Nationalities Papers, 2016
Vol. 44, No. 4, 611–627, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Remembering and forgetting: the state policy of memorializing Stalin's repression in post-Soviet Kazakhstan

Zhanat Kundakbayeva[a]* and Didar Kassymova[b]

[a]*History, Archeology and Ethnology Department, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan;* [b]*Department of International Relations, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan*

(*Received 11 November 2014; accepted 1 September 2015*)

The general perception of Western analysts and observers is that the nation-states created as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union all treat the memory of the dark, repressive aspects of the Stalinist regime in public spaces as a symbolic element in the creation of a new post-Soviet identity [Denison, Michael. 2009. "The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism, and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan." *Europe-Asia Studies* 61 (7): 1167–1187]. We argue that the government of Kazakhstan employs non-nationalistic discourse in its treatment of Stalinist victims' commemoration in a variety of forms, through the creation of modern memorial complexes at the sites of horrific Soviet activity (mass burial places, labor camps, and detention centers), purpose-built museum exhibitions, and the commemorative speeches of its president and other officials. Kazakhstan's strategy in commemorating its Soviet past is designed to highlight the inclusiveness of repression on all peoples living in its territory at that time, not just Kazakhs, thereby assisting in bringing together its multinational and multiethnic society. Thus, the official stance treats this discourse as an important symbolic source of shaping the collective memory of the nation, based on "a general civil identity without prioritizing one ethnic group over another – a national unity, founded on the recognition of a common system of values and principles for all citizens" [Shakirova, Svetlana. 2012. "Letters to Nazarbaev: Kazakhstan's Intellectuals Debate National Identity." February 7. Accessed July 28, 2015. http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/discussion/letters-nazarbaev-kazakhstans-intellectuals-debate-national-identity].

Keywords: Kazakhstan; Soviet repression; memorialization; commemorative narrative; the non-nationalistic discourse

The ruling elites of the ex-Soviet states have employed different strategies when memorializing the Soviet period, usually highlighting the dark, repressive aspects of the Stalinist regime in public spaces as a symbolic element in the creation of a new post-Soviet identity (Denison 2009, 1167). In constructing a new historical narrative, Evgeny Finkel has homogenized the experiences of the ex-Soviet countries and concluded that most ex-Soviet states posit themselves as victims of genocide (Finkel 2012, 297; Miller 2012, 28). This is too simplistic, however, because commemorative practices in Kazakhstan are markedly

*Corresponding author. Email: janbekkun@mail.ru

© 2016 Association for the Study of Nationalities

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

different from those in many other ex-Soviet countries. So, for Russia it is characteristic to oust memory of the tragic past (Adler 2012, 327; 2005, 1094).

We argue that the government of Kazakhstan employs non-nationalistic discourse in its treatment of Stalinist victims' commemoration in a variety of forms. Thus, the official stance treats this discourse as an important symbolic source of shaping the collective memory of the nation, based on "a general civil identity without prioritizing one ethnic group over another – a national unity, founded on the recognition of a common system of values and principles for all citizens" (Shakirova 2012).

A growing body of scholarly literature on how post-Soviet states employ the memory of the victims of Stalin's political repression in nation/state-building processes again proves relations between collective memory and politics. Symbolism and Stalin's victims' commemorative narrative vary from country to country as Kazakhstan's case proves. One should also note that the social–cultural context of the society (population, ethnic composition, and the way it was formed, level of political culture, and geopolitical environment) remains a contributing factor as well.

Here, we apply a top-down perspective of memory construction process (Pettai 2014, 15) to answer the question: What specific narrative has been employed by the state to construct and institutionalize a revised memory about the victims of Stalinism in Kazakhstan? An analysis of symbolic meaning and narrative strategies of violence as they appear in commemorative practices would also enable us to show what purpose they may serve in the search for identity of the country and in intended nation and state building in Kazakhstan.

The "twin process of nation building and state formation" (Podeh 2011, 3) has now been progressing for over 20 years, and throughout these years there has been a debate about the model for nation-building in Kazakhstan. While "the presidential administration aimed to steer the public toward a general civil identity with a Kazakhstani society, Kazakhstani citizens, and Kazakhstani patriotism," a strong opposition force has been represented by the Kazakh intellectual community – the conductor of the nationalistic discourse, based on the principles of ethnic nationalism (Shakirova 2012).

The social scope of Kazakhstan seems to be quite divided. A multitude of actors are involved in the quest for the national idea, all of which have various ideological stances, from Russian and Kazakh nationalists to Sufites and Islamites, from Westerners and anti-Westerners to traditionalists of different kinds (Shakirova 2012).

As Elie Podeh remarks, the process of identity formation in the so-called colonial states is associated with the adoption of nationalism by the ruling elite (Podeh 2011, 10). In relation to that, Burton Benedict notes:

> Many of the new nations are amalgams of diverse peoples with various languages, customs and religions. The consolidation of national power has been a major difficulty for this country and all have sought appropriate symbols to project the image of unity for their own people and to present to the world at large. Like many other nations they have invented traditions and reconstructed history. They have delved into the events of their pasts to find appropriate symbols and to construct narratives which will justify their national identities. (Burton Benedict in Podeh 2011, 13)

Thus, one can safely say that the need of an updated past, created by the formation of a new nation, then catalyzes the discovery of new paths to commemorate and interpret featured events in the new nation's objective past (Gillis 1994).

The collective memory in Kazakhstan has not emerged as the result of consensus between the official and vernacular memory (terms taken from John Bodnat in Podeh 2011, 13), as is often the case in democratic states. The memory constructed in Kazakhstan is solely official memory, because the commemorative resources are controlled by the

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

ruling elite (Barry Schwartz in Podeh 2011, 13). The elite thus employ different channels of broadcast to take the lead in the process of formation of the collective memory.

The theoretical framework of the authors' choice is defined mainly by the concepts stated in the corpora of works by Pierre Nora, Yael Zerubavel, and Paul Connerton. Thus, Nora highlights not only places and objects, but also concepts and practices such as commemorations and rituals as parts of the collective memory. Underlining the constructivist nature of the collective memory formation, Nora notes the strong relationship between the process of constructing the official collective memory and commemorative symbolism (Pierre Nora in Podeh 2011, 14).

Multiple commemorative practices in Kazakhstan (sacralization of sites and erection of national monuments, and also commemoration through ritual and museum space) are analyzed through the concept of "commemorative narratives," as developed by American Jewish Studies scholar Yael Zerubavel. According to her, "each act of commemoration reproduces a commemorative narrative, a story about particular past that accounts for this ritualized remembrance and provide a moral message for the group members" (Zerubavel 1995, 237).

The commemorative narrative, Zerubavel says, is creative, it manipulates historical data, deliberately suppresses them, or creatively exploits. The commemorations are fragmentary, as they only reconstruct select segments of the past. However, jointly they form the master commemorative narrative which is linked to the main storyline. The master commemorative narrative is culturally shaped by the political elite and serves their special interests. Thus, the storyline of the group's past is not always linear. From time to time some things are omitted, repeated, or highlighted (Zerubavel 241). Master commemorative narrative, on one hand, provides the members of the group with some sort of a conceptualization of their collective past, and on the other hand, serves the interests and goals of the ruling elite. The master commemorative narrative contributes to the development of the nation, as it characterizes it as a joint group moving through history (Zerubavel 241).

The concept of commemorative density is also important in this discussion. Zerubavel uses it to define the degree to which the events of the past are reflected in the master commemorative narrative. According to her, there are historical periods and events which are central to the collective memory, and those are commemorated in detail. There are also events which do not get denoted in the master commemorative narrative.

Within that conceptual framework, several important distinctions are made with regard to the notions of commemoration, historical narrative, and forgetting as a function of the formation of national identity. First, Zerubavel's working definitions of commemoration and its specific meaning within the greater historical context provide the authors with a stable basis for the discussion of commemorative experiences, as it reads: "The master commemorative narrative focuses on the group's distinct social identity and highlights its historical development." Meanwhile, the historical narrative is defined in the given framework in a broader context, ascertaining that "historical changes usually occur over a period of time and as a result of a process rather than single event," thus introducing commemoration as a subclass of the formation of collective memory. Moreover, Connerton's taxonomy of forgetting – which he defines in neutral terms, as opposed to the more traditional negative connotations – supplements this conceptual space by separating different cases of the phenomenon of commemoration, defining their causes, and inspecting positive or negative effects of forgetting on the process of the national identity formation.

Using the commemoration of Stalinist repressions' victims in Kazakhstan as an example, we see that Stalinist repressions became a part of collective memory and are

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

now written into the master commemorative narrative, based on the official non-nationalistic discourse taken by the country's government. Underlining the communion of the tragedy and committing the ethnic aspects of the repressions to oblivion, the state thus attempts to shape group solidarity within the confinement of a complex multinational society of Kazakhstan.

Material landscapes of remembrance

In recent times in Kazakhstan a number of public places that are dedicated to the memory of mass violence have emerged, and are maintained and regularly used for commemorative events. These spaces include the mass burial sites of those shot during the Soviet state terror, prison and camp graveyards, cemeteries of persons interned in special settlements, and exiled people's graves.

In Russia Anstett notes that there is a lack of government involvement – be it federal, regional, or local – in the field of national heritage, aimed at preserving major sites relating to the Gulag. The practice of repurposing camps effectively helped to erase the past, and the countless burial sites resulting from the Gulag have never undergone a systematic, or even a summary inventory by the authorities (Anstett 2011). Panikarov considered that those that were not reused were simply abandoned, gradually to be destroyed by the weather and the passing of time (Anstett 2011). Indeed, many sites of the Soviet Terror on Russian soil still have no monuments (Etkind 2009, 184).

In Kazakhstan, however, the situation is different. The discovery of mass burial sites, the investigative work to reveal the names of as many people as possible buried there, and the creation of memorial signs are all undertaken with financial and other support by the state. Unlike any other ex-Soviet state, though, Kazakhstan does not try to use these sites as a nation- or state-building tool. The two largest cemeteries of the Karlag labor camp in the Karaganda region – the Spassk cemetery of Camp No. 99 and Mamochkin cemetery – have been given the special status of "memorial cemetery." Terror sites have also been found and marked in other regions, saving them from disappearance by turning them into public spaces with proper memorial signage. Within Kazakhstan these sites are seen as silent denunciations of Stalinist terror, and immortalize the memory of its victims regardless of ethnic origin.

The erection of monuments and memorial sites to Stalinist victims began in Kazakhstan in the late 1980–1990s on the wave created by perestroika. During that period, almost all projects memorializing victims of the Soviet era (in Russia as well) were initiated by private donors (Etkind 2009, 195), as well as sponsors from regional affiliates of "memorial enlightening" societies, and consulates and embassies of foreign states. Kazakhstani state participation during that time was in the development of roads to provide access to the memorial sites – an expensive process given the country's size.

In contemporary Germany and Russia, each respective culture deals with the past in different ways. Etkind considers that in culture, as in a computer, there are two forms of memory that can be likened to hardware and software. Soft memory consists primarily of texts (including literary, historical, and other narratives) while hard memory consists of monuments. Museums, cemeteries, commemorative festivals, guided tours, and history textbooks demonstrate multilevel interaction between the hardware (sculptures, obelisks, memorials, and historic sites) and the software (songs, films, guidebooks, inscriptions, and historical studies) of cultural memory. It is not the mere existence of the hardware and software but their interaction, transparency, and conduct that give cultural memory life (Etkind 2009, 194). Whereas Russian memory is pervaded with "soft" texts, German

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

memory is crystallized in "hard" monuments. As the cycles of German memory develop from hard memory to soft memory, so the Russian cycles invariably move in the opposite direction, from soft to hard (195). In Kazakhstan the memory of Stalinist terror has been focused on the hardware since 2004, when the state suddenly began to finance the erection of memorial sites directly.

In Kazakhstan, as elsewhere in the world, the symbolic significance of monuments depends on the choices of politicians and reflects changing official concepts of national identity and nation-building practices (Forest and Johnson 2002, 525). Forest and Johnson argue that political elites generally have far greater power than does the public to shape the physical and symbolic representation of national identity (526). According to them, "powerful political actors thus have a rare chance to impress their conceptions of the national character onto the public landscape, and in doing so assert their right to lead the nation and the state into the new era" (527).

The state not only finances but also controls the stylistic design and symbolism of monuments. In Pavlodar a memorial to Soviet terror victims was opened in 2013, although the first stone had been laid down 16 years ago.[1] The monument could have appeared earlier as money had been allocated from the local budget in 2004, when it was the winner of the "Agys" Almaty art-industrial project contest. However, the designers' concept – which used symbolism from the region's ancient Turkic roots – bewildered the city's inhabitants and was rejected after public discussions. The public debates on the project demonstrated how difficult it was to fully understand the monument's symbolism, and a new call for ideas was announced.

To understand the degree of the state's control over the style and symbolic meaning of national memorials today, let us look at the announcement text for a recent contest. The state stipulates the main idea of the monument and defines the terms and size of the award. It does not limit participants only to professionals – amateurs and the elderly are also invited to take part. The most important requirement for participants is to express the main concept of the monument, namely to create a "display of the mass physical extinction of innocent people by the totalitarian regime."

Monuments can have a powerful visual effect on people, so their design must strive for a balance between sorrow and hope, condemnation and warning. In this sense in Kazakhstan the state's control over the symbolic meaning of its memorials acquires positive significance. An example of a monument constructed in a bizarre style – sponsored by the descendants of victims in a city – can be seen in Ekibastuz, a mining city to the northeast of Astana. A five meter high composition called "Shroud" (*Savan*)[2] stands there; the central themes of the composition are "three partially formed figures without faces" on a red brick wall background in the form of a five-pointed star. The red brick depicts part of the Kremlin wall, the star an obvious Soviet symbol. The figures without faces symbolize the remaining "bodies of mourning women" whose souls had left them. It is a strange monument, to put it mildly.

Inscriptions are a vital element in the symbolic power of monuments (Etkind 2009, 194). State elites must try to express a nation's attitudes and emotions using short, concise memorial inscriptions (Forest and Johnson 2002). At first glance, the very brief, concentrated inscriptions on Kazakhstani monuments look emotionless compared to monuments full of metaphors such as can be found in Lithuania, Uzbekistan, etc. It should be noted, though, that unlike many other ex-Soviet states, inscriptions in Kazakhstan are made in two languages – Russian and Kazakh. It is worth noting that the bilingual inscriptions are not an appeal to the memory of the victims, who were ethnically Russian or Kazakh, but the reflection of an accustomed practice of bilingual policy in Kazakhstan in

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

general. Although after 1991 Kazakh is the only state language, the scope of application of Russian is still wide. As in Soviet times, all the ethnic groups who live in Kazakhstan utilize Russian as the language of international communication (Jankowski 2012, 11, 33). Thus, Russian makes the inscription intelligible and accessible to everyone who comes to honor the memory of the victims. Therefore, the authors widen the scope of the monument's audience, including all ethnic groups and not just Kazakhs or Russians.

The titles of monuments and their signage can reveal much about a nation's attitude toward their Soviet past. For example, a sign in the garden of a Lutheran church in Latvia reads: "Memorial to those exiled, tormented to death, and died the death of heroes for our Fatherland" (Limbazh district, Salatsgriva city). A monument in Chisinau, Moldova, emphasizes those victims from a particular region in the country's northeast: "Passers-by bow your head in honor of the Bessarabians annihilated by the Bolshevik butchers in June 1940–July 1941." A widespread practice has recently developed in Kazakhstan whereby the victims are addressed directly. In this way, the memory of the horrors of that period becomes more human and intimate and less monumental.

In a critical analysis of Kyrgyzstan's Ata-Beiit memorial complex, Owen (2011) highlights the various ways that such a site can be used. The Ata-Beiit Memorial complex was designed originally to be a burial site for 137 people shot between 5 and 8 November 1938, including "low- and middle-level functionaries of local parties, employees of the People's Commissariat of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), regional militia leaders, students and educators from higher institutions, writers, heads of the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz SSR, and other state officials." However, in 2010 the Ata-Beiit became the burial site for victims of the so-called April events (when 89 protestors were shot dead in front of the government building in Bishkek). This, in conjunction with the use of Islamic and nationalistic symbolism at the complex, in Owen's opinion "turned a commemoration site of Communist regime victims into a nation-state building instrument" (Owen 2011).

It should be noted that there are few monuments that use Islamic or nationalistic symbolism in Kazakhstan. An exception is a monument in Zhanaozen where combined symbolism is used: nationalistic symbolism is reflected by use of the *shanyrak* – a symbol of the Motherland and independence, while a bas-relief resting on a black square of an artificial marble with a crack splitting it symbolizes a crack in human fate and lives – a direct reference to memory of the victims.

Monuments at mass burial sites follow a common commemorative pattern practiced in Kazakhstan. For example, a 2001 memorial in Zhalayq settlement in the Talgar region of Almaty oblast was made in the form of a gravestone[3] ("Kazakhstan vspominaet" 2002), while on the site at Camel Mountain in West Kazakhstan a granite stela (from Khromtau city) was erected standing on a multilevel pedestal. The monument is simple in form but constructed from high-quality materials and is highly emotive: the heavy granite stone symbolizes eternity, peace, and memory; a granite slab in the base shows an image of a group of victims; and a bilingual inscription in gold letters addresses the victims of Stalin's repression directly. A different category of monuments can be found in Kazakhstan's towns, where they are an important part of the urban landscape. Their stylistic design differs, usually in monuments with easily read symbolism, such as the "Broken flight" composition in Zhezkazgan.[4] However, Kazakhstan also boasts some unique memorials built in the post-Soviet era. Among these is a memorial in the center of Petropavlovsk, opened in 2012 and costing the state $100,000. The uniqueness of this monument is in the integrity of its concept: to immortalize and keep in the minds of future generations the memory of 6800 inhabitants of North Kazakhstan who were victims of Soviet terror. The memorial's placement – near the building where the NKVD (*Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del* or

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) was located in the 1930s – is significant too. The memorial, a tetrahedral pyramid with projecting thorns and a stone column, symbolizes the terrible secrets and crimes committed in the torture chambers of the NKVD. The memorial is surrounded by a black granite wall inscribed with the 6800 victims' names, giving it the feeling of a necropolis, but the composition is enhanced by areas of wire where memorial pieces of cloth, or *zhyrtyses*, can be tied. In Kazakh funeral rites, a piece of fabric is a very meaningful component, not only as a symbol of mourning, but also as a link between the worlds of the living and the dead (Kul'maganbetova 2012). The style of the Petropavlovsk memorial echoes that of the necropolis at the Kremlin wall – a Soviet era monument – but the name "Memory Wall" itself suggests associations with the Weeping Wall in Jerusalem, a holy pilgrimage site for Jews. In general, the whole concept of the memorial is life-asserting in character; it is a place where people can come to remember family members and friends who died during that time, even if their burial place is still unknown. A final design element, the "greening" and illumination of the memorial square, symbolizes the "continuation of life."

Thus, unlike other ex-Soviet countries the monuments in Kazakhstan are created simply to immortalize the memory of the victims of Stalinist repression, not to glorify them as Kazakh martyrs. Discovering all the mass burial sites from the Stalinist regime in Kazakhstan, and the identification of the bodies found, is an ongoing and arduous process. Much relevant or helpful information has been lost over time, and the country's geography is vast. Nevertheless, state participation at both central and regional levels ensures that when a site is found it is maintained in proper order, given appropriate memorial signage, and used in public commemorative events.

Memorial museums to victims of Stalin's political repression

Museums play a significant role in commemoration. Their displays confer legitimacy on specific interpretations of history, and attribute significance to particular events (Whitmarsh 2001).

The creation of museums honoring the memory of victims of Soviet repression is another important part of Kazakhstan's policy of memorialization. However, museums differ from other complexes that have emerged in the ex-Soviet countries. They can be highly diverse in what they offer: some are designed in novel, even pretentious ways, while others are modest in their form. What they all have in common though is that they are not simply additions to the local pantheons and do not narrate their story in the traditional Soviet manner, that is, it was awful, but that is the price for victory (Stradanie kak eksponat ili Muzei strogogo rezhima/kak pokazyvat' v muzeiakh 'negativnuiu istoriiu' 2011). In these museums people are thrown into a world of violence that cries injustice toward the repressed. The primary emotion they evoke is compassion and sympathy toward the victims of terror, as opposed to the suffering and sorrow of the nation. Kazakhstani museums tell the very personal tales of victims of political repression, not a general history of tragedy for the Kazakh people.

Russia is only now beginning to develop a federal program immortalizing the memory of victims of political repression, whereas in modern Kazakhstan, according to the words of the director of the "Butovo" memorial complex Gar'kavyi, "memorialization of the topic became an essential part of state policy" (Gar'kavyi 2012). Russia is only planning to create a model memorial center of the political repressions' history in open air, "Perm-36", and also two national centers – a Butovo polygon under Moscow, and the second, under St Petersburg (Istoriya muzeya "Perm' 36" 2009).

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Many unique museum complexes have been, and continue to be, created in Kazakhstan. However, collating and critically assessing all the material evidence of injustice, violence, and brutality has been very problematic. Yet it has been no easy task to incorporate a negative social experience into the value system of contemporary Kazakhstani society; strong stereotypes of a museum profession formed during Soviet times (Gnedovskii 2010) still remain.

In the creation of its "museums of consciousness," Kazakhstani specialists have studied and learned from museum expositions related to a number of global twentieth-century events, including World War II, the Holocaust, and the Gulag. The starting point for these museums became the fate of humans, their family connections, and personal situations, and their mission became the confirmation of the value of individual human life.

Two of the largest Kazakhstani museums have been built on the original sites of actual Gulag camps. Specialists categorize such museums in a special group – memorial museums located in historically authentic sites where the crimes were committed (International Memorial Museums Charter 2011; Mezhdunarodnyi ustav memorial'nykh muzeev 2011; Moore 2009, 51).

With this authenticity, though, comes an unsettling connection with the notion of realism, which many theoreticians claim can lead to a type of secondary trauma rather than conscious remembrance or healing of wounds. This is the result of representing war, genocide, and other egregious violations of human rights in environments that are themselves traumatizing (Bingula 2012). A special note in the International Memorial Museums Charter (2011) stipulates that memorial museums located on historically authentic sites where crimes were committed not only provide an excellent opportunity to conduct historical and civic education, but also represent significant risks. In this respect, the esthetics of the museum are considered very important because they can have such a strong influence on visitors. For example, in the Tuol Sleng museum in Phnom Penh, skulls collected from the remains of victims of the Pol Pot regime are still exhibited, but they have been removed from the "skull map" of Cambodia that existed until 2002. In the Kigali Memorial Center in Rwanda, the exposition documenting the horrors of that conflict displays hundreds of corpses exhumed from common graves and preserved with limestone.

In the creation of museum expositions, the main question is: Why and for what should the victims be remembered? The model followed during the creation of the Dolinka and ALZHIR (Akmolinsk Camp for Wives of Traitors to the Motherland) museums[5] was the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC that offers visitors several types of experience, from educational to emotive and compassionate, and of course commemorative and memory-inducing. Its main concept is to create a setting where visitors "live the life" of Holocaust victims.

It is important to note that the creation of large memorial complexes in Kazakhstan could never be realized without active participation by the state. For example, the total area of Karlag was enormous, equal to a medium-size European country, while its buildings had become very dilapidated, including a majestic but tumbledown main building in the "Stalinist empire" style, a huge but slowly disappearing children's cemetery, barracks built by prisoners, and a hospital complex of the Dolinka NKVD administration (Kokhanova 2009). The original museum was created in February 2001, but at that time it was small and only of local significance. In addition it shared the building with a psychological clinic for Karlag servicemen. The total size of the building was 167 m^2 and of that the display area covered only 78 m^2. The situation changed in 2009 when the original administrative building of the entire Karlag labor camp in Dolinka was given historical monument

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

status and protected by the state. About $800,000 was allotted to the reconstruction and restoration of the building (built in 1935), and it now boasts 14 exposition halls in the renovated main building.

Another Kazakhstani museum–memorial complex dedicated to victims of political repression and totalitarianism is ALZHIR, which was created under the personal guidance of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Commemorative Kazakhstani museums are designed around the concept of an immersive experience (although other techniques are also used). In particular, the Dolinka museum focuses on a direct reconstruction of camp life in its 25 museum exposition halls, with visitors making their way through male and female cells, a transient detention cell and an infirmary. Three halls explain aspects such as the "leisure time" and multicultural activities of the prisoners; the Karlag Library houses a selection of books and the printing house of the newspaper *Putevka* that was issued in Dolinka from the beginning of the 1930s; and there is a scientific-research laboratory where scientist–prisoners conducted their research. Other aspects of prison life can be seen in the pre-investigation room where personal files and personal cards of the convicts were registered, the room of the special commissioner where arrestees were interrogated, and the office of the head of the Karlag administration. Some halls detail the methods of coercion used on the prisoners, from a torture cell to a punishment cell and a *zindan* – a pit where prisoners were kept (Hall No. 6); others display the methods of execution used (usually shooting – a figure is shown of a convicted man), and the morgue installation.

In contrast, only a few halls reconstruct camp life in the ALZHIR museum–memorial complex. These include an interrogation room where women were tortured and raped, a camp barrack where 200–300 women lived, and a "Stalin wagon" – a railway boxcar used for transporting prisoners. In general ALZHIR's design follows a standard modern museum style, with symbolic design techniques aimed at creating a special atmosphere that leaves nobody untouched. The museum's themes – about 8000 women wrongfully convicted; the sad fate of their children, families forced apart and broken – are told simply but effectively. The building's exterior resembles the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York City.

Educational elements are important components of these museums. In the Dolinka museum, the starting point for documenting repression in this region is 1918, and it continues through the 1980s. Hall No. 24 – "Repression of 1950–1980s" – narrates the repressive action against the creative intelligentsia, which includes both Kazakhs and individuals from other ethnic groups. The key word in this exhibit is dissidence, not a struggle for national liberation, and details can be read of the uprising of prisoners at Kengir on 16 May 1954 in Zhezkazgan, described by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in *The Gulag Archipelago*.

The Dolinka museum's mission to immortalize the memory of victims of repression is clearly reflected in the list of victims. The story is devoted to individuals, including women and children, who served their sentences or were executed in Karlag. Among the prisoners in Karlag were artists deported from many different parts of the Soviet Union, as well as the Kazakh intelligentsia (who are represented in their own hall in the museum). The Dolinka museum also tells the story of the 1.3 million people deported to Kazakhstan between 1936 and 1949.

The start of Russian repression is dated much earlier at Tashkent's museum for victims of repression in Uzbekistan, where it begins in 1716 and the failed Khiva campaign led by the Russian officer Alexander Bekovich-Cherkassky. The museum includes such events as the conquest by Imperial Russia of the Kokand Khanate, Bukhara, and Khiva in the 1860–1870s, the Tashkent riot of 1892, the Andijan rebellion of 1898 that was brutally suppressed

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

by the Russian authorities, and the massive rebellion of 1916 that led to enormous losses and repression. The creators used the concept of pre-revolutionary history in the form of an anti-colonial discourse structure of the 1920–1930s (Abashin 2009).

The Tashkent museum focuses on Uzbeks as victims of imperial violence and heroes of national revival, while in contrast, Kazakhstan's Dolinka museum provides a narrative of the victims of Stalinist repression in general, memorializing them regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. In Uzbekistan those people who suffered under repression are glorified as heroes who perished in the fight for freedom; in Kazakhstan they are represented and remembered as guiltless victims.

The ALZHIR museum, however, does not follow such distinct concept guidelines as at Dolinka. Its purpose as a memorial to the 8000 female prisoners of ALZHIR and those deported to Kazakhstan from distant homelands is clear, and it can also be seen as a memorial to participants in the events of December 1986, when students protested the appointment of a Russian as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. But the exhibit in the "Alash" Hall strays from the general theme, as it explains the undermining and eventual liquidation of the khans' power in Kazakhstan during the nineteenth century, as well as one of the biggest rebellions in Kazakhstan against the Russian empire. Also in this hall are displays about the political activities of the Kazakh nationalist intelligentsia from 1905 to 1916. The "Long way to independence" display includes the story of the establishment of Soviet power, its collectivization policies, and the tragic consequences for the peasantry including the famine of the 1930s and the "Great Terror of 1937–1938."

Thus, the ALZHIR museum does utilize the discourse of genocide and suffering of the Kazakh nation. The presence of such discourse indicates that in Kazakhstan it is still too early to talk about societal conformity in terms of the nature of the historical narrative and its symbolic representation. At present Kazakhstani society is far from homogeneous. A great variety of ideological actors take part in the discussion about the model for nation-building in Kazakhstan. While the state government firmly maintains the principles of civic nationalism "aimed to steer the public toward a general civil identity with a Kazakhstani society, Kazakhstani citizens, and Kazakhstani patriotism" (Shakirova 2012), there is also present an influential opposition represented by the Kazakh intellectual elite, who assert the nationalistic discourse and the principles of nationalism founded on ethnicity. However, in the commemorative narrative of Stalinist repressions, the ALZHIR museum's genocide discourse is thus far the only place where there is some attention focused on the Kazakh identity of the victims. On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Kazakh territory was the site for the largest camps of the Gulag and the burial sites for the wrongfully convicted from all over the Soviet Union. Therefore, it would not be humane to remember only Kazakhs as victims of the Stalinist regime, consigning the prisoners of Stalinist camps set in Kazakhstan to oblivion.

The ALZHIR museum's broad scope bears comparison with the Museum for Victims of Political Repression in South Kazakhstan oblast. Opened in 2001, this was the only museum of its type in the republic for some time. Today the sculpture "Repression," which is the centerpiece of the museum's exposition, can be seen to be somewhat simplistic. The concept of this museum in Shymkent – the southernmost city in Kazakhstan and populated predominantly by ethnic Kazakhs – was deliberate and consistent from the start. The period of repression in this museum starts from the "Little October:" idea launched in Kazakhstan by Filipp Goloshchekin, the first secretary of the Kazakh Krai Committee, in the 1920s. Texts on the tragic effects on the Kazakh people of the violent destruction of their traditional lifestyle and their forced resettlement are written in simple language but

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

in a scholarly, impartial manner. The texts on the horrific purges of 1937–1938 are also written without reference to any ethnic component of the repression.

As well as offering educational and awareness activities, the museum carried out in-depth investigations and research, compiling a data bank on victims of repression. In recent years all the archived files have been declassified, and relatives of the "rehabilitated citizens" now have access to these documents, allowing people to come to the museum and learn more about the fate of their relatives and the events of that time.

In a small memorial museum to the victims of political repression in Oskemen (formerly Ust-Kamenogorsk), East Kazakhstan oblast, no reference is made at all to the Imperial Russian period, and there are no exhibits dealing with the 1960–1985 period – this museum's focus is purely on the memory of victims of the Stalinist regime, which ruthlessly destroyed the whole social strata, from military men and politicians to members of the intelligentsia, state officials, and ordinary people, regardless of their ethnicity.

Nowhere will you find a validation of the Soviet era in Kazakhstan; there is a distinct lack of any glorification of the USSR or claim that repression was a justifiable expense in the necessary process of modernization. But equally you will not see the theme of national suffering and national tragedy being used. Kazakhstan's museums clearly intend to incorporate the topic of Stalinist repression into the broader context of crimes against humanity. They depict the history of Stalinist repression from the Kazakhstani viewpoint, but without excessive pathos or martyrdom. The museums' leitmotifs are the fate of the repressed, resulting in a narrative that addresses Kazakhstani visitors but is just as understandable for other people.

Remembrance Day speeches as a specific type of commemorative activity

According to Jõesalu (2012), Peter Reichel in his study of the politics of memory in Germany has identified political celebrations and official anniversaries – among other mediums of memorial activity – that effectively use emotion to produce feelings of identity and integration (Jõesalu 2012). We will analyze material mainly from speeches given by Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev from 2007 to 2015. The focus is primarily on speeches given on the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression (31 May), which deals with the recent past.[6] The broad purpose of the president's annual speeches on this day is not to inform, nor persuade, but simply to commemorate. In them the president does not make any dedication to the Kazakh people, the "owners" of this independent state, but simply remembers any and all victims of political repression. It is clearly a memorial speech, designed to honor the memory of all such victims.

The subjects of President Nazarbayev's speeches at the inauguration of ceremonial monuments, memorials, or during commemorative events such as 31 May have remained unchanged since 1997 – he addresses the sacred memory of all victims of political repression, making no reference to the tragic effects on the Kazakh people specifically. In his speeches, the victims of political repression count in the millions of people regardless of ethnic or religious status; they are simply those poor guiltless souls who were caught up in the stone mill of the totalitarian system and mercilessly evicted from their native lands, convicted for dissidence, or who perished in the Gulag prisons ("Glava" 2007).

In explaining the specifics of Kazakhstani speechmaking, we can compare it with the structure of President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan's speech during that country's "Day of the Memory of the Repression Victims" on 28 May 2013. He spoke of "historical memory, achievements of the independence period, successes, and changes in the lifestyle and mentality of the people." The speech was like a report on the achievements of an independent Uzbekistan but as an expression of "deep gratitude" to "great ancestors" (V Uzbekistane 2012).

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

So, we can see that in Karimov's speeches the victims of political repression are heroes who sacrificed their lives in the struggle for freedom and independence of their country. In contrast, Nazarbayev's speeches declare the victims to be "our grandfathers and fathers … our compatriots, guiltlessly suffering during the years of political persecution." It is clear that the Kazakhstan president's rhetoric when addressing the victims of repression is much more personal and filled with human emotion.

In President Nazarbayev's ceremonial speeches, the narrative structure and rhetoric when addressing victims display a notable lack of any motif about the suffering or martyrdom of the Kazakh people, or elements of sacralization of national sorrow (Miller 2012, 21). In each speech President Nazarbayev emphasizes that Kazakhs were not the only victims of repression. As early as 2010 at a meeting with the descendants of repressed people from various countries, President Nazarbayev explained clearly that he would never recognize the tragic events of the 1920–1930s purely as an act of genocide against the Kazakh people, nor accept within the Russian discourse that "it was an inevitable price of future successes" (Segodnya v Akorde Glava gosudarstva Nursultan Nazarbaev provel vstrechu, posvyashchennuyu pamyati zhertv politicheskikh repressii 2010). But in 2012 at the opening of a monument dedicated to the victims of famine, the President warned: "We must be wise in our comprehension of history and not politicize that theme. The reasons for the famine, deportations and mass human deaths were the brutal politics of the Soviet regime" (Nazarbayev 2012a).

In his article on using genocide for political purposes in the post-Communist period, Finkel wrote: "In the vast space from Estonia in the north to Kazakhstan in the south there is hardly a country whose authorities or opposition would not seriously consider the idea of official recognition of past suffering as genocide" (Finkel 2012, 297). But in a speech President Nazarbayev delivered in 2012 at the opening of the Monument of Memory to the famine victims of the 1920–1930s, we see no desire to describe a "national Holocaust" (Finkel 2012, 297), or evaluate the Kazakh people's tragedy as genocide. He stressed instead that "famine covered not only Kazakhstan, but Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as well," explaining that in total 7 million people died of hunger, of which 1.5 million perished in Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev 2012a). Let us compare this speech with the ceremonial address by Victor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, in November 2009 on the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Holodomor:

> We see the real scale of our nations' annihilation in the relocation of hundreds of thousands of families from other republics to impoverished regions, especially Donetsk, Lugansk, Khar'kov, Poltava, Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolayev and other oblasts. Like us, they also became the hostages of the regime. We definitely know that this was genocide – a pestilence on our people accompanied by ferocious murder of its intelligentsia, clergy, and political, public and cultural elites. We recognize Holodomor as genocide in the Ukrainian parliament. (Yushchenko 2009)

Many ex-Soviet states mark a Memorial Day for Victims of Political Repression in their calendars, but its symbolism can differ considerably. For example, in Uzbekistan it is dedicated to all of the citizens who were first brutally persecuted by Tsarist Russia, and then by representatives of Bolshevik power: it is a commemoration of "compatriots and fighters for freedom who were victimized by the regime" (V Uzbekistane 2012). In 2013 the list of tragic events in Uzbekistan's history was listed thus: the conquest of Turkestan by Russia in the nineteenth century; the Jadid movement; the New Economic Policy campaign on dekulakization; the "horrible repression of the 1930s–1950s;" and the "cotton affair" of the 1980s (the arrest of thousands of officials for corruption). Uzbekistan's commemoration day is also highly symbolic as it takes place on 31 August and precedes the national holiday

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of Independence Day, celebrated on 1 September – which adds weight to the idea that they "sacrificed their lives for the freedom of the country" ("V Uzbekistane" 2012).

In 2012, Kazakhstan's Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Political Repression also became a memorial day for the victims of the 1932–1933 famine. The authorities built an obelisk in their honor, and emphasize that the two tragedies are interconnected, both being the result of "the Soviet regime's harsh policies … that cannot be justified in any way" (Nazarbayev 2012b). The concluding parts of the speeches by the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also have different meanings. President Nazarbayev states that this situation will never be repeated, and that "the victims did not suffer in vain – they passed on immunity to the virus of violence and extremism to future generations. This is the lesson – that it must never happen again." But the President of Uzbekistan has a different point of view, seeing the victims as "the price for independence;" their sacrifice was also not in vain, because "Uzbekistan became an independent and prosperous country." During the Malinovka Memorial opening speech, Nazarbayev stated that this was the place for remembering those "who were guiltlessly repressed and annihilated;" on the other hand, the "*Shahidlar hotirasi*" memorial complex in Uzbekistan is "an expression of deep respect and worshipping of the memory of thousands of compatriots who were victims of the colonial regime's repression."

It is clear that the Kazakhstan government realizes the importance of the tragic events of the Stalinist period as symbolic resources in achieving the long-term strategic objectives of domestic policy, such as the formation of national identity, creating solidarity within a large community, and the development of collective self-appraisal (Malinova 2012, 389).

The speeches given by Kazakhstan's President on the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Political Repression are about what is most important to society – unity and trust.

Nazarbayev's commemorative speeches are more than just a celebration of past or present accomplishments – they give the audience hope for the future and celebrate such basic values as justice, kindness, and truth, accentuating the need for tolerance, values, and social norms of a civil society. In his words: "Stability, peace, and unity are reliable guarantees of prosperity and wealth for the country, and the welfare of every Kazakhstani family. We must keep them and pass them on to future generations" (Nazarbayev 2014).

A strong theme through all of Nazarbayev's speeches is the idea that "we reject evil, violence and brutality in our past," and "the values of unity and accord are the foundation of our society, the basis of our unique Kazakhstani tolerance … that we must carefully pass on to new generations of Kazakhstani people" (Nazarbayev 2012b, 2014; The Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan 2009). There is no prolonged focus on loss or suffering in President Nazarbayev's commemorative speeches, nor is there any intention to use the tragic pages of history as rhetoric for legitimizing independence (Finkel 2012, 296). Nazarbayev's speeches are clearly memorial speeches that honor the victims, not political vehicles for influencing audiences' feelings.

Conclusion

Thus, at a closer look, it becomes clear that deliberate policies of memory construction of the totalitarian suffering and its ethnic neutralization have defined notable directions in the new historical narrative in Kazakhstan. The commemorative narrative in Kazakhstan is built around Stalinist victims who are universally sacralized and have no ethnic face; they are mostly anonymous victims sharing common tragic ordeals and human suffering. However, the narrative does not concern the heroism of the Kazakh people or the struggle on their way to gaining independence from Soviet rule. The Kazakhstani narrative is shaped

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

by the desire to enlist the Stalinist history into the universal history of suffering by focusing on the idea that Kazakhs were not the only victims.

Nevertheless, commemorative practices in Kazakhstan, despite their non-ethnic nature, have not yet come to the interpretation of Stalinism as a dictatorship hostile to democracy and lawful states. Kazakhstani narrative is characterized by an abstract and generalized vision of dictatorship as arbitrary historical violence against people.

Moreover, the Kazakhstani narrative is characterized by an abstract and generalized vision of dictatorship. For instance, no place has been found for deported peoples still with regard to the official position of the state. The memory about them is formed and maintained not at the government level, but only at the levels of family and diaspora. The selected list of actors entitled to construct a commemorative narrative in Kazakhstan is quite limited, and includes only the elite in power and a few representatives of the intelligentsia.

Kazakhstan is not an exception in using the memory of the terror victims in its nation-building process (Denison 2009, 1167; Jõesalu 2012, 1007; Malinova 2012, 388). Arguably, the commemorative practices are employed as a symbolic support to unite an ethnically diverse population. This is reflected in promoting the concept of "Kazakhstanis" proposed by President Nazarbayev, especially in the National Unity Doctrine and its key formula: one people, one fate, different origin but equal opportunities (The Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan 2009; "The Strategy for development of the Republic of Kazakhstan until the year 2030" 1997).

The nation-building process in Kazakhstan is far from being complete and promises to be a prolonged one, if only because it attempts to accommodate various ethnicities under one civic-based state. The community of professional historians is not homogeneous regarding the nation-building processes. Furthermore, social–cultural context is much more complex than the state non-nationalist commemorative practices. Kazakhstan's commemorative practices have thus developed as idiosyncratic, selective, de-ethnicized, elite driven, and historically non-specific.

Where the Soviet period is concerned, the state plays down its diverse ethnic components, to some extent passing it over in deliberate silence (Connerton 2008, 59), "taking into consideration long-term objectives such as national identity formation, solidarity mobilization within the framework of a bigger community, collective self-appraisal raising …" (Malinova 2012, 388–389). Among Connerton's seven types of forgetting, "a third type of forgetting, which is constitutive in the formation of a new identity," can be applied to historical policy relating to the memory of Stalinist repression in Kazakhstan.

> The emphasis here is not so much on the loss entailed in being unable to retain certain things as rather on the gain that accrues to those who know how to discard memories that serve no practicable purpose in the management of one's current identity and ongoing purposes … Forgetting then becomes a part of the process by which newly shared memories are constructed because a new set of memories are frequently accompanied by a set of tacitly shared silences. What is allowed to be forgotten provides living space for present projects. (Connerton 2008, 63)

In general, one can say there is no comprehensive or coherent account of the Soviet period in the national history narrative in Kazakhstan. While there exists a multiplicity of formal and informal discourse in the society on nation and identity building, such a discourse is rather absent in the commemorative narrative about the victims of the Stalinist repressions. This has left the state as the only effective interpreter and player in dealing with memories of victims of the Soviet period; the fact that plays out both as a constraining factor on a wider national debate and as a paternalist instrument for preventing ethnic dissonance.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes

1. The final version of the composition consists of seven cubes with two stelae on each side. The words of the president have been placed on the left stela; on the right one there is an inscription titled "Eternal memory," written in 40 languages.
2. A shroud is a swath of linen or white cotton that wraps a dead man's body in Islamic funerals.
3. Four high granite posts are symbolic of mothers bowing their heads to the innocent victims on their iron prison stools under the cold light of a cell. A gun muzzle looks out of the stylized cell as a symbol of violence and annihilation, and the prison bars symbolize the hopelessness and deep trauma.
4. This monument comprises bronze wings on a black-and-white pedestal, with a background of red prison bars, and barbed wire twining round the wings to prevent them from taking off. The monument is crowned by a flower.
5. The mission and objectives of the museum were defined in the following way:

   > The main task of the museum is to accumulate and disseminate knowledge about that unprecedented tragedy; preserve the memory about those who suffered; and induce its visitors to ponder over moral issues that those tragic events pose before us, and over their civic duties and responsibility as citizens of the democratic states.

6. In the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression is an annual commemorative celebration decreed by the Kazakhstani President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, since 1997.

References

Abashin, Sergei. 2009. "Mustakillik i pamyat' ob imperskom proshlom: prokhodya po zalam tashkentskogo Muzeya pamyati zhertv repressii." *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* 66 (4). http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2009/4/ab6.html.

Adler, Nanci. 2005. "The Future of the Soviet Past Remains Unpredictable: The Resurrection of Stalinist Symbols Amidst the Exhumation of Mass Graves." *Europe-Asia Studies* 57 (8): 1093–1119.

Adler, Nanci. 2012. "Reconciliation with – or Rehabilitation of – The Soviet Past?" *Memory Studies* 5 (3): 327–338.

Anstett, Elisabeth. 2011. "Memory of Political Repression in Post-Soviet Russia: The Example of the Gulag." Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence. September 13, 2011. Accessed February 25, 2013. http://www.massviolence.org/Memory-of-political-repression-in-post-Soviet-Russia-the?decoupe_recherche=elisabeth%20anstett.

Bingula, Mihaela. 2012. "The Role of Museums in the Construction of the Social Memory of the 1990's in Croatia." *Ethnological Researches* 17: 153–170.

Connerton, Paul. 2008. "Seven Types of Forgetting." *Memory Studies* 1 (1): 59–71.

Denison, Michael. 2009. "The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism, and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan." *Europe-Asia Studies* 61 (7): 1167–1187.

Etkind, Alexander. 2009. "Post-Soviet Hauntology: Cultural Memory of the Soviet Terror." *Constellations* 16 (1): 182–200.

Finkel, Evgenii. 2012. "V poiskakh 'poteriannykh genotsidov': istoricheskaia politika i mezhdunarodnaia politika v Vostochnoi Evrope posle 1989g." In *Istoricheskaia politika v XXI v*, edited by Alexei Miller and Maria Lipman, 292–328. Moskva, RF: Novoe literatur noe obozrenie.

Forest, Benjamin, and Juliet Johnson. 2002. "Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92 (3): 524–547.

Gar'kavyi, Igor'. 2012. "Pomnit', chtoby zhit'. 75 let s nachala Bol'shogo terrora." October 30. http://solovki-monastyr.ru/library/543/.

Gillis, John R. 1994. *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

"Glava gosudarstva Nursultan Nazarbaev prinyal uchastie v torzhestvennoi tseremonii otkrytiya Memorial'no-muzeinogo kompleksa pamyati zhertv politicheskikh repressii i totalitarizma "ALZhIR"." 2007. Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, last modified

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

May 5, 2007. http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_glava-gosudarstva-nursultan-nazarbaev-prinyal-uchastie-v-torzhestvennoi-tseremon_1348723516#page.
Gnedovskii, Mikhail. 2010. "Starye i novye istoricheskie muzei. Panorama memorial'nykh muzeev (muzeev sovesti)." ossiiskii portal "Uroki istorii." Accessed October 7. http://urokiistorii.ru/memory/place/1194.
International Memorial Museums Charter. 2011. "Rossiiskii portal "Uroki istorii." Accessed December 9, 2011. http://falstadsenteret.no/ic_memo/charter.pdf.
Istoriia muzeia "Perm' 36." 2009. "Sait Perm' 36 Muzei istorii politicheskikh repressii." Accessed September 21, 2010. http://www.perm36.ru/ru/istoriya/istoriya-muzeya.html.
Jankowski, Henryk. 2012. "Kazakh in Contact with Russian in Modern Kazakhstan." *Turkic Languages* 16 (1): 25–67.
Jõesalu, Kirsti. 2012. "The Role of the Soviet Past in Post-Soviet Memory Politics Through Examples of Speeches from Estonian Presidents." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64 (6): 1007–1032.
"Kazakhstan vspominaet zhertv politicheskikh repressii." 2002. Web "Centrasia.ru." Accessed June 2, 2002. http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1022875320.
Kokhanova, Svetlana. 2009. "Arkhipelag Karlag." Express K. Accessed December 23, 2009. http://www.express-k.kz/show_article.php?art_id=35415.
Kul'maganbetova, Gil'zat. 2012. "Nasledie kazakhskikh kurakov." Accessed December 6. http://www.enu.kz.
Malinova, Olga. 2012. "Ispol'zovanie proshlogo v rossiiskoi ofitsial'noi simvolicheskoi politike (na primere analiza ezhegodnykh prezidentskikh poslanii." In *Istoricheskaia politika v XXI v*, edited by Alexei Miller and Maria Lipman, 368–395. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie.
Mezhdunarodnyi ustav memorial'nykh muzeev. 2011. "Rossiiskii portal "Uroki istorii."" Accessed December 9. http://www.urokiistorii.ru/memory/org/2712.
Miller, Aleksei. 2012. "Istoricheskaia politika v Vostochnoi Evrope nachala XXI v." In *Istoricheskaia politika v XXI v*, edited by Alexei Miller and Maria Lipman, 7–32. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie.
Moore, Lisa M. 2009. "(Re) covering the Past, Remembering Trauma: The Politics of Commemoration at Sites of Atrocity." *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 20: 47–64.
Nazarbayev, Nursultan. 2012a. "Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan Nursultana Nazarbaeva na otkrytii Monumenta pamiati zhertv goloda 1932–1933." Ofitsial'nyi sait Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan. Accessed May 31. http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-nursultana-nazarbaeva-na-otkrytii-monumenta-pamyati-zhertv-golo#page.
Nazarbayev, Nursultan. 2012b. "Vystuplenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N.A.Nazarbaeva na XIX sessii Assamblei naroda Kazakhstana." Ofitsial'nyi sait Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan. Accessed April 27. http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/vystuplenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-n-a-nazarbaeva-na-xix-sessii-assamblei-naroda-kazakhstana-27-04-2012_1340715076#page.
Nazarbayev, Nursultan. 2014. "Address of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev to the Nation." Accessed January 17. http://akorda.kz/en/page/page_215752_.
Owen, Catherine. 2011. "Memorial Ata-Beiit: Kyrgyzstan zakryvaet vozmozhnost' dialoga s sovetskim proshlym." Accessed November 14. http://www.cogita.ru/pamyat/istoricheskaya-politika/memorial-ata-beiit-kyrgyzstan-zakryvaet-vozmozhnost-dialoga-s-sovetskim-proshlym.
Pettai, Eva, ed. 2014. *Memory and Pluralism in the Baltic States*. London: Routledge.
Podeh, Elie. 2011. *The Politics of National Celebrations in the Arab Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Segodnya v Akorde Glava gosudarstva Nursultan Nazarbaev provel vstrechu, posvyashchennuyu pamyati zhertv politicheskikh repressii. 2010. "V meropriyatii prinyali uchastie potomki repressirovannykh iz Kazakhstana i deportirovannykh iz-za rubezha v Kazakhstan v period 30-50-kh godov XX veka." Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, last modified May 27, 2010, http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_segodnya-v-akorde-glava-gosudarstva-nursultan-nazarbaev-provel-vstrechu-posvyash_1348723080#page.
Shakirova, Svetlana. 2012. "Letters to Nazarbaev: Kazakhstan's Intellectuals Debate National Identity." February 7. Accessed July 28, 2015. http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/discussion/letters-nazarbaev-kazakhstans-intellectuals-debate-national-identity.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Stradanie kak eksponat ili Muzei strogogo rezhima/kak pokazyvat' v muzeiakh 'negativnuiu istoriiu.' 2011. "Rossiiskii portal "Uroki istorii."" Accessed October 11. http://www.urokiistorii.ru/current/view/2528.

The Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan. Astana. 2009. "Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations in New-York." http://kazakhstanun.org/press-releases/the-doctrine-of-national-unity-of-kazakhstan.html.

"The Strategy for Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan Until the Year 2030." 1997. Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakstan. Accessed October http://www.akorda.kz/en/category/gos_programmi_razvitiia.

"V Uzbekistane otmetili Den' pamiati zhertv repressii." 2012. Accessed August 31. http://www.gazeta.uz/2012/08/31/memorial/.

Westrate, Michael. 2009. "Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post Soviet Russia: Destroying the Settled Past, Creating an Uncertain Future." *Europe-Asia Studies* 61 (4): 721–722.

Whitmarsh, Andrew. 2001. "'We Will Remember Them' Memory and Commemoration in War Museums." *Journal of Conservation and Museum Studies* 7: 11–15.

Yushchenko, Viktor. 2009. "Vystuplenie Prezidenta Ukrainy Viktora Yushchenko v Den' pamiati zhertv Golodomora." Novosti Ukrainy. Accessed November 28. http://www.ua-today.com/modules/myarticles/article_storyid_27851.html.

Zerubavel, Yael. 1995. *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157 Published online by Cambridge University Press