BAVARIA

(MUNICH)

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MUNICH

FO 9/110: Alfred Guthrie Bonar to Viscount Palmerston, No 6, Munich, 10 February 1851

Attitudes of chambers towards government; conduct of king and royal favouritism

Although M. von der Pfordten had told me but two days before that he expected the opening of the Chambers would be still deferred until the 10th or 12th instant, they were formally opened on Saturday the 8th by Prince Luitpold, invested with the Royal Commission.

The Members of the two Chambers have already elected several Committees, before whom will be laid the various projects of Laws originating in the present Session. But the formation of all these committees has turned out to be most unexpectedly favorable to the present Government – their Members being such that M. von der Pfordten may confidently foresee the result of all their reports, and count upon their steady support by a large majority.

Indeed during the last few days, since the States have assembled at Munich and have held the usual meetings preparatory to the opening of the Session an extraordinary change has taken place in the combination of the different parties, and in the tactics prescribed for themselves. By the programmes of the Opposition which have now become known, the Ministry, which until lately could reckon with certainty on only sufficient support in the Chambers to enable them to maintain with dignity their Offices, now find themselves likely to be seconded by a numerous majority, and even by as many as two thirds of the entire number of votes – which majority in their favor would be required in the case of any measure demanding the revision of any fundamental Law, or any Article of the Constitution.

It was also only that I might be enabled to lay before Your Lordship a correct statement of the cause, and the real effect of this new attitude of the Chambers, that I have delayed until today the forwarding of this despatch.

The vacillating and little consistent character of the King is universally felt and deplored – and his indecision which induces him to lend an ear and indeed to be easily gained over by other advisers than his responsible Ministers, deprives His Majesty of the firm adherence and confidence of any one Party. But the Royal favouritism displayed

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in the late nomination of Dr Dönniges as Plenipotentiary to Dresden[1] (to which I alluded in my last dispatch to Your Lordship), and which is here supposed to be but a prelude of the further advancement of that Gentleman, has become the cause of a general alarm, and indeed inspired all Parties with an anxiety much greater than is perhaps warranted.

Dr Dönniges is known to be most hostile to the present Government, and to be the advocate of a return to the Abel, or High Tory, Party – to which of his own accord His Majesty would already but too willingly lean.[2] The return to office however of M. d'Abel and his party would be so unpopular at present throughout the Kingdom, that that Minister would meet with nothing but opposition in the Diet; and any attempt on the part of the Court to maintain him against the popular will, could not fail to engender general and alarming disturbances.

Yet the "Left" Party in the Chambers conducted by Prince Wallerstein, as well as the "Centre" whose leader is Baron Lerchenfells [*sic*], have seen in the tendencies of His Majesty sufficient to induce them to fear the possibility of such a policy. They at the same time themselves admit that a Government chosen from either of their own bodies, would also meet with too little favor to enable it to conduct the affairs of the State – and the consequence has been a determined coalition of the Party of the "Centre" in the Second Chamber with the "Left Centre", or the more moderate Members of the "Left", to support and to maintain M. von der Pfordten in power, as the sole Ministry which would not at this moment be fraught with danger to the whole country.

I now know that Prince Wallerstein himself has said that his plan of operations for the present Session would therefore be, in few words, as follows:

The Points on which the Government will be attacked are principally those of the Danish Question – the Question of the Hesse Electorate, and the Expenses to which Bavaria has been put thereby – and the lukewarmness of Bavaria in having apparently so readily abandoned the idea of establishing a National Parliament for Germany at Frankfort.[3]

If Baron Lerchenfells and his Party make a decided opposition to M. von der Pfordten, and attempt to endanger his continuance in office,

[1]For the Dresden Conferences see n. 1 in Saxony section.

[2]The Abel Party was named after Karl von Abel, Bavarian interior minister from 1837 to 1847, who promoted a highly monarchist and pro-Catholic policy.

[3]Bonar refers to the Bavarian agreement with the Austro-Prussian policy towards the Holstein *Statthalterschaft* (see n. 2 in Saxony section) and support for the prince elector in the constitutional struggle in Hesse-Cassel. Expenses were incurred owing to the provision of Bavarian troops for the intervention in Hesse-Cassel in November 1850.

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Prince Wallerstein will be prepared so to turn the tenor of the debates as to enable the Ministry to triumph over the Party of the "Centre", and Prince Wallerstein then voting with the "Right" will give the Government an overwhelming Majority. But on the other hand the "Left" will not leave M. von der Pfordten in peace if Baron Lerchenfells in his turn be feeble in his opposition, or if the Government should find means to gain him over to their views – then Prince Wallerstein's attacks will again become constant, in order to remain true to the traditions and hitherto policy of his party, and indeed doubly violent from being assured that they can only lead to the Embarrassment of the Government, but not to it's resignation.

M. von der Pfordten then is even well pleased with the Chambers now meeting, and I believe all danger to his tenure of office has again been dissipated.

FO 9/111: John Ralph Milbanke to Viscount Palmerston, No 13, Munich, 28 July 1851

Prussian and Austrian plans for a central federal police authority; likelihood of opposition from Bavaria; effects of reactionary policy on public feeling

The Rumours, which have lately acquired a certain degree of consistency, relative to the intention of Austria and Prussia to propose to the Diet at Frankfort the Establishment of a central Federal Police, appears [*sic*] to have excited no small uneasiness among the States of a Second order in Germany; especially as one great feature of the plan is reported to involve an arbitrary accommodation of some of the existing Constitutions to the general Regulations, which it is intended to introduce into the Confederation, under the pretext of preserving internal Order.[4]

That some of the Governments of these States would gladly avail themselves of such a pretext, for getting rid of inconvenient obligations imposed upon them by the political events of the last two or three years, is I think hardly to be questioned, but as far as this Country is concerned, the two Great Powers of Germany will in vain look to it for support to their plans; for I am confident that Bavaria would with difficulty submit to any attempt to modify her Constitution by external influence or dictation. I am however still in doubt as to the

[4]From June 1850, Austria and Prussia had planned to establish a central police authority for the German Confederation in Leipzig as a check against the democratic movement. A formal proposal was brought to the Federal Diet on 11 October 1851, although the deliberations that followed were without result. Revisions of the constitutions of the individual states were regulated on 23 August 1851 (see n. 2 in Württemberg section).

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intentions of Austria and Prussia on this particular point of federal administration, for I cannot learn that any definite proposal has yet been made to the Diet; but I am rather disposed to think, that they will scarcely venture to brave the outcry which the establishment of such a Tribunal would raise throughout Germany, and that the whole demonstration will probably terminate by an attempt to revert to the old order of things, which subsisted previously to the outbreak of 1848.

At all events, the two Great Powers cannot proceed with too much caution in affairs of this description for the state of Publick feeling is by no means what it was before the period I have mentioned above, and the ground which has been gained by the Press, although it is daily becoming more fettered, renders it nearly impossible to return to the repressive system of former days.

The fact is that the reactionary proceedings of the German Governments, both great and small, and their indiscriminate, not to say illegal persecution of individuals supposed to belong to the democratick party, is daily rendering them more odious to the People, and recruiting the ranks of that Party, which is urgent for a change, on almost any terms, from amongst those classes which might be supposed to be attached to ancient recollections and Institutions.

FO 9/117: John Ralph Milbanke to Earl of Clarendon, No 14, Munich, 3 March 1853

Bavarian approval of commercial agreement between Austria and Prussia; close connections between Bavaria and Austria

I have but little to say from hence relative to the Commercial arrangement recently concluded between the two great German Powers.[5] Mr von der Pfordten, and, as far as I am able to learn, the Commercial Interests in Bavaria seem to be all equally satisfied with the results attained; and they are in consequence quite ready to recommence the negotiations with Prussia for the reconstruction of the Zollverein with a full determination not to peril its existence a second time. Each Party of course claims the victory, but both are, I am convinced, not a little pleased at having found a plausible pretext for escape from the very embarrassing position into which their mutual jealousies and animosities had brought them, and which has for some time past caused so much uncertainty as to have inflicted no small injury upon commercial enterprize in almost every part of

[5]Austro-Prussian commercial treaty of 19 February 1853, based on a most favoured nation clause. The duration of the treaty was set to last from 1 January 1854 to 31 December 1865.

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Germany. At the first glance some apprehension was entertained that the provisions of the Tariff would be prejudicial to the wine growers and glass manufactures of this Country, but I understand that on closer examination their interests are ascertained to be sufficiently guarded.

To myself and others of my colleagues the language of Mr von der Pfordten is, as I have above stated, that of triumph and satisfaction, but I have heard from other quarters that he has expressed himself in somewhat strong terms against the Austrian Cabinet for having signed the Treaty with Prussia without having first obtained the sanction of Bavaria and the other States of the Darmstadt coalition.[6]

However had the two Cabinets submitted the project of the Treaty for the approval of the Coalition, conference would, in all probability, have followed conference, and the result which is expected to reestablish harmony throughout Germany would certainly not have been so easily or speedily attained.

This state of things which is well known to the Austrian Government will go far, in my opinion to account for the neglect complained of; but at the same time such is the dominion exercised by the Imperial Cabinet over the councils of this Country, and such is the hold it has over the Roman Catholick Population, especially among the higher and influential classes, that Bavaria is at this moment little better than an Austrian Province, and as I firmly believe would have accepted however much against the grain, any other Commercial arrangement even though less favourable than that actually concluded, had she been required to do so by Austria.

FO 9/118: John Ralph Milbanke to Earl of Clarendon, No 68, Munich, 1 September 1853

Disputes between government and Catholic Church

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt by the Messenger Wright, of Your Lordship's Despatches to No 32 inclusive, & one marked "Circular" of the 15th Ultmo.

Owing to the usual stagnation of business at this season of the year, arising from the absence from the Capital, of the Court & nearly all the Ministers as well as most of the members of the Diplomatick Body, I have little to report which could prove of much interest to Her Majesty's Government.

[6]For the Darmstadt Coalition see n. 10 in Prussia section.

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The dispute between the Roman Catholick Bishop's [*sic*], & the Government has made no progress towards a solution since I last touched upon the subject; & although fully alive to the danger of prolonging suspence on so important a matter,[7] the latter is, in consequence of the well known sentiments of the King, extremely embarrassed what course to pursue.

The points at issue however cannot be allowed to remain much longer in their present uncertain State, for if I am correctly informed a movement, supposed to be investigated by the High Church Party, is beginning to be perceptible among the Professors & Students of the University here, who meditate, it is said, a remonstrance to the King on the subject of the existing system of education in general, but more especially in respect to certain nominations to Professorships recently made, which gave great umbrage on account of the acknowledged scepticism on religious matters of the Persons chosen to fill the vacant Chairs.[8]

It is almost needless to add that if the King is unwise enough to give time for the development of this description of agitation which can hardly fail to extend itself in the Country, the obstacles to a satisfactory arrangement will be very materially increased, & it is by no means unlikely that in the end the Government may be forced to make concessions still less compatible with what the King imagines to be the unfettered exercise of the Royal Prerogative, than those now sought, or at least than those with which the Episcopal Body might be contented, if they were but granted in a more conciliatory form & tone.

FO 9/121: John Ralph Milbanke to Earl of Clarendon, No 40, Munich, 24 June 1854

Course of Bamberg Conference; discussions over the Eastern policy of Austria and Prussia; ineffectiveness and division of German minor states; dismissal of 'Trias' as political power

I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of an article which has appeared in some of the German Journals, giving the substance of the Note, addressed to the Austrian & Prussian Cabinets, by which the Governments, represented at the Bamberg Conferences, announce the results of their deliberations; & I also inclose a French

[7]The major issues in this conflict were the bishops' demands for the strengthening of the independence of the Catholic Church and the repeal of the Religious Edict of 26 May 1818.

[8]The *Nordlichterstreit* revolved around the appointment of Protestant professors from north Germany in Bavarian universities. This policy was promoted by Maximilian II, but was strongly resented in Bavaria.

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Analysis of the Memorandum which Mr von der Pfordten presented to the assembled Plenipotentiaries, & which seems to have served as the basis for their Resolutions.[9]

Although the delay which has occurred[10] will have deprived the communication of these documents of much of the Interest which would have attached to them had it taken place a fortnight earlier, they may nevertheless still be of service in aiding Your Lordship to form some appreciation of the views & sentiments which prevailed at the Conference in reference to the Eastern Policy of the Two Great German Powers; & above all when the results are compared with the previous pretensions so loudly proclaimed by the Bavarian Government, it will at once be evident how little reason it had to be satisfied with the support it received from the Smaller States, upon whom it conceived it could most count; &, to lead whom, is the great object of its ambition. In the place of a guarantee of the Crown of Greece to the present Dynasty,[11] which was announced as the conditio sine quâ non of the accession, of this Country at least, to the Berlin Treaty of the 20th of April, all it appears to have been able to obtain consists of a vague expression of sympathy for the Dynasty; & that only on the Ground of its German Origin.

A more complete failure upon this point, on which so much stress was laid beforehand, it would be difficult to imagine; but it is marvelous [*sic*] how Mr von der Pfordten could ever have entertained the idea that Austria & Prussia would accept such conditions; since they would in practice, supposing Germany to be able to give effect to such a guarantee by securing the King of Greece from all possibility of loss, put him in a position to prosecute with impunity his aggressive designs against Turkey, & thus, indirectly, make them abettors of the Insurrection.

I need not enter into any examination of the other propositions contained in Mr von der Pfordtens Memorandum, which I have

[9]At the Bamberg Conference (25–30 May 1854), the foreign ministers of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Württemberg, Baden, Electoral Hesse, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau deliberated their position regarding the Eastern Crisis. As stated in their note to Austria and Prussia of 3 June 1854, the Bamberg Coalition made its accession to the Austro-Prussian treaty of 20 April 1854 (see n. 45 in Prussia section) conditional upon both Turkey and Russia being excluded from the Danubian Principalities, and the German Confederation being independently represented at all forthcoming negotiations. In addition, the Bamberg Conference agreed on periodic meetings of the ministers of the middle states. Enclosures: results of the Bamberg Conference of 1854; *analyse du mémorandum Bavarois qui a servi de base aux déliberations de Bamberg.*

[10]Milbanke refers to the late publication of the documents, as the Bamberg Conference had taken place in the previous month.

[11]Otto, second son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria and brother of Maximilian II, was placed on the Greek throne in 1832 following the conclusion of the Greek War of Independence and a short-lived republic.

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reason to believe has given rise to bitter offence & sharp reproaches on the part of the French Cabinet,[12] whilst on the other hand his whole conduct in connection with the Bamberg Conference has been severely censured by the Two Great German Powers.

In the meantime the reply to the above Note of the smaller States has been transmitted to their respective Governments.[13] Here, the Communication of it was made a few days ago; & although in reality it concedes but little, it is drawn up in measured language & in terms calculated to make it as little unpalateable [*sic*] as possible. Austria & Prussia declare in it, that they would not be indisposed to receive the accession of the other States in Germany through the Channel of the Diet; but they agree to this course solely upon the understanding that it shall not be clogged with conditions or demand for explanation of any kind whatsoever, & they give those States distinctly to comprehend that, in the event of any attempt being made to create further difficulties, they are fully resolved to pursue their own interests in conjunction with such of the Smaller States as may deem it for their advantage to act with them. That portion of the note which bears upon the question of an armistice & the reciprocity called for in the summons to be addressed to the Belligerent Powers had previously been practically answered by the demand for the evacuation of the Principalities made by Austria on the 3rd Instant to the Cabinet of St Petersburgh.

The Confederation can undoubtedly, under the Provisions of the final act of Vienna,[14] claim to participate in any negotiations for Peace which may follow a war in which it has been engaged in its federal character; but, independently of the interpretation which other Powers, not belonging to the Confederation, might be inclined to put upon that act, in cases involving interests not purely German, the admission of Plenipotentiaries named by the Diet & acting under its instructions, would, in all probability, render such Negotiations interminable, & serve to perpetuate uneasiness & confusion among all the Smaller States of Germany.

The only mode of escaping such dangerous complications would, it strikes me, be for the Confederation to confer upon the Austrian & Prussian Plenipotentiaries, who must necessarily take part in any transaction of this description, full powers to conclude Peace in

[12]The French government objected that the proposals seemed to indicate a collective and proactive policy by the German states in the East, even though they had not been involved in the war. It was felt that this could undermine existing French, Turkish, and British interests.

[13]Identical Austrian and Prussian dispatches of 16 June 1854; this reply was agreed upon at the meeting between Emperor Franz Joseph I and King Friedrich Wilhelm IV at Tetschen, 8–10 June 1854.

[14]Articles 48–50 of the Vienna Final Act of 15 May 1820.

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its name; but I much question whether any proposal to this effect would meet with support from this country, which aims at the exercise of a leading influence over its weaker Neighbours, & which might, & in all probability would, on such an occasion, lay claim to represent the remaining Members of the Confederation. Should such case occur, I cannot very clearly see what the Smaller States will have gained, for they would simply have lent themselves to the furtherance of the ambitious purposes, perhaps of one Individual,[15] but at all events of a Government[16] of which they are all more or less jealous.

From all that has reached me on this subject I can scarcely doubt that ultimately all these apparently refractory States will make a virtue of necessity, & accede to the Treaty unconditionally. The only two which might be expected to make a show of opposition are Saxony & especially Wurtemberg; but I am disposed to think that they will hardly push matters to extremity, when they take into consideration that on the present question it is not necessary that the vote in the Diet should be unanimous. That all of them should have felt themselves neglected & aggrieved at the persevering silence of the Two Great Powers in a matter on which their concurrence was not altogether indifferent is perhaps natural: but if any proof of the prudence of the course pursued were required, it is I think to be found in the conditions sought to be imposed upon them in Mr von der Pfordten's Memorandum; one of which, at any rate, would go far to overthrow the principles laid down in the different Protocols signed at Vienna, in which a positive distinction is drawn between the aggressive & defensive positions of the Belligerent Parties, to whom Mr von der Pfordten would have transmitted the like summons to retire, on the ground that it would be unjust to call upon Russia to evacuate the Ottoman Territory whilst the Fleets of the Maritime Powers[17] were in possession of the Baltick & Black Seas & their Military Forces occupying points of the Turkish Territory.

Mr von der Pfordten can hardly have supposed that such a parallel could be admitted for an instant by the Two high contracting Parties, or that they would consent to reopen a discussion on a once established principle, & upon the basis of his modifications, even at the risk of not obtaining the accession of this Country to their Convention. It appears to me therefore that so far from having improved & strengthened the attitude of the Smaller States, the Bamberg Conference has in reality produced exactly the opposite result, for they now find themselves

[15]Otto von Bismarck.
[16]Prussia.
[17]France and Great Britain.

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exposed to the unpleasant alternative either of signifying their pure & simple accession to the Treaty, if I except the trifling concession accorded in the form of so doing, – or of submitting to a position of isolation, which it would be perfectly impossible for them to sustain for any length of time. A very small amount of reflection would, it seems to me, have sufficed, to convince the Governments represented at the Conference that such must be the inevitable consequence of their feeble attempts at opposition, in the event of the Two Great Cabinets declining to yield to their pretensions.

To Your Lordship the tortuous efforts of these petty States to exercise a preponderating influence in European Politicks must appear inexplicable & almost devoid of interest. Unfortunately however they are, by the embarrassment they cause to those who are called upon to decide grave questions of international Rights & Policy, not entirely without importance. The events of late years, & particularly the rivalry between Austria & Prussia, have contributed to awaken in them the idea that if they can but manage to bring all political questions, affecting what they denominate German interests, within the range of the Diet, they would, thus united, constitute a third Great Power possessing sufficient vitality & force to hold the balance between the other Two. This notion, which will remind Your Lordship of the so much talked of "Trias" of some years ago,[18] has always been most earnestly & passionately advocated by the Bavarian Ministers, because they flatter themselves that Bavaria would, in her capacity of the third State of Germany, be entitled to the direction of the Policy of the weaker Governments. Nothing but a firm resistance to this preposterous combination can save the Two Great German Powers, not to say Europe itself, from the most fatal complications & embarrassments; & in support of this view I need I think only appeal to the doctrines laid down & the hostility evinced towards England & France in Mr von der Pfordten's unlucky Memorandum, which at the same time shews a somewhat singular appreciation on his part of the value of solemn Treaty engagements. But it is inconceivable that Austria & Prussia could ever commit so great a political blunder as to allow the Diet to take the direction of the Foreign Policy of Germany out of their hands, or even to submit to be partially & indirectly hampered by the ambitious activity of some of the Statesmen to whose guidance, for their Misfortune, the smaller States have confided their affairs.

[18]This refers to the idea of a Third Germany under Bavarian leadership alongside Prussia and Austria, which was a constant feature of Bavarian federal policy, particularly from the accession of King Maximilian in 1848.

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FO 9/126: John Ralph Milbanke to Earl of Clarendon, No 78, Munich, 24 December 1855

Bismarck's visit to Munich; Prussian proposals to establish common weights, measures, and commercial code at Diet; apparent Prussian desire to remove middle states from pro-Austrian course

The recent visit to this Capital of Baron Bismark-Schönhausen has, as was to be expected, attracted a good deal of publick attention both here and elsewhere, and much curiosity has been evinced in diplomatick circles to ascertain it's real object, for few are credulous enough to believe that the one alleged is sufficiently important to furnish the only motive for his mission.[19] To it however I must first direct Your Lordship's notice, although it is not improbable that the propositions in which it originated may have reached Her Majesty's Government through some other channel. The apathy and supineness of the Diet in all matters relating to the development of the material interests of Germany have as is well known, for many years been a subject of dissatisfaction and complaint, and have in reality been one of the principal causes of the frequent and loud demands which have been made at different times for a thorough revision of the existing Federal Laws and organization. The Symptoms of a revival of this agitation which have of late manifested themselves in some of the States of the Confederation, and especially in the Lower Chamber of this Country, have probably forced upon the Government the conviction that the time is come for introducing some measure calculated to allay the rising clamour, and satisfy those expectations for the fulfillment [*sic*] of which the Nation has waited in vain since the year 1815. Such at any rate are said to be the reasons assigned by this Government for a step which seems to have aroused the jealousy of the Prussian Cabinet, and to have been in part the cause of Baron Bismark's journey to Munich. In a few words the matter stands thus: Bavaria in a "circular"[20] addressed a short time ago to her representatives at other German courts, announced her intention of proposing at the Diet the addition to the existing Federal Legislation of certain more precise Laws relative to Equality of the Standard for coinage, weights and measures, a common commercial code, the execution in all the states of the Confederation of Judgements [*sic*] pronounced by the Tribunals in any one of them, the Laws of Nationality, and the regulations in regard to emigration and Settlement. Most of the States to whom the communication of this Project was made, have,

[19] Bismarck visited Munich from 13 to 17 December 1855.

[20] Von der Pfordten to Schrenck von Notzing, the Bavarian envoy at the Federal Diet, 10 November 1855. The dispatch was also sent as a circular to the other Bavarian envoys in Germany, who were instructed to communicate its contents to their respective governments.

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I believe, already acquiesced in the principle of it and Baron von der Pfordten has informed several of my German Colleagues that his interviews with Baron Bismark were upon the whole favorable to it, the principal objection of the Prussian Cabinet being, as I understand it against binding the Federal Governments to the proposed Laws irrevocably, at such a critical moment, or in other words, the Prussian Government is desirous of reserving to itself, and all the other Parties to the arrangement, the faculty of giving notice of their intention to withdraw from it at the expiration of a given period.

The arrival at an understanding upon this affair has been put forward as the ostensible motive for Baron Bismark's visit, but it is no secret that the present threatening position of affairs in Europe was discussed with earnestness. Baron von der Pfordten read to Baron Bismark his Despatch to the Bavarian Minister at St Petersburg,[21] through which he made an appeal to the Russian Cabinet in favor of Peace, and pointed out the inevitable consequences of a prolonged and obstinate refusal to accede to the wishes of Germany. Baron Bismark approved of this Despatch in all it's parts except that in which an insinuation was made that War, if allowed to go on, might eventually acquire a character of nationality, but whilst admitting that Baron von der Pfordten had done right to avail himself of the possibility of such a danger to strengthen his representations at St Petersburg, he observed, that the consequences would be so portentous to the Emperor Louis Napoleon, that any encouragement of it on his part was totally out of the Question.

From the information I have been able to obtain from different sources, I am disposed to think that one – perhaps the Chief, – object of Baron Bismark's journey to Munich, was to endeavour to prevent too close an adhesion of the smaller states of Germany to the policy of Austria. In coming to this conclusion I have been more led by inference than by any positive knowledge of what passed between the two statesmen though I have been told that very little impression was produced on the mind of Baron von der Pfordten, who is reported to have declared that in the event of a catastrophe, Bavaria was resolved to stand by Austria.

This part of the business, at all events, seems to date from Baron von der Pfordten's excursion to Paris, and his subsequent change of language on his return,[22] which produced so much effect on my

[21] Milbanke most probably refers to von der Pfordten's disptach to Otto Camillus Hugo Graf von Bray-Steinburg of 12 November 1855.

[22] Von der Pfordten was in Paris from 27 October to 3 November, where he inquired about the French position on the Eastern Question and peace with Russia. After his return, von der Pfordten adopted a more pro-Western stance on the issue.

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Prussian colleague[23] that it was generally supposed to have been the cause of his hasty journey to Berlin, and the presumption is that Baron Bismark was sent to ascertain the true extent of the alteration of the views of the Bavarian Minister for Foreign affairs on the important question at issue and to prevent his taking any precipitate resolutions or engagements.

In one respect the journey of the Prussian Diplomatist would appear to have been not altogether fruitless, for I have good authority for stating that on a very recent occasion the King expressed his firm conviction, that the observance of the strictest neutrality had until now preserved, and was in future alone likely to enable Germany to keep aloof, from the War. As a proof however that His Majesty's appreciation of the present position of affairs in Europe is not shared by all his Ministers, I need only mention that it has been found impossible to persuade the Minister of war[24] to consent to the sale of a number of horses, – I believe about 3,000 – in order to avoid the expense of their keep during the winter and approaching Spring months, which is urged by the Minister of Finance.[25]

FO 9/129: John Ralph Milbanke to Earl of Clarendon, No 45, Munich, 10 July 1856

Relations between the king and the chambers; king's disregard for the right of the chambers to approve budget; remarks on condition of parliamentary government in Germany

The Chambers were prorogued on the 1st instant by H.R.H. Prince Adalbert who in the absence of the King and Prince Luitpold was deputed by His Majesty to deliver the customary Royal Message to both Houses on the closing of the Session.[26]

I have the honour to inclose herewith a Copy of that document by which the Royal sanction is given to a considerable number of measures bearing upon the internal administration and development of the resources of the country, including the further construction of Railroads, but most of which hardly call for any special notice on my part.[27] The only point indeed to which I think it necessary again to recur is the difference of opinion which prevailed as to the amount to be accorded for the Military Budget, which it will be in Your

[23]Heinrich Friedrich Philipp von Bockelberg.
[24]Wilhelm Ritter von Manz.
[25]Joseph von Aschenbrenner.
[26]The royal message was dated 1 July 1856; the chambers were prorogued on 3 July 1856.
[27]Enclosure: *Abschied für den Landtag des Königreichs Bayern*, 1856.

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Lordships recollection was reduced in the Lower Chamber by more than a Million of Florins –

The expectation of the Government, that it might be able, through the Upper Chamber to effect a compromise by which it would succeed in obtaining a few hundred thousand Florins more than the Sum fixed by the Committee of the Lower Chamber has not been realized, and after some vain attempts to arrive at an agreement the Upper Chamber accepted the Finance Law as it was sent up to it, under a sort of Protest, that it must be understood not to give its consent to any economical measure which would have the effect of weakening the military power of the Country.[28]

The King on the other hand annoyed at the obstinacy of the Lower Chamber and encouraged by the support conveyed in the above mentioned Protest, made no effort to conceal his dissatisfaction at the conduct of the former whom he informs in his Royal Message, that he has sanctioned the Finance Law for the 7th Finance Period 1855/61 on the basis laid down in the Budget which he had caused to be submitted to it, under Reserve of the Constitutional Rights of the Crown, and in conformity with the Constitutional agreement come to in that respect during the Session of the States of the year 1813 [*sic*].[29]

His Majesty observes, that the decision of the Chambers based upon the balance of the Accounts for the Years 1853/54 and 1854/55 communicated to them during the present Session, raises considerably the Estimates for nearly all the principal branches of revenue, and that although a proportionate augmentation on some of these Items may appear to be justified by the favourable results of the two last years of the expiring Finance Period, which were not known when the Budget was originally presented to them, and when the accounts of 1852/53 were alone available to guide the calculations, H. Majesty feels himself compelled in consideration of the importance of the increase of the Revenue Estimates fixed by the Chambers as the basis for the Constitutional Vote of the direct Taxes required to cover the Public Expenditure including the necessary reserve fund, and in the event of a deficit occurring in the estimated receipts to such an extent as to cause them to prove insufficient to meet the wants of the State, expressly to reserve to himself the right to exercise the

[28]The military budget (9,075,900 florins, as decided by the committee on 9 May 1856) was approved by the second chamber as part of the general budget on 29 June 1856. The first chamber followed on 30 June, with a caveat against any cuts in the military budget.

[29]This refers to the *Verfassungsverständnis* of 14 June 1843, a compromise in the budgetary law of the *Landtag*. Surplus revenue (until that point the main issue debated in the chamber) would henceforth be bought into the budget and subjected to the control of the *Landtag*.

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Powers with which he is in such a case invested under the Act of the Constitution.[30] The King holds the following language in reference to the difference of opinion as to the amount of the Military Budget which has arisen between the Lower Chamber and the Crown. "We have learnt with displeasure that the Chamber of Deputies has not given its sanction to the grant demanded by us, and recognised by the Upper Chamber as indispensible to the requirements of the active Army. We shall direct our Minister of War[31] to effect every possible saving, but mindful of our Sovereign Duties, we declare that it is our fixed determination to maintain the Army on a footing corresponding to the dignity of our Crown – the Position of Bavaria – and to the federal obligation taken by us – We shall therefore order the outlay to meet the necessary expences, which is unavoidable for the attainment of this object and reserve to ourselves to lay before the next Chambers as well the accounts relating thereto, as the requisite proposals as to the means of covering the excess of Expenditure which may have arisen."

A similar disregard of the privileges of the Chambers to regulate the Public Expences has more than once been resorted to by this Government in an indirect manner, by diverting funds voted for one particular object to some other purpose without consulting the Chambers, as for instance the application a few years ago of a part of the Loans voted for the construction of Railroads to the service of the War Department, but since the accession of the present King there has never yet been so openly avowed any intention of setting the Constitutional attributes of the Lower Chamber in respect to the supplies so completely at defiance.

However the King is only following the example of other German rulers in endeavouring under cover of conforming to the orders of the Diet at Frankfort,[32] to emancipate himself and his Government from the Controul exercised by the Chambers in regard to the Supplies, of which although it is of an exceedingly mild description, every Sovereign in Germany is to a degree impatient.

In the present case, the demand of the Diet that the federal Contingent should be kept in a more perfect state of discipline and instruction by retaining the new levies longer than heretofore with their Regiments, and thereby occasioning considerable additional

[30]The king referred to Section VII §§ 8 and 18 of the Bavarian constitution of 26 May 1818, which provided measures for granting additional sums under extraordinary circumstances.

[31]Wilhelm Ritter von Manz.

[32]Milbanke refers to the effects of the federal resolution of 23 August 1851 (see n. 2 in Württemberg section), particularly with regard to Württemberg, Hanover, and Hesse-Darmstadt.

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expence,[33] is in fact the cause of the dispute, but the principal reason for the augmented military Budget is the desire of the King to maintain his Army at an effective force of 6000 men above the federal Contingent[34] under the pretext of furnishing Garrisons for the Fortresses. The qualification of this wish was opposed by the Lower Chamber as involving an useless waste of the Public Money, at a moment especially when in consequence of the restoration of Peace to Europe, most of the States of Germany are seeking to repair their shattered finances by the reduction of their Military Establishments. But nothwithstanding [*sic*] the resistance of the Chamber on this one point the Government can hardly complain of a want of liberality on most others connected with the developement [*sic*] of the internal resources of the Country, and it has in my opinion no right to be in any way dissatisfied with the result of the Session. At the same time it is undeniable, that the King has not been allowed to have his own way quite as much as he wished, and he has unwisely in his Royal Message manifested symptoms of resentment at his disappointment which he would have done better to conceal. It was, I believe, with difficulty, that his minister obtained His Majesty's promise to assent to the Law for the reorganization of the Tribunals,[35] in its present form of a compromise, by which means alone they were enabled to get it accepted by the Chambers, for they had to struggle not only against the Kings own apprehensions of a diminution of his royal influence and authority, but also against the counsels of the irresponsible advisers by whom His Majesty is surrounded. On this question they were in reality on the side of the Chamber and in opposition to the opinions of their Sovereign, and became thus placed in an anomalous position incompatable [*sic*] with their duty, and only possible in States which like those of Germany have yet to learn the practical part of constitutional Government[.]

The notion that Parliamentary Government is the basis of these so called Constitutional Monarchies in these Countries is altogether erroneous. Most of the Ministers are mere promoted Employés whose education has been confined to administrative matters, and who have no pretension whatever to be ranked as Statesmen. They seldom distinguish themselves by the exhibition of much political independence, or consistency, and it is not often that they are in the enjoyment of sufficient fortune to make them indifferent to

[33]These demands were based on the revision of the 1822 *Bundeskriegsverfassung* (federal military law), passed on 4 January 1855.

[34]According to the decision of the Federal Diet of 10 March 1853, Bavaria's federal contingent was 59,334 men in total.

[35]The *Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz* of 1 July 1856 reorganized the legal system, though it did not fully eliminate privileges or separate the judiciary from the state administration.

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the pecuniary emoluments of their Posts which it will be readily comprehended they do not under any circumstances willingly resign with the certain prospect of an inadequate Pension, and a return to the obscurity from whence they were taken – whatever authority they possess and it is unquestionably considerable, is derived entirely from the Sovereign, and they are the more powerful in proportion as they succeed in identifying themselves with his will and opinion. At the same time they not unfrequently take up a position between the Sovereign and the Chambers, by playing off the will of the one against the wishes of the other, and they avail themselves of the prevailing extensive and complicated Bureaucratic System to carry out their own particular views and projects, and by means of which they are often enabled to oppose with success by procrastination or some similar manoeuvre, the execution of those measures of which they do not approve, but which they do not venture openly to resist. All these tricks and expedients are but negative in their operation, for so far from developing independent Ministerial authority they rather contribute to lame and weaken the powers of the Government which generally speaking has no one but itself to blame for its want of tact, or timely use of the right of initiative secured by the Constitution to the Sovereign, whenever the Chambers do succeed in forcing their will upon him, or carrying through reforms to which the Government is averse.

For these however there is unquestionably a growing desire among the middle classes who are becomming [*sic*] far less cautious than formerly in their criticisms on the conduct both of the Government and their own Representatives, although they are disposed to acquit the latter of wilful disregard of the interests of the country on the ground, that they are for the most part taken from a Class of citizens whose education has by no means fitted them for the discharge of their political duties.

No one at all acquainted with the public opinion of the smaller German States can doubt the existence of opposition tendencies in nearly all Classes, but owing to the total absence of all organization it will in all probability be long before they assume an aspect of danger to the present unsatisfactory system of Government. On the other hand the policy of their Rulers has of late years especially been marked by vacillation and uncertainty – they have in ordinary times resisted without much discrimination every popular demand for change and reform as an encroachment on the royal prerogative and influence, and I need scarcely allude to the abject concessions made by many of them in moments of difficulty – the dynastic attachment to most of the reigning houses has either disappeared altogether or has been greatly impaired by recent events, and in some cases has been followed by the loss of that respect which is due from a subject to the Crown.

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All this and much more is eagerly laid at the door of the Constitutional system, with what justice may be learnt by a short inquiry into the position accorded to the Sovereign by most of the German Constitutions, which if it were adroitly turned to account would place much real power in his hands by enabling him in pursuance of the special right of originating and the exclusive privilege of executing the laws to give a wholesome impulse to the policy of the Country. The utmost he has to encounter is passive opposition on the part of the Chambers whose controlling power has no active tendency, and is in fact so long as the Confederation subsists completely nugatory. Nevertheless complaints that the system of constitutional Monarchy is incompatible with all Princely power which it is asserted to be undermining and destroying by its republican Institutions, are increasing, and it has been my duty on more than one occasion to notice the endeavours of the King of Bavaria to return to the ancient principle of representation by "States" which he considers to have a more conservative character than the present Electoral Institutions.

It is to be presumed that His Majestys efforts were directed to the reestablishment of the "States" in the more modern acceptation of the term for in the earlier periods of the "Old Bavarian States Charters" (altbayerischen Landständischen Freibriefe)[36] those Assemblies are represented to have acted as the Government of the country – to have divided the care of the State with the Princes whom they elected, to have made their influence felt in all subdivisions of the Land[,] to have established the Right of primogeniture and to have exercised that of sanctioning Wars. To have had the right of Petition against grievances, participation in the Legislation not only in the deliberations upon individual Laws but in those of the general Codex – the faculty of granting the different classes of taxes and cooperating in the management and expenditure of them; possessing in short a power of executive interference which would I conceive but ill coincide with the King's notions of monarchical Government.

If I bestow any notice upon the Aristocratic elements of Government in Germany, it is merely for the purpose of observing, that as a Body the hereditary Nobility have abdicated into the hands of the Bureaucracy all political influence whatever, and of expressing my doubts as to the ultimate success of the agitation recently commenced by them in the hope of regaining their lost position. Some of the foregoing observations have been suggested by the perusal of a series of Articles on the manner in which Constitutional Government is understood

[36]This collection of mainly sixteenth-century charters guaranteed the rights of the estates, and was published by Gustav Freiherr von Lerchenfeld in 1853. It was used to justify the call for more constitutional rights for the Bavarian *Landtag*.

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in Germany, which have appeared in the "Augsburgh Gazette,"[37] but which do not after all throw much new light upon the matter. However as I deemed the moment of the termination, of the Session opportune for endeavouring to explain some of the anomalies in the Working of the System which are universally allowed to require reform, I have entered at more length into the subject than perhaps is excusable.

FO 9/140: John Ralph Milbanke to Earl of Malmesbury, No 34, Munich, 26 April 1859

Public feeling on Franco-Austrian Crisis over Italy; general support for Austrian position in Bavaria; illiberal course of German states since 1848

In the state of publick feeling which has prevailed here for some time past, it was hardly to be expected, that the important political events of the last few days would do otherwise than add to the excitement which the prolonged uncertainty as to the turn matters would take on a question in which the interests of Germany are likely to be so deeply involved, has served to keep alive.[38] The Press has never relaxed one instant in it's warnings against the designs of France, & generally in language but little calculated to aid the efforts making in other quarters with a view to the preservation of peace. All parties, whatever may be the difference in their ultimate objects, have from the beginning of the present crisis, concurred in agitating in favour of supporting Austria, & have certainly done their best to encourage & urge her to take the decisive step upon which She has at length determined, & which they now loudly applaud. However, notwithstanding the Zeal displayed in her cause which they adopt as their own, there are still perceptible some lurking signs of hesitation among the Governments, but which will in all probability rapidly disappear before the same overwhelming force of publick opinion by which they have been fairly driven to make what is considered to be a tardy demonstration against the supposed aggressive intentions of the reigning Emperor of the French. This alledged backwardness in the performance of their duty has once more aroused the national tendencies in the direction of Unity, & little pains are taken to mask the opinion, that had a powerful Central Government based on popular representation been in existence, not only would Germany itself have been safe from attack, but all danger of war in Italy or elsewhere would have been averted. The development

[37] *Allgemeine Zeitung* (established 1798).

[38] Milbanke refers to the diplomatic activities prior to the Austrian ultimatum of 19 April 1859 (delivered on 23 April), which demanded that the Sardinian government cease mobilization within three days. See n. 74 in Saxony section.

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of these symptoms which bear an ominous resemblance to those which preceded the troublous year 1848, will probably in a great measure depend upon the course of events, but their revival at the present moment is viewed with some apprehension as an indication of a revolutionary spirit pregnant with the gravest complications under the apparently impending contingency of a general European Conflagration. Unfortunately the Sovereigns of Germany, generally speaking, have neither turned the ten years which have elapsed since that period, to good account, nor have they profited by the experience they ought then to have acquired. Most of them on the contrary unmindful of the peril to which their Thrones were exposed, have since been intent upon the recovery of that Authority which they confess to have been at that time wrested from them by popular clamour alone, & not shared with their Subjects from any desire to meet their wishes for internal reform. The manner in which the promises then given under compulsion, has been fulfilled, is too notorious to require further notice, but there can be but little doubt, that the evasion or violation of them was mainly prompted by the success of the reactionary policy carried out in France by the Emperor Louis Napoleon[39] who from the moment he commenced it was worshiped as the unflinching support & defender of the true Monarchical Principle, & whose strong handed rule the German Sovereigns shewed every disposition to imitate in many points. It is almost needless to say, that since the commencement of the present year, a sensible modification of their first opinions in respect to the Emperor has been brought about, & some of them at least appear at length to entertain misgivings as to the prudence of a System which it is too evident alienates all parties from them.

In this Country the course adopted by the Government towards the Chambers, of late years, has gone far to undermine the King's popularity, whilst his hesitating & indecisive character renders it extremely difficult for his Ministers to carry on the publick business even in ordinary times. The delays occasioned by the necessity of obtaining His Majesty's sanction to matters relating to the commonest occurrences are felt by all classes, & are the cause of the deep seated discontent which exists, & which must ultimately find vent in some shape or another which will prove more or less dangerous, if the King & his Government persist in closing the only constitutional Channel for the expression of popular grievances. The Roman Catholick Clergy are for reasons of their own not the least active in stimulating their

[39]Since the *coup d'état* of 2 December 1851, legislative and executive power in France had been concentrated in the hands of the emperor, the controls on the press and theatres were tightened, and the participation of the political opposition in the 1852 and 1857 legislative elections was severely restricted.

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flocks to patriotick demonstrations, & it would be almost superfluous to add that in the midst of what I may term the general confusion the democratick party is by no means idle. In the mean while although repeated representations have been made to the King on the inconvenience & embarrassment occasioned by his procrastination in completing the new Ministry, he seems to be unable to fix his choice.[40]

Some little uneasiness as to the probable amount of assistance to Austria to be expected from Prussia, which prevailed before the object of the Arch Duke Albrecht's visit to Berlin[41] became known, has been dispelled by the knowledge, that His Imperial Highness was especially charged to communicate the unalterable determination of the Emperor to take the settlement of this dispute with Sardinia into his own hands, & to clear up all doubt with respect to the possible attitude of Prussia in the event of the offensive being first entered upon by Austria.

I have just seen Baron von der Pfordten who informs me, that the movements of French Cavalry towards the frontier of the Palatinate, & the nomination of General Pelissier to the command at Nancy has excited a good deal of alarm, & irritation here, & even causes him to apprehend, that matters may come to a crisis on the Rhine rather sooner than he had expected & before the Austrian Troops could possibly arrive.

FO 9/141: John Ralph Milbanke to Lord John Russell, No 86, Munich, 28 September 1859

Meeting at Munich on common federal policy of middle and minor states; dissatisfaction with Prussian policy; reactions to national movement

The recent simultaneous visit to this Capital of the Wurtemberg and Saxon Ministers for Foreign Affairs has naturally enough in the present State of publick feeling in Germany, led to the supposition that it was in some way connected with the prevailing agitation in favor of federal reform, and the presence of Baron von der Pfordten at the conferences which took place between them and Baron Schrenk has

[40]A new ministry, under Karl Freiherr Schrenck von Notzing, was installed on 1 May 1859.

[41]The Austrian emperor sent Archduke Albrecht to Berlin and Potsdam on a secret mission from 12 to 20 April 1859, to inform Prussia of the impending Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia. His efforts to win Prussia's consent, as well as his attempts to convince Prussia of her federal obligations in the case of a possible war with France, were unsuccessful. The suggestion that Prussia deploy troops on the Rhine to threaten the French army, and thereby prevent French support of Sardinia, was also rejected.

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given a certain amount of consistency to that common belief.[42] As yet very little has transpired in regard to the details of the matters discussed which appear to have been so closely kept that even the Wurtemberg and Saxon Representatives at this Court[43] are only partially and imperfectly acquainted with them. Baron Schrenk is on his part no less reserved than the Ministers of the other two Kingdoms appear to have been, and in reply to my endeavours to obtain some insight into the objects of their meeting merely spoke in general terms of the present unsatisfactory state of Germany and the absolute necessity of more concord at the Diet, especially among the Middle and Minor States of the Confederation, whose safety he rightly considers mainly rests upon their power to maintain unimpaired the existing order of things. All the Federal Governments are averse to any steps which might have an appearance of encouraging or stimulating the excitement which has been aroused by the events of the last few months,[44] and are consequently opposed in principle to reforms which if carried out in the sense demanded would seriously compromise, if not entirely destroy their independence. Against them therefore they will struggle to the utmost, and the object of the meeting of the above named Statesmen was, if I am correctly informed, not to occupy themselves with the Question of federal reform which none of them believe to be practicable, but to concert the means of making their resistance to the movement effectual, and to lay the basis of a common course of action in the Diet for the smaller States. What form or what proportions this incipient league against Prussia, for to this it amounts practically, will ultimately take, will more or less be determined by future events, but there are many pending questions, and among them that relating to the constitution of the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel, which may indirectly bring the disputed point of compulsory submission to a majority in the Diet to an issue.[45]

The minor German Governments have long been dissatisfied with the tone assumed by the Prussian Ministers[46] at the Diet, and weary of the uncertainty which prevails as to the intentions of the Cabinet of Berlin, which it appears to be their determination to test on the

[42]Karl Eugen Freiherr von Hügel, Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, and the Bavarian foreign minister, Karl Freiherr Schrenck von Notzing, met from 19 to 23 September 1859. The talks dealt with the federal policy of the middle states against Prussian hegemony and encroachments upon the Federal constitution.

[43]Ferdinand Christoph Graf von Degenfeld-Schonburg and Carl Gustav Adolph von Bose.

[44]Milbanke primarily refers to the Austro-Italian war and the foundation of the *Nationalverein* (see n. 71 in Frankfurt section).

[45]For the constitutional conflict in Hesse-Cassel see n. 79 in Frankfurt section.

[46]Otto von Bismarck and his predecessors.

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first convenient opportunity. This is no doubt at the bottom of what is now going on, but it is clear that if pushed too far the experiment may prove most dangerous to the peace of Germany, and under no circumstances can it tend much to further that union which all profess to desire though they cannot agree upon the form. A strong suspicion is entertained in some quarters, but it is as strenuously denied by the opposite party, that the course pursued by Baron Beust has been taken at the instigation, or at any rate with the connivance of the Austrian cabinet, and certainly when the ill-humour manifested by it in the lecture addressed to His Highness the reigning Duke of Saxe Cobourg through the Austrian Minister at Dresden[47] under the date of the 4th Instant, reproving His Highness's answer to an Address on the German question presented by some of his own subjects, be taken into account, there is fair ground for presumption that the Imperial Cabinet was at least privy to it.[48] On the other hand Baron Beust's restless disposition in all political matters is quite sufficient to explain the origin of what I may almost term an intrigue, without any previous understanding with Austria, although it is beyond all question that the Minor States must be well assured of her protection and support before they can enter with the slightest prospect of success upon any path of opposition to Prussia. The meeting which has just terminated here, was proposed by Baron Beust full two Months ago, but various obstacles combined to prevent the conversation which he expressed himself to be so desirous of holding with Baron Schrenk upon the then critical State of Affairs in Germany. Baron Schrenk himself viewed the overture with disfavor, and I do not believe that up to the moment of the arrival of Baron Beust at Munich his opinion as to the inopportunity of a step which could scarcely fail to give an additional impulse to the prevailing popular excitement, had undergone any change. Baron von der Pfordten also, whose short experience of the ways of the Diet[49] has I learn convinced him of the utter hopelessness of ever effecting anything like a cordial understanding between Austria and Prussia, was it seems at first equally persuaded of the inexpediency of this Conference at such a time. However, the result was that some points have been agreed upon as a basis for the line of conduct to be

[47]Richard Fürst Metternich-Winneburg.

[48]In the Gotha address of 22 August 1859, Ernst II was asked to support the movement for national unity. He responded on 28 August by welcoming the development of a national party and publicly offered his support. Both the Austrian and Prussian governments complained about the affair, and the note of the Austrian foreign minister, Rechberg, of 4 September stated that this view coming from the mouth 'of a sovereign prince was completely reprehensible'.

[49]Ludwig Freiherr von der Pfordten was Bavarian envoy to the Federal Diet at Frankfurt from May 1859.

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followed by the minor federal States under certain eventualities, and as soon as they have received the Sanction of those Sovereigns whose Ministers have taken the initiative an Appeal will be made to the rest to adhere to them. Here is I understand no question of Signatures, or of requiring any more binding form of concurrence than simple verbal assent to the course proposed, and it is expected that there will be no great difficulty in obtaining the adhesion of a sufficient number of the smaller States to secure a preponderance of votes in the Diet. The revival of the reform movement has greatly alarmed them all and formed the subject I am assured of earnest consideration at these conferences where Baron Beust is said to have suggested more rigorous police measures against it's extension. They are all indignant in the highest degree against Prussia whom they accuse of working to discredit the Diet, and by fomenting the present agitation, seeking to undermine the authority of the Minor States in the hope of profiting by their weakness. With all these tendencies towards resistance however they seem to feel that their best chance of counteracting the effects of the movement is to make some shew of concession to public opinion, and accordingly, among other plans which are carefully concealed, it is proposed to appoint a sort of commission at Frankfort composed of Delegates from all the constitutional States of the Confederation, for the purpose of drawing up a common commercial code for the whole of Germany. I have not been able to ascertain in what manner this assembly is to be constituted, whether it's members are to be named by the Sovereigns or chosen by the chambers from among themselves; but I hear that their labours are to be restricted to the one object above mentioned, and that all interference with political affairs will be interdicted. The deliberations of such a commission will naturally raise a number of questions connected with the commercial interests and policy of the north and south of Germany which will inevitably lead it beyond the limits assigned to it.

In short, without dwelling longer on these details it is impossible to give Your Lordship an adequate notion of the confusion of ideas which to all appearance pervades the whole of this part of Germany. Even the most sober minded among the promoters of the present agitation do not give much evidence of a very clear comprehension either of what they seek, or what is attainable. The Eisenach programme[50] has as might be expected found no sympathy whatever in southern Germany, and in this Country especially has in as far as I am able to judge, rather damped than stimulated the desire for change shewn in the first moments of enthusiasm. If the political uncertainty as to the future which now prevails should soon subside and affairs

[50]See n. 44 in Hamburg section.

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return to their wonted channel, the probabilities are that the present movement will once more die away of itself, for it's leaders do not sufficiently possess the confidence of the Nation, nor have they the qualities or ability required to make it really dangerous to the existing order of things. But it recurs too often to be entirely neglected, and it becomes therefore the duty as it is unquestionably the interest of all the Rulers of Germany to take timely precautions for meeting a pressure which they will not find it easy to resist or control, while yet in their power. One or both of the two great federal Powers ought seriously to take the matter in hand without delay, and instead of mutually imputing to each other the blame of being the cause of the loud and just complaints raised against the System now pursued, heartily direct their energies towards the improvement and developement [*sic*] of the resources of the Country. In such a course the support of the smaller States could not possibly fail them, and they might enter upon it with a firm reliance that whichever of them offered most in the way of civil, religious and commercial liberty, would exercise a predominant influence in Germany.

FO 9/144: John Ralph Milbanke to Lord John Russell, No 38, Munich, 25 April 1860

On free trade and the commercial prospects of Bavaria; necessity of protectionism to maintain Bavarian industries

I have the honour to inclose herewith the Translation of a note, which I have received from the Bavarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to that in which I forwarded to His Excellency, in obedience to the instructions conveyed to me in Your Lordship's Despatch No 21 marked "Circular" of the 7th instant, one of the Papers therein transmitted to me shewing the practical results of the policy of Free Trade as adopted in Great Britain.[51]

In the short conversation with Baron de Schrenk to which this communication gave rise, His Excellency observed that Her Majesty's Government must be aware that, however sound the policy recommended might be, the engagements of this Country towards the Zoll-verein entirely prevented it from pursuing an independent Commercial path. It would be impossible His Excellency said for some branches of the Trade and manufactures of the Kingdom to subsist at all without protection, and he particularly instanced the

[51] Enclosure: letter from Karl Freiherr Schrenck von Notzing to John Ralph Milbanke, 21 April 1860 (translation).

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Iron Trade as being too much in it's infancy to make head against the smallest Foreign Competition. The so-called Commercial movement between this and Foreign Countries is in fact of extremely limited proportions. The exports consist almost exclusively of agricultural produce in which Bavaria is rich enough to be able to supply the wants of the Mountainous districts beyond her Southern Frontier where little grain is grown. Many circumstances combine to strengthen the presumption that this Country will long retain it's present agricultural character. It is comparatively speaking but thinly populated – It's inhabitants are in general devoid of all spirit of enterprize on an extended scale – Capital is not sufficiently concentrated or abundant to seek a vent in Speculation, – and although the Mineral treasures of Bavaria are said to be considerable the scarcity of proper fuel greatly cramps the development of this branch of national Wealth. Seams of Coal have been discovered in various parts, but their produce is not satisfactory in quality, whilst owing to the want of labour the quantity raised is still inconsiderable, and besides this the absence of communication greatly enhances the difficulty of turning that produce to account. The smelting furnaces are therefore thrown back upon the forests and Turf Bogs for the means of carrying on business, but it is to the requirements of the Railroads that is to be principally attributed the enormous rise in the price of wood for fuel that has taken place in this and the adjoining States of latter years. At the same time it cannot be denied that in some branches of industry Bavaria is making a rapid and wholesome progress.

FO 9/149: John Ralph Milbanke to Lord John Russell, No 40, Munich, 18 April 1861

Account of the Nationalverein*; moderation of national and democratic movements since 1848; relations of* Nationalverein *with other political groups*

Although I may fairly presume that Your Lordship is sufficiently acquainted with the tendencies and objects of the so-called "National Verein", which is at this moment attracting a good deal of attention in Germany, to make any further explanation of them superfluous on my part, the same may not be the case in regard to the position assumed towards it by the democratic party, and I shall therefore endeavour with the help of a sort of public declaration made by a writer[52] who professes to speak, without being actually authorised or instructed so

[52]Name not traceable.

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to do, the sentiments of the latter, to throw some light on the political principles of the different shades of public opinion in these Countries.[53]

The "National Verein" has, as Your Lordship is aware, lost no opportunity of proclaiming clearly and distinctly, that the object of it's agitation is an united Monarchical Constitution for Germany. It repudiates all illegal attempts to overthrow existing arrangements, and limits it's program to intellectual preparation for a reform of the Constitutional organization of the common "Fatherland".

Notwithstanding this declaration of it's moderate views, it has, it gives out, at first hesitatingly, but always in a more decided manner, been joined by earlier Republicans, and the Pessimists of the present day, who have, by the adoption of those views, gone far to abandon their hitherto discontented passive attitude.

On the other hand a great portion of the real Constitutionalists – the so called "Gotha Party" of former years[54] – has, it is said, more or less kept aloof, although the "National Verein" affirms that it has again taken up in all it's essential points, the old program of that Party.

How, it is asked, is this state of things to be accounted for, – is there hypocrisy on one side, or a change of opinion on the other? Is the intention of the old democracy, from a disbelief in the possibility of carrying through the program of the "National Verein", to try, and turn it to advantage for the furtherance of it's own separate objects; and does it only assume a legal and friendly mien externally, whilst internally brooding revolutionary, and subversive designs? And on the other hand has the old Constitutional Party lost all faith in it's own traditionary [*sic*] principles, or does it with Baron de Schleinitz consider the time for peaceful reforms as not yet come, and the moment for their attainment by war as still distant? These questions the writer from the democratic Camp above alluded to, undertakes to answer with a full conviction, that he will have the approbation of a very large number of those who profess the same opinions as himself. He asserts, that prior to, and during the year 1848, the majority of his Party were Republicans on principle – fundamentally revolutionary – anti-monarchical on dogmatical grounds – in one word "Idealists". Facts were despised as common, and arbitrary, and even admitting the principle to be correct, as subordinate to it. History was not held to be a natural chain of real causes and effects, but the unavoidable, and necessary realization of philosophy – an emanation of "loftier critical ideas". Another section of the revolutionary party, and also Anti-Monarchical, but on practical grounds, was filled with a happy faith in the omnipotence of the Masses, and the never erring instincts

[53]For the *Nationalverein* see n. 71 in Frankfurt section.
[54]See n. 7 in Frankfurt section.

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of the People, and as a natural consequence entertained the deepest distrust of the capacity, and good will of the different Dynasties, and whilst maintaining that everything was possible through the former saw in all political disputes only a struggle between them and their Rulers, and was incapable of comprehending a national development in conjunction with the latter. As it was then, so is it now. Democracy has become at the present day more real, and recognizes as it's paramount duty the acknowledgement of accomplished facts, and action upon them from the only quarter from whence any decided influence is possible. It now respects a small real practical progress far more than an ideal bound. It troubles itself but little with differences of principle, and willingly accepts as Confederates those whom it sees following the same path. It no longer strives fundamentally to do away with everything at once, for it has learnt, that the only practical policy is to concentrate all it's action upon one attainable point. It no more struggles in ideal regions but in those of suffering humanity. It feels that a practical Constitution is the principal want of the Nation, and it does not fear to enter upon the only practical course which can lead to the attainment of this object, even though the means be opposed to Principle. It is not prepared to accept Monarchy as a dogma, but as a practical political necessity, and if it cannot imagine Germany without Prussia, neither can it, in as far as it is able to calculate, figure to itself Prussia without her Dynasty.

These are stated to be the considerations which have induced the Democratic Party to join the "National Verein", honestly, and without hypocritical reserves; that party, at least in Germany, is affirmed to have ceased to be revolutionary on principle, and to have become legal, and Monarchical from the insight it has obtained, into practical reality. This altered situation is in short held to be decisive for its future course of action. It however leads also to the question of what, in this moment of German historical development, ought to be the task of the Constitutional party, and of those Classes which are most interested in it's legal progress; and the answer given is, that if they comprehend their own interests, they ought to contribute by all the means in their power to the support of the efforts making by the Nation, and at once join an Union which proclaims the reform of the united German Constitution as a necessity, and consequently a right of the People, but chooses the strictly legal path for effecting it. This is pointed out as the true basis for conciliation, and the settlement of old Party differences; and the conviction, that this is so, as well as, that the ground upon which the "National Verein" has taken it's stand, is perhaps the last legal point of departure, for the movement towards German unity is said to be rapidly gaining ground among the Middle Classes of all Professions.

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The Ultramontane Party has, as was natural, from the first, been a declared opponent of the "National Verein", and one of it's most ardent partisans, the Bishop of Mayence,[55] has very recently made a pastoral letter the channel of a special attack upon it; The most remarkable part of this Address is a paragraph much commented upon in the Press, which is taken as an admission, that even the party which he ably and zealously represents, looks upon the present political state of Germany as most deplorable. The Bishop says that it could not refuse it's unqualified sympathy to the "National Verein", if it really directed it's endeavours to a closer unity in the Constitution of the German "Fatherland", and at the same time sought to give to the people the position to which they are entitled in regard to other Nations, among which Germany formerly took the first place; and if in it's pursuit of this noble end it laid aside all minor party secondary considerations, and attempting only it's attainment by honest means, avoided all attack on the well founded Rights of individual Sovereigns.

The spirit of the Roman Catholic Church, which interwoven with the traditions of Germany formerly, the Bishop continues, raised the People to the first rank among Nations, would not now prevent it from greeting in the warmest manner, any signs of a resuscitation from the humiliating position in which Germany is placed at the present moment, when She can scarcely claim a voice in the great Councils of Europe.

I see no cause for questioning the correctness of these statements especially, as I have observed no attempt at contradiction from any other quarter. Comment upon the picture thus sketched is unnecessary, but it would hardly be complete without some consideration of the religious, and confessional disputes, which now distract different parts of Germany.[56]

The "National Verein" is to all appearance gradually taking deeper root; in this Kingdom perhaps, at least openly, less than in many other federal States; but as it is composed of, and open to the discontented of all shades of opinion, and has the character of a regularly organized rallying point, it is inconvenient, not to say disquieting to all the Dynasties of the Minor States, who do not dare to oppose it.

[55]Wilhelm Emmanuel Freiherr von Ketteler. Milbanke refers to chapter IV of Ketteler's pastoral letter of 27 March 1861, *Soll die Kirche allein rechtlos sein? Ein Mahn- und Hirtenwort an die Gläubigen der Diöcese Mainz* (Mainz, 1861).

[56]Milbanke refers to the disputes over the Württemberg Concordat of 1857 and the Baden Church Laws of 1860, which were introduced after the revocation of the Baden Concordat in 1860.

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FO 9/149: John Ralph Milbanke to Lord John Russell, No 63, Munich, 28 May 1861

Military conferences at Würzburg; divisions in policy between Austria, Prussia, and the middle states

I have put off to the last moment before the departure of the messenger, any notice of the renewal of the Military Conferences at Würzburg, because I was in hopes of being able to give at the same time some account of the proceedings.[57] Nothing, however worth relating has transpired, and indications, that they are already beginning to lose some of the importance with which they were at first invested, are by no means wanting. It is now loudly proclaimed that the Officers sent thither are not in any way authorized to deal with the question of appointing a Commander in Chief for the federal Corps, not comprehended in the Austrian and Prussian contingents, but that their sole business is to arrange the details of organization, concentration, Supplies &c, the basis of which was laid down in the Project of convention of the 5th of August last, a translation of which I forwarded to Your Lordship in my Despatch No 81 of the 24th of November.[58]

They will, however, have to settle all matters connected with the commands and staffs of the four Corps above designated, or at any rate of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Corps, supposing the services of the 10th to be required for the defence of the Northern Coasts, and the result of their deliberations with the Convention itself, will then be submitted for the judgement of the Diet.

The nomination of a Commander in Chief over the whole is reserved, under the present pacific aspect of affairs, for agreement between the different Courts which might lay claim to the Post, and I have reason to believe, that an active correspondence on this subject has been carried on for some time past. The only two likely Candidates for it that I have heard named, are the King of Wurtemberg, who is 80 years of age, and Prince Charles of Bavaria, whose health would scarcely, I should think, permit him to risk the fatigues of active service in the field. The selection therefore of either of these Princes, both of whom would accept the offer if made, must be productive of

[57] The third Würzburg Conference took place from 21 to 23 May 1861. All the middle states of Germany, with the exception of Baden, were represented (i.e. Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Hanover, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Electoral Hesse).

[58] *Würzburger Konvention* of 5 August 1860. This convention, agreed at the second Würzburg Conference (30 July–6 August 1860), suggested revisions of the military law of the German Confederation. It was an expression of the general political aspirations of the Third Germany, proposing a greater role for the middle states through the creation of an independent military contingent and the appointment of a supreme commander in case of war.

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inconvenience, for it would have no object in time of peace, and it would have to be set aside on the first approach of danger. However, even upon this point, I would not take upon myself to say that the jeaulousies [*sic*] of 1859 might not again be revived.[59] Be this as it may, the present state of the dispute may be described in very few words. The nation calls loudly for reforms in the federal military organisation. Austria and Prussia are, after various attempts, unable to come to any understanding upon them; the middle and minor States resist the idea of dualism, which, if admitted, would absorb their forces into the Austrian and Prussian Armies, and as their only chance of escape from this danger, they in the first place hold fast to the 12th article of the federal organic Law which stipulates unity of force and command in the Confederation,[60] but they profess their readiness, in the event of their being driven in self defence to draw closer together, to place all their forces under the supreme Command of any General in Chief named by the Diet, or by joint agreement between Austria and Prussia. Their great object is unity of Command, whilst the two great Powers desire the division of the federal forces when amalgamated with their own, into a Northern and a Southern Army. This project has been frequently discussed between the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, and formed, I believe, one of the principal objects of the Visit of the Arch-Duke Albert to the latter Capital a year or two ago,[61] but it was then so vigorously opposed by Baron von der Pfordten, who rightly judged that concession on this point would be a death blow to the independence and influence of the Middle and Minor States, that it once more fell to the ground. Although agreed upon the absolute necessity of one undivided central supreme Command, public opinion is by no means so as to the means of attaining unity, and may be said to be divided into two Camps; one urges the dissolution of the German Diet and the creation of a new Union of States under the lead of Prussia, even at the cost of excluding Austria; the other presses for a closer union of the federal States on the basis of existing laws, and it is hardly to be doubted that the great majority of the nation belongs to the latter party; but, those who profess these opinions are not the less puzzled how this closer union is to [be] brought about under the present organization of the Diet, and the proverbial antagonism between Austria and Prussia.

[59]Milbanke alludes to Bavaria's aim of taking the leading role in the Third Germany, which was put forward in the course of the debates on federal reform.

[60]The *Bundeskriegsverfassung* (federal military law) of 9 April 1821 was an addition to the Federal Act of June 1815. Article 12 reads: 'the established military force of the Confederation is an army, and commanded by a commander-in-chief [*Feldherr*]'.

[61]See n. 41 in this section.

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Baden as Your Lordship is aware, declines all participation in the Würzburg Conferences upon the ground, that they are dangerous to Germany both in a military and political point of view, and to say the truth, I do not feel quite certain that such complete unanimity as they profess, prevails even among those States which are represented at them.[62] At all events I feel satisfied, that however much they may negotiate, no definitive solution of the main question will be arrived at until the hour of trial comes upon them, but the panic will then in all probability be so great that they will be ready to agree to anything.

FO 9/158: Alfred Guthrie Bonar to Earl Russell, No 1, Munich, 2 January 1863

Divisions between Prussia and south German states over Franco-Prussian Commercial Treaty

An interchange of Notes continues to be carried on between Prussia and the Southern German States on the question of the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Commerce,[63] but they are still barren of result – and the reply of the Bavarian Government to Count de Bismark's last communication on that subject under date of the 12th of November last,[64] is now before the King for His Majesty's approval, but from all I learn from Baron de Schrenk it is likely to be of no more avail than any of its predecessors in bringing about a better understanding between the two Governments – whilst the material question, already so important in itself, is again embittered and rendered each day more difficult of solution by the antagonistic political attitude assumed afresh by the two Great German Powers and their respective adherents in the Diet at Frankfort.

It is the determination of the Bavarian Government (for the present at least) to make no concessions on the Treaty as it now stands, and the Munich Cabinet is evidently in complete accord with that of Stuttgardt as to the line of policy to be conjointly followed by them.

[62]The support of Baden's new government for a *kleindeutsch* solution to the German Question made it hostile towards the Würzburg Convention, and meant that Baden was not invited to the third Würzburg Conference. See nn. 57 and 58 in this section.

[63]Bavaria (11 August), Württemberg (12 August), and Hesse Darmstadt (12 October) all declined to join the Franco-Prussian Commercial Treaty of 1862 (see n. 88 in Frankfurt section).

[64]Bismarck's note of 12 November 1862 to the Prussian envoy to Munich, Graf Perponcher, took up the Bavarian desire for an agreement as brought forward in Schrenck von Notzing's dispatch of 23 September 1862.

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It will be the object of Baron de Schrenk to bring the Austrian propositions of July 10th[65] under consideration at the General Zollverein Conferences to be shortly held in this Capital, and which it was expected would open on the 5th Instant but have now been deferred until next month – and on my alluding, in conversation with His Excellency, to the positive declaration of Prussia that she would take no part in any discussion on that topic, Baron de Schrenk answered: "Then we shall have done all in our power to give the question a fair and sincere consideration – and if Prussia retire from the Conferences and abandon us, we shall have no option but to form a separate body with those States who go with us, and we shall have three years to think over the position and resolve upon the future." Count de Bismark's last note (of November 12th) was so far more satisfactory to the Bavarian Government than the frequent communications on this subject from Count de Bernstorff, that it was couched in a more courteous tone – and in one passage, alluding to the hope which the Bavarian Government had expressed in its Note of the 23rd of September last, that an understanding might still be arrived at between the two Governments, Count de Bismark directly demanded of Baron de Schrenk to state his views in some definite form. On my asking Baron de Schrenk, however, how this proposal had been met by him, and whether it was acceded to in the answer of the Bavarian Government now about to be despatched to Berlin, he informed me that it would be useless for Bavaria to make any propositions otherwise than in concert with the other Governments' opponents of the present Treaty, because that would lead to no result – and, at present, all that Baron de Schrenk aims at is, the obtaining of Prussia [*sic*] an honest consideration of the Austrian propositions in all their bearings.

Baron de Schrenk cannot but be alive to the danger and complications which would indubitably arise in Germany from the termination of the Zollverein,[66] particularly its disruption under circumstances of such animosity between the German States – and that the formation of two separate Customs' Unions, one with Austria the other with Prussia at its head, would become at once as much

[65]Rechberg, the Austrian foreign minister, suggested in his circular dispatch of 10 July 1862 to the Austrian representatives at the German courts that a preliminary treaty for a customs union between Austria and the *Zollverein* on the basis of complete freedom of trade and transit (with effect from 1 January 1865) should be agreed to. Prussia declined this proposal on 20 July 1862.

[66]The *Zollverein* treaty expired on 31 December 1865.

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Political as Commercial Confederacies, and bring with them the inevitable disruption also of the Germanic Confederation.

But His Excellency holds that the loss to Prussia of the numerous and accustomed markets which her industry finds in the wide extent of the Zollverein would be as fatal to the former State as to any other in Germany, and that Prussia therefore will be as loth as any of her neighbours to proceed to extremities when the termination of the Zollverein is imminent. The large and mainly agricultural population of Bavaria offers a constant and most valuable market to the varied industries of Prussia which it repays almost solely by raw produce, its own busy industries of Nuremberg and other Chief towns finding markets abroad, in America &c &c. – In the important article of sugar for instance, Bavaria with its nearly 5,000,000 of inhabitants possesses only 2 or 3 working Manufactories, and not any refining Establishments, and draws four fifths of its large consumption from the Beetroot Sugar Manufactories of Prussia.

The many and excellent Linen Fabriques of Prussia export in enormous quantities to Bavaria, where, by national custom, but little of Cotton Stuffs is worn – and the same applies to the trade in ironwares, and numerous other important articles.

These are solid advantages to Prussia, and the result of Commercial habits of 30 years standing, which the Bavarian Government imagine Prussia will not lightly relinquish, and the stipulations of its Treaty with France most inadequately compensate.

The various considerations above stated, together with the unalterable political attachment of the Bavarian Government and people to Austria, and their distrust of and antagonism to Prussia, will cause a long period to elapse before the many German Governments will come to an agreement on the question of the French Commercial Treaty – at the same time throughout Germany the great trading Community is each day demanding that some means be found for maintaining the present Customs' Union.

The Commerce and Industry of Germany have not yet felt the influence of the wrangling continually going on between the various Governments, but as the time approaches when the Zollverein, according to the present Convention, draws to a close, and when its last year shall bring upon so numerous and important a class the disturbing influence of uncertainty and suspense, I expect the German Governments will hardly maintain against the universal pressure, and that none will then, Prussia no more than any other, take upon itself to determine the cessation of the Zollverein, that has continued uninterruptedly in Germany during 30 years of peace, of improvement, and of development of all the energies and resources of the Country.

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FO 9/158: Lord Augustus Loftus to Earl Russell, No 14, Munich, 3 March 1863

King's involvement in Greek succession question; indifference of public opinion in Bavaria

The events passing in Greece and elsewhere connected with the Succession to the Throne, which have until now been viewed with unbroken silence by the King of Bavaria and His Government are apparently beginning to occupy their serious attention.[67] Before proceeding further I may observe to Your Lordship that the public opinion of Bavaria evinces no interest in a question which is regarded as one of a purely dynastic nature, and is quite indifferent on the subject of Greece or of the restoration of the Bavarian Dynasty. The Bavarian people have no direct interests at stake in Greece, and their sole wish is to avoid being drawn into engagements on account of interests purely Dynastic which might cause expense to the Bavarian Treasury or occasion embarrassment to the Bavarian Government in their political relations with Europe.

The King of Bavaria is, I am informed, fully persuaded of the hopelessness of the restoration of King Otho. – He unhesitatingly censures the past system of Government in that Country, and has, I am told, repeatedly warned King Otho of the impolitic and dangerous course He was pursuing.

While entertaining these opinions and regarding as hopeless the return of King Otho, His Bavarian Majesty appears, however, to cling to the idea of the possibility of the transfer of the Throne to His Nephew Prince Louis, Son of Prince Luitpold of Bavaria, and although neither the King personally nor His Government have as yet taken any formal steps in this sense, yet there are certain indications that they consider the present moment propitious for recommending to the Protecting Powers the fulfilment of the Treaty stipulations regulating the Succession to the Throne.[68]

The reasons which have apparently induced the King of Bavaria and His Government to entertain these hopeful expectations, and to abandon the passive attitude which they have hitherto observed, may be traced to the following causes: – 1º To the unsuccessful result which has till now attended the offers of the Vacant Throne – and 2ly to the return here lately from Athens of Count Hompesch, the Bavarian

[67]King Otto of Greece was deposed on 23 October 1862.

[68]The protecting powers were Great Britain, France, and Russia. The succession to the throne was regulated by the Treaty of London of 7 May 1832, the supplementary article of 30 April 1833, the Greek constitution of 1844, and the Treaty of London of 20 November 1852.

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Representative accredited to King Otho, and to the report he has made of the existing state of Affairs in Greece.

Count Hompesch called on me soon after his arrival and I could easily discover that in his opinion, although the return of King Otho was regarded as hopeless, the chances for the succession of a Bavarian Prince were not entirely lost.

He stated that there was still an influential Party in Greece devoted to the Bavarian Dynasty, who would hail with satisfaction the Succession of a Bavarian Prince.

He observed that the predominating Political Influence in Greece was centered [*sic*] in a certain number of Families at Athens and at one or two of the maritime Towns, who were ambitious of power and patronage, but whose voice could not be taken as representing the opinions of the Country: that over amongst this Party there were great divergences of opinion actuated by private jealousies and personal rivalry, although they were all acting at present against the Bavarian Dynasty.

He stated that great ignorance and apathy existed among the mass of the people to whom it was a matter of perfect indifference on whom the royal dignity was conferred but that, misled by Political intriguers, they became unconsciously the Victims of party strife. He observed that the maintenance of a Monarchy was the prevailing wish of the Nation, and that the repeated failures in obtaining the Sovereign of their choice had been mortifying to the national pride, and would in his opinion, at no distant period be the means of reconciling the Greek Nation to the Bavarian Dynasty.

He represented the present state of the Country, of the Government, and more especially of the Finances as deplorable, and affirmed that no Sovereign could accept the Throne of Greece with the hope of maintaining himself and of carrying on the Government of the Country satisfactorily, without a loan guaranteed by the Foreign Powers. In short, although he regarded the restoration of King Otho as next to impossible, he considered that there were favourable chances for the Succession of Prince Louis, admitting at the same time that it would entirely depend on his obtaining the countenance and support of Great Britain. He seemed also to found these bright expectations on the hopeless despair of the Greek Nation of acquiring a Sovereign of their own choice, and on the necessity which may present itself to them of at last resorting to the Bavarian Dynasty as the only means of filling the Throne, rather than on any intrinsic merit of Prince Louis; or any attachment on the part of the Nation to the Bavarian Dynasty. He was of opinion that the present moment was propitious for the Bavarian Government to propose to the Protecting Powers to return to the Treaties providing for the Succession to the Greek

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Throne, and he gave me further to understand that on his passage through Vienna, Count Rechberg had expressed himself in this sense, and had advised the Bavarian Government to seek the support of Her Majesty's Government.

After listening attentively to all Count Hompesch had to say, I replied that I had received no instructions from Your Lordship on the affairs of Greece, nor had I any official information of what had taken place at Athens. From the reports of the Press it was, however, evident that the Voice of the Greek Nation had declared itself unmistakably against the Bavarian Dynasty, and I observed that no more striking proof of the National feeling could be given than the recording of one Vote in favour of King Otho as a Candidate for the Throne. I could not therefore admit that there existed any party in Greece who desired the restoration of the Bavarian Dynasty, nor could I participate in his opinion that the moment was propitious for the course he advocated. As regarded Prince Louis, I observed that it was in the hands of the Greek Nation and not in those of the Protecting Powers that the choice of a Sovereign lay, and if the Bavarian Government looked to His succession, it was evident that it could only be brought about with the entire concurrence of the Greek Nation, and that it could not be imposed by Foreign Intervention. I was induced to make this latter observation in consequence of Count Hompesch having hinted that he might be sent to London to submit a proposal in favour of Prince Louis to Her Majesty's Government.

I have reason to believe that since the return here of Count Hompesch, both King Otho and His Bavarian Majesty have abandoned all hopes of the restoration of King Otho. On the other hand the report made by Count Hompesch of the State of affairs in Greece appears to have resuscitated hopes in the minds of the Bavarian Royal Family that Prince Louis may finally succeed to the Throne of Greece.

It has been remarked here that since the day on which Count Hompesch was received by King Otho, His Majesty has ceased to wear the Greek Costume.

FO 9/163: Lord Augustus Loftus to Earl Russell, Confidential, No 34, Munich, 1 March 1864

Popular meeting at Erlangen censuring government's uncertain policy in Schleswig-Holstein Crisis; unfeasibility of Third Germany assuming influential role

I have the Honour to forward to Your Lordship herewith a summary of the resolutions voted at a large Popular Meeting held at Erlangen,

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at which 7000 persons were present, in favor of the Schleswig-Holstein cause.[69]

Your Lordship will perceive that a censure is passed therein on the Bavarian Government for their apathy and want of energy in the cause of the Independence of the Duchies, and the opinion is expressed that the National cause can only be furthered in Bavaria by the immediate convocation of the Chambers and the mobilisation of the army.

From private information which I have received I am enabled to confirm the opinion expressed to Your Lordship in my Despatch No 31 of the 24th Ultimo stating that the King of Bavaria and His Ministry were not disposed to advance further in the Question of Schleswig-Holstein and that a fear of the Revolutionary Party had lately produced a desire for a better understanding between the Minor States of Germany and the Two Great German Powers.

I am consequently disposed to believe that the result of the Meeting at Erlangen will be to deter the Government from any active measures in the sense of the Resolutions passed, rather than to induce them to act in concurrence with them.

At the same time the position of the Government as regards the public opinion of the Country is one of difficulty and embarrassment, and they are consequently obliged to exercise great caution so as not to expose themselves to any violent popular ebullition.

The King by His letter to Baron Schrenk of the 17th December 1863 has committed Himself to a recognition of the legality of the claims of Prince Frederick of Augustenburg[70] and His Majesty is consequently bound to support them at the Diet. But I have reason to believe that His Majesty and Baron Schrenk would not regret, if the claims of Prince Frederick should be rejected by the Diet.

His Majesty would then be able to prove to His people that His efforts have been consistent, but that He was bound to submit to the decision of the Diet. Although therefore the Bavarian Government may not be able to withdraw at once from the attitude they had taken on the Schleswig-Holstein Question, and may be obliged to save appearances both as regards the public opinion of their own country and of Germany, yet I am disposed to believe that their opposition will be lukewarm, and I feel confident that they will not be induced to join in any measures of active opposition to the Two German Powers.[71]

[69]The meeting at Erlangen took place on 28 February 1864. Its resolutions demanded the complete separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark and criticized the inaction of the Bavarian government. Enclosures: telegram of 28 February 1864 (original and translation).

[70]See n. 97 in Frankfurt section.

[71]Austria and Prussia.

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I may here remark to Your Lordship that the idea of the formation of a Third Power in Germany (for the Headship of which Bavaria has always been ambitious) has lately been proved impracticable.

This third group which was to have consisted of all the Minor States and which has been Known under the name of "the Bambergers" and the Wurzburgers",[72] is now divided in itself, as was shown by the absence of Hanover, Oldenburg and Electoral Hesse at the Conference at Wurzburg; and again by the divergence of their votes at the Diet on the occasion of discussing the Four Points of the Report of the Committee on the Schleswig-Holstein Succession.[73]

It must therefore be apparent that if the Bavarian Government had ever looked to the realisation of a Third Power in Germany or as it is usually called the "Trias" under Her Auspices, this hope must be now regarded as illusory, and to this circumstance may be possibly owing the desire of the Bavarian Government to resume their former cordial understanding with Austria and to harmonize with the Policy of the Two Great German Powers.

FO 9/164: Lord Augustus Loftus to Earl Russell, No 80, Munich, 26 July 1864

Conference on Zollverein *in Munich; south German opposition to Franco-Prussian Commercial Treaty*

With reference to my Despatch No 79 of the 6th Instant I have now the Honor to enclose to Your Lordship herewith in duplicate and original an article from the Bavarian Gazette together with a précis of it in translation by Mr Trench, reporting the result of the Conferences lately held at Munich on the affairs of the Zollverein, and the general nature of the proposals agreed upon by the Plenipotentiaries of the States therein represented.[74]

[72]These referred to the participating states of the Bamberg Conference of 1854 (see n. 9 in this section) and the Würzburg Coalition (see n. 55 in Hanover section and nn. 57 and 58 in this section).

[73]The four points proposed by the Holstein Committee of the Federal Diet on 11 February 1864 were discussed by Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, Brunswick, Nassau, and Saxe-Meiningen at the conference at Würzburg of 18–19 February, and were voted on in the Federal Diet on 25 February. The Diet rejected points 1 and 2, which declared that the provisions of the 1852 London Protocol on the succession in Schleswig-Holstein (see n. 97 in Frankfurt section) were not binding and impossible to execute. However, point 3, which declared that the (Danish) vote for Holstein in the Federal Diet was not to be recognized, and point 4, which stated that the committee was not required to take the London Protocol as the basis for further deliberations, were accepted.

[74]Enclosure: extract headed *Nichtamtliches. Zur Zollvereinkrise* from *Bayerische Zeitung*, no date (original, translation, and précis).

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Since the first meeting of the Munich Conference, the Governments of Hanover, Electoral Hesse and Frankfort have seceded from their confederates, and have signed the Treaty with Prussia for the renewal of the Zollverein.[75] There is every reason to believe that Grand Ducal Hesse and Nassau will take a similar course, and that Bavaria and Wurtemberg will be necessarily constrained to follow in their wake.

Baron Schrenk however still withholds the adhesion of Bavaria and makes it conditional on the previous acceptances by Prussia of the proposals submitted by the Plenipotentiary of Hesse Darmstadt and agreed to by the Conference at Munich.[76] In case of their rejection by Prussia it is probable that the Bavarian Chambers will be convoked, and that they will be called upon to decide on the acceptance or final rejection of the French Treaty.[77] Baron Schrenk is of opinion that it will be rejected by the Chambers, and His Excellency is apparently prepared for the Consequences of its rejection. He maintains that if on the present occasion Prussia is allowed to dictate to Her Confederates arbitrarily the terms on which the Zollverein is to continue to exist, there is an end to the independence and self-action of the several Governments, and they must hereafter be content to accept the supreme control of Prussia on all Questions relating to the Zollverein.

He is accordingly of opinion that Bavaria, with Wurtemberg or alone if necessary, should abandon the Zollverein rather than accept the French Treaty except on the conditions now submitted to Prussia. Baron Schrenk has even expressed his determination of retiring from office rather than affix his signature to the French Treaty as originally proposed by Prussia.

It appears to me that under existing circumstances – when nearly all the German States have given in their adhesion to the Prussian Treaty, neither Wurtemberg nor Bavaria can long withhold their concurrence.

The Bavarian Palatinate would be entirely cut off and isolated from Germany, unless it were included in the Commercial Zone of

[75]The Munich conference (*Zoll-Sonderbundskonferenz*) sat from 19 June to 12 July 1864. Electoral Hesse and Frankfurt signed the new commercial treaty with Prussia on 28 June, and Hanover followed on 11 July.

[76]On 22 June 1864, Maximilian von Biegeleben proposed the continuation of the commercial treaty between Austria and Prussia of 19 February 1853 (see n. 5 in this section), which would lead to the *Zollverein* states and Austria retaining their respective tariffs. On 12 July 1864, the participants of the Munich conference (Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau) agreed to this compromise as the basis for a future agreement. The *Punktuation zu einem Übereinkommen Österreichs mit dem Zollverein* was communicated to Prussia on 28 July 1864.

[77]For the Franco-Prussian Commercial Treaty of 2 August 1862 see n. 88 in Frankfurt section.

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the Zollverein, and in the present temper of the German mind, the erection of Commercial Barriers between the Zollverein and the Two South German States, (Bavaria and Wurtemberg), would appear to be not only impossible but an experiment which would be attended with danger to the internal peace and prosperity of those States.

FO 9/165: Lord Augustus Loftus to Earl Russell, No 117, Munich, 29 November 1864

Professor Liebig's 'Essence of Meat'

In conversation lately with Professor Liebig my attention was drawn to his account of an enterprize which is being now made in South America under his Auspices for the purpose of providing a healthy and nutritious food at a very diminished cost.

Science has of late years rendered the most signal Services to mankind in bringing to light discoveries which have been productive of inestimable blessings to the human race, and the beneficent results which have been thus attained under an All-Wise and merciful Providence are fresh inducement to Philanthropists and Men of science to persevere in their work of labour and love.

The discovery to which my attention has been drawn by Professor Liebig is the producing of an Essence of Meat from the flesh of the Animals now slaughtered in vast quantities in South America for their hides and Tallow only. The invention of Essence of Meat is not of recent date.[78] Some years ago Professor Liebig introduced at Munich the use of Soup made from the Essence of meat, and its efficacy has been satisfactorily tested and proved at all the Hospitals. But the high price of meat, and the consequent expense of its production has limited its use to medicinal purposes. It has been the constant aim of Professor Liebig to find means of giving an extension to this most useful discovery, but until lately it has been found quite impracticable for general use on account of its high price.

A German Engineer named Giebert residing in South America has however been the means of carrying out the ideas and hopes of Professor Liebig, and under his authority and guidance has organised in Uruguay an Establishment for the purpose of utilizing the flesh of the Animals slaughtered there in large quantities for their hides and tallow only.

[78]Justus von Liebig published his findings on *Extractum Carnis* in the journal *Annalen der Chemie und Pharmacie* in 1847. The 'Essence of Meat' was available in Munich pharmacies from the early 1850s.

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Previous to undertaking this Enterprize M. Giebert visited Munich and learnt the process laid down by Professor Liebig for reducing the flesh to a pure and unadulterated Essence.

Professor Liebig has only lately received the first results of M. Gieberts undertaking, which he pronounces to be a perfect success. He received lately a case of 80. lbs. of the Essence of Beef and a smaller quantity of the Essence of Mutton, the produce of Animals slaughtered in September last, and he is advertised that M. Giebert will forward a supply of 5000 lbs. to arrive in Europe about December, and that he calculated after that period on being able to transmit regularly the same quantity monthly.

Professor Liebig has promised M. Giebert to give the support of his name to the Essence of Meat forwarded by him to Europe provided that he would engage to furnish it at a price not exceeding 5. Florins per lb – (or about 7 s. 3 d. the present cost of the same at Munich being 32 s.) – and provided also that he should previously be enabled to analyse and guarantee the purity of the Essence.

Professor Liebig is perfectly confident of the success of the undertaking as far as the Essence itself and its durability are concerned, but he appears to fear that when once made known, the demand will be greater than the supply and that consequently competition may raise the price of the article – thereby diminishing the great Value of the undertaking as a boon to humanity – and also that thro' competition, adulteration may take place, and that it may thus be rendered less nutritious and efficacious for the purposes desired.

I have the Honor to enclose to Your Lordship a printed statement drawn up under the sanction of Professor Liebig, detailing the circumstances which have led to the Enterprize in question, and the great results which are likely to assume from it.[79]

I further annex copy of a Letter which I have received from Professor Liebig, forwarding to me the accompanying Samples of Essence of Beef and Mutton, and strongly recommending the rise of this Essence for the army and navy.

In Venturing to bring this subject under Your Lordships notice I have a double object in view: namely,

1. To suggest that this article of food, when duly tested and proved may be of great value both in a sanitary and in an economic sense, if introduced for the use of the Army, Navy, Public Hospitals and other institutions.

[79]Enclosures not included in FO 9/165.

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2. To suggest that if proved to be efficacious, a similar system might be introduced into Australia where the flesh of thousands of sheep, now worthless, might be turned to an useful profit.

FO 9/169: Lord Augustus Loftus to Earl of Clarendon, No 14, Munich, 12 December 1865

Violent press and public opposition to the Royal Private Chancellery and Pfistermeister; Wagner's influence over the king

A series of violent articles has been lately published in the Columns of a daily Munich Journal called the "Neueste Nachrichten", a Paper which is the Organ of the Democratic Party, and very largely circulated, and read, among the lower classes in Bavaria. These Articles contain strong invectives against the Private Chancellerie of the King, and are more especially levelled against Monsieur de Pfistermeister, who, as His Majesty's Private Secretary is the Chief of that Department.[80]

They allege that the existence of the Kings Private Chancellerie is unconstitutional, and that it places irresponsible Servants of the Crown in a position of exercising undue influence over the Sovereign. They complain that by this organisation the responsible Ministers of the Crown are placed in a secondary position, and that in consequence of the Affairs of State having to pass through the hands of the Private Secretary before being submitted to the Sovereign, a wide scope is given to the Exercise of Secret influences, apart from Ministerial responsibility, and which may prove baneful to the principles of Constitutional Government.

In support of these arguments they assert that the Ministerial changes involving the retirement from office of Monsieur de Mulzer, the late Minister of Justice, and of Monsieur de Neumayer, the late Minister of the Interior, were brought about conjointly by the influence of Monsieur de Pfistermeister and the Private Chancellerie of the King under reactionary motives, and they deduce from these circumstances future consequences which may greatly endanger the welfare of Constitutional Government, and the maintenance of the Liberties of the Subject.

It is impossible to contest validity of the maxims which are thus plausibly put forth to conceal the real motives by which the Party in question is actuated, but in the present instance the inconveniences and even the dangers referred to are more imaginary than real. No law

[80] An anonymous article (dated 28 November) in the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* (established 1848) of 29 November played a key role in the controversy.

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or ordinance in Bavaria can be published by the King or become legal without the countersignature of a Member of the Cabinet, and this would apparently offer a sufficient safeguard against any infringement of the Constitution, or of the Liberties of the People by the Crown.

Some time ago when referring to the Private Chancellerie of the King, Baron von der Pfordten took the occasion to remark to me that it was impossible that the Ministers could severally lay before the King every document requiring His signature. It was therefore a matter of absolute necessity that there should be a channel through which they should reach His Majesty and the King's Private Secretary was the most appropriate and natural channel for their submission to His Majesty.

Moreover Baron von der Pfordten observed, that Monsieur de Pfistermeister of whom he spoke in terms of eulogy – was a Councillor of State, and as such was clothed with the character of a responsible Servant of the Crown. He had been for many years Private Secretary to the late King, and bore a reputation of irreproachable integrity. Baron von der Pfordten likewise observed that on no single occasion had His Majesty rejected any proposal or suggestion which in his capacity as a Minister of State he had tendered to Him.

But whatever views or opinions on public grounds are entertained by the Party who have initiated these attacks against the Private Chancellerie of the King, it is obvious that there are other causes of a personal and an interested nature which have dictated their acerbity against Monsieur de Pfistermeister. For some time past the Public in this Capital, and generally in Bavaria – have been much moved by the favors lavished by the King on Monsieur Wagner[81] – a musical composer of loose and eccentric character – who by fostering the highly poetic and fantastic temperament of the King succeeded in acquiring a very great influence over His Majesty.

It is further generally known that of late Monsieur de Pfistermeister had made himself obnoxious to Monsieur Wagner. This personage whose chief notoriety consists in his eccentric musical compositions, and expensive tastes, obtained such an ascendancy over the young Sovereign that he managed to extract at various times from His Majesty very large sums of money to nourish his spendthrift habits. Monsieur de Pfistermeister, it appears with a conscientiousness which does him honor, repeatedly remonstrated with the King, and endeavored to dissuade Him from this lavish expenditure – counselling Him at the same time against the wily artifices of this unscrupulous

[81]The 'favours' included annual stipends, payments for composing parts of *Der Ring des Nibelungen*, free occupancy of a house, and gifts from the royal treasury.

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musician. He has done so at the risk of losing his Post and the favor of His Majesty.

Monsieur Wagner, and his associates (who for other political motives had joined with him) have sought through the means of the Journal to which I have referred, to discredit the private Chancellerie of the King, hoping by these means to be relieved of the opposition of Monsieur de Pfistermeister, and to acquire a more complete hold over the King.

In consequence of these articles, Monsieur de Pfistermeister judged it necessary to address a Letter to the Public Press[82] refuting the charges brought against him as false and calumnious, but the language of his Letter was vague, and little suited to assuage the storm which his adversaries had raised against him. If the defence of the Private Chancellerie of the King had been deemed necessary, it should have emanated from a responsible official source for it does not seem judicious on the part of Monsieur de Pfistermeister in his position as Private Secretary to the King, to have descended into the Public arena to defend himself personally against charges which had been levelled more against the department of which he was the Chief, than personally against himself.

Be that as it may, the effect of Monsieur de Pfistermeister's Letter was rather to add fuel to the flame than to tend to extinguish it. This warfare at last began to assume larger proportions, and to cause considerable sensation here among all classes. The Public, discontented with the persons who had gathered around the King and deeply incensed against Monsieur Wagner, got up an address to Monsieur de Pfistermeister,[83] which was signed by above 800 of the Citizens of Munich, praying him to retain his Post, and not to be discouraged by the attacks levelled against him. Up to this period no notice had been taken of this conflict in the official organs of the Press. But on the day following the King's return to Munich, a strange notification of the dismissal of Monsieur Wagner was inserted in the Bavarian Gazette (of which I enclose to Your Lordship herewith a copy in original with a Translation in French.)[84]

I am informed that Prince Charles of Bavaria immediately on the King's arrival, made a serious representation to the King on the state of the Public feeling and exasperation against Monsieur Wagner, and plainly told His Majesty that His choice lay between dismissing Monsieur Wagner or risking His Throne.

[82]Public statement by Pfistermeister in the *Bayerische Zeitung* of 30 November 1865.

[83]Address of 4 December 1865.

[84]Enclosure: extract from *Bayerische Zeitung*, 7 December 1865 (original and French translation). It was announced that Wagner would leave the country for a few months.

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At 2 o'clock on the morning after His arrival, His Majesty addressed a Letter to Baron von der Pfordten announcing His decision to send away Monsieur Wagner. In notifying this decision the King made use of the following emphatic phrase "I will prove to my beloved People that I esteem above all things their confidence and love."

By the same Messenger[85] the King sent a Letter to Monsieur Wagner expressing His wish that he should leave Bavaria forthwith. In obedience to these commands, Monsieur Wagner has taken his departure for Geneva to the great joy of all classes of His Majesty's Subjects.

This act of acquiescence with the Popular wish has been well received by the Public, and it is hoped that all excitement and irritation caused by this untoward affair will now be allayed.

FO 9/173: Henry Francis Howard to Earl of Clarendon, Most Confidential, No 9, Munich, 10 March 1866

Agreement between Saxony and Bavaria on joint policy in event of Austro-Prussian hostilities

I understand that the result of a correspondence which has lately taken place between the Bavarian and Saxon Governments and in which Baron von der Pfordten took the iniative [*sic*] has been an agreement between those two Governments that they shall take their stand, as regards a conflict between Austria and Prussia, on the Federal Law, that if Austria should bring the case of a Prussian aggression against Her before the German Diet, and should give such explanations as showed that She is disposed to support Federal Right in the settlement of the Schleswig Holstein Question, they should, as in duty bound support Her, but that, if Austria should engage in a war, without reference to the Diet, and independently of Federal Right, they should remain neutral. I have reason to believe that Monsieur von der Pfordten had proposed that, in the latter contingency, the two Governments should retain their liberty of action, but that Baron Beust (for reasons that are obvious)[86] expressed the opinion that they should decide upon remaining neutral – a view to which Baron von der Pfordten has associated himself.

The attitude to be observed by the Governments of Bavaria and Saxony having been thus defined and agreed upon, it appears that Baron von der Pfordten last night transmitted communications to the Governments of Wurtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau,

[85]Johann Lutz.
[86]Howard alludes to Prussia's pressure on Saxony.

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inviting their concurrence in it.[87] The cooperation of Wurtemberg is, I am told, anticipated. I have not, however, been able to ascertain whether the Governments of Bavaria and Saxony have yet come to a definite agreement upon the attitude they are to assume in case of a majority of the Diet being opposed to taking part in a war in support of Austria.

Baron von der Pfordten, as your Lordship is aware, has hitherto been opposed to the intervention of Foreign Governments in the Schleswig-Holstein Question, which he wished to see treated as a German affair, but I learn that his views have so far undergone a change that he would not now be indisposed to agree to a European Conference taking it in hand, considering that, after a war, it would no doubt be brought before a Conference, and that such being the case, it would be preferable that it should be submitted to a Congress, before than after a war broke out.

I have not received the information contained in this Despatch from Monsieur von der Pfordten, who, on the plea of illness, had countermanded his two last receptions of the Heads of Foreign Missions not having special communications to make to him, but from a source which I consider perfectly reliable.

FO 9/174: Henry Francis Howard to Earl of Clarendon, Confidential, No 92, Munich, 24 May 1866

King Ludwig's neglect of public duties and continued close relationship with Wagner

I regret to state that the mode of life of the young King of Bavaria has again attracted unfavorable notice and caused much dissatisfaction amongst the Public.

His Majesty had been living since the 11th instant in complete seclusion at his Country Residence of Berg on the lake of Starnberg, had abstained, as I have already reported, from assisting at the celebrating of the 50th anniversary of the annexation of the Palatinate to Bavaria,[88] and had recently resisted the wishes of his ministers that He should open in Person the extraordinary Session of the Chambers, when two days ago, it was learnt that he had left Berg on horseback attended by a single groom, for Hohenschongau,[89] without giving

[87]Dispatch of 8 March 1866; identical notes were sent to the governments of Saxony, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau.

[88]These celebrations took place in Kaiserslautern on 6 May 1866. The Palatinate (on the left bank of the Rhine), which had been annexed by France in 1795, became part of Bavaria in 1816.

[89]Hohenschwangau Castle.

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any indication as to his ulterior destination, and it was only through a Telegram received at the office of his private treasury directing money to be sent to him, for it appears that he had taken but ten Florins with him, that it became known that he had proceeded to Lindau on the lake of Constance, where he arrived by railway on the 22nd instant, and whence he immediately, according to further accounts, started for Rorschach in Switzerland.

It had been rumoured some time ago that His Majesty was contemplating a meeting with his favorite Richard Wagner, the musical composer, from whom public indignation had obliged Him reluctantly to part in November last,[90] and who has since been living in Switzerland, and I believe there is no doubt that such is the object of His present Journey. Yesterday evening it was stated that, with this view, he had continued his route to Zürich.

It is needless to say that the fact of His Majesty absenting himself from his Dominions, for however short a time, with such an object, and without notice to his Ministers or others, at so critical a moment as the present, and on the eve of the opening of the Legislative Assembly, has made a very bad impression not only on the public at large but likewise upon the members of the Chambers.

FO 9/174: Henry Francis Howard to Earl of Clarendon, Confidential, No 112, Munich, 5 June 1866

Public and political opinion becoming increasingly pro-Austrian; exasperation at Bismarck's belligerent policy

Public opinion on the great pending question in Germany has undergone recently a considerable change in this Country. A couple of months ago there was believed to be a strong Party favorable to Bavaria maintaining an armed Neutrality in the event of war breaking out between Austria and Prussia. It was in this sense that some of the leaders of the Radical Party in the Bavarian Chamber of Deputies pronounced themselves and voted at the meeting of Deputies of various German Parliaments lately held at Frankfort.[91] But these same Persons, finding on their return home that the great majority, even of their own Party were opposed to their views, have explained them away by stating, in the Committee of the Chamber of Deputies which

[90] See pp. 440–442.

[91] The *Deutsche Abgeordnetentag* was established in September 1862, originating from a private initiative to establish a congress of national liberal parliamentarians from the German states. Its aim was to debate questions of national interest 'in the absence of a German Parliament'. The *Abgeordnetentag* of 1866 was held in Frankfurt on 20 May, with 250 participants.

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has been charged to draw up the address in answer to the King's speech on the opening of the Legislative Session,[92] that they had not intended to advocate Neutrality on the part of Bavaria in the event of Prussia attacking Austria.

The projected address adopted by the majority of the Committee strongly declares itself I understand, like that of the Peers, against Neutrality.[93] It appears that there were even members of the Committee who, on the ground that whether Prussia or Austria made the first attack, Prussia was the real aggressor, proposed the insertion of a clause recommending that Austria should be supported in every case, but that Baron von der Pfordten who attended the Committee in order to explain the Policy of the Government, disadvised such an expression of opinion, being apprehensive lest it should encourage Austria to commence the war, and the idea was accordingly not acted upon.

The discussions in the Chamber on the address will begin on the 7th instant, and there appears little doubt but that the attitude assumed by the Government on the dispute between Austria and Prussia will meet with the approbation of the House.

I should observe that the change in public opinion, which I have referred to at the beginning of this Despatch, may be attributed to the exasperation produced amongst all Classes of Persons in this Country by Count Bismarck's policy leading to civil war, and by the Calamities which it has already brought to the doors of so many families. Thus a feeling has been induced that all Germany must rise up to silence and put down the Perturbator of the Public Peace.

FO 9/176: Henry Francis Howard to Lord Stanley, No 65, Munich, 21 August 1866

Popular assembly at Munich advocating Bavaria's entry into the North German Confederation; division of public opinion on German unity and Bavarian independence

Resolutions, chiefly proceeding from the Democratic Party, have been adopted at popular meetings in various towns of this Kingdom, and more recently at Munich,[94] deprecating a separation of the South

[92] Royal speech from the throne of 27 May 1866.

[93] In its response on 30 May 1866 to the speech from the throne, the *Reichsrath* (first chamber) spoke against Bavarian neutrality. The second chamber followed on 9 June, after two days of debate in the *Addresskommission* (address committee).

[94] On 13 August 1866, a popular assembly in Munich denounced the division of Germany along the Main, and called for the entry of the south German states into the North German Confederation (see n. 136 in Hanover section).

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of Germany from the North and advocating, more or less explicitly, the accession of Bavaria to the North German Confederation under Prussia's leadership.

On the other hand, the following Resolutions, in a contrary senses [*sic*] as far as the second point is concerned, have been proposed by influential persons, principally belonging to the middle classes in this Capital, and are, it is said, receiving numerous signatures from the citizens;

"1 – In the same manner as we consider the separation of Austria from Germany to be a National Misfortune, should we view, in a similar light, the separation of the South from the North.

2 – Under existing circumstances we consider it inexpedient, either in the interest of Bavaria, or of Germany, that we should subordinate ourselves to the North, and thus subscribe to the policy of violence which exists there.

3 – So long as the Union of North and South Germany in a Federal State with a Parliament proceeding from free popular Election, and invested with a decisive vote in all common affairs, is not attainable, we consider it expedient to aim at the formation of a South Western German Confederation on a popular basis, without any privileges for a particular state, but with a common Federal Government and popular Representation, as we entertain the opinion that the union of Germany on a liberal basis will not be thereby impeded, but on the contrary, promoted.

4 – The dissolution of the Zollverein, would injure the North as much as the South; it ought therefore, according to our conviction, not to take place, even if the political union of North and South Germany cannot at present be attained."

I doubt much whether either the resolution passed by the popular Meetings, to which I have first referred, or those initiated by a certain number of the citizens of Munich[95] which I have last specified, can be taken as correctly representing public opinion in this country, which can as yet hardly be formed, considering that neither are the conditions upon which Peace is to be concluded between Bavaria and Prussia, nor those upon which the Northern Confederation is to be established, yet known.

On the one side, the feeling in favour of German unity, and more particularly of a German Parliament for the Whole of Germany, has very numerous partisans in this Country, and the dissatisfaction caused by the failure of the policy of the Government, and by the incapacity,

[95]Statement of the citizens of Munich on 18 August against the resolution of the popular assembly on 13 August.

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which has marked the conduct of the Bavarian Military operations has, no doubt, greatly increased their ranks.

On the other side, there is a strong feeling in favour of Bavarian independence, which will probably gain strength, in proportion as the discontent, to which I have alluded, calms down. Moreover, there will not be the same readiness to make sacrifices for the purpose of joining a Confederation so completely dominated by Prussia as the projected Northern Confederation[96] will evidently be, as there would be for the purpose of belonging to one in which the popular Element, represented by a Parliament with more extensive attributes than those which Count Bismarck is likely to assign to that which figures in his Scheme, would hold a prominent place.

At all events, before a competent opinion can be formed as to the public feeling of the Country, it will be necessary to wait until the Chambers, which are to be very shortly convoked, shall have met, and pronounced themselves upon the policy to be pursued by Bavaria in the present altered state of affairs. Their last act before their prorogation, was to express a strong condemnation of the policy of Prussia, to lay great stress upon the necessity of maintaining the independence of Bavaria, and, if a General Parliament for the whole of Germany could not be attained, to advocate the formation of a South German Parliamentary League.[97]

The policy pursued by Baron von der Pfordten, has been quite in consonance with the expressed wishes of the Chambers. It will be for them to say how far they still wish to uphold the independence of Bavaria. Even Count Bismarck in his recent speech in the Prussian Chambers[98] described the projected constitution of the North German Confederation to be such as to preclude a proposal to join it, being made to such a state as Bavaria.

However, the formation of a South German Confederation appears very problematical, for the reasons I have already given in my previous correspondence, and the tendency to Union in Germany is so decided, that the general impression is, that Bavaria and the South German states will, ere many years are past, see themselves forced to join the Northern Confederation.

[96]The North German Confederation based on the Prussian proposal for federal reform of 10 June 1866 (see n. 117 in Frankfurt section).

[97]Howard refers to the statements by the Bavarian minister president, Ludwig von der Pfordten, and Joseph von Pözl, president of the second chamber, in the sitting of 21 June 1866. The *Landtag* resumed its negotiations on 27 August 1866.

[98]Bismarck's statement to the Address Committee (*Adresskommission*) of the Prussian chambers, 17 August 1866.

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FO 9/176: Henry Francis Howard to Lord Stanley, No 69, Munich, 21 August 1866

Positive attitude of British press towards Bismarck; Prussian annexation of smaller states; observations on Hanover; transformation of Germany and implications for British interests

I observe that an influential portion of the British press but a few months ago could not find sufficiently strong terms of vituperation as applied to Count Bismarck and his policy, or appraise of the conduct and patriotism of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, which persisted in refusing during a series of years, the supplies necessary for that reorganisation of the army to which the extraordinary successes of the Prussian army are mainly due, and moreover, opposed the annexation of the Elbe duchies to Prussia,[99] as something monstrous, whereas after their separation from Denmark it was difficult to deny that it was preferable, in the [*sic*] their interests, to their erection into a semi-dependent state under a nominal Sovereign.

This same Press, now that Success has crowned Count Bismarcks efforts, lauds him immoderately, and not only approves of the annexations, which he has already decreed of Hanover, of the Electorate of Hesse, of Nassau, and of the Free City of Frankfort,[100] of which it so rigorously took the part when the Senate resisted demands on the part of Prussia and Austria inconsistent with the liberal institutions and the independence of a free state,[101] but urges him not to stop short in his career, but to sweep away the independent Existence of the remaining states of Germany including Bavaria, a state of nearly five Millions of inhabitants, which has hitherto been happy and prosperous, and has enjoyed a liberty for which Prussia has been in vain sighing.

In this respect the portion of the English press to which I allude, has proved itself more Bismarckian than he is himself, for he, with more knowledge of the state of Germany, and of the diversities between the North and the South, has been unwilling to undertake, for the present, more than he can manage, and has consequently omitted the South German states from his Confederation,[102] leaving it to time and to the future course of events to bring them into it. Were Prussia to consent to merge into Germany, the South would certainly claim

[99]See n. 119 in Frankfurt section.

[100]In the royal message of 16 August 1866, Wilhelm I announced Prussia's intention to annex Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfurt. The law of 20 September 1866 decreed the complete incorporation of these states into Prussia.

[101]Howard refers to the formal protests by Prussia and Austria on 6 and 8 October 1865, directed against Frankfurt's toleration of the meetings of the *Abgeordnetentag* (see n. 91 in this section) within the city limits on 1 October 1865.

[102]For the North German Confederation see n. 136 in Hanover section.

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not to be excluded from the Confederation she is organizing, but as Count Bismarck and the great Majority of the Prussians demand that Germany should merge in Prussia, a longer period will be required before an amalgamation of North and South can take place.

My object in taking up my pen is not to write up the smaller states. Where they did not exist, I should certainly not have been in favour of creating them, but where they did, I should have preferred to see them die a natural, rather than a violent, death. Moreover I consider it a mistaken notion that the inhabitants of a large state are necessarily happier and more prosperous than those of a small one. The reverse I believe to be frequently the case. Having been six years Her Majesty's Minister at Hanover, I am pretty well acquainted with that Country, and I may safely say that I have never known a richer or more prosperous one. If in some respects it was behind others, the fault lay, I may say, with the population itself in many respects too well off to be stimulated to exertion or to court innovations. It enjoyed, too, a great degree of political liberty, and a constitution which gave it full command over its finances, blessing practically with held [*sic*] from the Prussians. I do not say that dissatisfaction has not been at various epochs felt with the system of Government, and with the choice made by the King of his Ministers; but I maintain that there was no deep rooted cause for discontent, nor any which could not be easily removed by the action of the Constitution and of the press, to which great latitude was granted.

I will not deny that Hanover will derive advantages from belonging to a great power, and that in a few years, as Count Bismarck remarked the other day in the Prussian Chambers,[103] her population will become reconciled to the change, although some time will be required to counterbalance the benefits which she has hitherto enjoyed, of a light conscription, hardly felt by the Country and of a taxation less, I believe, by half, than that which now presses upon the Prussian people, but which is to be raised in the annexed countries, in order to alleviate the latter.

I may perhaps be also permitted to express some regrets at seeing an ancient dynasty, from which Our Own Gracious Sovereign, under Whose beneficent Reign we Englishmen have enjoyed an unparalleled degree of liberty and prosperity, is sprung, effaced from the list of Sovereigns, and a young Prince of much promise, like the Crown Prince of Hanover,[104] reduced, without any fault of his own, to a most humiliating position.

[103]Howard is probably referring to Bismarck's remarks following the royal message on 17 August 1866 concerning the annexation of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfurt.
[104]Ernst August.

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Looking at the Question of Prussian Annexations from a higher point of view, that is to say from their bearing upon British interests, the aggrandizement of Prussia ought, in principle, to be viewed with satisfaction as creating a strong Power in the Centre of Europe, the natural ally of Great Britain from a community of interests, of Religion, and, to a great extent, of race, and calculated to form a barrier against the ambition of France on the one side and of Russia on the other: but, I may ask, can we see it with unmixed satisfaction when it is coupled with the enfeeblement of Austria, which some day or other may be completed by the severance of her German Provinces, and by the disruption of Germany, and when we reflect, from the past conduct of Prussia, that we have no security against Her not allying Herself with Russia, and with France even, or at all events conniving in a policy in the East detrimental to our interests? Who knows whether at this present moment Russia has not been induced to remain a passive spectator of the subversion in the West of Principles to which she has always clung, by the prospect held out to Her of having full liberty of action left to Her in the East, when the time for the solution of that momentous Question arises?

These forebodings may not, and I hope will not, be realised, and the present transformation of Germany may only be the commencement of what the Germans term a great future for the Common Fatherland, but considering the labour which the reconstruction of Germany will require, and the prospect, sooner or later, of a bloody conflict between Her and France, I cannot look to the more immediate future with that optimism and confidence with which a great portion of the British press, which generally represents the public opinion of the moment, has been so suddenly seized.

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