(and not so young) Athenian women? The possibility is opened up and plausibly pursued by Stieber – though it remains problematic to envisage the practical consequences of the theory. Athenian citizens allowing their daughters to pose in a sculptor's workshop? Surely not. Nevertheless, viewing the korai as if they served to parade instances of eminently eligible girls, like a coming-out of debutantes in stone, makes some sense of the otherwise paradoxical mix of devotion and sensuality apparent in these statues. Take the gesture, which many adopt, of lifting the hem of a skirt, or pulling it sharply to one side. Is this simply a sculptor's trick to animate the statue? Is it another signal of devotion – the first step of a votive dance-routine? Does it add to erotic appeal, by revealing a dainty ankle? Or is it rather dictated (as Karakasi concludes) by the primal forces of natural selection: the female of the species making it clear, by tightening the drapery around her hips and thighs, that she is well-equipped for child-bearing? Humfry Payne was not so quaint after all. With the korai, revealing 'the substantiality of the body beneath the dress' was a sculptural challenge, a social requirement, and a sexual imperative.

doi:10.1093/gromej/cxi015 NIGEL SPIVEY

Philosophy

A Guide to Greek Thought; Major Figures and Trends[1] and *The Greek Pursuit of Knowledge*,[2] both edited by G. E. R. Lloyd and J. Brunschwig, form a pair of excellent introductions to, and reference works for, the intellectual life of ancient Greece. The volumes contain an exhilarating sweep of material, from Parmenides to Polybius in the first, which deals with individual thinkers and movements; from history to cosmology in the second, which focuses on intellectual disciplines. The treatments are, on the whole, magisterial without being unduly technical (though the chapter on ancient harmonic theory, at least, fails as a beginners' guide, if that is how it was intended); and there is added spice in the range of approaches and styles one gets from an international cast of contributors. For all their great virtues, however, the existence of these books is something of a mystery to me, since they turn out to be constituted as *selections* from the only slightly larger *Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge* (itself a translation of *Le Savoir Grec*, originally published in 1996). The most obvious part of the latter *not* selected are the articles on 'Politics', and how many people with thank Harvard University Press for saving them the trouble of owning these as well? The division between people and movements on the one hand and philosophical themes on the other is a useful one that is followed by Anthony Kenny in his own survey of *Ancient Philosophy* – the first volume in a tetralogical *New History of Western Philosophy*.[3] Kenny pitches at second or third year undergraduates, and hits his mark: he is always clear, but always intelligent; sometimes idiosyncratic, but never cavalier.

[1] *The Greek Pursuit of Knowledge*. Edited by Jacques Brunschwig and Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd. Translated under the direction of Catherine Porter. Harvard U.P., Cambridge MA, London, 2003. Pp. xiii + 387, with 2 maps. Paperback £12.95.

[2] *A Guide to Greek Thought*. Major Figures and Trends. Edited by Jacques Brunschwig and Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd. Translated under the direction of Catherine Porter. Harvard U.P., Cambridge MA, London, 2003. Pp. xiii + 486, with 2 maps. Paperback £12.95.

[3] *A New History of Western Philosophy*. Volume 1: Ancient Philosophy. By Anthony Kenny. Oxford U.P., 2004. Pp. xxi + 341. Illustrated. Hardback £17.99.

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(His title invites comparison with Bertrand Russell's *History of Western Philosophy*, and Bertrand Russell could be very cavalier indeed.) I certainly felt happy enough in areas about which I know a little to trust myself to Kenny in areas about which I would like to learn more, which is a sure token of success in such a venture. The rather limited historical scope of the book I put down, in part at least, to the need to focus on themes that will resonate most through the remaining volumes of the history. So, while he sets out to cover a thousand years of thought 'from the beginning of philosophy up to the conversion of St Augustine in AD 387' (p. xviii), Kenny in fact seems rather unhappy to have to spend time away from Plato and Aristotle. The Presocratics and Hellenistic schools are treated very much as a matter of duty rather than pleasure, and even Plotinus only manages five pages or so in the 'thematic' discussion (311-16). They are illuminating and well-written pages, to be sure; but they contribute to the impression which Kenny encourages that rather little of real significance happened between Aristotle and Augustine (explicitly in the case of psychology at 248). If anyone wishes to check the validity of this assertion for Neoplatonism in particular, they could do much worse than to start with John Dillon and Lloyd Gerson's *Neoplatonic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*.[4] Here are 177 uninterrupted pages of Plotinus, and substantial extracts from the writings of Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus too. Dillon and Lloyd compare the book to Brad Inwood's *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings* (Hackett, 2nd edn. 1992), though it differs importantly from this in being organized by philosopher rather than by theme. There is a good index and a good glossary; but guidance for the reader is otherwise limited to the short introduction and what will fit into footnotes. More to the point, then, is the authors' statement that the collection was 'loosely conceived to be a sort of companion to R. T. Wallis' monograph *Neoplatonism*' (Hackett, 2nd edition 1997)' (p. ix). As such, or as a textbook for a course on Neoplatonism, it will be a highly valued resource. Hellenistic philosophy too has its advocates. *Epicurus: His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance*[5] already suggests, from its title, that it is a book with a mission: its editors, Dane Gordon and David Suits, clearly want to bring Epicurus to the attention of contemporary philosophical faculties in particular. Projects such as this are undoubtedly worthy, but they are not without their hazards. It might be that the primary material has to be introduced at a rather introductory level to a faculty unfamiliar with it; the more interesting philosophy, correlatively, might end up rather a long way from anything that could be justified for Epicurus or his historical followers; the editorial introduction might have to gloss over the gap thus created with cosy banalities. The greatest safety lies in Reception: and the core of the present collection is, in fact, constituted by later responses to Epicurus of various kinds, and at various levels of obliquity. These include Plotinus' attack on his epistemology, Lactantius' reaction to his denial of providence, and Epicurean resonances in Gassendi, Bishop Butler, Karl Marx, and C. S. Peirce. (Suit's discussion of the latter is very oblique indeed, but explores a hermeneutically interesting parallel between the motivational structure of doubt and belief in Peirce and that of pain and 'katastematic' pleasure in Epicurus.) Given all this, the editors' preface and Gordon's

[4] *Neoplatonic Philosophy*. Introductory readings. By John Dillon and Lloyd P. Gerson. Hackett, Indianopolis, 2004. Pp. xxiv + 373. Hardback £35; Paperback £14.95.

[5] *Epicurus*. His Continuing Influence and Contemporary Relevance. Edited by Dane R. Gordon and David B. Suits. RIT City Graphic Arts Press, 2003. Pp. 223. Illustrated. Paperback $24.99.

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own programmatic paper are a bit misleading when they suggest that the key theme, and the principal attraction of Epicurus for the contemporary world, is his view of friendship. In fact only two of the thirteen papers (those by Daniel Russell and M. R. Wheeler) address the theme of friendship – although they rank among the better chapters of the volume. Remaining contributions range from elementary introductions to Epicurean studies (six pages of basic information on Diogenes of Oenoanda by Andrew Moore), to a meditation on capital punishment whose only connection with Epicurus is the fact that its author (Stephen Rosenbaum) concludes, for reasons consistent with Epicurean logic, that execution is for its victim 'not the great harm it is commonly thought to be' (206). David Armstrong's paper on Philodemus deserves special mention for being the one contribution to combine practical introduction (to the material from the *villa dei papiri*) with close, sophisticated reading of an actual Epicurean text (Philodemus' *On Death*). Gordon Campbell's text, translation, and commentary on Lucretius 5.772-1104 will be of interest not just to philosophers, but to Classicists more generally. This passage of Lucretius deals with the 'youth of the world' (*mundi novitatem*), the origins of flora, fauna, and of humans and their society. Campbell's title, *Lucretius on Creation and Evolution*,[6] is snappier than this, but triply misleading: this passage is not about the origins of the world, and Campbell shows that Lucretius is in any case neither a creationist nor an evolutionist. Lucretian species, as he carefully explains, are selected by extinction, not evolved through mutation. Campbell's handling of Lucretius' golden age imagery, a second major theme of his commentary, is sensible and assured. He does not get hung up where others have on the tired distinction between 'primitivism' and 'progressivism'. Drawing on terms from Richard Dawkins, he focuses instead on Lucretius' 'vaccination' of his readers against a credulous and misplaced piety, his appropriation of traditional language for an anti-teleological account. Campbell's commentary is enlivened with comments on what 'we' think of the subjects discussed by Lucretius: as, for example, that we agree that early man was larger and more robust (189), or that pity was a 'strategy for survival' displayed very early on in human history (280). The relevance of these observations to a reading of Lucretius is usually unclear to me, but I don't mind hearing them, as I don't mind reading the many literary parallels which Campbell quotes for their similarity rather than their engagement with Lucretius (cf. O'Brien and O'Grady at p. 144). The book ends with two appendices listing ancient sources for zoogonical theories, and for themes associated with the Golden Age. *The Philosophy of Zeno*[7] is a collection of articles dealing with the founder of Stoicism, based on a conference held in his home town of Citium (now Larnaca, in Cyprus). The conference took place in 1998, and a few of the papers will in retrospect be recognized as work in progress for larger monographs which have appeared subsequently; but they all work very well together. The papers range through Zeno's biography (variously Jacques Brunschwig, David Hahm), his view of philosophy (Jaap Mansfeld), an analysis of the logical forms implicit in his arguments (Katerina Ierodiakonou), his epistemology

[6] *Lucretius on Creation and Evolution.* A Commentary on *De Rerum Natura* 5.772-1104. By Gordon Campbell. Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford U.P. 2003. Pp. xii + 385. Hardback £60.

[7] *The Philosophy of Zeno.* Zeno of Citium and His Legacy. Edited by Theodore Scaltsas and Andrew S. Mason. Municipality of Larnaca, 2002. Pp. x + 380, with black and white plates. Hardback £20; Paperback £15.

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(Anthony Long, David Sedley), physics (Keimpe Algra), psychology (Teun Tieleman), ethics (Richard Sorabji, focussing on Chrysippus' innovative developments, Michael Erler, Maximilian Forschner), and politics (Christopher Rowe, Malcolm Schofield). The final paper, by Ian Kidd, leaves the reader with a reminder of how much we do not know about Zeno; but what is achieved in this collection is impressive and believable. In the obligatory 'reception' paper, Myrto Dragona-Monachou surveys later appropriations of Stoicism by radical political causes, including contemporary environmentalism; but (*pace* Dragona-Monachou) not only is it unclear to me that any of this can be evidence that Zeno himself was especially 'radical' in his outlook, it is actually one of the strengths of the present collection as a whole that it roots him so firmly and believably in a Socratic tradition mediated through the texts of Plato and Xenophon in particular. Five hundred years after Zeno, the Stoic Cleomedes wrote *On the Heavens*, a work now translated for the first time into English as *Cleomedes' Lectures on Astronomy* by R. B. Todd and A. C. Bowen.[8] The treatise is best known for the account it contains of two ancient attempts at estimating the circumference of the earth: those of Posidonius and Eratosthenes. There is a great deal more rather technical material too, but the treatise is not at all dry. There is vicious polemic against Epicurus (primarily for claiming that the sun is no bigger in reality than it looks, viz. about a foot across); and a vivid sense of how the cosmos appeared to the Stoics, with the earth a tiny but extremely dense sphere in the centre of a vast and rarefied heaven. An intelligent introduction gives the context for the work and explores its methodological reliance on Posidonius in particular. There are extensive notes, astronomical figures, a glossary, and index. Among the works on Plato in this year's round-up are some excellent close studies of individual dialogues; but I should mention first two reissues of more general relevance. Christopher Rowe's **Plato*[9] was originally written in 1984, but is still effectively unchallenged as an introduction to Plato. (It is surprising, in fact, how few works there are that even try to compete. It might be that it helps to have the kind of 'holistic' view of Plato's output that Rowe does.) Gail Fine's *Plato on Knowledge and Forms*[10] is a reissue in the looser sense that it reprints 15 essays published by Fine over the last 27 years. These essays have all become standards, and it is useful to have them in one place; but I am not too sure what to make of the claim made on the back that they cover 'a broad range of Plato's works, from the *Meno* to the *Theaetetus*'. Is that so *very* broad? Of the commentaries, pride of place must go to David Sedley on *Plato's* Cratylus,[11] partly in recognition of the fact that the discussion is very good indeed, and partly because it makes a strong case in favour of an unfashionable dialogue. Sedley's argument is that the *Cratylus* dramatises Plato's familiar position that a complete philosophy should set the Heraclitean 'flux' of the sensible world within a system of 'stable values'. If this underlying argument has eluded previous readers of the *Cratylus*, it is because they have failed to take the discussion of etymology that

[8] *Cleomedes' Lectures on Astronomy.* A translation of *The Heavens* with an introduction and commentary by Alan C. Bowen and Robert B. Todd. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2004. Pp. xvi + 238, with 25 figures. Hardback.

[9] *Plato.* By C. J. Rowe. 2nd Edition. Bristol Classical Press, London, 2003. Pp. xii + 228. Paperback £14.99.

[10] *Plato on Knowledge and Forms.* Selected Essays. By Gail Fine. Oxford U.P., 2003. Pp. ix + 447. Hardback £65.

[11] *Plato's* Cratylus. By David Sedley. Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato. Cambridge U.P., 2003. Pp. xi + 190. Hardback.

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characterizes the dialogue quite, or at all, seriously. But Sedley argues that it testifies to a sophisticated theory of 'accurate' naming. It is worth noting that Sedley's reconstruction of this theory, including the idea that language can be examined to reveal, not the truth, necessarily, but at least the beliefs of the original name-givers, puts Plato in a clear and plausible relationship with developments in later antiquity. The immediate result, however, is to show that Plato was able to trace the excessive focus on flux as a characteristic of the world back to the earliest men. Plato himself turned to Socrates to complement what he thus learns from Cratylus about the ancient belief in flux, and in this way, Socrates became, in the title-words of another commentary, *The Midwife of Platonism*.[12] The author, again, is David Sedley; the dialogue this time, the rather less neglected *Theaetetus*. The central exegetical problem in this case has always been the need to explain the 'Socratic' feel of what seems to be a late Platonic work. There is no mention of the theory of forms, for example; but the aporetic discussion of knowledge seems to have form-shaped gaps in it. Sedley argues that this tension is deliberate: Plato is precisely trying to show how his own mature philosophy developed from the work of the historical Socrates. Socrates famously compares himself to a midwife in the *Theaetetus*: barren in himself, but capable of delivering others of their brainchildren. Plato is telling us that *his* is the one healthy system delivered by Socrates. As Plato thus accounts for his philosophy as a development from Socrates, so, it might be noted, one of the strengths of Sedley's reading is its success in incorporating earlier interpretations. It would also seem to have important consequences for our understanding of the historical Socrates (and it is particularly interesting that some of the features of Socrates' thought that Sedley takes to have been 'developed' by Plato are just those revived later on by the Stoics). In *Plato's* Parmenides,[13] Samuel Scolnicov looks at a dialogue that is disturbing in at least two respects: two thirds of it are almost unreadable, and the remaining pages appear to undermine the theory of forms, and with it everything one might have thought one knew about Plato's philosophy. Scolnicov's translation of the dialogue, with commentary interspersed (*à la* Cornford), presents a reading that aims to make the dialogue more accessible, and philosophically integrated with the thought of the 'Middle' dialogues. He argues that the attack on the forms, and on participation in particular, only works from the standpoint of an austerely Parmenidean ontology which denies the possibility of relationship between the 'One' and a putative plurality. The trouble is that this viewpoint seems to overturn the very possibility of our discussing (and so being in relationship with) the One. So in what follows, Scolnicov argues that Plato uses the 'method of hypothesis' familiar to us from the *Republic* to approach the question from the other direction: to explore the ontological preconditions of such a discussion. The result is not the overthrow of Parmenidean logic, but a modification of it (in the direction, it might be noted, of the bi-categorial system familiar from later followers of Plato). *Absolute* being is only one way of being; our problems are solved if we recognise being *in relation to others* as a second way of being. This is a very attractive thesis, and one set out with admirable clarity and economy. There are times when one thinks that the *Republic* could do with

[12] *The Midwife of Platonism*. Text and Subtext in Plato's *Theaetetus*. By David Sedley. Oxford U.P., 2004. Pp. x + 201. Hardback £30.

[13] *Plato's* Parmenides. Translated with introduction and commentary by Samuel Scolnicov. University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2003. Pp. xii + 193. Hardback £32.95.

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being *more* neglected than it is. John Bremer strains credibility with his thesis that the dialogue (which he calls *Polity*) was written as the foundational document of the Academy, meant to be read out every year on the anniversary of its foundation on 19th Thargelion, 374 BC (173). Specifically, he suggests, it was meant to be read between Noon and Midnight on that day. In *Plato and the Founding of the Academy*,[14] Bremer analyzes the work into 240 'Bremer units', each of which represents a single wax tablet's worth of writing. As well as mapping the time it would take to read the whole work aloud (each unit is reckoned to have taken around three minutes to read), the 'Bremer units' are supposed to be the elements of a minute and deliberate mathematical articulation given by Plato to the *Republic* as a literary composition. Bremer's exercise in 'revealing' this articulation is not at all devoid of interest or the capacity to provoke insight; but it shares all the vices as well as the virtues of numerological studies. In particular, it leaves one with the suspicion that similar principles could be applied with equal success to any other text; and in the end, in any case, it is difficult to see what difference it makes to our understanding of Plato's philosophy. Bremer interposes material of wider exegetical significance in his analysis, but this has the air of rather old-fashioned commentary. (Indeed, Bremer's conceit is to present his theories as a 'newly-discovered letter from Plato', which allows him to adopt the form of a commentary as well.) There is no sign that Bremer is aware of more recent scholarship on Plato at all. If I managed to get some enjoyment out of Mitchell and Lucas' *An Engagement with Plato's* Republic[15] it was as a trip through some major issues in philosophical ethics, not at all as a response to Plato. In fact the book contains, alongside some spirited philosophical insights, some really thought-provoking and innovative translation that would seem to bode well ('autistic autocrat' for the *tyrannos* is good). But it soon becomes clear that Mitchell and Lucas have a profound, an almost obsessional, disdain for Plato, untempered by the slightest qualms of political correctness. They assert, then, that Plato was homosexual, and ascribe his homosexuality to a 'regression from the responsibilities of heterosexual love occasioned by emotional alienation from the Athens which had killed Socrates' (134); they accuse him in addition of being psychologically conflicted (154), and puritanical (163). The *Republic* itself is presented as a work bolted together through fully *five* successive editions – Plato being, apparently, unable to disguise the joins between them. Now and again, the authors say something in Plato's favour: they mount an excellent defence of him against Robinson's reading of the Cave narrative, for example. But they only make any effort to defend the coherence of the theory of forms to the extent that they themselves might agree with the conclusion; and actually resort to the implication that Plato was psychologically incapable of a sensible discussion of art. Whatever one thinks of this book, it is no *engagement* with Plato. Plato here is an occasion for thought, little more than the most sustained among the many cultural allusions that colour the discussion. Richard Hunter's discussion in *Plato's* Symposium[16] is less

[14] *Plato and the Founding of the Academy*. Based on a Letter from Plato, Newly Discovered. By John Bremer. University Press of America, Lanham, New York, Oxford, 2002. Pp. vii + 230, with 11 figures. Paperback.

[15] *An Engagement with Plato's* Republic. A Companion to the *Republic*. By Basil Mitchell and J. R. Lucas. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003. Pp. xi + 177. Paperback.

[16] *Plato's* Symposium. By Richard Hunter. Oxford Approaches to Classical Literature. Oxford U.P., 2004. Pp. xiii + 150. Paperback £10.99.

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philosophical, but much more engaging; and certainly restores one's faith in Plato's literary ability. Hunter leads the reader through the *Symposium* section by section, setting up some of the larger themes in his discussion of the frame narrative, before moving on to a survey of each of the speeches. He emphasizes in particular the serio-comic as a feature of the historical institution of the symposium, and as the dominant literary tone in a dialogue which is all about superficial appearance and underlying reality. There is a political level to this (the reader of the *Symposium* knows that there are storm-clouds on the horizon); and there is reflection on what it is to be a philosopher, of course; but there is also a message about textual interpretation, which emerges as the increasingly sophisticated accounts of *eros* unfold. In the final chapter of the book, which deals with the reception of the *Symposium*, Hunter makes the bold claim that 'the *Symposium* was determinative of the way in which classical and Christian texts, including of course Plato himself, were read' (130). My favourite articles in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*[17] this year are two in volume XXV: one by Gregory Scott, who cuts a Gordian knot of Aristotelian scholarship by athetizing the clause that introduces *katharsis* into Aristotle's definition of tragedy in the *Poetics*; the other by Keimpe Algra, in his illuminating discussion of 'appropriation' as the basis for other-regarding activity in Aristotle, Stoicism, and (even) Epicureanism. Other articles deal with Plato's *Euthyphro* (Mark McPherran) and his exploration of the notion of 'craft' (C. D. C. Reeve); nature in Aristotle's *Physics* (Sean Kelsey), *nous* in the *de anima* (Frank Lewis), metaphysics in the *Categories* (Kyle Fraser); the composition of the *Metaphysics* (Daniel Devereux), and the virtue of women and slaves (Marguerite Deslauriers); Alexander against the Stoics (Inna Kupreeva), and A. A. Long's book on *Epictetus* (Margaret Graver, including an important digression on the term *prohairesis*). *OSAP* XXVI includes articles on Heraclitus (Herbert Granger), and the Eleatics (John Palmer); on Plato's *Gorgias* (Gabriela Carone), *Phaedo* (Raphael Woolf), and *Republic* (Rachana Kamtekar), and two on the *Theaetetus* definition of virtue as 'becoming like god' (John Armstrong; Dirk Baltzly); on Aristotle's *Categories* (Mehmet Erginel), his polemical use of the principle of non-contradiction (Michael Wedin), and his ethics (Michael Pakaluk; Erik Wielenberg). The volume ends with reviews of works on Antiphon (Paul Woodruff) and Plato (Charles Kahn). I end my own review with some books which are less philosophical in content, but which in various ways serve to elucidate something of the social context within which particular philosophical figures operated. Marie-Laurence Desclos' *Aux Marges des Dialogues de Platon*,[18] is not restricted in its scope to an analysis of Plato: there is a great deal of interest in Herodotus and (especially) Thucydides as well. But its springing-point is a dense study of language and imagery to be found in the strictly non-philosophical ('marginal') material of the Platonic dialogues, language which Desclos suggests is intended to locate his work within the wider political discourse of his day. Robert Mayhew's *The Female in Aristotle's Biology*[19] is a critical evaluation of the charge often levelled against Aristotle that his philosophical judgement was sometimes affected by blind

[17] *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.* Edited by David Sedley. Vol. XXV, Winter 2003: Oxford U.P., 2003. Pp. 380. Vol. XXVI, Summer 2004: Oxford U.P., 2004. Pp. 380. Hardback £40 each.

[18] *Aux Marges des Dialogues de Platon.* Essai d'histoire anthropologique de la philosophie ancienne. By Marie-Laurence Desclos. Jérôme Millon, Grenoble, 2003. Pp. 288. Paperback €27.

[19] *The Female in Aristotle's Biology.* Reason or Rationalization. By Robert Mayhew. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004. Pp. x + 136. Hardback $28.

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misogyny. Mayhew sets out a test for such 'ideological' influence (7) and applies it to every text that has been adduced in evidence against Aristotle. The result is almost complete vindication: it is only Aristotle's claim that women are naturally paler than men that Mayhew cannot quite exonerate, and even here the mistake rests on an empirically real phenomenon. (The question is *why* women were, *ceteris paribus*, paler: Mayhew thinks that Aristotle might have overlooked culturally contingent differences of diet.) Since the book is a defence against a particular charge, it contains rather little exegetical novelty. It covers some interesting and relatively unfamiliar ground, though, from eunuchs to the dominant females of the insect world (forget about the 'king' bee). If *you* are appalled at Aristotle's belief that women have smaller brains than men (but then for him the brain is not the organ of thought), or if *you* think he makes women no more than seed-beds in the process of reproduction (he does not at all), you should read this book at once. *Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria*[20] by Joan Taylor is really a study of the *de vita contemplativa*, a work in which Philo of Alexandria described a mixed contemplative community on the outskirts of Alexandria which has through the ages been variously identified as Christian, Essene, or the product of Philo's own imaginings. Taylor argues for a 'straight' reading of Philo: that it was a Jewish community which, if idealized by Philo (with an eye to impressing a Roman audience), was not invented by him. Her arguments are compelling, and the account is rich in contextual detail: everything from the geographical location of the community to the clothes they wore is reconstructed here. But why *Women Philosophers*? The 'philosophical' angle of the book is an oblique one: it is that Philo, and the community he describes, wish to represent Judaism at large as a philosophical people. 'Women' are relevant here only, in truth, because women seem to have been included in the community on equal terms with men – a fact which Taylor reasonably encourages us to think is indicative of the existence of a wider community of thoughtful Jewish women in Alexandria. But since Taylor draws the terms and limits of her reconstruction of their position from what we already know (or think we know) of women and philosophy in antiquity, she has little to add to the wider question, and starts to seem unduly concerned with what is only one aspect of the community whose whole life she discusses so well.

doi:10.1093/gromej/cxi016 GEORGE BOYS-STONES

[20] *Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria.* Philo's 'Therapeutae' Reconsidered. By Joan E. Taylor. Oxford U.P., 2003. Pp. xv + 417, with 22 figures. Hardback £70.

General

Richard Rutherford's **Classical Literature: A Concise History*[1] is one of the first to be published of a new series, Blackwell Introductions to the Classical World; if other contributions are to be of such a standard, this will be a welcome contribution to modern literature on the subject. The preface is suggestively Livian in tone: Rutherford begins by apparently setting out his limited ambition for the work: 'My aim in this volume is to provide a short, accurate and readable guide to the works of Greek and

[1] *Classical Literature.* A Concise History. By Richard Rutherford. Blackwell, Malden and Oxford, 2004. Blackwell Introductions to the Classical World. Pp. xi + 350, with 3 maps. Paperback £16.99.

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