B.J.Pol.S. **29,** 291–322
Printed in the United Kingdom
Copyright © 1999 Cambridge University Press

Individual Rights and Social Movements: A Comparative and Statistical Inquiry

JOE FOWERAKER AND TODD LANDMAN*

This article is a comparative study of the relationship between social movements and the individual rights of citizenship. It identifies three main connections between collective action and individual rights made in theory and history, and analyses them in the context of modern authoritarian regimes. It does so by measuring both social mobilization and the presence of rights over time in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Spain, and analyses their mutual impact statistically – both within and across these national cases. The results demonstrate the mutual impact between rights and movements, and more importantly, constitute a robust defence of democracy as the direct result of collective struggles for individual rights.

THE OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY

This article analyses the reciprocal relationship between individual rights of citizenship and social movement activity over time. Its specific objective is to measure these reciprocal effects and to compare them across cultures. The method adopted requires the construction of a parsimonious model that can sustain systematic research and support substantive interpretation. The article begins by describing the main variables of the model and the means used for their measurement and then proceeds to a statistical investigation of the relationship between rights and movements. Beyond the specific aims of the inquiry, the article addresses two large social scientific literatures which do not usually 'talk to each other'. There is a large literature on social movements, which tends to divide between high-flown theorizing and case-studies. There is also a large literature on individual rights, which tends to be confined either to political philosophy or to specialized but non-theoretical studies of human rights. But there are relatively few comparative studies of *either* social movements *or* rights, and, to the best of our knowledge, no such study of the relationship between them over time. The study of this relationship may therefore add a new dimension to both literatures.

The main contributions to our understanding of the relationship

* Department of Government, University of Essex. We wish to acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social Research Council for research into 'Citizenship and Social Movements in Comparative Perspective', and of the British Academy for research into 'Individual Rights and Democratic Performance'. The dataset for *Citizenship and Social Movements in Comparative Perspective* (computer file) is available from the UK Data Archive, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex, CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom, http://dawww.essex.ac.uk; and the full version of the arguments and data analysis appears in *Citizenship Rights and Social Movements: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

between rights and movements to date have come from historical and sociological studies of past events such as the Revolutions of 1789 and 1848, or from analysis of the process of modern state-formation. But the relationship between rights and social mobilization is yet more relevant today, and more intimately connected to the challenges of affirming citizenship and achieving fair and effective government. Over the past twenty years social movement theory has mainly flourished in Western Europe and North America, but the social movements themselves have been most numerous and active in Latin America, South Africa, Eastern Europe, China and South-East Asia – in regions where the struggle for individual rights is still high or foremost on the popular political agenda.

Consequently this study may also illuminate a wide range of popular and democratic struggles in the present. It reaches beyond the confines of 'welfare capitalism', or the liberal democratic polities associated with developed capitalist countries, to political cultures where the integrity and freedom of the individual is still a primary political concern, and where the individual rights of citizenship are far from being secure. It is our contention that the relationship between social movements and individual rights can best be explored in the political context of these modern authoritarian regimes. Studies of the past concluded that social movements may achieve individual rights either *through* or *against* the state, while the state may either guarantee or revoke and repress rights. Our evidence suggests that it is not so much the comfortable presence of 'civicness'[1] but a high incidence of 'public contestation'[2] which best serves to vindicate the individual rights of citizenship in many if not most political cultures.

Our analysis is conducted across four authoritarian political systems: Franco's Spain, Pinochet's Chile, military Brazil and the one-party dominant system of Mexico. This selection enables a comparison of similar variations in individual rights and social movement activity across similar cases – in what Faure calls the 'mirror-image' of the 'most similar systems design' or MSSD.[3] All these cases show strong similarities in their periods of authoritarian rule, forms of regime and relationships between regime and individual. They also exhibit visible variations in the gap between the rhetoric and reality of citizenship rights, strong fluctations in social movement activity, and greater or lesser degrees of political liberalization over time. The analysis sets out to explore the relationship between rights and movements both *within* and *across* cases by using time-series data to trace the trajectories of both movement activity and rights provision.

[1] Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[2] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).

[3] Andrew M. Faure, 'Some Methodological Problems in Comparative Politics', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 6 (1994), 307–22.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Even though the cases are similar, they are far from being identical. Two (Brazil, Chile) are examples of a military-authoritarian regime, and two (Mexico, Spain) of a civilian authoritarian regime. Two (Chile, Spain) had personal dictatorships, and two (Brazil, Mexico) highly institutionalized forms of government. The latter had regular or frequent elections, the former did not. Two (Chile, Spain) experienced 'rapid' transitions to democratic rule, and two (Brazil, Mexico) more protracted or incomplete transitions. Perhaps most significantly, given the importance of the labour movement to social movement activity overall across the cases, the four cases span the spectrum of corporatist control and intermediation, from the universal and uniform system of Franco's Spain, through the comprehensive but variegated state-chartered corporations of Mexico and the mixed, uneven and unwieldly model of Brazil, to the complete absence of such intervention in Chile. All these systemic-level differences tend to be reflected in the statistical findings.

THE MODEL

We regard 'citizenship' as having three distinct components: (1) the extent to which certain normative attributes of citizenship are embodied in the constitutions of different regimes; (2) the degree to which the practices and policies of these regimes conform to these prescriptions; and (3) the extent to which social movements and popular political organizations aim to make the practices so conform, or promote this as a contingent result through pressing their demands in terms of rights. In sum, citizenship may be approached through the three perspectives of (constitutional) *forms*, (political) *practices* and (social movement) *struggles*.

Since the primary research objective is to achieve measurable comparisons of both rights provisions and social movement activity over time, we seek to construct time-series datasets that can support indices of the three main objects of citizenship research (forms, practices and struggles) during periods of authoritarian rule and through moments of democratic transition. In short, the primary data were used to construct three main indices: a legal-institutional index that describes *rights-in-principle*, or the presence of constitutionally or legally prescribed rights; a *rights-in-practice* index, that describes the degrees to which the real rights enjoyed by different populations at different times fall short of or exceed these formal rights;[4] and social movement measures that show the incidence and extent of social movement activity over time.

The majority of academic arguments tend to see the relationship between rights and social movements in one of two ways. On the one hand, the language of rights acts as a banner for social mobilization and as a common currency of social protest. In effect, individual rights elicit social movements.

[4] A further index designed to monitor the variable 'gap' between the rhetoric and the reality of citizenship rights was calculated as the residuals that result from regressing the rights-in-practice index onto the rights-in-principle index, using ordinary least squares (OLS).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

On the other, social struggles by the poor, downtrodden and excluded achieve rights piecemeal, over the *longue durée*. Social movements act to discover and disseminate a knowledge of rights, as well as to pursue and secure the rights themselves.[5] Logically, this leaves a third possibility, that rights and movements act to encourage and expand each other. In this latter view, they do not merely appear together on the historical stage, but act as mutual catalysts, and so are mutually constitutive over time. There is therefore a *rights perspective*, a *social movement perspective* and a *dual perspective*. The analysis here explores each of these perspectives in turn, and gives them statistical expression.

THE DATA AND THEIR DESCRIPTION: RIGHTS

Our analysis is based on time-series data covering both rights provision and social movement activity. The first comprises indices for *rights-in-principle*, *rights-in-practice*, and for the *gap* between them. The second comprises measures for labour movement activity and other social movement activity. Since the study seeks to trace the relationship between rights provision and movement activity during periods of authoritarian rule and through moments of democratic transition, the time period for the four cases varies according to their particular political histories, as follows: Brazil 1964–90 ($N = 27$); Chile 1973–90 ($N = 18$); Mexico 1963–90 ($N = 28$); and Spain, 1958–82 ($N = 25$). In each case the dataset comprises *annual* values for the three rights indices and the two social movement measures over the respective period.

The rights indices focus on the core civil and political rights of citizenship. Civil rights are those necessary to individual freedom, and are associated most directly with the rule of law and the system of courts. Political rights ensure

[5] This is as true of the arguments drawn from history and historical sociology as it is of sociology and political sociology, political theory and political economy. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1968); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848* (London: Sphere Books, 1977); Barrington Moore Jr, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Landlord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin University Books, 1973); E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974); Goran Therborn, *Science, Class and Society* (London: New Left Books, 1976); Goran Therborn, 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy', *New Left Review*, 103 (1977), 3–42; Anthony Giddens, *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1982); Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (London: Macmillan, 1985); Bryan S. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Iris M. Young, 'Impartiality and the Civic Public', in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds, *Feminism As Critique* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Iris M. Young, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', *Ethics*, 99 (1989), 250–74; J. M. Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988); David Held, 'Citizenship and Autonomy', *Political Theory and the Modern State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), pp. 189–213; Michael S. Kimmel, *Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Dennis Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991); Barry Clarke, 'Citizen Human', *Citizenship* (London: Pluto Press, 1993), pp. 4–30.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

participation in the exercise of political rule, and are associated with elections and parliamentary institutions of different kinds. In recent years there have been numerous attempts to construct scales and indices of such rights-*in-principle*.[6] For the purposes of the present study an Institutional-Procedural Index (IPI) was constructed, which comprised the full gamut of civil and political rights.[7] The elements of the index were coded for each year (see Table 1), and the range of 0 (no rights guaranteed) to 29 (full rights guaranteed) was subsequently transformed to a scale of 0 to 1.[8]

It is relatively simple to measure rights-in-principle in this way, but it is intrinsically more difficult to measure *rights-in-practice*, if only because the reporting of rights violations under authoritarian rule is necessarily incomplete and nearly always imperfect (reflecting different forms of bias). For this reason we resort to 'abstract' measures of rights-in-practice, which themselves respond to primary evidence or shared perceptions of rights violations (see Table 2). The 'freedom scale' developed by Raymond Gastil measures both civil and political liberties, and ranges from 1 (full protection) to 7 (no protection).[9] For the Latin American cases, the Fitzgibbon–Johnson 'image index' and the Duff and McCamant 'repressiveness' measure were used.[10] Fitzgibbon and Johnson polled academic opinion on the state of rights protection in Latin

[6] Between 1954 and 1965 2,080 such indices were constructed, of which only 28 per cent have been used more than once. See R. L. Barsh, 'Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15 (1993), 87–121, p. 91.

[7] Civil rights were understood to depend on habeas corpus provisions; freedom of assembly, association, speech and information; independent judiciary and judicial review; and the absence of military tribunals, and of 'exceptional' or emergency clauses in the constitution. Political rights were gauged according to legislative selection, executive selection, competitive nomination procedures, limitation of extreme political parties, dominance of political parties, the freedom of trade unions, suffrage, and free and fair elections.

[8] Some coding is binary, indicating that certain rights are present (1) or absent (0). Others run from 0 to 2 or 3, indicating that the guarantees, freedoms or rights in question are absent or partially or completely present.

[9] Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World: Political and Civil Liberties, 1986–1987* (New York: Freedom House 1987). The scale has also been used as a measure of the 'repressiveness of the regime', of the 'probability of political freedom', and of democracy *tout court*, as well as a 'scale of polyarchy'. See Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'Inequality and Insurgency', *American Political Science Review*, 81 (1987), 425–51; Michael Coppedge and W. Reinicke, 'A Scale of Polyarchy', in Gastil, *Freedom in the World*, pp. 101–21; John F. Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth', *British Journal of Political Science*, 24 (1994), 225–48; and Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, 'Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism and Presidentialism', *World Politics*, 46 (1993), 1–22.

[10] See R. H. Fitzgibbon, 'Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America', *Journal of Politics*, 29 (1967), 129–66; Kenneth F. Johnson, 'Scholarly Images of Latin American Political Democracy in 1975', *Latin American Research Review*, 11 (1976), 129–41; Kenneth F. Johnson, 'Research Perspectives on the Revised Fitzgibbon–Johnson Index of the Image of Political Democracy in Latin America, 1945–1975', in James A. Wilkie and Kenneth Ruddle, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1977); Kenneth F. Johnson, 'The 1980 Image-Index Survey of Latin American Political Democracy', *Latin American Research Review*, 16 (1981), 193–201; Earnest A. Duff and John McCamant, *Violence and Repression in Latin America: A Quantitative and Historical Analysis* (New York: Free Press, 1976).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 1 *Coding Sheet for the Institutional-Procedural Index (IPI)*

	Score
Core rights	
Habeas corpus provisions	0–2
Assembly	0–1
Association	0–1
Speech/information	0–1
Exception clauses	0–1
Independent judiciary	2
No military tribunal	1
Military tribunal	0
Judicial review	0–1
Contestation	
Selection of legislature	0–2
Competitive nomination	1–2
Party competition	0–3
Largest party $<70\%$	2
Largest party $>70\%$	1
Trade unionism	0–3
Executive selection	0–1
Term limitation	0–1
Re-election	1–2
Participation	
Suffrage	0–2
Elections exist	0–1
Fair procedure	0–1
Total range	0–29

America at five-year intervals beginning in 1945. Their scale ranges from 1 (full protection) to 20 (no protection). Duff and McCamant established a scale of repressiveness ranging from 0 (full protection) to 16 (no protection). Subsequently, Arat constructed a scale of 'democraticness' that ranges from 29 (no protection) to 109 (full protection), while Humana scored countries against the provisions contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[11] Of the latter, just those provisions relating to rights-in-practice were retained, and the index rescaled from 0 to 100, to describe the range from zero to full protection.

[11] Zehra F. Arat, *Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); Charles Humana, *World Human Rights Guide* (London: Hutchinson, 1983); Charles Humana, *World Human Rights Guide* (New York: Facts On File Publications, 1987, 1992).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 2 *Rights-in-practice Measures*

Data source	Range of raw score	Dates covered	Cases covered
Gastil	1 (Full protection) 7 (No protection)	1972–90	Brazil, Chile,* Mexico, Spain
Fitzgibbon-Johnson	1 (Full protection) 20 (No protection)	1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985	Brazil, Chile, Mexico
Duff and McCamant	0 (Full protection) 16 (No protection)	1950–70	Brazil, Chile, Mexico
Arat	29 (No protection) 109 (Full protection)	1948–82	Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain*
Humana	0 (No protection) 100 (Full protection)	1983, 1987, 1992	Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain

* Indicates full time-series coverage of case in question.

These five measures were transformed to a range from 0 (no protection) to 1 (full protection) and combined. In this way a combined rights-in-practice index (CRI) was created by averaging the different measures for each year where they showed a score.[12] The resulting index is not without its problems. In the years of heavy overlap the scores will tend to converge towards the mean, while individual scores will be weighted more heavily in years with a single score or few scores. It might also be objected that this manœuvre combines 'apples and pears' and calls them 'fruit'. Since all the original measures are subjective in nature, however, their combination appears warranted if it can provide a clear view of the evolution of rights-in-practice over time.

Finally, the *gap*, or the difference between rights-in-principle and rights-in-practice, was calculated by regressing the CRI on the IPI, and saving the residuals.[13] What this means is that the rights-in-principle index (IPI) is used as an independent variable to predict that such rights should produce identical values of rights-in-practice. The actual values, however, indicate the real degrees of compliance or non-compliance with the rights-in-principle. GAP represents the difference, or residual, between the two.[14] Logically, since the rights indices both have a range of 0 to 1, the gap will have a range of values from -1 to $+1$. With a positive gap, practice is greater than principle, and citizens enjoy fuller rights than those that are legally guaranteed. With a negative gap, principle is greater than practice, and individual rights are being denied or compromised. If the gap is zero, rights in principle are equal in value to rights in practice. This tells us nothing about the quality of citizenship, since a zero gap simply indicates a certain equivalence: a totalitarian polity with no rights protection and much repression, and a democratic polity with full rights protection and complete liberty may both have a zero gap. In reality most polities will fall somewhere between -1 and 0 or 0 and $+1$.

These different rights indices can be plotted graphically to show the evolution of rights provision over the relevant time periods of the four cases. Thus, Figures 1 to 4 express the trajectories of IPI, CRI and GAP for Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Spain respectively. The 0 to 1 index on the *y* axis represents the transformed

[12] The combined rights in practice index (CRI) represents the mean of all five scores in each year of each case. The Gastil, Fitzgibbon–Johnson, and Duff and McCamant measures were reversed and transformed to reflect a positive scaling as is found in the Arat and Humana measures. The separate political and civil liberties of Gastil were combined, reversed and rescaled as follows: [14 − (political liberties + civil liberties)/12] (see Helliwell, 'The Empirical Linkages between Economic Development and Democracy', pp. 225–48). The Fitzgibbon–Johnson raw score was subtracted from 20 and divided by 19. The Duff and McCamant raw score was subtracted from 16 and divided by 16. The Arat raw score was subtracted from 109 and divided by 80. The Humana raw score was divided by 100.

[13] For a detailed explanation of this method, see Robert D. Duval and Michal Shamir, 'Indicators from Errors: Cross-National, Time Serial Measures of the Repressive Disposition of Government', in Charles Lewis Taylor, *Indicator Systems for Political, Economic, and Social Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980), pp. 155–82.

[14] In more technical terms, GAP represents the *unexplained variance in rights-in-practice* given a certain level of rights-in-principle.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

values of IPI, and the transformed and combined values of CRI, while the -1 to $+1$ index on the same axis represents GAP as the residual of CRI regressed on IPI.

These figures paint a clear picture of the similarities and differences in the evolution of rights provision across the four cases. Broadly speaking, all the cases show an improvement in rights-in-principle over the period, but this trend is barely perceptible in Mexico, or in Spain until the death of Franco and the beginning of democratic transition. However, there is a steady improvement in




Fig. 1. IPI, CRI and GAP in Brazil, 1964–90




Fig. 2. IRI, CRI and GAP in Chile, 1973–90

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press




Fig. 3. IRI, CRI and GAP in Mexico, 1963–90




Fig. 4. IRI, CRI and GAP in Spain, 1958–83

Brazil from the beginning of authoritarian 'liberalization' in the mid-1970s, while the trend in Chile rises sharply in the 1980s (following the new constitution of 1980), but falls again as the regime attempts to curb the waves of protest of the mid-1980s. Rights-in-practice tend to 'track' rights-in-principle in Brazil, and follow them very closely in Spain: in both countries these rights advance beyond formal provision in the initial years of their democratic

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

transitions, having fallen behind in Brazil during the struggles of the early 1980s. In Chile, on the contrary, rights-in-practice fall far short of rights-in-principle throughout the 1980s (although both trends improve as the democratic transition approaches), while there is a distinct deterioration in the practical provision of rights in Mexico throughout the period.[15]

In general, the literature on liberalizing regimes tends to assume that the presence and practice of individual rights must continue to improve as liberalization progresses.[16] The evidence on the evolution of rights-in-principle mainly supports this assumption, in so far as their formal advances are not usually rescinded. Even so, there are significant exceptions to the rule in Spain in the late 1960s and in Chile in the mid-1980s. But the assumption is far less safe regarding rights-in-practice, not only because they fall short of the formal guarantees for long periods in both Brazil and Chile, but because they clearly suffer a secular decline in Mexico. It may be easily conceded that liberalization is an uneven process, but, against the academic consensus, the process in Mexico appears to be running in reverse.

THE DATA AND THEIR DESCRIPTION: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movement activity was divided between labour movement activity and all other activity. In the tradition of mainstream research on labour movements time-series data on the strike rate (SR) for all cases were derived from ILO data and other secondary sources on labour activity.[17] The strike rate (or the number of strikes in any given year) is the most salient form of labour activity and can be compared directly to other social movement activity. Similarly, in the tradition of previous research on social movement activity in general,[18] a social mobilization coding protocol was constructed to measure the incidence and

[15] As suggested above, the trends in the measure of GAP simply reflect the ways in which the two rights indices move against each other. As such it is a 'derivative' measure designed more for the subsequent statistical analysis than for the description of rights provision. It is important to note, however, that GAP is negative in Brazil for eleven years, in Chile for eight years, in Mexico for twenty-two years, and in Spain for eighteen years.

[16] For example, O'Donnell argues that the process of liberalization, or the 'opening of the previous bureacratic authoritarian regime' includes 'effective judicial guarantees of some individual rights'. See Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Notas para el Estudio de Procesos de Democratización a partir del Estado Burocrático-Autoritario', *Estudios CEDES* 5 (1979).

[17] See E. Shorter and Charles Tilly, 'The Shape of Strikes in France, 1830–1960,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 13 (1971), 60–86; Douglas A. Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976); and Leopold H. Haimson and Charles Tilly, *Strikes, Wars and Revolutions in an International Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[18] See William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975); Anne N. Costain, *Inviting Women's Rebellion: A Political Process Interpretation of the Women's Movement* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–75* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); and Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Giugni, *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (London: UCL Press, 1995).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

character of this activity. The protocol recorded mobilization by year (sub-divided into quarters) and contained the following categories: event (*N*), magnitude (*M*), type of action (strike, non-strike), location (urban, rural), participants (workers, peasants, women, students, the poor), demands (material, economic, political, civil, other), themes (e.g. land, water rights, housing, repression, voting), and links with unions and parties. The data for the protocol came from an extensive reading of secondary and primary source material on social movement activity in the four cases.[19] For present purposes we focus exclusively on the events data as a measure of social movement activity (SMA). Thus, Figures 5 to 8 show the trends in strike rate (SR) and social mobilization (SMA) for the four cases, with SMA measured on the left-hand *y*-axis and SR on the right.

Observe that the different scaling for social movement activity in general (SMA) and labour movement activity (SR) may disguise the far greater magnitude of labour mobilization in Brazil, Mexico and Spain. Only in Chile are the two measures of protest of the same order of magnitude. Similarly, the distortion induced by the scaling may disguise the crucial fact that the waves of labour protest always *precede* the initial peaks of social mobilization in general (even in Brazil). But, despite the scaling difficulties, clear differences




Fig. 5. Strike rate and social movement activity in Brazil, 1964–89

[19] Newspaper coverage proved difficult for the authoritarian cases, since many events simply never appeared in the press, which in these cases was never free from direct and indirect censorship. Instead, the protocol reflects the events that received wide coverage in the academic literature on social movement activity in the four cases. Two microfilm collections, however, did prove invaluable for the cases of Brazil and Chile. See Library of Congress, *Brazil's Popular Groups: 1966–1986* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1988); Princeton University, *Chile, Protesta Nacional 1983–1984* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press




Fig. 6. Strike rate and social movement activity in Chile, 1974–90




Fig. 7. Strike rate and social movement activity in Mexico, 1964–90

emerge in the patterns of protest across the cases. In Brazil, the massive mobilization by labour continues to increase throughout the 1980s, while other forms of protest peak during the 'direct' democratic struggles of the early 1980s.[20] In Chile, exceptionally, social protest in general outpaces labour mobilization during the mid-1980s, but labour protest rises sharply as the

[20] The ratio of strikes to social movement events is 180 : 27 in 1979 and 843 : 24 in 1985, the first year of the democratic transition. As the trends suggest, SR and SMA are not significantly correlated in Brazil ($r = -0.23$, $p = 0.31$).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press




Fig. 8. Strike rate and social movement activity in Spain, 1958–82

democratic transition proceeds.[21] In Mexico, although labour leads the social protests, the peaks of labour and other forms of mobilization tend to coincide, if only loosely, in both the 1970s and 1980s, while social mobilization in general tends to 'track' labour protest very closely in Spain both before and during the transition to democracy.[22]

RELATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Having described the trajectories of individual rights provision and social movement activity across the four cases under comparison (Figures 1–8), the argument now proceeds to address the relationship between them. First, the three rights indices (IPI, CRI and GAP) are correlated with the two social movement measures (SMA and SR) to reveal the 'first order' or descriptive associations that may exist between rights and social movements. Secondly, multivariate regression is used to model the unidirectional and causal mechanisms that may configure the relationship *both* between rights and movements *and* between movements and rights. In the latter stage the scope of the inquiry is broadened to include economic variables in addition to the rights and movement variables.

[21] See Paul Drake and Ivan Jaksic, eds, *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982–1990* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1991); Brian Loveman, 'Military Dictatorship and Political Opposition in Chile, 1973–1986,' *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 28 (1986), 1–38.

[22] SR and SMA are not significantly correlated in either Chile ($r = -0.09$, $p = 0.749$) or Mexico ($r = 0.08$, $p = 0.72$), but are significantly and positively correlated in Spain ($r = 0.55$, $p = 0.009$).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 3 *Bivariate Correlations for All Cases (Pearson's* r*)*

	GAP	IPI	SMA	SR
Brazil				
CRI	0.85***	0.52***	0.26	0.70***
GAP		—	0.27	0.36*
IPI			0.03	0.72***
SMA				− 0.23
Chile				
CRI	0.84***	0.55**	− 0.14	0.80***
GAP		—	− 0.43*	0.48**
IPI			0.32	0.77***
SMA				− 0.09
Mexico				
CRI	0.70***	− 0.71***	− 0.10	− 0.06
GAP		—	0.05	0.41**
IPI			0.21	0.32*
SMA				0.08
Spain				
CRI	0.36*	0.93***	− 0.09	0.41**
GAP		—	0.08	− 0.06
IPI			− 0.13	0.50**
SMA				0.55**

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$. IPI is the institutional procedural index which measures rights-in-principle; CRI is the combined rights index, which measures rights-in-practice, the GAP is the residual from regressing CRI on IPI; SMA is social movement activity; and SR is the strike rate, the principal measure of labour activity.

Bivariate Correlations

The bivariate correlations between the rights variables and the movement variables (Table 3) show that labour movement activity (SR) is positively associated with the rights measures in all of the cases, although the association is much stronger in Brazil and Chile than in Spain, while in Mexico the main association appears to be with the GAP. This finding suggests that *either* the labour movement extends formal rights and has a strong impact on regime behaviour, *or* that it takes advantage of such formal rights that are conferred, and that regime behaviour is effective in encouraging and discouraging labour activity. In Mexico, by contrast, since GAP was recurrently and increasingly negative (Figure 3), it appears that *either* the relative lack of rights-in-practice provoked labour protest, *or* that this protest tended to raise levels of repression despite formal guarantees. The negative, if not very strong or significant correlation between SMA and GAP in Chile is difficult to read because of the way GAP switches sign from the 1970s to the 1980s: for the 1982–85 period, but only for this period, high levels of protest (SMA) coincide with a strongly negative GAP.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

These preliminary results suggest that despite the huge effort dedicated to theorizing new forms and sectors of social movement activity,[23] it appears that it is the labour movement which is most closely associated with individual rights. Labour is both the biggest actor and the first to enter the political arena. Moreover, although the correlations can tell us nothing about the direction of the relationship between labour activity and rights, the strength of the association does invite some interesting *hypotheses*.[24] In Brazil it seems possible that labour protests succeeded in influencing both regime configuration and regime behaviour (rights-in-principle and rights-in-practice); while in Chile it may appear more plausible that labour took whatever advantage it could from periods of mitigated repression. In Spain the labour movement may have both precipitated and responded to the moment of democratic transition (which itself tends to 'concentrate' these two-way effects), even if its often powerful protests failed to have much impact on rights until that moment. Finally, the labour movement in Mexico is divided between 'official' and 'dissident' strands and so behaves differently; and it may be the combination of labour and other social movement protest (especially in the electoral arena) that influences rights-in-principle and practice.

However, there are reasons to be cautious about these observations. On the one hand, the apparent preponderance of labour may result, in part, from measurement bias: the data on strike activity is relatively complete in relation to the more sporadic data on other social movement activity. On the other, correlations cannot tell the whole story, and it may be the case that the labour movement 'mimics' the effects of underlying economic variables such as inflation or economic growth, with which it is itself highly correlated. These considerations are pertinent to the next stage of the statistical analysis which will both clarify the hypothetical possibilities and test the strength of the associations arising from the correlation results by modelling the relationship between social movements and rights through multivariate regression.

Time-series Regression

Given that the relationship between rights and movements could be reciprocal, we are clearly interested in two distinct sets of causal connections:

$$\text{Rights} \rightarrow \text{Social Movements} \tag{1}$$

$$\text{Social Movements} \rightarrow \text{Rights} \tag{2}$$

For the first relationship (1), the dependent variable is either SMA or SR, so parameters were estimated for two separate equations per country. For the

[23] See Joe Foweraker, *Theorizing Social Movements* (London: Pluto Press, 1995).

[24] Further bivariate correlations between the rights and movements variables at time t as well as time $t-1$ (i.e. lagged one-year) do not change the overall interpretation of the simpler matrix presented in Table 3. None the less, these correlations are presented in the Appendix in order to confirm the present results.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

second relationship (2), the three rights measures (IPI, CRI and GAP) are the dependent variables, so parameters were estimated for three equations per case.[25] At the same time, measures of GDP growth, inflation and energy consumption[26] are included as independent variables in both sets of equations for modelling purposes. It is plausible to argue that economic conditions will influence social movement activity (Model 1), so the economic variables are included alongside the rights variables. Since it is equally plausible to suggest that economic conditions will influence the rights indices (especially in so far as they serve as a proxy for 'regime behaviour'), Model 2 maintains the economic variables, but switches the rights and social movement measures, making movements independent and rights dependent.[27] To estimate the parameters for the two relationships (Models 1 and 2) maximum likelihood autoregression was employed to control for autocorrelation.[28]

[25] Since strong causal inferences cannot be made from regressions at time *t*, the Appendix presents a general model of the relationship between 'first differences' in the dependent variable (i.e. the values at time *t* minus the values lagged by one year), and differences and lagged differences in the independent variables. The interpretation of these more advanced statistical results does not alter the simpler first order regressions presented in Tables 4–6.

[26] Gross domestic product (GDP) growth is the percentage change per year in GDP, inflation is the percentage rise in prices per year and energy consumption is the million metric tons of coal equivalent consumed by a nation in any given year, including solid and liquid fuels; domestic and imported gas; hydroelectric, nuclear and imported electricity. The data were collected from various editions of the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*.

[27] The literature on the connections between economic growth and regime types has dominated much of comparative political science since the work of Seymour Martin Lipset, who recently defended his original thesis in the *American Sociological Review*, 59 (1994), 1–22. In particular, there is a large literature on the relationship between economic growth and democracy, which was reviewed in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), and which continues to grow (see Helliwell, 'Empirical Linkages between Economic Development and Democracy'). Equally, there have been numerous attempts to explore the relationship between economic development and social mobilization (see Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Karl-Werner Brand, 'Cyclical Aspects of New Social Movements: Waves of Cultural Criticism and Mobilization Cycles of New Middle Class Radicalism,' in Russell Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, eds, *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 23–42; and Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)).

[28] Autocorrelation occurs when the disturbance term for any year (ε_t) is correlated with the disturbance term for the previous year (ε_{t-1}). Since these disturbance terms can 'trend' on each other over time, the use of the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique can produce biased results in the form of inflated coefficients and underestimated standard errors. 'First order' autocorrelation, AR(1), occurs when the error term of one year is a bivariate linear function of the error term in a previous year: $\varepsilon_t = p\varepsilon_{t-1} + v_t$, where ε_t and ε_{t-1} are the systematic errors from an OLS time-series regression, v_t is a randomly distributed, or genuine error term, and p is equal to 1. The autoregression procedure in SPSS identifies an AR term, estimates its parameters and includes it in the final equation. For a full review of time-series techniques and the problems of autocorrelation, see David Sanders and Hugh Ward, 'Time-Series Techniques for Repeated Cross-Section Data', in R. Davies and A. Dale, eds, *Analysing Social and Political Change: A Casebook of*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 4 *Parameter Estimates for the Rights Perspective (Model 1)*

	Brazil[a]		Chile[b]		Mexico[c]		Spain[d]	
Ind. Var.	SMA	SR	SMA	SR	SMA	SR	SMA	SR
Const.	− 15.86 (− 1.54)	− 2290.03*** (− 4.79)	15.21 (0.936)	− 26.25** (− 2.27)	83.40 (0.322)	− 1438.72 (− 0.591)	6.96 (0.168)	534.48 (0.57)
IPI	22.15 (1.55)	1184.89* (1.76)	29.87 (1.34)	65.49** (3.19)	− 78.68 (− 0.208)	2718.09 (0.760)	− 92.23** (− 2.59)	− 202.86 (− 0.215)
CRI	− 34.25** (− 2.63)	3807.96*** (4.85)	− 56.23 (− 0.875)	139.70** (3.56)				
GAP					105.57 (1.19)	2561.97* (1.77)	− 118.25 (− 1.56)	− 5352.57** (− 2.87)
GDP	0.11 (0.367)	31.53* (1.98)	0.13 (0.151)	0.65 (0.735)	− 1.67 (− 0.900)	− 2.89 (− 0.097)	− 2.73 (− 0.684)	− 141.78 (− 1.70)

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Inflation	− 0.024** (− 3.22)	2.17*** (5.93)			0.10 (0.315)	0.12 (0.033)	5.67** (3.51)	119.69** (2.54)
Energy	0.46*** (4.50)	− 7.22* (− 1.80)						
AR (1)	0.42 (1.44)	− 0.63** (− 2.78)	0.22 (0.825)	− 0.03 (− 0.114)	0.56** (2.95)	0.38* (2.04)	− 0.17 (− 0.712)	0.44* (1.75)
DF	17	16	12	12	19	22	15	14
LL	− 70.6	− 163.34	− 73.91	− 76.06	− 112.52	− 203.68	− 98.6	− 153.84

Notes: IPI is the institutional procedural index which measures rights-in-principle; CRI is the combined rights index, which measures rights-in-practice; GAP is the residual from regressing CRI on IPI; SMA is social movement activity; and SR is the strike rate, the principal measure of labour activity. Reported values are unstandardized coefficients with *t* values in parentheses. *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.001$; DF = degrees of freedom; LL = Log Likelihood

[a] Since CRI and GAP are highly correlated ($r = 0.85$), GAP was excluded from the equation.

[b] Since CRI and GAP are highly correlated ($r = 0.84$), GAP was excluded. Moreover, since both inflation and IPI ($r = -0.70$) and CRI and energy ($r = 0.88$) are highly correlated, the results exclude both inflation and energy.

[c] Since IPI and CRI are highly correlated ($r = -0.70$), the CRI is excluded from the equation; and since energy consumption is highly correlated with both inflation and IPI, it too is excluded.

[d] Since IPI and CRI are highly correlated ($r = 0.93$), the CRI is excluded from the equation; and since energy consumption is highly correlated with both GDP ($r = -0.77$) and inflation ($r = 0.87$), it too is excluded.

The parameter estimates for the *rights perspective* (Model 1) are shown in Table 4, where the two separate dependent variables for each case are aligned in the first row along the top of the table, and where the independent rights and economic variables are listed in the first column. Reading across the columns it appears that rights-in-practice (CRI) have a significant and positive impact on labour movement activity, but a negative effect on other social mobilization in Brazil; while both rights-in-practice (CRI) and rights-in-principle (IPI) act to encourage labour activity in Chile. Mexico shows no significant results, while in Spain the rights measures (IPI and GAP) appear to discourage social protest. In the latter case the Franco regime not only stuck to its own repressive rules, but exceeded them in most years (Figure 4), and this was evidently effective in crushing dissent. Not surprisingly, inflation tends to encourage labour mobilization in both Brazil and Spain.

The parameter estimates for the *social movement perspective* (Model 2) are shown in Table 5, where the three separate dependent rights variables per case are aligned along the top row, with the independent variables listed in the first column. Reading across the columns it appears that both labour (SR) and other forms of mobilization (SMA) have a significant and positive impact on rights-in-principle (IPI) in Brazil and Chile. Labour activity seems to have no significant effects on rights-in-practice (CRI) in any of the cases, yet this activity does have such effects on GAP in both Brazil and Mexico, indicating that labour mobilization may be stretching formal rights and so extending rights-in-practice. The anomalous case is Spain. Here labour mobilization still has a positive and significant effect on rights-in-principle (IPI), but SMA has a negative impact on these same rights, while labour activity has a negative and significant impact on GAP. Just as the repressive regime discouraged labour protest, so this protest tended to provoke further repression.

Since the overall results for Mexico were the weakest of the four cases, a combined variable for social movement activity was created, SMASR, which represents the sum of SMA and SR. The re-estimated parameters for equations which include this new term as a dependent variable (the rights perspective) and as an independent variable (the social movement perspective) are shown in Table 6, where it is clear that not only does SMASR have a positive impact on GAP (much as SR did), but that both rights-in-principle (IPI) and GAP have positive and significant effects on SMASR. This suggests that it is government initiatives (IPI) and regime behaviour (GAP) which stimulate the labour movement and other social movements to act in consort in Mexico; and, in particular, that social movements react to the *perceived* gap between the rights they hold in principle and those they enjoy in practice, and mobilize to close this gap. These specificities of the

(F'note continued)
Methods (Thousand Oaks and London: Sage, 1994), pp. 201–23; and Charles W. Ostrom, *Time Series Analysis Regression Techniques*, 2nd edn, Sage University Paper 9 (London: Sage, 1990).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE 5 *Parameter Estimates for the Social Movement Perspective (Model 2)*

	Brazil[a]			Chile[b]			Mexico			Spain		
Ind. Var.	IPI	CRI	GAP	IPI	CRI	GAP	IPI	CRI	GAP	IPI	CRI	GAP
Constant	0.87***	0.14	− 0.47***	0.27**	0.18**	− 0.07	0.68***	0.70***	− 0.03	0.41	0.60**	0.10
	(11.58)	(1.63)	(− 5.16)	(2.52)	(2.26)	(− 1.04)	(47.20)	(13.60)	(− 0.667)	(1.80)	(2.20)	(0.98)
SMA	0.01***	− 0.006*	− 0.009**	0.004**	− 0.00003	− 0.001	− 0.00007	0.0003	0.00009	− 0.005**	− 0.0005	0.0005
	(4.19)	(− 2.02)	(− 2.76)	(2.25)	(− 0.024)	(− 1.28)	(− 0.826)	(0.559)	(0.264)	(− 3.10)	(− 0.77)	(0.870)
SR	0.0002***	− 0.00001	0.0001**	0.006**	0.002	0.0002	− 0.0000001	0.00005	0.00006**	0.0002*	− 0.00004	− 0.0001**
	(7.36)	(− 0.470)	(− 2.63)	(3.72)	(1.41)	(0.221)	(− 0.025)	(1.58)	(2.35)	(2.21)	(− 1.45)	(− 3.66)
GDP	− 0.015***	− 0.0009	0.007	− 0.007	0.003	0.005	− 0.0005	0.002	0.003	− 0.03	− 0.01	− 0.02**
	(− 5.10)	(− 0.229)	(1.70)	(− 1.09)	(0.605)	(1.22)	(− 0.845)	(0.501)	(0.779)	(− 1.37)	(− 1.00)	(− 2.70)
Inflation				− 0.0009**	0.00007	0.0004*				0.004	− 0.003	0.009
				(− 2.37)	(0.266)	(1.76)				(0.35)	(− 0.29)	(1.29)
Energy	− 0.005***	0.006***	0.008***				0.0007***	− 0.001**	− 0.0002			
	(− 4.00)	(4.52)	(4.99)				(4.91)	(− 2.84)	(− 0.524)			
AR (1)	− 0.64**	0.05	− 0.04	0.15	0.30	− 0.028	0.68**	0.11	− 0.17	− 0.20	0.94**	0.60**
	(− 2.87)	(0.164)	(− 0.146)	(0.527)	(0.803)	(− 0.073)	(3.59)	(0.436)	(− 0.759)	(− 0.780)	(11.7)	(2.83)
DF	15	15	15	10	10	10	19	19	19	14	14	14
LL	25.56	27.02	24.78	10.45	16.67	17.90	83.36	39.23	42.74	7.70	19.55	26.59

Notes: IPI is the institutional procedural index which measures rights-in-principle; CRI is the combined rights index, which measures rights-in-practice; GAP is the residual from regressing CRI on IPI; SMA is social movement activity; and SR is the strike rate, the principal measure of labour activity. Reported values are unstandardized coefficients with *t* values in parentheses. *$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.001$; DF = degrees of freedom; LL = Log Likelihood. [a]Since SR and inflation are highly correlated in Brazil ($r = 0.91$), inflation is excluded from the equation. [b]Since SR and energy are highly correlated in Chile ($r = 0.77$), energy is excluded from the equation.

TABLE 6 *Parameter Estimates for Models 1 and 2 (Mexico)*

Ind. var.	SMASR	IPI	CRI	GAP
Constant	− 7627.69**	0.64***	0.70***	− 0.03
	(− 3.42)	(49.94)	(14.73)	(− 0.686)
SMASR		1.00E-7	0.00005	0.00006**
		(0.010)	(1.66)	(2.45)
IPI	11947.46**			
	(3.62)			
GAP	3256.01**			
	(2.20)			
GDP	− 12.35	− 0.0004	0.002	0.003
GDP	(− 0.428)	(0.642)	(0.409)	(0.800)
Inflation	− 5.22			
	(− 1.47)			
Energy		0.0007***	− 0.001**	− 0.0002
		(5.18)	(− 2.95)	(− 0.541)
AR (1)	− 0.043	0.65**	0.06	− 0.18
	(− 0.182)	(3.24)	(0.253)	(− 0.818)
DF	19	20	20	20
LL	− 179.11	83.07	39.27	42.87

Notes: IPI is the institutional procedural index which measures rights-in-principle; CRI is the combined rights index, which measures rights-in-practice; GAP is the residual from regressing CRI on IPI; SMASR is the sum of social movement activity and labour activity. Reported values are unstandardized coefficients with *t* values in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.001$; DF = degrees of freedom; LL = Log Likelihood.

Mexican case probably reflect the struggle for political rights waged by social movements in the electoral arena.[29]

In general, regression analysis confirms the conclusions drawn from the correlations (Table 3), and so confirms the importance of the labour movement for the development of individual rights. But it also amplifies these conclusions, highlighting exceptions (and partial exceptions) and accentuating the differences between cases. Brazil is the paradigmatic case where labour's predominance cannot easily be contested. In Chile labour remains a central actor, but since it never succeeded in extending rights-in-practice (the real degrees of liberty within the society at large) its influence can only be measured by institutional changes over the longer term. The labour movement also appears

[29] For a fuller discussion of the Mexican results as a reflection of the specificities of the Mexican political system, see Joe Foweraker, 'Measuring Citizenship in Mexico', in Monica Serrano and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, eds, *Rebuilding the State: Mexico after Salinas* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1996), pp. 79–98.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

preponderant in both Mexico and Spain, but in Mexico it mainly influences and responds to rights in consort with other social movements and forces, while in Spain it does not appear to make any significant impact on individual rights before the moment of the democratic transition.

The regression analysis also makes clear that the relationship between social movements and individual rights is a two-way relationship, and thereby lends indirect support to the *dual perspective*. Once again, Brazil appears to provide the paradigmatic case in this regard, with both labour and other movements influencing rights-in-principle, just as rights-in-practice stimulates or 'elicits' labour activity. In Chile both labour and other movements are also important to rights-in-principle, and, equally, labour appears to respond to both kinds of changes in rights. But, in contrast to Brazil, social mobilization remains insensitive to rights-in-practice. In Mexico the same two-way effects are at work, but here it is the *combination* of labour with other movements that works to close the gap between the rhetoric and reality of citizenship rights, just as this gap – and government initiatives – appears to call forth or provoke social movement protest. Only in Spain does this order of relationship remain opaque. In sum, the relationship between rights and movements may be said to be mutually conditioning but weak in Mexico, mutually conditioning but partial in Chile, and mutually constitutive and strong in Brazil.

The Spanish case is distinctive. There is no doubt that the principal opposition labour movement, the Workers' Commissions, grew massively during the latter years of the dictatorship, nor that it succeeded in colonizing the corporatist centrepiece of the regime, the Vertical Syndicate.[30] But the movement's ingenious combination of clandestine and open struggle achieved change in a piecemeal and informal fashion that did not alter rights-in-principle or rights-in-practice. On the contrary, the regime remained highly repressive until and through Franco's dying days. But even if labour's struggle was not reflected in the rights measures, it was effective in 'schooling the working class in "free" collective bargaining and in a sense of its democratic rights, so readying it for its massive mobilization at the moment of the formal and constitutional transition.'[31] In Spain, therefore, the mutual effects of rights and movements are concentrated in the moment of transition, and it is these 'concentrated' effects which muddy the regression results and 'distort' them in some degree.

EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RIGHTS AND MOVEMENTS

The statistical analysis appears to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that there is a dynamic two-way historical relationship between social movements and individual rights. In other words, the discourse of individual rights and

[30] See Joe Foweraker, *Making Democracy in Spain: Grass-Roots Struggle in the South, 1955–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
[31] Foweraker, *Making Democracy in Spain*, p. 222.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

social movements not only coexist in the public domain, but also condition each other's development and political trajectory. In its strongest form this proposition suggests that rights and movements are mutually constitutive, meaning that the one cannot develop without the other. But both the correlations and autoregressions further suggest that the relationship varies significantly in both strength and shape across cases, while the descriptive data reveal how the relationship also shifts over time. In short, the relationship is demonstrated, but differently so across time and political cultures.

Yet the methodological limits of this analysis clearly constrain its scope. Without a close focus on the internal development of social movements, our analysis has little to say about social movement strategy. Without an institutional focus, we cannot explore the changing 'political opportunity structures' that may catalyse successful collective action.[32] But the consistent focus of the relationship between rights *provision* and social movement *activity* writ large does have an analytical pay-off. By concentrating on one key aspect of strategy, which is the pursuit of rights, our analysis provides hard measures of at least one aspect of social movement 'success' – its political impact on rights provision.[33] Conversely, by isolating one enduring aspect of the 'political opportunity structure'[34] faced by social movements – the provision of rights (whether rights-in-principle or rights-in-practice) – we are able to measure social movement responses to changes in this provision.[35]

[32] This order of analysis has been carried out elsewhere. For a detailed analysis of social movement strategy in Spain, see Foweraker, *Making Democracy in Spain*; and for a full account of shifting 'political opportunity structures' in Mexico, see Joe Foweraker, *Popular Mobilization in Mexico: The Teacher's Movement 1977–1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[33] The political impact of social movements is the grand *incognitus* of social movement research. Strange as it may seem, this question is usually treated intransitively, as if it were unimportant to know *on what* social movements are meant to have an impact. Consequently, the question is only rarely operationalized to good effect. Exceptions, or partial exceptions to the rule, which attempt some form of comparative or statistical analysis, include Gamson, *The Strategy of Protest*; Susan Welch, 'The Impact of Urban Riots on Urban Expenditures', *American Journal of Political Science*, 19 (1975), 741–60; and Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Pantheon Press, 1977), on North American movements; and Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder*; J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds, *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements* (London: UCL Press, 1995); and Kriesi *et al*., *New Social Movements in Western Europe*, on European movements.

[34] Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[35] There is a further respect in which the inquiry may elucidate the idea of a 'political opportunity structure'. The literature remains ambiguous about the quality of this structure, and fails to resolve whether its existence is 'objective' or primarily 'subjective', in so far as opportunities must be perceived before they can influence collective action. See Alberto Melucci, 'Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in Social Movements', in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi and Sidney Tarrow, eds, *From Structure to Action: Comparing Movements Across Cultures*, International Social Movements Research, Vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988), pp. 329–48. By measuring the gap between rights-in-principle and rights-in-practice, and by tracing the influence of this gap on

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Primary Role of the Labour Movement

But, even if social movements in general can have a political impact on rights provision, it is clear that it is the labour movement that leads this process of social mobilization. The descriptive data show that the first wave of labour mobilization always precedes the first wave of mobilization by other movements, while both the correlations and the autoregressions tend to confirm the primary place of labour in the struggle for the individual rights of citizenship. This finding should cause no surprise. The English school of social history has shown how working people began to speak the language of rights and successfully defended freedom of association as part of the lexicon of rights.[36] Historians have also demonstrated beyond much doubt that, across nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, the biggest working-class struggles were spurred by the prospect of electoral reform.[37] And recent scholarship confirms that the emergence of individual rights in the modern period was closely tied to the success of the working-class movement.[38] But the main body of social movement theory has clearly become so far distracted by the proliferation of 'new social movements' since the 1960s that there is now a clear need to 'bring labour back in'.[39]

It is not difficult to discern why the labour movement plays such a key role. It may be true, as the theory suggests, that all social movements act as schools of rights, with their processes of organization, mobilization and strategic choice creating the means for a popular education in rights. And it is also possible that an awareness of rights leads directly to the struggle to vindicate these rights, and so 'operationalizes' the legal content of citizenship through public contestation and public demands for rights. The labour movement, however, is not only bigger than most other movements combined, but it also has a unique capacity to hit the capitalist economy where it hurts – through strike action. Under authoritarian regimes, where economic performance is central to political legitimacy, such action may have an immediate political impact, which strengthens labour's political leverage.

But although the *a priori* arguments appear convincing, the real process of

(F'note continued)

social mobilization, our research provides some empirical evidence for evaluating the impact of this perception on social mobilization.

[36] Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men;* Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*.

[37] M. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Volume 2.

[38] See Ruschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, which is the major work of comparative historical sociology in the field and provides a wealth of empirical evidence. But the authors also conclude that the working-class movement has rarely been strong enough to win citizenship rights by itself, and has often had to depend on more powerful political allies or on splits in ruling-class coalitions.

[39] See Foweraker, *Theorizing Social Movements*, pp. 37–45.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

labour mobilization may be more complicated, if only because labour may aspire to forms of corporate rights which are not universal. In both Spain and Latin America in particular, labour's citizenship rights were often restricted to a form of economic rights. This occurred wherever the co-optation of the labour movement into a clientelistic and corporative framework led to a political trade-off between the political and social rights of citizenship,[40] so undermining any sense of universal rights and promoting in their place a set of social benefits in the form of legal privileges and political prerogatives.

None the less, the record shows that such forms of 'regulated citizenship'[41] can precipitate wider struggles for civil and political rights; and even highly corporatized labour systems can create institutional contexts which are favourable to the emergence of combative labour movements. This was true of Spain, Brazil and Mexico where the most effective labour movements arose from within the state-chartered union corporations of authoritarian regimes.[42] These movements (in Spain in the 1960s and 1970s and in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s) put labour rights back on the political agenda.[43] In all these cases direct bargaining between employers and grass-roots labour leaders bypassed the corporatist controls of the state, so securing the *de facto* right to strike and challenging the core of the exclusionary labour systems; while attempts at state repression often accelerated the collapse of legal constraints and catalysed the liberation of labour for fuller citizenship. This trajectory of the labour movement illustrates that social mobilization which is initially driven by demands which are immediate and material may catalyse broader demands for civil and political rights, especially in the restrictive political conditions of authoritarian regimes.

Social Mobilization, Rights and Democratic Transitions

This trajectory suggests, and the results of the statistical analysis confirm, that the waves of social mobilization occurring under authoritarian regimes are motivated increasingly by the struggle for rights. In no small degree, therefore, it is the dissemination of a sense of individual rights through new and old forms of collective action that educates popular political actors and catalyses the

[40] See James Malloy, 'The Politics of Transition in Latin America', in James Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds, *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), pp. 235–58.

[41] Held, 'Citizenship and Autonomy'.

[42] See Joe Foweraker, *The Struggle for Land: A Political Economy of the Pioneer Frontier in Brazil, from 1930 to the Present Day* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Foweraker, *Making Democracy in Spain*; and Foweraker, *Popular Mobilization in Mexico*.

[43] In the case of Brazil the new unionism of the late 1970s insisted that the workers themselves should decide their own forms of organization, while the strikes of 1979 seemed inspired by 'an assertion of rights rather than a demand for concessions'. See Margaret Keck, 'The "New Unionism" in the Brazilian Transition', in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 252–98, at p. 289.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

creation of a new political agenda, which is a rights agenda.[44] The evolution of this agenda is halting and uncertain, as the descriptive data show, and there is no chiliastic vision of a bright democratic future. None the less, the time-series data described here do serve to lengthen the analytical perspective on democratic transitions. Rustow argued in his seminal article that most such transitions are 'set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle',[45] and further suggested that one generation is usually the minimum period required to achieve them. But the more recent literature has mainly ignored such observations, and has tended to see these transitions as critical moments in political time. The evidence assembled here suggests that it may be useful to recall Rustow's insights, and distinguish between democratic *transition per se* and the period of democratic *transformation* which precedes it, and which 'creates the political conditions in which the transition takes place'.[46] The study of democratic transitions might then properly focus on the changes of regimes at government level, or on the legal or constitutional norms governing the operation of the newly democratic regime, while research into democratic transformation would address the multiform struggles within civil society which prepare the political ground for these changes.

By extension, the present study may help to rescue the role of popular political actors in democratic transitions. The first wide-ranging comparative study of democratic transition in southern Europe and Latin America noted that, while democracies may be brought down by conspiracies involving few actors, the liberalization and eventual fall of authoritarian regimes has the 'crucial component' of large-scale mobilization.[47] Moreover, it was argued that the process of liberalization might itself catalyse increasing opposition and a 'resurrection of civil society',[48] which would then impel the transition forward. But despite these salutary observations it was the 'short-term manœuvring' by elites[49] that remained central to O'Donnell and Schmitter's analysis, and, subsequently, most discussions of democratic transitions have focused on elite actors and have derived their typologies of transition from the *ex post* modelling of elite decision making.[50] Hence, this attempt to measure the trajectory of

[44] See Foweraker, *Theorizing Social Movements*, pp. 90–114.

[45] Dankwart A. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', *Comparative Politics*, 2 (1970), 337–63, p. 352.

[46] Foweraker, *Making Democracy in Spain*, p. 2.

[47] Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 18. This point is reinforced by Przeworski who argues that splits in the regime combined with popular mobilization leads to political liberalization, but mobilization is still only conceived as a 'signal' to 'Liberalizers'. See Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 57.

[48] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, p. 26.

[49] Daniel Levine, 'Paradigm Lost: Dependency to Democracy', *World Politics*, 40 (1988), 377–394, p. 85.

[50] Thus, Przeworski studies the choices made by different attitudinal groups of elite actors (liberalizers and hardliners) during the process of transition, while both Higley and Gunther and

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

social mobilization, and so unpack the catch-all notion of a 'resurrection of civil society', may help to redress the balance in some degree.

But with the transition to democracy it must be recognized that the struggle for citizenship rights will move to the constitutional sphere, and so social movements may lose their pre-eminent role as defenders and promoters of civil and political rights. Every state administration that is organized through bureaucratic power relations will seek to institutionalize positive law and so create 'subjects capable of political obligation, and later the rights of citizens';[51] and a newly democratic regime will seek to build legitimacy by insisting on these rights. In other words, citizenship becomes an identity that is defended and disseminated by the state against all class and regional differences, and against the specific identities and claims of social movements.[52] During periods of democratic transformation it is social movements that demand citizenship rights and challenge authoritarian regimes to put these rights into practice. In so far as this occurs through democratic transition, many of their demands are met, and their political impetus begins to decline. In this way 'successful social movements inevitably lose their reason for being'.[53]

APPENDIX

Time-series correlation and regression at time *t* reveals first-order relationships from which strong causal statements are not easily derived. However, by including the lagged values of the principal variables into the analysis, stronger causal inferences can be drawn from the data. Thus, this appendix expands Table 3 to show the bivariate correlations between the rights and movements variables and their lagged values (Table A1). It then presents a general model which specifies the relationship between the first differences and lagged first differences of the rights and movements variables.

The bivariate correlations in Table A1 confirm the preponderant effect of labour mobilization

(F'note continued)

Hagopian consider elite pacts and settlements made at the moment of democratic transition. Colomer and Colomer and Pascual attempt to formalize these elite-centred studies through the application of game theory to the Spanish and Polish transitions. Although these studies make important contributions to the analysis of democratic transitions, they tend to ignore the question of popular agency entirely. See Adam Przeworski, 'Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 47–63; Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*; John Higley and Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Comsolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Frances Hagopian, 'Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political Pacts and Regime Transition in Brazil', *Comparative Political Studies*, 23 (1990), 147–70; Josep M. Colomer, 'Transitions by Agreement: Modelling the Spanish Way', *American Political Science Review*, 85 (1991), 1283–302; and Josep M. Colomer and M. Pascual, 'The Polish Games of Transition,' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 27 (1994), 275–94.

[51] Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), p. 439.

[52] Alain Touraine, *The Return of the Actor: Social Theory in Post-Industrial Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 75.

[53] Jane Jaquette, ed., *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Feminism and the Transition to Democracy* (Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 194.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

on all three rights measures across all four cases at time t and $t-1$. The strongest relationship remains that between labour mobilization and rights-in-principle, and on balance, the correlations show slightly more support for the rights perspective.

To examine the relationship more closely, the next step is to specify a model that relates first differences in the dependent variable to first differences in the independent variables at time t, as well as time $t-1$. This model appears formally as follows:

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha_t + \beta_1 \Delta X_{1t} + \beta_2 \Delta X_{1t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta X_{2t} + \beta_4 \Delta X_{2t-1} \ldots + \ldots \beta_i \Delta X_{nt} + \beta_j \Delta X_{nt-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

Where ΔY_t is the first difference of the dependent variable (in this case, either a movement or rights measure), $\Delta X_{1 \ldots n}$ are the first differences of the independent variables at time t; $\Delta X_{1t-1 \ldots nt-1}$ are the lagged first difference independent variables; α_t, β_1, β_2, β_3, β_4, β_i, β_j are the parameters to be estimated, and ε_t is the error term. This appendix reports the strongest parameter estimates for the rights and movements perspectives in each of the four cases. Standard OLS regression was used to estimate the parameters since the inclusion of first differences eliminates the problem of first-order autocorrelation. The results reported by case include unstandardised co-efficients, t-values in parentheses, R^2 values, F-statistics, and the p-values, which follow the standard reporting format (*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.001$).

Brazil

Parameter estimates for the rights perspective:

$$\Delta \mathrm{SR}_t = 148.04 - 1508.84\ \Delta \mathrm{IPI}_t + 4896.71^{***}\ \Delta \mathrm{IPI}_{t-1}$$
$$(1.63)\quad (-1.39)\qquad\qquad (4.37)$$
$$R^2 = 0.49$$
$$F = 10.09^{***}$$

$$\Delta \mathrm{SMA}_t = 0.04 - 28.90^{**}\ \Delta \mathrm{GAP}_t - 0.98\ \Delta \mathrm{GAP}_{t-1}$$
$$(0.03)\quad (-2.30)\qquad\qquad (-0.09)$$
$$R^2 = 0.16$$
$$F = 2.75^{*}$$

Parameter estimates for the movement perspective:

$$\Delta \mathrm{IPI}_t = 0.01 - 0.0000002\ \Delta \mathrm{SR}_t + 0.0002^{**}\ \Delta \mathrm{SR}_{t-1} + 0.006^{**}\ \Delta \mathrm{SMA}_t + 0.0009 \Delta \mathrm{SMA}_{t-1}$$
$$(0.57)\quad (-0.01)\qquad\qquad (2.70)\qquad\qquad (2.22)\qquad\qquad (0.33)$$
$$R^2 = 0.32$$
$$F = 2.80^{*}$$

$$\Delta \mathrm{CRI}_t = 0.02 - 0.006^{*}\ \Delta \mathrm{SMA}_t + 0.005\ \Delta \mathrm{SMA}_{t-1}$$
$$(0.84)\qquad\qquad (-1.85)\qquad\qquad (1.58)$$
$$R^2 = 0.20$$
$$F = 3.11^{*}$$

$$\Delta \mathrm{GAP}_t = 0.002 - 0.008^{**}\ \Delta \mathrm{SMA}_t + 0.006^{*}\ \Delta \mathrm{SMA}_{t-1}$$
$$(0.08)\qquad\qquad (-2.16)\qquad\qquad (1.76)$$
$$R^2 = 0.27$$
$$F = 4.07^{**}$$

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

TABLE A1 *Bivariate Correlations for All Cases (Pearson's r)*

	IPI_t	CRI_t	GAP_t	SMA_t	SR_t	IPI_{t-1}	CRI_{t-1}	GAP_{t-1}	SMA_{t-1}	SR_{t-1}
Brazil										
IPI_t		0.52**	—	0.03	0.72***	0.88***	0.63**	0.20	0.09	0.79***
CRI_t			0.85***	0.26	0.70***	0.44***	0.79***	0.65***	0.33	0.70***
GAP_t				0.26	0.36*	−0.07	0.58**	0.69***	0.36*	0.34
SMA_t					−0.23	−0.04	0.25	0.29	0.77***	−0.22
SR_t						0.63***	0.74***	0.45*	−0.004	0.90***
Chile										
IPI_t		0.55**	—	0.32	0.77***	0.86***	0.02	−0.23	0.06	−0.41*
CRI_t			0.84***	−0.14	0.80***	0.62**	0.68**	0.67**	−0.29	−0.09
GAP_t				−0.43*	0.47**	0.10	0.47**	0.65**	−0.38	0.18
SMA_t					−0.09	0.37	−0.19	−0.40	0.36	−0.06
SR_t						0.65**	0.77***	0.22	−0.14	−0.22
Mexico										
IPI_t		−0.71***	—	0.21	0.32*	0.94***	−0.69***	—	0.29	0.30
CRI_t			0.70***	−0.10	0.06	−0.71***	0.58**	0.04	−0.28	−0.02
GAP_t				0.05	0.41**	−0.01	0.03	0.003	−0.10	0.21
SMA_t					0.08	0.25	−0.23	−0.10	0.54**	0.15
SR_t						0.40**	−0.16	0.14	−0.05	0.50**
Spain										
IPI_t		0.93***	—	−0.13	0.50**	0.92***	0.94***	0.20	−0.04	0.58**
CRI_t			0.36*	−0.09	0.41**	0.88***	0.97***	0.35*	0.11	0.56**
GAP_t				0.08	−0.06	−0.003	0.16	0.37*	0.41**	0.22
SMA_t					0.55**	−0.17	−0.15	−0.08	0.53**	0.43*
SR_t						0.36*	0.38*	0.21	0.48**	0.67***

*$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.001$.

Chile

Parameter estimates for the rights perspective:

$$\Delta SR_t = -58.14 - 100.00\ \Delta CRI_t + 2403.39^{***}\ \Delta CRI_{t-1}$$
$$(-1.02) \qquad (-0.18) \qquad (8.23)$$
$$R^2 = 0.80$$
$$F = 34.92^{***}$$

No significant results were obtained for the movement perspective.

Mexico

Parameter estimates for the rights perspective:

$$\Delta SMA_t = 4.84 + 167.08^{**}\ \Delta CRI_t + 122.35\ \Delta CRI_{t-1}$$
$$(0.95) \qquad (2.20) \qquad (1.53)$$
$$R^2 = 0.12$$
$$F = 2.62^{*}$$

$$\Delta SMA_t = 3.64 + 168.71^{**}\ \Delta GAP_t + 138.08\ \Delta GAP_{t-1}$$
$$(0.72) \qquad (2.10) \qquad (1.64)$$
$$R^2 = 0.11$$
$$F = 2.42 \text{ (Sig } F = 0.11)$$

Parameters estimates for the movement perspective:

$$\Delta IPI_t = 0.003 - 0.00008\ \Delta SMA_t - 0.0002^{**}\ \Delta SMA_{t-1}$$
$$(1.71) \qquad (-1.13) \qquad (-2.18^{**})$$
$$R^2 = 0.15$$
$$F = 3.01^{*}$$

$$\Delta CRI_t = -0.008 + 0.00006^{*}\ \Delta SR_t + 0.0009^{*}\ \Delta SMA_t$$
$$(-1.59) \qquad (1.87) \qquad (1.71)$$
$$R^2 = 0.16$$
$$F = 3.26^{*}$$

$$\Delta GAP_t = -0.004 + 0.00006^{*}\ \Delta SR_t + 0.0008\ \Delta SMA_{t-1}$$
$$(-0.25) \qquad (1.82) \qquad (1.46)$$
$$R^2 = 0.13$$
$$F = 2.76^{*}$$

$$\Delta GAP_t = -0.002 + 0.00006^{*}\ \Delta SMASR_t$$
$$(-0.11) \qquad (1.88^{*})$$
$$R^2 = 0.10$$
$$F = 3.56^{*}$$

Spain

Parameter estimates for the rights perspective:

$$\Delta SR_t = 148.21 + 382.09\ \Delta IPI_t - 2974.72^{**}\ \Delta IPI_{t-1}$$
$$(0.79) \qquad (0.265) \qquad (-2.07)$$
$$R^2 = 0.13$$
$$F = 2.50^{*}$$

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press

$$\Delta SR_t = 206.09 + 4260.70^{**}\ \Delta CRI_t - 1325.96\ \Delta CRI_{t-1}$$
$$(1.25) \qquad (-2.58^{**}) \qquad (-0.80)$$
$$R^2 = 0.20$$
$$F = 3.83^{**}$$

$$\Delta SR_t = 79.51 - 4343.39^{**}\ \Delta GAP_t + 1479.80\ \Delta GAP_{t-1}$$
$$(0.53) \qquad (-3.22) \qquad (1.08)$$
$$R^2 = 0.34$$
$$F = 6.11^{**}$$

Parameter estimates for the movements perspective:

$$\Delta IPI_t = 0.02 + 0.0001^{**}\ \Delta SR_t + 0.00009^{**}\ \Delta SR_{t-1} - 0.002^{**}\ \Delta SMA_t - 0.003^{**}\ \Delta SMA_{t-1}$$
$$(0.66) \qquad (2.93) \qquad (2.56) \qquad (-2.71) \qquad (-3.27)$$
$$R^2 = 0.35$$
$$F = 3.39^{**}$$

$$\Delta CRI_t = 0.02 + 0.00005^{*}\ \Delta SR_{t-1} - 0.001^{**}\ \Delta SMA_t - 0.001^{**}\ \Delta SMA_{t-1}$$
$$(1.20) \qquad (1.79) \qquad (-2.49) \qquad (-2.18)$$
$$R^2 = 0.25$$
$$F = 2.97^{*}$$

$$\Delta GAP_t = 0.01 - 0.0008^{**}\ \Delta SR_t$$
$$(0.49) \qquad (-3.31)$$
$$R^2 = 0.33$$
$$F = 10.96^{**}$$

In general, the difference tests confirm the correlation and regression results presented in Tables 3–6. It is true that no complete symmetry exists between the two orders of results in so far as the difference tests do not always reveal the same relationships to be significant in every instance. None the less, where the difference tests do highlight the same relationships, they tend to confirm or strengthen them. Within the rights perspective, this is true of the effects of rights-in-principle on labour mobilization in Brazil, rights-in-practice on labour mobilization in Chile, rights-in-practice and the gap on social mobilization in Mexico, and all rights measures on labour mobilization in Spain. Within the movement perspective, it is equally true of the effects of labour and other social mobilization on rights-in-principle and social mobilization on rights-in-practice in Brazil, social mobilization on rights-in-practice and the combined measure of labour and other social mobilization on the gap in Mexico, and the differential effects of all mobilization measures on all rights measures in Spain.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123499000137 Published online by Cambridge University Press