs the term δραστικός in a causal context three times in *On the Gods* 1 (= *P Herc.* 26), for which the only complete edition to date remains H. Diels, *Philodemus über die Götter, Erstes Buch* (Berlin, 1916). The relevant passages in Diels's edition are cols. 14,24, 19,20, and 23,16–17.

[12] In *PH* 3.1, for example, Sextus Empiricus divides all ἀρχαί (= αἰτίαι) posited by 'dogmatic philosophers' into τὰς μὲν ὑλικάς and τὰς δὲ δραστικάς. In subsequent chapters, he uses the adjectives δραστικός and ἐνεργητικός interchangeably. (Interestingly, nowhere does Sextus himself use the adjective ποιητικός in the attributive position with a noun meaning 'cause'.) For the synonymy of δραστικός and ποιητικός in particular, as well as an explicit contrast between these two and παθητικός/ὑλικός, see especially Gal. *De plen.* 3.12–13 (= 7.524.13–19 K).

[13] Arist. *Ph.* 2.3 194^{b}23–35 contains a general statement of the doctrine of the four causes. Aristotle's description there of what has come to be known as the 'efficient cause' does not include any occurrence of the adjective ποιητικός, though it does contain the phrase καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου. For the specific phrase τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον adopted as standard by later Peripatetics and others, see, e.g., *GC* 1.6 324^{b}13.

[14] The two passages other than Phld. *Ir.* 50.6 from which DGE quotes in support of the definition 'eficiente', for example, are both from Galen (= Gal. *Nat. Fac.* 2.7 K and Gal. *De const. art. med.* 1.252 K). R.J. Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought* (Oxford, 1998), 379–85, offers a clear and concise discussion of the influence of Aristotelian aetiology on Galen's own.

[15] The only recent commentator of whom I am aware to deviate from the standard translation is R. Sorabji. In a passing reference in the published version of his 1997 Gifford Lectures (= *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation* [Oxford, 2000], 26), Sorabji glosses the phrase δραστικὸν αἴτιον from *On Anger*'s final column as 'sufficient cause', albeit without explaining or attempting to justify his choice of translation.

On the potential for the English translation 'efficient' as applied even to Aristotelian notions of causation to mislead, see J. Moravcsik, 'Aristotle on adequate explanations', *Synthese* 28 (1974), 3–17 at 9; and W. Charlton, *Aristotle's Physics* I, II; rev. ed. (Oxford, 1992), 101.

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Hellenistic period.[16] Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics recognized as causes properly speaking only active ones.[17] To the extent that other causes – e.g., the material – continued to be admitted, the tendency among Hellenistic philosophers was to regard their status as secondary or somehow qualified.[18] Within the single genus of 'active cause', however, the Stoics carved out numerous subdivisions. Our ancient sources include references to *αἴτια συνεκτικά, αἴτια αὐτοτελῆ, συναίτια, συνεργά, αἴτια προκαταρτικά, αἴτια ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ,* as well as a host of Latin terms, not all of which have immediately obvious Greek equivalents. We need not concern ourselves here with the messy details of all the various distinctions attributed to the Stoics.[19] A few key points and passages should suffice.

In *De fato* 41, Cicero reports that Chrysippus distinguished between 'perfect and primary' (*perfectae et principales*) and 'auxiliary and proximate' (*adiuvantes et proximae*) causes.[20] It has been argued convincingly that the two adjectives in Cicero's second pair are not synonymous.[21] *Causae proximae* are presumably to be identified with the Stoic class of antecedent, or 'triggering', causes designated in Greek by *αἴτια προκαταρτικά*.[22] *Causae adiuvantes*, on the other hand, seems to translate the Stoic term *συνεργά*. These two classes are not coextensive. They are, however, related, and it is easy enough to imagine why Chrysippus (or Cicero) would have grouped them together: both kinds of cause play a secondary role in the explanation of a particular effect.[23] There is less agreement as to whether *perfectae* and *principales* likewise differ in denotation.[24] *Causa perfecta* clearly renders the Greek term *αἴτιον αὐτοτελές*.[25] Clement, who identifies *αἴτιον αὐτοτελές* with *αἴτιον συνεκτικόν*, characterizes this as a cause 'self–sufficiently productive of the effect'.[26] *Causae principales* may be intended to designate a separate class of causes that, while not sufficient to bring about an effect unaided, nevertheless bear major or primary responsibility for it; i.e., causes that are 'salient' but not 'perfect'.[27] Such a distinction certainly has its

[16] Concerning the Stoic notion of a cause generally and its influence on subsequent philosophy and science, see especially M. Frede, 'The original notion of a cause', in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat and J. Barnes (edd.), *Doubt and Dogmatism*: *Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology* (Oxford, 1980), 217–49; and R.J. Hankinson (n. 14), 238–67 and *passim*.

[17] See, e.g., Sen., *Ep.* 65.4.

[18] Cf. Frede (n. 16), 218–20; Hankinson (n. 14), 238. This tendency diminished somewhat in the imperial period, which saw revivals of (versions of) Platonism and Aristotelianism, as well as a general trend toward a syncretism in aetiology; see Hankinson (ibid.), 339–447.

[19] Frede (n. 16) at 238–49 attempts to map out precise and coherent connections between the various kinds of causes attributed to the Stoics. Hankinson (n. 14) at 243–9, by contrast, despairs of the possibility.

[20] The passage appears to be a Latin translation of a direct quotation from Chrysippus: '*Causarum enim*', *inquit*, *'aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae*'.

[21] See D. Sedley, 'Chrysippus on psychophysical causality', in J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum (edd.), *Passion and Perceptions*: *Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, 1993), 313–31 at 323; cf. Hankinson (n. 14), 248–9.

[22] Sedley (n 21), 323; cf. Frede (n. 16), 240–8.

[23] Cf. Frede (n. 16), 241–2; Hankinson (n. 14), 249; and Sedley (n. 21), 323.

[24] Frede (n. 16), 239–40, for example, treats these two adjectives as synonymous; Sedley (n. 21), 321–5 argues for a distinction between them; and Hankinson (n. 14), 246–7 reserves judgement.

[25] On which, see [Gal.] *Def. med.* 19.393 K. and Clem. *Strom.* 8.9.33 (= *SVF* 2.351; LS 55I).

[26] Clem. *Strom.* 8.9.33 (= *SVF* 2.351; LS 55I): *αὐτάρκως δι' αὑτοῦ ποιητικόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος*. The translation provided is that of A.A. Long and D. Sedley in *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1987), 336. On the identity of *αἴτιον αὐτοτελές* and *αἴτιον συνεκτικόν*, see also Clem. *Strom.* 8.9.25 (= *SVF* 2.346).

[27] So Sedley (n. 21) at 321–5; the term 'salient' is his.

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attractions,[28] but I shall not essay an independent defence of it here. The specific context in which all of these various causes are introduced in *De fato* is Chrysippus' attempt to make room for individual responsibility within the framework of Stoic determinism.[29] More generally, however, the broad distinctions made in this passage serve to discriminate between causes that actively contribute to a certain effect without counting as responsible for it and those that do bear responsibility, whether sole or primary.

The same basic dichotomy informs a passage from one of Seneca's *Epistulae Morales*, in which the Roman Stoic invokes Posidonius. Posidonius, writes Seneca, claims riches to be a cause of evil 'not because they themselves bring about something (*faciunt aliquid*), but because they incite those who will bring it about (*facturos irritant*)'.[30] That is, while riches do play an active role in the production of the harm in question, the ultimate responsibility for bringing it about rests with the human agents themselves. Of particular interest are the terms Seneca employs in the very next sentence to characterize the distinction: 'For a *causa efficiens*[31] is one thing … an antecedent cause another' (*alia est enim causa efficiens … alia praecedens*). The context in which Seneca employs *causa efficiens* here clearly indicates that he intends by the term not simply an active cause *simpliciter* but rather a *specific kind* of active cause; namely, one that, in contrast to a merely antecedent cause, actually brings about or is responsible for a particular effect.

Finally, we may profitably compare with these passages from Cicero and Seneca the section of Stobaeus' *Anthology* that purports to give Posidonius' general definition of cause. Following brief summaries of the relevant views of Zeno and Chrysippus, we read: 'Posidonius says as follows: cause is defined as of something, through which (δι' ὅ) it is this something, either the principal producer (ἢ ὁ πρῶτον ποιοῦν), or the instigator of the production (ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως)'.[32] It should be noted first that Posidonius' account is entirely orthodox; both ὁ πρῶτον ποιοῦν and τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως are active causes in the broad sense required by Stoic aetiology.[33] His twofold division calls to mind the distinction made in *De fato* 41 between causes that are responsible for a given effect and those that merely contribute actively to it. Both Posidonius' 'instigator of the production' (τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως) and Cicero's 'proximate cause' (*causa proxima*) match up well with what Seneca terms *causa praecedens*, as evidenced by the latter's association with things that incite people to action (*facturos irritant*). More importantly for present purposes, Seneca's *causa efficiens* is itself a good match for the kind(s) of causes designated as *causae perfectae et principales* and ὁ πρῶτον ποιοῦν in the passages cited from Cicero and Stobaeus respectively, namely, causes either sufficient or primarily responsible for a given effect.

[28] It would, for example, not only render symmetrical the list of causes Cicero credits to Chrysippus but also fill a potential gap in the underlying classificatory schema; cf. Sedley (n. 21) at 324.

[29] For an overview of the Stoic theory of human action generally, see B. Inwood, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* (Oxford, 1985), 42–101. On the issue of Stoic compatibilism in particular, see S. Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford, 2004) and R. Salles, *The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism* (Burlington, VT, 2005).

[30] Sen. *Ep.* 87.31.

[31] Ibid. I postpone translating this crucial technical term, since the sense of *causa efficiens* in this passage is precisely what I hope to explicate by means of the ensuing analysis.

[32] Stob. 1.13.1C (= Fr. 95 EK). My translation follows that of Hankinson (n. 14).

[33] Cf. Hankinson (n. 14), 328.

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Such is also, I suggest, the kind of cause Philodemus wishes to designate by his term δραστικὸν αἴτιον, for which *causa efficiens* would be a natural Latin translation.[34] Clear evidence of his intended meaning can be found in the specific analogy offered earlier in his reply to the third argument: 'For just as one cannot become wise without learning the alphabet, but it will not follow that if someone has learned the alphabet, that person is also wise, so …' (col. 49,33–9). Literacy is, of course, a necessary condition for becoming wise, but literacy by itself does not suffice for wisdom. Accordingly, Philodemus' subsequent use of the phrase δραστικὸν αἴτιον should not be understood as designating an 'efficient', or even generically 'active', cause. What Philodemus contends that his opponents have not shown – and would have to show in order for them to make their point – is not that the bare supposition of harm is 'also an *efficient cause* of anger', as *per* the standard translations,[35] but that this supposition is a cause sufficient or responsible for producing the effect in question.

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[34] I do not claim that Seneca's own use of *efficiens* in *Ep.* 87 must represent an attempt to translate into Latin the adjective δραστικός from a specific Greek source (e.g., Posidonius himself). I content myself with pointing out that *causa efficiens*, which could serve equally well to translate either δραστικὸν αἴτιον or ποιητικὸν αἴτιον, was in fact used relatively early in the imperial period to designate a specific kind of active cause rather than active causes generically. One might speculate that the use of δραστικός to designate a particular species of active cause originated with a desire to avoid confusing this species with its genus, for which the adjective ποιητικός had been in common use at least since the time of Aristotle. If any such technical distinction ever did exist between these two Greek adjectives, however, it had clearly faded by later in the imperial period, as indeed had the use of either to refer to a specific kind of active cause. As previously acknowledged (n. 12), Galen regularly employs δραστικός and ποιητικός synonymously to refer to active causes generally.

One passage from Galen's commentary on the sixth book of Hippocrates' *Epidemics* [= 17b.202.13–18 K.] perhaps reflects an earlier usage of δραστικός in a more restricted sense, though the words αἴτιον δραστικόν appear there only in Wenkebach's supplement '*ex interpr. arab.*' (E. Wenkebach, *Galeni in Hippocratis sextum librum epidemiarum commentaria i–vi* [*Corpus medicorum Graecorum* 5.10.2.2; Leipzig, 1940], 238). A remnant of such an earlier, more restricted usage may also possibly be detected in the frequent use of comparative and superlative forms of δραστικός and ποιητικός in imperial discussions of causation. A δραστικώτερον αἴτιον is not more of an active cause than other δραστικὰ αἴτια, but it might reasonably be regarded as more responsible for determining a particular effect.

[35] Tsouna, for one, seems aware of the tension between her translation of δραστικὸν αἴτιον and the sense the specific context in *On Anger* demands. Her discussion of the passage in question (= Tsouna [n. 7], 237–8) is replete with references to necessary and sufficient conditions, but the words 'efficient cause' found in her translation are tellingly absent from the accompanying analysis.

DE NATURA DEORUM 1.65, SAVING THE TEXT

There is no need to follow Lambinus (ad Lucr. 1.266) and all subsequent editors in positing a lacuna after *Nihil est enim*. The text makes sense as given in the manuscripts, and indeed better sense than it does on proposed supplements.

The MSS reading is as follows (in the translation, I number the clauses for convenience of reference):

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