(CD 75.2.6) and soldiers from other armies (Tac. *Hist.* 2.37). Soldiers looked, sounded, and moved differently from civilians.

Chapters 5 and 6 use Keith Hopkins's model of cash taxes and trade from *JRS* 70 (1980), 101–25 to organize material on the army and the regional economy. For the principate (pp. 171–211) P. downplays the cash injected into the local economy by the army, and shows that the archaeological evidence does not support (although it does not rule out) Hopkins's case for an increase in production. For the dominate (pp. 213–39), when an increase in supplies in kind and *fabricae* further reduced the armies cash imput, P. demonstrates that, contra Hopkins, the evidence points to an increase in trade. P. does not cite Hopkins's reworking of his model in *Kodai: Journal of Ancient History* 6/7 (1995/6), 41–75.

The final chapter (pp. 241–50) looks at the army's rôle in economic exploitation (timber and stone quarries) and investment, pointing out that most army building was for military reasons.

After a brief conclusion (pp. 251–4), two appendices provide very useful catalogues of sites (pp. 257–303).

Here P. gives us an army in the east largely 'isolated' from the civilian population by its 'institutional identity', which stands in marked contrast with Richard Alston's 'integrated' army in Egypt (*Soldier and Society in Roman Egypt* [London, 1995]). As P. notes (p. 166 n. 213), the very different conclusions can be explained either by the different types of evidence surviving from the two areas or by regional differences (more non-local troops in Syria, and/or Ptolemaic dispersed military settlements having promoted greater integration than urban colonial settlements in Seleucid Syria). Whichever is right (and a third possibility exists that one scholar is wrong), the publication of a second important work on the theme will ensure further lively debate on 'the army and society'.

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PALMYRA

U. HARTMANN: *Das palmyrenische Teilreich.* (Oriens et Occidens 2.) Pp. 532, pls. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001. ISBN: 3-515-07800-2.

A book of more than 500 pages devoted to twelve years of Roman history; a book with a title that cannot be rendered sensibly in any language but the author's own; a book retaining so clearly its past as a dissertation that many pages devote more space to footnotes than text, might not appear an appetizing proposition. That would be, in this case, wrong. This is a very good book.

H.'s case is that the dynasts of Palmyra should not be seen as usurpers in the traditional sense in that they had no obvious ambitions to establish themselves as rulers of the empire, or even as rulers of an independent state. They were not driven by a desire to establish some sort of Semitic empire of their own; rather, they were, and would have remained, content to maintain the interests of Palmyra within the framework established after the capture of Valerian. In H.'s view they were driven into rebellion by the aggressive policy of Aurelian, who wished to end their anomalous position within the empire. He is correct that there were major differences between the Palmyrene regime and the *imperium Galliarum.* The latter arose out of a direct challenge to the authority of the reigning emperor, and involved the assumption of the

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symbols of imperial power by Postumus and his colleagues—their *imperium Galliarum* was indeed a separatist state, but only because Postumus failed to defeat Gallienus. Gallienus gave Odaenathus an official position within the Roman hierarchy as a reward for his loyalty during the revolt of Macrianus and Quietus. In return, Odaenathus recognized Gallienus' continuing authority in Syria, as seen most clearly in his appointment of governors to the province. H. correctly draws attention to the significance of the lead tessera from Antioch depicting Herodianus, the son of Odaenathus, in the guise of a Parthian King (it is unfortunate that the reproduction of this fascinating piece on Pl. 3 is not good—the fault of the publisher—those who are interested can look at the excellent photograph in E. Equini Schneider, *Septimia Zenobia Sebaste* [Rome, 1993], p. 98). Odaenathus and Herodianus took the title 'king of kings' to describe their position *vis-à-vis* Persia; their position *vis-à-vis* Rome was defined by Odaenathus' title of *corrector totius orientis*, which H. correctly sees as granting Odaenathus *imperium maius* over some portion of the eastern provinces.

The one quibble that I have with the picture that H. offers is that he sees Claudius tolerating the continued authority of the Palmyrene house in Syria after the death of Odaenathus. After an exhaustive study of the chronology, H. comes down in favor of what is the *communis opinio* these days that Odaenathus died in Gallienus' year 15 (267/8), and that it is likely that he died in the later half of 267. This is possible, although some more attention might be paid to the story that Odaenathus was killed during 'some annual festival' at Emesa (Zos. 1.39.2). The principle festival of Elagabal, to which this must refer, seems to have been in April (M. Frey, *Untersuchungen zur Religion und zur Religionspolitik des Kaisers Elagabal* [Stuttgart, 1989], pp. 48–9), meaning that Odaenathus died within months of the murder of Gallienus in 268. H. then notes (p. 261) that there is a problem with the tradition that Gallienus dispatched an army under the praetorian prefect Aurelius Heraclianus to bring the Palmyrenes under his control (*HA V. Gall.* 13.5). He is absolutely right about this, since, in the late summer of 268, Heraclianus is attested as one of the leaders of the conspiracy against Gallienus by the author of the *Historia Augusta*, who did not realize that he was contradicting himself, as well as by Zosimus (Zos. 1.40.2; *HA V. Gall.* 14.1). The real problem here is that the context, as provided by *HA V. Gall.* 6: 'inter haec Scythae per Euxinum navigantes Histrum ingressi multa gravia in solo Romano fecerunt', is one of the notorious cruces of third century history. This section of the *Historia Augusta* life of Gallienus agrees with the chronicle of George Syncellus in placing the most serious Gothic invasion, the one which resulted in the sack of Athens, in 268. Unfortunately for the many proponents of this view, the Anonymous Continuator of Dio places the sack of Athens firmly in the reign of Claudius, and it looks as if the record of Claudius' reign was 'corrected' to place most of the disasters of these years under Gallienus, and most of the successes under Claudius (*FGH* 4, 196). I suspect that the actual date of Heraclianus' expedition was in fact 269—the context in which this account of the Gothic naval invasion belongs. If this is so, it would support H.'s overall interpretation which sees Zenobia as reacting to previous Roman efforts to reassert control over the Palmyrenes. The invasion of Egypt in 269/70 thus becomes explicable in light of Claudius' mismanagement of the relationship, and this, in turn, may explain why Zenobia felt that it would be possible to restore the status quo under Gallienus after the accession of Aurelian.

Disagreements such as those in the previous paragraph are few. H. has a splendid command of the evidence of all sorts—including the complicated narratives of Manichaean missionaries and of Arabic sources. He writes clearly and well. It is to be

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hoped that many of the older discussions of the Palmyrene regime may now be put to rest, and that we can move on from the excellent starting point that H. offers.

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CAPPADOCIA

R. VAN DAM: *Kingdom of Snow. Roman Rule and Greek Culture in Cappadocia*. Pp. ix + 290, map. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002. Cased, $49.95/£35. ISBN: 0-8122-3681-5.

Van Dam refers in his acknowledgements to 'this trilogy of books', of which *Kingdom of Snow* appears to be one. No information about them appears under his name in the bibliography. On p. 4 we learn that the three volumes are *Families and Friends*, about the family relationships and friendships of the Cappadocian Fathers; *Becoming Christian*, about the impact of Christianity on Cappadocian society; 'and this one about Roman rule and Greek culture'. So the companion volumes must be forthcoming—and I await their appearance with interest.

Kingdom of Snow is in turn divided into three subsections, each with its own introduction: 'Badlands' (pp. 13–69), 'Empire and Province' (77–156), and 'Culture Wars' (159–204). The distinction between the content of the first two subsections is not clear; the third, however, reveals itself as a definite study of the idea of 'culture' in a threeway comparison between Emperor Julian, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory Nazianzen.

V.D. attempts to broker between a Church-based study of the Fathers and a secular academic treatment of Cappadocian history. He states his intentions on p. 4:

> These investigations attempt to combine close reading of the texts with a sense of the larger historical and cultural rhythms of the region. They also hope to demonstrate the advantageous intersection of ecclesiastical texts with social and political history. Patristics scholars need to demonstrate a greater awareness of the realities of Greek and Roman society, and social and cultural historians need to acquire a deeper familiarity with the potentialities of theological and ecclesiastical texts.

In general, V.D. adopts a moderately secularist reading of the Fathers and of their Christianity, slipping occasionally into a reductionist and dismissive tone.

Kingdom of Snow proceeds thematically rather than chronologically. Thus the narrative wanders backwards and forwards over the centuries and within the fourth century, as it visits and revisits a variety of social, geographical, political, and historical interests. Perhaps it is inevitable that such an anecdotal manner slips into what one might call 'pluperfect history'. It is a disconcerting, if not unamusing, feature of the book that the narrative frequently 'restaggers' itself into prior historical strata. Single paragraphs can be studded with the auxiliary 'had', e.g. pp. 66–7 [square brackets and bold emphases are mine]: 'Digenes **had** abruptly interrupted his conversation with the emperor [post-ninth century A.D.] to strangle a menacing lion. Gregory of Nyssa's friend **had** kept tame fish at his rural villa as a reminder of his local domination [fourth century A.D.]. Digenes now impressed an emperor by killing a lion . . . Long ago, when a huntsman **had** once saved the Persian king from a lion, he **had** received all Cappadocia as his reward [fifth century B.C.]'. It is not easy to see how this late legend of Digenes Akrites fits into any historical argument. Instead, we seem to have a literary meditation woven around the theme of 'highlander'. Similarly, the

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