emotional or a volitive phenomenon? Is the replacing of the words *emozione—sentimento* (e.g. p. 84) intentional or accidental—and how should this terminological licence be related to Plato? The author's ambivalent relation to Dodds is also puzzling (cf. p. 27 and p. 56, whose text is 'bellissimo', but it includes an 'affermazione' which is not 'vera'). P. dares to criticize this author, but she also adopts his distinction of 'razionale e irrazionale' (p. 27, cf. p. 75: 'razionalità e irrazionalità'). Dodds indeed dominates P.'s work in numerous places, cf. *Indice dei nomi*, p. 110. A weaker point of P.'s book is her analysis of the description of the set in *Phaedrus*. P. omits the charioteer's emotional nature, although she notices an interesting thing: that 'l'esistenza dell'anima . . . sarà proprio un'emozione, cioè quella dell'amore . . .' (p. 45 n. 71). Saying that 'l'auriga corrisponde all'intelletto' (p. 49) would probably be an overinterpretation—for how could one explain that the charioteer-intellect is 'preso da timore e venerazione' etc. (p. 49)?

The slips and typos I came across are rare: *Leing* for *Laing* (p. 21, n. 28, p. 105, p. 110), *de* for *the* (p. 22, n. 50, p. 105), Frère's paper was published not by Vrin (p. 79, n. 122, p. 105), but by Les Belles Lettres. Also p. 70: *capopolo*, but two lines earlier correct *capopopolo*.

The impression of insufficiency in this book may be caused by the selectivity of its material, and by the difficulty in defining the criteria of selection. This may not however be a reason for reproaching the author, who herself calls her valuable study 'un piccolo contributo' (p. 15). But then I would request the author to withdraw from 'momentanea chiusura' and to write a further study, this time *un po' più grande*. In this way she would contribute still further to the rehabilitation of the position of feelings both in current research on Plato and in anthropology.

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PLATONIC PROSOPOGRAPHY

D. NAILS: *The People of Plato. A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics*. Pp. xlviii + 414, maps. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002. Cased, £49. ISBN: 0-87220-564-9.

The people are chosen from the *corpus Platonicum* (including the *Letters* and the *spuria*), the Socratic works of Xenophon, and a few other λόγοι Σωκρατικοί. To be elected you must be an historical figure who either appears in one of those texts or else is mentioned therein as alive or recently dead—but a few friends and relations, hangers-on, and homonyms also get in. They number 300: 190 from Plato, a further eighty from [Plato] and the *Letters*, and then the odds and sods.

Each entry sets out what is known or conjectured about its subject. An entry may occupy anything from a line to six pages, its length depending on the nature of the evidence rather than on the significance of the subject in its Socratic setting. Sources—at least, early sources—are listed. Contestable claims are supported by argument. Complicated interrelationships are illustrated by genealogical trees. The entries are interrupted by four historical excursuses and followed by four appendixes. One of the appendixes catalogues some 300 'Peripheral Persons' (who are also intercalated among the entries). There are maps, a glossary, a bibliography, etc.

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The book is well presented, cleanly organized, and easy to consult. The occasional zany sentence adds charm, and the dozen or so misprints keep readers on their toes. (A second edition might also correct one or two odd remarks about the orthography of names, both in Greek and in English.) It is a book I am very glad to have on my shelves—and, what is more, it is a book I shall often take down from my shelves.

POP is a treasury of facts. But it tartly corrects numerous scholarly gaffes; it contains several challenging propositions, the most striking of which concern the dates of Plato's birth (424/3, not 428/7) and of Theaetetus' death (391, not 369); and it is founded on a provocative hypothesis—for 'a hypothesis of this study is that there is something important to be gained from taking Plato's representations of Athenians seriously, at least in the first instance. Empirically, there proves to be more consistency and coherence in the genuine Platonic dialogues than has previously been suspected' (p. 120).

In general, N. prefers 'our contemporaneous sources, Plato and Xenophon' (p. 209) to the later tradition (which starts with Aristotle), yet she acknowledges that Xenophon's works contain 'glaring anachronisms' (p. 63; cf. pp. 92, 118) and she affirms that 'Plato, the consummate philosopher, was not preoccupied with dramatic dates, so one rarely expects exactness; the dialogues are replete with anachronisms' (p. 307). Some historians infer that Plato and Xenophon are untrustworthy sources. Other historians infer that Xenophon and Plato are not sources at all—they are careful composers of fiction, not careless compilers of fact. In either case, they reject N.'s hypothesis.

N. defends the hypothesis thus:

> I have assumed that we are on rather safer prosopographical ground when Plato is writing about people he knew than when he is reconstructing the distant past—not because he made accuracy a goal, which he may or may not have, but because his memory naturally informed his imagination . . ., requiring a deliberate decision to change what he remembered for some literary or other purpose. (p. 307)

That is an ingenious and a refined assumption. But is it a true assumption? And if it is true, can it be applied to the concrete particularities of the ancient texts? Well, it is in the concrete particularities of *POP* that the answers to those questions will be sought.

POP's most passionate readers will be historians. But N. wrote *POP* 'with one very specific audience in mind, *those who teach and research the philosophy of Plato*' (p. xxxvii); and she claims that

> the lives of the people of Plato, insofar as they can be reconstructed, need to be read back into the dialogues in an informed and responsible way. It is sometimes important to get the history right. Who a person was can *matter* to the range of plausible interpretations of a dialogue. (p. xxxviii)

I do not believe it; and I doubt if anything in *POP* will make any difference to the interpretation of Plato's philosophy. But that scarcely matters: *POP* is full of splendidly fascinating stuff, and a reader of Plato would be dull of soul could he pass it by.

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