Afterword: War Play

DIANA TAYLOR

In memory of Augusto Boal (1931–2009),
friend and mentor, who taught many of us the seriousness of play

ON 27 FEBRUARY 2009, THE ESSAYS FOR THIS *PMLA* ISSUE ON WAR were coming in, against a background of various wars. The Iraq War had claimed over 100,000 civilian lives. The newly elected Obama administration vowed to amp up efforts in Afghanistan. The rubble in Gaza still smoldered from the recent Israeli attacks. The ongoing conflict in Darfur had already left 300,000 people dead, not to mention the 2.5 million displaced. When President George W. Bush left office, his boundless war on terror had exacted more lives, money, civil-liberty concessions, and international goodwill than one could even begin to tally. These were just the newsworthy wars that happened to be featured that month in the *New York Times*. Other, "low-intensity" wars—the devastating fighting in East Congo, the ongoing Zapatista uprising, Colombia's fifty-year-old armed conflict, Sri Lanka's civil war, and similar struggles—simmered on the back burner. The topic of war seemed as urgent that February morning as it had two years earlier, when the editors proposed this special issue. Ironically, that morning's *Times* showcased "Weekend at War" in its Escapes section (Sokol). The oversize image showed a crowded ballroom full of happy dancers in World War II outfits swinging to a big band orchestra—the uniforms, insignia, hats, hairdos all conjured up another time. The caption read, "It's winter 2009, but for hundreds of reenactors, it's December 1944 at the Battle of the Bulge."

War as escape? War as a tourist destination? The article goes on to document some of the aspects of this particular event, though much of what it says holds for other war reenactments, now a major pastime

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and industry in the United States and elsewhere. Reenactments can attract as many as twenty thousand participants and witnesses. Authenticity is important. Participants go to great lengths to research and acquire the real uniforms and accoutrements.[1] Anachronistic props or breaking character can spoil the as-if 1940s photographics. Why do players expose themselves to terrible food, weather, and living conditions to enact war? Why is the *doing* so important? Participants ("living historians") see reenactment as a way of understanding history. For veterans of real battles, reliving can mean remembering, although some experience traumatic flashbacks. For young people who grew up on video war games, it provides a way of physically placing their bodies in the scenario. "You're kind of at odds with your head," one participant said. "You know you're not going to die, but your body keeps telling you different." Reenactments are "fun," adventurous, and participants get to play both sides—the Axis and the Allies, in this case—though they "leave the politics at home." Instead of playing Nazis, reenactors play Germans: "Underneath [the] uniforms, 'we're Americans, and we believe in our country. . . . We are glad our country came out victorious'" (Sokol). The pretend *them* produces the cohesive, patriotic *we*. Reenactment, then, works as remembering and forgetting. As participants reenact the good war, they can forget the bad—from Auschwitz to Hiroshima to Iraq.

"Weekend at War" is not an isolated example of how scenarios involving embodied practices such as role-playing, reenactment, simulation, and other practices and frameworks associated with theater and performance contribute to envisioning, rehearsing, enacting, and memorializing warfare. Reenactments re-create the past; other performance modes, such as simulation, rehearse the future. Theater immersion, for example, is a simulation technique that the United States military has increasingly used to train troops before deploying them to battle. Fort Irwin, a military base in the Mojave Desert the size of Rhode Island, currently boasts eleven mock Iraqi villages (the Sandbox), where soldiers rehearse war strategies before heading out to Iraq (the real Sandbox).[2] Arab Americans and professional actors earn twenty dollars an hour to play the Iraqi enemy. Homeless people from nearby towns "are dressed in costume, coached to speak three anti-American phrases in Arabic, and inserted in key moments into the simulation" (Magelssen 63). Playwrights devise the plots, composed of episodic and interchangeable acts featuring car bombings, beheadings, and suicide bombers. The controller-observers literally call the shots governing fair play and determining if a soldier has been killed or wounded. Faux reporters cover and broadcast the news in pretend outlets modeled on CNN and Al Jazeera. "Nonplayers," such as observers, remain "invisible in the simulation" (57). Three hundred fifty Arabic-speaking Iraqi Americans live there most of the year to play the role of Sunnis and Shiites. "The insurgents even get acting lessons, coached by Carl Weathers" from the *Rocky* films (Filkins and Burns). As in the reenactments, here too the performance involves cultural impersonation: Christians play Muslims, United States citizens pretend to be Iraqi. All actors playing the enemy are pro-American and want to remain anonymous to protect family members back in Iraq. Actors need to stick to their scripts, even under interrogation. And while soldiers are taught about hearts-and-minds diplomacy, they can speak with the Iraqis only through translators. Trained to be hypervigilant and suspicious, they can never let down their guard. "The lesson for American soldiers," a *New York Times* article states, is clear: "never trust any Iraqis, no matter how friendly they seem." The playlike quality of war simulations does not hide their real effects:

> With actors and stuntmen on loan from Hollywood, American generals have recast the training ground at Fort Irwin so effectively

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> as a simulation of conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 20 months that some soldiers have left with battle fatigue and others have had their orders for deployment to the war zones canceled. In at least one case, a soldier's career was ended for unnecessarily "killing" civilians. (Filkins and Burns)

To date, 1.2 million soldiers have trained at Fort Irwin.

War cannot be conceptualized without theater models (reenactments, simulations) and metaphors that prepare politicians, soldiers, and the various publics to imagine, rehearse, and participate in militarism. As a theater and performance studies scholar, I am troubled by the largely unexamined ways in which the tools of my field contribute to waging war. Other academics included in this issue express similar concerns in regard to their areas of expertise—language instruction, pedagogy, visual culture, history, and so forth. If the various pronouncements by professional associations (anthropology, medicine, psychiatry, journalism) are any indication, we are not alone in worrying about how our fields collude with militarism.[3]

The phrases *theater of war* and *theater of operations* have been used since the Napoleonic Wars by thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz and Henri de Jomini to refer to the entire bellicose enterprise and to discrete areas of engagement, respectively. While Clausewitz stressed the importance of understanding the human and social conditions underlying conflict and the value of diplomacy in resolving it, Jomini emphasized military and strategic superiority. These two models for enacting war have vied for supremacy to this day, each staging a different theater of engagement and rehearsing very different denouements.[4]

But theater and performance enable war beyond the conceptualization of territories and strategies. War thinking takes place within theatrical as-if conventions and rules. How war makers and peacekeepers imagine war often depends on paradigms such as scenarios (Latin *scaenarium* 'place for erecting stages,' from *scaena* 'stage') and scenario thinking ("Scenario," *Merriam-Webster*). *Scenario* is originally a theater term associated with commedia dell'arte. As in war reenactments and simulations, commedia dell'arte players followed "an outline of entrances, exits, and action describing the plot of a play that was literally pinned to the back of the scenery" ("Scenario," *Wikipedia*). The performance created its audience, the *you* and *we* it both addressed and forged. Improvisation allowed for variations and surprises. Contemporary events could easily be folded into the loosely structured plot, allowing actors to adapt to audience responses, which in turn helped shape the drama. While actors could test the limits of the scenario by suggesting alternative possibilities and outcomes, at the end of the play they returned to the conventional endings and reinforced the assumed worldview. The usefulness of the term *scenario* far outreaches its sixteenth-century origins. A *Google* search in early 2009 turned up 54,400,000 entries, encompassing military scenarios, scenario planning, worst-case scenarios, and survival exercise scenarios. Few of the entries had anything to do with formal theater.

Scenarios, as frameworks for thinking, have become the privileged site for modeling a wide range of practices, from theatrical as-if simulations of catastrophic events such as nuclear war to hypothetical what-if setups such as a ticking bomb to acts of torture ("scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent" [Lukes 5])[5] to scenarios that aim to heal victims by working through trauma (simulations such as *Virtual Iraq* help veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder [Halpern]) to conflict-resolution preparation, such as *Virtual Peace*, which trains peacekeepers in an "immersive, multi-sensory game-based environment that simulates real disaster relief and conflict resolution." The basic idea—that people learn, experience, and come to terms with

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past and future behaviors by physically doing them, trying them on, acting them through, and acting them out—is the theory of ritual, older than Aristotle's theory of mimesis and as new as theories of mirror neurons, which explore how empathy and understandings of human relationality and intersubjectivity are vital for human survival (see Gallese). Yet the ways in which scenarios have increasingly been used to override people's survival instincts, disavow intersubjectivity, and create, blind, and exclude audiences put us all at risk. Quite simply, our scenarios are killing us.

Scenarios, of course, are not necessarily good or bad; they are culturally specific meaning-making paradigms that account for embodied practice and gestures, attitude, and tone not reducible to language. Reenactments and simulations show the many things that people learn by putting bodies in the frame. Not only do soldiers learn by doing but also Clausewitzians base decisions on multiple human variables, on what they perceive as the motivation, disposition, character, past behaviors, and present conditions of other forces or players. When evaluating the enemy, they put themselves in the enemy's (imagined) place: so and so will do or say the following. Empathy here is used to undermine rather than understand another. Participants read gestures and signs for affect (will the enemy tough it out?), even as they rehearse face-saving maneuvers. The physical presence of the actor, moreover, helps make evident the many logistical, tactical, and ethical issues surrounding the soldier's body. But even when the body remains in the scenario, it is often thought of as a thing, a cog in the wheel, "the war machine's software" (De Landa 18). The obvious though often overlooked fact that real people enacting war scenarios have all the strengths and limitations of human beings becomes even more of an issue in Jominian scenarios. Human beings cannot be trusted to make strategic decisions that override their survival instincts: "in exercise after exercise . . . [h]umans participating in battle situations refused to cross the nuclear threshold" and were replaced by automata, a series of Sams and Ivans, born of the cold war (102–03). What is so shocking about both variations, the Clausewitzian and the Jominian, is that the human body becomes a thing that needs to be managed and, if necessary, removed. Increasingly, the ways bodies are used in war strategizing, gaming, and simulations target embodiment itself as human beings give way to avatars and robots.

These war scenarios are illuminating for many reasons. They reveal that the action takes place in several arenas at once: war planners may write heroic scripts far from the Sandbox while soldiers, as surrogates, fight in pretend and real militarized zones. The action creates the we (protagonists) who coalesce in the face of the them (antagonists)—the nameable enemy, "the reliable enemy" in Allen Feldman's essay. They also aim to create audiences who need to find the performance convincing, whether it's the civilians in the hearts-and-minds show, those watching the newscast back home, or the enemy who needs to know that we mean business. The more persuasive the scenarios put forth, the more likely participants will buy into them as a viable way of making sense of the world. As in commedia dell'arte, scenarios often end up affirming the conventional ending and the given worldview.

While scenarios have long been around, scenario thinking, the staging of the *what-if* for strategic purposes, is relatively new—post–World War II. Some claim scenario thinking is a child of the information age, a form of analysis that supplants the strategies associated with the industrial age (Klinec). Instead of case studies that use empirical evidence from past practices to provide qualitative and quantitative information and predict new outcomes, scenario thinking incorporates war games, simulations, and other activities to imagine future outcomes. As Sherry Turkle writes, "Twenty years ago,

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designers and scientists talked about simulations as though they faced a choice about using them. These days, there is no pretense of choice" (71). While not predictive in function, scenario thinking tempts participants to extrapolate that what might be will be. Imagining unprecedented war, the total nuclear war envisioned since World War II, these commentators say, cannot draw on past practice. As Tracy Davis, a performance studies scholar, shows, the cold war's "duck and cover" enactments made sure that the population participated in the imaginings (2). The new, terrified we come into being through these rehearsals of futures we hope will never happen. The move from analyzing the past to restaging the future is part of a larger cultural move. Andreas Huyssen notes that while the "enlightened notion that one can learn from history has been so violently disproved both at the social and the political level . . . the desire for narratives of the past, for re-creations, re-readings, re-productions, seems boundless at every level of our culture" (5). We mine the past more for affect than for knowledge.

So rather than turn to past practice, scenarios encourage participants to literally walk into their cultural representations and inhabit them, as if. The "serious games" that train the military succeed in their pedagogical function. The retention level produced by doing, "which includes realistic, interactive simulations . . . generates a 75 percent retention rate" as opposed to five percent for lectures with *PowerPoint* and ten percent for reading (Jeanne Meister, qtd. in Testa). By physically and virtually inhabiting the scenarios, people internalize them; the scenarios become us.[6] They expand imaginings of the possible and of the admissible. Participants are encouraged to engage actively, casting themselves as protagonists preparing for the worst or saving the world from ticking bombs. Scenarios work as meaning-making systems not because they are verifiable but because they are emotionally compelling. The more powerful the war play, the more it can obfuscate the limits of scenario thinking.

The limits are many. One can only prepare for things one already imagines, so scenarios tend to reinforce certain ways of envisioning conflict and resolution. The "unknown unknowns," as Donald Rumsfeld put it ("DoD News Briefing"), will continue to elude strategists. The past performs the future. The assumptions that underline scenario thinking presuppose agreement, so participants are trapped in a tautological circle in which the assumptions about who they are and what they are doing are not examined. Scenarios are only as good as the people who conceptualize and perform them—the privileged subjectivity created by the scenario itself. Because planners do not involve members of the opposing side in the enactment, the enemy is always one of us—an extension of our fears and fantasies, which nonetheless have perilous implications for others. Instead of engaging in meaningful dialogue with people with other viewpoints or from other places, we thus create the conflict in our own image. And while scenarios have no predictive value—there are simply too many variables—they do influence outcomes. The Californian Sandbox exercises affect the real conflict in Iraq, since the options are delimited from the start. The rebuilding of Iraq—politically, economically, and architecturally—is also a simulation in its own way of the United States imaginary, the evacuation of what was. So simulation produces the new real. Finally, scenarios function as the framework in which thinking takes place. They simultaneously prepare populations for and blind them to what is going on. One might go so far as to suggest that they are what's going on. They reveal cultural imaginaries, ways societies organize and envision themselves, the nature and possible denouements of societies' conflicts.[7]

Looking at scenarios historically reveals what they themselves cannot, the ways in which the staging of conflict reflects domi-

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nant worldviews. At times, war seems to meld seamlessly with performance. Before the Spanish conquest of Mexico in 1521, the Mexica engaged in various kinds of warfare, the flower wars (*xochiyaoyotl*) being the most ritualized and theatrical, enacted in special, predetermined locations with clear rules, frameworks, and outcomes. Flower wars were useful and entertaining, as Fray Diego Durán, a sixteenth-century friar, wrote in *The History of the Indies of New Spain*. They "had as [their] purpose recreation for the army . . . and pleasure and food for the gods" (402). Their very real consequences—the death and capture of some of the participants—acquired meaning within the logic of the same framework. Those killed were thought to have died a "happy and fortunate death," says Durán, for "this type of death was considered blessed, was considered magnificent" (437).[8] Here too the scenario assumes an agreement that would have to be proved. After the conquest, warfare as theater and theater as warfare continued for the purposes of conversion. As Fray Toribio Motolinía reports, in 1539 the town of Tlaxcala staged the play "La conquista de Jerusalén" 'Conquest of Jerusalem' by building elaborate towers and battlements ("all very realistic"), on an enormous plain large enough to accommodate "a great many people," including representatives of the Spanish viceroyalty (110). The battles were complex and confusing. Conquered Amerindians dressed up and played the roles of the various armies: the Spanish army, the army of New Spain, and the sultan's army that defended the besieged Jerusalem. Motolinía notes, "There was little difference of costume between them, for as the Indians have never seen them and do not know about the differences, they pay no attention to them" (111). At the end of the performed siege, the "Moors" predictably acknowledged the supremacy of the Christian belief system; the sultan knelt before the emperor, who "led him before the Most Blessed Sacrament, where the Pope was. . . . The Sultan brought with him many Turks (these were adult Indians whom they had planned to have baptized)" (117). Thus, the pretend pope accepts the pretend Turks from the pretend sultan and emperor and proceeds to actually baptize them. So the war play ends. The role of performance was so powerful in making the conquered physically enact the ideology of their conquerors that, in María Sten's terms, "theater was for the spiritual conquest of Mexico what horses and gunpowder were for the military conquest" (14; my trans.).

While it seems difficult to imagine a universe in which militarism, ideology, and theatricality are as tightly intertwined as they were in the Mesoamerican one, the United States military-industrial-entertainment complex certainly gives a sense of the collapsed borders between war and performance. To judge from recent politics and media coverage in the United States, war might be as central to the country's sense of self as it was to the Mexica's. For the Mexica, war was literally a way of life because their sun god, Huitzilopochtli, needed constant human sacrifice to fortify him in his daily struggle against the stars. For those of us living in the United States, war is also a way of life. The we fashioned by the scenario have declared war on everything: Operation Infinite War. Telling, too, is the continuous loop among war, politics, and entertainment. The film *Top Gun* (1986), starring Tom Cruise, was named after a Navy program, which funded it to raise enrollments. It was so spectacularly successful that the Navy set up recruitment booths at movie theaters (Halter xix). The film also fed back into politics, setting the stage for Bush's Mission Accomplished act in 2003. As in conversion theater, conversion play interpellates participants in current war efforts. Some popular video games today, such as *America's Army*, are funded by the military and include training models that actually prepare participants for engagement.[9] Players can enlist at the end by clicking on a button. Artistic imaginings enacted through scenarios

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and war games not only anticipate war policies, they are war policy (Gray). They have enduring legal effects. Bush's administration, for example, perfected scenario politics, basing decisions on ticking-bomb legal memos.[10]

And war seeps back into aesthetic frameworks. *Avant-garde* is originally a military term, meaning the advanced guard of an army. *Rendition* referred to surrender before it meant performance. Now *rendition* is synonymous with dark sites and criminal warfare. The blurring of boundaries between militarism and play, and between scenarios and the real, allows the performance of power to reach very different audiences. The media ensure that militarism reaches their own theater of operations—public opinion. *Counterinsurgency*, the 2006 field manual (FM3-24) put out by the United States Army and Marine Corps, makes it clear in the first paragraph of the introduction: enemies of the United States cannot confront its military with conventional weapons; the military is too powerful. So "they try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support. Defeating such enemies presents a huge challenge" (ix). The "decisive battle," as one commentator put it, "may take place, not in the streets of Baghdad, but in the living rooms of America."[11] We, the imagined audience, are the target; our resolve is the weak link.[12]

The media engulf the viewing public in war, ensuring that we, like the journalists, go along for the ride. Embedded with the United States military forces, the top journalists in the country covered the invasion of Iraq from the scope of a rifle. NBC News published *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Twenty-Two Historic Days in Words and Pictures*, with a foreword and DVD narration by Tom Brokaw, which illustrates the degree to which journalists produced, rather than covered, the excitement of the first weeks. Reporters, Tom Brokaw explains, "were sent to military training schools to learn the rudiments of survival in combat," and NBC "assembled a team of retired high-ranking military specialists from all branches of the services to serve as consultants and expert commentators" (ix). In live newscasts, included in the DVD, journalists gushed over the "unprecedented access," the broadcast quality of the images beamed from the desert, the brilliantly choreographed air strikes that shone "like 4th of July fireworks." "It looked great." Technology, war, and entertainment melded together—"just like an action movie, but this is real." The NBC shock-and-awe story ended on a triumphalist note: "Certainly, it is evident that not many voices—pro- or anti-war—have been raised to dispute Vice President Cheney when he said, 'The conclusion of the war will mark one of the most extraordinary military campaigns ever conducted'" (224–25).

In this fictional report, viewers are reassured that the deadly accuracy of the military blasts spared civilians. Technology allows the bodies to disappear: the bodies of the soldiers firing the deadly shots and the bodies of the victims on the ground. The bodies of dead United States soldiers come back under a cover of secrecy; under Bush, no photographs of their bodies or coffins were allowed. The bodies of all the dissenters were erased from the frame. No bodies, no problem. The public's role as nonseeing audience was prescripted. Nonplayers needed to remain invisible. Good audiences were told to stay in their seats, suspend disbelief, and applaud. Percepticide, I've called this in relation to the "dirty war" in Argentina: "Spectacles of violence rendered the population silent, deaf, and blind. . . . [T]he population as a whole was the intended target. . . . People had to deny what they saw and, by turning away, collude with the violence around them" (*Disappearing Acts* 122–23). The uneasy silence produced by military dictatorship prompted my earlier thinking about percepticide, but the current shock-and-awe show in Iraq positioned the spectators as a unified audience, assuming a

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level of consensus that needed to be proved, allowing the newly created us to believe that cool technology didn't kill people, that the violence was not for real—and, besides, it kept us safe. It made us complicit, blind to the price of belonging, insensitive to the violent inclusions and exclusions that went into the production of the we.

The invasion of Iraq positioned members of Bush's administration as truly radical performance artists, who broke all conventions to rave reviews. The theater of operations reflects the move from Bush's performative declaration of war, which sought to create a community of consent, to the animative, the way that human beings in the United States continue to live it on the ground. Albeit in different ways, we are all required to participate in the scenario, to undergo ritual acts of surveillance by showing our IDs, submitting to searches, taking off our shoes, reacting to color-coded alerts, and having our phones tapped. We perform terror every day; we incorporate it. Still, the barrage of homeland security signs—"If You See Something, Say Something"—caution that we are also being co-opted into a widespread surveillance system, where we are asked to be vigilant, to call out the enemy. The scenario is no less powerful for Muslims or undocumented workers, who know themselves to be the pretext and the prey. There is no neutral place, no nonwar. The politics of fear governs the willing and the unwilling.

But the enemy, I think, are these disempowering scenarios themselves. They are powerful not because they are true or predictive but because people internalize and reproduce them in various ways. But rather than engage the what-ifs, commentators might productively examine scenarios for what they say about social fears, about ways of envisioning and addressing conflict, and about how even resistant audiences collude, however inadvertently, with these imaginings. Media studies, literature, performance, theater, and visual studies help people debunk these stagings and complicate notions of cohesive audiences. Stephen Colbert, one of the most seriously playful commentators of our time, uses humor and a fog machine to expose the ways fearmongers stage scenarios of the "hypothetical death of all we love" and remind us "we are not looking for solutions." He welcomes viewers into his Doom Bunker, a parody of Glenn Beck's War Room on Fox, to work through several impossible scenarios. "This is never going to happen," he prefaces. "What do we do?" To heighten the fear, he calls for "more fog!" (*Colbert Report*).

Scenarios can rehearse other worldviews. Ordinary people can take them back, as Augusto Boal tried, to envision more liberating outcomes. Whereas military scenarios require participants who follow scripts, Boal developed the "theatre of the oppressed," in which everyone became the writer, director, and actor in his or her own drama. Various exercises focus on envisioning and rehearsing positive social change. "Image theatre," for example, allows people to stage the "actual image" of what is, the "ideal image" of the desired outcome, and the "transitional image" that allows them to get there (135). Here too the images will prove only as good as the participants, but Boal's work trains participants to be active *spect-actors*, who help correct, analyze, and compose the images. Theater, he reminds us, "is a weapon. A very efficient weapon. For this reason one must fight for it" (ix).

Like Boal, others contest the disempowering and potentially fatal scenarios of power by bringing back the element of play, but differently. Theater and performance models have blinded populations to much of what is going on in the name of war; they're all about percepticide and fog machines. But others heighten public awareness and, as Grace Paley showed (see Hirsch's essay in this issue), encourage best behaviors. There are no nonplayers. No one can leave politics out of it. Everyone participates in social dramas, but the better informed the participants, the better

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the outcomes. Rather than allow scenarios to be used as weapons against us, perhaps we need to fight for the ability to see ourselves acting, to recognize how our roles position others, to compose and rehearse different scenarios, and to enact different futures and more liberating denouements.

Notes

1. The Civil War Reenactors Web page urges participants "to be as authentic as possible and wearing a uniform or carrying equipment that is incorrect will ruin your impression" ("So You Want").

2. For a full description of the simulations at Fort Irwin, see Magelssen.

3. The American Anthropological Association condemned Human Terrain Systems—the military program that embedded anthropologists in military teams in Iraq and Afghanistan—even though some argued that the scholars reduced the violence against civilians. The American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association have gone on record against the involvement of physicians and psychologists in torture and so-called enhanced interrogation. In 1985, the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association issued a position statement against torture ("Against Torture: Joint Resolution"). In 2006, the American Psychological Association issued a new resolution against torture ("Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment"). Here too some apologists argued that the physicians were making sure that the torture victims survived their ordeal. The American Historical Association issued "Resolution on United States Government Practices Inimical to the Values of the Historical Profession" in 2007, incensed over the Bush administration's misuse of history. The list goes on. Clearly, war as practice and as political project draws from (and feeds into) the specialists, ideas, imaginings, and workings of our related fields.

4. Manuel De Landa argues that the post–World War II computer-generated scenarios for nuclear war follow the Jominian theory that reduced war to eternal laws and great leaders. The Clausewitz model of war, always linked to negotiation and diplomacy, often falls away in current thinking (see 89–105).

5. This position was argued by Diane Beaver, staff judge advocate for the Defense Department, Oct. 2002.

6. See Myers for a discussion of how scientific models become incorporated and lived by the scientists who create them.

7. I go into a more detailed discussion of torture scenarios, including the ticking-bomb scenario, in "Double Blind."

8. See Hassig for a detailed analysis of Aztec warfare.

9. Halter describes these games.

10. The ticking-bomb scenario underwrites the famous memo by Alberto R. Gonzales to the president, in which he argues that long-standing international and national laws of war could be superseded by this "new kind of war . . . which places a high premium on other factors, such as the ability to move quickly to obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians" (84).

11. The commentator is Thomas R. Mockaitis, an independent analyst who worked on the 2007 Iraq War report published by the United States government (Magelssen 53).

12. *Counterinsurgency* makes explicit that the United States public is a battleground: "the North Vietnamese shifted their focus from defeating U.S. forces in Vietnam to weakening U.S. will at home. These actions expedited U.S. withdrawal and laid the groundwork for the North Vietnamese victory in 1975" (1.8).

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