22

Victory denied and wartime consensus shattered

The clinching English victory never came. Instead of bonfires lighting English celebrations, and great guns informing the countryside of English victories the following summer brought with it the flames of English men-of-war fired in the Medway by the Dutch navy and the sounds of Dutch guns bombarding the English coast. What had happened? Why did the English, who had seemed to be on the threshold of a total victory over the Dutch and their allies in the autumn of 1666, suffer such an ignominious defeat at the hands of the Dutch republican leader John De Witt the following summer?

At the exact moment in which English hopes for victory were being widely expressed, they received a damaging blow in the Netherlands. In early August 1666 the English government's chief Orangist agent, the Sieur de Buat, mistakenly delivered to John De Witt a letter from Arlington which "enlightened" De Witt as to "the design of promoting the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange, and of the constraining of the States to conclude a peace to the betraying of their liberties."[1] Buat was quickly incarcerated, brought to trial and ultimately beheaded for his treason.[2] At his trial, Buat claimed – and the States General did everything to publicize Buat's statements in his own defense – that "what he did was with a good intention," an intention to "make the King of England the greatest monarch in the world."[3]

The charges against Buat were not trumped up. He had long been working in close concert with Arlington, Clarendon, and Charles himself. Buat passionately believed that his actions were all intended "only to settle a good peace and promote the interest of his master the Prince of Orange," an interest which he perceived to be indifferentiable from that of the United

1 Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1129. This episode is discussed from the Dutch perspective most fully by Rowen, *John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625–1672* (Princeton, 1978), 613–622.

2 Nypho to Arlington, 11/21 August 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 38r; *Current Intelligence*, 16–20 August 1666 (unpaginated); Thomas Corney to Williamson, 6/16 October 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 135r.

3 John Evelyn, notes for history of second Dutch War, Christ Church, Evelyn MSS 134, p. 35; Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1134.

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Provinces as a whole.[4] Passionate, extremist, and blundering Buat might have been, but he was not politically inept. By the late summer Buat had drawn "many of the greatest amongst the burgomasters to delight in his conversation and to trust him much."[5] He had, thought a Venetian observer, tapped into a party "numerous and powerful in the Provinces."[6] Arlington's assessment after the St. James's Day battle that "this was the time ... to promote the Orange faction in council, city and country" was merited by Buat's political achievement.[7]

Buat's arrest meant much more to the English than simply the demise of a sympathetic politician.[8] It signaled the collapse of the Orangist cause. The States General left no stone unturned in "the discovery and pursuit of the accomplices of Buat."[9] Upon pressure and threats of torture, and perhaps because of his own conviction that his actions had been perfectly justified, Buat revealed the names of more than sixty political allies – many of them highly placed in the Dutch government – who were all committed to the Orangist cause and to peace with England.[10]

These revelations initiated a mass exodus of Orangists, stumbling over one another to reach the borders of the United Provinces before De Witt and the States General were able to have them imprisoned. Most spectacularly John Kievet, Van Tromp's brother-in-law, burgomaster of Rotterdam and "next to De Witt the most considerable man" in Holland, fled to England.[11] One deputy of the States of Holland was dismissed for visiting

[4] Muddiman's newsletter, 30 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/169/96; Sylvius to Arlington, 9/19 December 1665, in R. R. Goodison (editor), "Further Correspondence Relating to the Buat Affair," in *Bijdragen en Medeelingin van het Historisch Genootschap* Vol. 38, p. 27.

[5] Edward Hyde, *The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon* (Dublin, 1760), pp. 331–332.

[6] Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 28 August/7 September 1666, *CSPV*, p. 63. For evidence of his earlier activity and attempts to convert Beverning to the Orangist cause see Sylvius to Arlington, 25 November/5 December 1665, PRO, SP 77/33, f. 335r; P. A. Rompf (The Hague) to his father, 29 November/9 December 1665, Goodison, "Buat Affair," p. 21; Sir Walter Vane to Arlington, 8/18 December 1665, BL, Add. 16272, f. 11r; Sylvius to Arlington, 9/19 December 1665, PRO, SP 77/33, f. 353r; Sir Walter Vane to Arlington, 29 December/8 January 1665/6, BL, Add. 16272, f. 24r.

[7] Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, pp. 1128–1129 (based on Arlington's letter seized from Buat).

[8] For evidence of English popular discussions of the event see Oldenburg to Boyle, 16 October 1666, Rupert A. Hall and Marie Boas Hall (editors), *The Corespondence of Henry Oldenburg*, Vols. II–VI (Madison, 1966–1967), Vol. III, p. 245; J. J. (Newcastle) to Richard Forster, 5 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/177/86I; newsletter from Antwerp, 29 September/9 October 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 169r.

[9] Temple to Ormonde, 12/22 October 1666, Carte 47, f. 300; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 11/21 September 1666, *CSPV*, p. 74; Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1134.

[10] Arlington to Ormonde, 23 August 1666, Carte 46, f. 358.

[11] Temple to Carlingford, 1/11 September 1666, in Karl Taaffe (editor), *Memoirs of the Family of Taaffe* (Vienna, 1856), p. 164; Hyde, *Life*, p. 337; newsletter from The Hague, 20/30 August 1666, PRO, SP 101/50, f. 277; James Banckes to Thomas Banckes, 26 August/5 September 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 95r; Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1129; entry to Ormonde, 26 August 1666, Carte 47, f. 462r.

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Buat in prison.[12] Another had his cushion removed for admitting that his father had been an Orangist.[13] The honor guard of the States General was summarily purged not only of its Orangist officers but also of all Orangist symbols and insignia.[14] The supporters of De Ruyter and the republican party decisively won the ideological struggle in the Dutch navy.[15] Although it no doubt took longer for the republican triumph to reach the local governments, by the following spring it was clear that "the magistrates of the towns [are] almost all creatures of the Pensionary."[16] There could be no doubting the extent of the republican victory. "The friends and good servants of the Prince of Orange are oppressed and persecuted," was the unanimous conclusion of the observers of the Dutch political scene.[17]

The effect of the republican political triumph upon Anglo-Dutch relations was immediately apparent.[18] The result of Buat's demise, Clarendon recalled from his French exile, was that "the Prince was much lower than before, and all hopes of reviving almost extinguished or expired; De Witt stood firmer upon his own feet than ever, and directed all preparations for the war without control; and all the present expectations in England vanished."[19] All of the contemporary evidence supports the Lord Chancellor's assessment. There could be little hope for an immediate peace, opined one of Arlington's political informants, "because De Witt and all his faction are as powerful as ever and the entire party of the Prince of Orange is oppressed and persecuted."[20] Arlington himself concluded that "the cutting off [of] poor Buat's head is likely to terrify all that party which so earnestly desires [peace]."[21] The Dublin merchant and former unofficial contact

12 Aphra Behn (Antwerp) to Halsall, 14 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/171/120.
13 Newsletter from The Hague, 6/16 September 1666, Carte 47, f. 298r.
14 Hyde, *Life*, p. 337.
15 Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 21/31 August 1666, *CSPV*, p. 61; Jo. Carlisle (Dover) to Williamson, 24 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/168/138; Jo. Carlisle (Dover) to Williamson, 26 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/169/9; Aphra Behn to Halsall, 27 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/169/38; Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1143.
16 Newsletter from Flanders, 9/19 March 1667, PRO, SP 77/36, f. 125r (my translation).
17 Letter to Arlington, 18/28 August 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 64v (my translation). See also Nypho to Arlington, 1/11 September 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 108; Temple to Ormonde, 18/28 August 1666, Carte 47, f. 291v; Temple to Arlington, 24 August/3 September 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 93r.
18 K. H. D. Haley, *An English Diplomat in the Low Countries* (Oxford, 1968), p. 97.
19 Hyde, *Life*, p. 337.
20 Letter to Arlington, 13/23 October 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 203v; see also Temple to Arlington, 5/15 October 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 181v; Temple to Arlington, 18/28 September 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, ff. 142–143; Temple to Arlington, 23 November/3 December 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 287.
21 Arlington to Ormonde, 13 October 1666, Carte 46, f. 385v. See also Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 8 October 1666, p. 315. From the perspective of republican sympathizers De Witt's revival was a natural revulsion against foreign intervention. "The more our enemies exclaim upon De Witt and the other patriots of our country," argued one newsletter-writer, "the more sensibly we find them to be the support of the nation." newsletter from Holland, 9/19 November 1666, PRO, SP 101/50, f. 90. This was the general consensus: St.

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between the Rump and the States General, Toby Bonnel, knew that "the Dutch are generally for keeping up this war hoping yet to make their gains by it," pointing out that however popular the Orangist seaman Cornelius Van Tromp might once have been now "the children spit at him for a false hearted traitor."[22] The political implications of the failed Orangist revolution were not hard to discern. "It seems in short," Temple advised Arlington who almost certainly understood the situation all too well, "if his Majesty desires only a general peace, and to end where he began, it is in his hands, if an advantageous peace he must expect another conjuncture."[23]

The collapse of the Orangist party, then, explains the failure of the English to achieve their war aims in the autumn of 1666. A second development in September 1666, this time within England, shattered the popular mood of enthusiasm and confidence. On 2 September, in Pudding Lane, a fire began in a baker's shop which soon engulfed the entire city of London, and many of its suburbs. When the flames finally subsided, they were revealed to have transformed the economically thriving metropolis into a city of ashes. "We have undergone the highest calamity this nation hath ever felt by a terrible fire which hath destroyed three parts of four of the whole city of London," a still shocked Clarendon informed the Earl of Winchilsea.[24] "I believe there never was any such desolation by fire since the destruction of Jerusalem," scribbled a thoroughly shaken Sir Heneage Finch to his friend Viscount Conway, "nor will be till the last and general conflagration."[25] Naturally since London was very much the economic fulcrum around which England's commerce turned, the devastating effects of the Fire were felt throughout the country.[26] "The money, the furnishings, the precious capital lost," led a Venetian observer and many subsequent historians to conclude that the Fire "will constrain the English to abandon

Serfe's newsletter, 18 October 1666, LOC, 18124, Vol. I, f. 122r; Muddiman's newsletter, 1 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/177/6. See also Temple to Arlington, 26 October/5 November 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 277r; Temple to Arlington, 30 October/9 November 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 231; Temple to Arlington, 23 November/3 December 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 287r; Allan Broderick to Ormonde, 10 November 1666, Carte 35, f. 122r; Thomas Corney to Nicholas Oudart, 7/17 December 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 324r.

22 Toby Bonnel (Dublin) to John Johnson, 23 October 1666, CUL, Add. 4, f. 4v.

23 Temple to Arlington, 5/15 October 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 181v.

24 Clarendon to Winchilsea, 20 September 1666, LRO, DG7/Box 4984, Letters Folder. For other reactions to the Fire, see James Oxenden to George Oxenden, 8 January 1667, BL, Add. 40713, f. 29r; Humphrey Bishop of London to Sancroft, 10 September 1666, Bod., Tanner MSS 45, f. 101r.

25 Sir Heneage Finch to Lord Conway, 8 September 1666, HL, HA 14724. The number of people shocked and devastated by the Fire of London could be multiplied endlessly. The most thorough discussion of the Fire remains Walter George Bell, *The Great Fire of London in 1666* (London, 1920).

26 See for, example, Ralph Hope (Coventry) to Williamson, 9 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/171/12; Thomas Waade (Whitby) to Williamson, 10 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/171/41.

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their high pretensions and to humble themselves before" the King of France.[27]

The Fire triggered a sea-change in national sentiment. While Sir Robert Holmes's dramatic raid on the Vlie had prompted national celebrations and prophecies of a victorious peace, the Great Fire prompted national lamentations and predictions of impending doom. "Everybody," thought Samuel Pepys after the Fire, was "prophesying destruction to the nation."[28] "Our native country is full of wastes, sadness, and murmurings," exclaimed one merchant.[29] To his friend Sir George Rawdon, Viscount Conway reported that "the next year is expected by all men to be a year of trouble and confusion."[30] Nearly all of Samuel Pepys's many and varied acquaintances were speaking the language of doom and gloom in the autumn of 1666. His cousin Roger Pepys, a country member of Parliament, was "confident we shall all be ruined very speedily."[31] Sir George Carteret, the Anglican Royalist treasurer of the navy, spoke "of the general complexion of matters ... with horror and gives us all for an undone people." The Presbyterian Denzil Hollis reputedly "wept to think in what a condition [we] are fallen."[32] The Anglican Royalist merchants Sir Richard Ford and Captain George Cocke, both of whom had been extremely confident of an absolute victory over the Dutch a few short months before, now were convinced "that we must be undone in a little time."[33]

It was no doubt this general malaise, this sense of inexorable decline, which provoked so many popular disturbances throughout the country.[34] Almost as

27 Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 18/28 September 1666, *CSPV*, p. 78. I hope to show below that, while the economic devastation wrought by the Fire should not be minimized, it was political considerations not economic ones which prevented the English from sending out a fleet in 1667. I am arguing that the real devastation engendered by the Fire was on the national psyche; it revealed deep ideological fissures hitherto submerged below an ostensible Anglican Royalist consensus.

28 Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 2 December 1666, p. 395. See also Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 12 November 1666, p. 366.

29 Thomas Lacherly to George Oxenden, 11 March 1667, BL, Add. 40713, ff. 4–5; see also James Oxenden to George Oxenden, 8 January 1667, BL, Add. 40713, f. 28v.

30 Edward Conway to Sir George Rawdon, 17 November 1666, HL, HA 14447. See his similar statement in Conway to Ormonde, 13 November 1666, Carte 35, f. 126v.

31 Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII 26 November 1666, p. 387.

32 Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 14 November 1666, pp. 369–370.

33 Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 18 November 1666 (Cocke), p. 375; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 19 December 1666 (Ford), p. 416.

34 Paul Seaward has argued that the members of the Cavalier Parliament were obsessed with "their sense of decline." Paul Seaward, *The Cavalier Parliament and the Reconstruction of the Old Regime 1661–1667* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 326. This is certainly an apt description of popular as well as elite sentiment for much of the 1660s. I think, however, to understand fully the viciousness of the Parliamentary debates of 1666–1667 one needs to recall that, for brief periods both at the Restoration and during the Anglo-Dutch War, there were moments of heady optimism, moments in which the English were once again confident that they would achieve their rightful place in the world. Victory in the war, it must be remembered, was thought to bring with it economic prosperity and the destruction of both radical religious dissent and republicanism.

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soon as the flames dissipated in London there were fears of "some distractions and disorders among us."[35] Sure enough, throughout the country people who had been willing and able to pay their stiff taxes throughout the early months of the war rioted against the hearth tax. In Newcastle, Lynn, and Hereford – as well as in many other places – the people who "were much discontented" began "to beat the collectors of the hearth money."[36]

This sudden descent from ecstasy to misery, from national exultation to national lamentation, from confidence of military victory to murmurings about a possible humiliating defeat, necessarily led to introspection. There was little doubting that the Fire had altered the national mood. But, why did the English think the Fire had happened? To this question, the Dean of St. Paul's, William Sancroft, noted, "every faction amongst us hath a revelation, hath an interpretation."[37] The immediate predisposition of Anglican Royalists was to blame the fire on the usual suspects – the fanatics and their European allies the Dutch.[38]

It soon became clear, however, that there was precious little evidence to sustain this interpretation, and, more importantly, very few were prepared to accept such an explanation. Before the ashes on the London streets had cooled, the government issued its official account of the Fire, an account which asserted that "the whole was an effect of an unhappy chance, or to speak better, the heavy hand of God upon us for our sins, showing us the terror of his judgment in thus raising the fire."[39] It was God's role in punishing London for its sins, particularly its most horrid sin of rebelling against its king, which Anglican Royalist polemicists and preachers

[35] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 30–31 October 1666, pp. 347–349.

[36] Richard Forster (Newcastle) to Williamson, 7 December 1666, PRO, SP 29/180/127; Edward Bodham (Lynn) 5 December 1666, PRO, SP 29/180/85; Joseph Fitzherbert (Bristol) to Williamson, 1 December 1666, PRO, SP 29/180/5; Muddiman's newsletter, 24 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/179/41; Max Beloff, *Public Order and Popular Disturbances 1660–1714* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 92–93; Seaward, *Cavalier Parliament*, pp. 272–273.

[37] William Sancroft, *Lex Ignea: Or, The School of Righteousness*, sermon preached before Charles II, 10 October 1666 (London, 1666), p. 23. See the similar statements by Richard Perrinchief, *A Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons*, 7 November 1666 (London, 1666), pp. 21–23; James Oxenden to George Oxenden, 8 January 1667, BL, Add. 40713, f, 29r.

[38] John Lysle (West Cowes) to Williamson, 5 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/170/102; Earl of Carlisle to Williamson, 8 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/170/152 (reporting a rumor he had heard); Thomas Neulin (translator) *Bishop Parker's History of his Own Time* (London, 1727), p. 117 (the only retrospective account blaming the Fire on "rebel fanatics"); Jo. Carlisle (Dover) to Williamson, 5 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/170/103; Luke Whittington (Hull) to Williamson, 8 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/170/159; intelligence to Ormonde, 21 September 1666, Carte 35, f. 94r; examination of Edward Taylor (age 10) by John Lord Lovelace, 9 October 1666, PRO, SP 29/171/11.

[39] *A True Relation of that Sad and Deplorable Fire* [8 September] (York, 1666), broadside. See also Joseph Williamson's Memorial, September 1666, PRO, SP 29/173/132; Arlington to Ormonde, 7 September 1666, Carte 46, f. 363; Sir Heneage Finch to Lord Conway, 8 September 1666, HL, HA 14724; D. de Repas to Sir Robert Harley, 8 September 1666, BL, Add. 70010, f. 316r.

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expatiated upon. "The dividers cried out," Richard Baxter wrote of the Anglican preachers, "it is God's just judgment on the City, that hath been so much against the king and the bishops, and God would not pardon them though the king did."[40] "Now loyal London has full ransom paid, / For that defection the disloyal made," rhymed the Anglican Royalist poet John Crouch after the Fire.[41] Charles II's chaplain Nathaniel Hardy thundered that the Fire was an occasion for "our wealthy citizens" to recall "how forward they were to part with their wealth for raising a rebellious war against their sovereign, which at last most tragically ended in his murder."[42]

It was a measure of a how far the Anglican Royalist consensus had deteriorated since 1664, however, that very few concluded that the Fire was in fact London's punishment for murdering Charles the Martyr. While radical Protestants and republicans, that "generation of fanatic vipers," blamed the Fire on the sins of the Restored Monarchy, most in England were convinced that the Fire had been set by the French in collusion with Papists.[43] Despite official denials it was "generally concluded from pregnant circumstances too large now to relate that this was not an accident but a design."[44] Early reports claimed both of England's foreign enemies had carried out the firing of the City.[45] Very quickly, however, popular fury focused on the French and the Papists. "The plot as is generally reported," Anthony Wood wrote to a friend from Oxford, "was laid and acted by the Papists and French."[46] Popular gossip in Pembroke reported "a great treason acted by the French" in burning London.[47] "The ignorant and

[40] Matthew Sylvester, *Reliquiae Baxterianae* (London, 1696), Pt. III, p. 18; see also Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1132.

[41] John Crouch, *Londiniensis Lacrymae: Londons Second Tears Mingled with her Ashes* (London, 1666), p. 9. The "defection" referred to is the spilling of "a Martyr's blood." See the similar views expressed in Nicholas Buckeridge to George Oxenden, 26 December 1666, BL, Add. 40713, ff. 1–2.

[42] Nathaniel Hardy, *Lamentation, Mourning and Woe*, preached 9 September 1666 (London, 1666), p. 29. See also Sancroft, *Lex Ignea*, pp. 21–22; George Cartwright, "Upon the Deploreable Fire," 1666, BL, Add. 34363, f. 57r.

[43] Richard Watts (Walmer) to Williamson, 6 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/170/114. For more on the radical claims see: Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, pp. 1131–1132; *Parker's History*, p. 118; John Fitzherbert (Bristol) to Williamson, 22 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/172/106.

[44] Dr. Peter Barwick to Sancroft, 7 September 1666, Bod., Tanner MSS 45, f. 100r. See also Francis Bellott (Pendennis) to Williamson, 10 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/171/34; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 6 September 1666, p. 277.

[45] Examination of Anne English, 3 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/170/64; Silas Taylor (Harwich) to Williamson, 4 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/170/93; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 5 September 1666, p. 277; Alexander Fleming to Daniel Fleming, 6 September 1666, Bod., Don MS C37, f. 8r; Evelyn, *Diary*, 7 September 1666, p. 462.

[46] Anthony Wood to Dr. Richard Lower, 15 September 1666, Bod., Tanner MSS 45, f. 103v.

[47] Francis Malory (Pembroke) to Williamson, 10 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/171/27. The same tale was told in the north. See Colonel Anthony Byerly to John Cosin, 8 September 1666, in George Ornsby (editor), *The Correspondence of John Cosin* Pt. II (Durham, 1872), p. 155.

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deluded mob," the unsympathetic William Taswell remembered, "who upon the occasion were hurried away with a kind of frenzy, vented forth their rage against the Roman Catholics and Frenchmen; imagining those incendiaries (as they thought) had thrown red-hot balls into the houses."[48] The French, one broadside claimed, were "confidently believed" to be "the plotters of the ruin of this famous city."[49] Other reports, all over the kingdom, emphasized the role of Catholic and Jesuit conspirators. "it is generally believed, but not at court," Dr. William Denton informed his friend Sir Ralph Verney, "that the Papists have designed this and more, many and strong presumptions there are for it."[50] "The great talk of the time was, who were the burners of the city?" recalled Richard Baxter, "and there came in so many testimonies that it was the plotted weapon of the Papists, as caused the Parliament themselves to appoint a committee to inquire after it, and receive information."[51]

It was this Parliamentary committee, combined with the voluntary confession of a deranged Frenchman, which finally convicted the French and Papists of having set the Fire in the court of public opinion.[52] The committee proved, to the satisfaction of most, that "several persons, Papists, Irish and French spoke of it to their friends before the Fire began."[53] Within a short

[48] George Perry Elliott (editor), "Autobiography and Anecdotes by William Taswell," in *The Camden Miscellany* Vol. II (1853), September 1666, p. 11; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 5 September 1666, p. 275; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 7 September 1666, p. 279; Hyde, *Life*, p. 351.

[49] *London's Lamentation: Or its Destruction by a Consuming Fire* (1666). See also *The Late Apology in Behalf of the Papists Re-Printed and Answered in Behalf of the Royalists* (London, 1667), p. 37.

[50] Dr. William Denton to Sir Ralph Verney, 8 September 1666, Firestone Library, Verney MSS Reel 21 (unfoliated).

[51] Sylvester, *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, Pt. III, p. 18. For more on claims that Catholics set the Fire, see P. Manaton (Barnstaple) to Williamson, 11 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/171/56; Elizabeth Isham (Worcestershire) to Sir Ralph Verney, 12 September 1666, Firestone Library, Verney MSS Reel 21 (unfoliated); Ralph Hope (Coventry) to Williamson, 15 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/171/128; Anthony Thorold (Lyme) to James Hickes, 29 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/173/79; Muddiman's newsletter, 6 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/177/80; Robert Elborough, *London's Calamity by Fire* (London, 1666), p. 14; Simon Ford, *The Conflagration of London* (London, 1667), p. 27; *Tydings from Rome, or England's Alarm* (London, 1667), p. 6; Thomas Barlow (Oxford) to Francis Parry, 8 January 1668, Bod., English Letters MSS C328, f. 509v. Beloff has argued that the popular interpretation of the causes of the Fire was a significant turning point in the history of Restoration public opinion: "it marks the beginning of the period when all untoward accidents were ascribed to the mchinations of the 'papists', thus foreshadowing the outburst of national hysteria at the time of the Popish Plot." Beloff, *Public Order*, p. 37.

[52] For the confession of Hubert see newsletter, 11 October 1666, PRO, SP 29/174/139; Sir Edward Harley to Lady Harley, 20 October 1666, BL, Add. 70010, f. 339v; Josselin, *Diary*, 11 November 1666, pp. 531–532.

[53] Sir Edward Harley to Lady Harley, 20 October 1666, BL, Add. 70010, f. 339r. See also Committee's Report Concerning Firing of London, 1666, BL Sloane 970, f. 35r; St. Serfe's newsletter, 23 October 1666, LOC, 18124 Vol. I, f. 123r; Muddiman's newsletter, 27 October 1666, PRO, SP 29/176/62; Sir Edward Harley to Lady Harley, 27 October 1666, BL, Add. 70010, f. 341r; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 5 November 1666, pp. 356–357;

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time it was "believed by the most" that London was "purposely set on Fire by furious French ... for they are a malicious people."[54]

Why did the English public, which had two years previously been convinced that republicans and radical Protestants were the most significant – indeed the only – threat to their regime, turn so viciously against the French and Catholics in the autumn of 1666? Why was Charles II's government so singularly unsuccessful in channeling popular anger against the republican and heterodox Dutch? What had happened to shatter the Anglican Royalist political consensus?

Louis XIV's entry into the war on the Dutch side, beginning with his support of the United Provinces against the Bishop of Munster in the autumn of 1665 and culminating in his declaration of war against England in the winter of 1666, dramatically altered the English understanding of the nature of the conflict.

Over the course of 1665 it became increasingly apparent that France would soon honor its diplomatic obligations to the United Provinces and enter the war against England.[55] English Francophobia grew apace. Already in January, before war with the Dutch had officially been declared, there were "great rejoicings for the first news which made it visible that our king hath apprehensions of the arms of him of France."[56] The French ambassador's failure to celebrate the English victory at Lowestoft so provoked "the common people" that they "threw firebrands against his door and broke his glass windows."[57] By mid-summer there was so much "talk amongst the people against the French nation" that the Dutch ambassador Van Goch

Sylvester, *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, Pt. III, p. 18; Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1135.

54 An. Masters to George Oxenden, 15 January 1667, BL, Add. 40713, f. 28r. See also examination of Bellow and his wife, 31 July 1667, PRO, SP 29/211/111; "A Warning to Protestants," 21 April 1667, Carte 35, f. 386r; "Vox et Lacrymae Anglorum," January–February 1668, Bod., Don MSS E23, f. 33r. Of course, the most lasting testimony to this popular conviction is the inscription on the monument.

55 Hollis to Bennet, 4/14 February 1665, PRO, SP 78/120, f. 39r; Sir Ralph Verney to Edmund Verney, 18 May 1665, Firestone Library, Verney MSS, Reel 20 (unfoliated); Downing to Arlington, 19 May 1665, PRO, SP 84/176, f. 40r; Arlington to Fanshawe, 29 June 1665, in Thomas Bebington (editor), *The Right Honourable the Earl of Arlington's Letters* ... Vol. II, p. 82; Downing to Arlington, 7 July 1665, PRO, SP 84/177, f. 9r; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 22 July 1665, p. 165; Hollis to Arlington, 9/19 August 1665, PRO, SP 78/121, f. 33; Samuel Tuke to John Evelyn, 12 August 1665, Christ Church, Evelyn In-Letters 1298; Hollis to Arlington, 12/22 August 1665, PRO, SP 78/121, f. 38r; Arlington to Ormonde, 22 August 1665, Carte 46, f. 198; Thomas Thynne to his father, 8/18 September 1665, Longleat House, Thynne MSS 12, f. 1r; Sir Thomas Osborne to Lady Osborne, 13 October 1665, Andrew Browning, *Osborne* Vol. II, p. 12; John Lord Berkeley to Ormonde, 23 October 1665, Carte 4, f. 450v.

56 Thomas Salusbury to Earl of Huntingdon, 9 January 1665, HL, HA 10663. See also Orrery to Ossory, 16 May 1665, *Orrery State Letters*, p. 193.

57 Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1072. See also M. Van Goch to States General, 16/26 June 1665, PRO, SP 84/176, f. 172v.

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thought they were "no less hated than the Dutch."[58] By the time that Lord Chancellor Clarendon "with nervous eloquence stirred the people to wrath" against France, he was already preaching to the converted.[59] "The humor of England is grown much more crusty and rough toward that people, than a little while since it has been," Sir Robert Southwell wrote of the French.[60] English privateers began systematically seizing and pillaging French merchant ships, expressing their eagerness "for a rupture with the crown of France."[61] Colonel Walter Slingsby enthused that "our people are strangely eager after a French war like an empty hawk transported with the hopes of purchase."[62] One newsletter-writer claimed the English were "in a mutiny for a war with France."[63]

When Louis XIV finally declared war in Paris in late January 1666, Henry Oldenburg was convinced that it "will unite England as one man."[64] William Temple agreed that it was "the best way could have been found out to unite all his Majesty's subjects."[65] On 10 February heralds in London proclaimed war against France, eliciting spontaneous celebrations.[66] "Never was any declaration proclaimed with a more general satisfaction to the people than that of the war against France," Henry Muddiman announced proudly.[67] The Presbyterian secretary of state William Morrice was convinced there was "great animosity against the French and a national antipathy."[68] The English, it soon became clear, were willing to risk their lives in order to defend their country against the French. The London silk weavers "who are mixed of French and English [descent] offered their

[58] Van Goch to States General, 20 July 1665, PRO, SP 84/177, f. 133r. See also Arlington to Henry Coventry, 7 July 1665, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LXIV, f. 184v; Dr. William Denton to Sir Ralph Verney, 27 July 1665, Firestone Library, Verney MSS Reel 20 (unfoliated).

[59] Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 24 November/4 December 1665, *CSPV*, pp. 230–231 (reporting on the previous month's Parliamentary activity); Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 16 October 1665, p. 270.

[60] Robert Southwell to Ormonde, 24 October 1665, Carte 34, f. 452v.

[61] Sagredo to Doge and Senate, 14/24 November 1665, *CSPV*, p. 227; Colonel Walter Slingsby (Isle of Wight) to Williamson, 1 November 1665, PRO, SP 29/136/3; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 16/26 January 1666, *CSPV*, p. 247.

[62] Colonel Walter Slingsby (Isle of Wight) to Henry Muddiman, 30 October 1665, PRO, SP 29/135/109.

[63] Newsletter from Oxford, 16 January 1666, Carte 72, f. 64r; see also Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 19/29 Janury 1665, *CSPV*, p. 249.

[64] Henry Oldenburg to Robert Boyle, 27 January 1666, *Oldenburg Correspondence*, Vol. III, p. 33.

[65] William Temple to Carlingford, 31 January/10 February 1666, *Memoirs of Taaffe*, p. 99. This was the view espoused in the official newsletter: Williamson's newsletter, 30 January 1666, Carte 222, f. 84r.

[66] News from London, 12/22 February 1666, *CSPV*, p. 266. See also William Coventry to Ormonde, 10 February 1666, Carte 47, f. 436v.

[67] Henry Muddiman to ?, 16 February 1666, PRO, SP 29/148/38.

[68] William Morrice to Henry Coventry, 30 March 1666, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LXIV, f. 325r. See also Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 27 March/ 6 April 1666, *CSPV*, p. 281.

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persons and fortunes for prosecution of this war."[69] In the north of Ireland "the major part" were "as forward and willing to fight in this war against the French as any men can be."[70] Many who had previously refused to fight in the war now came forward as volunteers.[71] On the Isle of Wight there was "much readiness to protect their king and country," the men were very much "animated ... against the French."[72] After the French Declaration of War, the Earl of Castlemaine recalled, "no body ... was daunted, but on the contrary we were the more penchantly animated by it."[73]

Why was there such popular enthusiasm for war against France? Why did a nation, convinced that its republican and religiously heterodox enemies were seeking universal monarchy, embrace so readily a war against the most absolute monarchy in Europe? Why, in short, were the English so eager to fight an enemy with none of the Netherlanders' ideological flaws?

Much of the explanation for this reaction lies in the widespread and growing belief that France had originally provoked, and was doing everything in its power to prolong, the war. It was not only the republican Algernon Sidney who believed that "the King of France has encouraged us to the war, that we may perish in it."[74] George Downing, in a rare endorsement of one of John De Witt's political assessments, agreed that the French "are mightily glad of this hopes and appearance of a breach between his Majesty and this country, for that they hope thereby not only to get a share of the trade, but to carry on their other designs without controls or hindrance."[75] It was the French, claimed William Temple, "whose work it was perhaps to begin the war and whose interest it is to continue it."[76] William Morrice opined in the spring of 1665 that it was Louis XIV's "proper end dictated by his interest to engage and embroil us and he hath

69 St. Serfe's newsletter, 10 February 1666, LOC, 18124 Vol. I, f. 28r.

70 J. T. to Ormonde, 12 March 1666, Carte 34, f. 628r.

71 See for example petition of John Tiler, March 1666, PRO, SP 29/152/77; D. de Repas to Sir Robert Harley, 4 July 1666, BL, Add. 70010, f. 314v.

72 R. Dillington (Knighton) to Williamson, 14 July 1666, PRO, SP 29/162/136.

73 Castlemaine, "History of the Dutch War," 1668, NMM, Clifford Papers, Dw130, p. 6.

74 Algernon Sidney, "Court Maxims," Warwickshire Record Office, f. 164. This was also apparently the radical William Say's view: Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1065.

75 Downing to Clarendon, 6 May 1664, Bod., Clar. 107, f. 196r. He restated this opinion the following year: Downing to Clarendon, 27 January 1665, Bod., Clar. 108, f. 195v. William Coventry shared Downing's opinion: William Coventry to Arlington, 9 August 1665, PRO, SP 29/128/75. Coventry elaborated these views in his "Essay of France," 1664, Longleat House, Cov. MSS CI, f. 25r. Apparently the view that France fomented the war was widely held in the United Provinces: see Boreel to States General, 29 April/9 May 1664, PRO, SP 84/170, f. 139v; De Bacquoy/Van Ruyven to Bennet, 26 August/5 September 1664, PRO, SP 84/172, f. 9v; newsletter from The Hague, 7 April 1665, PRO, SP 84/175, f. 82r.

76 William Temple to Ormonde, 21/31 December 1666, Carte 47, f. 314v. See also Temple to Arlington, 4/14 December 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 310.

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hitherto moved in such ways and with such pace as may rather bring things to extremities than reconcile them."[77] The scientist Henry Oldenburg thought that had the Dutch "not been assured by [the French] of sea and land-assistance, they had never begun the war."[78] The Anglican virtuoso John Evelyn was also convinced that "this terrible war" was "begun doubtless at secret instigation of the French."[79]

Not only did the English believe that the French had provoked the war, they were also convinced that Louis XIV's subtle diplomats did all in their power to preclude an Anglo-Dutch accommodation. Lord Ashley kept among his papers a letter, purportedly written by the French minister De Lionne, advising Louis XIV that "it would be a stroke of admirable prudence to let [the Anglo-Dutch War] go on" because both antagonists would then be "reduced to the point of being no more able to oppose those conquests which your Majesty has formed in your mind."[80] "The Italians generally" thought similarly of Louis XIV's strategy, claiming that the French will "do what possibly they can to keep us and the Dutch at wars and to ruin us both."[81]

After war between the English and the Dutch had begun, French duplicitous mediation ensured that no compromise would be concluded.[82] When the French began to fear that Dutch resolve would fail after the first year's campaign, they shored it up by entering the war. Arlington was certain that Louis XIV declared for the Dutch "to prevent their treating with us."[83] "The Dutch were upon thoughts of articles for peace," the East India merchant Sir William Ryder explained to George Oxenden, "but the French to prevent it furiously denounced war against us."[84] French hopes were immediately realized. "The Dutch are grown more audacious and obstinate," complained William Morrice after the French Declaration of War, "those seeds of peace which both sides were cultivating, are stifled and

77 William Morrice to Henry Coventry, 31 March 1665, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LXIV, f. 144r.

78 Oldenburg to Boyle, 21 November 1665, *Oldenburg Correspondence*, Vol. II, p. 616. Clarendon made almost an identical argument in his memoirs. See Hyde, *Life*, pp. 330–331.

79 John Evelyn, *Diary*, 5 April 1665, pp. 404–405.

80 De Lionne to Louis XIV, 1666, PRO, PRO 30/24/4, f. 137r.

81 George Legat (Genoa) to Williamson, 25 July/4 August 1666, PRO, SP 79/1, ff. 235–236. The Venetian ambassador in Paris agreed: Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 12/22 June 1666, *CSPV*, pp. 17–18; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 31 July/10 August 1666, *CSPV*, p. 50.

82 William Temple to Ormonde, 18/28 September 1665, Carte 47, f. 258v; Hyde, *Life*, p. 271; News from The Hague, 31 August/10 September 1665, *CSPV*, p. 198.

83 Arlington to Henry Coventry, 2 February 1666, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LIII, f. 307r. See also Arlington to Ormonde, 12 December 1665, Carte 46, f. 229; Arlington to Ormonde, 20 January 1666, Carte 46, f. 294.

84 Sir William Ryder to George Oxenden, 1 March 1666, BL, Add. 40712, f. 45v. Similar views are expressed in Henry Coventry to Carlingford, 21 March 1666, Beinecke Library, Osborn Collection, Carlingford Papers, Box II.

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mortified."[85] Having given their support to the Dutch, many thought, the French began to fear that the Dutch would emerge from the war victorious. As a result Louis XIV opted to support the Dutch as little as possible, he "chose rather to see the English and them weakening each other than to give any real assistance against their enemies."[86] When peace terms were again floated in the autumn of 1666 Louis XIV and his minions succeeded in preventing the Dutch from considering them. His policy, the English thought, was to "overawe the Dutch" so that "our peace will be strangely hindered."[87]

French duplicitous mediation, ambivalent aid of the Dutch, and diplomatic obstructionism were all of a piece. The English became convinced – and those less firmly committed to intolerant Anglicanism became convinced more quickly – that it was all part of the French grand strategy to achieve universal dominion. A war between Europe's two great maritime powers, a war in which Europe's two greatest navies were busily destroying each other and each other's merchant marines, gave France the perfect opportunity to seize control of the world's trade. "The clashing of those two trading nations laying trade asleep," the Presbyterian William Morrice wrote of the Anglo-Dutch War, France "could take this opportunity to get it into their hands."[88] The former radical preacher and Cromwellian George Downing complained to a member of the States General that "it was lamentable to see these two nations about to cut each other's throats ... while their neighbors would get all the profit out of it and laugh at their folly."[89]

Indeed in almost every commercial arena the French used the Anglo-Dutch conflict to seize upon their trade routes. French merchants merely

[85] William Morrice to Henry Coventry, 12 February 1666, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LIII, f. 310r. Morrice is positing a causal connection between the French Declaration and the demise of the peace feelers. Thomas St. Serfe thought that the French intercepted the vital letters: St. Serfe's newsletter, 27 February 1666, LOC, 18124 Vol. I, f. 34r. John Evelyn intended to endorse this opinion in his "History," see his Notes for History of Second Dutch War, Christ Church, Evelyn MSS 134, f. 105.

[86] Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1122. See also Carlingford to Reverend Burgate, 12/22 August 1666, *Memoirs of Taaffe*, p. 124; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 31 July/10 August 1666, *CSPV*, pp. 50–51.

[87] St. Serfe's newsletter, 8 November 1666, LOC, 18124 Vol. I, f. 129r; Oldenburg to Boyle, 15 November 1666, *Oldenburg Correspondence*, Vol. III, p. 282. See also William Temple to Arlington, 11/21 December 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 328v; Muddiman's newsletter, 11 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/178/69; Arlington to Sir Robert Southwell, 3 January 1667, Bebington, *Arlington's Letters*, Vol. II, p. 215.

[88] William Morrice to Henry Coventry, 14 April 1665, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LXIV, f. 156r. See also William Morrice to Henry Coventry, 12 May 1665, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LXIV, f. 163r. Many in the merchant community expressed similar sentiments: news from The Hague, 2/12 March 1665, *CSPV*, p. 89; Downing to Clarendon, 28 April 1665, Bod., Clar. 108, f. 229r.

[89] News from The Hague, 2/12 March 1665, *CSPV*, p. 89. See the similar views in Downing to Clarendon, 28 April 1665, Bod., Clar. 108, f. 229r.

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replaced Dutch ones in the European carrying trade.[90] In France every effort was made to sabotage the commercial endeavors of English merchants.[91] In the West Indies the French massacred the English at St. Kitts and then "made themselves masters of all the Caribee islands except Barbados."[92] "The French picked this quarrel," John Evelyn maintained, "out of affectation of sovereignty in the Mediterranean and to control the trade of other nations."[93] As soon as war broke out between the English and the Dutch the French set about terrorizing English merchants and enforcing their commercial claims with a powerful fleet.[94] By 1666, in the Mediterranean, the French "nation's shipping [was] carrying all the trade before them," and the Earl of Winchilsea was convinced "that in time they will obtain what they desire" in the Levant.[95] Even in Newfoundland, where De Ruyter had made one of his more spectacular descents in 1665, it was the French who were accused of attempting to possess the trade.[96] In fact, the French exploited the economic space generated by the Anglo-Dutch War to begin to gain a foothold in the East India trade.[97] While in early 1664 the English might well have feared the economic expansionism of the aggressive Dutch mercantile community, by late 1666 they had every reason to tremble at the

[90] Hollis to Arlington, 13/23 September 1665, BL, Althorp Papers Papers C13 (unfoliated); Robert Southwell to Ormonde, 24 October 1665, Carte 34, ff. 452–453.

[91] Edward Moor, John Holman, Benjamin Arundel, Andrew Stuckey, Thomas Preston, Andrew Whitley to Hollis, 21 May 1665, PRO, SP 78/120, f. 138r; Hollis to Arlington, 11/21 October 1665, PRO, SP 78/121, f. 111v; St. Serfe's newsletter, 24 November 1665, LOC, 18124 Vol. I, f. 6r.

[92] Samuel Tucker to William Johnson, 15/25 February 1667, PRO, SP 84/182, f. 44r. See also Toby Bonnell (Dublin) to John Johnson, 25 December 1666, CUL, Add. 1, f. 1r; Nicholas Buckeridge to George Oxenden, 26 December 1666, BL, Add. 40713, f. 2r. The massacre at St. Kitts was extremely well publicized in England, and elicited widespread popular fury. See Arlington to Carlingford, 27 July 1666, *Memoirs of Taaffe*, p. 152; Thomas Waade (Whitby) to Williamson, 12 July 1666, PRO, SP 29/162/91; Thomas Mayden (Amsterdam) to Joseph Hill, 8 July 1666, PRO, SP 29/162/60/V; Sir Robert Paston to his wife, 19 June 1666, NRO, Bradfer-Lawrence MSS IC/1; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 18 June 1666, p. 171; Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1121; instructions to St. Albans, 1666, Bod., Clar. 84, f. 43r; *Current Intelligence*, 18–21 June 1666.

[93] John Evelyn, notes for history of second Dutch War, Christ Church, John Evelyn MSS 134, f. 100.

[94] Levant Company to Consul Cave, 20 November 1665, PRO, SP 105/113, f. 58; John Evelyn to Sir Richard Browne, 28 November 1665, Christ Church, Evelyn Out-Letters 1486; Allan Broderick to Ormonde, 2 December 1665, Carte 34, f. 490r; newsletter from Oxford, 5 December 1665, Carte 72, f. 58v.

[95] Arnold White and Arthur Bernardiston (Smyrna) to Winchilsea, 29 January 1666, LRO, DG7/Box 4963, Bundle VII; Winchilsea to Arlington, 20/30 May 1666, PRO, SP 97/18, f. 197r; Joseph Kent to Williamson, 15/25 September 1665, PRO, SP 85/8, ff. 28–29.

[96] "A Narrative Showing the Benefit of the Newfoundland Trade," 6 December 1667, PRO, SP 29/224/58.

[97] De Bacquoy/Van Ruyven to Bennet, 24 September/4 October 1664, PRO, SP 84/172, f. 93r; Downing to Clarendon, 9 September 1664, Bod., Clar. 108, f. 179; Downing to Arlington, 1 August 1665, PRO, PRO SP 84/177, ff. 51–52; Thomas Tyne to George Oxenden, 10 March 1666, BL, Add. 40712, f. 21r.

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prospect of the world's trade being usurped and dominated by a newly commercially conscious French monarchy.

The diversion created by the Anglo-Dutch War, which the English were coming to believe the French had provoked, combined with the fortuitous death of King Philip IV of Spain, created a power vacuum in the Spanish Netherlands, a power vacuum which Louis XIV was all too happy to fill with his armies.[98] The implications of a French invasion of the Low Countries, so long perceived to be of pivotal strategic importance in European politics, was such that "even their allies the Hollanders grow very jealous of them on that side."[99] Without an Anglo-Dutch peace, Bishop Morley of Winchester feared, "it will be impossible to secure Flanders against the French or secure Holland itself if the French once become masters of Flanders."[100] "If France should master that country," Henry Coventry scribbled to Carlingford full of trepidation, "where, when, or by whom he will be stopped is more than I can guess."[101]

It was precisely such a French torrent, a torrent now fueled by the vast economic resources of a royally sponsored commercial empire, that all England was beginning to dread. "France tumbles about like the Leviathan," the religiously tolerant scientist Henry Oldenburg warned Lord Brereton, "and would be a terror to Europe."[102] "France is quiet within itself," observed the former Cromwellian Roger Boyle Earl of Orrery, "and governed by a young prince, ambitious absolute, and wealthy, and apt on any occasion to enlarge his dominions."[103] Denzil Hollis, the former

[98] One can track the growing realization that the French meant to invade the Spanish Netherlands in: newsletter from The Hague, 1/11 September 1665, PRO, SP 101/47, f. 233r; Arlington to Fanshawe, 17 December 1665, BL, Harleian MSS 7010, f. 465v; Sir Bernard Gascoigne to Arlington, 16/26 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/169/7; John Lysle (West Cowes) to Williamson, 20 October 1666, PRO, SP 29/175/117; Muddiman's newsletter, 11 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/178/69.

[99] Diary of Sir William Clarke, 19 May 1666, BL, Add. 14286, f. 31r. See also Marin Zorzi (Madrid) to Doge and Senate, 13/23 June 1666, *CSPV*, p. 22; Charles Molloy, *Holland's Ingratitude: Or, A Serious Expostulation with the Dutch* (London, 1666), pp. 13–14.

[100] George Morley to ? Sheldon, 30 September 1665, Bod., Tanner MSS 45, f. 31r.

[101] Henry Coventry to Carlingford, 17 February 1666, Beinecke Library, Osborn Collection, Carlingford Papers, Box II.

[102] Oldenburg to Lord Brereton, 16 January 1666, *Oldenburg Correspondence*, Vol. III, pp. 22–23. Oldenburg also told Robert Boyle that he feared that France's expanding commecial empire was designed "so they may keep their moneys at home and make conquests with it abroad." Oldenburg to Boyle, 28 September 1665, *Oldenburg Correspondence*, Vol. II, p. 533.

[103] Orrery to Ormonde, 14 December 1666, *Orrery State Letters*, Vol. II, p. 96. William Temple repeatedly voiced similar views: Temple to Arlington, 6/16 November 1666, PRO, PRO SP 77/35, f. 247; Temple to Arlington, 14/24 December 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 333r; Temple to Ormonde, 2/12 February 1666, Carte 34, f. 601v; Temple to Arlington, 23 July/2 August 1666, PRO, SP 77/34, f. 398v; Temple to Arlington, 1/11 September 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 111v. Haley has pointed out that Temple's August 1666 pamphlet meant for Dutch consumption, *Lettre d'un Marchand de Londres à son Ami d'Amsterdam*

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Presbyterian leader and current ambassador in France, felt certain that the French aimed "to become the masters of the trade of Europe."[104] Edmund Verney, whose political and religious views were quite moderate, knew Louis XIV as "the dreadful hector of Christendom."[105] Thomas Sprat, the Duke of Buckingham's chaplain, was familiar with and excoriated Gallic claims making "France the seat of a universal monarchy."[106]

Soon many in England of all ideological stripes began to appreciate the danger from French expansionism, began to enunciate their belief that " 'tis our interest as well as of all Christian princes and republics to keep the [European] balance even ... for the peace and liberty of the rest of Christendom."[107] Louis XIV, the East India merchant Humphrey Gyfford knew, had "an exceeding treasure, vast armies, hath by purchase and building increased his shipping to a considerable number, very well enforced and provided, is an ambitious resolute prince of good counsel and conduct, who knows his interest and advantage to be in eternizing a war between the Dutch and us that he may pick the bone and get the marrow."[108] Sir Allan Broderick, a devout Anglican, observed that the French "doubt not (as the generality of their letters express) to become arbitrators of Christendom both by sea and land."[109] It was "apparent" to the Duke of Ormonde that "France aspires to umpire all the differences in Christendom."[110] Thomas St. Serfe made the same point in his newsletter when he informed his readers that Louis XIV intended "to debate the Empire of the Sea."[111] The sole aim and justification of Colbert's elaborate economic policies, Clarendon noted in his memoirs, was to make France the arbiter of Europe, to allow Louis XIV to "imitate the famous precedent of adjudging that to themselves that was in difference between their neighbors."[112]

The identification of Louis XIV as an aspiring universal monarch placed a great deal of pressure on the Anglican Royalist ideological nexus. While

Depuis la Dernière Bataille de Mer, highlighted the danger from the aspiring greatness of France. See Haley, *English Diplomat*, p. 96.

104 Hollis to Arlington, 18/28 October 1665, PRO, SP 78/121, f. 122.

105 Edmund Verney to Sir Ralph Verney, 20 February 1665, Firestone Library, Verney MSS Reel 20 (unfoliated, my translation). For a discussion of the political views of the Verneys, see my "From Butterboxes to Wooden Shoes," *Historical Journal* (June, 1995).

106 Thomas Sprat, *Observations of Monsieur de Sorbier's Vayage into England* (London, 1665), p. 37. See also Josselin, *Diary*, 21 January 1666, p. 524; Marin Zorzi (Madrid) to Doge and Senate, 2/12 January 1667, *CSPV*, p. 120 (reporting on conversations with the Earl of Sandwich, who was in Madrid in the capacity of ambassador).

107 MSS Pamphlet, 1665, NMM, Clifford Papers Vol. III, Dw100, f. 6.

108 Humphrey Gyfford to George Oxenden, 15 April 1667, BL, Add. 40713, ff. 54–55.

109 Allan Broderick to Ormonde, 9 December 1665, Carte 34, f. 506r. See also Broderick to Ormonde, 6 April 1667, Carte 35, f. 372r.

110 Ormonde to William Temple, 16 March 1667, Carte 47, f. 333r. Louis XIV's attempt to achieve universal monarchy was reportedly dramatized on an Oxford stage: Joseph Kent to Williamson, 3/13 February 1666, PRO, SP 85/8, f. 73.

111 St. Serfe's newsletter, 24 March 1666, LOC, 18124 Vol. I, f. 45r.

112 Hyde, *Life*, pp. 290–291.

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English propagandists might excoriate Louis XIV for aiding and abetting the Dutch rebel state, no one could doubt that he was the most absolute monarch in Europe.[113] The author of one squib circulating at court argued, uncontroversially, that Louis XIV had reduced to virtual slavery "not only the queen, but the princes of the blood, the nobility, the religious, the soldiery, the courts of justice, the universities, the merchants, the citizens, and the people, and it is by these steps that [he] hopes to mount to the universal monarchy."[114] The French government "is monarchical to excess" observed another pamphleteer for "the king imposeth on his subjects what he lists."[115] It was a commonplace that the French people were in a state of virtual "slavery," were subjected to "an Egyptian bondage," were "slaves in body and in mind."[116]

Nor, of course, could France be categorized as a radical Protestant state. The French, like the Dutch, were widely suspected of meddling with the disaffected in the British Isles. But unlike the Dutch, whom Anglicans were convinced were working in alliance with their radical Protestant brethren, the French were thought, for the most part, to be plotting rebellion with Catholic priests. Well before France actually entered the war, concern began to mount that the French were laying the groundwork for Papist insurrection. One of the Duke of Ormonde's informants reported that Louis XIV was offering "his assistance in forwarding the Catholic cause."[117] The Irish Catholics, thought Clarendon, "want no malice to invite [the French] to do all the hurt they can."[118] Orrery, whose Cromwellian past may have made him more sensitive to Papist threats than his Anglican colleagues, "warmly apprehended danger from those of their religion," a danger which he was sure would not "possibly be neglected by the French, nor arms nor

[113] George Eliot, *A English Duel* (1666), broadside; *Hollands Representation: Or, The Dutchmans Looking-Glass* (London, 1665), broadside; Molloy, *Holland's Ingratitude* (1666), sig. A3v.

[114] "A Charitable Advice of France Lamenting the Deplorable Condition of the Netherlands," 16/26 April 1667, Sir William Haward's Collection, Bod., Don MSS B8, ff. 122–123. I am grateful to Rachel Weil for discussing this manuscript with me.

[115] *Europae Modernae Speculum: Or, A View of the Empires, Kingdoms, Principalities and Common-Wealths of Europe* (London, 1665), pp. 95–96.

[116] St. Serfe's newsletter, 10 February 1666, LOC, 18124 Vol. I, f. 28r; *Poor Robin's Character of France* (London, 1666), p. 30; [John Caryll], *The English Princess: Or, The Death of Richard the III* (London, 1667), p. 40 (first performed March 1667). For other endorsements of this political commonplace, see Samuel Tuke to John Evelyn, 28 October 1665, Christ Church, Evelyn In-Letters 1299; Sir Edward Nicholas to Williamson, 4 January 1666, PRO, SP 29/144/37; *The English French-Mans-Address* (1666), broadside.

[117] Intelligence to Ormonde, 27 April 1665, Carte 34, f. 180r. See also newsletter from The Hague, 22 September/2 October 1665, PRO, SP 101/47, f. 274r; Hollis to Arlington, 2/12 December 1665, PRO, SP 78/121, f. 171r; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 19/29 June 1666, *CSPV*, p. 24; Richard Williams to Ormonde, 13 March 1666, Carte 34, f. 632r.

[118] Clarendon to Ormonde, 18 August 1666, Carte 47, f. 125v. In his memoirs Clarendon emphasized the desire of Louis XIV to give "life to some domestic rebellion in England and in Ireland." Hyde, *Life*, p. 290.

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ammunition omitted to be sent to them."[119] William Temple got wind of Colbert's discussions with a series of Irish Catholic priests who were supplied "with instructions from France to dispose the Irish to a general revolt upon assurance of support in all kinds from France."[120] The Irish Catholic nobleman, and virulent Francophobe, the Earl of Carlingford was also convinced that the French were contributing vast sums to Catholic priests "as toward a war of religion."[121]

The English also suspected that Louis XIV was "laboring to stir up the kingdom of Scotland to an rebellion." The French strategy, it was claimed, was to "send disguised in apparel some seminaries, Jesuitical priests, and other factioners to stir them up" while at the same time convincing the "sectarians" that Charles II was "a Roman Catholic, as they say may be perceived clearly by the assistance his Majesty giveth to the Bishop of Munster for the destroying of the Protestant religion in Holland."[122]

French entry into the war in 1666, then, not only raised new military problems for the English, it also cast a great deal of doubt upon the Anglican Royalist understanding of the nature of the conflict. No longer was the Restored Monarchy threatened merely by its traditional enemies, radical Protestantism and republicanism. Now the English were also fighting an enemy associated with the old Parliamentarian bogeys of Popery and arbitrary government. For Charles II and his government to combat successfully these two very different enemies simultaneously required an ideological realignment, a redefinition of Englishness.

The magnitude of the ideological reorientation required quickly became evident. For most throughout Britain it was the absolutist French monarchy not the Dutch Republic which seemed to be the more dangerous enemy, the more serious claimant to the universal monarchy. The Dutch ambassador Van Goch, who might be accused of wishful thinking, reported to his superiors that "the commonalty are more incensed against the French than the Netherlanders."[123] His assessment, however, was seconded by Charles II who informed the French ambassadors at Salisbury that while Londoners had loaned him £100,000 "to continue the war with the United Provinces" they would offer "four times as much if he should choose to break with the

[119] Orrery to Ormonde, 14 December 1666, *Orrery State Letters*, Vol. II, p. 96. Orrery apparently convinced Arlington of the danger: Arlington to Ormonde, 1 May 1666, Carte 46, f. 292r; Arlington to Ormonde, 26 June 1666, Carte 46, f. 323.

[120] Temple to Ormonde, 21/31 December 1666, Carte 47, f. 315v. See also Temple to Arlington, 21/31 December 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 342.

[121] Carlingford to Ormonde, 29 January 1667, Carte 35, f. 285r; Carlingford to Ormonde, 26 February 1667, Carte 35, f. 323r.

[122] Advice from Paris, April 1665, PRO, SP 78/120, f. 129r. Pepys also believed that Louis XIV was behind the 1666 rebellion in Scotland. Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 25 November 1666, p. 384.

[123] M. Van Goch to States General, 12/22 June 1665, PRO, SP 84/176, f. 168v.

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most Christian."[124] Robert Southwell was similarly persuaded that his compatriots "would be more fond to break with France, than they are resolute in continuing this war with the Dutch."[125] Dutch authorities, after interrogating a group of captured English fishermen, concluded "they hated the French more than the Dutch."[126] "A peace with Holland and the continuance of a war with France," argued the English diplomat William Temple, "are such infallible steps to his Majesty's and the kingdom's glory and greatness that nothing should be omitted that could contribute to them."[127] "All this kingdom," Robert Mein wrote from Scotland, wish "for a peace with the Dutch, but war with the French."[128] In Deal "our common people cry out peace with Holland, and war with the unworthy French."[129] "Contrary to what it was last year," summarized Arlington accurately in 1666, "everybody now cries to us have peace with the Dutch and war with France."[130]

At the same time that French entry into the war refocused English popular animosity onto an absolutist and Catholic state, the manifest suffering at home which accompanied the war led many in England to shift their domestic concerns from fears of fanatics and republicans to their government's own shortcomings. The speed and ease with which the Interregnum regimes had defeated the Dutch, the deep-seated belief in the superiority of the English navy, led many to ponder the inability of the Restored Monarchy to deliver the knockout blow.

High taxes, the economic devastation associated with a maritime war, and the horror and misery associated with the plague, all combined to create a sense of urgency during the war years. The optimistic Hollandophobic propaganda, a body of literature which reminded its readers of the facility of the Cromwellian victory over the Dutch, created extremely high standards of military success. As a result, though the English proved victorious in the majority of the battles fought in the first two years of the war, there was a growing concern that victory had not yet been achieved. After the Bergen fiasco, Samuel Pepys heard current complaints of "a great deal of money being spent, and the kingdom not in a condition to spare, nor

[124] Sagredo to Doge and Senate, 23 June/ 3 July 1665, *CSPV*, p. 147.
[125] Robert Southwell to Ormonde, 12 October 1665, Carte 34, f. 431r; see also Warham Jennett (Dover) to Williamson, 31 January 1666, PRO, SP 29/146/72.
[126] Relation of captured English fishermen, 5/15 August 1666, PRO, SP 101/50/138 (my translation).
[127] Temple to Arlington, 21/31 August 1666, PRO, SP 77/35, f. 74.
[128] Robert Mein (Edinburgh) to Williamson, 11 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/167/49. See also Robert Mein (Edinburgh) to Williamson, 7 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/166/116.
[129] Richard Watts (Walmer) to Williamson, 17 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/168/9. See also Richard Watts (Deal) to Williamson, 12 December 1666, PRO, SP 29/181/83; Richard Watts (Deal) to Williamson, 24 February 1667, PRO, SP 29/192/87. For another example of this sentiment, see Edmund Verney (East Claydon) to Sir Ralph Verney, 4 May 1667, Firestone Library, Verney MSS Reel 21 (unfoliated).
[130] Arlington to Ormonde, 17 February 1666, Carte 46, f. 256.

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a Parliament, without much difficulty, to meet to give more."[131] Recriminations against the government's management of the war only accelerated when Parliament did meet. "The Dutch appearing on our coast, though to no effect in the world but their own damage," observed the Earl of Sandwich with a certain amount of ire, "hath given occasion to foolish discourses."[132] The infamous division of the fleet during the Four Days Battle the following summer convinced a still larger number of people that the war was being poorly managed. After the battle "there was nothing to be heard among the common seamen but complaints against dividing our fleet."[133] Samuel Pepys heard "that all the commanders, officers, and even the common seamen, do condemn every part of the late conduct of the Duke of Albemarle."[134] Ominously one of those seamen, Thomas Barlow, blamed the division of the fleet on "English Papists and traitors."[135]

Naturally such sentiments were episodic, and could often be assuaged by an ensuing naval victory. However, as English suffering became more profound and as the economic devastation became more general, so too did the belief in governmental incompetence become more widespread. Certainly the treatment of the country's seamen, "without whom the land would soon be brought under subjection," left ample scope for criticism.[136] In many ports could be heard the "sad cries of poor sick seamen which daily perish in the streets for want of quarters."[137] "In many ships," it was claimed, "there is not meat nor drink that men can eat."[138] Many sailors ran away for lack of clothes.[139] The most common, most bitter, and most dangerous grievance of the seamen was their lack of pay. This treatment of the country's seamen, John Evelyn thought, was "not frugality ... but madness and the very brink of confusion." The result, he felt certain, would be that Charles II would lose "all his interest in his seamen."[140] Sure enough, it became increasingly difficult to man the fleet, and those who did enlist frequently mutinied for lack of pay.[141] No wonder that the flamboyant country member of Parlia-

[131] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 31 August 1665, p. 208.
[132] Earl of Sandwich to Sir Thomas Clifford, 28 October 1665, NMM, Clifford Papers, Vol. III, Dw99.
[133] Arlington to Ormonde, 5 June 1666, Carte 46, f. 317r; Sir Thomas Clifford to Arlington, 6 June 1666, PRO, SP 29/158/46I.
[134] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 10 June 1666, p. 158.
[135] Basil Lubbock (editor), *Barlow's Journal*, Vol. I (London, 1934), pp. 116, 119.
[136] Barlow, *Journal*, p. 128.
[137] Peter Pett (Chatham) to Pepys, 21 September 1665, PRO, SP 29/133/22.
[138] Letter from a woman to Charles II, 30 June 1666, PRO, SP 29/160/104.
[139] Captain Roger Jones to Navy commissioners, 25 September 1665, PRO, PRO SP 29/133/37. For all of these grievances, and Pepys's perception that they were being incompetently dealt with see Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 18 September 1665, p. 230.
[140] John Evelyn to Sir Richard Browne, 23 October 1665, Christ Church, Evelyn In-Letters 1480. See also Williamson's notes, 6 November 1665, PRO, SP 29/136/71.
[141] Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, pp. 1099–1100; Williamson's newsletter, 29 January 1667, Bod., Don MSS C37, f. 9r; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 14 June 1667, p. 267; Davies, pp. 147–148.

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ment Sir Richard Temple included the "non-payment of seamen whereby the great ships have been kept in port all the Winter long and the seamen utterly disheartened and discouraged from the king's service" among his list of grievances prepared for the Parliamentary session of 1667.[142]

Most believed it was not want of money but graft and corruption which kept the navy poorly supplied and the seamen in constant penury. The well-publicized revelations that the Earl of Sandwich had improperly seized prize goods after the 1665 campaign convinced many that such activity was the rule rather than the exception.[143] Many came to suspect that many members of government, including the most prominent, were sacrificing the lives and purses of good patriots in order to line their own pockets. It was not merely Samuel Pepys's crotchety friend George Cocke who believed that the Lord Chancellor and Lord Treasurer minded "getting of money and nothing else."[144] In January 1666, for example, "a turbulent crowd" gathered in front of Clarendon's new house – commonly called "Dunkirk House" since the Lord Chancellor was thought to have paid for the magnificent new dwelling from the sale of the Normandy town to Louis XIV – "to administer punishment for the venality which they suspected."[145] "Vox Populi," one of Arlington's intelligencers was forced to admit, had it that England was being handicapped by corruption in its war against France and the United Provinces. It was widely believed "that the tenth part of England's strength is not employed, though the fortune of all England lie at stake."[146] No wonder Edmund Verney doubted whether any sum "would suffice to vanquish the Hollanders, French, and Danes, considering how things have been managed till now."[147] "Too late grown wiser," one poet wrote of the English, "they their treasure see / Consum'd by fraud or lost by treachery."[148]

Increasingly the incompetent management of the war was understood to be symptomatic of a profound governmental malaise, a deeply imbedded cancer of the body politic. Republicans, of course, had known all along that any monarchy would prove to be arbitrary, would govern in a corrupt fashion.[149] Remarkably, over the course of the war – and with accelerated frequency during and after the campaign of 1666 – even many fervent

[142] Sir Richard Temple, "General Heads of Grievances," 1667, HL, Temple Stowe STT Military Box 1 (50).

[143] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 11 October 1665, p. 261; Robert Southwell to Ormonde, 24 October 1665, Carte 34, f. 453r; Allan Broderick to Ormonde, 16 December 1665, Carte 34, f. 512r.

[144] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 9 September 1665, p. 218.

[145] Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 9/19 January 1666, *CSPV*, p. 244; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 20 February 1666, p. 39.

[146] L. Hugh Squire (Westminster) to Arlington, 24 June 1666, PRO, SP 29/159/108.

[147] Edmund Verney (East Claydon) to Sir Ralph Verney, 15 November 1666, Firestone Library, Verney MSS Reel 21 (unfoliated).

[148] "The Fourth Advice to a Painter," 1667, *POAS*, p. 141.

[149] This was Algernon Sidney's point in the "Court Maxims." See Scott, *Algernon Sidney*, pp. 190–204.

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supporters of the Restored Monarchy could not deny the ubiquitous corruption at its core. John Evelyn, a committed Anglican Royalist, frequently complained to Samuel Pepys "of the vanity and vices of the court, which makes it a most contemptible thing."[150] The treasurer of the navy, Sir George Carteret, lamented "the baseness and looseness of the court."[151] The country gentleman Roger Pepys "doth by no means like the liberty of the court."[152] The dissoluteness of Charles II's court was hardly a well-kept secret. Charles II's relationship with Barbara Palmer Lady Castlemaine, for example, was not unknown in Oxford. One morning the king's mistress awoke to find written on her door: "The reason why she is not ducked / is because she is by Caesar ___ ."[153] Charles II's amours – and Charles merely set the example for the rest of his court – were thought to be outrageous because they were not so much a diversion from the rigors of political life as a replacement for it. "The whole nation" says "give the king the Countess of Castlemaine and he cares not what the nation suffer," claimed one of Charles II's angry female subjects.[154] Indeed a wide variety of Pepys's acquaintances complained that the king was ignoring the nation's pressing business.[155]

While the nation was reeling from the burden of heavy wartime taxation, the interruption of commerce, and the ravages of the plague, at court money was freely spent on the newest fashions and the most lavish luxuries. Even the Earl of Clarendon "doth confess our straits here and everywhere else arises from our outspending our revenue; I mean that the king doth do so."[156] Lady Ranelagh commented bitterly that while "scarcity of money is generally complained of ... it produces no abatement of excesses and those continued must increase the scarcity."[157] There was a widespread perception that governmental offices were mere sinecures, that no one was doing the work of government. Edward Howard, for example, pilloried the court

[150] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 29 January 1666, p. 29; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 26 September 1666, p. 297; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 26 April 1667, p. 181; Evelyn, *Diary*, 10 October 1666, p. 464.

[151] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 24 July 1665, p. 168. See also Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 26 February 1666, p. 57.

[152] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VIII, 27 January 1667, p. 33. For Pepys's own sentiments, see Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 15 October 1666, p. 323. The previous year Pepys's patron, the former Cromwellian Earl of Sandwich, had condescendingly commented that "all the court are in an uproar with their loose amours." Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VI, 17 November 1665, pp. 301–302.

[153] Denis de Repas to Sir Robert Harley, 8 March 1666, BL, Add. 70010, f. 278r; see also Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 9 January 1666, p. 8.

[154] Letter from a woman to Charles II, 30 June 1666, PRO, SP 29/160/104.

[155] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 7 July 1666, p. 197; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 8 December 1666, p. 400; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VIII, 9 May 1667, p. 207.

[156] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VIII, 20 February 1667, p. 75.

[157] Lady Ranelagh to Earl of Burlington, 7 May 1667, BL, Althorp Papers B4 (unfoliated).

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"about selling of places and doing everything for money," on the London stage in his popular play *The Change of Crownes*.[158]

It was because of this "sad, vicious, negligent court" that by the autumn of 1666 "all sober men" were becoming "fearful of the ruin of the whole kingdom this next year."[159] Indeed, Clarendon recalled, that as members of Parliament assembled for that autumn session "they did not conceal the very ill opinion they had of the court and the continual riotings there."[160] "Cries are now heard on every hand," reported one Venetian observer, "that since the House of Stuart came to the throne England has never enjoyed felicity but has suffered from incessant miseries."[161]

While the entry of France into the war had reminded the English of the political evils of absolutism, had enabled the enunciation of concerns that "the model of France" was being followed too closely in England, it also coincided with renewed concerns about the growth of Popery.[162] Fears of Popery, of course, were omnipresent in seventeenth-century England. In the early 1660s, however, most in England were far more concerned with the threat from radical Protestantism, Popery in disguise, than they were terrified of a renewed Roman Catholic menace.[163] Even England's alliance with the Bishop of Munster against the Protestant United Provinces – an alliance that Dutch propagandists claimed to be "a conspiracy of Papists" – did not raise much concern in Britain.[164] However, the ubiquitous rumors

[158] F. S. Boas (editor), *The Change of Crownes* (Oxford, 1949); Williamson's journal, 22 April 1667, PRO, SP 29/231, f. 14v; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VIII, 15–16 April 1667, pp. 167–169.

[159] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 31 December 1666, p. 426.

[160] Hyde, *Life*, p. 367; see also Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 26 September 1666, p. 298.

[161] Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 18/28 September 1666, *CSPV*, p. 77.

[162] Hyde, *Life*, p. 239. See also Sprat, *Observations*, pp. 75–76. For an early statement that the style of the Restoration court was "Frenchified" see *The Last Will and Testament of the Late Deceased French Jackanapes* (London, 1661), pp. 3–4. This fear was expressed in the Parliamentary motion against the importation of French luxury goods, and the reform of court fashion in the autumn of 1666.

[163] Radical Protestants themselves continued to emphasize the threat from Roman Catholicism. See, for example, John Taylor to Hannah Booth, 2 May 1665, PRO, PRO SP 29/121/93 IV.

[164] Newsletter from The Hague, 1/11 September 1665, PRO, PRO SP 101/47, f. 229 (my translation). See also Arlington to Carlingford, 7 October 1665, Beinecke Library, Osborn Collection, Carlingford Papers, Box II (unfoliated); Temple to Castel Rodrigo, 2/12 December 1665, *The Works of Sir William Temple* (London, 1814), Vol. I, p. 225; Temple to Arlington, 2/12 March 1666, PRO, SP 77/34, f. 102v; Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1076. This Dutch propaganda campaign does appear to have had a fair amount of success on the continent. See newsletter from The Hague, 26 Sepember/6 October 1665, PRO, SP 101/47, f. 281v; William Morrice to Henry Coventry, 9 November 1665, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LIII, f. 258r; newsletter from The Hague, 10/20 November 1665, PRO, SP 101/47, f. 311r; Moray to Oldenburg, 27 November 1665, *Oldenburg Correspondence*, Vol. II, p. 625. The English government was extremely concerned to combat this perception. See Clarendon to Henry Coventry, 4 October 1665, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LXIV, f. 239; MSS Pamphlet, 1665, NMM, Clifford Papers Vol. III, Dw100, ff. 5–7.

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of French political conspiracy, the widely perceived court corruption, and the manifest proliferation of Catholic propaganda, all served to revive fears of a more traditional form of Popery in the autumn of 1666.[165] On the Isle of Wight it was rumored "as though the Romanists would have a design upon us that are Protestants."[166] The Hertfordshire-trained bands marched out of the exercise field when they heard they were to serve under Popish officers.[167] Dissenters in the West Country were said to "employ men and women to go up and down on purpose to inform that the mother queen doth intend to bring in Popery into this land and the king doth countenance it."[168] In Chester there were "of late many rumors of Papist plots," which the Anglican Royalist Sir Geoffrey Shakerley judged "to be the old Presbyterian design revived to disturb the peace of the kingdom once more through the Papists' sides."[169] One William Hopkins of Wedgbury in Staffordshire was reputed to have exclaimed that "the king and Duke of York are Papists, and the king hath been at mass underground within this week, or fortnight, and I can prove it."[170] Dr. Isaac Basire received a letter from William Prynne in which he ominously warned "style *veteri* of fears and jealousies of plots and designs of Jesuits and Romanists against our church and religion."[171] In Yorkshire the Nonconformists all claimed that there was "an absolute intention to bring in Popery."[172] Unsurprisingly in traditionally puritan Dorchester there was an anti-Popery riot provoked by an innkeeper changing his sign from that of the red lion to that of the pope.[173]

All over the country, and with alarmingly reminiscent intensity, then, English men and women were once again expressing their fears of Popish plotting in the autumn of 1666. Upon arriving in London for the Parliamentary session Sir Edward Harley discovered that "the members of the House from all parts are full of alarms concerning the Papists."[174] "Papists at this time very insolent in most parts of the nation," the Anglican Oxford scholar

[165] *More News from Rome or Magna Charta, Discoursed of Between a Poor Man & his Wife* (London, 1666), p. 1; St. Serfe's newsletter, 29 November 1666, LOC, 18124 Vol. I, f. 135r.

[166] John Lysle (West Cowes) to Williamson, 10 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/177/158. For fears of Popery in Bristol, see John Fitzherbert (Bristol) to Williamson, 19 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/178/135. See also John Fitzherbert (Bristol) to Williamson, 3 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/177/39.

[167] Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1126.

[168] Peter Crabb (Exeter) to Arlington, 11 August 1666, PRO, SP 29/167/68.

[169] Sir Geoffrey Shakerley (Chester) to Williamson, 17 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/178/103. See also Shakerley to Williamson, 19 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/178/134.

[170] Deposition of William Hopkins of Wedgebury, County Stafford, before Sir Robert Hall, 17 September 1666, PRO, SP 29/172/13.

[171] Isaac Basire (Durham) to Williamson, 4 December 1666, PRO, SP 29/180/68.

[172] Christopher Sanderson (Eggleston) to Williamson, 23 October 1666, PRO, SP 29/175/87.

[173] C. Sawtell (Weymouth) to Edmund Sawtell, 5 June 1667, PRO, SP 29/203/77.

[174] Sir Edward Harley to Lady Harley, 20 October 1666, BL, Add. 70010, f. 340r.

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Anthony Wood confided in his diary that same month, they "appear in public, contrive the massacring of many hundreds."[175] These sentiments, this ubiquitous whispering about Catholic plotting, Pepys tellingly pointed out was "the very beginning of the late troubles."[176] John Fitzherbert of Bristol, while commenting on the proliferation of anti-Papist gossip, warned that "we have been cheated into twenty years of wars by the same artifices."[177]

Unlike the previous two years in which every effort had been made to discover and disarm Dissenters and republicans, the autumn of 1666 was marked by a crackdown on Roman Catholics. All over the country the houses of Roman Catholics were searched for arms.[178] In Parliament members "took occasion to fall upon the Papists," compelling Charles II to issue a proclamation enjoining enforcement of the Elizabethan recusancy laws.[179] The result was that "in many places of the country the common people, beyond what is intended, disarm the Papists."[180] The Duke of Albemarle and others strictly administered the oaths of supremacy and allegiance in order to purge the army of Catholics.[181]

The entry of France into the war – an absolutist and nominally Catholic power – opened up the field of political discourse. At the outset of the war, a war which was begun in a fit of Anglican Royalist enthusiasm, any criticism of the regime, any voice of dissent, would have been, and often was, labeled as yet another republican or fanatic attempt to overthrow the Restored Monarchy in collusion with the grasping imperialist Dutch. The French declaration of war, however, made it clear to English observers that it was not exclusively republican and religiously pluralist regimes which sought universal dominion. Indeed the reports of Dutch economic misery combined with their manifest military vulnerability convinced many that the French represented the greater threat. As long as Charles II and his government seemed poised to repeat the Cromwellian victories over the Dutch, it was extremely difficult to criticize the regime. However, when the Orangist political offensive collapsed, the Fire devastated England's metropolis and morale, while barely a blow had been struck against the aggressive and ambitious French, a barrage of political criticism was heard throughout

[175] Anthony Wood, *Diary*, October 1666, Bod., Wood's Diaries MSS 10, f. 32r.
[176] Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. VII, 27 October 1666, p. 343.
[177] John Fitzherbert (Bristol) to Williamson, 19 November 1666, PRO, SP 29/178/135.
[178] Thomas Rugge, "Mercurius Politicus Redivivus," 30 October 1666, BL, Add. 10117, f. 180r.
[179] James S. Clarke, *The Life of James the Second* (London, 1816), Vol. I, , p. 424; Sir Edward Harley to Lady Harley, 3 November 1666, BL, Add. 70010, f. 349r; Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1136; Samuel Rolle, *The Burning of London in the Year 1666* (London, 1667), sig. A5–A6.
[180] Ludlow, "A Voyce," Bod., English History MSS C487, p. 1136.
[181] Pepys, *Diary*, 4 November 1666, pp. 353–354; Rugge, "Mercurius Politicus Redivivus," November 1666, BL, Add. 10117, f. 182r.

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the kingdom. That most in England thought the Fire had been set by a French/Papist coalition rather than by an alliance between the Dutch and the radicals demonstrates the extent to which the center of English political discourse had shifted.

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