Index

agent-neutrality, 2, 94–97, 142, 143
agent-relativity, 2, 94–97, 101, 144–145, 150–151, 213, 215
algorithms, *see* strategies to argue for underdetermination
anti-realism
  moral anti-realism, 10, 52–53, 185–186, 196–202, 205–211
  scientific anti-realism, 10, 162–164, 185–190, 196, 202–204
argument from moral underdetermination, *see* skepticism
Audi, Robert, 47, 48, 54, 57

backward-looking account of consequences, *see* constitutive consequences
Baker, Derek, 46, 52–53, 197–198, 208–209
Berker, Selim, 46–51, 208
Bonk, Thomas, 27, 32, 166–167, 174
Bortolotti, Lisa, 17, 169, 171
Boyd, Richard N., 55, 58, 60
Brandt, Richard B., 41, 136
Broome, John, 94, 97, 108, 110, 122
Brown, Campbell, 97, 108–111, 215, 221–222

compelling idea, 133, 140–143, 145, 150–151, 153, 154, 177, 213
completeness condition, 41, 89, 135–137, 172–173
conciliationism, 179–183
consequentialism's compelling idea, *see* compelling idea
consequentializing, 2–5, 9, 57, 71, 89–129, 133–135, 137–148, 150, 152–155, 165–166, 168, 174, 194, 213–215, 217, 219, 221
  recipe to consequentialize, 90–91, 121, 138, 147, 214
constitutive understanding of consequences, 93–95, 97, 117, 118, 215
constructive deonticism, 10, 159, 185–186, 190–211, 221
constructive empiricism, 10, 185–190, 199–200, 203–204
contractualizing, 98, 104, 105, 192
convergence argument, 9, 71, 73, 79–80, 126, 169, 217, 219
  conciliatory interpretation of, 73, 80–84, 221
  Triple Theory interpretation of, 73, 82–85
Crisp, Roger, 76, 128
Cummiskey, David, 76, 128

Dasgupta, Shamik, 50, 194–195
deontic content, 4, 40, 60, 61, 69, 80, 99, 185
deontic equivalence thesis, 91, 106, 166
deontologizing, 2–3, 5, 9, 57, 71, 89–90, 98–107, 111, 113–114, 117–119, 121–126, 128–130, 133–135, 137–148, 152–155, 165, 174, 219
  recipe to deontologize, 90, 104–105, 118, 121, 147
Dietrich, Franz and Christian List, 4, 38–40, 61, 85, 91–112, 165, 212
dirty hands, *see* problem of dirty hands
doctrine of double effect, 102, 106, 139, 214
Douven, Igor, 14, 65, 170
Dreier, James, 90–91, 93–94, 97, 99, 105, 111–117, 121, 135, 141–142, 165–169, 195, 197
Duhem, Pierre, 3, 16–25, 29, 33–34, 65, 130, 152, 161–162, 169

epistemic peers, *see* peer disagreement
evidence transcendence, 180–183
expressivism, *see* metaethical expressivism
extensional equivalence thesis, *see* deontic equivalence thesis
extensionality thesis, 113–114, 117, 166

falsificationism, 19, 152–153, 156
fictionalism
  moral fictionalism, 200–201
  scientific fictionalism, 164, 199–200
Fogal, Daniel and Risberg, Olle, 46, 50–53

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 14:41:24, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.015

Foot, Philippa, 141, 167
Frankena, William, 41, 44–45

gimmickyiness, 105, 121–126
grounding
  metaphysical grounding, 46–48, 50, 194–195
  moral grounding, 46–53, 85–88, 115, 191, 194–195, 197–198, 200, 208

Hare, Richard M., 50, 73, 75–77, 81, 125, 128, 215
Harman, Gilbert, 37, 177
Herman, Barbara, 80, 99–100
holism, *see* strategies to argue for underdetermination
Hooker, Brad, 76, 78, 82, 84, 106, 128, 203, 216, 217
Hurley, Paul, 95, 99–100, 108, 118, 124, 141, 143
hyperintensionality, 48, 49, 86, 88, 195
hypothetico-deductivism, 18–20, 175, 217

independence from axiology, 143–146, 150, 151, 154, 177
instrumentalism, 162, 165, 186, 199

Kantianizing, 104–105, 118
Kukla, André, 27–28, 121–123, 169, 170

La Théorie Physique: Son Object, Sa Structure, *see* Duhem, Pierre
Ladyman, James, 14, 15, 169, 170, 189
Laudan, Larry, 5, 29–30, 33, 133, 134, 174–175
Laudan, Larry and Jarrett Leplin, 28, 123–124
Leibowitz, Uri D., 13, 37, 39, 42–45
List, Christian, *see* Dietrich, Franz and Christian List
logical positivism, 67, 187–189, 197, 220
Louise, Jennie, 97, 101, 108

Maxwell, Grover, 206–207
metaethical expressivism, 52–53, 197–199, 202
metaphor of the mountain, 73, 77, 81, 85
Mill, John Stuart, 73–75, 77, 81, 125, 128, 213–215
Moore, George Edward, 94, 213
moral particularism, 45–46, 106

neutral goodness, *see* agent-neutrality
Norton, John Daniel, 21, 27–28, 33, 126, 148, 175
notational variants view, 3, 15, 28, 112–118, 164–169, 191, 195, 220

Okasha, Samir, 31, 162
On What Matters, 2, 5, 9, 58, 71, 73, 76–88, 125–127, 217

parasitism, 28, 119, 123–126, 162
Parfit, Derek, 2, 4, 9, 41, 58, 71, 73–90, 117, 125–130, 132–133, 135–137, 149–151, 169, 173, 179, 203, 209, 217, 219, 221
peer disagreement, 64, 179–183
Peterson, Martin, 93, 97, 109, 127, 215
Portmore, Douglas W., 4, 15, 41, 91, 93, 97, 102, 104–105, 107–112, 114–116, 118, 124–125, 133, 138, 141–143, 152, 194, 213–215, 217
prima facie duties, 43–45, 102–103, 106, 139, 148, 214
problem of dirty hands, 131–132
Putnam, Hilary, 6, 222

Quine, W. V. O, 3, 14, 17–18, 21–23, 25–26, 30–31, 33–34, 112, 130–132, 152, 161–168

radical disagreements, 3, 15, 26, 49–51, 86–88, 115, 117–119, 129, 134, 164, 169, 171, 173, 219
Rawls, John, 55–56, 59–62, 78, 216–217
realism
  moral realism, 10, 51–53, 87–88, 186, 202–206
  scientific realism, 152, 163–164, 169–171, 187–189, 202–204
reason-based representation of moral theories, *see* Dietrich, Franz and Christian List
reflective equilibrium, 10–56, 59, 125, 216–218
relative goodness, *see* agent-relativity
Rosen, Gideon, 46–51, 185, 186, 189, 199–200
Ross W. D., 43–45, 54, 102–103, 106, 214

Sachs, Benjamin, 100–101, 147
Scanlon, Thomas M., 78–80, 85, 87, 104–105, 136, 149, 216–217
Schroeder, Mark, 96, 126, 141–143, 147, 213
Schroeder, S. Andrew, 90, 107, 112, 114, 116, 144, 165, 177–178
Sen, Amartya, 96–97, 122
Sidgwick, Henry, 76, 179
skepticism
  epistemic challenge, 10, 67, 135, 161, 165–169, 171–173, 196, 197, 220
  moral skepticism, 9–10, 36, 103, 106, 122–123, 137, 159, 165–169, 172–185, 194–196, 198, 202, 204, 206–211, 220
  scientific skepticism, 9, 134, 159–162, 170–171, 173, 175–178, 181, 191, 206–207
  semantic challenge, 10, 67, 135, 161, 165–169, 191, 195, 197, 220
Sklar, Lawrence, 31–32
Stanford, P. Kyle, 15, 17, 24–27, 32, 122, 125, 132, 140, 169

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 14:41:24, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.015

strategies to argue for underdetermination
algorithmic, 9, 26–28, 34, 71, 89, 107, 121–126, 132, 141, 173, 219
holistic, 19, 21–22, 25–27, 34, 130–132
inductive, 24–26, 34, 125–127, 132, 136
Stratton-Lake, Philip, 44, 57, 58
structural analogy, 3–4, 8, 10, 35, 43, 55, 85, 166, 185, 202, 204, 222
Suikkanen, Jussi, 4, 77, 79, 82, 98, 143, 192, 194
superfluity, 28, 123–124, 126

tenet of explanatory disagreement, *see* textbook view of moral traditions
tenet of extensional disagreement, *see* textbook view of moral traditions
test tube for theoretical virtues, 153–156
textbook view of moral traditions, 1–3, 5–6, 37, 49, 73–74, 76, 86–87, 91, 110, 220–222
The Scientific Image, *see* van Fraassen, Bas
Triple Theory, *see* convergence argument
trivial expedient, 164–168
Tulodziecki, Dana, 17, 175
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, *see* Quine, W. V. O.

Väyrynen, Pekka, 38, 46
van Fraassen, Bas, 10, 62, 67, 169, 176–178, 185–191, 196–197, 199–200, 202–204, 208, 220
varieties of underdetermination
ampliative, 32–33, 107, 140–151, 155, 171, 173–177
deductive, 32–33, 140, 141, 143, 144, 151, 153, 171, 173–175
egalitarian, 30, 134–135, 151, 175
existence, 29, 133, 135, 151
global, 30–31, 130, 135–137, 151, 172–173, 177
local, 30–31, 130, 135–137, 151, 172, 177
non-uniqueness, 29–30, 123, 134, 135, 151, 175
permanent, 31–32, 137–140, 151, 152, 218
recurrent, 32, 140
transient, 32, 137–140, 151
virtue ethics, 127–128, 132

web of beliefs, 21–23, 130–132
Wright, Crispin, 180–182

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 14:41:24, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.015