Was Leibniz an Idealist?

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> '... to construct a theory is, in its more developed and sophisticated form, to postulate a domain of entities which behave in certain ways set down by the fundamental principles of the theory, and to correlate—perhaps, in a certain sense to identify—complexes of these theoretical entities with certain non-theoretical objects or situations, that is to say, with objects or situations which are either matters of observable fact or in principle at least, describable in observational terms. This "correlation" or "identification" of theoretical with observational states of affairs is a tentative one "until further notice,"...'
>
> Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, p. 94f.

I

In the study of Leibniz's philosophy, at least since the later nineteenth century, there has developed a consensus and an orthodoxy as to the fundamental character of his mature metaphysical views, the position he had come to by the mid-1690's, and held to thereafter.[1] Complex and multi-layered as Leibniz's system is agreed to be, it comprises in the end a deep division between appearance and reality, and the reality, in Leibniz's system, is a set of compossible minds or mind-like items and their representational states; and nothing else. So Leibniz has for some time been standardly read. This interpretive view is locatable early in modern historiographi-

[1] The first full articulation of Leibniz's 'mature' philosophy may be seen in the 'New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and of the Union which Exists between the Soul and the Body', published in the *Journal des Savants* 27 June and 4 July 1695 (with four alternative drafts of the same period, which also have survived, and some of which were shown to some of Leibniz's correspondents). See *Leibniz's 'New System' and Associated Contemporary Texts*, trans. and ed. by R. S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). Subsequent writing enlarges on this work, sometimes modifying particular details, the whole achieving succinct epitome and its most famous exposition in *The Monadology* (1714). The most developed formulation of Leibniz's earlier metaphysical views, from which there is in any case important but not extreme departure or revision in the mature work, is the *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686).

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cal scholarship, and is expressed regularly to the present day. Thus, we find Friedrich Ueberweg, characterizing Leibniz's mature philosophy: 'There exists nothing besides monads and phenomena, which are perceptions in monads. All extension belongs only to the phenomenal; matter, with its continuous extension, exists only in the confused apprehension of the senses. This matter is merely a "well-founded phenomenon" (*phenomenon bene fundatum*), "a regulated and an exact phenomenon, which does not deceive him who is careful to observe the abstract rules of the reason."'[2] This interpretive position continues at the centre of serious creative accounts of Leibniz's work. Thus, for example, a prominent very recent study of Leibniz's philosophy, by R. M. Adams, is titled, emphatically, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist*.[3] And, although he is an important voice for moving to some degree of modification or complication in the Leibnizian picture, Stuart Brown likewise gives expression to the classic view in his characterization of Leibniz's position in the period subsequent to the *Discourse on Metaphysics*: 'The word "external" is a spatial one and the denial of space as an objective thing outside phenomena means that belief in an "external" world needs, in strict metaphysics, to be articulated in a way that avoids the objectionable implications of the word "external" … [H]is later modifications led him to deny that his substances are strictly in space at all. The universe must accordingly be reduced to the sum total of the substances comprising it and its unity to the interconnection between their phenomena.'[4] Although only some interpreters put it as baldly, and straightforwardly as this, this now-orthodox reading of the mature Leibniz in fact identifies him, it should be clear, as an idealist.[5]

[2] Friedrich Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy* (trans. from the fourth German edition by G. S. Morris), vol. II (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1874), p. 111.

[3] New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

[4] Stuart Brown *Leibniz* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984), pp. 148f.

[5] Some interpreters have, to be sure, seen an idealist philosophy as emerging (or fully emerging) in Leibniz only in and after 1704, the cast of his system between 1686 and 1704 being held by these scholars to be Aristotelian rather than idealist. See, for example, C. D. Broad, *Leibniz: An Introduction*, (Cambridge, 1975), p. 87; Daniel Garber, 'Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years', in K. Okruhlik and J. R. Brown, eds., *The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz* (Dordrecht 1985), pp. 27–130; N. Jolley, 'Leibniz: Truth, Knowledge and Metaphysics', in G. H. R. Parkinson, ed., *The Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Rationalism* (London, 1993), p. 396. More orthodox critics will have none of it. G. H. R. Parkinson ('Substantial forms in the "Système nouveau" and related works', in R. S. Woolhouse, ed., *Leibniz's 'New System' (1695)* (Firenze:

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It would be altogether mistaken to infer that consensus and orthodoxy mean complete unanimity in interpretation.[6] Surprisingly many interpreters of Leibniz skirt direct confrontation with whether his system is (at any stage) idealist, preferring, it seems, to compartmentalize his work into distinct topics and problems which are then themselves adumbrated wholly from within his own perspective, and terminology. And at least one interpreter—Catherine Wilson[7]—sees an indecisive and inconsistent Leibniz, drawn not only in successive stages of his philosophical development but within a single phase by incompatible principles and commitments, some of which he does succeed in seeing as doubtfully admitting combination, and others not. Thus, for Wilson Leibniz is drawn early in his career both to phenomenalism—i.e., idealism—and also to the Aristotelian conviction that (God's excepted) there are no minds without bodies (which conviction he 'Neo-platonizes'—so to speak—by adding that there are no bodies without minds). These views operate then as interwoven strands in his thinking throughout his subsequent work, with Leibniz, when he finds or feels himself forced to choose (as in some of his correspondence, in particular, he does[8]), preferring his idealist to his Aristotelian commitments. The result, for Wilson, is many problems never solved, many, indeed, never genuinely confronted; and certainly no finished systemic edifice, least of all in *The Monadology*. Nonetheless, for Wilson as for the preponderant body of Leibniz's interpreters, the primary metaphysical note in the last decades of his life—especially towards its end—is idealist. 'Under pressure from des Bosses, Leibniz finally realized, in the last years of his life, that for the sake of logical coherence he would have to choose definitely between monads and corporeal substance. He did not hesitate. Either there are corporeal substances or there are only monads, he agreed, "but I should prefer to say that there are no substances over and above monads, but only appearances."'[9]

[6] A useful survey of general trends of Leibnizian metaphysical interpretation, with special focus on the idealism/realism theme, may be found in Chapter One of Allison P. Coudert, *Leibniz and the Kabbalah* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995).

[7] Catherine Wilson, *Leibniz's Metaphysics* (Princeton University Press, 1989).

[8] Especially, for Wilson (p. 192), the correspondence with des Bosses.

[9] *Leibniz's Metaphysics*, p. 192.

Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1996), p. 125 and R. M. Adams *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Chs 11–13 are sure that Leibniz's commitment to idealism is entire and complete from at least the 1690s.

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The aim of the present paper is not to overthrow but to contribute to problematizing or complicating this orthodoxy, and to argue that there is a case for thinking that Leibniz's system, even in its latest articulations, affirms the reality (and not merely the appearance) of moving extended bodies in space, hence that the system is not idealist.[10] I want further to discuss metaphilosophical issues that idealism in Leibniz, such as it is, poses, and which has implications for other metaphysical systems and views than just his.

II

Formally, philosophical idealism is the metaphysical thesis that everything real is an immaterial thinking substance or a nonphysical thinking state (presumably of an immaterial thinking substance) or a nonphysical dependent entity only real as an object of a thinking nonphysical state (sense data, for example, in some subjectivist versions of sense data theory; or universals, for certain conceptualist positions on the problem of universals).

Formality duly noted, there are complexities in or for idealism, posed by just what is meant by mind, and thought. Leibniz's conception of a monad, as it is set out in *The Monadology*, identifies

[10] Other interpreters of Leibniz have in recent years challenged the 'orthodox' or idealist view, among them Stuart Brown and Pauline Phemister. Phemister's paper 'Leibniz and the Elements of Compound Bodies' (*British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, forthcoming (1998)) is a particularly thorough and well-reasoned attempt to argue for an Aristotelian Leibniz, for whom animals and animal bodies are systematically to be distinguished, the former substances (each with a prevailing soul or soul-like entelechy), the latter not. Phemister also takes seriously, and literally, the neo-Platonism of *Monadology* 63–70 (and elsewhere), according to which each material body contains animals within it, at each successive stage of subdivision. This does definitely seem a prominent and central theme in Leibniz's later philosophy, and reflected in Leibniz's repeated praise of Anne Conway (who had had a similar view) and other neo-Platonists. At the same time this conception is difficult to map onto appearances, in the way that both the standard idealist, and some other non-idealist interpretations seem able to do. At any rate, one should certainly distinguish the case for a non-idealist metaphysic in Leibniz from coming to determinate conclusions about precisely what the details of the non-idealism he might have espoused would be. Phemister provides an extremely powerful case for the first, and a highly suggestive proposal for the second. *All* interpretations, idealist and non-idealist alike, face the tribunal of apparently contrary texts in Leibniz that must be explained or explained away.

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them as a class of which minds, or souls, in what is supposed to be a familiar and common-sensical sense, are just a proper subclass. The *other* monads—the monads that aren't minds, or souls—are mind- (or soul-) *like*. They are aspatial, without extension, in some absolute sense simple, and they all have states which are or may be regarded as *representational*. They all have what Leibniz calls *perceptions* (as opposed to the *apperceptions* which soul monads have). The Leibnizian texts seem to make it clear that no mere *analogy* is meant. Rather, there is a really existing kind (he does not, but we might call it a natural kind), whose varieties comprise a continuum from clearer, better-organized, more conscious instances to ones that are dim, confused, ill-organized, and wholly unconscious. They are all substances—in fact, for Leibniz (at least on standard interpretations), the only true substances—and of a single fundamental *type*.

It is important to be clear, and explicit, about what the idealist interpretation of Leibniz's metaphysics implies. If this interpretation is correct, then, according to Leibniz there literally are no physical objects, matter, space, extension, or motion. It is as though there were such things. There are apparent physical objects, matter, space, and motion. *Something* in reality is experienced—more accurately, it is as though something in reality is experienced—as physical, extended, and moving in space. There really *are* things-in-themselves, even though (as the 'windowlessness' of the monads will imply) no one has actual perceptual or other contact with them, and these things correspond to or are counterparts of physical objects moving in space (and time) we think we experience. But these actual things are all minds or mind-like, or (nonspatial) aggregates of them. And these apparent realities that we do experience will contrast with mere illusions, hallucinations, and groundless appearances. None the less, this view will imply that in Leibniz's scheme of things nothing in fact moves, nothing is a physical part of anything else, nothing is adjacent to or at any distance from anything else, nothing has or is a body. This would *not* be a view according to which the real or actual character of matter, extension, space, or motion is different, even radically different, from what common sense, or scientists' (or other theorists') theories, say it is—like claims that real physical space is, say, Riemannian, not Euclidean, or that real physical objects are actually series of events, not (even briefly) stable substances. It would be a view according to which there are no such things as matter, extension, space, or motion to be conceived differentially and with one degree or other of accuracy. All such items will be *phenomena*: *appearances* merely. Minds' apprehensions of them will be *of* them as well-ordered, and

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as having characters that can be accurately or inaccurately described, just as there can be errors as to what someone's dream-content was as well as getting the latter right.

The 'orthodox' view may instructively be compared with Locke's view of the secondary qualities of physical objects.[11] Students repeatedly and their teachers occasionally put the latter view in a way that isn't literally accurate, saying that Locke thinks secondary qualities merely subjective, or that secondary qualities include colour, taste, sound, and temperature. The actual view is that secondary qualities are entirely objective, and in physical objects, and do not include colour, taste, sound, or temperature. Rather, the secondary qualities are powers physical objects (or their primary qualities) have to produce sensations or perceptions of colour, taste, etc., in our and like minds. Nothing, for Locke, actually has colour, taste, sound, or temperature. Some things seem to or are experienced as having these features, due to the operations of certain qualities (the secondary qualities) on our minds, with what might be called receptivity features of our minds. So, for Locke, colour is a *phenomenon bene fundatum*, which does not resemble its actual or objective counterpart.

Similarly for Leibniz (in the orthodox view) physical objects—and their extension and motion—are *phenomena bene fundata*, with the important difference that minds do not make objective contact with anything outside themselves. There nonetheless correspond to—some of—their objects real items of the world. In no case however is the real item a physical object, extended, in time or space, or in motion. These last features are all *like* colour, taste, sound, etc. The real item, counterpart to the experienced extended spatio-temporal motile physical item, is actually a monad (i.e., a thing of the same ontic type or category as the *experiencer* is), or, possibly, an aggregate of monads.

III

The currently prevailing idea is that in interpreting Leibniz it is critical invariably to distinguish what he sees as well-founded but not literally accurate accounts of reality from those that are strictly literal, and structures of appearance from the precise truth they approximate; distinctions, that is to say, that have application both to the word and to the world sides of things. So armed, Leibnizian pronouncements cannot always be taken on their face, or in isolation from their contribution to the exposition of the system as a whole.

[11] A version of which Leibniz himself shared.

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In its entirety, as already affirmed, the system, as standardly now understood, conceives reality as a hierarchy of minds across a wide continuum from God to finite intelligences to 'the beasts' to lesser living beings, to inanimate nonliving things, each individual in the span a mind or sort of mind, and reality exhausted by the representational states (a so-called complete defining notion) that each has in a compossible conjunction, or relational states between the compossibles.

Whether Leibniz does come to literally idealist metaphysical conclusions, it will be clear that to the degree and in whatever way he may do so, they are not conclusions that are prompted by or imbued with what may be called the 'spirit' of idealism. That is, unlike Berkeley, and the several varieties of post-Kantian idealists (including many contemporary postmodernists), Leibniz has not come to a supposed insight that reality is saturated with thought, is mental through and through, or unintelligible save as filtered or apprehended in thought. If he is an idealist, Leibniz is not an idealist out of Berkeleyan or cognate pan-mentalist motivations. If idealism in the deepest or most genuine sense is imbued with this spirit, or should so be regarded, Leibniz is not an idealist. Rather, if he is an idealist, Leibniz is so out of what may be called Occamist spirit and for Occamist reasons. He will believe all substances minds-of-a-sort and all states of substances mental states-of-a-sort because it will unify reality so to think.

A brief passage from 'A New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances, and of the Union of the Soul and Body' (1695) will illustrate this last idea, and set out some interplay between a number of the themes I have identified. This essay of Leibniz's was published anonymously in the *Journal des Savants*, and constituted, as Ariew and Garber, Leibniz's editors and translators, remark, 'the first public statement of his philosophy'[12].

Repudiating both what Leibniz calls 'the yoke of Aristotle' and atomist materialism, Leibniz says that he 'perceived that it is impossible to find *the principles of a true unity* in matter alone, or in what is only passive …' He goes on to relate that 'in order to find these *real entities* I was forced to have recourse to a formal atom, since a material thing cannot be both material and, at the same time, perfectly indivisible, that is, endowed with a true unity. Hence, it was necessary to restore, and as it were, to rehabilitate the *substantial forms* which are in such disrepute today, but in a way which would render them intelligible, and separate the use one should

[12] G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, ed. and trans. by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 138.

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make of them from the abuse that has been made of them. I found then that their nature consists in force, and that from this there follows something analogous to sensation and appetite, so that we must conceive of them on the model of the notion we have of *souls*. But just as soul must not be used to explain the particular details of the economy of the animal's body, I judged that we must not use these forms to explain the particular problems of nature, even though they are necessary to establish the true general principles. Aristotle calls them *first entelechies*; I call them, perhaps more intelligibly, *primitive forces* …'[13]

From the period ushered in with the 'New System', to the end of Leibniz's life in 1716, there is no question that the Leibnizian texts *very* frequently present the appearance of being 'body-realist' (so to speak), not idealist. Thus, the 'New System' proceeds to tell us that 'minds have particular laws, which place them above the upheavals [revolutions] in matter' (p. 140), speaks of 'material souls' (ibid.) and 'ordinary animal bodies and other corporeal substances' (p. 141). Leibniz goes on further in fact to adumbrate the monadological conviction that soul-monads are metaphysical atoms, windowless isolates whose representational states are in fact 'like well-ordered dreams' (p. 143); this notwithstanding, Leibniz tells us that he is referring here to 'our internal sensations (meaning those in the soul itself, and not those in the brain or in other subtile parts of the body)' (ibid.). These, and many other passages, certainly look as though they are envisaging a material order or domain subsisting alongside a purely mental or mind-like one. Indeed, Leibniz appears to affirm a duality in the order of explanation as well as in that of being, in the 'New System'. Having argued for the theoretical value of reintroducing the notion of a substantial form in natural philosophy, and conceiving it on the model of a soul, Leibniz proceeds to say: 'But just as soul must not be used to explain the particular details of the economy of the animal's body, I judged that we must not use these forms to explain the particular problems of nature, even though they are necessary to establish the true general principles.' (p. 139). More famously pointing in the same direction than perhaps any other Leibnizian idea is his celebrated *parallelism*, Leibniz's wholly original proposed solution to issues of mind-body putative interaction, set out frequently in his writings, including in the 'New System'. As will be evident, the *point* and illumination that parallelism is supposed to afford will be hard to see without an ontological dualism, of thinking beings or states and independent physical beings or states, assumed or implied.

[13] Ibid., p. 139 (Leibniz's emphases).

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Other relevant passages, from the Letters to Clarke (1715–6):

> 'I hold that every created substance is attended with matter.' (p. 225)

Space 'is *that order*, which renders bodies capable of being situated, and by which they have a situation among themselves when they *exist together*' (p. 235).

Leibniz also advocates here attraction at a distance; and affirms the reality of motion (of animals explainable by natural forces) (p. 235).

'The least corpuscle is actually subdivided *in infinitum*, and contains a world of other creatures …' (p. 236)

Leibniz affirms as well that all of space is actually filled with matter; there are unendingly smaller 'corpuscles' of things (p. 236f).

'[T]he *soul* and *body* do *only agree* together; the one acting freely according to the rules of final causes; and the other acting *mechanically*, according to the laws of efficient causes' (p. 269)[14]

Perhaps most significantly of all, the work that is held most usually to epitomize Leibniz's mature metaphysical scheme and to disclose it as idealist, *The Monadology* (1714) itself contains repeated passages that at least on their face imply a real material world.[15] Leibniz says that 'there are composites' (2), and that in them 'internal movement … is possible, since the parts can interchange place' (7). If—*per impossibile*—monads had been without qualities, the result would be that '[t]he plenum being presupposed, no space … could ever receive through movement anything but the equivalent of what has been in it, and one state of things would be indiscernible from another.' (8) Leibniz's model of a machine that will show that thought cannot be understood or explained mechanistically should provide him with occasion to affirm the merely apparent reality of machines and their kind. But no: the machine is taken to be a composite entity, with figure and movement. (17) Leibniz goes on to describe our own motions without phenomenalized qualification: 'when you turn around several times you get a vertigo'; the same passage affirms the real-

[14] 'On Newton's Mathematical Principles of Philosophy (Letters to Samuel Clarke, 1715–6)', in Philip R. Wiener, ed., *Leibniz Selections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), pp. 225–69; Leibniz's emphases. It is reasonable of course to hold that given the purpose and character of the correspondence with Clarke Leibniz's full metaphysical views need not be on full display, or indeed altogether disclosed in the work.

[15] Citations are from G. W. von Leibniz, *Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays*. trans. by Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965).

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ity of animals and their deaths. (19) Movement, he tells us—not apparent movement—'cannot come naturally except from another movement' (23). Nature has provided animals 'with organs which collect several light rays or several air waves'; and 'what occurs in the soul represents what occurs'—what really occurs, evidently, not just what seems to—'in the sense organs'. (25) There are sticks, and dogs, and the latter run away. (26) On a more general plane, strongly suggesting a broadly dualist conception of the world: 'the variety of natural things is immense, and bodies are infinitely divided. There is an infinity of figures and movements, past and present, which contribute to the efficient cause of my presently writing this. And there is an infinity of minute inclinations and dispositions of my soul, which contribute to the final cause of my writing.' (36)

Monadology 61 seems very difficult to reconcile with an idealist conception of Leibniz's views: 'The composite substances are … symbols of the simples. For since all is a plenum, all matter is connected and all movement in the plenum produces some effect on the distant bodies, in proportion to the distance. Hence every body is affected not only by those with which it is in contact, and thus feels in some way everything that happens to them; but through them it also feels those that touch the ones with which it is in immediate contact. Hence it follows that this communication extends over any distance whatever. …' What ensues—indeed, virtually the whole of sections 62 through 82—provides the proponent of a non-idealist Leibniz with a veritable embarrassment of riches, so plainly to affirm the reality of matter, motion, extension, space, and existing individual bodies, as to require being supposed to be written in deep and exceptionally subtle *code* to be otherwise interpreted.

IV

It is of course important to consider whether, in posing issues as to relations between minds and bodies, and appearing, as Leibniz regularly does, to regard the latter as extended and occupying and moving in time and space, Leibniz is merely speaking with the (relatively) vulgar—the philosophically vulgar—as preliminary to leading them to a more esoteric and idealist construal of bodies as monads or monad aggregates, and space, time, and extension as mere *phenomena bene fundata*. Remembering Russell's portrait of Leibniz as duplicitous and generally morally dubious, it may seem further problematic whether Leibniz's at least sometimes apparent

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orthodoxy in respect to the existence of extended bodies can be taken as sincere. Most scholars now regard Couturat's and Russell's conception of two Leibnizian philosophies—a public religiously orthodox and optimistic one intended to edify princesses, and a secret esoteric one, grounded in supposed insights of logic, and with theologically suspect implications—as exaggerated, or plainly wrong. The supposedly hidden philosophy *does* come out in Leibniz's correspondence, in his published journal articles, as well as in unpublished treatises (apart from work in learned journals, Leibniz only published one major treatise in his lifetime), and Leibniz's Christianity does seem in fact genuine. Nonetheless, it cannot be regarded as impossible that Leibniz should have wanted to lead his correspondents by stages to his supposed insights. Leibniz himself sometimes acknowledges that he writes with consciousness of who his audience is, and what its philosophical orientations may be.[16]

That said, the insights are constructionist (or reductionist), not Berkeleyan; and they are not, *when they do appear in his work*, particularly hidden. And yet they subsist side by side, chronologically speaking, with writing in natural philosophy that rubs shoulders and intersects with others'—colleagues'—views on bodies in space and time that are realist, as well as his own also seemingly realist ones. And, as we have seen, Leibniz's at least apparent realist and dualist views do not show up only in his correspondence, or his published work.

V

There is a further complicating feature of the Leibnizian mix. Just as there is a significant, and mutually revealing, sense in which Leibniz is the philosophical father of Kant[17], so is there in which Leibniz is philosophical grandfather of Hegel. By this I mean that there is a strong foreshadowing in Leibniz of something that resem-

[16] Thus, in a letter of 1714, Leibniz says, with reference to different journals his work appears in: 'In those of Leipzig I accommodate what I say to some extent to the language of the school; and in the others I accommodate myself rather to the style of the Cartesians'. (Letter to Remond, cited in R. S. Woolhouse and R. Francks, ed., *Leibniz's 'New System' and Associated Contemporary Texts*, p. 1.)

[17] Kant's 'agnostic realism', for example—his belief that there are things-in-themselves whose natures are wholly opaque to us—seems clearly an intellectual descendant of Leibniz's doctrine of the reality of external substances, together with the windowlessness of soul monads.

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bles Hegelian historicism and contextualism.[18] For Leibniz, as for Hegel, every—or almost every—point of view has its 'truth': there will be a sense in which Plato had it right (and indeed, before him Heraclitus, and Democritus, and Anaxagoras), and certainly Aristotle; and the schoolmen, and Descartes, and Spinoza. … Each contribute their partial vision, each of which is in a way deeply sound; and the actual, objective, absolute truth—and there is such a thing—is a sort of point of convergence of these several independently valid approximations. This 'proto-Hegelian' note in Leibniz manifests itself in his correspondence, where we find a kind of chameleon-like quality in Leibniz's stance, easy to see as a sort of duplicity. Leibniz writes, characteristically, as though his correspondent is a 'brother', a fellow spirit with whom he shares a fundamentally common view, save for a few matters where Leibniz hopes to persuade the correspondent to move in a certain theoretical direction that, as a matter of fact, will bring past giants' insights into new deployment—and show Leibniz to have come up with something importantly original.

The foregoing at any rate is a way of seeking to account for what is otherwise frequent inconsistency in Leibnizian texts, even within a single period. Some see him as tailoring, or modifying, his stance to suit or fit the philosophical allegiances of his correspondent, or intended audience. My suggestion is, rather, that Leibniz is participating in a plurality of philosophical thought-worlds, or frames of discourse, each of which he is genuinely sympathetic to, while—in each case—he believes the thought-world or discourse-frame incomplete or partial, and needing nudging, best secured (Leibniz supposes) by a particular way of putting his (Leibniz's) views.

Some of Leibniz's writings in natural philosophy might seem to offer promise of a closer view if not resolution of whether he is genuinely 'body-realist' in the last decades of his career. The important treatise *A Specimen of Dynamics*, above all, invites consideration in this way. It was written in 1695, the same year as the 'New System',

[18] Thus, e.g.: '… one should choose the more intelligible hypothesis … the truth of a hypothesis is nothing but its intelligibility. Now, from different points of view, not with respect to people and their opinions, but with respect to the very things we need to deal with, one hypothesis might be more intelligible than another and more appropriate for a given purpose. And so, from different points of view, the one might be true and the other false. Thus, for a hypothesis to be true is just for it to be properly used.' ('On Copernicanism and the Relativity of Motion (1689)', in G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (ed. and trans. by R. Ariew and D. Garber) (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 91.) One may see here ancestry not only of Hegel, but also of Peirce and James.

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and introduces a number of terms and conceptions new to Leibniz's work, including the Aristotelian ideas of primary and secondary matter, and the notions of a *conatus* or active striving in substances, and the correlative *nisus*. As in other writings, earlier and later, though, we find concurrently at least apparently affirmed, or implied, both the ideality and the reality of space, time, and motion; but more firmly asserted, or implied, is the reality of bodies, the principles of whose behaviour are explored and adumbrated at considerable length in the work.

VI

If Leibniz is *not* an idealist, what then is he? We might usefully postpone an answer, at least briefly, by trying to enumerate the major metaphysical alternatives to idealism. If we confine attention to the broad spheres of the mental and the physical, or the at least apparently mental and physical (hence ignore positions on abstract entities, or times, for example), there seem to be three or possibly four broad major alternatives. (There will be considerable variation of detail for particular instances of the broad options.) First, there is materialism. Second, there is dualism. Third, there is neutral monism. And—perhaps—a fourth alternative is Aristotelianism.

Strictly, materialism is better labelled physicalism. It is the view not that everything ('everything' is, throughout this context, to be understood as abbreviating 'everything in the really-or-apparently mental-or-physical sphere') is comprised of *matter*, but rather that everything is of a nature that current or anticipatable 'hard' natural science encompasses or countenances. It will be quite clear that Leibniz is not a materialist, so this option may be discarded from consideration.

Dualism should not be conceived as limited to the particular metaphysical views of Descartes. Plato was a dualist long before him, as were many others, and many since—including a significant representation in the twentieth century. Dualism broadly is now held to take two forms: substance dualism and property dualism. Both involve the claim that there are realia that are not reducible to anything further, and irreducibly distinct from each other: substance dualism, that mental and physical substances are so, property dualism that mental and physical properties (or states, or events) are so. Key is the common idea that the mental and the physical (whether substance or property) are both appearance and reality, not mere appearance. That is, there don't just seem to be unextended thinking substances (or nonphysical mental states): there really

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are. Likewise there don't just seem to be nonthinking physical substances (or nonmental physical states): there really are. And neither can be reduced to, or explained as the other, or, indeed, as anything else. Anyone who believes the foregoing may reasonably be held to be a dualist—conforming to standard and regular usage in place since (at least) 1900.

Neutral monism is a term only coined after 1900, but plausibly does fit some earlier metaphysical views—perhaps the earliest case is the Ionian cosmologist Anaximander. Like dualism, neutral monism takes two forms. (They parallel, interestingly, reductive and eliminative materialism.) According to the first, there are genuinely mental and physical entities, and both reduce to or are manifestations of something more fundamental—the neutral stuff, (kind of) substance, or state, which is not, strictly speaking, precisely either mental or physical. According to the second form of neutral monism, the mental and the physical are both strictly speaking unreal, mere phenomena or appearances—though certainly *phenomena bene fundata*, in Leibniz's sense. What mental and physical phenomena are appearances of will be, of course, the neutral reality of the first version. There seems no question that, if a neutral monist, Leibniz is *not* one of the second type; since he clearly regards mental items—both substances and states—as real, whether or not he so views physical items. God is definitely real, as are lesser persons, and both are thinking (apperceiving) substances.

So far, then, there seem two primary contenders for Leibniz's's metaphysical position if it isn't idealist: viz., substance dualism and reductive neutral monism. There is in addition a further possibility to consider, which I have called Aristotelianism. It may also usefully be called neutral vitalism. According to it *living beings* are the primary substances of the world, and while they have both physical and mental (or sort-of-mental) states, they themselves are to be seen as logically simple and not exactly either mental or physical substances.

This last option seems definitely not accurately assigned Leibniz, for it leaves God out of account. God is certainly a substance for Leibniz, but he is wholly immaterial, and, indeed, not in an obvious or illuminating sense a *living* being (as opposed to an *existent* one). Further, even if living substances were denied the typological classification *thinking substance* or *physical substance*—and denying them these classifications is problematic—it seems unpersuasive that Leibniz would have seen them (living substances) as wholly exhausting everything that there is in the mental-or-physical sphere. The case that Leibniz is not an idealist depended on taking

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his assertions about bodies, motion, and extension, more or less literally. If there is a physical world of extension and motion, it doesn't *only* have individual plants and animals in it.

Either then, Leibniz is a dualist or he is a reductive neutral monist (if he isn't an idealist). Which is the more reasonable attribution? Deciding between the two is made more challenging by the fact that the difference between them can come to seem razor-thin. A reductive neutral monist, believing that mental and physical items are both reducible to the neutral item, need not believe that mental and physical items are reducible *to each other*; indeed, presumably will suppose that they are precisely *not* so reducible. Believing in that case that mental and physical items are both altogether *real*, and irreducibly distinct from each other, such a neutral monist will differ from a dualist only in holding that the mental and physical are expressions or cases of a further more fundamental reality. This is, to be sure, a difference, and, ontologically, a significant one. But a dualist might nonetheless understandably view the divide between himself or herself and such a neutral monist as almost nominal. Or, perhaps, we should say that whether a genuinely significant difference is made will depend on what positive content is given to the idea of the neutral item. If there were an actual contentful *theory* about the character and nature of the neutral item, one that explained or illuminated what was at root similar or identical about the mental and the physical, there might be increased ground for distancing a neutral monist from a dualist view. But this, close study of Leibniz's texts seems to show, is what Leibniz does not provide, or perhaps even conceive of. There is no theory of a neutral stuff, substance, or type of state, in Leibniz, that offers to furnish it with content or an explanatory role. Certain parallelisms between motion in bodies and thought in minds are affirmed—not altogether unlike comparable claims in Locke—and certainly the idea of a *unity* in the concept of a substance (so that, for Leibniz, a substance should turn out to be of a single type or kind). But as we have seen already, it is not clear that for Leibniz substances exhaust the real.

There is in any case further good reason to defend the view that Leibniz is a dualist. It is afforded by God, whose fundamental presence in Leibniz's system we have already seen to provide grounds for rejecting an Aristotelian or neutral vitalist view. The body-realist interpretation of Leibniz takes seriously, and literally, the idea that for at least typical substances there needs to be distinguished the substance's primary matter and its secondary matter. The secondary matter is, it seems, the aggregate or what is otherwise constituted of the monad and the substance's body, to form the sub-

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stance; the primary matter is the substance's body.[19] The supreme substance, God, however, does not have a body. He is wholly without primary matter. Reality then comprises a hierarchy of substances all of which have (possibly, in some cases, are) mind-like organizing entelechies or monads, and some of which have and others of which do not have accompanying bodies. This picture is certainly dualist, save possibly for the idea that minds and mind-like entities are just special cases of, and reducible to, something more basic. But can God's cognitive apprehensions be—at an ultimate or any other level—*other than* cases of divine contemplation and knowledge? It is difficult to see that anything resembling Christian orthodoxy could be sustained if a divine mind and its contents were anything other than a mind, or anything other than mental contents.[20]

[19] Leibniz adopts the scholastic distinction between primary and secondary matter in *A Specimen of Dynamics* (1695), understanding it there as a contrast between impenetrability (primary matter) and passivity (secondary matter). (G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (ed. and trans. by R. Ariew and D. Garber) (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 120.) In 'On Nature Itself' (1698) Leibniz more fully appropriates the distinction, uniting features of both scholastic conceptions in primary matter: 'it is in this very passive power of resisting (which includes impenetrability and something more) that I locate the notion of primary matter or bulk [*moles*], which is everywhere the same in body and proportional to its size.' (ibid., p. 162) He goes on to refer to 'primary matter or bulk [*moles*], something essentially passive' and to identify secondary matter as what is produced by primary matter together with the first entelechy—'what is called *the soul* in living things and *the substantial form* in other things'—which 'together with matter constitutes a substance that is truly one'. (ibid.) His summary comment: 'I understand matter as either secondary or primary. Secondary matter is, indeed, a complete substance, but it is not merely passive; primary matter is merely passive, but it is not a complete substance.' (ibid.)

[20] Other interpreters see a clearly dualist Leibniz. 'As J. A. Cover and I have argued elsewhere—J. A. Cover and Glenn A. Hartz, 'Are Leibnizian monads spatial?', *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, XI (1994), pp. 295–316—'Leibniz was a staunch dualist—very wary of items sliding from one side to the other of the mind-body divide. In 1704 he writes to Lady Masham,

> … it is no more comprehensible to say that a body acts at a distance with no means or intermediary, than it is to say that substances as different as the soul and the body operate on each other immediately; for there is a greater gap between their two natures than between any two places. [*Die Philosophischen Schiften von G. W. Leibniz*, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, III, p. 354.]'

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The 'spirit' of Leibnizian metaphysical analysis seems in fact not accurately caught by an idea like neutral monism. *Leibniz's* motivation to reduction is the desire for simplicity, economy, and comprehensive unity. If one *can* view F's as G's, and G's are (or seem to be) more basic, more generic, and to have also H's—otherwise unrelated to F's, at least on the surface—as instances, and a total picture results that is plausibly maximal in respect of unity, economy, and simplicity, then Leibniz would enjoin so seeing things. Much of Russell's work is accurately discerned in this mode. So too are some current endeavours from people who work in information theory and in what they are pleased to call cognitive science. Viewing minds as fundamentally information processors, and in this respect of common kind with thermostats and heat-and-light-responsive plants (sunflowers, say), is a contemporary instance of this reductive motivation. Earlier cases that may be viewed in a similar spirit are identifications of numbers as sets, spatio-temporal objects as series of events, and individual thinkings of human beings as electro-chemical episodes in those human beings' bodies.

Generalizing, someone may see a similarity—an analogy—between F's and G's, and propose that F's may be seen as in a sense G's, then proceed to declare that F's really are G's. In some cases they may go on to be led to think that *everything* can be viewed as a G, hence, really is a G. But if we suppose also that they were actuated primarily by considerations of the second reductive type identified above, and knew that they were, it will get things wrong to say that they see the world in a G sort of way, or that everything is G-ish through and through. It will also get things wrong to say that they think they have discerned a contentful kind H underlying both F's and G's and to which they both reduce.

VII

Although the evidence from Leibnizian text provides a good case—a very good case—for reading Leibniz's mature system as dualist, the complexities in Leibniz's motivations, the degree of his candour and self-disclosure, and what I have called his proto-Hegelian convictions, all make it inadvisable to rest deep revision in interpreting the philosophy on aggregating textual passages alone. It would be

So Glenn A. Hartz asserts, in 'Exactly how are Leibnizian substances related to extension?', in Roger S. Woolhouse, ed., *Leibniz's 'New System' (1695)* (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1996), p. 68. He then goes on to 'complicate' his interpretation of Leibniz's real views, coming in the end to what looks to be a standard idealist one.

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easy, in fact, to depict a hopelessly inconsistent Leibniz from passages, in the same chronological period, that would seem to show, for example, that monads are and are not substances, that they are the only ones and that there are others, that intra-substance causality does and does not occur, as well as that a material world is mere appearance and also objective reality. What I want primarily to do is to speak for the reinsertion, so to speak, of a dualist metaphysic in Leibniz, which, while it might be allowed displacement to an ultimately idealist scheme at a final stage of highly sophisticated (and only occasionally deployed) analysis, will occupy a centre of stage and a centre of theoretical gravity in Leibniz's enterprise. In this scheme, only some substances are monads, and the monads have, typically (God of course does not), accompanying bodies, which are extended and in motion and in real space and time. (Real space and time would still certainly be for Leibniz Aristotelian, or relational—only real in connection with objects and events occupying them.)

VIII

As already partly shown, there is considerable textual evidence that, in and subsequent to the 1690s, Leibniz believed that every corporeal substance had a monad or soul or soul-like substance that animated it or unified it and made it *be* a substance. This theory, the cumulative argument mounted so far suggests, is not so much a panpsychism as a 'pan-dualism'.[21] The interesting 1698 essay 'What is Nature?'[22] sets this view out in a particularly clear and striking way. Leibniz here affirms the ubiquity of incorporeal entelechies in material things, and also the ceaseless motion of the latter. 'If there were nothing incorporeal in the corporeal things, it would be justifiable indeed to say that they consist in a perpetual flux and have no substance whatever—a consequence which the Platonists correctly recognized long ago.' Further, 'not only is all that acts an individual substance, but every individual substance acts without intermis-

[21] The term, and the idea, may suggest or point to a closer kinship between Leibniz's system and Spinoza's than the orthodox interpretation would involve.

[22] 'What is Nature? Reflections on the Force Inherent in Created Things and on Their Actions", so titled in G. W. von Leibniz, *Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays*, trans. by P. and A. M. Schrecker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). The same essay is called 'On Nature Itself' in R. Ariew and D. Garber, ed. and trans. G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989); and elsewhere.

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sion. And this is true also for corporeal substances, in which no absolute rest can ever be found.'[23]

Further, in the debate with Clarke, Leibniz writes with candour as to views familiar in *The Monadology* and other putatively idealist works; among them, that 'space in itself is an ideal thing, like time' (Wiener (ed.), p. 247). Yet, throughout, as illustrated earlier, Leibniz affirms the reality of matter, extended material bodies, motion, and particular kinds of material substances solid and fluid. There is no indication whatever that material bodies are merely *phenomena bene fundata*, or ideal. All of Leibniz's animus is against the possibility of a vacuum or the existence of atoms, the character of space or time conceived as 'absolute'. And most or all of the preceding are argued against not as absurd or impossible in principle, but as precluded by fundamental and secure metaphysical principles, among them principles establishing or emanating from the reality or nature of God. In some contexts the 'ideality' of space and time appears in fact no more 'radical' than—and indeed quite similar to—the Aristotelian position on universals: just as universals for Aristotle are real but only when exemplified, so for Leibniz space and time are real (their *character*, of course, relational, not absolute), but only when occupied.

Likewise Aristotelian, matter can be viewed as fictional, or mere abstraction, for Leibniz, at least partly in the sense that no matter is without form—some form or other. Monads—which Leibniz does repeatedly style the *entelechies* of things—will then be the forms of substances. Matter will still be *real*, as, likewise, will extension and motion, and space and time as well—even if, in *their* case, they will also have the same fictionality as matter without form (since Leibniz is, like Aristotle, a relationist on time and space, as already remarked).

It seems clear at any rate that what Leibniz may say about *matter* cannot be translated automatically into views about individuals bodies or corporeal substances. 'Matter considered as the mass in itself is only a pure phenomenon or a well-founded appearance, as also are space and time … and I can say the same about magnitude and motion, namely these qualities or predicates partake of the phenomenal as do colours and sounds … and consequently extended mass considered without entelechies is not bodily substance, but an entirely pure phenomenon like the rainbow.'[24] Perhaps so; but these remarks will suggest as well that extended mass considered *with* entelechies is bodily substance, and more than mere well-founded phenomen.

[23] *Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays* (Schrecker and Schrecker: trans.), pp. 102–3.

[24] Correspondence with Arnauld. (9 Oct. 1687).

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IX

How Leibniz saw, and put, his position on mind, body, monads, substances, and their mutual relations—and relations with common sense or other realist views—is easily, and often, found in his work. In one of the last things he ever wrote, a letter of 1716 (the year of his death), to Samuel Masson, Leibniz says: '… I would not say, as has been imputed to me, *that there is a single substance for all things*, and that this substance is mind. For there are as many completely distinct substances as there are monads, and not all the monads are minds, and these monads do not make up a whole that is truly one, and the whole, were they to make one up, would not be a mind. I am also far from saying that matter is a *shadow* and even a *nothing*. These expressions go too far. Matter is an aggregate, *not a substance but a substantiatum* as would be an army or a flock; and, insofar as it is considered as making up *one* thing, it is a phenomenon, very real, in fact, but a thing whose unity is constructed by our conception.'[25]

This, and like passages, answer many questions but not all. Even if not all monads are minds, aren't they all *mind-like*, as *The Monadology* seems to imply? Aren't they all immaterial, nonphysical, incorporeal? And can what Leibniz says of *matter* be applied straightforwardly to *material object* or *material* (*at least putative*) *substance*? Are dogs, cats, tables, chairs, planets, boulders army-like or flock-like things? And if they—or some of them (living things like dogs and cats might of course be, or have, minds)—are army-like or flock-like, what will it be, and of what *sort*, and with what characteristics on the corporeal/incorporeal scale, that corresponds to the individual soldiers of an army, or sheep of a flock? The answer now usually given is that it will be monads that are aggregated together, and which we group or conceive or constitute as material things when so aggregated; and that since all monads are without extension, the literal result is indeed that literal reality is extensionless and immaterial.

This predominant interpretive conception may be right; or what needs in the end to be seen as Leibniz's position. But there are inherent philosophical difficulties with it, analogous to those historically associated with extreme mind-body dualism. If monads are extensionless, how will even an infinite aggregation of them yield extension? The now orthodox line on Leibniz will answer that

[25] 'Letter to Samuel Masson, on Body (1716)', in G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, (ed. and trans. by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber), (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 227 (emphases in original). The editors assert (in a footnote) that a '*substantiatum* is an aggregate of substances that is not itself a substance.'

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it doesn't; it just seems to. Sufficient numbers of monads, of requisite sorts, clustered in requisite ways, and apprehended—more accurately, apparently apprehended (in the pre-established harmony)—by the right kinds of monads, will be experienced (or apparently experienced) as extended material things, without really being so.

Yet when pressed, or conceiving himself pressed by critics and objectors, Leibniz moves to Platonist or Aristotelian renderings of his views, in ways that interestingly complicate what they are. (One should not of course necessarily take protestations against having nonstandard or seemingly paradoxical views as decisive, or even surprising, on their own. Berkeley claims to be champion of common sense. Derrideans claim that of course they don't literally think reality only contains printed text. Presumably some philosophers really do have nonstandard anti-common-sensical views, and many of them will protest that it is otherwise when attacked.)

In the same letter to Masson quoted from above Leibniz goes on to say that 'what allows one to conceive the unity of a piece of matter is, no doubt, only a modification, in particular motion and shape, which make up its entire essence when entelechies are set aside. Likewise, this piece is only a fleeting thing and never remains the same more than a moment, always losing and acquiring parts. That is why the Platonists said of material things that they are always becoming, and never are, nor do they exist at any time.'

This passage does seem most naturally taken as implying that reality contains pieces of matter that do objectively move and have shape; that are indeed constantly changing, so much so that they may not deserve to be said to *be* at any given time, but always only to be *becoming*. For these reasons they may not be entitled to the honorific *substance*, or even to that of *existent*. Such substantiality as they have may depend parasitically on a monad (or possibly, in some cases, a group of monads) in some manner 'associated with' them, informing them and constituting their unity—perhaps, in some or all cases, only doing so as a construction or an imposition that an observing mind would, or will, place upon them constituting (or with the associated monad, 'co-constituting') the unity the material object will have. Even if their reality is derivative, secondary, or parasitic, armies and flocks *are* real. And Leibniz does seem to say as much about material objects. He goes on, in the letter to Masson, to say that 'one must know that even in the least portion of matter, he who knows all reads the whole universe in virtue of the harmony of things. It is true that this could not be if matter were not actually subdivided to infinity. But it is impossible that things are not this way.' (p. 228) Whatever else this implies, it does seem to imply that there really are pieces of matter, and that they are infinitely (and

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presumably *spatially*) divisible. Leibniz goes on further to acknowledge that his view is that 'matter cannot pass for a real substance'. But: what is true of matter might not be true of *pieces* of matter; and, more significantly, what is not a real *substance* may still be real. Indeed, Leibniz continues, discussing another philosopher's views, when this thinker 'says that *particular bodies have no reality* … he goes further than I do in opposition to the reality of bodies' (ibid.; Leibniz's emphasis). Moreover, Leibniz says, 'on my view, the soul is always accompanied by a composite being, or organs … [T]he simplicity of a substance does not prevent several modes from being in it all at once.' (ibid.)

That Leibniz's view may be that material objects are real—not mere appearances (well-founded or otherwise)—but not appropriately to be designated *substances*, is actually affirmed in writing prior to 1695, our presumed date of demarcation between the earlier and the fully mature philosophy. One particularly lucid passage occurs in the (1690) 'Notes on Some Comments by Michel Angelo Fardella':

> A body is not a substance but an aggregate of substances, since it is always further divisible, and any given part always has another part, to infinity.
> Hence, it is contradictory to hold that a body is a single substance, since it necessarily contains in itself an infinite multitude, or an infinity of bodies, each of which, in turn, contains an infinite number of substances.
> Therefore, over and above a body or bodies, there must be substances, to which true unity belongs. For indeed, if there are many substances, then it is necessary that there be one true substance. Or, to put the same thing another way, if there are many created things it is necessary that there be some created thing that is truly one. For a plurality of things can neither be understood nor can exist unless one first understands the thing that is one, that to which the multitude necessarily reduces [*referatur*].
> Hence, unless there are certain indivisible substances, bodies would not be real, but would only be appearances or phenomena (like the rainbow), having eliminated every basis from which they can be composed.[26]

This will presumably imply that not everything real is a substance, or a state of a substance, conforming to the later notion that as well as substances (and their states) there are *substantiata*. There are, to

[26] G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays* (ed. and trans. by R. Ariew and D. Garber) (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), p. 103.

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be sure, later texts that imply that bodies are mere appearances. We need, then, for a consistent and dualist Leibniz, to suppose that these are incautious remarks, or dialectical 'approximations', and that the earlier view (of the Fardella notes of 1690) remained Leibniz's continued true position on bodies.

X

It should be noted that the view with which the more standard interpretation is contested here only departs from *some* of that standard view. It does not affirm (for Leibniz) a perceptual realism, i.e., any claim of contact with reality beyond the mind's contents. Nor need it affirm that all of the actual qualities of (real) physical objects resemble those we experience. Moreover, it will affirm, with the standard line, that to the physical objects we seem to apprehend there do correspond monads or monad aggregates. What is added to the latter view is the claim that these objective monad-counterparts are monads *of* or *for* extended motile objects in space and time; with the added insistence, with the standard view, and the Aristotelian view it incorporates, that space and time have only a derivative, secondary, relational reality.

One interpretive line which would accommodate at least most texts, and which furthers the 'Fardella' position identified above, would be to hold that for (late) Leibniz there are no material or corporeal substances, because to be a substance requires being both simple (where *simple* implies *indivisible*) and stable; and, indeed, that nothing material or corporeal has *being*, because being requires stability; but that nonetheless material or corporeal things are *real*—where we would view reality as the aggregation of things that have either *being* or *becoming*. This rendering of Leibniz's view roots it deeply in Plato. An alternative to this view—perhaps the only plausible alternative that will also be dualist—is Pauline Phemister's Aristotelian reading, according to which *animals*—but not animal bodies—are simple and stable in the senses required, and also material or corporeal; hence that there are material or corporeal substances, namely, animals. Animals, in this construal, contain monadic entelechies as unifying principles or forms, and though these are sometimes called monads, the proper and true monad is the simple, stable, but corporeal animal itself. Phemister's interpretation would seem naturally to involve applying the first alternative (dualist) view to everything material that isn't an animal, including therefore animal bodies.

One is choosing, then, with these two interpretations, between

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Plato and Aristotle. Both of these philosophical giants are acknowledged by Leibniz to be deeply insightful contributors to the real truth of things. And there will be, in any case, a close commonality between the way the Leibnizian universe will look on either view. Both involve simple, impartible, stable things as sole candidates for substances, and both affirm the reality of the material. The chief difference is that for the Platonic rendering all monads are indeed minds or mind-like things, and not themselves material, and for the Aristotelian while God may be an immaterial mind-monad, all others are living things whose unity (and impartibility) is constituted by an immaterial principle or form. Phemister's view would also seem to involve giving up the windowlessness of monads.

XI

Among a number of issues that will be problematic for 'pan-dualism' (in any form) is *how* unextended nonmotile monads (or monad aggregates) might give rise to, or form, extended motile physical objects. Another will be whether monads are to be assigned, according to 'pan-dualism', spatial parameters or properties of any sort, and if so what ones and how. The intersection of the Greenwich Meridian and the equator is an extensionless point to which may be assigned (somewhat arbitrarily, to be sure) a location on the earth's surface. A hovercraft could hover above it, be more than five kilometres away from it, etc. Will it be like that for monads and material bodies, according to the view being probed as alternative to the idealist rendering of Leibniz's mature system? This will not be something about which a confident view would seem warranted.

The aims of this paper have been modest, and somewhat provisional. I have (as recently have others) sought to reopen the question whether the orthodox idealist view of the philosophy of the monadology is correct, and to argue that there is strong reason to decide that it is not. As I see it, such reason is strong but not conclusive. Leibniz to some degree tailored his accounts of his views to fit their audience, he had also a proto-Hegelian tendency to see measures of truth in a diversity of (incompatible) positions, and—for me the most important consideration—his aim was the synoptic, heuristic, 'Occamist', one of a unity and economy of system that would encourage, for example, flirting with literal idealism without actually embracing it (or—perhaps the same thing—sometimes embracing it but always only tentatively and under reserve.) These cautions notwithstanding, I have argued that Leibnizian text in and after 1695 makes a case for seeing him as affirming 'body-realism'

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almost overwhelming. Beyond this base, I have argued that if an idealist interpretation is rejected, the most reasonable classification of Leibniz's system is as a variety of (non-Cartesian) dualism, not as a form of neutral monism or Aristotelian neutral vitalism. As to the interesting and important issues posed by Leibniz's frequently affirmed Neo-platonist theses, of ensouled material bodies containing constituent ensoulments, I have not ventured a view.

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