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Finiteness, mood, and morphosyntax[1]

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The approach adopted here identifies finiteness with the capacity to license an independent predication. The prototypical independent predication is positive and declarative; other 'moods', or main-clause types, while finite, may fail to display the morphosyntactic properties associated with this prototype. These properties vary from language to language, but the recurrent core properties are verbal, since the verb is the prototypical predicator. Some constructions that occur in both main and subordinate clauses, such as the infinitival in English, differ in interpretation in these two different circumstances; this may be the only difference between finite (main-clause) and non-finite (subordinate-clause) use. This general approach is contrasted with one in which finiteness is identified with the presence of a particular set of morphosyntactic properties: such a view as the latter can be maintained, if at all, only on the basis of massive recourse to covert categories.

1. Introduction

One strand of thinking on finiteness has emphasised its association with the independence of a predication (cf. e.g. Anderson 1990, Givón 1990: chapter 19, Dik 1997: 144–168, Sag & Wasow 1999). Such a view is embodied in the second part of Matthews' (1997: 29) dictionary definition:

> Finite verb Traditionally a verb, e.g. in Latin and Greek, inflected for person and number. Now more generally of any verb whose form is such that it can stand in a simple declarative sentence.

And indeed, Anderson (1997a: section 2.3.3; 1997b, 2001a, b) defines finiteness as the capacity to license a potentially independent, but not necessarily declarative, predication. This capacity (vs. its absence) is a property of the head of the predication, the predicator; but it may be associated, in a particular language, with the presence (or the absence) of certain morphosyntactic properties realised in different parts of the predication defined by

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the predicator. Here I want to follow out the consequences of such a view of finiteness in a radical way, an enterprise that will lead us to some instructive conclusions.

In different languages and predication-types, absence from a predicator of the capacity to license syntactic independence may be associated with loss by the predication of some or other of the morphosyntactic characteristics of finite sentences. These characteristics are not definitional, however, but typical in a particular language; the first part of Matthews' definition is patently language-particular. The relevant characteristics vary from language to language – though there are typological patterns to be observed (see e.g. Cristofaro to appear). The stigmata of finiteness may include the presence of certain morphological categories that are typically verbal, or the absence of non-verbal categories or verbal markers of dependency, or the licensing of subjecthood, or the occurrence of a particular word order, or the absence of an interpretation that is only available for the same construction when non-finite, or the reverse. I shall illustrate these various circumstances in what follows. Before we proceed to this, though, I want to formulate what I see as the relationship between finiteness, as just conceived, and (a very general sense of) 'mood', or main-clause type. This will determine the course of our discussion.

In accordance with cognitive simplicity, the prototypical finite is positive and declarative (and realis); it makes a simple assertion. Expression of other moods (and modalities) may lack some of the characteristics associated with the prototypical, without ceasing to be finite. Indeed, the expression may resemble that of non-finite constructions, to the extent of being structurally identical with them and differentiated only by their respective interpretations. This means that while finiteness itself is discrete, we can nevertheless recognise degrees of prototypicality (among non-prototypical moods) in the expression of finiteness.

The mood associated with a particular cluster of properties is also prototypical only: the structures may involve 'secondary speech acts', as when, as is familiar, *It's cold in here* is intended as a request to close a door or window. We cannot associate the manifestations of finiteness, or clause-type, directly with 'speech acts', but rather with what I'm calling moods, or 'prototypical speech acts'. We are concerned here with moods as grammatical subcategories of finiteness.

We have, then, three domains here to which prototypicality is pertinent: speech act, mood and expression. It is necessary to differentiate prototypicality of speech act (involving relative 'directness'), of mood (i.e. of prototypical speech acts in relation to finiteness, with declaratives being prototypical), and of expression of finiteness (with the expression of declaratives being prototypical).

I draw a further distinction between moods and 'modalities'. Non-declarative moods, such as questions or commands, do not make assertions.

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All of the different moods, including declaratives, may bear marked (irrealis) modalities, classified in various ways (e.g. 'epistemic', 'deontic') that need not concern us here. They do not alter the mood of the predication. Likewise, negation cuts across the mood dimension. Expression of marked modality and negation introduces distinctive elements, but they do not affect the finiteness of a construction, though in some languages they may themselves be realised as the predicator that bears the finiteness, as with the English modals. There is, on the other hand, a close relationship between mood and finiteness, as I've been suggesting.

We also need here to maintain a distinction between moods, or prototypical speech acts, and the battery of properties – or 'constructions' – that realises any of them. Mood variation – i.e. variation in prototypical speech act – is a property of finite clauses. The declarative, the pragmatico-semantic prototypical finite mood, is manifested by what in the particular language we might call the 'indicative' construction. Constructions that relate to the expression of finiteness but in some way diverge from the indicative tend to specialise either as an expression of mood, and so are finite (imperative, say), or as not expressing mood, and so non-finite. Interpretable as such non-finites are some 'subjunctives', or the 'dependent' verb forms of the north-west Caucasus (see e.g. Hewitt 1987: 151). Or such constructions can be either finite or non-finite, but with a different interpretation in the two cases (as with some other 'subjunctives'). An indicative can occur in subordinate clauses and remain finite, though in that case the assertion made by the declarative is contingent or reported, as I shall illustrate. Other 'reported moods', reports of utterances that are non-prototypical in mood, are marked as non-finite.

To sum up. Finiteness is the syntactic category with the capacity to license an independent predication. Moods are subcategories of finiteness, associated with different prototypical speech acts. In traditional terms, this category and its subcategories all have notional content; they are notionally-based properties of predications. Declaratives are the prototypical finite. Their prototypical expression (the indicative) may be departed from by the expression of other moods. Other constructions still may be dedicated to non-finiteness (under one interpretation, at least). Our concern here, then, is with the interaction of the three elements included in my title, finiteness, mood and their morphosyntactic expression. Their interaction defines for a particular language the range of communicative roles served by different clausal constructions.

Let us now look at the kind of phenomena involved in the expression of finiteness. We shall move from prototypical finites and the indicative construction expressing them in a particular language (section 2) through other, more marked moods (questions, for instance) and their expression (by various interrogative constructions in this case – section 3), while also noting, for comparison, constructions which are not markers of non-prototypical

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moods. These last may simply lack a main-clause use (section 4), or they may (also) indicate modal qualifications (epistemic or deontic), such as some 'subjunctives' (section 5). In section 6, imperative constructions, which are finite, are contrasted with subjunctives and infinitives, which may be finite or non-finite.

Section 7 attempts to express the correlations in English between moods and modalities of varying markedness and their deviance of expression from the unmarked indicative construction. The character of the correlations will vary cross-linguistically according to the constructions available in particular languages; what remains to be investigated is whether there exists in general a correlation between deviance from the indicative and non-prototypicality of mood or modality. In section 8, some consideration is given to 'nominal (verb-free) sentences', which add another dimension to what is tabulated in section 7. Such an interactive account of finiteness as is offered here is contrasted in section 9 with the dominant tradition whereby finiteness is identified with presence of certain (other) morphosyntactic properties.

The phenomena addressed are not in any sense exotic: most of what I want to talk about can be illustrated from familiar areas of English, though I shall invoke material from other languages (without needing to stray very much beyond Europe) where this seems to clarify a point. Nevertheless, the perspective offered by the following brief survey of these phenomena, as representative of the results of a wide range of work on finiteness in language (only some of which will be alluded to here), has important but not generally recognised consequences for approaches to the notion, and, indeed, to morphosyntax in general.

2. Prototypical finites and the indicative construction

Consider the English assertion-making positive declarative in (1).

(1) Bill smokes a pipe in bed

This is a finite predication; finiteness is embodied in the predicator, as the head of the predication, here the verb form *smokes*. It possesses various properties associated with prototypical finiteness (declarativeness) in English: it is marked contrastively for person-number, and tense (non-past); the argument selected as a subject is the nearest participant argument (non-adjunct) to its left, and the subject is nominative, if pronominal (e.g. *they* rather than *them*); and the construction is associated with particular intonation contours. This battery of properties is prototypical for English in the expression of the finite unmarked mood. I shall refer to them as constituting in English the 'indicative construction'. Of course, the indicative can be associated with other speech acts, such as naming or promising, but these latter are signalled as non-prototypical by the presence of particular

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'performative' verbs in an overt 'performative' main clause. The unmarked function for an indicative is to make an assertion.

The morphological properties that manifest finiteness in various languages include centrally marking of tense, aspect and mood, and of person-number. These are prototypically verbal, though they may appear on nouns (cf. e.g. S. R. Anderson 1985: 179, on tense on nouns). This situation is not surprising, given that the prototypical predicator is a verb and finiteness is a property of predicators. But I reiterate that these properties, the constitution of the indicative construction, cannot be taken to be necessary to finiteness, as we shall see as we proceed. There is no simple universally applicable mapping of even the unmarked declarative mood onto a construction of a uniform type.

Finiteness in English may be associated with a non-lexical verb, what I shall call an operative verb, an adaptation of Huddleston's (1984) term 'operator', a finite 'auxiliary' (in one sense of the latter term), as in (2).

(2) Bill may smoke a pipe in bed

In English, the presence of the operative involves a step away from the manifestations of prototypicality, and it is associated with the signalling of (marked) modality or aspect or voice (and, as we shall see, negation and questions). We can note too that the modal operative (though not the other finite auxiliaries) lacks the morphological manifestations of prototypical finiteness, such as person-number agreement, and (except marginally, as e.g. in 'reported speech') tense variation. The presence of an operative involves divergence from the English indicative construction. But this divergence is minimal, and appropriately so, in so far as the operative's primary function is the expression of a specialised declarative, one which marks a marked modality (as in (2)), aspect or voice.

In negative sentences in English, presence of an operative, however, is obligatory, with that in (3a) representing a default (in the absence of marked modality, aspect or voice):

(3) (a) Bill doesn't smoke a pipe in bed
(b) Jill asked Bill not to smoke a pipe in bed
(c) Jill made Bill not smoke a pipe in bed
(d) Bill **does** smoke a pipe in bed

Thus, negative sentences in English necessarily manifest reduced prototypicality of expression, as well as containing an element that expresses negation. Necessary presence of an operative in an indicative clause is non-prototypical in English. On the other hand, presence of the negative does not affect the finiteness status of the predication, either in the case of the finite (3a) or the non-finites (3b–c). The predication in (3d) is contrastive, indicated crudely by the double-underlining below the operative. It too requires the presence of an operative, and it doesn't affect the

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finiteness of the predication. And as with negatives (and, of course, simple indicatives), the finite-marking construction can appear in subordinate clauses.

In some languages the presence in finite clauses of an operative is prototypical. Thus, in the major verbal system of Basque (i.e. if we lay aside a small set of lexical verbs with a 'synthetic' conjugation), finiteness is embodied in the presence of forms of an operative, as shown in (4).

(4) Paulok untzia aurdiki du
Paul the.vase throw:PST,PTCP PRS.3SG,ERG.3SG,ABS
'Paul threw the vase'

The forms of the lexical verb are non-finite; they cannot head an independent predication. The operative, in final position in (4), carries present or non-past tense (past time reference here is signalled by its combination with the past participle) and agreement (on an ergative basis) with both arguments.

In other languages there is not a distinct, syntactically motivated class of operative verbs. The situation is clouded by the common confusion, as 'auxiliaries', of operatives with periphrastic (or analytic) elements associated with the expression of verbal categories. While French and German, for instance, show periphrastic expression of (at least) tense, it is not clear which if any of these periphrastic elements ('auxiliaries' in this sense) warrant assignment to a distinct syntactic class of operatives in these languages (cf. e.g. on German, Huber & Kummer 1974). In the main, what precedes has illustrated just a little of the range of expression in indicative constructions in English. Different elements of this recur in other languages.

3. Interrogatives and relatives

Questions are expressed by an interrogative construction. In English, it departs from the indicative in possessing a combination, or various combinations, of additional properties that may not all be present in any particular instance. Mostly the properties are not generalizable to other languages: there is a variety of further types of interrogative construction to be found elsewhere (including ones involving dedicated interrogative predicators, or 'particles').

In English *yes*/*no*-questions, an operative is also obligatory if interrogativeness is signalled by 'inversion', as in (5a), rather than by intonation (alone), as in the spoken equivalent of (5b).

(5) (a) Does Bill smoke a pipe in bed?
(b) Bill smokes a pipe in bed?

(5a) and (5b) thus depart from prototypical indicative expression in different ways, positional (associated with presence of an operative) and (purely) phonological. I shall refer to (5a) as involving the 'inversion' construction,

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whereas the latter sentence involves 'inquisitive' intonation. These are both interrogative constructions.

There is also inversion and an obligatory operative in most '*wh*-questions', as exemplified by (6a), but not if the questioned element is not preposed, as illustrated by (6b) (which is not necessarily contrastive), or if the subject is questioned, as in (6c).

(6) (a) What does Bill smoke in bed?
(b) Bill smokes what in bed?
(c) Who smokes a pipe in bed?
(d) Where does Bill smoke a pipe?

Thus, English interrogatives are variously non-prototypical in expression and to various degrees. In (6) interrogativeness is also signalled by the presence of an interrogative (*wh*-)form. The presence of *wh*- characterises the '*wh*-construction', which may or may not coincide with inversion. (6a) and (6d) in addition show 'ectopicity': the *wh*-argument is 'displaced' from the position usually occupied by its non-*wh* congener. We have a construction marked by ectopicity. In (6c), by contrast, there is no overt ectopicity.

The structure of the 'corresponding' subordinates in (7), indeed, in lacking 'inversion', is more consistently indicative-like in expression than the predications in (6).

(7) (a) She asked/knew whether Bill smokes a pipe in bed
(b) She asked/knew what Bill smokes in bed
(c) She asked/knew who smokes a pipe in bed
(d) She asked/knew where Bill smokes a pipe

Note particularly the subordinate clause in (7c) again. But the subordinate clauses in (7a, b, d), which, lacking inversion despite the initial *wh*-form, cannot constitute an independent predication, seem thus to be non-finite, even though they depart less from indicative structure than some of those in (6). All the examples in (7) involve the *wh*-construction, and (b) and (d) ectopicity; the *wh*-form in (7a) no longer occurs in main clauses in English. We return to further questions concerning (7d) in section 4.

However, the subordinate *wh*-constructions in (7) all, including (7c), differ in interpretation from those in (6): they are not necessarily associated with questions. Whether a question is involved or not is signalled by the superordinate verb in (7): contrast the interpretations associated with *asked* and *knew*. They both introduce a reported predication, marked (*asked*) or unmarked (*knew*) in modality, and they signal the mood of that predication. Unsurprisingly, with *asked*, the *wh*-construction here does not signal a non-prototypical mood, but a modality (irrealis), predicational (7a) or argumental (7b–d). Under both the 'ask' and the 'know' interpretations of (7), the *wh*-construction is non-finite, despite the retention of markers (agreement, tense, etc.) that also accompany indicativeness. The

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wh-construction can be finite or non-finite, differentiated as such by its interpretation, as well as the other differences between (6) and (7).

Likewise, the relative clause of (8a) is marked as non-finite by ectopicity of the *wh*-form without inversion:

(8) (a) This is the pipe which Bill smokes in bed
(b) This is the man who smokes a pipe in bed
(c) This is the pipe that Bill smokes in bed
(d) This is the man that smokes a pipe in bed

And both relatives in (8a–b) differ in interpretation from the corresponding sequence when used finitely. The form of the relative in (8b) is that of a finite (question), but this form in this subordinate context is not interpreted as a question, whatever semantic properties there may be in common. As a main clause, the sequence *which Bill smokes in bed* can only be interpreted as a question about the identity of the several Bills involved in smoking some unspecified entity. And the sequence *Bill smokes in bed* can be used finitely, but in that case the absence of the expected object is interpreted 'indefinitely', or 'characteristically', whereas the absence (in its usual position) of the object in (8a) is interpreted anaphorically.

So too with both (8c–d) the absence of object and subject is interpreted anaphorically, even though, once more, the sequence *Bill smokes in bed* can be used finitely. The simple (non-*wh*-marked) 'anaphoric-gap' construction of (8c–d) is also non-finite (despite, again, the retention of many markers of finiteness): the same sequence cannot be interpreted as a main clause. But, unlike the *wh*-construction, this anaphoric-gap construction is not normally used finitely. Relatives express embedded declaratives, but in an interpretation that cannot be used in a finite main clause.

These observations should not be interpreted, however, as leading to the conclusion that every clause preceded by a clausal subordinator should be treated as non-finite. I have not myself here invoked the subordinator in deciding on the finiteness status of the predication. The relationship between mood, finiteness and construction in subordinate clauses is a complex one, as the immediately following discussion will reveal, but it does not invoke extra-predicational elements such as independent subordinators.

4. The status of subordinating words and the role of word order

The *that* in (8c–d) and (9a) does indeed mark the clauses following it as subordinate – unlike the 'contact clause' in (9b).

(9) (a) We said that Bill smokes a pipe in bed
(b) We said Bill smokes a pipe in bed

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But this does not warrant attributing non-finiteness to (9a) as well as (8c–d). Such a suggestion would drain finiteness of almost any independent content it might have: the only subordinate finites would be 'contact clauses' like (9b). Moreover, both (9a) and (9b) differ from all of (8) in not showing any 'clause-internal' departure from the prototypical manifestation of finiteness associated with main-clause indicatives. In this they differ from the expression of other moods.

Of course, (9) involve reported assertions; they do not reflect the mood of the whole complex sentence. But this embedded-assertion status is signalled by their indicative structure, whereas, although the subordinates in (7) may involve a reported question, whether or not this is the case is indicated by the superordinate verb, say *asked* vs. *knew*. The non-prototypical mood of the utterance reported by the subordinate clause is imposed by this verb. Both main-clause and subordinate indicatives may be qualified by modal elements (adverbs, 'dicitur' morphology, etc. – see below). Modality (say, epistemic or deontic), unlike non-prototypical mood, is compatible with declarativeness, even though, as with negation, its expression may depart from prototypical indicative expression. But a subordinate indicative has the same value as a main-clause: it makes an assertion. Declaratives, like other moods, are associated with constructions that are finite; but other moods are not expressed in subordinate clauses by this finite construction. It is, of course, not impossible to express reported questions, for instance, but not in English by the construction dedicated to finite expression(s) of that mood. Conversely, unmarked reported declaratives are indicative and finite. And non-finite expression of them is often not by a dedicated construction: consider the infinitive, which may express either a reported declarative or a reported imperative.

This strongly suggests that it is necessary, and indeed more illuminating, to exclude from considerations of finiteness clausal subordinators that do not impinge on the internal structure of the clause: they are extra-predicational, so not pertinent to questions of finiteness. Unlike the above *wh*-forms (which represent arguments, participant or circumstantial, of the predicator, or refer to the truth of the predicator itself), *that* is not integrated into the predication it announces. The subordinate clause in (9a) is thus finite.

The German subordinate clause in (10a), however, is not finite, on other grounds.

(10) (a) Er sagte, daß er ihn gesehen hätte
he said that he him saw had:SBJV
'He said that he had seen him'

(b) Ich hatte den Hut vergessen/Den Hut hatte ich vergessen
I had the hat forgotten the hat had I forgotten
'I had forgotten the hat'

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(c) Er sagte, er hätte ihn gesehen
he said he had:SBJV him saw
'He said he had seen him'

The position of the verb is incompatible with finiteness, as shown by the main-clause order in (10b): the subordinate clause in (10a) contains a non-finite construction signalled by word order, which is reinforced (in this case) by presence vs. absence of the subordinator (though, as we have seen, this, being outside the predication, is not a determinant of finiteness). The subordinate clause in (10c), without subordinator and with main-clause order, is finite in this respect, however. And this finiteness is determined by the positional syntax, without necessary reference to the presence or absence of the subordinator.

In connexion with this, I note in passing that the relation between absence/presence of subordinator and word order (particularly availability or otherwise of 'verb-inversion') is more complex than some advocates of accounts involving 'movement' have assumed. Thus, for instance, in Old English we find 'inversion' as well as (more commonly) its absence in clauses introduced by a subordinator (for references see Denison 1993: part II). We are dealing here with potentially independent variables.

Determination of the status of (10c) depends also on what one makes of its 'dicitur'/evidential subjunctive *hätte* (can it be finite? – see further below). But there is, anyway, a tendency to use the indicative in such constructions, consistent with a finite status, particularly when the speaker wants to convey the modality of certainty, or perhaps just unmarked modality (though there are other factors – see Hammer 1983: 265–268).

Thus, the excluding of simple clausal subordinators from evaluation of finiteness is consistent with the view that finiteness is a property of predications, and thus of the head of the predication, the predicator. The subordinate clause in (9a), as well as (b), manifests all the prototypical declarative properties, including its interpretation. And in this respect the situation is unlike that with other forms (such as the *wh*-construction) which may be finite or non-finite but in the two cases are associated with a different interpretation, with the finite interpretation being a marked mood. This has led us to the conclusion that only declarative (but possibly modal) expressions can constitute subordinate finites.

I assume too that 'adverbial' clauses containing the indicative, such as (11), are also finite.

(11) (a) When/as she was leaving John arrived home
(b) John arrived home when/as she was leaving

This might seem not to be consistent with the suggestion that the clause announced by *where* (for which we could substitute *when*, for instance) in (7d) is non-finite. The difference is that the occurrence of *where* or *when* in

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(7d) and the like is licensed by the complement-taking main verb and the interpretation of the subordinate clause is modal rather than associated with mood, and so, as governed, the clause is necessarily non-finite; whereas the *wh*-form in (11) is independently selected and the interpretation unmarked in mood and modality.

The exclusion of clausal subordinators from considerations of finiteness may be related to the possibility of using clauses preceded by what is normally a clausal subordinator to express, in conjunction with the verbal subjunctive, a non-prototypical mood, as in the French hortative in (12a), or, without subjunctive marking, exclamatory mood, as in (12b) (which once had an analogue in English).

(12) (a) Que votre Majesté me le rende!
that your majesty me it return:SBJV
'Let your majesty return it to me!'
(b) Qu'il est gentil!
that it/he is nice
'How nice it/he is!'

It may rather be, however, that this usage merely reflects a generalisation that extra-predicational markers of subordination are no more exempt from finite use to signal marked moods than the use as finites of verbal forms which more generally indicate non-finiteness, such as we shall encounter shortly.

Notice too, incidentally, the English exclamative in the gloss to (12b), where a 'preposed' element which is normally associated with inversion (in questions) occurs in a main clause with prototypical order of subject and verb. The combination signals a distinct marked mood.

Inversion was once quite extensive in what are traditionally (though perhaps questionably) regarded as subordinate clauses in English, in the shape of irrealis conditional protases like (13a), which are now tending to obsolescence, but were not uncommon in preceding centuries – with latterly limitation to the presence of certain operatives, such as *had* in (13a):

(13) (a) Had he realised that, Bill would not have smoked a pipe in bed
(b) If he realised that, Bill would not smoke a pipe in bed
(c) It is remarkable how extensive is his knowledge of eighteenth-century warfare
(d) If it assume my noble father's person, I'll speak to it, though hell itself should gape

The protasis of (13a) involves the 'inflected', rather than the 'bare', subjunctive (Anderson 2004: section 3), expressing irrealis (indeed 'counterfactual').

Let me explain the terms just used here. The inflected subjunctive shares its form with the preterite (indicative), as is clearly shown by *realised* in (13b), and also by *had* in (13a), where past time reference is signalled by the

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have-periphrasis rather than the inflection on *had*. The bare subjunctive of the Shakespearian sentence of (13d) cited by Poutsma (1926: 188) became highly literary and is obsolete in such conditionals and in (other) adverbial clauses (note the use of a subjunctive periphrasis in the final concessive clause). The terms 'bare' and 'inflected' reflect the fact that in Present-day English the first of these shares its form with the infinitive (and imperative), while the latter shares its (overtly inflected) form with the preterite (except that subjunctive *were* doesn't contrast in person-number, unlike preterite *were* (vs. *was*)).

We come back to the bare subjunctive below. What I am concerned with at this point is evidence that inversion in English has not been limited to uncontroversial main clauses, and that we can differentiate a finite (though not prototypical, in English) use of it, in interrogatives, and a non-finite, in conditional protases, if the latter are subordinates. There is another vestigial subordinate-clause use of inversion, illustrated by (13c). It, however, involves factors of 'weight': 'lightening' the final phrase in (13c) leads to increasing unacceptability. So, it is generally true that in Present-day English the inversion construction, outside a few specialised constructions (*Here comes Joey*, *Seldom have I been so surprised*), is a marker of questions, and as such devoted to main-clause use. It has, however, a shared role in a distinct further use, namely the following.

The (?also obsolescent) English periphrastic optative in (14a) is finite, though it necessarily contains an operative, indeed the specific operative that, along with inversion, expresses the mood:

(14) (a) May he smoke a pipe in bed!
(b) Let him/let's smoke a pipe in bed!

So too the hortative in (14b). This in addition lacks a nominative subject, though it also shows cliticisation uncharacteristic of accusatives.

5. Subjunctives

In some languages, hortatives and optatives are expressed using what is traditionally called a 'subjunctive' form, as in the Latin optative (15a):

(15) (a) Stet haec urbs
stand:SBJV this city
'May this city continue to stand'
(b) Utinam reviviscat frater
may relive:SBJV brother
'May my brother come to life/Would that my brother would come to life' (from Gildersleeve & Lodge 1867/1968: section 260)

Again, the (finite) subjunctive main clause may be introduced by a subordinator, *ut* (cf. French (12a)), but more common is *utinam*, as in

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(15b), which has specialised as a mood marker (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1867/1968: section 261). Note too again the expressionally non-prototypical character of the English gloss. The subjunctives in (15) are associated with particular, more specific moods, and as such they are necessarily finite.

However, my impression is that, in so far as there is a uniform application of the term 'subjunctive', it is as denoting a verbal form that signals 'irrealis'. This underlies such traditional formulations as Gildersleeve & Lodge (1867/1968: section 255):

> The Subjunctive Mood represents the predicate *as an idea*, as something merely conceived in the mind (abstracts from reality).

Such a modal use is in principle compatible with either finite or non-finite status, both in main and subordinate clauses. Usually, indeed, such forms are taken to be 'finite', on the basis of retention of indicative properties, like taking a nominative subject, showing person-number concord (though often reduced – and indeed lost in Present-day English) and tense (though often 'modalised' – as, completely, in English). However, such a characterisation conceals a vast range of different uses associated with the subjunctive even in the various Indo-European languages, not to mention the forms that have been labelled 'subjunctive' in other languages. Certainly, in so far as subjunctive simply expresses (irrealis) modalities (including 'dicitur'/evidential) it can be a finite that appears in both main and subordinate clauses. But conversion of (non-factual) modality into (non-prototypical) mood, as exemplified by (15), introduces a necessarily finite use. And a combination of specialisation as a mood marker in main clauses and as an irrealis governed by main-clause elements in subordinates can lead to a finite/non-finite split: the finite and non-finite uses are different (though related) in interpretation. And even a purely 'irrealis' use of the subjunctive is often associated with non-finiteness, indeed with government by particular classes of main verbs. An interpretation for a construction that is available only under government is necessarily associated with non-finiteness of the construction.

The Present-day English bare subjunctive, indeed, is only non-finite; finite use is obsolete. Except in a few idioms like *Long live the Emperor*, it cannot appear in a main clause (see Jespersen (1933: section 27.3$_1$) for a list of common idioms, and Poutsma (1926: chapter LXIX, sections 6–12) for a fuller treatment). The typical bare subjunctive occurs, rather, in constructions governed by different classes of superordinate predicators, as illustrated in (16a):

(16) (a) They demanded/required that Bill (not) smoke a pipe in bed
(b) They demanded/required that Bill smokes/doesn't smoke

The presence of the subjunctive in (16a) is sanctioned by the governing verb. Notice too the position of the negative in (16a), characteristic of (non-finite) infinitives (as observed by Haegeman & Guéron 1999: 325): compare (3b–c).

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In the present context, we can associate this position for the negative with non-finite (bare) forms; in contrast, the negative of the (main-clause) non-finite bare form of the English imperative discussed in section 6 takes a (finite) operative (*Don't go*, etc.).

The minimal functional value of the English governed subjunctive in (16a) is reflected in the fact that many speakers may alternatively or in preference use the indicative form in (16b) (cf. e.g. Jespersen 1924: 316). As a marker of irrealis in subordinate constructions it is superfluous to the extent that irrealis is imposed by the governing verb. This marginality is no doubt enhanced by the minimal expressional salience of the bare subjunctive vis-à-vis the indicative.

(16a) involves the bare subjunctive, whose form is, as noted, identical to the (bare) infinitive, and (except in the case of *be*) to the non-third-singular present indicative form. Subjunctives lack the (for English) prototypical finiteness manifestations of agreement and of marking for preterite vs. non-preterite tense. Whatever the inflected and the bare subjunctives differ in semantically, it does not involve the signalling or not of preterite tense (cf. again Anderson 2004: section 3). As we have seen, traditional descriptions usually class subjunctives as 'finite' on the basis of retention of prototypical properties. But, on the present view, this cannot be criterial; and the 'retention' in English, indeed, is minimal. We have with the English subjunctive another instance of the failure of the properties to 'cluster': only the licensing of a nominative subject in the canonical position (except in 'inversion conditionals' – recall (13a)) remains of these. So that even in terms of morphosyntactic properties the subjunctive is marginal as a potential 'finite', as are the modals. And syntactically the subjunctive is non-finite in Present-day English, while the modals are finite (except where used as subjunctive periphrases – Anderson 2001b, 2004).

More generally, it seems that subjunctives may be finite or non-finite in the same language, with different interpretations in the two cases. In many languages, in main clauses the subjunctive can, particularly in conjunction with other markers, signal specific moods, such as optative. Often, as we have seen, in subordinate clauses the subjunctive is irrealis merely, with any indication of 'mood' coming from a superordinate predicator (which governs the subjunctive); such government is illustrated in English by (16a); but the English bare subjunctive, unlike the Latin, lacks a finite use.

Jacaltec introduces a descriptive problem that we encounter in a lot of languages which appear to have both a finite and a non-finite use of the subjunctive. The Jacaltec *-oj* form looks as if it illustrates both finite and non-finite use of the same (subjunctive) form, depending on the interpretation:

(17) (a) chura- oj ab s-c'ul anma tu'
get.angry-SBJV HORTATIVE stomach people that
'Let them get angry'

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(b) xc-ach to sajch-oj
you go play-SBJV
'You want to play' (from Craig 1977)

In (17a) the subjunctive and 'hortative particle' signal a mood; in (17b) the irrealis subjunctive is triggered by the verb class of the governor.

Whether or not the preceding is a just description of this and similar systems depends on the analysis of the 'hortative particle'. If the latter is an operative, for instance (like the Greek 'particles' mentioned in section 10 below, which refers to the discussion in Anderson 2001a), then the subjunctive form can be interpreted as governed by it, and so non-finite. And this may also apply to *utinam* in (15b). A similar problem arises with Algonquian 'conjunct' verb forms, which are ordinarily non-finite, but can mark main-clause moods in association with certain other elements (Mithun 1999: 266–268). I do not pursue this here. But the treatment of the Greek 'particles' in Anderson (2001a) suggests how a general argument might go on the status of such 'particles' as that in (17a) and such subjunctive uses. In such languages too the subjunctive may be uniformly non-finite.

In some languages, the subjunctive has an irrealis interpretation in main as well as subordinate clauses, and is thus potentially uniformly finite (when showing this interpretation), other things being equal, as with German (18).

(18) Das wäre eine gute Idee
that be:SBJV a good idea
'That would be a good idea'

A finite irrealis subjunctive is a modalised indicative. English has a periphrastic non-governed irrealis subjunctive, as in the gloss to (18), which is a finite that also occurs in both main and subordinate clauses. In German, overt subordination of the irrealis subjunctive is associated with non-finite word order, as in the 'dicitur' use of (10a), vs. (10c) with finite word order. Example (18) and both (10a) and (10c) seem to represent variants of 'irrealis'. On these grounds the subjunctive clauses in (10c) and (18) are both finite.

The interpretation of what comes closest to being a main-clause irrealis subjunctive of Latin – what Gildersleeve & Lodge call the 'potential subjunctive' – 'varies from vague surmise to moral certainty, from "may" and "might" to "must"' (1867/1968: section 257). They cite such forms as *vellem* 'I should have wished'; English again uses a periphrasis. In addition, the Latin irrealis subjunctive is not necessarily governed when in a subordinate clause. It can occur in, for instance, (subordinate) temporal clauses 'when Suspense and Design are involved' (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1867/1968: section

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572), as well as in various kinds of irrealis conditional protases and apodoses (section 596–597):

(19) (a) Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis
clown waits until run.off:SBJV river
'The clown waits for the river to run dry'
(b) Si id credidisses, erravisses
if that you.believe:2SG.PRF.SBJV err:2SG.PRF.SBJV
'If you had believed that, you would have gone wrong'

In English there is a (finite) periphrastic subjunctive in the apodosis; the morphological (inflected) subjunctive again occurs only in the subordinate sentence. The Latin irrealis subjunctive is apparently finite, despite government in some circumstances. For irrealis in main clauses, however, English, as we have seen, uses a (finite) subjunctive periphrasis, not a simple verb form, as in the gloss to (18). The English morphological subjunctive is non-finite; and only some of the irrealis periphrases in English are finite.

In some uses in Latin, such as are illustrated by (15a), the Latin subjunctive occurs only in main clauses. Thus, Latin subjunctives have both a finite use (optative) limited to main clauses and a finite use (irrealis) that occurs in both main clauses and subordinates.

Many of the uses in both main and subordinate clauses in Latin that are described as 'potential' or 'irrealis' occurrences seem to be specialised (as markers of modality, politeness, etc.). But, in general, pure irrealis subjunctives tend to non-finiteness – as reflected in the traditional name for the verb form that is the head of such constructions, 'subjunctive', translated from the Greek 'hypotaktikē'. And the main-clause subjunctive tends to be specialised for the expression of particular moods and modalities. The subjunctive (in so far as we can generalise about such a diversely manifested putative construction) is thus a construction often split between finite non-declarative main-clause and governed modal subordinate-clause uses, the latter of which (given the loss of equivalent main-clause uses) are non-finite.

6. Imperatives and infinitives

The imperative construction of (20) is finite, signalling the mood of command or direction. But, compared with the indicative, its choice of subject is restricted in person and it may be absent:

(20) (You) smoke a pipe in bed!

As Huddleston & Pullum observe (2002: 80–89), the form of the verb in (20) is the same as that in subordinate, and apparently non-finite, constructions such as those in (21), traditional 'infinitives'.

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(21) (a) Bill appears to smoke a pipe in bed
(b) Bill longs to smoke a pipe in bed
(c) (For him) to smoke a pipe in bed is unthinkable
(d) She expected him to smoke a pipe in bed

Compare already Bloomfield (1933: 164): 'the forms which, when spoken with exclamatory final-pitch, have the meaning of a command, make up, by virtue of this fact, the English form-class of "INFINITIVE expressions"' (my emphasis – JMA). Like the bare subjunctive, the imperative shares its verb form with the infinitive. The infinitive constructions in (21a–c) lack an adjacent or obligatory nominative subject, and, however one analyses (21d), it too lacks a nominative subject. But the imperative and infinitive are not manifestations of the same construction – just as the non-third-singular present indicative verb form in English and the bare subjunctive are associated with different constructions. In most circumstances in English the infinitive is distinguished by a periphrastic element, *to*. And, as we have seen, the imperative takes an optional unmarked subject of a very restricted kind. These properties are, of course, particular to the English imperative: in other languages imperatives may differentiate number and/or person and embrace hortative.

The subordinates in (21) are not commands. Nor is this the case in (22), where the command sense is embodied in the superordinate verb.

(22) We ordered him to smoke in bed

This is what we have come to expect of non-declarative moods. Non-inflecting *smoke* is finite in the absence of a nominative subject only in an imperative construction, which bears a command interpretation, and in the absence of periphrastic *to*, or if it is associated with yet another mood, to which I now turn.

I have in mind finite sentences like (23), involving what Nikolaeva (to appear b) calls an 'incredulity root infinitive'.

(23) Him, smoke a pipe in bed!?

Since normally a subjunctive in English takes a nominative subject and imperatives are second person, we can safely regard the verb form in (23) as an infinitive: (23) lacks an overt subject, but contains a topic. This construction lacks almost all the characteristics of a prototypical finite, but it constitutes an independent predication. Of course, as with many uses of moods, that in (23) implies a context: it is typically a response of some sort, often indeed an 'echo'. But such a usage should be distinguished from elliptical 'sentence fragments' such as answers to questions which fill in slots in preceding predications and do not constitute a distinct structurally independent sentence themselves:

(24) What does he smoke in bed? A pipe

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With (23) there is nothing needing to be supplied from the context to render it syntactically complete (as opposed to referentially transparent). (23) is a complete predication, an independent sentence; the second utterance in (24) is non-predicational, structurally parasitic upon a predicational utterance.

Unlike 'subjunctive', the form-type to which 'infinitive' is traditionally applied has been considered by many to be an exemplary 'non-finite' form, associated with lack of a nominative subject, and in English, absence of person-number and tense marking. All of these morphosyntactic properties are parochial, and none of them needs to be associated with non-finiteness (in the sense adopted here); even the presence of a nominative subject can be associated with a form that otherwise, in another use, is resolutely non-finite, as will immediately be illustrated. At most we can say that infinitives are forms whose unmarked use is non-finite; but, despite being in some way or other non-prototypical of finites in their expression, they may also mark a variety of different moods, and thus be finite.

Nikolaeva (to appear b: section 3.4) discusses a range of moods expressed by infinitives in various languages, including declarative mood. Latin (25) illustrates this:

(25) … noctu multa domum dimitti
at-night many:NOM home send:INF.PASS
'At night many were sent home'

Here the verb form takes a nominative subject (though there is syncretism with the accusative in this instance) and is inflected for passive voice, but it lacks marking of tense and agreement; it normally has a past-time reference, however. Such forms are thus marked as non-prototypical, specialised declaratives, which normally don't constitute the initial predication in a discourse, and are as such labelled by Nikolaeva 'narrative root infinitives'. And we can associate this restriction with the departure from the manifestations of prototypicality normally associated with (particularly declarative) finiteness.

Disterheft (1980) discusses what she calls 'predicate infinitives' in early Indo-European languages. She includes among these 'predicates' infinitives which are governed by a copula and which I do not consider here; finiteness is carried in their case by the copula. But, among finite infinitive clauses, she also distinguishes clauses like the Latin of (25) from a type with a slightly different interpretation, one which is illustrated by (26), from the *Rigveda* (Disterheft 1980: 44):

(26) stuṣé káṇvāso aśvínā
praise-INF Kanvas:NOM Ashvins:ACC
'The Kanvas praise the Ashvins'

Disterheft comments on this use of the infinitive that it 'typically describes ritual or habitual actions and activities of the gods' (1980: 41). The infinitive

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is finite, and declarative, but this use is restricted to a very particular register; moreover, expression of non-present tense or non-declarative mood utilises the copula. It can be said to represent a sub-type of 'narrative' infinitive.

Disterheft also distinguishes an 'imperative infinitive', which seems to be associated with a range of moods, including hortative, optative and imperative. Such a use can be illustrated by the first conjunct in the Hittite of (27a) (from Disterheft 1980: 166):

(27) (a) tuk-ma kī uttar ŠÀ- ta siyanna
you-but this:NOM word:NOM heart-LOC impress:INF
ishiull-a ēsdu
covenant:NOM-and may.it.be:IMP
'May this matter be impressed on you in (your) heart and may it be a covenant'

(b) Schuhe abtreten
shoes wipe:INF
'Wipe your shoes'

Concerning this and similar examples, Disterheft comments: 'That these are indeed imperatival in meaning is demonstrated by the fact that there is sometimes a parallel finite imperative in an adjacent sentence' (1980: 165), as in (27a). In present terms, both 'sentences' in (27a) are 'finite', however one classifies their mood. Infinitival imperatives are also familiar from other languages – for instance, as parts of instructions or official notices: cf. (27b) from German.

Thus, apart from the 'narrative' infinitive, there are finite uses of infinitives that involve non-declarative moods. This is illustrated by the 'incredulity' example from English in (24), as well as the 'deliberative' of (28), which (as is usual with the infinitive) lacks a subject:

(28) Why speak of those times?

Latin uses here an interrogative word plus 'deliberative subjunctive' ('conjunctivus deliberativus' – Gildersleeve & Lodge 1867/1968: section 265).

Since the 'narrative' infinitive of (25) and (26) is declarative, it is non-prototypical in other ways than these other 'root infinitives', in involving discourse restrictions of different sorts, not a mood distinction. The lesser distance of (25) from prototypicality is perhaps reflected in the fact that it alone of these finite infinitive constructions shows an unmarked (nominative) overt subject.

Notice finally here that these finite uses of a typically non-finite construction are not arbitrary. Just as a non-finite infinitive is associated with subordination, so the (finite) 'narrative infinitive' of (25) is associated with predications that are subordinate within discourse, within the structure of the narrative. And just as non-finite infinitives are associated with unspecified subjects, so the 'imperative infinitives' of instructions, such as (27b), have

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an unspecified subject, rather than the immediately identifiable addressee of ordinary imperatives. The relationship between these complementary uses of the infinitive is thus non-arbitrary.

7. Markedness of mood and prototypicality of expression: an overview

In this section I try to draw together the main observations made above concerning the correlation between 'markedness' of mood (deviance from declarativeness) and its English morphosyntactic expression.

Interrogatives and (particularly) negatives do not depart radically from positive (non-modal) declaratives in mood: only a positive declarative asserts a proposition, but all of these 'moods' can be related to the truth of some assertion, the negative most directly. And, as relatively unmarked in mood, in departing minimally from the prototypical, interrogatives and negatives accordingly tend to retain the manifestations of prototypicality. They add properties rather than cancelling them. Indeed, negatives, which essentially stand outside the mood system, involve minimal disruption of indicativeness: they are realised by indicatives containing a negative marker. And they do not affect the finiteness status of the predications they are associated with. They appear in main-clause and subordinate finites (as in (3a) and a report of it), and in non-finite predications (as in (3b–c)). In other languages, negation (like interrogation) is an overtly verbal form, which may be finite.

Subjunctives, in marking irrealis, non-factuality of the assertion, may depart further from the manifestations of finiteness associated with the indicative; and they may indeed in particular languages be non-finite, if limited to occurrence under government. They may also be associated with moods (hortative, etc.) more marked than the question, in not involving a (questioned) assertion. Imperatives, as typically directives rather than assertions, are more marked still in their function, and they tend to depart even more in their structure from that of the prototype. And, as with questions, their dedicated construction is restricted to main clauses. More than subjunctives, infinitives are typically non-finite, and, more than subjunctives, show reduced verbal properties. But, again as with subjunctives, infinitive forms can often be used finitely to express non-prototypical predications, typically involving marked moods; but, as with finite irrealis subjunctives, they can also sometimes express restricted, untypical declaratives, as in the case of the 'narrative infinitive'. See also Evans (to appear) for a survey of such 'insubordinations'. Ledgeway (to appear) documents that we also find diachronic 'demotions' of expressions used in finite clauses to non-finite use.

Imperatives are insistently finite; infinitives are predominantly non-finite; on the other hand, imperatives are marked in mood, whereas finite infinitives

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MOOD	CONSTRUCTION	CLAUSE STATUS	EXAMPLE
declarative	indicative		(1)
question	inquisitive (intonation)	Main	(5b)
exclamative	*wh*	Main	(12b) gloss
question	inquisitive + *wh*	Main	(6b)
reassertion	contrast (intonation + operative)		(3d)
	negative + operative		(3a)
	ectopic + *wh*	Subordinate	(7)
question	inversion + operative	Main	(5a)
question	ectopic + inverted + *wh*	Main	(6a–d)
optative inversion	+ periphrastic *may*	Main	(14a)
(exclamative	subordinator	Main	(12b))
(optative irrealis	subordinator + subjunctive	Main	(12a))
declarative irrealis conditional	bare subjunctive	Subordinate	(16a)
declarative (declarative	inflected subjunctive	Subordinate	(13b)
narrative	nominative + infinitive	Main	(25))
command	imperative	Main	(20)
(instruction	infinitive	Main	(27b))
declarative	infinitive	Subordinate	(21)
	negative + infinitive	Subordinate	(3b–c)
hortative	infinitive + periphrastic *let's*	Main	(14b)
deliberative	ectopic + *wh* + infinitive	Main	(28)
incredulity	infinitive + topic	Main	(23)

Table 1
Moods and verbal constructions in English

may be assertions, i.e. declarative, as well as directives. However, they both depart significantly from the prototypical declarative. And, in expression, both may or must lack an overt subject (or other principal relation – see e.g. Anderson 1997: 188–191), even in languages where this lack is generally disallowed. This may underlie their overlap in use – and, in English, in form. In English, the overlap in form has extended even to one of the two varieties of subjunctive, the bare subjunctive.

This formal coalescence perhaps reflects the adjacency of the constructions in the rough hierarchy of prototypicality of expression tentatively suggested by the ordering (from top to bottom) in table 1. Columns 1 and 2 in

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table 1 list, respectively, moods and other communicative functions, and constructions which may express them; some of the entries in column 2 involve combinations of components which may appear in other entries. Column 3 indicates whether the construction is limited, on that particular interpretation, to main or subordinate clause, or not: finiteness-expressing constructions occur only in main or in both. The bracketed entries in the table are constructions not found in English, but mentioned above and included for comparative purposes. It will be immediately obvious that just a modest expansion in the languages invoked would reveal many further constructional possibilities.

Clearly, too, the ranking of (unbracketed) entries is language-specific. For instance, the low ranking of the subjunctives reflects the low retention of indicative properties in the English constructions. Also, much of the ranking in the table remains intuitive, so that, for instance, my ranking of inquisitive intonation as less disruptive of indicative expression than presence of an operative may simply reflect a traditional syntactico-centric bias among grammarians. Here there is lacking an objective measure of degree of divergence from the prototype. Such language-specific tables, however, might prove useful in the comparison of the finiteness status of constructions in different languages and in the elucidation of the range of variation to be found in language. And that may contribute to the development of a measure of divergence. At this point it seems to me that modesty is appropriate in proposing measures of prototypicality in this area.

Overall, then, though there may be tendencies in the expression of finiteness, clauses containing verb forms of any of the various particular types (briefly surveyed here) that are not prototypically finite (either in interpretation or in expression) are not necessarily excluded from finiteness. Some verb forms, however, such as 'participles' and 'gerunds', do not seem to be at all usual in finite use. Rather, the 'independent occurrence' of constructions they head is limited, as with other sentence fragments, to very specialised registers, such as, in their case, headlines and titles of publications. But even they in such circumstances may constitute an independent (but marked) predication.

Notice finally here that I'm not suggesting that what we've been looking at constitutes an argument for grammars based on 'constructions' (as in, say, Goldberg 1995). The constructions invoked here are simply collections of morphosyntactic properties with no content independent from that of their heads. The 'meaning' of a (combination of) construction(s) is simply part of the meaning of its head, particularly (in the area we're concerned with) its mood, modality and finiteness status. Thus the various individual constructions, such as the 'infinitival', do not have a consistent 'meaning', and they may combine with each other in different functions. What is crucial is the finiteness status of the predication realised by the construction or combination of constructions: does the predicator license status as

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an independent predication? Finiteness is itself a property of the head of the construction, the verbal element, lexical verb or operative, in the cases we have been looking at. Observe how the crucial non-intonational differentia of the constructions in the table involve the form of the head (agreement, subjunctive, infinitive) or its relation to other elements (nominative-assignment, final-position, inversion, ectopicity, topicalisation). Even the intonation associated with reassertion is tied to this head; while negation and inquisitive intonation do not affect the finiteness status of the predication. Indeed, the position of the negative is decided by the finiteness of the predicator it negates. Finiteness is a lexical property of predicators.

8. Non-verbal predicators

Finiteness can even be associated with non-verbal predicators. This is indeed a familiar observation: Hjelmslev (1948), for instance, recognises this as a motivation for disassociating predicativity ('nexus') from verbs; and there was at an earlier period much other discussion of 'nominal sentences', particularly as manifested in early Indo-European (Meillet 1906–1908, Bloch 1906–1908), but also elsewhere (Gauthiot 1908–1909, Sacleux 1908–1909). True 'nominal sentences' lack a verb, even a copula.

More recently, Stassen (1997), in providing an account of different 'intransitive' predicators, illustrates in some detail non-verbal ones, particularly nominal. Such non-copular constructions are 'used almost uniformly in Oceania (covering the Papuan, Australian, and Eastern Austronesian languages)' and are 'highly prominent in Central and South America' (Stassen 1997: 63), and elsewhere.

Stassen illustrates the construction with, for instance, the sentence in (29) from Guaraní (Tupi):

(29) né soldádo
2SG soldier
'You are a soldier'
(Stassen 1997: 63, citing Gregores & Suárez 1967: 158)

(29) is complete; there is no motivation for appealing to a non-overt verb (as demonstrated by Stassen 1997: chapter 3). Non-verbal predicators are non-prototypical as predicators, however; associating finiteness with them is also non-prototypical, then. And, as is familiar, in many languages the equivalent of such sentences as (29) must contain a verb (as in English) or a verb is absent from them only when the tense/aspect/mood is unmarked, as in many other Indo-European languages (cf. e.g. Lyons 1968: section 7.6.3), and as with the 'predicate infinitives' discussed by Disterheft (1980: section 2.2) – though unmarked tense/aspect/mood does not necessarily correlate with absence of a copula (Stassen 1997: section 3.3).

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Jespersen (1924: 121) notes one circumstance in which 'nominal sentences' regularly occur in English, which he illustrates with a range of quotations, including (30a), from Ruskin:

(30) (a) Quite serious all this, though it reads like a joke
(b) Singulier homme qu'Aristote
'A singular man (*subordinator*) Aristotle'

The preposed adjective in (30a) is not 'supported by' a copula, but we have a viable predication. Jespersen also notes the equivalent French construction, with the same subordinator as we found in (12). He observes in conclusion (1924: 122): 'It is no use saying that we have here ellipsis of *is*; it would only weaken the idiomatic force of such sentences if we were to add the verb, though it would be required if the subject were placed first'. And he comments: 'I have given all these examples, because grammarians generally fail to appreciate these constructions' (ibid). Plus ça change!

We also find in English the typically parenthetical, but syntactically complete, type of (31):

(31) … And him a clergyman …

(31) lacks a verb, any possible candidate for a nominative subject and any morphosyntactic indication of finiteness; but it is a complete predication, with mood indicated by verblessness, the 'conjunction' and the accusative. It is difficult to reconcile this with the 'deletion' analysis often advocated for 'nominal sentences' (alluded to by Jespersen, and undermined by Stassen 1997: section 3.3).

Kahn (1973: 436) offers such a ('deletion') proposal, of a type also espoused by Anderson (1971) and Hopper (1972), for instance. Specifically he suggests that 'nominal sentences' of Ancient Greek such as (32a) – cf. English (30a) – involve 'a phenomenon of zeroing or deletion of the copula', retained in (32b):

(32) (a) Kalòs ho paĩs
beautiful the boy
(b) Kalós esti ho paĩs
beautiful is the boy

Such a device is unacceptably powerful; and, as Stassen (1997: section 3.3) shows, such a derivation is difficult to reconcile with the absence in a large number of languages of any evidence for a copula construction. Similarly unacceptable is the postulation of a 'zero-copula' (argued against by e.g. Jelinek & Demers 1994: section 2.5). These proposals are both clearly unacceptable in a properly restrictive grammar that does not countenance deletions or elements in a particular language that are never realised.

Equally unacceptable is the suggestion that the copula is inserted in such as (32b). Lyons (1968: 323), for instance, claims 'to have made a general case

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for the elimination of the "verb *to be*" from the underlying constituent-structure of English' (cf. also Bach 1967). Kahn (1973: 436f.) observes, with respect to such an insertion analysis of 'non-verbal predications', that 'as a device accounting for the Greek data, this solution is clearly uneconomical', and that 'we would have to specify a rule for its possible insertion in all cases and for its massive, well-nigh obligatory insertion in most cases'. Moreover, postulation of (transformational) insertion of syntactic categories and their realisations is again highly undesirable, as well as encountering the kind of distributional problems raised by Stassen (1997: section 3.3).

All of these proposals invoke an over-powerful syntactic apparatus. It is surely preferable to simply accept (in the spirit of Hjelmslev) that (29) and (32a), etc. are complete finite sentences that lack a verbal form, and that non-verbal predicators may carry finiteness. This is characteristic of a number of languages. There are others where in certain circumstances (marked tensing, for instance) finiteness cannot be attributed to non-verbal predicators. And others reject this very generally; nominal predicators are non-finite (with such exceptions as (30) or (31)). This is one more aspect of variability in language: whatever the preferences to be found in particular languages, there is no universal template for sentences with nominal predicators. Nominal predications introduce another kind of deviance from prototypicality, given that verbs are the prototypical predicator, and they are the normal repository of finiteness; but the nouns in nominal sentences are nevertheless predicators, and finite.

Bloomfield discusses along with imperatives another class of 'exclamations' that he refers to as 'the form-class of "personal substantive expressions"' (1933: 164), which he illustrates with *John!*, *Boy!*, *Mr. Smith!* and *Teacher!* Later (1933: 170), Bloomfield comments: 'In the exclamation just cited, *John* is a sentence'. These constitute a distinct class of 'nominal sentence' expressing a particular mood, 'vocative'.

Finally, we should mention minimal predications like those in (33a), not usually cited in connexion with finiteness:

(33) (a) Hello
Thank you
(b) Yes

There are pragmatic limitations of use of both of (33a), but they cannot be said to be structurally incomplete. Interpretation of (33b), certainly, is even more heavily context-dependent; like the second part of (24), it is a 'response', usually to an utterance. But (33b) is also not a 'fragment'; and it is not structurally parasitic. Its interpretation does not involve missing structure (as that of the answer in (24) does), but assent to a proposition, however the latter was expressed. Thus, it too can perhaps be taken as a manifestation of finiteness, as well as a complete predication.

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9. Rameian finiteness

What I'm suggesting here departs from the rather incoherent tradition emanating from Ramus, or de la Ramée, whereby finiteness is associated with the presence of particular morphological categories. Ramée (cited from a near-contemporary English translation, 1585, II, chapter 1) begins his discussion of verbs thus: 'A verbe is a word of number with tense and person'. It then transpires that the full range of these properties is associated specifically with what he calls the 'verbe finite'. A 'verbe infinite' shows at most a reduced range of tense distinctions, and lacks the other properties – and it may be 'declined like a noune that hath cases'.

Much recent work in syntax has adopted some variant of this view: something of the range of proposals can be gained from George & Kornfilt (1981), Cole (1982), Raposo (1987), Fisher (1988), Holes (1990), Sridhar (1990), Holmberg et al. (1993), Platzack & Rosengren (1998), Adger (to appear); there are textbook presentations in Haegeman & Guéron (1999: 34, 94) and Sag & Wasow (1999: 188). Much of this tradition has ignored the circumspection of such treatments as Chomsky (1988: 102): 'Finite clauses can stand alone; infinitival clauses generally cannot. A finite clause typically has an indication of tense and of subject-verb agreement. … An infinitival clause typically lacks these elements.' This involves some hedging, but, if we substitute 'non-finite' for 'infinitival', it can be construed as not too different from Matthews' criterial dictionary definition (1997: 129), cited in section 1, in at least apparently implying the non-generalisability of the traditional morphological-category-based notion. And this in turn is not far from the approach advocated here, except that Matthews' definition associates finiteness specifically with the ability of a verb form to occur in 'a simple declarative sentence', while here I have suggested that we should think of declaratives as merely prototypical, and that the interpretation of the form must be taken into account in assigning finiteness, as embodied in the analyses presented in the table in section 7 above. The latter proposal, I acknowledge, is a major innovation over the requirements of the definition.

Problems with the Rameian tradition have been evident for some time: consider recently Joseph (1983: chapter 1), Koptjevskaya-Tamm (1993), Vincent (1998) and contributions to Nikolaeva (ed., to appear), some of which have been cited here. It is not just that languages vary in the properties of prototypical finites that are retained by non-finites – so that, as is familiar, some infinitives retain person marking but not tense (as in Portuguese – Joseph 1983: 12), while others retain tense (as in Latin). But also some non-finites may retain all the properties of finites, but be marked as 'dependent', non-finite (as in Abkhaz – recall Hewitt 1987: 151). And verbs in some languages do not inflect at all; a finite/non-finite distinction may not be universally applicable. As Nikolaeva (to appear a), for instance, notes, there are apparently languages where the distinction is not motivated;

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there is no distinctive form of behaviour associated with the predicators in subordinate clauses. All syntactically manifested predications in such a language would then be finite, in present terms. And, even where the distinction is applicable, there is no constancy in the set of morphological properties that are invoked as manifesting finiteness, though there are tendencies. Also, dependence on morphological criteria obscures the relevance of mood (not necessarily expressed morphologically), which is argued for here.

Such Rameian proposals as currently persist are not generalisable (without recourse to a battery of covert categories), as well as robbing finiteness of any independent content. On the other hand, the recognition that expressional properties of prototypical finites vary from language to language maintains the syntactic independence of finiteness, while, by recognising that verbal properties, by virtue of the status of verbs as core predicators, tend to be among these properties, we do not thereby obscure the prevalence in particular languages of certain properties among those that are prototypical for that language. For the most pervasive manifestations of finiteness are those which are typically verbal – marking of agreement, tense, modality, aspect, and the presence in unmarked positions of the full range of the arguments of the predicator, including in subject-forming languages signalling of an obligatory unmarked subject. Prototypical finite elements are maximally predicational. So the presence of verbal properties in finite predications is not surprising, but also not definitional.

10. Conclusion

Rejection of a morphologically-based view of finiteness, in favour of one that is independence- and mood-based, lends some interesting perspectives on familiar phenomena. For instance, Anderson (2001a) argues that various 'particles' in Greek are indeed operatives and that some traditionally 'finite' forms are indeed non-finite, dependent for their appearance in an independent clause on the presence of such a particle. Thus, as in (34a), to occur in an independent predication, the inflecting verb form, labelled 'subjunctive' (but also 'aorist', or perfective), must be accompanied by one of a range of 'particles' which may be carriers of finiteness, but some of which may in turn be subordinate to a main verb, as in (34b):

(34) (a) Θa pliroso
FUT pay:ISG.SBJV
'I shall pay'

(b) (Θelo) na pliroso
I-want PARTICLE pay:ISG.SBJV
'I want to pay'

(c) (Na) min tou to δosis
PARTICLE not to-him it give:2SG.SBJV
'Don't give him it'

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(d) Δen to iδa
not it saw:1SG
'I didn't see it'

See also Miller (2003), who argues that the 'finite' form following *na* in sentences such as (34b) is what he calls a 'conjugated infinitive'. I prefer to think of it as a neutralisation of infinitive and subjunctive: Greek simply lacks such a contrast. The form is non-finite, whatever. The negative in (34c), unlike that in (34d), is just such a 'particle' as *θa* (though a *na* 'particle' is also optionally present in (34c)). Negative commands involve the subjunctive rather than the imperative (which is a not uncommon alternation). Unlike in English, the form of the negative, not merely its position, is sensitive to finiteness: *δe*(*n*) can accompany only finites; *mi*(*n*), though itself a finite operative, is accompanied by a non-finite.

The form I've labelled 'subjunctive' in (34a–c) – Holton, Mackridge & Philippaki-Warburton's (1997) 'dependent form' (also a revealing label) – depends, on the analysis of Anderson (2001a), on the preceding 'particle' for its occurrence in an independent predication. Θ*a* is an operative, on that analysis. What has inhibited recognition of the operative status of *θa*, etc. is that, unlike the operatives in Basque (recall (4)), they do not 'inherit' the person-number morphology of the dependent non-operative, while the latter displays these traditional stigmata of 'finiteness'. But the equal availability of the Greek option is not surprising: the agreements in the Basque sentence of (4) reflect the argument structure of the non-operative rather than the operative's own requirements; we have 'displaced' agreement. (34) does not 'displace' the agreement, unlike (4). Whether *θa* is analysed as an independent operative or as an affix, it is the element that confers finiteness on the predication.

Likewise, Anderson (2001b, 2004: section 3) suggests, contrary to traditional opinion, that the form *should* in English is both finite and non-finite. Finiteness is associated with particular modal interpretations (as with the Latin subjunctive). Thus, the occurrence in (35a) is finite, and (for many speakers) is paraphrasable as *ought* (*to*), and the epistemic use in (35b) is also finite and (for many speakers) paraphrasable in the same way:

(35) (a) He should/ought to leave immediately
(b) That should/ought to be the postman we can hear

But *should* can also function as a (perhaps pragmatically conditioned) equivalent for the English bare subjunctive exemplified in (36a), as in (36b), which usage is not paraphrased by (36c):

(36) (a) She demanded/required that we leave
(b) She demanded/required that we should leave
(c) She demanded that we ought to leave

Like the subjunctive in English, *should* in this last usage is not finite: it cannot occur with this interpretation in an independent clause. Whereas as a

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'full modal' (epistemic or deontic) it is finite. In being necessarily governed and modally bleached, 'subjunctive *should*' represents a further step in 'grammaticalisation'.

There are at least three morals, perhaps, to be extracted from this brief survey – or rather from the tradition which it draws on and interprets. Firstly, as observed in section 9, we gain no insight into grammatical structure by identifying 'finiteness' with the presence of certain morphological categories (as in recent times in the tradition underlying Haegeman & Guéron 1999: 34, 94). Such an identification is self-defeating – maintainable, if at all, even in a single language, only by recourse to non-overt expression of morphosyntactic categories, as again in e.g. Haegeman & Guéron (1999: 324–326), and abandonment of any conceptually independent status for finiteness. Faced with the 'non-finiteness' of a verb like that in the subordinate clause in (36a) – it lacks any verbal morphology – Haegeman & Guéron (ibid.) posit an 'abstract modal' as the bearer of finiteness – since a clause containing a 'nominative subject' (like the subordinate in (36a)) is 'finite'. But, again, such a property (the licensing of a 'nominative subject') is independent of finiteness, though they tend to co-occur, for familiar reasons to do with the nature of verbs. The phenomena manifesting the problems with such morphological approaches to finiteness, as sampled only here, have been known for a long time, though it is only recently that they have been attracting more widespread attention.

Secondly, there is some plausibility in the notion, announced initially, that finiteness is intimately associated with mood, and this is reflected in morphosyntactic expression. The prototypical finite is an unmarked positive declarative; and it also tends to show the most extensive manifestation of verbal morphology (and absence of nominal morphology) and of verb-determined syntax. However, a distinctive class of (finite) operatives may (unlike those in Basque) lack these properties, which are marked instead on the (non-finite) verb, as in Greek (according to Anderson 2001a). More generally, expression of marked moods and marked uses of the indicative may lack the stigmata of prototypical finites. Moreover, the same forms may be both finite and non-finite, signalling both a marked finite in main clauses and non-finiteness in dependent clauses that differ in interpretation, but not arbitrarily, from how the form is interpreted in main clauses. This is well illustrated by the behaviour of infinitives in many languages.

Finally, associated with this last point, understanding of the situation exemplified by (23) or (27), where finite use of a form that is typically associated only with subordination is linked with a particular (related) interpretation, or that in (36b), where the reverse is the case, depends on the recognition that morphosyntactic categories must not only be non-covert but also semantically grounded, as argued in Anderson (1997a). They are in both respects true signs in the Saussurean sense: 'Le signe linguistique est donc une entité psychique à deux faces, … Ces deux éléments sont intimement unis

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et s'appellent l'un l'autre. … Nous appelons *signe* la combinaison du concept et de l'image acoustique' (Saussure 1916/1962: 99; see further Anderson 2005a, b). In this respect, it seems to me that the present account of this complex area illustrates the potential fruitfulness of the traditional notional approach to grammar in articulating the systematic relations among finiteness, mood and their expression, and between different interpretations of an expression. The occurrence of morphosyntactic markers of finiteness, for instance, varies with the mood of the sentence; and the same form may be finite or non-finite, depending on its interpretation.

The importance of meaning to the identification and description of constructions was apparent to Bloomfield (despite his diffidence in relation to the 'handling' of meaning): in this respect (as well as others, and unlike his successors), he was a traditionalist (see again Anderson 2005a). So too Bloomfield acknowledged the syntactic (constructional) relevance of intonation, such as we have observed here. In more general terms, I suggest that the traditional strategy of viewing morphosyntax and prosodic phonology as complementary manifestations of structures that interpret or express notionally based categories, as in principle adopted here, warrants further (re)investigation.

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