categorizes the different genres of laments: (i) five types for gods and heroes; (ii) the historical lament for the fall/destruction of cities; and (iii) the classification of ancient and modern laments/songs to the dead (*thrênos*, *goos*, *kommos*). She includes here a short section on 'the men's part', and 'the origin of modern *moirologi*'. Finally, in 'The Common Tradition', Alexiou examines more deeply the form and structure of laments, their conventions, themes, and formulae. In a section entitled 'The Allusive Method', she explores the expression of ideas through symbols and imagery (e.g. 'death as a journey').

The year 2002 was an auspicious one for Alexiou, for it saw the re-issue of this ground-breaking work and also the publication of its long-awaited sequel: *After Antiquity: Greek Language, Myth, and Metaphor*. Taken as a whole, these two complementary studies contribute much to our understanding and appreciation of the beauty, the power, and the significance of poetics in Greek tradition through the ages.

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DIVINE INTERVENTIONS

V. Muñoz Llamosas: *La intervención divina en el hombre a través de la literatura griega de época arcaica y clásica*. (Classical and Byzantine Monographs 51.) Pp. xi + 726. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 2002. Paper. ISBN: 90-256-0638-5 (90-256-1155-9 hbk).

The book under review, a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation (University of Oviedo, 2000), proposes to 'investigate the phenomenon of divine intervention in human beings exhaustively and in detail, covering all of classical and archaic [Greek] literature' (p. 1). The author states that she has not limited herself to Greek religion and mythology, since the study of divine intervention requires an examination of the development of ancient Greek thought generally. Clearly, she has set herself no small task.

The work has the virtues and defects of an old-fashioned dissertation. The author has staked out an immense subject, has accumulated a huge bibliography, and has dutifully covered the terrain. Unfortunately, she has not managed to articulate a clear and up-to-date theoretical framework, and she does not succeed in offering new interpretations of any author or passage.

After a brief attempt at defining 'religion' and, more particularly, 'Greek religion', M. Ll. introduces the views of Nilsson and Nestle (p. 2). Although she claims that she will nuance the evolutionist view of Nestle—the famous transition from mythos to logos—it soon becomes clear that her approach remains grounded in the concepts of these two scholars and those of a few others, whose debt to them is apparent (e.g. she adopts Dodds's idea that the Homeric world represents a shame culture). Thus we read on p. 2 that 'the mythic mode of thought . . . is just as rational as the logical mode'; and yet, on p. 3, M. Ll. states: 'the opposition between mythos and logos that has been characteristic of western thought since the sixth century B.C. arose under specific circumstances, and was completely foreign to earlier authors such as Homer and Hesiod.' One might suppose she means that the opposition—not rational thought itself—arose in the sixth century (although on p. 144 we read that Pindar 'is the first author in whom the opposition μῦθος/λόγος, which is essential to Greek thought, may be documented'). But, on the following page, where she outlines her conclusions

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(which is just as well, given that there is no summing-up chapter at the end), she writes: 'We shall have occasion to confirm that, to all appearances, this passage from a theocentric, mythic, and—as some maintain—irrational mode of thinking to one that is anthropocentric, logical, and rational indeed took place' (p. 4). On p. 65 (the conclusion to her analysis of archaic epic), M. Ll. writes: 'At these moments, man analyzes his environment and discovers forces that are superior to him, to which he ascribes many of the things that occur, whether on the physical or on the psychic plane. We are dealing with a type of mythic thought in which it is practically impossible for someone to consider the human plane without thinking also of the divine.' And yet, in n. 354 to this same paragraph, the author again states that the opposition *mythos/logos* is not the best way to approach the study of Greek thought. Thus, despite her attempt to distance herself from Nestle, Jaeger, and their like (p. 4), M. Ll.'s conclusions seem little more than a rehash of the positions they defended.

The new scholarship that M. Ll. brings to bear on the question is limited to references to L. Duch, *Mito, interpretación y cultura* (Barcelona, 1995). She seems wholly unaware of the profound criticism to which the 'great dichotomy' between mythos and logos has been subjected (the term is Claude Calame's, 'The Rhetoric of Muthos and Logos: Forms of Figurative Discourse', in R. Buxton [ed.], *From Myth to Reason?* [Oxford, 1999], pp. 119–43). Absent from her extensive bibliography are, for example, M. Detienne, *L'Invention de la mythologie* (Paris, 1981) or P. Veyne, *Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes? Essai sur 1'imagination constituante* (Paris, 1983).

The several chapters are organized pretty much on a uniform principle: there is a brief account of the general characteristics of the period or author covered, followed by what M. Ll. calls 'an examination of religious thought', that is, the extent to which a given author invokes or does not invoke divine intervention to explain what transpires in the world. Within each section, then, she pays special attention to certain words and to the ways in which 'their semantic evolution reflects the evolution that is taking place on a more general ideological level' (p. 3).

M. Ll. has read widely concerning the uses and meanings of thorny terms such as αἰδώς, νέμεσις, ὕβρις, δίκη, etc., and, in general, she is true to the arguments of the scholars she mentions, although again, one misses a reference to H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley, 1971), particularly in connection with the presumed moral difference between the divine worlds of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and to B. Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley, 1993), who challenges the distinction between shame cultures and guilt cultures. But she has not achieved a coherent understanding of the various scholarly positions and their implications, which renders her analysis superficial and, occasionally, even contradictory (as in the case of Nestle).

Sometimes it is impossible to discern what the author really thinks or means. For example, on the question of individual responsibility in Homer, her conclusion is (p. 65):

> Homeric man is not totally responsible, given that only occasionally is he free from the superior forces represented by the gods and destiny, which does not eliminate human decision, although it is most common in this time to present man as subject to the will of the gods, or, at most, acting in conjunction with them.

What does the author believe? Does Homeric man have responsibility for his actions or not?

One gets the impression, moreover, that the author has worked with secondary literature more than with the Greek texts themselves. At no time does she provide the

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reader with a Greek passage to illustrate her argument; occasionally she fails even to give the reference for a citation. For example, on p. 20 n. 94 she affirms that '$\beta\acute{\iota}\eta$ has a negative sense only once in the *Iliad*, in a recent passage'. The reader would like to know which passage the author had in mind—and why it is characterized as 'recent'.

This is a very long book and it is all the more regrettable that the lack of theoretical sophistication renders it superficial, even if this is often the way with dissertations. As a compendium of information, however, it will be useful.

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THE INVENTION OF LITERATURE?

A. FORD: *The Origins of Criticism. Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece*. Pp. xiv + 356. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002. Cased, £29.95. ISBN: 0-691-07485-2.

Andrew Ford offers us in this substantial volume an ambitious and challenging attempt to rewrite the history of early Greek criticism. The discussion is detailed, wide-ranging, impressively documented, and often highly original. Since it is far too rich a book to summarize (or discuss) in full in a short review, I shall simply say that everyone should read it for themselves, and proceed to raise a few questions.

F. defines 'criticism', at least for the opening phase of the story he tells, as 'any public act of praise or blame upon a performance of song' (p. 3). This reflects his emphasis on the 'close connection between social occasion and critical values' (p. xi) in late archaic discussions of literature—a connection broken as the story unfolds. Because of this break, it is misleading if earlier criticism is read with hindsight as a series of contributions to a single, progressively emergent critical discourse. Rather, what later emerged was a different kind of discourse about poetry: there was 'a fundamental and broad shift from early responses to singing as a form of behavior regulated by social, political, and religious values to a conception of poetry as a verbal artifact, an arrangement of language subject to grammatical analysis, formal classification, and technical evaluation' (p. 8).

In his treatment of the earlier period, F.'s programmatic emphasis yields valuable fruit in a series of readings that seek to place the material more fully in a social and cultural context than has been done before. The evidence is, of course, scanty, and F. is sensitive to its limitations and to the fact that accidents of preservation are not necessarily representative (see, for example, the apposite observations on the possibly 'adventitious centrality' of Gorgias, p. 172). This awareness enables him to subject received interpretations to a sceptical reappraisal, while showing (in general) proper caution in proposing alternatives.

My doubts became progressively stronger, however, the nearer we got to the end of the story. Chapter 10 marks a crucial turning point with its title, 'the invention of literature'. But when F. has taken such care to avoid reading anticipations of later critical discourse back into the archaic period, it is disquieting to find him claiming that 'it is first in the fourth century that we can recognize something like the modern notion of literature as imaginative writing and of literary criticism as a special knowledge of such writings' (p. xi). 'The' modern concept of literature (ill-defined and, in my view, of deeply questionable usefulness) is the product of a long and complex post-classical history: I would need a lot of convincing that it can validly be mapped onto fourth-century concepts. The same goes for 'art': when F. (speaking of the

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