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Part I.—Original Articles.

Mental Organization: An Introductory Chapter. By HENRY MAUDSLEY, M.D.

THE command laid upon mankind to increase and multiply on earth has been gladly obeyed and abundantly fulfilled. In parts thereof the multiplication has sometimes gone beyond the means of subsistence, and the unoccupied parts suitable for human habitation become scarcer, though there are yet vast areas of undeveloped land in the South American Continent. Nevertheless the race continues to multiply without regard to the possible risk that it may one day outgrow its means of subsistence, increase of population and increase of trade being the ideals which it is thought right to pursue in order to maintain and increase the health, wealth, and prosperity of the nation in particular and of the race in general. The more babies that are born and reared in a country, the more bargains that are made in it, the more wants and their gratifications are multiplied, the sounder is its strength and the brighter its future outlook, although it is not unimaginable that fewer children, fewer wants, fewer bargains might sometimes produce more health, more virtue, more progress, more stability. That, however, is an unbecoming suspicion to harbour, for it is unworthy the trust which it behoves a right-thinking mind to put in the providential scheme of the universe and its benevolent workings for human ends. Impotent to com-

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prehend the mystery of things, foolish to expect it, fatuous to bewail his inability to get behind the veil, which would be to get absolutely out of his relative self, man is yet sure that the universe was created and works for his advantage and perfecting, and in that happy faith counts an unlimited procreation in gratification of a natural lust his proper and pleasing duty. The instinct of human nature dictates it, therefore the laws of universal nature were framed to sanctify it.

Imbued with the lofty sense of his supreme worth and immortal destiny he doubts not that the small fraction of the universe on which he plays his predominant part is typical of the whole, and his intelligence a true sample of an universal intelligence; for, being *one* himself, how can he choose but think ONE intelligence, if he thinks it at all? Wondrous strange it would be if he, thinking necessarily in terms of a personal self, had not made the inference and believed it sound. Not that he presumptuously imagines his mind to be the measure of the universe, although necessarily the measure of the particular universe which it creates for itself, or, more properly speaking, which is created for and by it out of the interaction between organism and outer world; all that he modestly insists on is that his mind is derived from, of the same nature with, and a section of the universal mind. Because he designedly constructs a watch, an engine, a battleship, and other ingenious mechanisms by a series of patient and toilsome adaptations of means to ends, he is sure that the universe was constructed after the all-comprehensive design of an universal mind working like him by intelligent processes of adaptation, only in that large case without the forethought, labour and contrivance which his progressive adaptations cost him. Thus to fashion an universal designing mind after the type of his mind, yet in the same breath to eliminate the toils, experiments and adaptations by which this has got itself constructed, is to go far to spoil and invalidate the inference. Is it not withal presumptuous, if not preposterous, to transform human limited foresight into a Divine foreseeing, and thus to degrade omniscience into Providence? Evidently it is more easy and agreeable to put the manlike into God than the Godlike into man.

Besides, it is not easily thinkable that absolutely intelligent and omnipotent mind should ever be so cabined and confined

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in its sectional human and animal embodiments as to lose all but the merest fraction of its power and intelligence, and to go through a succession of tentative and many times abortive travails to attain an often imperfect success. For many organisms, judged by human understanding of means and ends, fall much short of ideal perfection, when they are not, as they sometimes are, cumbersome structures grotesquely fitted for their laboured functions. If adaptation to the environment be the law of organic development, they must have had odd environments or have adapted themselves oddly to them, satisfied thereafter to try no new and less strangely circuitous adaptations. In their uncouth, contorted, or otherwise ungraceful bodies the organic flux, like a much-winding river, plainly went round about along the line of least resistance when it was hindered from going directly forwards, making that natural election in the absence of a more propitious natural selection. Even the human eye, notwithstanding its long process of elaborate formation and admirable structure, is said not to be so perfect an organ of sight as it might be, and the human body is subject to incommodities which detract much from its excellence as a perfect machine.

Be that as it may, the human mind could no more in the first instance have designed the construction of a watch or an engine by any premeditative contrivance than it could have constructed an universe. It was obliged first itself to undergo gradual construction, succeeding thus by the requisite modifications and adaptations in fashioning the perfect mechanism, which was then the consolidate embodiment of many tentative and partial designs; after which, by virtue of the accomplished effect, the perfected design built up in fit plexus of mental structure by the inductions of experience, it was able deductively to apply this to predict and produce similar effects, and thus properly test and verify its value. By working experience and the consequent physical structuralization in the brain—the literal in-struction or in-formation, that is, of cerebral plexuses of structure and function—were the incorporation of memories in knowledge and the required skill gained: without such definitely organized plexuses the mental function which they embody and discharge never was, nor is, nor probably ever can be performed on earth. When these are destroyed in the individual brain, its memory of the past is lost and conscious-

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ness disappears with its contents. In all its various kinds and degrees, whether as taste, touch, emotion, or thought, consciousness is a dependent phenomenon or so-called epiphenomenon which constantly vanishes dream-like into nothingness or the void. In dreams, at any rate, it cannot be said to precede or work in the mental creation; it obviously then dances a ridiculously servile attendance on their fantastical fictions.

A truth which, rightly apprehended, might perhaps serve to clarify some obscurity of thought is that ideas, like purposive movements, must always be learned gradually by steps of patient performance. Then the ratio—the *ratio*nal which is rightly proportioned adaptation organized in structure—is discharged consciously in function as reason. Without such previously structuralized reason or *ratio*nalized structure through the adaptive interactions of the individual organism and its medium no idea could be formed and performed and there could be no conscious reason. To make reason the prescriptive attribute of a postulated separate spiritual entity is to overlook the entire process of its formation and the conditions of its function in every developing mental organization. In the finely complex and condensed structure of a fly's small body is concentrated more reason, implicit or, so to speak, embedded, than conscious intelligence is likely for a long time, if ever, to find out and equally structuralize. Whence comes its structuralized or so-called instinctive reason if not from fitly proportioned or rational adaptations of experience through past ages of development? In the procreative act, which the human species nowise learnt from any animal species nor any animal species from it, there is latent instinctively a fund of silent embodied intelligence which, had procreation to commence now for the first time, it would need to spend a good deal of conscious contriving to accomplish. Intelligence in what is presumably an intelligently constructed universe is obviously not confined to its human embodiments and conscious manifestations; its function is performed silently and steadily, without the exultation which a self-conscious and self-worshipping being can never sufficiently admire and express when he functions more or less intelligently.

In no case, then, is the performance of an idea done by a separate entity in the body which is called *the* mind any more than a purposive movement is performed by an imagined spirit

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of motion, or the function of any bodily organ by its particular animal spirit, as was once supposed. And not quite absurdly, since the notion of its special *animal spirit* was an obscure but just recognition of its quasi-intelligent concert and co-operation in the complex harmony which the whole organism is or ought to be. Be that as it may, the idea is not performed by a separate mind; it *is* mind, not in only but of it, and is performed well or ill by the individual self who is an essential and indivisible unity of body and mind—directly, in fact, by the special nervous organization which represents in its complex structure and function every organ and function of the whole body. Into the composition of every thought which is performed has every organ and every gland of the body entered; the minutely different structures and physico-chemical changes of individual parts in different persons producing different temperaments, and the signally special organs of the male and female bodies different mental qualities sanely requiring their special directions of development. Scornfully to deride the notion of mechanism as anywise applicable to life and life in mind is natural to a person who, ignorant of the exquisitely subtile physical and chemical processes at work in the simplest vital substance, can only think crudely of inert matter, and of mechanism as exemplified in the structure of a wheelbarrow or a steam-engine. When the mind is said, then, to pursue tracks of thought, what is really implied is that particular tracts of a mental organization are in action, and that conscious mental function is concomitant or sequent; not otherwise than as in the riot of delirium there is, literally speaking, dis-tracted function, which is function off the normal tracks. Just, indeed, as the proper nervous plexus actuates the definite movements of motor apprehension when the hand purposely grasps an object, the specific mental motion preceding the specific muscular action, so its proper nervous plexus in the supreme cerebral layers actuates the definite mental apprehension; both functions in the dejection of disease and the tedious decline of old age becoming weaker and more sluggish in performance; for senile decay, as it passes wearily to second childhood, lingers, staggers and stumbles in mental as it does in motor apprehension, till both end fitly at last.

It might be a gain to mental science if those who write diffusely about mind were to descend from generalities to a clear

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and distinct idea of mental organization and, having done so, always in thinking to substitute mentally the positive definition for the word mind. Thus stooping they might impart life and substance to expatiations which are apt to become vague, pale and lifeless abstractions, for they could hardly then fail to realize that mind imports life in mind and conduct, and that the study of it and its adaptive relations apart from life is devoid of positive basis. Formal logic might, it is true, suffer, for assuredly life is not, nor ever will be, logic. Helpful, too, it might be in the matter if more thought were given to the close analogy between idea and movement. In grasping a small object where a nice adaptation of finger and thumb would suffice and be graceful, the ungainly use of the whole hand, or at first perhaps of the whole arm and shoulder, is ugly, for it is disproportionate, unapt, therefore essentially ir*ration*al. In like manner a nicely adapted act of the trained right hand becomes irrational when attempted by the untrained left hand, being then quite disproportionate and ungraceful. Now an exactly similar want of relation and ratio is oftentimes notable in mental apprehension: an untaught mind is as clumsy and ungainly in grasping and performing an idea as an untaught hand in the nice grasp and use of a small instrument. For the idea is a grasping or apprehension on the higher psychical plane of the supreme cerebral centres of motor intuition, and never could be thus grasped save by the co-operation of the more abstract, or, so to speak, sublimated motor and sensory factors of the lower nervous centres represented in them. As right vision is an exact apprehension of the image of an object impressed on the retina, so the clear and distinct idea is the exact apprehension of the precedent and underlying sensori-motor adaptations—of its image, so to speak.

Motor reactions contribute as essentially as sensory impressions to the construction of a mental organization, and fitly respond to them in the complex compositions of judgment. When the expert batsman in a game of cricket watches with concentrated attention the flight, pace and pitch of the ball which the bowler sends him, and tensely combines and uses all the muscles of his body to perform the right stroke to play it, the matter is not one of apparently simple sensory perception, but of perceptual intelligence in which the higher centres of mental organization have their essential share; the right complex and

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concrete judgment for each occasion has been formed gradually by continued practice in correcting the wrong and applying the right muscular action. He does not then merely see the ball and make a random stroke, as the beginner does; he minds what he sees, and intuitively or, as it were, instinctively judges and performs his proper skilled act, which he could not do if he had not diligently organized the proper mental plexuses.(1) Such specially acquired judgments, formed and consolidated by experience, constitute indeed the essence of all instructed perception, and they require for their formation answering varieties of motion to varieties of sense. The old saying, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerat in sensu*, might, perhaps, not unfitly be supplemented, not by the witty *nisi ipse intellectus*, but by *et in motu*. That the whole body enters into the constitution of every mood, thought and feeling is nowise the extravagant statement which it appears superficially to be. Man is essentially a unity, not the disunity which the union of two separate unities, mix them as he may, would really be.

Being an organized federation of many nervous plexuses or so-called complexes which may act separately, and movement-like oftentimes act automatically in mental function, as well as through the complex intra-mental associations which issue in concepts, judgments and rational actions, mind, like body, acts in parts, seldom, if ever, as a vital whole in most persons.(2) Notably does a special tract of it sometimes reach such a height of exaggerated and almost exclusive activity as to inhibit other mental function, as in states of deep absence of mind, when, in fact, a great part of mind is practically absent; in the ecstasy or transport of horror or panic of fear, the intensely strained part of it being then functionally transported or rapt out of it; in the fascinated bird which is said to drop paralysed into the cat's mouth, and in the terror-stricken rabbit which crouches in motionless collapse until the pursuing stoat seizes it; in the hypnotized person who is abjectly servile to suggestion; in the distraction of passionate fury, when reason is in complete abeyance; all which extremes are but extraordinary and abnormal instances of ordinary and normal mental processes. That is the reason, too, why in a more chronic way persons who have been educated in the practice and have sedulously cultivated the habit of a dissociated compartment of mind are able to keep it reason-tight, as a reserved and sacredly tabooed

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territory in which they can honestly believe by faith what is incredible to reason—that is, to a whole mind rationally constructed and exercised; the reason, too, why the primitive savage amazes the missionary, stoneblind to his own unreasons, by his utter impermeability to the plainest evidence which blankly contradicts his totemic beliefs and customs. Until psychology comes down from its misty heights and abstractions to the positive study of biology and lays its foundations solidly in a science of life not separated by any restrictive or obstructive barriers from other sciences, it cannot do what it may hope to do when it adds to its subjective study of mental phenomena a positive study of their basic origin and growth, and thus gives its aid to the construction of a scientific *psychogeny* and *psychonomy*.

Positive study of the genesis and development of mind in the process of organic evolution must obviously tend not only to produce more correct notions of its relative nature, but might perhaps serve usefully to lower its soaring flights of fanciful thought. To transfer to universal mind as absolute origin and beginning of things, itself without beginning, attributes of foreseeing, designing, fashioning, loving and hating, which are strictly relative and very limited functions of mental organizations which begin and end, implies a sheer abolition of all the definite qualities of mind and conditions of its operation as known positively: it is to translate that which is the last effect of evolution, as we know it, into a creative cause of evolution deprived of all by which we know it. Thus to wipe concrete mind clean out and then anthropomorphically to bring it to abstract life in the absolute may be, after all, nothing else but a flattering apotheosis of human self-adoration, which, rightly or wrongly, is well-nigh unlimited. Besides being illogical to imagine, it is a sort of impiety to profess to know qualities in that which in the same breath is justly declared to be incomprehensible and ineffable—in fact, to convert a humble and reverent agnosticism into a positive and definite gnosticism. No doubt eternal and infinite mind, if imaged humanly as primal reality, which is absurd, seeing that it is avowedly ultra-human, must be interpreted in terms of human thought and fashioned symbolically into some sort of idealized personality, so far as possible divested of its limitations; not now as the once grotesque image of a magnified man, for the gods of men change from age

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to age more than men themselves, but refined, or, to speak, volatilized into a luminous haze of transcendent spiritual feeling which is undefinable in thought, sensible only to fine spiritual feeling; *this* prone then, unless wisely ruled, to become mystical debauch of feeling, the more thinly strained and mentally debilitating it is.(3) Its thrilling delight withal is no case proof of its value, for no delight equals the occasional rapture of a pleasing delirium, as no sanely imaginable hell equals the horror of a horrible delirium. Was any sane mortal ever so continuously happy as is the insane general paralytic? Being incurable, he cannot, like the old Grecian madman, whose delight it was to sit in the empty theatre and applaud an imaginary play, exclaim sorrowfully when his friends had cured him of his pleasant delusion:

> Pol, me occidistis amici,
> Non servastis.

Charles Lamb, who had a brief attack of mania, wrote to Coleridge after his recovery, "While it lasted I had many hours of pure happiness. Dream not, Coleridge, of having tasted all the grandeur of and wildness of fancy till you have gone mad. All now seems to me vapid, comparatively so." Eloquent writers, like Jeremy Taylor, have used all the resources of language to depict in flaming rhetoric the burning torments of hell through endless time, but their pictures were in the end unfelt fantasies of the imagination which did not seriously horrify their hearers, rather perhaps pungently tickled their fancies, not as in a torturing delirium unspeakable horrors of feeling from which death would be a blest deliverance.

Such the substantial horrors created by a distracted nervous organization which are felt in and by a hurt spiritual mind whose essentially separate and independent nature, as the dualist holds, owes nothing to the body which thus sorely wounds it by some mysterious interaction; the very mystery of the unity of disunities being then embraced and hugged as positively certifying and even hallowing the breach of evolutional continuity and the irruption of a special creation, just as the undiscovered origin of life is still revered as a creative mystery. Why so, seeing that in a divinely governed universe all things

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are equally divine, body no less so than mind, non-living than living matter? The human mind creates its beliefs, as it needs must in the onward motion of its life, and belief in something fixed for the time being it will have; it is natural to it, therefore, to believe in a special creation for the occasion suiting its state of development, even though it contentedly abandon it at the next station of thought at which it arrives.

The plain truth of observation is that ecstasy, though it may exalt and delight, is nowise sound and wholesome mental function; it denotes more or less distortion or deformity of mind, being a quasi-convulsive or delirious rapture of special tracts of thought (an ἔκ στάσις, or standing out of them), with an accompanying exaltation of feeling; with the thereupon following notion that spasm of thought, when dignified as intuition, and spasm of feeling, when spiritualized as faith, are mystically divine. Yet in no case is mental any more than bodily convulsion strength. A dose of opium or like acting drug will produce a like mental beatification in fitly sensitive brains, gloriously lengthening time into eternity, expanding space into infinity, melting individuality into universality; the transport equalling or surpassing that which the disequilibrated mystic feels when he, or more commonly she, passes, as alleged, beyond humanity, but does not, as might sometimes be wished, stay there. When the several parts of the cerebral federation work together in close, compact, and harmonious co-operation, they sustain and strengthen one another; when a federated part is in excessive and unruly action it weakens or inhibits other parts and so far disables the whole, for it denotes a functional and tends to a fixed disintegration. To keep a special compartment of mind reason-tight cannot fail to impair its full rational powers and to endanger a quite wholesome moral nature. Being a sort of partial mutilation, it is liable to produce detrimental effects; for a complete division never is practically possible, subtile under-currents of thought and feeling, latent but not quite inactive, running deeply beneath conscious reason and faith and stirring a lurking doubt or suspicion. The person is driven to do his utmost to ignore or suppress doubts which he secretly feels that he ought to face frankly, thus to foster an unwitting self-deception and to prejudice his whole intellectual and moral nature—its integrity, not in the sense only of wholeness, but also in the sense of entire moral soundness.

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Human notions of Providential designs being at bottom presumptuous transferences of a relative being's experiences, as he thinks purposely in time and space, to absolute, eternal, illimitable Being in relation to which it is absurd to speak of purpose, time or space, it is no marvel that many events mightily perplex and trouble him. He finds it hard to discover the designs of them, and is forced to bow his reason to the adoration of an inscrutable mystery: the design, for example, of the natural and necessary earthquake which destroys a whole city and citiful of busy people, or whole-heartedly to admire the tiger's fearful symmetry and the exquisite designs of numberless other animal structures framed fitly for the destruction of numberless weaker creatures framed equally fitly to suffer terror and destruction(4); finds it hard, in fact, to see the design of evil in the world, although without evil good could not be any more than cold without heat or light without darkness, seeing that they are antirelates, if not correlates, in co-existent being—seemingly unifiable by Hegelian synthesis—and appear to maintain the existing equilibrium of things by their opposite forces. As the human mind necessarily makes divisions of sciences for its purposes of apprehension and action, setting divisions in thought between that which is not divided in nature, so it forms separate and static intellectual concepts—it could not think and act to any useful purpose if it did not—sundering that which is continuous and perplexing itself thereafter with the divisions and oppositions which it makes and then treats as fixed realities. How could individuality, being more or less of a separation during its temporary yet not wholly detached being, do otherwise? But as a true scientific philosophy must bring the separate and self-regarding sciences, now for the most part speaking different and reciprocally unintelligible languages, into intelligent relations and co-operative union, so a true psychology must be founded on a clear and distinct recognition of the essential continuity and constant flux of things, in which all so-called causes are effects and all so-called effects causes: mind be conceived in thought as a part of the nature which its organization is in fact. Continuity of motion without end, the perpetual flux of things which the old Greek philosophers, Democritus and Heraclitus, insisted on and Lucretius so lucidly and logically expounded, that is the fundamental fact: the world never the same for an instant, nor

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two minds ever the same, nor any mind ever the same for a single hour.

As separations and oppositions of thought are static concepts, like hours and years, months and centuries, miles and millimetres, artificially dividing and parcelling what is continuous, they so far falsify the dynamic flux of nature wherein all things mingle into each other's being, good springing from evil and evil linked to good, and good being evil and evil good according to circumstances. He who is hurt naturally thinks his hurt an evil and wails accordingly, but it is better that he should break his leg or his neck when he falls carelessly or clumsily than it would be for the law of gravitation to be suspended for a moment in his interest and for the universe to be wrecked as he by self-conservative instinct would have it be. His personality, which is a small and passing thing, suffers rightly in the interest of the whole, which is a great and continuing thing. To think otherwise is to take himself too seriously and overrate his being and doings in the universe, as it is the habit of the species to do, being its own self-valuer with no supervising check on its self-valuation. After all, it is possible that the universe has not been created and set going wholly and solely for his benefit, as he tacitly assumes or openly declares, and the final audit of human accounts on earth, summing up the *mortalium rerum ludibria*, may not tally with the human appraisement. Wonderful in truth it would be if the human species were free from the bias of self and able to judge impartially concerning itself, seeing how mighty a self-glorification, self-adulation, self-worship its self-estimate inspires.

Reflecting on the order of the universe, not from fixed points of causes and effects, but as a continuity of motion without end, a perpetual flux of the mighty tide of being and becoming; and, furthermore, considering curiously what an impartial observer, looking down on the earth-planet from the moon, might think of its human swarms and their doings—it is not difficult to picture a gradual transition from the most simple to the most complex, from inanimate to animate matter, from nascent sensibility to the most exquisite sense, from reflex nervous organization to mental organization, which is the supreme achievement of organic evolution, its present crown and climax in man and its possible consummation. How shall that consummation eventuate in the particular nation whose really

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pursued ideals are indefinitely to increase the volume of its trade, the number of its babies, the stores of its wealth, and the variety and vigour of its amusements? It is a not quite uninteresting nor irrelevant question for any nation which, loudly vaunting a civilization consisting mainly in the eager pursuit of these ideals, pays little or no heed to its ethical foundations. A national, like an individual organism, may nurse within itself the seeds of its own decline, although, like it, loth to think it and glad to believe itself immortal; a result which, when all is said, would be a grave hindrance to the progressive flux of humanity moving slowly on, despite its refluxes, to a fondly expected perfection. For, if death be the "last enemy" of the individual mortal and nation, it has always been, is now, and ever shall be the best friend of the race.

(1) And it is the reason why the expert cricketer, when he has occupied an hour in blocking ball after ball without making more than half a dozen lucky runs—which is now called admirable sound defence, as if sound defence was the right way to win a battle—and then attempts his only real stroke, whether a hard drive to the on or the off, or a hit to leg, he has got his mind and muscles so set by prolonged routine of practice that they are not immediately pliable enough to make the stroke rightly, and he is forthwith caught or bowled. He is not unlike a person who, thinking painfully too long and precisely on the event, cannot come to a decision, or, if he does, as likely as not makes a wrong decision. In the play of life, as in the play of cricket, a too self-conscious and exclusive heed to the individual score spoils the game. There may be some measure of truth in the reported saying of Cromwell that a man never rises so high as when he does not know where he is going, although Cardinal de Retz (in his *Mémoires*), when the saying was repeated to him, said, "S'il est de ce sentiment, il me paraît d'un fou."

(2) The largest part of mind is usually quiescent in its habitual functioning and a large part of its mentality always undeveloped. Consider how easily a person who has been taught and trained to speak three or four languages can speak them without suffering any apparent deduction from his proper mentality; and, again, how readily one who has learnt long passages of poetry by heart as a child can, once they are well started, repeat them by rote in old age without the least thought or effort. How many, then, the unused mental tracts in most minds on which no register of function is ever made, and how few the tracts which ever function as they might do in them! It is not so much more mind that is wanted in the majority of mankind, who for the most part do not reason, not having the least notion that reason, like speech, needs to be learnt, as more use of the uncultivated mental tracts which are left derelict. However much is put into a mind, there is commonly room for more, if the contents are rightly packed.

(3) For purposes of worship a personalization of some kind is inevitable. How pray and praise otherwise? Hence such expressions as "Our Father," "King of Kings," "Lord of Lords," "Almighty Wings," and the like symbols of an ultimate reality. What would become of the spiritual feeling and melody of some of the Psalms, and of the fervent curses of others of them, if they were not addressed to a personal Being? It is related of Queen Victoria that, when a favourite lady-in-waiting was dilating on the joy it would be to meet in heaven, not only those who had been dear on earth but such biblical persons as Abraham Isaac, David, etc., the Queen curtly interjected, "I do *not* wish to meet David." Many devotional hymns in common use, if understood literally, would grossly shock feeling by their crudities of expression and utter absence of real poetry,

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were it not for the hallowed associations of custom and place of worship, and for the moving melody of the familiar tunes by which is uttered in song what cannot be expressed in words. The deepest and inmost utterances of nature are in cries and songs of discharged feeling, not in definite articulations of words, which are specific motor adaptations of expression: the deep feelings of religion and love, therefore exclamations of feeling inexpressible in words, ineffable. Symbols, metaphors, and ceremonials have always been necessary to give form to feeling, the mistake having been to count those befitting one stage of human development unchangeable and suitable to all succeeding generations.

(4) Cannot now heartily sympathize with the *Bridgwater Treatise* in its naïve admiration of "the infinite and ineffable wisdom with which the various instincts are planted in animals to fit them for the respective purposes they were designed for." Although the fact is grateful to the understanding, it is grating to the æsthetic and moral sensibilities which nature is now evolving through human nature in its onward progress.

The Presidential Address, delivered at the Opening Meeting of the Section of Psychiatry of the Royal Society of Medicine, on October 22nd, 1912. By Sir GEORGE H. SAVAGE, M.D.

GENTLEMEN,—I welcome you to this the first meeting of the first new Section of the Royal Society of Medicine. I have consented to give an inaugural address, somewhat against my feelings, for I believe that as this Section is one starting with the full intention of work for the advance of medical science, time might have been better occupied in learning definite results of original work than in hearing generalities. I have to admit that I have had very long and perhaps exceptional opportunities of observing mental disorders, and it may be of service to record some of my impressions and hopes. I will shortly outline the past, survey the present, and prospect the future.

Fifty years ago we were proud in thinking that we English were the great protectors of the insane. We introduced humane treatments and were content that the patients should be protected, while also society was safeguarded from injury.

A time of heaping up of statistics followed, but it was long before the true spirit of scientific investigation arose, and it is for this work that we are now labouring. No time has been without its earnest workers, and we have to remember that men like Bevan Lewis, Wiglesworth and others have done valuable work in large asylums in the North, and that Crichton-Browne encouraged men like Ferrier to combine general neurology with the investigation of mental symptoms. Many of us, too, have very grateful recollection of the bright and

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