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WHOSE *MISAFIRS?* NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE ALONG THE TURKISH–SYRIAN BORDER

Abstract
This article examines the figure of the *misafir* (guest) as it personifies the combined domains of everyday and institutional hospitality in Hatay, a contested border province annexed to Turkey from French Mandate Syria in 1939, and home today to over 400,000 displaced Syrians. Based on fieldwork conducted between 2010 and 2012 in Hatay's administrative capital, Antakya, I focus on the perspectives of the region's bilingual (Turkish-Arabic) Jewish and Christian populations about the official *misafir* status of the first Syrian arrivals. I argue that the sudden transformation of Syrians from familial *misafir*s to governmental *misafir*s in the early days of the Syrian conflict ruptured the hierarchical domains of reciprocity that have historically shaped the cross-border relations between these communities. In this process, Antakya's religious minorities recognized and negotiated the limits of their own residence, difference, and citizenship in Turkey, and invoked the lived practices of hospitality that exist beside but also transcend ethnoreligious and national identities. By examining how historical articulations of religious and national difference along the Turkish–Syrian border are entwined with the figure of the *misafir* at the interpersonal level, this article contributes to debates on hospitality in scholarship on the Middle East and in migration literature.

Keywords: displacement; hospitality; migration; minorities; Turkey

"Whose *misafir*s [guests] are they?" asked Meryem.[1] "Hatay's, Turkey's, or the government's?" She was referring to the first group of Syrians to cross the border from Latakia to Turkey's border province of Hatay shortly after the start of the Syrian uprising in March 2011.[2] Meryem was originally from an Orthodox Christian village in Hatay but had been living in Hatay's administrative capital, Antakya, for over ten years. We were in her courtyard, enjoying the bitter taste of the smuggled tea that she had bought in Antakya's Syrian market, when she posed this rhetorical question on the legal category assigned to Syrian newcomers by the Turkish state.[3]

This first group, hosted in "guest camps" and consisting of some 250 Syrian citizens, was labeled by the authorities as *misafir*s rather than as "refugees" (*mülteci* in Turkish—*al-lāji'* in Arabic) or "asylum seekers" (*sığınmacı*).[4] Turkey's then–foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, stated that Turkey was ready to admit Syrians who were not "happy at home" and would welcome its Syrian *misafir*s until the conditions for their return were secured.[5] The governor of Hatay emphasized that these Syrians came with their

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passports and would be shown respect, honor, and geniality in accordance with the codes of "Turkish hospitality" (*Türk misafirperverliği*).[6] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the sitting prime minister, declared that Turkey was capable of "hosting" (*misafir etmek*) the whole Syrian population if necessary.[7]

In official terms, the *misafir* status differentiated the Syrian newcomers from both Turkish citizens and "non-European" asylum seekers in Turkey.[8] According to Turkey's partial commitment to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), Turkey grants refugee status only to citizens of member states of the Council of Europe and provides temporary asylum for asylum seekers in Europe or elsewhere.[9] However, the Turkish political leadership took measures to treat the most recent arrivals from Syria outside the procedures specified in those documents. Having acquired "temporary protection" status on a group basis, Syrian nationals were granted the right to legal stay, protection from refoulement, and access to basic humanitarian services, yet were discouraged from making individual applications for international protection through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[10]

An impromptu response to a situation of "mass influx," this de facto regime was formalized through Turkey's adoption in 2013 of a comprehensive European Union (EU) inspired law that established the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) and introduced "The Temporary Protection Regulation" (TPR) in 2014.[11] By minimizing UNHCR's and international relief actors' direct involvement with this population, this law has allowed the Turkish state to take full management of the now over 3 million Syrians living there and gradually become the sole decision maker in determining their status.[12]

Naming the first arrivals from Syria *misafir*s was a strategic move on the part of the Turkish state: it avoided possible tensions with European countries over refugee agreements and conformed to Turkey's ethnic and religious priorities.[13] It also echoed the government's historical treatment of migrants. The Turkish state had hitherto used the rhetoric of hospitality to avoid its responsibilities to refugees under international law and maintained its reservation of the 1967 protocol as a bargaining tool with the EU in its negotiations for accession.[14] By using the same terminology this time for Syrian nationals, Turkish authorities not only created exceptions within the legal system that eventually became the rule, but also endeavored to have the upper hand in relations with the EU, with Turkish citizens, and with the new arrivals. Such machinations include the controversial EU–Turkey deal of March 2016 (which called for mass return of migrants from Greece to Turkey in return for financial assistance from the EU) as well as Erdoğan's public speeches in early 2016 that hinted at the possibility of granting citizenship to Syrians.[15]

Yet the rhetoric of hospitality also invoked a moral domain of everyday sociality that exceeded—and strengthened—the Turkish state's role as a "benevolent host" in charge of regulating the differences of its visitors as well as its own citizens. This article examines how the figure of the *misafir* operated in this domain in the early days of the Syrian conflict. I focus on the myriad ways in which Hatay's religious minorities invoked everyday hospitality to negotiate their own status vis-à-vis the Turkish state's authority as the ultimate host. Here, *misafir* should be understood as an indexical category that is always defined by the historical and interactional context of its invocation.

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Deriving from the root *safar* (travel), *misafir* in Arabic (*musāfir*) means "one who is traveling," as opposed to the Arabic term *ḍayf* (guest). The way it is used in Turkish, however, prioritizes the perspective of those who host travelers and translates into English directly as "guest." Even though it is this second meaning that informs the official declaration of welcome, in a bilingual (Turkish-Arabic) border context such as Antakya these two meanings converge and address guesthood as a matter of both hospitality and mobility. The *misafir* as a traveling guest, then, signifies a relative position that cannot easily be pinned down to a particular group of people, property, or entity.[16] Unlike the bounded and place-based categorizations of ethnoreligious identity, the *misafir* status can be inhabited by anybody and is expected to be exchanged with that of the host in daily relations of hospitality.[17] Deeply anchored in ethical codes of reciprocity, this unstable and impermanent positionality calls for a constant negotiation of power concerning who controls the space of interaction and who belongs to it. While the power plays of hospitality connect the micropolitical space of home to a public mode of politics, they also expose the tensions between the two in engaging the question of difference on the ground.

Taking as my starting point Meryem's question ("Whose *misafir*s are they?") and its emphasis on the host, in this article I probe the daily negotiation of politically ascribed identities (religious, ethnic, and national) in interpersonal relations of hospitality and the tensions that emerge in the process. After situating such negotiations and tensions within the longer history of displacement in the region, I argue that the sudden transformation of "the Syrian" from a familial *misafir* to the *misafir* of the Turkish state reveals that, when used metaphorically by the state to refer to the outsider, the immigrant, or the other-within, the moral relationship between host and guest no longer involves mutual recognition but becomes a confirmation of the host's authority. Ascribing the positions of guest and host to specific identities, this break of reciprocity has allowed Antakya's Arabic-speaking non-Muslim communities to recognize the political limitations of their own difference and citizenship in Turkey. Through an interpretative analysis of this process, this article contributes to debates on hospitality in scholarship on the Middle East and in migration literature. By examining how historical articulations of religious and national difference along the Turkish–Syrian border are entwined with hospitality practices at the interpersonal level, I interrogate the tendency of both literatures to examine the institutional and everyday workings of guesthood as separate processes.

FIELDWORK

This article is based on ethnographic research conducted in Antakya over sixteen months between 2010 and 2012. When the war in Syria began, I was examining the sociopolitical conditions of coexistence among the city's bilingual Alawi, Jewish, and Orthodox Christian residents as well as Sunni Turks, all groups with whom I had already established relationships through regular visits, mutual friends, and participant observation. Given the region's historical networks with Syria (described shortly), commentaries about Turkey's Syria policy quickly entered the daily conversations in my research locations, which varied widely and included city bazaars, shared sacred sites, public interfaith events, women's social gatherings, and a multireligious choral ensemble. Although hospitality-based relationships were already prevalent in these settings (also

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discussed shortly), with the arrival of Syrian refugees the term *misafir* gained a new referent in such relationships.

Of the forty-four ethnographic interviews that I conducted with members of Antakya's diverse communities after the outbreak of the Syrian war, thirty-eight made direct reference to the Syrian *misafir*s in responding to my general questions about intercommunal relations. Most of these comments echoed those of Meryem, expressing suspicion and uncertainty and implicating the Turkish state's role as the Syrians' hosts. The most common complaint I heard, for instance, concerned the privileged access to public healthcare that Syrians were assumed to have and was encapsulated in a comment by one of my Christian interviewees: "They make us wait for hours [in hospitals] but accept any Syrian patient upon arrival. Who is the *misafir* here—us or them?"[18]

In my return visit to the field in the summer of 2016, I found that the rhetoric of hospitality endured, but the terms and context of its negotiation had changed. Displaced Syrians were now called *mülteci* or *sığınmacı* in official records and were no longer restricted to the camps (which, until recently, only officials had been allowed to enter). Numbering approximately 83,000 in Antakya alone, Syrian refugees had already started to blend in with locals as their neighbors, coworkers, grocers, and tenants, blurring the boundary between Syrians as familial *misafir*s and Syrians as *misafir*s of the state.[19] I also observed that Syrians, too, were using the language of hospitality to construe their experiences of precarity and temporariness in these everyday networks.[20] Because my argument concerns the implications of "state hospitality" toward noncitizen Syrians for those who already inhabited the margins of Turkish citizenship, I prioritize here the perspectives of Antakya's Arabophone non-Muslim residents rather than those of Syrians themselves. The early days of the conflict that constitute the main time frame of this article provide a particularly significant context for identifying such implications in the absence of direct relations between these two groups.

Although my fieldwork involved interaction with Alawi and Sunni residents who constitute the majority of Antakya's population of some 470,000 people, their perspectives are omitted here because they demand attention to issues beyond the scope of this article. For the Alawis, these issues include the nuances of Arab Alawi identity in Turkey, this community's political and religious attachments to Bashar al-Asad, their reliance on cross-border economies prior to the Syrian war, and the sectarian tensions between Alawis and Sunnis.[21] Sunni Turks, by contrast, tend to adopt a much more distant tone in their expressions of sympathy or concern regarding Syrians due largely to the absence of a shared language and history between the two groups.[22]

My analysis of the narratives presented here attends to their indexical characteristics that are contingent on the social situation of their communication.[23] What Antakyans relayed to me about their experiences was initially informed by my positionality as a Turkish anthropologist from Canada—that is, a member of the ethnoreligious majority and a fellow Turkish citizen with the means to amplify their voices for the international community. As our relationships developed, however, I came to occupy other positions as well and became their customer, neighbor, friend, tenant, and guest—the latter, in its figurative sense, subsuming all the others and marking their impermanence. Shaped by my interlocutors' awareness of my researcher identity, their public commentaries about Syrian *misafir*s demonstrated a negotiation of their own precarious identities vis-à-vis the Turkish nation. Our interactions in other social domains, however, pointed to

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the cultural and historical forces underlying these commentaries. Having embodied the guest status in these domains, I was also able to identify the ambiguities of identity surrounding hospitality that transcend the distinctions between minority and majority.

INSTITUTIONAL AND EVERYDAY MEANINGS OF HOSPITALITY

Studies that examine hospitality in the context of national borders often approach the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion through the legal, territorial, and nationally ascribed categorizations of identity. Works inspired by Kant's formulations of cosmopolitanism, for instance, understand hospitality as a natural and "cosmopolitical" right bestowed by the state and protected by international law.[24] Hospitality as a universal right requires the nation-state to open its borders to noncitizens yet does not necessarily challenge the nation-state system or its power to inscribe individual and national life. It also does not account for the everyday forms of sociality that refugees become part of—or are excluded from—after they cross borders, especially (as in Turkey) in the absence of structured legal asylum mechanisms.

Derrida used the term "conditional hospitality" to describe the limitations of this state-centered perspective.[25] Hospitality as a juridicopolitical right, he suggested, starts with the interrogation of the newcomer's name: it is conditional on the state's ability to identify, recognize, and name the border-crossing other. This is why the gates and borders are opened only to "deserving" guests—that is, "those who arrive with their passports, valid visas, adequate bank statements, or invitations."[26] Many others face hostility, or as Derrida called it, "hostpitality," as the states' preferential welcoming of guests is often accompanied by maintaining the guests as strangers for generations; placing them in refugee camps, detention centers, or ghettos; or simply refusing them entry.[27] Located at the intersection of compassion and repression, conditional hospitality reconfirms the nation-state's sovereignty through its ownership of "home" and its populations. Its territorially based language undergirds both the national and international regulation of refugees that anthropologists have explored in relation to law, spatial containment and immobility, time, uncertainty, dispossession, and border security.[28]

The hospitality offered to the Syrian newcomers by the Turkish state can be understood in similar terms, yet also adds a new dimension to Derridian critiques. Housed in impromptu tent camps in Hatay's border district of Yayladağı as registered *misafir*s, Syrians who arrived in Turkey with their passports during my fieldwork were mostly identifiable to the state and relied on its institutions for survival. Their official status as *misafir*s evoked a discourse of generosity and compassion rather than one of rights, however, putting many in a legally precarious position. While providing access to the free healthcare, education, and labor market that were denied to conditional asylum seekers in Turkey, the TPR also placed the guests' destiny mostly in the hands of the Turkish state with little in the way of protection from international agencies.

The Syrians' state-ascribed status of *misafir* in Antakya also created problems for their local integration beyond these institutional processes of identification. Unlike in major Turkish cities such as Istanbul and Ankara, the Syrian *misafir* in Antakya never denoted a unified identity marked by national citizenship. Instead, this status embodied multiple positionalities anchored in the local vernaculars of ethnicity, language, kinship, and religion. While negotiating the implications of these positionalities for their own

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self-image as Turkish citizens, Antakya's long-term Arabophone residents drew on customary traditions and historical registers of hospitality. They construed the state's hospitality toward Syrian newcomers on the basis of their own experiences of hosting and being guests in ordinary settings, experiences that formed the basis of but also transcended the official rhetoric of guesthood.

Anthropologists have long observed hospitality as one of the most intimate ways of interacting with people outside of one's own household in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean contexts.[29] They have examined how the routine of hosting others establishes and strengthens relationships based on neighborliness, partnership, camaraderie, and kinship, and defines the internal and external boundaries of the house.[30] They have also shown how such relationships can be bound up with jealousy, familial and communal hierarchies, and sociospatial exclusions.[31] Like Derrida's "conditional hospitality," which entails hostility, everyday hospitality upholds and creates conflict as much as it establishes intimacy and social solidarity.

In Antakya, this power-laden intimacy is most evident in the moral weight of being a host, where it operates through the display of certain objects, the performance of certain rituals, and hierarchies of reciprocity. For instance, almost all kinds of social arrangements start with the visit of one party to another's house, a visit that must be reciprocated later for the continuation of the relationship. Women arrange rotating reception days (*gün*) in the guestrooms of their homes, where they offer each other coffee, food, and company; demonstrate their cooking and hosting skills; and share gossip and news. Alongside these *gün*s (some of which are exclusive to women of a particular religious community) there are also visits that include both men and women; ideally, these involve two or three families that may be relatives, neighbors, or business partners. Customers in the historical souk or visitors to people's workplaces are always greeted as if they are a *misafir* in a house and insistently offered coffee or tea until they accept. Most such visits end with the *misafir* stating, "We're expecting you" (*biz de sizi bekleriz*), an implication that the visit should be reciprocated.

Expectations of reciprocity in both public and private visits are often disrupted by people's understandings of themselves as hosts more so than as guests. Through the phenomenon that Anne Meneley describes in her work on sociability in a Yemeni town as "competitive hospitality," men and women manifest their status and wealth in their separate spheres of hosting.[32] Andrew Shryock observes a similar tendency in Balgawi tales of hospitality, in which leaders of different tribes take pride in their hosting abilities and challenge one another in rivalries of generosity that are measured against an impossible ideal of hospitality, one that resonates with the Derridian ethics of unconditional hospitality.[33] Barbara Aswad's analysis of Sunni Muslim women's visitation patterns in Antakya in the 1960s portrays a balanced reciprocity in which the failure to return the visit equivalently and within an agreed upon time limit means either a break in the relationship or the affirmation of the higher rank of one party over the other.[34] The host's prestige is measured by the number and status of her guests as well as her ability to *not* reciprocate a visit. Across the border in Damascus, Christa Salamandra describes women's customary morning coffee visits (*subḥiyya*) and monthly afternoon receptions (*istiqbāl*) as gendered sites of competitive display.[35] Mirroring women's *gün*s in Antakya, these gatherings frame the act of hosting as a marker of social distinction, familiar today to both Antakya's long-term residents and Syrian *misafir*s.

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Consequently, in Antakya, I noticed that people often speak from the position of and desire to be the subjects rather than the objects of welcome. For instance, a common expression that indicates the high status of one's family is "I come from a family that hosted [was able to host] guests" (*misafir ağırlayan bir aileden geliyorum*). One's power is defined by the ability to host others, stage that hospitality, and be recognized as a host; it is this position that allows the host to compete with other hosts and show mastery of the rules of hospitality. Reciprocity and the desire to *not* reciprocate are intrinsic, rather than in contradiction, to each other, however. The host status owes its power and moral value to the social fact that hospitality *can* be and often *is* reciprocated in actual relations.

What happens, then, when hospitality is invoked by the state to address an outsider who is in no position to reciprocate and thus cannot enter into related social networks? What does the micropolitics of everyday hospitality in Antakya reveal about the grounds and limits of this political invocation? Meryem's question "Whose *misafir*s?" underscored the disintegration of reciprocity in the case of hosting the new Syrian *misafir*s and articulated a tension between political categorizations of hospitality and the multilayered realities of guesthood in Antakya. On the one hand, social identities ascribed to the Syrians on the basis of their ethnic origin, national citizenship, and religious affiliation gained their meaning in interpersonal relations of hospitality. On the other hand, neither the guesthood of Syrians nor the associated discourses of hospitality in everyday settings was independent of the historically contingent characteristics of the Turkish–Syrian border and the processes of displacement endemic to the Middle Eastern borderlands. This multifold relationship complicates the perspectives on hospitality in migration literature that focus predominantly on hospitality's rhetorical or biopolitical use by state institutions and humanitarian agencies.[36] This relationship also addresses the underexamined question of how group affiliations surrounding citizenship figure in the daily negotiations of guesthood in the Middle East.[37] My ethnography suggests that the familial relations of hospitality studied widely by anthropologists of the Middle East are not exclusive of but concurrent—and indeed interdependent—with the social identities that arise historically from such affiliations.

THE MAKING OF HATAY AS A BORDER TOWN

Prior to the Syrian conflict, "the Syrian" occupied an ambiguous position among Antakyans, shifting between kin, neighbor, and enemy. The history of this ambiguity dated back to the region's incorporation into modern Turkey and the ensuing minoritization of ethnoreligious identities and population displacement.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Antakya, the harbor city İskenderun, and the Amik Plain were excluded from the national pact of the newly founded Turkish Republic and instead became part of French Mandate Syria as the Sanjak of Alexandretta.[38] While Turkey was undergoing national homogenization in an attempt to dissociate itself from the dissolved empire's multiconfessional legacy, France employed the colonial governing tactic of emphasizing the ethnic and religious diversity of the sanjak's inhabitants, a tactic that had also underlain the French subdivision of the Mandate into six states.[39] By the early 1930s, the Sanjak of Alexandretta contained about twenty-one religious communities that spoke at least five languages (Turkish, Arabic,

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Armenian, Kurdish, and Circassian).[40] Despite the rigid classifications of ethnic groups in official French statistics, it was not uncommon for people in Antakya to speak more than two languages, with one or more of these functioning primarily as an instrument for commerce, prayer, or government rather than as a determinant of ethnic identity.[41]

In the context of the efforts of European states to consolidate power and cultivate allies in the run-up to World War II, France reached an agreement with Turkey in 1937 to recognize Alexandretta as an independent state.[42] This state was called the Republic of Hatay in reference to the Hittites, the ancient Anatolian people claimed as "proto-Turkish" and also as ancestors of the local Alawis.[43] The politics of naming places and communities reflected the increasing political significance of population numbers in deciding the fate of Hatay State. Central to such population wars was uncertainty about whether "minority" and "nationality" were objective designations identifiable through ethnic, linguistic, or religious affiliation, or subjective psychological processes based on individuals' feelings of belonging.[44] Turkey coerced and persuaded the region's local inhabitants to identify with Turkishness and to register in the Turkish electoral body; the Turkish government also resettled ethnically and linguistically Turkish populations in the region, thus characterizing the republic's relationship to Hatay.[45]

In 1939 the Hatay parliament voted for Hatay's annexation to Turkey, and the process—even today still not formally recognized by Syria—was completed with a referendum stage-managed from Ankara.[46] The ambiguous and multiple identities of its people have positioned Hatay at the nation's periphery throughout the history of modern Turkey because they exposed a gap, so central to the processes of state-making in former Ottoman territories, between the state's territorial sovereignty and people's right of self-determination.[47] In Hatay, as elsewhere in the region, this gap manifested in an extended process of forced migrations and minoritization of entire populations that had held relatively stable positions until the late Ottoman period.[48]

Unable to fit in with the dominant ideologies of Turkish citizenship and fearing reprisals, many people left for Syria and Lebanon after the annexation. The first to leave were the Armenians, some of whom had been resettled in the region by France after surviving the 1915 genocide.[49] They were eventually followed by the Alawis, Orthodox Christians, and Sunni Arabs, as well as some Turks unhappy with the republic's secular identity.[50] The exclusionary nationalism of the early republican era led to state support for the development of a Muslim bourgeoisie with the introduction in 1942 of the Wealth Levy that specifically targeted well-off Christians and Jews and with the confiscation of the properties of non-Muslim foundations. These developments further encouraged outmigration by non-Muslims—to Europe in the case of Christians, and to Israel and North America in the case of Jews. Fear and violence during the political unrest of the 1970s and after the 1980 military coup led to another wave of migration for the region's Jews and Christians. As the Turkish populations of these communities dwindled, younger generations moved to cities (such as Istanbul) with larger Christian and Jewish populations to study and find partners. At the start of my research in 2011, only about 110 Christian families and ten Jewish families resided in Antakya.[51]

Non-Muslim communities who remained often encountered suspicion about their role in the delay of Hatay's union with Turkey. They were treated as potential transgressors and felt themselves to be second-class citizens always needing to prove their loyalty to the Turkish state. In an attempt to evade suspicion about their true attachments, many

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Arabic-speaking residents of Antakya emphasized their love for Turkey in our first conversations and communicated their resentments only after they knew me better. These resentments, it should be emphasized, did not necessarily contradict their first remarks. Their communities had been assimilated into Turkey even if they maintained relationships with the Arab world: new generations, for example, had a better knowledge of Turkish than of Arabic—the end result of six decades of assimilationist education policies on the part of the Turkish Republic. Many of those younger generations referred to themselves and to each other as "Turkish" and distinguished themselves from Syrian Arabs, whom they characterized (following Turkish conventions) as "dirty," "disorderly," and "religiously conservative." The necessity people felt to highlight their nationalism reflected their experiences of exclusion from hegemonic understandings of Turkish citizenship. The same necessity, together with a feeling of resentment, nevertheless implied their desire to be recognized by Turkey, not Syria.

FROM NEIGHBORS AND WIVES TO *MISAFIRS*

The ambivalent positionality inhabited by "the Syrian" was perhaps most apparent in the intimate domain of the family. Even as the Turkish–Syrian border divided communities and isolated many from their extended kin, Antakyans continued to establish familial relationships with people from Syria.[52] Indeed, cross-border marriages between people of the same faith were strongly desired by the city's diminishing communities of Jews and Christians. It was easier for members of these communities to find an acceptable match of the same faith in Syria than in the rest of Turkey, especially when they could not find one in Hatay. Because such marriages were often followed by the resettlement of the newlywed wife in the place where the husband and his family lived, "the Syrian" as a family member in Antakya referred to the wife rather than the husband. During my fieldwork, I met and became close to two such women, Salma and Dima, who ambivalently cohabited the positions of kin and *misafir*, and whose stories of border crossing for marriage were woven with the displacement of their larger communities.

Salma was the daughter of a rabbi in Damascus, where she had grown up and worked as a teacher in an elementary school for Jewish boys. One day, a visiting acquaintance of the school's director (who was the Jewish community leader in Aleppo) told her that a young Jew in Antakya was looking for a suitable wife. He asked her whether she would like to live in Turkey, a possibility that her parents thought over and decided to try. This was in 1984, during the years of conflict under the rule of Hafiz al-Asad when it was not easy for the Syrian Jewish community to go abroad, partly due to tensions between Syria and Israel. Eventually, with passports and a one-month visa in hand, the family went to Antakya.

The two families quickly reached an agreement, and by the second week of the visit Salma married Isak, who worked in his family's housewares store in the historic souk. Isak and Salma moved into his family's apartment on the grounds of the synagogue in the old city and lived with her in-laws for some ten years. Her parents left after the wedding, and although some of her family members have visited her, she herself has never been back to Syria, in part because she has feared being arrested by Syrian officials for not returning before the expiration of her Turkish visa. There was little left for her to go back to anyway, she said, since a large part of her community in Damascus had

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emigrated to the United States in the early 1990s after an agreement between the two countries.[53]

Although like Salma's story in many ways, Dima's was very different. She had moved to Antakya from Aleppo in the 1970s upon her marriage to Hamid, a Christian artisan in Antakya's historical souk whom she had met during one of his visits to Syria. Dima's family was originally from Antakya but, afraid of losing their rights and properties under the Turkish regime, had emigrated to Aleppo along with other Christian families during the annexation. Unlike Salma, who learned Turkish well enough to interact with her customers in the marketplace where she worked with Isak, Dima stopped working after she married at the age of thirty, spent most of her time at home, and spoke very little Turkish, preferring to communicate in Arabic with her neighbors and sellers in the market. The TV in the guest room of Dima's house was always on, broadcasting religious programs from an Orthodox Christian channel in Syria or Turkish soap operas to which she owed her limited Turkish.

Personally both women's connections to Syria were diminished by their marriages, but publicly those connections were emphasized by members of their new communities in Antakya. For instance, while conversing with some men in the synagogue about the life of Antakya Jews, when I explicitly mentioned Salma's name as someone whose religiosity impressed me, one man said, "You know she is from Syria, right? She is different from us. Syrian Jews are more conservative. We are more modern and secular!" as the others nodded in silent agreement. Since all these men were practicing Jews and it was Salma's Jewishness that made her entry to the community possible, I take this comment to be less about discrimination and more about a communal self-representation bound to the interactional context of its utterance. When my questions about Jewish religiosity reminded those men of my identity as a Turkish-Canadian researcher, they endeavored to express their commitment to the Turkish national discourse of secularism by dissociating their community from any links with Syria. In other words, this immediate attempt to differentiate the Antakyan Jew from the Syrian Jew expressed the anxieties of the former (whose loyalty to the Turkish state was under continuous suspicion) about being identified with the latter.

Jacob, a member of the Orthodox Community Foundation, used the term *misafir* to overcome his anxiety about Dima's background. During one of my visits to his office, we were conversing about the *misafir* status of the Syrian arrivals, and Jacob told me that if it became necessary, the Orthodox community would be willing to welcome their fellow Christians from Syria in the guesthouse that was attached to their church.[54] He added, "But we also need to ensure the safety of our own community. We cannot let just anybody in." Amid this conversation, Dima walked past his office toward her home and waved at him. He reciprocated, then turned to me to make the interruption relevant to our conversation: "You see her? She is also a *misafir* here for many years." When I asked him what he meant by that, he said, "Her roots are somewhere else."[55]

Having left their homes and lives in Syria under completely different circumstances, Dima and Salma certainly cannot be simply lumped in with the new Syrian refugees settling in Hatay, even those who shared their religions (respectively, Christianity and Judaism). Jacob's emphasis on "roots" while comparing these two groups as *misafir*s to me is nevertheless telling. In defining guesthood as "uprootedness," Jacob conflated past and present articulations of the difference of Syrian nationals in Antakya, built on

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the displacement, fragmentation, and minoritization of their communities in the making of national borders in the Middle East.[56] After all, the stories of Dima and Salma of becoming "Syrian" brides were not merely personal or familial, but were also shaped by the imposition of territorial borders between Turkey and Syria.

Their citizenship prior to marriage marked these women as "familial *misafir*s" and thus "intimate outsiders" within their own family circle, excluded in public discourse yet included in social life. As such, their experiences anticipated the ambivalent domain of hospitality that the recently displaced Syrians came to occupy (and challenged) in the eyes of Christian and Jewish peoples of Antakya.

SYRIANS AS BAD *MISAFIRS*

Dima's and Salma's guesthood was framed in this realm of proximate relatedness and was managed primarily by the communities they joined. This, however, was not the case for the first arrivals to Antakya from Syria after the conflict began in March 2011. As the question "Whose *misafir*s?" implied, the problem for people like Meryem was not so much the *misafir* status of the Syrian refugees, which in fact resonated with how Antakya residents have long been interacting with the Syrians in their own family circles. Rather, the problem was the unknown identity of these new *misafir*s and the well-known identity of their hosts. "If these Syrians were my *misafir*s in my home," Meryem continued during our conversation, "I would do everything on my part to make them feel welcome. But I would also know who they were, how long they would stay, and what they wanted from me. We don't know any of these—only the government does!"

Meryem's suppositional approach to hosting Syrians in her own home acknowledges how power operates in everyday hospitality with respect to time, mutual expectations of guest and host, and the ability to host and recognize the *misafir*'s identity. As *misafir*s of the Turkish state rather than of Antakya's local communities, the Syrian refugees not only were removed from these domains and networks of sociality, but also symbolized the official denial of host status to the region's existing religious minorities. A member of the Orthodox Community Foundation in Antakya put this problem into words: "We are one of the most rooted people, who have existed in these lands for centuries, but we have now become minorities. As the government welcomes all these people [Syrians] with an open-border policy, we have become like unwelcome *misafir*s in our own homes."[57]

Although invoked in the recent context of the Syrian conflict, guesthood here denotes a historical link between minoritization and dispossession, underlining the long-term marginalization of the Arab Christian community in Turkey. If not already deported through internationally sanctioned agreements (as in the postannexation exodus from Hatay[58]), communities labeled as "minorities" were recognized as citizens of the newly formed nations, yet their ethnic, religious, and linguistic difference from the "majority" marked them permanently as foreign to national history and as a threat to its sovereignty.[59] Being a *misafir* of the state, then, meant not only occupying an ambivalent position between insider and outsider, but also being the threat associated with that position.

The unexpected guesthood of Syrian refugees under the government's supervision only intensified such associations, tying these communities' past experiences of being at the peripheries of national citizenship to new forms of precarity related to the conflict

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across the border as well as to Turkish foreign policy in regard to Syria. For instance, long before Erdoğan's public statements on the matter, some of my interlocutors suspected that the Syrians would eventually be given citizenship and integrate easily into society as supporters of the government. Others drew parallels between the government's "excessive hospitality" toward Syrians—in the form of free healthcare, work permits, and education—and the resettling in Hatay of landless Sunni Turks from the Black Sea region in the 1960s and of Sunni Afghans in the 1980s. After all, since its annexation to Turkey in 1939, Hatay had witnessed systematic resettlement policies intended to increase the number of Turkish and Sunni inhabitants. According to my interlocutors, the first group of Syrians who crossed the border in 2011 comprised Turkish-speaking Sunni Syrians; they were followed by Sunni Arabs.

Adding to these parallels was the fear that the conflict across the border would spread to the Hatay region, which according to my interlocutors was a convenient base for opposition forces and a hub for smuggling weapons and rebel soldiers into Syria.[60] Referring to Erdoğan's statement, made shortly after the first Syrians' arrival, that events in Syria were for Turkey "a domestic issue" rather than an international affair,[61] Yeşim, an Antakya Jew in her thirties, remarked: "How can Syria be Turkey's domestic issue when its own citizens are not considered and treated as such?"[62] For people like Yeşim, the kind of *misafir*s Syrians were in the eyes of the state was directly related to the kind of *misafir*s they themselves had historically been, showing the contours of who it was that occupied the realm of the "domestic" and under what circumstances.

In this context, Antakya's non-Muslim residents once again strove to differentiate themselves from the Syrians and regain their status as hosts by contrasting their deep historical roots in Antakya with the guesthood of Syrians. This comparison involved references to everyday relations of hospitality and expressed anxiety over the possibility of the Syrians settling permanently and taking on the status of hosts, as evident in the following conversation:

Meryem: I heard that they're going to build prefabricated homes near my village for the Syrians. This means they won't go back. *They'll take over the homes of those who show them hospitality* [emphasis added]. I heard that recently some of these Syrians entered the garden of a man around my village, took his pomegranates from the tree, and threw them on the ground because they weren't ripe enough. . . . When the owner came and confronted them, these Syrians told him that they could do whatever they want and nobody could stop them. This isn't even about being a *misafir* any longer [*bunlar misafirliği geçti artık*]. If they didn't plan to stay and weren't backed by the state, they wouldn't do such things.

Selim [Meryem's neighbor from Harbiye, the Alawi district next to Salma's neighborhood]: If this happened in Harbiye, nobody would let them get away with that.

Meryem: Same in my village. But I think they didn't want to give the impression that we exclude the Syrians just because of a pomegranate.

A Christian store owner in the souk made a similar comment after repeating rumors that I had heard many times about the newly arrived Syrians going to restaurants in the city and not paying for the food with the excuse that they didn't like it. This rumor was reported as news in local and national newspapers after the number of Syrian *misafirs* in Hatay increased, with some versions of the story having the cook or restaurant owners

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being beaten by the customers.[63] This store owner's concluding comments about these rumors were remarkable: "They show no sign of gratitude. This is not how a *misafir* should behave!"

Although such incidents were prevalent in public discourse, none of my interlocutors actually witnessed or experienced any of them. Hence, the significance of their narration for my analysis lies in their indexical rather than referential function. In his study of Balgawi hospitality in Jordan, Andrew Shryock argues that bad hosts and bad guests in local historical accounts function as morality tales, registering "the ethical and political weight of the hospitality complex" and increasing the value of those who endure such encounters.[64] As made evident by the statements above, people in Antakya communicated their anxieties about the Syrian *misafir*s in a similar manner, expressing what good guests and hosts they themselves were in contrast to the Syrians. On the one hand, Syrians were identified as bad *misafir*s who refused to accept the proper role of guest, showed no respect, became parasitic, and even went so far as to claim the power and rights of their hosts.[65] On the other hand, even having bad guests did not automatically justify showing bad hospitality (at least in the way people talked about such incidents). Giving the impression of being bad hosts could damage one's reputation and in that sense was no less dangerous than the bad guests who violated the rules of hospitality.

The moral weight of being a host and the dangers of unknown guests, however, are both inflected by the state-created conditions of ethnoreligious difference. What made Syrians unwanted guests for Antakya's non-Muslim communities was not simply their alterity but the confirmation, through their guesthood, of the Turkish state's authority as the ultimate host. People held what they considered to be the state's excessive hospitality as responsible for the threat of intrusion that they faced. They believed, as Meryem put it, that "Syrians wouldn't do such things if they weren't backed by the state." And the backing of the Syrians by the state was yet another indicator for them of how they themselves were understood as the *misafirs* of Turkey rather than as a "domestic issue."

Although for different reasons, the state hospitality continued to pose a problem even after the Syrians came to live among these groups. Consider the following statement by Ferit on the Hatay Governorship's attempt to regulate his church's interaction with Syrian refugees:

> The state wants to be the only host [*ev sahibi*; lit. "homeowner"]. But Christians here [in Hatay] do not need the state to be hospitable toward Syrians. We've welcomed Syrians, opened our doors, and rented our houses even though some of us did not receive rent for months. We gave them jobs despite the news about Syrians stabbing their employers. We didn't do these things because the state asked us to do them. We did them because they were what being good hosts, being good Christians, requires us to do.[66]

In this statement, Ferit reclaimed the "host" status from the state on behalf of his Christian community. Yet he didn't introduce the possibility of a similar change in status for the Syrians whom he described as perpetual *misafir*s, lacking the resources to reciprocate as hosts and often showing signs of ungratefulness as guests. By contrast, his wife Yasemin alluded to the possibility of future communal incorporation while addressing this problem of reciprocity in the context of the mundane practices of hosting and visiting. During our interview, she told me of a Syrian woman whom she had met at her church and saw afterwards at a few *gün* gatherings, which were held as a part of

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the larger visitation network composed of Christian women. When I asked her if this woman became a regular member of the network, Yasemin responded: "She needs to be a bit more settled down for that to happen. I know the rental place she currently lives in. It is the basement unit of the house owned by our church's priest's relative. Not really appropriate for having people over. I am sure she prefers this arrangement to the shame of being an inadequate host."[67]

While the label "the Syrian" continued to mark difference in these statements, it is clear that this difference was no longer circumscribed by the state categorizations of the *misafir.* It was religious proximity, shared language, and socioeconomic conditions rather than bounded citizenship that determined the conditions of and changes for reciprocity in the host–guest relations. Ferit's problem with state involvement was also framed in these terms. The political significance of the *misafir* resided not in state action but in its everyday connotations as a moral, emotional, and intimate realm of relatedness, within which the Syrians—albeit not yet the host—could also potentially inhabit the positions of tenant, client, or employee irrespective of their ethnoreligious affiliations.

CONCLUSION

Displacement has been integral to the processes of state-building in the Middle East and continues to shape the regional and national governance of difference in the Middle Eastern borderlands.[68] The case of Syrian refugees over the last five years is no exception to this history and raises further questions about how these refugees were perceived by the region's formerly displaced minorities. In this article, I have explored this question from the vantage point of the Arabic-speaking Jewish and Christian communities in Antakya, Hatay, a contested border province that has been defined by its difference from the rest of the Turkish nation-state in its ethnic and religious identity and that has been both a migration source and a host to displaced populations for that very reason.

My engagement with the local responses to the Syrian refugees in Hatay has revolved around the figure of the *misafir,* a term that refers to several positionalities depending on the interactional and historical context in which it is invoked. In particular, I have compared the guesthoods of Syrian refugees, Syrian family members, and Antakya's non-Muslim communities against the backdrop of the entangled histories of their minoritization and displacement. Through an interpretative analysis of the links and tensions among these different frameworks, I have shown that local perceptions of Syrians' *misafir* status are anchored in actual, lived practices and meanings, and in particular histories.

Characterized by interrelated codes of reciprocity, recognition, intimacy, and hostility, everyday hospitality provides a familiar language for the Turkish state to deploy in framing its relationship to citizens, minorities, and noncitizens. Yet given that the positions of guest and host evade being overdetermined by or fixated on a particular identity and are often subject to constant negotiation, they cannot be easily molded to serve the interests of one particular polity, including the state. As depicted by my interlocutors' comments regarding Syrian *misafir*s, the link between the actual *misafir*s in Antakya and *misafir* as a metaphor that stands for collective entities must be constantly (re)created and managed in discourse and in practice. The valorization of being host in perceptions and representations of the self is an indicator of the struggle that comes out of this need and contrasts with the constant exchange of positions between guest and

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host on the ground. When one cannot exchange positions and inhabit the host status (as expressed through Meryem's question "Whose *misafir*s?"), the link between hospitality and hostility becomes most apparent.

Scholars have examined the relationship between actual and metaphorical relations of hospitality as a matter of scale. Derrida, for instance, holds that "the right to hospitality" transcends the individual and "commits a household, a line of descent, a family, a familial or ethnic group receiving a familial or ethnic group."[69] Dan Rabinowitz has highlighted the projection of localized acts of hospitality in homes and busses onto national contests over spatial sovereignty in Nazareth.[70] Shryock has described as "the scalar elasticity of hospitality" the expanding scale at which popular symbols of Bedouin hospitality are displaced in Jordan.[71] Calling the "stranger" a "shifter," Michael Herzfeld has addressed an "essential homology between several levels of collective identity—village, ethnic group, district, nation," and argued that "what goes for the family home also goes, at least by metaphorical extension, for the national territory."[72] Against these analyses, Matei Candea has suggested, in his study of Corsican hospitality, that a scalar elasticity is possible only by viewing hosts and guests as detached from the specifics of time and place.[73] Rosello has similarly criticized extending the logic of hospitality to debates around immigration (as in Derridean formulations), noting that "the vision of the immigrant as a guest is a metaphor that has forgotten that it is a metaphor."[74]

These cautions deserve attention especially for identifying how the extension of hospitality beyond the space of the home always comes with "the disarticulation of a complex, morally binding relationship between host and guest."[75] In Antakya, this disarticulation appears as a problem of reciprocity that is exacerbated by the intervention of the Turkish state (and its ascribed categorizations of identity) in the language of hospitality. The literal-to-figurative movement of the metaphor of *misafir* is not simply a rhetorical state act but a shift that is also primarily a part of ordinary people's ordinary language, thought, and action. People are aware of the political asymmetry involved in the separation of host from guests and of the everyday configurations of this separation in both house politics and state power. They address it and make use of it as they can when they see fit. The Syrian as an internal *misafir* within Antakya's religious communities is certainly not identical to the Syrian as the *misafir* of the Turkish state. Host–guest relations in each case imply a different degree of intimacy and proximity as well as a different form of involvement by the Turkish state. Yet it is through this very difference that the Arabic-speaking communities of Antakya are able to recognize the temporal and ethical limitations of their own residence, difference, and citizenship in Turkey.

NOTES

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[1]All the names of research participants mentioned in this article are pseudonyms and all translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[2]Located at the northeast corner of the Mediterranean Sea, Hatay was annexed from French Mandate Syria in 1939 and constitutes Turkey's southwest border with Syria.

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[3]The smuggling of cheap Syrian goods such as gas, cigarettes, and coffee, which was fairly commonplace at the time, represents one of the myriad modes of human connection in the cross-border area prior to the Syrian conflict.

[4]Zeynep Erdim, "Hatay'ın İstenmeyen 'Misafir'leri," *Bianet-Bağımsız İletişim Ağı*, 7 March 2011, accessed 9 April 2016, http://www.bianet.org/bianet/goc/131203-hatay-in-istenmeyen-misafir-leri; Şenay Özden, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey," MPC Research Report, European University Institute and Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, Florence, 2013; Deniz Zeyrek, "Hatay'lılara Misafir Uyarısı," *Radikal*, 27 August 2011.

[5]"Davutoğlu: Suriyelileri Misafir Olarak Görüyoruz," *Milliyet*, 24 June 2011.

[6]"Suriye'deki Olaylar -Hatay'da 252 Suriye'li Misafir Ediliyor," *Hatay Gazetesi*, 3 May 2011.

[7]Currently, Erdoğan is the president of Turkey.

[8]"Non-European" asylum seekers in Antakya are held in a foreigner removal center tied to the Turkish Police Department, which at the time of my fieldwork held people from Burma, Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan, but no one from Syria.

[9]Kristen Sarah Biehl, "Governing through Uncertainty: Experiences of Being a Refugee in Turkey as a Country for Temporary Asylum," *Social Analysis* 59 (2015): 65.

[10]Oktay Durukan, "Asylum Information Database (AIDA) Country Report: Turkey," European Council of Refugees and Exiles, Brussels, 2015, 15–16. A current exception to this arrangement is a small number of cases in which UNHCR Turkey processes the resettlement of Syrian refugees for protection reasons. Ibid., 105.

[11]For the treatment of Syrians until 2014, the Turkish authorities extended the 1994 Asylum Directive that considered situations of "mass influx" outside the regular international protection procedure. Kemal Kirişci, "Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality," Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 2014, 14.

[12]Durukan, "AIDA Report: Turkey," 9, 104–5.

[13]In contrast to the Ottoman Empire, which granted asylum to a wide range of non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities, Turkey to this day has publicly emphasized Turkish language and ethnic affiliation in its immigration policies and, despite its silence in respect to religion, has preferred immigrants with Sunni and Hanefi backgrounds. See Kemal Kirişci, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (2000): 3; and Ayşe Parla, "Irregular Workers or Ethnic Kin? Post-1990s Labour Migration from Bulgaria to Turkey," *International Migration* 45 (2007): 157–81. This ideology was also reflected in Turkey's refugee policies until 2011, when only forty-three refugees of Muslim background were accepted from Greece, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Serbia-Montenegro, and Albania; Mehmet Foca, "Turkey Sticks to 'Limited' Application of the Geneva Convention," *Bianet-Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi*, 2011, accessed 10 October 2016, http://www.bianet.org/english/world/131856-turkey-sticks-to-limited-application-of-the-geneva-convention.

[14]In 1988 Iraqi Kurds fleeing the Halabja massacre were housed as "guests" in southeastern Turkey without any formal protection; Kirişci, "Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges," 7. Furthermore, immigration detention centers in Turkey were called "foreigners' guesthouses" (*yabancılar misafirhanesi*) until the Ministry of Interior renamed them "removal centers" (*geri gönderme merkezleri*) in 2011 due to the pressure of international humanitarian organizations; Rachel Levitan, Esra Kaytaz, and Oktay Durukan, "Unwelcome Guests: The Detention of Refugees in Turkey's 'Foreigners' Guesthouses,'" *Refuge* 26 (2009): 77–91.

[15]Feyzi Baban, Suzan Ilcan, and Kim Rygiel, "The Syrian Refugee Crisis: The EU–Turkey 'Deal' and Temporary Protection," *Global Social Policy* 16 (2017); "Erdoğan Offers Citizenship to Syrian and Iraqi Refugees," *Aljazeera*, 7 January 2017, accessed 13 June 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/erdogan-offers-citizenship-syrian-iraqi-refugees-170106195134961.html.

[16]Andrew Shryock, "Breaking Hospitality Apart: Bad Hosts, Bad Guests, and the Problem of Sovereignty," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 18 (2012): S20–S33.

[17]As such, *misafir* differs also from *muhacir* (Arab. *muhājir*), a term that has been used in different Muslim-majority contexts to describe emigrants of Muslim background, connoting the *hijra* (migration) of Prophet Muhammad and his followers to Madina.

[18]Safia (retired teacher), interview with the author, Leban Café, Antakya, Turkey, June 2011.

[19]In March 2015 Turkey closed its official border-crossing points with Syria to Syrian refugees, decelerating the sudden demographic fluctuations in the region. According to DGMM statistics and my contacts in humanitarian aid organizations in Antakya, as of March 2017 Hatay is among the five provinces with the largest Syrian population in Turkey, with 20,000 refugees registered in five camps and an estimated 400,000 residing in its towns and villages; UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, 2017, accessed 27 May 2017,

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http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224. The statistics provided here for Antakya are not definite but draw on household numbers (16,000 multiplied by 5.2—the estimated average of individuals in a given Syrian household) available to these organizations through the *muhtar*s (the village/neighborhood representatives) with whom Syrian newcomers must register to access public services within Turkey.

[20]In response to my question about the significantly lower rate that he received for doing the same job as locals, the Syrian construction worker Ahmad remarked, "Of course [Antakyans] are paid better. They are permanents. We are only *misafir*s."

[21]Şule Can, "The Syrian Civil War, Sectarianism and Political Change at the Turkish–Syrian Border," *Social Anthropology* 25 (2017): 174–89. On Hatay's Alawis, see also Jens Kreinath, "Virtual Encounters with Hizir and Other Muslim Saints: Dreaming and Healing at Local Pilgrimage Sites in Hatay," *Anthropology of the Contemporary Middle East and Central Asia* 2 (2014): 25–66.

[22]Compare, for instance, the accounts analyzed below with the remarks of a Sunni interlocutor in 2016: "We do not want Syrians here. Yes, their situation is very sad, and I hope God never puts anyone through this. But the state should support them in the camps away from the towns. I do not want Syrians inside my community or before my eyes, speaking Arabic and all."

[23]In *Learning How to Ask* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Charles Briggs describes the "social situation" of an interview as encompassing the social roles and interactional goals between researcher and respondent, along with the content and form of the transmitted message.

[24]For example, Şeyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 26.

[25]Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).

[26]Shahram Khosravi, *"Illegal" Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 126.

[27]Derrida, *Of Hospitality,* 45.

[28]For law, see Khosravi, *"Illegal" Traveller*; and Sarah Willen, "Toward a Critical Phenomenology of 'Illegality': State Power, Criminalization, and Abjectivity among Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel Aviv, Israel," *International Migration* 45 (2007): 8–38. For spatial containment, see Nicholas De Genova, *Working the Boundaries: Race, Space, and "Illegality" in Mexican Chicago* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005); and Liisa Malkki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). For regulation of time, see Ruben Andersson, "Time and the Migrant Other: European Border Controls and the Temporal Economics of Illegality," *American Anthropologist* 116 (2014): 795–809; and Melanie Griffiths, "Out of Time: The Temporal Uncertainties of Refused Asylum Seekers and Immigration Detainees," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40 (2014): 1991–2009. For uncertainty, see Biehl, "Governing through Uncertainty." For dispossession, see Dawn Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For border security, see Didier Fassin, "Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries: The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40 (2011): 213–26.

[29]Michael Herzfeld, "'As in Your Own House': Hospitality, Ethnography, and the Stereotype of Mediterranean Society," in *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean* (Special Publication No. 22), ed. D.D. Gilmore (Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1987), 75–89; Julian Pitt-Rivers, *The Fate of Shechem: Or, The Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Dan Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth: The Ethnography of Exclusion in Galilee* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Andrew Shryock, "The New Jordanian Hospitality: House, Host, and Guest in the Culture of Public Display," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46 (2004): 35–62.

[30]Gabriele Vom Bruck, "A House Turned Inside Out: Inhabiting Space in a Yemeni City," *Journal of Material Culture* 2 (1997): 139–72.

[31]Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth.*

[32]Anne Meneley, *Tournaments of Value: Sociability and Hierarchy in a Yemeni Town* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).

[33]Andrew Shryock, "Hospitality Lessons: Learning the Shared Language of Derrida and the Balga Bedouin," *Paragraph* 32 (2009): 32–50.

[34]Barbara Aswad, "Visiting Patterns among Women of the Elite in a Small Turkish City," *Anthropological Quarterly* 47 (1974): 9–27.

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[35]Christa Salamandra, *A New Old Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 58.

[36]Mireille Rosello, *Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001); Katerina Rozakou, "The Biopolitics of Hospitality in Greece: Humanitarianism and the Management of Refugees," *American Ethnologist* 39 (2012): 562–77.

[37]For a recent exception, see Tahir Zaman, *Islamic Traditions of Refuge in the Crises of Iraq and Syria* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

[38]Avedis K. Sanjian, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish–Syrian Relations (1939–1956)," *Middle East Journal* 10 (1956): 379–94.

[39]Fulya Doğruel and Johan Leman, "'Conduct' and 'Counter-Conduct' on the Southern Border of Turkey: Multicultural Antakya," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45 (2009): 595.

[40]Pierre Bazantay, *La pénétration de penseignement dans le sandjak autonome d'Alexandrette* (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1935).

[41]Sarah Shields, *Fezzes in the River: Identity Politics and European Diplomacy in the Middle East on the Eve of World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19.

[42]Robert Satloff, "Prelude to Conflict: Communal Interdependence in the Sanjak of Alexandretta 1920-1936," *Middle Eastern Studies* 22 (1986): 147.

[43]Sanjian, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay)," 39. According to the Turkish History Thesis, which was influential in nation-building projects of the 1930s, Hittites were among the Turkic tribes who migrated from Central Asia to Anatolia. Renaming the sanjak as Hatay was an attempt to stress the Turkic origins of the region and to insert Turkish culture into the chain of historical continuity constructed among European, Anatolian, and Mesopotamian civilizations.

[44]Saba Mahmood, *Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015).

[45]Shields, *Fezzes in the River*.

[46]Roberta Micallef, "Hatay Joins the Motherland," in *State Frontiers: Borders and Boundaries in the Middle East*, ed. Inga Brandell (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 141.

[47]Inga Brandell, *State Frontiers: Borders and Boundaries in the Middle East* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006).

[48]Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*; Lerna Ekmekcioğlu, *Recovering Armenia: The Limits of Belonging in Post-Genocide Turkey* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2016); Patrick Finney, "'An Evil for All Concerned': Great Britain and Minority Protection after 1919," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30 (1995): 533–51; Fatma Muge Gocek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Mahmood, *Religious Difference in a Secular Age*; Mark Mazower, "Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe," *Daedalus* 126 (1997): 47–63.

[49]Vakıflı, the only Armenian village that chose to stay, is today Turkey's only remaining ethnic Armenian village and is located in the mountains of Samandağ thirty kilometers west of Antakya. One of the two Syrian nationals whom I met in Vakıflı in 2016 was of Armenian origin. He described his escape to Samandağ over the sea behind Mount Kılıç as the reversal of the route his ancestors took to escape the genocide.

[50]Berna Pekesen, "The Exodus of Armenians from the Sanjak of Alexandratta in the 1930s," in *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities*, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 63.

[51]There is no publicly available data on the number of these populations. My estimates are based on my interviews with the heads of the Jewish and Orthodox Foundations as well as informal conversations with members of these communities.

[52]Martin Stokes, "Imagining 'the South': Hybridity, Heterotopias and Arabesk on the Turkish–Syrian Border," in *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*, ed. Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 263–303.

[53]What Salma referred to is the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, at which the United States pressured Syria to ease restrictions on its Jewish population. Thousands of Syrian Jews from Damascus and Aleppo were thereafter granted exit permits on condition that they emigrate, though not to Israel. See Neil Quilliam, *Syria and the New World Order* (Berkshire: Garnet & Ithaca Press, 1999).

[54]In the following years, the guesthouses of Orthodox, Catholic, and evangelical churches in Hatay were indeed used to accommodate displaced Syrians who were mostly but not exclusively of Christian origin.

[55]Jacob (tourism agent), discussion with the author, respondent's office, June 2017.

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[56]For an extensive discussion on how ideas of "roots" played out in the Middle East, see Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 23–26.

[57]Sinan, interview with the author, Affan Kahvesi, Antaka, Turkey, July 2011.

[58]For example, Lerna Ekmekcioğlu, "Republic of Paradox: The League of Nations, Minority Protection Regime and the New Turkey's Step-Citizens," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 46 (2014): 657–79; Finney, "'An Evil for All Concerned'"; Mazower, "Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe"; and Eric D. Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions," *The American Historical Review* 113 (2008): 1313–43.

[59]Marc Baer, *The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular Turks* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010); Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East,* 27; Mahmood, *Religious Difference in a Secular Age*; Leyla Neyzi, "Fragmented in Space: The Oral History Narrative of an Arab Christian from Antioch, Turkey," *Global Networks* 4 (2004): 285–97.

[60]Confirming such concerns, in 2013 Hatay's Reyhanlı district near the border became the site of a terrorist attack in which two car bombs killed more than fifty people. Turkey blamed the Syrian regime for the attacks, while the Syrian regime blamed the opposition forces that it alleges are backed by Turkey. My interlocutors in Antakya believed the latter explanation. In 2014, the national newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, published evidence for the involvement of the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey in arms deliveries to the Syrian rebels, leading to the arrest of its two editors. Can, "The Syrian Civil War," 179.

[61]Yusuf Kanli, "Syria as Turkey's Domestic Issue," *Hurriyet Daily News*, 15 May 2011.

[62]Yeşim, interview with the author, respondent's home, Antakya, Turkey, June 2011.

[63]Kenan Butakin, "'Karanlık' Misafirler!: Hatay'da Neler Oluyor? Kim Bunlar?," *Vatan Gazetesi*, 24 August 2012; Omer Sahin, "Hatay 'Huzursuz' Ama 'Insanlik' Ayakta," *Radikal Gazetesi*, 30 August 2012.

[64]Shryock, "Breaking Hospitality Apart," S27.

[65]For other anthropological accounts of parasitic guests, see Giovanni Da Col, "The Poisoner and the Parasite: Cosmoeconomics, Fear, and Hospitality among Dechen Tibetans," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 18 (2012): S175–S195; Grégory Delaplace, "Parasitic Chinese, Vengeful Russians: Ghosts, Strangers, and Reciprocity in Mongolia," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 18 (2012): S131–S144; and Annh Kelly, "The Experimental Hut: Hosting Vectors," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 18 (2012): S145–S160. Whereas Delaplace examines Mongolian stories of haunting by ghosts, which portray Chinese people as parasites who refuse to reciprocate, Col and Kelly approach the figure of the parasite more in terms of the anxieties created by the relationships between human and nonhuman beings in, respectively, Dechen Tibetan and Tanzanian hospitalities.

[66]Ferit (farmer), interview with the author, respondent's home, Antakya, Turkey, June 2016.

[67]Yasmin (housewife), interview with the author, respondent's home, Antakya, Turkey, June 2016.

[68]Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*.

[69]Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, 23.

[70]Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth.*

[71]Shryock, "Breaking Hospitality Apart," S23.

[72]Herzfeld, "'As in Your Own House,'" 76, cited in Matei Candea, "Derrida En Corse? Hospitality as Scale-Free Abstraction," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 18 (2012): S34–S48, S43.

[73]Candea, "Derrida En Corse?."

[74]Rosello, *Postcolonial Hospitality*, 13, cited in "Derrida En Corse?," S43. See also Andrew Shryock, "Thinking about Hospitality, with Derrida, Kant and the Balga Bedouin," *Anthropos* 103 (2008): 405–21.

[75]Shryock, "The New Jordanian Hospitality," 57.

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