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WOMEN'S OBJECTIFICATION AND THE NORM OF ASSUMED OBJECTIVITY

ABSTRACT

MacKinnon has famously claimed that there is a connection between objectivity and objectification. This paper examines this connection by focusing on a particular norm of objectivity, *Assumed Objectivity*, which is linked to women's objectification. Haslanger argues that this norm should be rejected since, under conditions of gender inequality, (a) it harms the interests of women (it is *pragmatically* bad), and (b) it yields false beliefs (it is *epistemically* bad). Langton attempts to go beyond Haslanger's critique, suggesting that this norm is also epistemically bad because it yields *true but unjustified* beliefs (beliefs that have a *wrong direction of fit*). I argue that while the norm of Assumed Objectivity is epistemically problematic in yielding false beliefs, it is wrongly accused of yielding true but unjustified beliefs.

Catharine MacKinnon has famously claimed that there is a connection between objectivity and objectification.[1] Sally Haslanger has drawn out this connection by discussing a particular norm of objectivity she calls *Assumed Objectivity*, which she links to objectification (Haslanger 1993). Haslanger argues that those who follow this norm are led to false beliefs and, furthermore, that following it has harmful effects for women while serving the interests of men. In other words, the norm in question is both *epistemically* and *pragmatically* bad. Rae Langton attempts to go further than Haslanger's critique of the norm of Assumed Objectivity, and argues that there is yet another epistemic problem with it. Those men who follow the norm, Langton claims, are not only led to false beliefs, they are also led to beliefs which are true but have the *wrong direction of fit* (they are true but unjustified) (Langton 1993).

In this paper I argue that Langton is wrong to claim that following Assumed Objectivity yields true but unjustified beliefs. So she does not succeed in moving beyond Haslanger's critique in the way that she hopes to. The norm of Assumed Objectivity, I explain, may well be condemned for yielding false beliefs, yet it is wrong to think that it also yields beliefs that suffer from a direction of fit problem. As I explain, the aetiology of the true but unjustified beliefs Langton talks about,

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such as the belief *women are submissive and object-like*, is to be found in men's arranging their beliefs to fit their own *desires* that women be submissive and object-like. This process, however, is not one that conforms to Assumed Objectivity.

Let us start with Haslanger's critique of the norm of Assumed Objectivity. Haslanger, aiming at interpreting MacKinnon's conception of objectification, comes up with the following four conditions that are necessary, in order for person A to objectify person B:

(a) Person A *views and treats* person B as an object for the satisfaction of A's desire;
(b) Where person A *desires* person B to have some property, A *forces* B to have that property;
(c) Person A *believes* that person B has that property;
(d) Person A believes that person B has that property *by nature*. (Haslanger 1993, 102–3)

Focusing on women's objectification by men now, the above conditions go as following:

(a) Men *view* and *treat* women as objects of male sexual desire;
(b) Men *desire* women to be submissive and object-like and *force* them to submit;
(c) Men *believe* that women are in fact submissive and object-like;
(d) Men believe that women are in fact submissive and object-like *by nature*.

Now, in order for an objectifier to mask his power and believe that the observed differences between men and women are actually a consequence of their natures, Haslanger argues, he must resort to a *norm of aperspectivity*. In other words, he must believe that his observations are not conditioned by his own social position and, furthermore, that he has no impact on the circumstances under observation. According to Haslanger, a norm commonly used by the objectifiers is the norm of *Assumed Objectivity*, which consists of the following four sub-norms:

(a) *Epistemic neutrality*: one must take a genuine regularity in the behaviour of something to be a consequence of its nature.
(b) *Practical neutrality*: one must constrain one's decision making to accommodate things' natures.
(c) *Absolute aperspectivity*: one must count observed regularities as "genuine" when (i) observations occur under normal circumstances, (ii) observations are not conditioned by the observer's social position, and (iii) the observer has not influenced the behaviour of items under observation.
(d) *Assumed aperspectivity*: one must believe that any regularity one observes is a "genuine" regularity, and so reveals the nature of the things under observation. (106–7)

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Women's Objectification and the Norm of Assumed Objectivity

Under conditions of gender inequality, one who observes regular differences between men and women and satisfies the norm of Assumed Objectivity, Haslanger holds, will view and treat women as subordinate. However, this is not sufficient to make one an objectifier. For Haslanger, the norm of Assumed Objectivity is *appropriate* to the role of the objectifier. In other words, one who satisfies the norm in question gains success in that role, therefore becoming a better objectifier. However, she does not believe that following that norm is also sufficient for functioning in the role of an objectifier. That means that the norm in question is not actually *grounded* in that role. Haslanger, instead, holds that the norm in question is grounded in the role of the *collaborator in objectification*. The collaborator is a person who views and treats somebody else as an object that has by nature properties which are a consequence of objectification. However, a collaborator differs from an objectifier because he need not find the properties attributed to the objectified *desirable* and might not have the actual power to force his views of things upon the objectified.

Consequently, Haslanger rejects the norm of Assumed Objectivity because, under conditions of social hierarchy, the norm in question would instruct us to collaborate in the existing patterns of women's objectification and, therefore, our efforts at social change would become unmotivated. In other words, the norm in question has bad consequences for women. Furthermore, according to Haslanger, the norm of Assumed Objectivity should be rejected because it yields the false belief that women are submissive and object-like by their nature (108–15).

Langton agrees that the norm of Assumed Objectivity is problematic. However, she is not entirely satisfied with Haslanger's view of why this norm is bad and should be rejected. Haslanger offers, according to Langton, a pragmatic critique of the norm. In other words, she rejects it because she claims it has bad practical consequences for women while serving the interest of men and, furthermore, because it makes social change difficult, if not impossible.[2] If we want to judge the norm of Assumed Objectivity solely by its consequences, Langton argues, we are led to the following conclusion: the norm in question is bad for women, but good for men. However, this conclusion does not give us sufficient ground for rejecting the norm. A belief forming strategy, as Langton herself explains, can be thought to be rational just in case it serves its users' interests. According to this view, if the norm of Assumed Objectivity turns out to serve the interests of men and hurt the interests of women, it can still be argued to be *rational for men* (Langton 1993, 370–1, 378–9).

Langton argues that the norm of Assumed Objectivity should be rejected for two reasons. First of all (as Haslanger also noted), because it *yields false beliefs*: men who pursue that norm have a number of false beliefs, which do not fit the world at all. For instance, men who follow that norm falsely believe that women are sexually submissive and object-like by nature. Secondly, the norm *yields true, but unjustified beliefs,* such as the belief that women are actually submissive and object-like. Instead of men (the powerful) arranging their beliefs in order to fit the world, the world

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arranges itself to fit the beliefs of men. Those people who occupy a position of power and pursue the norm of Assumed Objectivity will bring it about that the world conforms to their beliefs.

Langton's view depends on a certain understanding of beliefs, desires, and their direction of fit. For her, a *belief* aims at being *true*, and its being true is its *fitting the world*. In other words, a belief is something that aims to fit the world (and a true belief is something that does fit the world). By contrast, a *desire* aims at being fulfilled, and its being fulfilled is the *world fitting it*. However, sometimes things do not work this way. First of all, beliefs may arrange themselves to fit desires: one *wants to believe* that X and brings it about that one *believes* that X. Secondly, the world may arrange itself to fit beliefs: One believes that one can do X, and by so believing, brings it about that one can actually do X. In the above cases, beliefs have an *anomalous direction of fit*.[3] They are therefore, according to Langton, unjustified.

In the case of women's objectification, Langton claims, women become submissive and object-like because of men's desires and beliefs. Men desire women to be submissive and object-like, and if they have the power required, they force women to actually become submissive and object-like. Men – following the norm of Assumed Objectivity – then form the belief that women are in fact submissive and object-like and, furthermore, that they are submissive and object-like by their nature. Therefore, in the case of women's objectification, the world conforms to men's minds (it conforms to what men desire and believe about women). However, their beliefs have the wrong direction of fit. Instead of arranging them in order to fit the world, men arrange the world in order to fit what they desire and believe (they arrange the world to fit their desires and beliefs about women being submissive and object-like). The norm of Assumed Objectivity, then, Langton concludes, yields the true but unjustified belief that women are submissive and object-like (2000, 138–42).

In what follows I will argue that the norm in question is wrongly accused by Langton of yielding true but unjustified beliefs. The aetiology of the true but unjustified beliefs Langton talks about is not to be traced to the norm of Assumed Objectivity, but elsewhere. Such beliefs, as I explain later in this paper, are yielded by men changing the world to conform to their own *desires* about women; they are yielded by the kind of 'self-fulfilling process' Langton thinks is involved in women's objectification by men (1993, 383). This process, however, does not conform to Assumed Objectivity.

Let us, first of all, see why it is not possible for one to follow Assumed Objectivity and be led to beliefs that are true but unjustified. In order to show that this is the case, I will deal with both of the beliefs that, according to Langton, are yielded by the norm of Assumed Objectivity: the belief that women are submissive and object-like, as well as the belief that women are submissive and object-like by their nature. I will argue that one who follows Assumed Objectivity can at no time be led to these beliefs in a way that they are true but unjustified.

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Take the belief that women are submissive and object-like first. This belief, according to Langton, is true but with the wrong direction of fit: instead of arranging their beliefs in order to fit the world, men have changed the world and made it conform to their belief that women are submissive and object-like. The problem for Langton is her claim that men are led to this true but unjustified belief by following the norm of Assumed Objectivity. Since, according to Langton, men have actually *altered* (*arranged*) *the world* and *made* women submissive and object-like (1993, 383), we can assume that there was a time in the past when women were not submissive and object-like. From now on, I will refer to this time as time 1 (t_1). At t_1, men's belief *women are submissive and object-like* was false, since women were not in fact submissive and object-like at that time.

So, Langton is wrong to say that men came to have the belief *women are submissive and object-like* by following the norm of Assumed Objectivity at t_1. This would simply not be possible, if the norm in question were followed correctly. That is because at t_1 women were *not* submissive and object-like and so it follows that it was *not* an *observed regularity* that women were submissive and object-like. According to the norm of Assumed Objectivity, one must start by observing regularities in the world and then one has to decide whether those observed regularities are also genuine regularities, that is to say, whether they actually reveal things' natures. As Langton also acknowledges, Assumed Objectivity tells us "… how to draw on observations in forming beliefs about the world… " (1993, 372)

Thus, we can either say that men's false belief that women are submissive and object-like, at t_1, was not formed by following the norm of Assumed Objectivity or that it was formed by following that norm incorrectly. For instance, we could assume that, even though it was not an observed regularity that women were submissive and object-like at t_1, men were under the impression that it was actually an observed regularity. So – it could be argued – if men had followed the norm in question correctly at t_1, they would not have been led to the belief that women actually were submissive and object-like, since it was *not*, at that time, an observed regularity that women were submissive and object-like.

Furthermore, if the norm of Assumed Objectivity had been followed properly by men at t_1, men would not have been led to the false belief that women were naturally submissive and object-like either. At t_1, it is an observable regularity that women are *not* submissive and object-like. One who follows the norm of Assumed Objectivity at that time can be led to the conclusion that the observed regularity that women are not submissive and object-like is a "genuine" regularity. That is because men's observation does occur under normal circumstances, it is not conditioned by men's social position and men have not influenced the behaviour of women. Therefore, the observed regularity that women are not submissive and object-like could be said to reveal the nature of women, so men should at t_1 constrain their decision making to accommodate this nature.

From the above we can conclude that following Assumed Objectivity correctly at t_1 would have been a good thing, since it would have yielded true and justified

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beliefs: first of all, the belief *women are not submissive and object-like*; secondly, the belief *women are not submissive and object-like by nature*.

At this point, we must examine the possibility of men following the norm of Assumed Objectivity at a different time. Since men altered the world and made it conform to their false belief that women are submissive and object-like (in other words, since men made women become submissive and object-like) we may talk of a later time, time 2 (t_2). At t_2 women are actually submissive and object-like, and have been submissive and object-like for a significant amount of time. A man who follows the norm of Assumed Objectivity at t_2, a time when women are in fact submissive and object-like, can be led to the belief that women are submissive and object-like, since it is at t_2 an observed regularity that women are submissive and object-like. However, at t_2, when, unfortunately, it is a fact that women are indeed submissive and object-like, the belief *women are submissive and object-like* is *true* and has a *correct direction of fit*. It describes the existing situation of women, who have come to be submissive and object-like.

Even though the whole process of women's objectification is *morally* unjustified, since women were not initially submissive and object-like, but came to be submissive and object-like because of men's desires and beliefs, the belief itself *women are submissive and object-like* is not at t_2 *epistemically* unjustified. At that time, men who follow the norm of Assumed Objectivity do not necessarily desire women to be submissive and object-like, and, furthermore, they do not force them to become submissive and object-like, since women already are submissive and object-like. So men at t_2 simply arrange their beliefs to conform to the way the world is; they arrange their beliefs to conform to the fact that the world has changed and women actually are submissive and object-like. Therefore, at t_2 the belief *women are submissive and object-like* is *true*. Moreover, the belief in question has, at this time, the *correct direction of fit*: at t_2, men do not arrange the world, in order to make it conform to their belief that women are submissive and object-like.[4]

One would plausibly wonder whether there could actually be a time when men form the belief *women are submissive and object-like* via following the norm of Assumed Objectivity, in such a way for it to be true and have the wrong direction of fit. In other words, one may wonder whether Langton is right to hold that the belief in question (yielded by the norm of Assumed Objectivity) is, at some time, true but unjustified. I will argue that such a time cannot exist.

If men are led to the belief *women are submissive and object-like* by following the norm of Assumed Objectivity, there is a time at which (a) the world is changed in order to conform to men's belief *women are submissive and object-like*, in other words, a time when women *become* submissive and object-like as a result of the belief in question; and (b) women's submissiveness is an observed regularity. However, any time that (b) is true, it will no longer be possible for (a) to be true. This means that at a time when it is an observed regularity that women are submissive and object-like, the world cannot actually be *shaped* to conform to men's belief *women are submissive and object-like*. Consequently, there cannot be a time when following the norm of

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Assumed Objectivity leads men to the true but unjustified belief that women are submissive and object-like.[5]

Therefore, either men are led to the *false* belief that women are submissive and object-like without following (or by wrongly following) the norm of Assumed Objectivity (at t_1), or men follow that norm (at t_2) and are led to the belief that women are submissive and object-like, which is *true* and has the *right direction of fit*. It follows from the above that the norm of Assumed Objectivity is wrongly accused by Langton of leading men to the true but unjustified belief that women are submissive and object-like. Men's belief *women are submissive and object-like* is – at t_2, when men follow the norm of Assumed Objectivity – true and has the right direction of fit.

Furthermore, the direction of fit discussion is not needed when dealing with the second belief yielded by Assumed Objectivity, namely, the belief *women are submissive and object-like by nature*. The belief in question is simply *false*. In other words, it does not correspond to the way the world actually is. Women were not initially submissive and object-like, but came to be submissive and object-like after their objectification by men. Therefore, women cannot be submissive and object-like by their nature. Men cannot alter the way the world is in order to make it conform to their false belief that women are submissive and object-like by nature. Therefore, there is no need for us to go further in examining the belief's direction of fit with respect to the world. The belief *women are submissive and object-like by nature* is false and its being false gives us sufficient epistemic grounds for rejecting it, and for raising worries about a norm likely to yield it.

From the above we can conclude that the norm of Assumed Objectivity can at no time yield true but unjustified beliefs, such as the belief *women are submissive and object-like* discussed by Langton. As we have seen, if men had followed the norm of Assumed Objectivity (correctly) at t_1, a time when women were not submissive and object-like, it seems that they would have been led to the true and justified belief *women are not submissive and object-like*. Furthermore, following the norm in question at t_2, a time when (sadly) it is an observed regularity that women are submissive and object-like, leads men to the true and justified belief *women are submissive and object-like*. While we can legitimately blame the norm of Assumed Objectivity (as Haslanger also noted) for yielding false beliefs, such as the belief *women are submissive and object-like by nature*, it would be wrong to blame the norm in question for also yielding the true but unjustified belief *women are submissive and object-like*.[6]

Since it is not possible for one to be led to the true but unjustified belief *women are submissive and object-like* by following the norm of Assumed Objectivity, then, it seems plausible to look elsewhere for the aetiology of the true but unjustified belief Langton discusses. As I will now explain, the aetiology of the belief in question is to be found in what Langton herself calls the "projection of the desired properties onto women", the process of men shaping their beliefs and the world to conform to their own *desires* about women's submissive and object-like status (1993, 383).

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As mentioned earlier, it makes sense to think that there was a time in the past when women were not submissive and object-like. I have called this time t_1. Women came to be submissive and object-like at a later time, after having been forced by men to act in these ways. t_2 is a time when women actually are submissive and object-like. The reason why women came to be submissive and object-like, according to Langton, is because men desired them to be this way. So it all started with men's *desire* that women be submissive and object-like. This desire eventually led them to change the world accordingly and to form the belief *women are submissive and object-like*.

There are two ways in which men's desire that women be submissive and object-like might have led them to the belief *women are submissive and object-like*, and to change the world and make women submit and act in object-like ways: (a) men *desire* women to be submissive and object-like, they *believe* that women are submissive and object-like, and then they *change the world* and make it the case that women are submissive and object-like (Route A: desire – belief – change of world); (b) men *desire* women to be submissive and object-like, they *change the world* and make women submissive and object-like, and then they come to *believe* that women are submissive and object-like (Route B: desire – change of world – belief).[7] In what follows I will explain in more detail how men could be led to the belief *women are submissive and object-like* by following these two routes.

Let us start with route A, the 'desire – belief – change of world' route. Men desire women to be submissive and object-like. Based on this desire, men form the belief *women are submissive and object-like* at t_1, a time when it was not the case that women were submissive and object-like. It makes sense to see the belief in question as a temporally extended belief. Since t_1 was a time when men had not yet changed the world and made women submissive and object-like, their belief *women are submissive and object-like* was, at that time, plainly false. Men came to form this belief, not because they observed how women were in the world, but simply because they desired women to be submissive and object-like. As mentioned earlier, if men had in fact observed how things were in the world (following Assumed Objectivity) at t_1, they would have been led to the true belief *women are not submissive and object-like*.

Sometime after t_1, men changed the world and made women submit and act in object-like ways. t_2 is a time when women are submissive and object-like. At this time, men's belief *women are submissive and object-like* becomes true, since it is at t_2 a fact about the world that women are submissive and object-like. However, the belief in question is unjustified insofar as it is not formed by men observing how the world actually is, but by men's desire that women are submissive and object-like. Insofar as the belief in question is still based on men's *desire* that women are submissive and object-like, and not on observations about the world, it can be said to have the status Langton takes it to have: the status of being *true but unjustified*. In this case, the belief in question is epistemically problematic, since it is not justified through any actual observations about women's submissiveness.

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Let us now examine route B (the 'desire – change of world – belief' route). At t_1, men desire women to be submissive and object-like. They then change the world and force women to submit and act in object-like ways. At t_2, a time when it is actually the case that women are submissive and object-like, men form the belief *women are submissive and object-like*. The belief in question is unjustified at t_2 insofar as it is not based on actual observations of women's status in the world, but on men's *desire* that women are submissive and object-like. In other words, if men form the belief in question, not because they actually observe that women are object-like and submissive, but simply because they desire women to be this way, then the belief in question has the status suggested by Langton: the status of being true but unjustified.

As explained earlier, however, if we take men to have formed the belief *women are submissive and object-like* at t_2 by observing women's submissiveness in the world (and so by following Assumed Objectivity), then their belief is both true and justified. It is true since it is actually the case at that time that women are submissive and object-like, and it is justified since men actually arrange their belief to fit the fact that women actually are submissive and object-like. Insofar as the belief *women are submissive and object-like* is yielded by actual observations of the world, then, we cannot take it to be epistemically problematic in any way. t_2 is a time when women actually are submissive and object-like. If men arrange their beliefs to fit this reality about women, then, their belief *women are submissive and object-like* is epistemically sound; it is true and justified.

The aetiology of the true but unjustified belief Langton talks about, then, is to be found in men arranging their belief, not to fit the way the world actually is, but to fit their own *desires* about women. The belief *women are submissive and object-like* is true but unjustified at t_2 only if we take it to be based on men's desires about the world and not on any actual observations of the world and of women's submissive and object-like status in it. This divorces the problem Langton identifies from the norm of Assumed Objectivity. The true but unjustified belief *women are submissive and object-like* is not yielded by men observing regularities about the world (and so by following Assumed Objectivity); it is, rather, a product of men's desire that women are submissive and object-like.

From that we can conclude that Langton is wrong to believe that the norm of Assumed Objectivity is epistemically problematic in yielding the true but unjustified belief *women are submissive and object-like*. She therefore fails to go beyond Haslanger's critique of this norm. Haslanger, as we have seen, first of all offers a pragmatic critique of Assumed Objectivity: we have reasons to reject it because it has bad consequences for women, while serving the interests of men. Furthermore, Haslanger offers an epistemic critique of this norm: Assumed Objectivity is, according to her, epistemically bad, as it leads to the false belief that women are submissive and object-like by their nature. In other words, Haslanger gives us both pragmatic and epistemic grounds for rejecting that norm. Langton attempts to offer a second epistemic reason for rejecting Assumed Objectivity, namely, that it

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yields true but unjustified beliefs. As we have seen, however, the beliefs yielded by Assumed Objectivity do not actually suffer from a direction of fit problem. The aetiology of the true but unjustified beliefs that Langton discusses, as I have explained, is to be traced elsewhere: to men's arbitrarily arranging their beliefs to fit their own desires about women being submissive and object-like.

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NOTES

1 MacKinnon writes:

> The stance of the "knower"… is… the neutral posture, which I will be calling objectivity – that is the nonsituated distanced standpoint…. [This] is the male standpoint socially…. [The] relationship between objectivity as the stance from which the world is known and the world that is apprehended in this way is the relationship of objectification. Objectivity is the epistemological stance of which objectification is the social process, of which male dominance is the politics, the acted out social practice. That is, to look at the world objectively is to objectify it. (1987, 50)

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2 Actually, Langton seems to me not quite right here. According to Haslanger the norm of Assumed Objectivity, besides being pragmatically bad, is also epistemically bad, since it yields the false belief that women are submissive and object-like by nature. So Haslanger offers both a pragmatic critique and an epistemic critique of the norm in question.

3 Langton discusses an example from William James of a belief with an anomalous direction of fit: "I want to believe that I can leap across the crevasse, and plucking up my courage, bring it about that I do so believe. Then the world arranges itself to fit this belief; I believe that I am able to leap across the crevasse, and by so believing, bring it about that I am able to leap across the crevasse." (Langton 1993, 368–9)

4 One could think that men do actually *arrange* the world to conform to their belief *women are submissive and object-like*, in the sense that this belief can serve to sustain and perpetuate women's submissive and object-like status. However, this does not make the belief in question epistemically problematic. Saying that Assumed Objectivity yields beliefs that serve to sustain and perpetuate women's submissive and object-like position constitutes part of the pragmatic critique of this norm. As Haslanger emphasises, the norm of Assumed Objectivity has bad consequences for women. The belief itself, however, *women are submissive and object-like*, in a world in which it is a fact that women are indeed submissive and object-like is epistemically sound: it is true and has a right direction of fit.

5 It could be said that the belief *women are submissive and object-like* is true but unjustified at the time when women *become* submissive and object-like. This must be a time between t_1 and t_2. I will refer to it as $t_{1.5}$. So $t_{1.5}$ is a time when the world is shaped by men's belief that women are submissive and object-like, as well as a time when women are actually submissive and object-like. However, such a time is problematic, since it would require that women's objectification is *instantaneous* (that there is a very specific time when women all of a sudden become submissive and object-like). This does not seem to be a very plausible conception of objectification. Even if we assume that objectification can be instantaneous (therefore holding that there exists this very specific time when men's belief *women are submissive and object-like* shapes the world in a way that women become submissive and object-like), we cannot hold that women's submissiveness at $t_{1.5}$ is an *observed regularity*. Since women become submissive and object-like at this very specific time, we surely cannot conceive women's submissiveness as a regularity.

6 Langton's overall project of criticising the norm of Assumed Objectivity for yielding the true but unjustified belief *women are submissive and object-like* is, in fact, quite puzzling. This is because Assumed Objectivity is a norm concerned with how to draw conclusions specifically about objects' *natures* from observing regularities in the world. In other words, it is a norm which is followed in order to form beliefs specifically about things' natures. However, the issue about natures is not relevant here, since the belief *women are submissive and object-like* is clearly not a belief about the nature of women (I would like to thank the anonymous referee of *Episteme* for this suggestion).

7 Langton refers to both these ways in which a person's desire can lead them to certain beliefs, even though she does not explicitly distinguish between them. She focuses on the 'desire – belief – change of world' route, route A, when discussing the crevasse example: I am initially unable to leap across the crevasse, but I desire to do so. I then come to believe that I am able to leap across the crevasse, and finally I bring it about that I can actually do so (1993, 368–9). When discussing Haslanger's four conditions

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involved in objectification, Langton focuses on route B, the 'desire – change of world – belief' route: Initially women were not submissive and object-like, but men desired them to be this way. They then changed the world and made it the case that women are submissive and object-like, and eventually men came to believe that women are submissive and object-like (375).

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