the equestrian and senatorial ranks in the Augustan era, starts with a resumé of Augustus' reforms of the equestrian and senatorial orders, without, however, tackling the issue of how one defines the *equites* at this time. Instead, she spends some time assessing Claudius' speech on the admission of the Gauls to the Senate, worrying about whether *ubique* means just Italy or includes the provinces too (p. 21). A typically fruitless discussion is opened in Chapter 2 (p. 27), where S. asks what is the significance if provincial senators or equestrians held no official posts back home, only to point out that the epigraphic evidence available does not allow us to assess this. Her conclusion in this chapter, that if someone was a member of Rome's ruling élite he was usually also of high status back home, is hardly worth stating. Another unsurprising conclusion is that Claudius allowed himself to exaggerate Augustan precedent in his speech (p. 38). In Chapter 4, on the provincials' wealth, she can only offer a general consideration of the sources of wealth in the areas producing provincial senators and equestrians (e.g. oil and wine production in Baetica).

Nevertheless, the book provides some useful tables of results, summarizing posts held by provincial equestrians and senators in their hometowns (pp. 31–2), their ethnic origins (pp. 39–40), their careers (pp. 60–1), and their family ties (pp. 77–9). The book ends with prosopographical information on the forty-two senators and equestrians, each entry starting with a handy compilation of primary and secondary sources. The accompanying commentary could perhaps have been more cautious, however: although S. discusses the identity of the Forum Iulium thought to be the birthplace of Cornelius Gallus, she does not also acknowledge doubts about a town of this name being his home (contrast *OCD* p. 395).

University of Warwick ALISON E. COOLEY
doi:10.1093/clrevj/bni144

THE BARCIDS

B. D. HOYOS: *Hannibal's Dynasty. Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247–183 B.C.* Pp. viii + 304, pls. London and New York: Routledge, 2003. Cased, US$80. ISBN: 0-415-29911-X.

Hannibal's great struggle against Rome continues to fascinate scholars as well as the general audience. A study such as this one, encompassing Hannibal and his Carthaginian background, with special attention paid to Hannibal's father Hamilcar—who in the 230s B.C., after the first war with Rome, established a Punic empire in Spain, thus helping redress the balance of power between the two contending states—would serve to put that second struggle into a useful context. And there are sections of good scholarship here: on the complex political structure of the Punic Republic, or the evaluation of the regime of Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal in Spain in the 220s. On the other hand, there is little discussion of Hannibal's great enemy, the Republic of Rome; the Romans are simply there as an obstacle, putting up army after army. H. handled such matters much better in *Unplanned Wars: The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars* (Berlin, 1998).

There are other problems with this book. First, it is not clear at what audience *Hannibal's Dynasty* is aimed. It begins with a dramatic scene of Hamilcar's night-time landing at Mt Heircte in Sicily in 248 B.C., which comes mostly from H.'s own

The Classical Review vol. 55 no. 1 © The Classical Association 2005; all rights reserved

https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni145 Published online by Cambridge University Press

imagination (p. 7): this suggests that *Hannibal's Dynasty* is aimed at a popular audience. So do warnings about translations to be found in Penguin editions (p. 251 n. 6). But there are also, occasionally, detailed discussions of interest only to scholars: the exact location of Hamilcar's bases in Sicily; the possible network of political ties which Hamilcar and family possessed at Carthage; the possible political reforms instituted by Hannibal at Carthage when he was *sufete* in 195 (an entire chapter on this). Moreover, the very detailed geographical discussions that occasonally appear are unlikely to be of sustained interest to a general reader, and all such geographical discussions (including the course of military campaigns) are undermined by the failure to provide the book with any maps. As for the discussion of Hamilcar's and Hannibal's political connections at Carthage, we simply do not know the details; H.'s attempts to tease political connections out of our small evidence will bore the general reader, while most scholars will find the conclusions too speculative.

H. also advances the thesis that Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, and then Hannibal were not merely key political figures in the Punic State as well as governors of the important imperial territory they carved out for Carthage in Spain (as large as the entire Punic empire in Africa), but indeed controlled and essentially ruled the Punic Republic itself. This thesis is stated repeatedly (see, e.g. pp. 59, 66, 71, 85, 87, 101, 105); but repetition is no substitute for proof. What little evidence we have on the political position of the Barcids at Carthage indicates that there was always significant opposition to Hamilcar, to his relatives (including Hannibal), and to their policies. This evidence begins with a contemporary source, the Roman senator and historian Fabius Pictor; and though Pictor must be used with caution, as the Greek historian Polybius says, because of his anti-Barcid bias (3.8), the overall evidence is significant in amount, and it is consistent. Nor, given the difficulties of long-distance communications under ancient conditions, is it prima facie likely that Hamilcar or Hasdrubal, with hands already full in administering and expanding the huge new Punic province in Spain, were simultaneously controlling Carthage from a base 500 miles away—or that Hannibal later, with his hands full in Italy, did the same. There is no evidence that Hamilcar even visited Carthage in the nine years between his departure for Spain in 237 and his death in winter 228; there is no evidence that Hasdrubal visited Carthage after 228/227; Hannibal himself was not present at Carthage between 237 and 202—thirty-five years (on his inexperience with the niceties of Punic politics, see the remark attributed to him at Polyb. 15.19.2–4, cf. Livy 30.37.7–8). Similarly, H. repeatedly terms Hannibal 'the elected generalissimo of Carthage' (see e.g. pp. 107, 166, 167, 184), the elected 'supreme commander' (see e.g. p. 173). But the closest equivalent term in the Punic political lexicon would be one translated into Greek as *strategos autokrator* (and its equivalent in Latin), and such a term never appears in connection with Hannibal. Indeed, the only point in this period where *strategos autrokrator* appears in relation to a Punic general is when the Spanish tribes (not the Carthaginian assembly) are said to have chosen Hasdrubal (not Hannibal) to be such a leader (Diod. 25,12). Hannibal himself is said to have been elected 'general' by the Punic army in Spain after the death of Hasdrubal, an act confirmed by the assembly at Carthage—but Polybius makes it clear that this is 'General in Spain' (3.13.3–4; note *ta kata tēn Ibērian*), not Generalissimo of the Punic Republic. In 218, as we happen to know, the family of Hannibal was concentrated almost totally in Spain. Thus the Roman Senate may have had some reason to believe in 218 that when Rome demanded that the Carthaginian Republic surrender Hannibal on pain of war following his destruction of Rome's friend Saguntum in Spain, the answer might be in the affirmative. Hannibal and his

https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni145 Published online by Cambridge University Press

family were important, to be sure, but not all-controlling—and their power had produced many enemies (see Livy 21.10: 'the speech of Hanno').

As for the Saguntum crisis itself, H. is willing to accept everything that Polyb. 3.14.9–10 indicates about Punic and Roman relations with Saguntum except the implication in 3.14.10 that the special relationship between Rome and Saguntum dated from the time of Hamilcar. But why should everything else in the passage be accurate, and this information not? H. detects a shift towards a harsher and more confrontational Roman policy in Spain *c*. 220, but Polyb. 3.14.10 indicates a different balance of responsibility in the crisis over Saguntum than H. posits. If the Saguntines' special relationship with Rome dated back to the time of Hamilcar, then even though the town was south of the Ebro, the pressure which Hannibal put on the Saguntines from *c*. 220 through his backing of their local enemies meant that it was Hannibal, not Rome, who was disturbing the *status quo*.

H.'s accounts of Hannibal's initial campaigns in Roman Italy once the war began are surprisingly slight. These campaigns were the highpoint of Hannibal's career, but, oddly, not much detail is given as to how—against such great odds—Hannibal achieved his amazing battlefield successes, which almost brought Rome to its knees. In fact, the evaluation of Hannibal as a general, especially on the strategic level but later also on the tactical level, is far from effusive. That is the second main theme of the book.

Thus the invasion of Roman Italy from bases in Spain may have been a brilliant concept, but Hannibal's war-effort never recovered from the huge losses his army suffered on the actual march to Italy—losses which are mysteriously large, even counting the famous bad luck of the early snowstorm in the Alps; they crippled Hannibal's effort. Yet entire Celtic peoples, with men, women, and children, had previously crossed the Alps without serious loss, and so did Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal in spring 207. H. underlines the fact that something went badly wrong here. It is also striking that the ancients were convinced that Hannibal could have marched on Rome after his great victory over the Romans at Cannae in 216, and that this constituted a crucial failure on his part to take advantage of a one-time opportunity (see e.g. Cato *Origines* frr. 86–7 P; Polyb. 3.118.6; Livy 22.51.1–4; Val. Max. 9.5 ext. 3). Though many moderns believe Hannibal was in fact right to attempt to detach Rome's allies first and gather larger resources before launching such a final attack, H. argues well that the ancient opinion, critical of Hannibal, has much in its favor (pp. 118–21); as Robert E. Lee said, looking back in 1867, when you are forced to run a war on a shoestring your only chance is to be bold. Similarly, H. notes that the reinforcements Hannibal received from Carthage for the war in Italy were miniscule, but he argues that many of the diversions of Punic effort from Italy (the large forces sent to Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain) were not the result of opposition to Hannibal at Carthage or division on how the war was to be run, but rather were Hannibal's own decisions. Polyb. 9.22.1–9 provides support for the view that Hannibal was running the war at the strategic level, but if so, then (despite Polybius' praise of Hannibal's energy in this passage) Hannibal's generalship is once more in question, since he failed to concentrate the Punic effort at the decisive point of attack in Italy; instead, for various seemingly good reasons, he fatally dispersed it (see e.g. p. 155). Occasionally H. goes too far here: there is no evidence that the disastrous expedition to Sardinia was Hannibal's decision (just the opposite: Livy 23.32.5–12 emphasizes the rôle of the Punic *principes* at home), while Polybius records bitter divisions over policy among the Punic generals in Spain (10.7.3 and 37.2): if there were such divisions in Spain, why should we assume that Hannibal was always in total

https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni145 Published online by Cambridge University Press

control of war strategy at Carthage? This is exactly where the Punic *principes* of Livy 23.32 come into play. There is significant ancient evidence both that some of Hannibal's ideas were opposed at Carthage and that, conversely, he felt betrayed by the home government (see Polyb. 3.8 on the one hand, and, conversely, Livy 28.12.9; 30.20.1–4; Sil. 187–235; App. *Lib*. 33.138).

H. is on firmer ground in his criticism of Hannibal's failure to march north in 207 to join forces with the reinforcements finally arriving in Italy from Spain under his brother Hasdrubal: the war was lost with the destruction of Hasdrubal's army at the Metaurus, and Hannibal was not there. The daring forced-march northward from the southern front by the consul C. Claudius Nero, who joined his forces with those of the other consul at the Metaurus and delivered the decisive blow against Hasdrubal, suggests what Hannibal himself might have achieved. H. can offer no explanation for Hannibal's crucial passivity in 207, but he is right to emphasize it (p. 149). He underlines, further, Hannibal's failure to launch a military demonstration in 205 in order to prevent P. Cornelius Scipio's preparations for an invasion of Africa, and his mysterious retreat from a confrontation with Scipio at Locri in southern Italy, also in 205, where the Punic general actually outnumbered him (p. 159). And H. judges Hannibal's conduct of the final battle at Zama in 202 to have been unimaginative (pp. 177–8). He leaves no doubt that Antiochus III was correct not to pay much attention to Hannibal's advice during the Seleucid monarch's war with Rome in 192–188 B.C.: it was overbold in its advocacy of another invasion of Italy, and self-interested in its advocacy of an attempt by Hannibal himself to seize power at Carthage (pp. 203–5). Yet one must note that Polybius praises Hannibal's dispositions at Zama as the best that was possible given the circumstances and the character of the troops he had at his disposal (Polyb. 15.16)—and Polybius had experience in command of ancient military forces. As for the tradition concerning Hannibal's advice to Antiochus, it was based on Hannibal's very reasonable view that one could not win a war against Rome except by taking the offensive. Antiochus—true, after seizing much of European Greece—stood on the defensive, and never came close to winning his war.

In fact, while H. presents an intriguingly revisionist view of Hannibal, it is not clear how the Hannibal of H. could have been as spectacularly successful as he actually was against the Romans for so long. Polybius emphasized to his audience the enormous scale of Roman military power by *c*. 225 B.C., with a specific remark about the magnitude of Hannibal's task (2.24.1). The Greek historian saw the flaw in Hannibal's conduct to lie in his failure to gather more resources before ever beginning a war against the Romans; because he attacked prematurely as a result of the crisis over Saguntum, Hannibal's military power was too limited, despite his enormous skills of battlefield leadership (see 11.19). This is an analysis well worth considering. H.'s failure to discuss in detail the characteristics of the Roman Republic and of Roman rule and hegemony in Italy, the characteristics that gave the Romans such resilience and allowed the Republic to survive Hannibal's onslaught, again contributes to the mystery both of Hannibal's successes and ultimate failure. But one answer to the Alexander-like drama which unfolded in Italy between 218 and 203 B.C. (when Hannibal was finally forced by Scipio's invasion of Africa to withdraw) is that perhaps Hannibal was actually quite a bit better as a general than H. contends.

University of Maryland ARTHUR M. ECKSTEIN
doi:10.1093/clrevj/bni145

https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni145 Published online by Cambridge University Press