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Empathy in Translation: Movement and Image in the Psychological Laboratory

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Argument

The new English term "empathy" was translated from the German *Einfühlung* in the first decade of the twentieth century by the psychologists James Ward at the University of Cambridge and Edward B. Titchener at Cornell. At Titchener's American laboratory, "empathy" was not a matter of understanding other minds, but rather a projection of imagined bodily movements and accompanying feelings into an object, a meaning that drew from its rich nineteenth-century aesthetic heritage. This rendering of "empathy" borrowed kinaesthetic meanings from German sources, but extended beyond a contemplation of the beautiful to include a variety of experimental stimuli and everyday objects in the laboratory. According to Titchener's structural psychology, all higher thought could be reduced to more elemental aspects of mind, and experimental introspection showed empathy to be constituted of kinaesthetic images. The existence of kinaesthetic images, Titchener argued, formed an incisive critique of the view that thought could take place without images, held by one of Titchener's major psychological rivals, the school of thought-psychologists in Würzburg, Germany. The new term "empathy" in early American academic psychology therefore delineated a kinaesthetic imaginative projection that took place on the basis of ontological difference between minds and things.

> "... everything is strange, but it is to us that the strange experience has come" (Edward B. Titchener 1915, 198)

When an experimental subject in Cheves Perky's 1910 experiments on the imagination conducted at the Cornell psychology laboratory was told to imagine a bunch of grapes, the report was of "a cool, juicy feeling all over"; when imagining a parrot, the response was of "a feeling of smoothness and softness all over me"; and the image of fish elicited a "slippery feeling in my throat, coolness in my eyes" (Perky 1910, 448–49). This subject, an "Observer" in the language of the new experimental psychology, was practicing systematic introspection – painstakingly describing the images, sensations, and affects running through the mind while observing, listening to stimuli, or imagining objects in the laboratory. In this instance, the Observer's felt sense of merging with the

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image of a fish, parrot, or grape was designated as "kinaesthetic empathy." Empathy, according to this rendering, was tied to one's own body and not to understanding another's emotional life, a meaning significantly different from that of contemporary American usage. Perky's experiments have been long considered one of the classic studies exhibiting the porous line between imagination and perception, but they were also one of the first to document empathy in a now unfamiliar variety in an American psychology laboratory.[1]

The term "empathy" was new to the English speaking world.[2] It was a translation of *Einfühlung,* a process of "feeling into" an object of art and a vaunted aesthetic theory in Germany, beginning in 1866 with the work of Friedrich Theodor Vischer and Robert Vischer, although its roots go back to Arthur Schopenhauer and Hermann Lotze (Mallgrave and Eleftherios 1994, 20; Vischer [1873] 1994). Vischer described *Einfühlung* as a process of projecting both body and soul into the inner structure or the form of an object (Vischer [1873] 1994, 92). One might project one's own feelings, movements, and bodily responses so that, for example, one would feel expansiveness or mental breadth whilst encountering a large form, or perceive a cliff to be standing at attention and defiant (ibid., 105). It was sometimes described as a fusion of the self and object, and most famously was depicted by the Munich psychologist and philosopher Theodor Lipps as pleasure objectified, or experienced in the object of contemplation itself (Lipps [1903] 1923; idem [1906] 1920; Jarzombek 2000; Koss 2006; Allesch 1987). Lipps declared *Einfühlung* the *sine qua non* of aesthetic experience, but he also extended the purview of *Einfühlung* beyond aesthetics to nature, common objects, and the expressions of others.[3] *Einfühlung* has a complex history in German philosophy, aesthetics, and psychology: it has been closely associated with Dilthey's aesthetic psychological methods of re-experiencing (*Nacherleben*) or putting oneself in the position of another (*Sich hineinversetzen*), and *Einfühlung* theory has also been

[1] Perky's study is still referred to in psychology textbooks as a classic mental imagery experiment, demonstrating how imagined images could be mistaken for perceptual images. Her findings were replicated in 1971, but in order to reproduce the effect, subjects had to be in a state of relaxation. One recent interpretation of the experiment is that the imagination can block normal perceptual mechanisms (see Thomas 2010).

[2] The *Oxford English Dictionary* reports that the Victorian novelist, travel writer, and psychological aesthetician, Vernon Lee (Violet Paget), was the first one to use the English term in her 1904 journals, but she credited E. B. Titchener, the director of the Cornell laboratory, in her 1912 book, *Beauty and Ugliness* (Lanzoni 2009). Lee's journals are no longer extant in the Vernon Lee archive in the Miller Library at Colby College, Maine. It seems likely that she made a retrospective translation, using the term "empathy" in 1912 to describe her earlier journal entries.

[3] Lipps described other forms of *Einfühlung*, including general apperceptive *Einfühlung*, for common objects; empirical *Einfühlung* of nature; mood *Einfühlung*, and *Einfühlung* with others, achieved through the sensory perception of the appearances of living beings (for his account of these different forms of *Einfühlung*, see Lipps 1903a chap. 14, 187–202; see also Lipps 1902, 368, for a definition of aesthetic *Einfühlung* as an unmediated experience in which one's own feelings are experienced in the aesthetic object).

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theorized as a early phenomenology *avant la lettre* (Barasch 1998, 117; Friedrich and Gleiter 2007, 9).[4]

If *Einfühlung* possessed a variety of meanings in late nineteenth-century German intellectual culture, this article asks how it came to be translated as "empathy," and what it meant in Anglophone psychological contexts. The fact that there are multiple early translations of the term reflects the growing importance of the concept in international circles during the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1909, Titchener had suggested the term as a translation of the *Einfühlung* in a series of lectures on the *Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes*, and early that same year, James Ward, a psychologist and philosopher at the University of Cambridge, had also suggested "empathy" as a translation. Titchener's translation of *Einfühlung* as empathy is often cited in the social psychological literature on the roots of empathy, but most accounts do not mention Ward's translation, nor do they elaborate on the context and meanings of empathy in Titchener's psychological laboratory (Wispé 1987; Hunsdahl 1967; Gladstein 1984).[5] This article tackles both projects: first showing that "empathy" had been suggested by James Ward in early 1909 or before, and second (which forms the bulk of the article), exploring the meanings of empathy as it unfolded in lectures, textbooks, and in the practice of scientific psychology at the Cornell laboratory. Only one year after Titchener's translation, the terms "empathy" and "empathic" appeared in observers' reports of experimental introspections at the laboratory. Empathy's first meanings in American psychology can thus be seen through an excavation of this major site of its emergence – the historical and epistemological moment of a turn of the twentieth-century practice of introspective experimental psychology at Cornell.[6]

How then was "empathy" reported as an experimental finding and in the textbooks emerging from Titchener's laboratory? Titchener first defined "empathy" in public lectures held at the University of Illinois at Urbana in March 1909, a sustained argument against the competing claims of the thought-psychologists based, for the most part, at the Psychological Institute at the University of Würzburg in Germany, under

[4] Dilthey's outline of a *verstehende* psychology, or a descriptive psychology in contrast to an explanatory or causal psychology included psychological and historical methods for transferring oneself into the expressions of life of another as a way of re-experiencing, a "*sich hineinversetzen*" (with similarities to *Einfühlung*) (see Dilthey ([1894], 1977; see also Makkreel 2000, 181–193; and Ringer 1969, 81–127). Friedrich and Gleiter argue that *Einfühlungsästhetik* as it emerged in the work of the Vischers found aesthetics to be a special case of everyday sensory experience – a way of perceiving the expressive and soulful content of objects. *Einfühlungsästhetik* also influenced architectural theories of the embodiment of space, exemplified in Heinrich Wölfflin, "Prolegomena zu einer Psychologie der Architektur" [1886] and August Schmarsow, "Über den Werth der Dimensionen im menschlichen Raumgebilde" [1896], both reprinted in Friedrich and Gleiter 2007.

[5] Wispé provides a helpful overview of the term's use in early American psychology, but only discusses the meaning of the term in Titchener's published writings of 1909 and 1915, omitting a description of empathy as an experimental finding in the laboratory (Wispé 1987).

[6] I frame my approach in the tradition of historical epistemology and ontology, defining a concept as a word to be understood in its sites, to paraphrase Ian Hacking (see Hacking 2002, 17; Daston and Galison 2007; Davidson 2002).

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the laboratory director Owsald Külpe.[7] Introspective experiments had led thought-psychologists to report that some thoughts, along with a variety of conscious attitudes (*Bewusstseinlagen*), were not composed of images or sensations, but were themselves elementary aspects of the mind (Mayer and Orth 1901; Marbe 1901; Kusch 1999; Humphrey 1951, 106–32). But Titchener's psychology had decreed that all contents of the mind could be reduced to basic mental elements – sensations, images, or feelings. Titchener claimed that thought-psychologists had simply overlooked kinaesthetic images, along with other organic images and sensations in their introspections of higher thought processes. A kinaesthetic image was the mind's *image* or *inner representation* of bodily movement, understood by analogy to a visual image, and enacted in the "mind's muscles." In these lectures, published in November 1909 as *Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes,* Titchener argued that "empathy" was one among other complex thoughts constituted by more elementary building blocks of the mind – in this case, the kinaesthetic image.

Titchener located "empathy" in the bodily imagination, and at the same time squarely within the academic project to uncover the structure of the mind in the controlled setting of the new experimental psychology.[8] His translation largely followed Wundt, in shifting the emphasis of *Einfühlung* from the subject's engagement with a beautiful object to a more generic function of the kinesthetic imagination. At the Cornell laboratory, empathy was enacted with everyday objects and situations, along with a variety of experimental stimuli. Titchener also drew from Vischer's characterization of *Einfühlung* as a process of objectifying one's bodily form, the body's sensations and movements, and even more deeply, one's feelings, into the form of the aesthetic object (Vischer [1873] 1994). Yet Titchener emphasized the presence of images of movement, or the kinaesthetic image, rather than actual feelings or sensations in empathic response.

Titchener did not lay much claim to the interpersonal value of *Einfühlung*, which Lipps had included among the many different forms of *Einfühlung*, as a reading of emotion through the sensory signs of others' expressions (Lipps [1903a]). This intersubjective meaning of *Einfühlung* often carried with it an assumption that one could read the emotions of others veridically, but Titchener questioned this ability, especially as a method of scientific study.[9] To empathize at the Cornell laboratory, rather, was to

[7] Proponents of the possibility of thought without images also included G. F. Stout 1896, Woodworth 1906, and Binet 1903. Titchener contracted with Macmillan to publish the lectures later that year, and wrote the preface and sent in the manuscript in July 1909, with an additional hundred pages of notes (George Juett at Macmillan Co. to Titchener, March 18, 1909, 14/23/545 Box 2. Edward Bradford Titchener Papers # 14-23-545 Rare and Manuscript Collections, Kroch Library, Cornell University [hereafter cited as EBT].)

[8] By 1904, there were more than 30 universities which held professorships of psychology, and 54 psychological laboratories in North America. More than 60 per cent of the students at larger universities had taken at least one psychology course (see Miner 1904; Cattell 1917).

[9] Max Scheler also critiqued Lipps's projective model of *Einfühlung* as inadequate to understand another's experience, arguing that it was a mechanical reading of emotion from another's sensory appearance or facial

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imagine objects or stimuli through an intimate kinaesthetic entry into their being. An otherness then, was not only part of the empathic process, but provided the condition for empathic experience to be carried out at all. Unlike the ways in which one might empathize today with another's state of mind or emotional expressions, empathy in experimental introspection remained closely connected to its German aesthetic origin. It merged subjects into things, and made things into subjects, unfolding on the basis of the ontological difference of empathizer and object, rather than on similarity.[10]

Before Empathy there Was Aesthetic Sympathy

Titchener, along with other English speaking psychologists at the turn of the twentieth century was in the business of translating major German psychological and psychophysiological texts for the English-speaking world.[11] British by birth, Titchener had studied the classics at Oxford, then physiological psychology in Leipzig with Wilhelm Wundt. He became one of the foremost practitioners of structural psychology in North America, serving as director of the Cornell laboratory from 1892 until his death in 1927 (Evans 1990; Heidbreder 1933). He was an editor of the *American Journal of Psychology* (with G. Stanley Hall and Edmund C. Sanford), took over sole editorship in 1921, and served as one of the American editors of the journal *Mind*. Although his method of pinpointing the elemental structures of the mind faded with the rise of behaviorist methods and the popularity of applied psychology around the time of World War I, his laboratory methods were standard practice for experimental psychologists for many years (Evans 1990, 30–32; Hindeland 1971).

Many American and British psychologists had earned their doctorates in Leipzig under Wundt and were immersed in German psychological literature in the late nineteenth century. Titchener claimed that nine-tenths of psychologists were trained in Germany in 1895 and consequently, "thinking in German upon psychological questions must be easier that thinking either in English or French" (Titchener 1895, 78). Anglophone psychologists struggled to translate German terminology into English,

responses, resulting merely in the projection of one's own feeling onto others (see Scheler 1970, 10–11). Scheler's critique of Lipps's theory of *Einfühlung* was adapted for psychiatric practice by the Swiss psychiatrist and proto-existentialist Ludwig Binswanger (see Lanzoni 2003). The film theorist Kaja Silverman draws on Scheler's idea of "heteropathic identification" as a form of empathic difference in which the self does not fully absorb the other, although Scheler had explicitly contrasted this notion with a Lippsian model of *Einfühlung* (see Silverman 1996, 23–24, 102; Scheler 1970, 18–19).

[10] The larger project of which this article forms a part is a book-length genealogical study of the shifting meanings of empathy across a broad range disciplinary and cultural domains beginning with the German aesthetic rendering of *Einfühlung* at the turn of the twentieth century and moving into American intellectual circles and cultural discourse over the course of this century. For more on contemporary interpersonal conceptions of empathy as understood from cognitive and philosophical perspectives, and touching on themes of difference and similarity, see Stephen Turner's and Shaun Gallagher's contributions in this issue.

[11] Some of his many translations include Külpe 1895 and 1897; and Wundt 1901 and 1904.

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and the term *Einfühlung* posed particular difficulties. In 1901, the philologist Wilbur M. Urban at Ursinus College described Lipps's concept of *Einfühlung* as a process whereby effects produced by an object awakened free activity of one's own, which was then experienced in the objectively conditioned experience. This resulted in an accord between subject and object – a familiar enough experience, as he put it, but it was "difficult to find an English equivalent" (Urban 1901, 433).

By 1909, a number of different translations of *Einfühlung* had emerged. In reviews of Lipps's work in English language periodicals, the preferred term was most commonly "aesthetic sympathy" and sometimes merely "sympathy" ("Philosophical Periodicals" 1900, 563; 1901, 428). Standardizing psychological nomenclature was a challenging task as evidenced by the efforts of editors of the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, published from 1901–1905. This dictionary listed English equivalents for a number of French, German, Italian, and other foreign terms.[12] *Einfühlung* was given the translation "aesthetic sympathy" in an entry written by J. Mark Baldwin with agreement initialed by Urban and Titchener, along with a note that Lipps had also used the term *Beseelung* or "animation" (Baldwin 1901–05, 679). Titchener alluded to aesthetic *Einfühlung* theory in 1899 when he spoke of aesthetic sentiments as "one's own emotions, projected into other people or into external nature, and refound there by one's active attention" (Titchener [1899] 1916, 330). In the *Dictionary*, however, the psychologist Karl Groos voiced his disagreement with Lipps's theory in an addendum, complaining that the locale of feeling (either in oneself or in the object) was confused in the term *Einfühlung* (Baldwin 1901–05, 679).

"Aesthetic sympathy" was not the only term suggested as a translation of *Einfühlung*: the philosopher James H. Tufts offered "pathos" and "pathetic"; it was also described as the animation of an object with one's own living energy, and the German philosopher J. Volkelt called it a fusion of the self and object (Volkelt 1876). The German-born Harvard psychologist Hugo Münsterberg treated aesthetic *Einfühlung* at length in his *Philosophie der Werte* in 1908, but in his own English translation the following year, described it as "feeling ourselves into" art or nature – a process "by which we introject our emotions into the things. We feel ourselves into the beautiful objects and give life and soul to them" (Münsterberg 1908, 191; idem 1909, 170). As the phenomenologist Andrea Pinotti has pointed out, there was never one simple psychological depiction of *Einfühlung* or empathy: projection, transfer, association, animation, personification, vivification, fusion, identification, among others were all possibilities (Pinotti 2010, 94).

These varied translations not only reflect the range of meanings of *Einfühlung* in a myriad of English terms, but also underscore the heated international debates regarding the role of association, imitation, motor movement, and the contribution of organic

[12] A discussion of the necessity of standardizing international psychological terms took place in August 1909 at the Sixth International Congress of Psychology, where new terms were to be derived from Greek and Latin roots (see Ogden 1909).

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sensations and mental factors in aesthetic *Einfühlung* (Geiger 1911). Some ventured to document actual motor movements while empathizing (Lee and Anstruther-Thomson 1897; Groos 1902), while others saw it as a form of inner imitation of gestures, and still others viewed it as a more abstract projection of one's own inner willing and striving onto the object without sensory or motor components. Lipps stressed the projection of spiritualized inner activity – the feelings and strivings of the ego or self and not muscular sensations were felt in the perceived object (Allesch 1987, 335; Lipps 1900; Lipps [1903] 1960). *Einfühlung* proliferated into many different types – in the main it was seen as an aesthetic process, but Lipps listed mood and nature *Einfühlung* along with the grasp of others' emotions through the perception of sensory signs of facial expressions. Despite its diverse meanings, however, *Einfühlung* theory most often entailed movement or activity, whether overt, inner, or imagined.

"*Einfühlung*" as "Empathy"

Although the term "empathy" has been widely reported to have first appeared in Titchener's 1909 *Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes*, this was not indeed its earliest appearance. In July of the previous year, it showed up in a footnote, attributed to Titchener but misspelled by the Viennese philosopher Oscar Ewald in his survey of German philosophy in the *Philosophical Review*. Ewald translated *Einfühlung* as "sympathy," adding in a footnote: "Professor E.B. Titchener has suggested the introduction of the term "enpathy" as an equivalent for *Einfühlung*" (Ewald 1908, 407). This was clearly a misprint, for in November of that year, a correction was printed offering the new term, "empathy" ("Notes" 1908, 694). Given that the editors of the *Philosophical Review* were based at Cornell, it seems likely Titchener engaged in conversations about the translation of *Einfühlung* in early 1908 with his colleagues.

But the adoption of "empathy" for *Einfühlung* is also attributed to the British professor of mental philosophy and logic at the University of Cambridge, James Ward, in a textbook on experimental psychology written in early 1909 by Ward's colleague, Charles S. Myers. Explicating Lipps' account of *Einfühlung*, Myers defined *Einfühlung* as "living into" the experience of the object; or a process by which "the subject feels in himself the suggestions of strain, movement or rest in the object, and makes them part of himself" (Myers 1909, 331). Myers then used the term empathy as a translation of *Einfühlung*, commenting in a footnote: "Professor James Ward suggests to me this convenient translation of the German *Einfühlung*." A lecturer at St. Andrews, R.F. Hoernle, also gave credit to Ward for the translation, along with the psychologist Charles Spearman, the reviewer of Myers' textbook in the journal *Mind*.[13] And, even

[13] R.F. Hoernle, a lecturer at St. Andrews and at Capetown, attributes the translation to Ward in Hoernle 1914, 600; (see also Spearman 1909, 617–618).

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more conclusively, Ward himself made this claim in a 1915 letter to the anthropologist Sir James Frazer, writing that recent talk of *Einfühlung* had been rendered by him as "empathy," a concept he found similar to Frazer's notion of personification.[14] Ward's conception of empathy thus entailed an almost religious personification of the world of objects, perhaps drawing on Vischer's pantheistic views, and supporting Ward's panpsychism.[15]

Despite being proponents of very different psychologies, Ward and Titchener both proffered the translation at about the same time from different sides of the Atlantic. In October 1908, the term "empathy" appeared in *Mind* in a summary of philosophical periodicals, likely written by one of the contributing editors, possibly Titchener or Ward: Titchener was the American editorial representative and had been paid for writing this section in previous years, and Ward was on the advisory committee.[16] It may have been that Ward and Titchener discussed the translation, as they shared a correspondence, or that they had independently turned to the Greek for the translation.[17]

Although the precise provenance of the English term remains unclear, by 1908, Anglophone psychologists felt the need to capture the sense of *Einfühlung* with an English term, albeit by way of the Greek. This need emerged from the central place *Einfühlung* theory held in German psychological aesthetics, as evidenced in the extended debates on its nature and scope in the *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, edited by Max Dessoir beginning in 1906. Ethel Puffer Howes, studying aesthetics at Münsterberg's laboratory at Harvard, gave pride of place to *Einfühlung* theory which she called Empathy theory (without providing a source) in a 1913 review of recent work on aesthetics (Howes 1913). Vernon Lee published her *Beauty and Ugliness* in 1912 and referenced therein Titchener's translation, becoming an early source for many of the exclusive attributions of the term "empathy" to Titchener.[18] If Ward understood empathy to be a form of personification, Titchener's

[14] Ward to James Frazer, Nov. 11, 1915 (Add. Ms. b. 37/331), Trinity College Archive: TCA. The typewritten note says that he had "purposed [sic] the translation." The typed word read "sympathy," with "sy" crossed out and a big "e" written over it. This suggests an overlap or confusion between the terms sympathy and empathy or perhaps a typing error, as the letter contains both typewritten and handwritten sentences, and Ward's letters of a few years earlier were all handwritten.

[15] This essay has not tracked the uses of empathy in Ward's published works, but the lines of connection between his panpsychism and his view of empathy as a kind of personification would be an intriguing line of research to follow up.

[16] Philosophical Periodicals, *Mind New Series* 1908, 593. In this section of the journal *Mind*, a summary of an article by Frl. Von Renauld about reflexive sympathy based on Hume's thought, claimed that we are aware of the existence of others, "analogous to ourselves by way of empathy, which is based mainly upon the impulse to imitation." Titchener had written these sections of the journal in the 1890s, evidenced by Stout's letter of thanks to Titchener for penning "fresh Notices of Periodicals" for which he had sent him payment (G.F. Stout to Titchener, May 17, 1894. EBT).

[17] The different attributions of the translations may be in part the result of an Anglo-American divide, but one important exception was the Victorian aesthetician Vernon Lee, who cited Titchener's translation.

[18] For a detailed assessment of Vernon Lee's empathy theories, see Lanzoni 2009.

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scientific aim was to discover the elementary mental units of empathy. After 1909, experimental studies at the Cornell laboratory did just that, as Observers in the laboratory began to report kinaesthetic images as the basis for empathy in their introspective accounts.

Empathy as Kinaesthetic Image

Sometime around 1908, Titchener decided that his concurrence on "aesthetic sympathy" as a rendering of *Einfühlung,* as noted in Baldwin's psychological dictionary, should be amended. Indeed, his rejection of the translation "aesthetic sympathy," and the substitution of the term "empathy" was an attempt to unmoor the concept from aesthetics, on the one hand, and on the other, to distinguish the process from that of sympathy. In 1895 Titchener published a series of translations of German psychophysical terms into English noting that such translations should be based on Latin-Greek origins, as was the terminology of the natural sciences of physics and chemistry (Titchener 1895, 79). One advantage of new English terms, as he saw it, was that one could adopt a technical term without popular connotations (for instance "cognize" rather than "know") producing less misunderstanding in scientific practice. He was thus in accord with the translation strategy of his colleague, Edmund C. Sanford, who remarked to Titchener in a letter: "I prefer a good English word to a literal translation of the German-French terms, and where that is for any reason poor, a decent classical term made new for the thing."[19] This is precisely what Titchener did when translating *Einfühlung* as "empathy," drawing on the Greek *empatheia* with its meaning of "pathos" or "feeling," but with a new twist. *Empatheia* signaled strong passion, even intense negative feelings toward another person, but Titchener's translation went from the Greek via the German *Einfühlung* to become in his laboratory, a broad kinaesthetic imaginative capacity. "Empathy" was to be a technical English term, to be used in the new science of experimental psychology, which would not be easily confused with the popular term "sympathy."

Titchener therefore differentiated empathy felt *into* situations and objects, from sympathy *together with* another (Titchener 1915, 198; Jahoda 2005; emphases in original). "Sympathy" had been in wide circulation in the eighteenth century in a variety of fields from philosophy, medicine, and metaphysics, to aesthetics and everyday discourse.[20] By the nineteenth century, sympathy represented a reliable access to another's feelings, and as Titchener explained, "empathy" was an imaginative entry

[19] Sanford was a psychologist at Clark University and a co-editor with Titchener of the *Journal of American Psychology* (E.C. Sanford to Titchener, June 16, 1895; E.C. Sanford to Titchener, May 23, 1895. EBT).

[20] There is a vast literature on sympathy and the moral sentiments from the early modern period that I cannot review here, but a small selection would include Marshall 1984; Barker-Benfield 1992; Marshall 1988; and Vila 1998. On sentiment and the history of science, see Alberti 2006.

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into one's experience of objects. Although it could also signify an understanding of another's state of mind, Titchener did not find this method reliable. The Cornell laboratory rejected the use of *Einfühlung* as a method of understanding another's introspective reports, sometimes adopted at the Würzburg laboratory. Purported objective psychological observations of others were too often tinted with a "coloring of empathy or of introspective analogy," making empathic methods a faulty method for scientific inquiry (Jacobson 1911, 576; Titchener 1912, 432). Other psychologists of the time made similar distinctions: Helen Wodehouse distinguished between a genuine sympathy in which one shared another's experience, and an imaginative *Einfühlung* in which one played at sharing such feelings; and J. Mark Baldwin contrasted the realms of knowledge and imagination, the latter of which was one of semblance, make-believe, or *Einfühlung* (Wodehouse 1910, 531; Baldwin 1908, 182). In short, empathy was too closely associated with the self and semblance to undergird accurate perceptions of others.[21] It was rather a projective capacity, an imaginative movement of the mind into perceived objects.

Titchener introduced his translation in a series of lectures, in which he argued that complex, or "higher" forms of thought such as surprise, expectation, and familiarity, which the Würzburgians claimed were *sui generis,* could be reduced to more elementary sensations, images or affects (Kusch 1999; Brock 1991; Titchener 1908, 8). Because the psychologists at Würzburg had not been sufficiently attuned to the presence of kinaesthetic and other bodily images, he declared, they had fallen into this error. For Titchener, the mind was populated by images, and not surprisingly, his own introspection had revealed that his mind was decidedly of "the imaginal sort" (Titchener 1909b, 7). He told his audience that he could not read or write a paragraph without hearing imagined musical accompaniment – usually the sound of the wood-wind, as he was keen on the oboe.[22] In addition to experiencing vivid auditory imagery, he reported a plethora of visual images, which he could "mould and direct at will" (ibid., 10). When reading complex psychological literature, he assembled facts and arguments into a visual pattern –generally colored a dull red, containing angles rather than curves, and demonstrating movement along lines, and "neatness or confusion where the moving lines come together" (ibid., 11–12). These were vivid visual patterns, but "bodiless and papery" when compared to direct perception. Titchener envisioned his own mind as a "fairly complete picture gallery, not of finished paintings, but of impressionist notes" (ibid., 13).

Granting individual variance in imaginal ability, Titchener nonetheless affirmed that all conscious experience could be derived from images and sensations. Experienced

[21] It is precisely the accurate appraisal of another's feeling that the moral philosopher Julien A. Deonna seeks to include in a current conception of empathy (see Deonna 2007, 115).

[22] His musical capacity, as he put it, also gave him a "quick and comprehensive understanding of a composition," what he called "a sort of logical and aesthetic *Einfühlung*, and immediate (or very rapid) grasp of the sense and fitness of the musical structure" (Titchener 1909b, 205).

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introspectors could painstakingly discover these elements of consciousness in controlled conditions, the essential task of a scientific psychology. This experimental psychology, based on a description of the existing contents of consciousness, occupied a new epistemological niche, not to be confused with philosophical theories of mind, logic, or knowledge (Titchener 1910a, 405).[23] Scientific psychology was to describe the contents of consciousness "not as they mean but as they are" (Titchener 1909b, 25).

Images in the mind thus formed the psychological vehicles for logical and abstract meanings. Titchener's own vehicle of "horse," for instance, took the shape of "a double curve and a rampant posture with a touch of mane about it." Cow was "a longish rectangle with a certain facial expression, a sort of exaggerated pout" (ibid., 18). Even "meaning" had a picturable meaning – "the blue-grey top of a kind of scoop, which has a bit of yellow above it . . . and which is just digging into a dark mass of what appears to be plastic material" (ibid., 19). He attributed this image to his classical education, during which he had busied himself in ferreting out the meanings of Greek and Latin texts. Titchener quizzed his graduate students to find that some of them visualized "meaning" too: one saw it as the unfurling of a white scroll, and another saw it as a horizontal line with two short verticals at each end (ibid).

In 1909, Titchener added another set of images to his crowded inner picture gallery – this time, the moving image. Kinesthetic images or images of movement functioned on analogy with visual images. As Titchener explained, the verbal description "stately" was, for him, composed of the visual image of a heroine – a tall figure, with a hand holding up a steely grey skirt (Titchener 1909b, 13). Just as one could visualize the heroine in one's mind, one could also kinaesthetically form an image of her movements. The kinesthetic capacity to read oneself into a situation, object, or stimulus based on some image of bodily movement formed the essence of his understanding of "empathy." In an oft-cited passage, Titchener explained: "Not only do I see gravity and modesty and pride and courtesy and stateliness, but I feel or act them in the mind's muscles. This is, I suppose, a simple case of empathy, if we may coin that term as a rendering of *Einfühlung*" (ibid., 21). One could visualize the idea of gravity in the mind's eye, as well as sense the image moving. The empathic kinaesthetic image thus entered the structure of the mind in Titchener's psychology.[24]

The nature of the mind's images was the focus of Titchener's laboratory and graduate student projects in 1908, the year he dedicated to the study of the imagination, and the year he was thinking more intensely about *Einfühlung* and empathy.[25] He may

[23] For a discussion of Titchener's persona, see Bordogna 2005, 95–134; and for his claims of the objectivity of experimental psychology, see Green 2010.

[24] Titchener's conception of the kinaesthetic image was adapted by Vernon Lee to explain aesthetic empathy of the formal-dynamic type (Lee and Anstruther-Thompson 1912, 148; Lanzoni 2009).

[25] Titchener to T.A. Hunter, May 17, 1908, EBT. Thomas Hunter had spent three months at Cornell learning about experimental psychology laboratories, and another few months touring laboratories in the Eastern United States, England, and the European Continent. He became one of the first experimental psychologists to establish a laboratory in New Zealand.

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have drawn directly from Wilhelm Wundt's third volume of his *Völkerpsychologie* on art, which appeared that same year. Wundt stressed the importance of the study of the imagination, noting that it was extremely complex, but that it formed the individual psychological basis that informed the understanding of aesthetics (Wundt 1908, 5). Titchener's rendering of empathy as a product of the imagination rather than as a theory of aesthetics tethered it to the functioning of the individual mind. He lamented the fact that there was "as yet no psychology of the imagination," even as experimental psychology had made amazing progress. Such an in-depth study would need ten more years, he declared (Titchener to T.A. Hunter, Jan.1, 1908, EBT).

The kinaesthetic image, however, was still a contested element in experimental psychology. Could one distinguish an *actual* movement or sensation from an *image* of that sensation or movement? Indeed, it had taken time for Titchener himself to come to believe in the possibility of an image of movement. In 1904 he had expressed doubt as to whether a kinaesthetic image could exist without reviving or recalling accompanying sensations. Although others had reported the existence of such images, Titchener thought it was easy to confuse the re-instatement of sensations with an image of that sensation (Titchener 1904). Titchener had attacked Théodule Ribot's theory of affective memory on this basis – that it was impossible to remember a feeling without enacting it.[26]

If the existence of the kinaesthetic image was in question, by the end of the nineteenth century the kinaesthetic sense had been well established as an important feature of a wide assortment of theories of mental life. The early nineteenth-century neuroanatomist Charles Bell added muscle sensibility to the catalog of five senses, sometimes called a sixth sense. In 1880, the pathological anatomist and professor of clinical medicine at University College London, H. Charlton Bastian coined the term "kinaesthesis" for this sense, which judged weight, resistance, and the awareness of the body's movement, and was experienced in a range of impressions from conscious to unfelt (Bastian 1880, 543). Kinaesthesis thus bridged the body and mind as the mind's registration of the body's movement.

By the turn of the twentieth century, neurologists, and animal and functional psychologists avidly took up the topic. Titchener's laboratory was equipped with a kinaesthetics room, which he had set up in 1907 with a Mach rotation apparatus in which Observers would sit in a chair mounted in rectangular frame that could be pivoted on a vertical axis to test perceptions of bodily movement.[27] The psychologist John B. Watson experimented on mice in 1906 to see if they could utilize a kinaesthetic

[26] The social psychologist George Herbert Mead also tried to disentangle the meanings of sensation and image, noting that images existed as conflicting tendencies in the mind with a conceptual content, and seemed to agree with Titchener that the core of an image was a "feel of some sort" – kinaesthetic visual or auditory (Mead 1904, 606).

[27] E.B.Titchener to Hunter, Jan. 24, 1907; E.B.Titchener to Hunter, July, 15, 1907 (Titchener 1969, 12). The frame was devised by Ernst Mach in 1875 (Warren 1934, 156).

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sense to reach the end of a Hampton maze. He blinded the mice, knocked out pads in their feet, destroyed the tympanic membrane in the ear and their olfactory bulbs to see if they could navigate with this kinaesthetic sense alone. An editorialist in the *New York Times* decried this method as torture not sufficiently warranted by the scientific results (Topics of the *Times* 1907). Nonetheless, Watson reported that the de-sensitized mice could orient through the maze, affirming the existence of the kinaesthetic sense (Watson 1907).[28]

Despite the recognized existence of a kinaesthetic sense, however, the extent to which bodily states could be registered as an image in the mind and not merely as a sensation was still in question (Titchener 1908, 102). S. S. Colvin's overview of the differences between kinaesthetic sensation and image recounted confusion on the topic, and he resorted to defining the image as existing when an object of sensation was not immediately present to the senses (Colvin 1908, 169). Some psychologists confidently reported that they possessed images of bodily feelings: one reported images of coldness: the cool spray of the surf, the cold shock of a shower bath. Images of heat included the "hot and stuffy interior of another bathing-house," and warm water touching his feet in a bay (Lay 1904, 70). Titchener sought to make clear distinctions between the image and sensation, especially in the case of kinaesthesis, but he also acknowledged the difficulty of disentangling the two (Titchener 1909a, 199). Sensations seemed to root one to the actual perception of one's surroundings, while images had more power – as mental pictures they could carry ideas and concepts, they comprised the essence of memory and imagination, and could carry one back to the past or into an imagined future (Titchener 1910b, 48). Images thus went a step beyond sensation in neural development, and represented the more advanced mind, which, of course included Titchener's own (Titchener 1909a, 283).[29]

In Titchener's first public use of the term "empathy" in his March lectures of 1909, he tried to convince his audience that the kinaesthetic image did indeed exist. Just as a trained introspectionist knew the difference between seeing a red square and imagining a red square, he or she should distinguish between having a sensation and having an image of that sensation. The criterion that could adequately make this distinction was that actual movement engaged many more muscles than were necessary, whereas an image of movement was limited to the particular muscles involved. So, an actual nod of the head employed more muscles than the more limited mental nod of the head, just as an actual frown was different from a mental frown (Titchener 1909b, 21).

Enticing his audience to imagine mental nods and frowns, Titchener conducted an informal poll at the close of his lectures, and determined that one-third of the attendees

[28] For more on the history of the sixth sense, see Wade 2009.

[29] The assistant in psychology at Clark University, Fred Kuhlmann, echoed this view: "The mind that can imagine is of a higher grade, and learning with the use of mental images is quite a different method of progress" (Kuhlmann 1905, 346).

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possessed a kinaesthetic form of ideation (Colvin 1910, 266).[30] Colvin, Titchener's host for the lectures, confessed later that year at the American Psychological Association meeting that before recognizing that he possessed kinaesthetic images, he believed that one could indeed have thoughts without images. But he came to believe in "those kinaesthetic experiences (whether central or peripheral in their origin) which we employ at times in our thinking and which constitute the mind-stuff of certain of our ideational processes." (ibid., 260). For instance, when imagining the outline of a circle, he did so with a kinaesthetic idea based on eye movements and eye fixation in attending to the center (ibid., 261). Even an abstract word like infinity was haloed by a kinaesthetic symbol that involved the prolonging of the word, projecting it from the mouth, with a "bending forward and tension of the entire body, setting itself as if for flight" (ibid., 264).[31] Colvin concluded that kinaesthetic imagery had been often overlooked in introspections of trained observers (Colvin 1909, 236).

As he had convinced Colvin and at least a third of his audience that higher thought could be constituted by kinaesthetic images, so had Titchener's own introspection convinced him that "I have turned round, time and time again, upon consciousnesses like doubt, hesitation, belief, assent, trying to remember, having a thing on my tongue's tip, and I have not been able to discover the imageless process" (Titchener 1909b, 182). As Titchener explained, his experience of sitting behind an enthusiastic lecturer who often employed the conjunction "but" led him to construct a feeling of "but" that comprised a "flashing picture of a bald crown, with a fringe of hair below, and a massive black shoulder, the whole passing swiftly down the visual field from the northwest to southeast" (ibid., 185). Words like "but" emerged from situations in which an organism was in a position to perform two incompatible responses at once, constituting the experience of a suspended, baffled, motor attitude. In the language of Titchener's descriptive psychology it was a kinaesthetic acting out, but in images (ibid., 185–86). It was precisely these kinds of images of bodily movement that Titchener claimed were overlooked by the thought psychologists, and constituted the basis of what he called a motor empathy (ibid., 292).

Titchener's exposition of the meanings that derived from imagined movements or motor empathy brought Titchener closer to functional psychologists such as William James and James Angell, even as it marked a decisive contrast to the imageless thought school. Angell, a prominent functional psychologist at Chicago wrote to Titchener in early 1910 with ample praise for Titchener's book on thinking: "you have punctured some of the fallacies of the 'imageless thought' crowd so nicely that

[30] Some audience members also reported "attitudinal feels" in consciousness (Titchener 1909b, 291).

[31] But even Colvin expressed doubt as to whether these kinaesthetic experiences were sensations or images, noting that it was unclear whether they emerged peripherally, or centrally.

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my soul is delighted."[32] As one psychologist of the period noted, the debates between Würzburg and Cornell brought to the fore the contested status of kinaesthetic and organic elements in thought (Downey 1929, 37). Indeed, Titchener's documentation of kinaesthetic elements in introspection was a decisive refutation of the claim that thought could take place without images (Heidbreder 1933, 145–46). In the heat of debate between Titchener and his one-time student Robert Ogden, who had gone over to the image-less thought school, Ogden declared: "I am not prepared to assert as you do, that a bodiless mind is a scientific impossibility."[33] For Titchener's elemental psychology, in contrast, the mind's registration and imagining of bodily movement stood as an anchor of thought. The crux of the debate between Cornell and Würzburg was, in no small part, the nature of the body's contribution to thought, and empathy, the expression of the kinaesthetic image, stood precisely at this juncture.

Experimenting with Empathy

After Titchener had consolidated his view of empathy in 1909, empathic kinaesthetic images began to appear in the introspective reports in studies on belief, conscious attitudes, imagination, and meaning at the Cornell laboratory. "Observers" (or experimental subjects) in early psychological laboratories, unlike in most psychological experimentation today, were not naïve undergraduates, but graduate students, professors, and laboratory assistants, all highly trained to report on the elementary bits of their thought processes (Danziger 1990). In laboratory spaces and dark rooms, they fixated lights, watched shadowy shapes appear from projected lantern slides, or narrowed their attention while being prompted verbally or visually with a stimulus word or image. Respiration would sometimes be measured with a kymograph, responses might be timed with a chronometer, and extended introspections were carefully recorded. Observers were trained to use the language of descriptive science to report on the perceived colors, images, shapes, tones of the stimulus object, rather than to casually describe it, which was to fall into the "stimulus error" (Titchener 1909b, 145–46; Henle 1971; Kroker 2003).

Far from anonymous participants, Observers were identified by name and position in the published experimental protocols, and were categorized as verbal, auditory, visual, kinaesthetic, and even empathic types, each of whom tended to report on particular kinds of images and sensations. At Titchener's laboratory, "Observers" ranged from graduate students working towards their doctorates, newly minted Ph.D.s who served as assistants in the laboratory, and more established psychology professors, along with

[32] Angell continued, "I have had a solemn compact with myself to do something of just this kind for two and more years past. You have not done all that I had in mind, but in the main you have covered essential points so well that I felt exonerated from my lonesome contract" (James Angell to Titchener, Jan 22, 1910, Box 2, EBT).
[33] Ogden to Titchener, September 26, 1911, Box 2, RMO.

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a significant number of women researchers. These women had taken advantage of the fact that many graduate schools had opened their doors to them in the 1890s. The new academic field of scientific psychology had sought recruits, becoming so popular that by 1897 psychology could boast more doctorates than any science other than chemistry (Miner 1904, 302).

In 1910 and 1911, work proceeded apace at the Cornell laboratory to counter the imageless thought claims, and reports of empathic kinaesthetic images soon were documented. Kinaesthetic images were compelling introspections, sometimes attributed directly to the stimuli, sometimes identified with the observer's own body image, and at other times reported as odd and startling images of a bodily fusion or confusion between self and stimuli (Jacobson 1911; Okabe 1910). In a 1910 study of belief conducted by Titchener's doctoral student Tamekichi Okabe, the graduate student Alma De Vries reported an empathic kinaesthetic response of a "visual image of a trick elephant dancing. Felt big and clumsy myself, as if I were the elephant" (Okabe 1910, 568–69). A frequent participant in imagery studies in the Cornell lab, De Vries had earned her doctorate in 1912 and went on to study the retinal afterimage with the psychologist Margaret Washburn at Vassar (Schaub 1911). She was described in Clarke's study as a mixed type, who reported many colored visual images, tactual images on the finger, verbal ideas, affective processes, and kinaesthetic and organic sensations (Clarke 1911, 216). A strong feeling of belief or disbelief was signaled by a stiffening or shrinking of her body. The instructor in psychology, L.R. Geissler also reported empathic-kinaesthetic responses in this experiment even though he was primarily a verbal type. While listening to a sentence about drinking, he imagined he turned his own head away: "there was a very vague, kinaesthetic and motor attitude, representing a woman of the total-abstainer kind, with disgust for drunkard, turning away her face and head and wrinkling her forehead: these things seemed to occur in my own case (feeling of disgust, tendency to turn head and wrinkle forehead)" (Okabe 1910, 589). In this report, an empathic response was an imagined bodily imitation.

Perky's 1910 experiments on the interrelation of imagination, perception, and memory, as mentioned above, elicited a number of empathic responses. Observers in these experiments, both trained and naïve, felt as if they were in a dreamlike state and described shapes they thought they had imagined, but had actually been presented to them as stimuli: The faint yellow shape of a banana projected from the lantern slide was described as imaginary; in another case the trickle of a stream of water was reported to continue even after it had been stopped (Titchener 1909a, 198). The imagination called up powerful, stable images, accompanied by kinaesthetic participation and feelings of strangeness or surprise. Some of these images were described as photographic. Observers also called up remembered images, which, in contrast to imagined images, were unstable, impermanent, and laden with personal meanings. Memory images were sometimes accompanied by actual bodily movements: for instance, the observer De Vries moved her nostrils when she introspected remembered olfactory images.

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Titchener drew on Perky and similar experiments to conclude in his psychology textbook: "Memory was characterized by the feeling of familiarity and by imitative kinaesthesis; imagination by the feeling of strangeness and by empathy" (Titchener 1915, 200). Empathy familiarized the strange by way of the imagination, and transformed sensations into an abstract world of images. Even more striking, the imagined kinaesthesis could merge the self in the object: "The object spreads all over me and I over it; it is not referred to me but I belong to it" (Perky 1910, 448). Immersion in the image was the hallmark of empathy; an Observer reported: "there, I seemed to jump into it; went all over me" (ibid., 449). In these instances, empathizing meant that one experienced the self as part of the object.

If empathy was based on kinaesthetic images, it could also be extended to an "attitudinal feel" – organic and whole-body responses to experimental materials and everyday situations (Titchener 1909b, 21). When sitting down at a desk to write a letter, Titchener explained, his own organic movements and kinesthetic representations were quite different from those when he sat down to compose a lecture. These bodily differences resulted from different visceral pressures or distributions of tonicity in his back and leg muscles, and differences in facial expression, all of which made up a global attitudinal feel. Attitudinal feels shaded into empathic experiences, so that the body's attitude appeared in the mind as a kind of feeling "in the mind's muscles" (ibid., 181). Empathy thus translated bodily impulses and motor activity into representations and images that could comprise a holistic attitudinal feel.

An empathic sense could also convey the meaning of shapes, as the graduate assistant Anna Sophie Rogers demonstrated in a 1917 study. Although meaning had been relegated to the sidelines in Titchener's psychology, meaning was for him directly related to kinaesthesis, usually understood as a bodily attitude, or sensations of the organism in a situation (ibid., 176).[34] Observers introspected their visual, kinaesthetic, and auditory images while viewing ink-blots, hieroglyphs, and shapes with some semblance of meaning (Rogers 1917, 551).[35] Rogers carried out these experiments before Rorschach published his own inkblots as psychological tools in 1921, and published them in Titchener's flagship journal (ibid., 575) (see fig. 1).

Observer Helen Clarke reported while studying the shapes that: "I felt myself (general empathic kinaesthesis) standing erect and rigid, and then the meaning 'grass' came" (ibid., 558). Empathic kinaesthetic responses of this type were classed as interpretative

[34] Titchener came very close to the functionalists when he wrote: "Meaning is, originally, kinaesthesis; the organism faces the situation by some bodily attitude, and the characteristic sensations which the attitude involves give meaning to the process that stands at the conscious focus, are psychologically the meaning of that process" (Titchener 1909b, 176). And further, "There would be nothing surprising in the discovery that, for minds of a certain constitution, all nonverbal conscious meaning is carried by kinaesthetic sensation or kinaesthetic image" (Titchener 1909b, 176–177).

[35] Anna Rogers was appointed graduate assistant in 1914, the same year Helen Clarke was appointed a fellow (see "Notes and News" 1914).

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


Fig. 1. Stimuli presented in Rogers, "An Analytic Study of Visual Perceptions," 1917.

perceptions – attempts to read meaning into the figures – in distinction to what Rogers called appreciative and orientating efforts. In another Cornell study of 1920, the observer Dr. L.B. Hoisington reported an empathic kinaesthetic response to visual squares, which had a "stability" or "compactness" based on a sensory or imaginal process felt in his chest and throat; the graduate student Observer, C. Comstock felt that the lack of balance in an oblong shape was determined by the images or sensations of pressure felt in the chest (Zigler 1920, 287). Other empathic responses were feelings of imbalance or solidity felt in the shapes themselves rather than as the Observer's own sensation.[36]

The finding that kinesthetic images could be localized in oneself, in the object, or in some kind of merger of the two, had repeatedly cropped up in the findings of the Cornell laboratory, and Alice Helen Sullivan's doctoral work of 1921 explicitly sorted out these differences (Hull 1920, 516).[37] She instructed observers to *feel* rather than think about the image in question: "Feel: yourself running downstairs; Feel: an acrobat walking a tight rope; Feel: Laocoon struggling in the coils of the serpent; Feel: yourself stooping to pick up a pencil" (Sullivan 1921, 69). She then classed these kinesthetic

[36] Other studies of the period conducted at Clark University mirrored some of these findings: one observer noted a feeling of "being stretched out like a starfish" while visualizing a triangular shape, defined as kinaesthetic empathy (Fisher 1917, 71).

[37] By 1922 Sullivan was an instructor in psychology at the University of Colorado. Titchener called her study "first-rate," and published it in his journal (Titchener to Sullivan, Sept. 24, 1921, Box 3, EBT). In 1923 Sullivan was listed as an associate in the psychology department at the University of Illinois at Urbana, and Titchener encouraged her to stay in university work despite bad luck and financial difficulties. He also took pains to assure her that she had the same degree and the same good judgment as her male counterparts (Titchener to Sullivan: February 1, 1923; March 14, 1923; May 18, 1923, Box 4, EBT).

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images according to whether they referred to oneself (resident) or to something else (projected).

She concluded that empathy was best characterized as a projected kinaesthesis (ibid.). For example, when asked to feel a farmerette (a Canadian term for a young woman working on a farm) pitching hay, one observer responded: "The kinaesthetic image belongs to the farmerette, it is a kind of empathy" (ibid., 70). To empathize meant to imagine another performing an action, or how it might feel to move in the way the stimulus object subject might move. If the action was unusual, and one the Observer had never performed, the Observer reported empathy as a projected kinaesthesis, rather than feeling it in her or himself. And Observers who more actively tried to imagine the performance of an action were more likely to report empathic responses. In short, empathic responses were unfamiliar images of movement felt as if they took place in another. Images of one's own actions (resident kinaesthetic images), on the other hand, were not empathic. They were usually fleeting and accompanied by a passive or receptive attitude. Projected kinaesthetic images – the hallmark of empathy – were more persistent and fixed. As Sullivan explained, empathy took focus and mental work: it was correlated with "an attitude which is active, exploratory, detached, scrutinising" (ibid., 80). As reported by the Cornell laboratory, then, empathy was a sophisticated imaginal complex actively undertaken. It was much more complicated than the simple sensory process of feeling something for oneself.

When encountering the unfamiliar, as Sullivan study's demonstrated, one was more prone to empathize. Titchener explained to beginning psychology students that empathy was feeling oneself *into* a situation, an experimental object or a stimulus at a distance from oneself. Sympathy, in contrast, meant one identified *with* the mental capacities of another person – presumably an experience that was familiar or usual. The preposition "in" rather than "with" marked this key difference. Titchener instructed students to examine their own empathic experiences and to ferret out their constituent elements while reading, while contemplating art or architecture, in the theater, even while day-dreaming (Titchener 1915, 201):

> We have a natural tendency to feel ourselves into what we perceive or imagine. As we read about the forest, we may, as it were, *become* the explorer; we feel for ourselves the gloom, the silence, the humidity, the oppression, the sense of lurking danger; everything is strange, but it is to us that the strange experience has come. We are told of a shocking accident, and we gasp and shrink and feel nauseated as we imagine it; we are told of some new and delightful fruit, and our mouth waters as if we were about to taste it. This tendency to feel oneself *into* a situation is called *empathy*, – on the analogy of sympathy, which is feeling *together with* another. (Ibid., 198; emphasis in original).

Rather than sympathizing with the familiar, empathy was a bodily imagining of oneself in a situation that was foreign or strange. Far from assuming similarity, then, empathy was predicated on difference.

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As a projection of the mind's images into the space of a strange other, empathy was a form of mind theater, a way of carrying oneself towards and into the object of perception. It not only transformed the mute presence of an object in the world with feeling, life, and movement, but more radically inserted the self into the object. Some introspectors reported feeling a self – object amalgam, blurring the lines between the contents of mind and objects in the world. Titchener was intrigued by empathic processes because they extended beyond perception to engage the imagination and could be haloed by kinaesthetic and organic sensations. Empathy, as defined by introspectors was never a matter of reading the world veridically, but of imputing images and feeling to it. It was a way of seeing the world as it might be: "Take the empathic tendency: what lover of books has not shifted the place of certain volumes on a shelf, because he could not bear to put good and bad, sound and trivial, side by side, – as if the *books* would feel the incongruity?" (ibid., 206).

The Mind as Empathic Projector

Titchener's science of psychology focused on the elementary structures of the mind, opening up a complex interior space brimming with images. From Perky's findings that one's imaginings could occlude the perception of real objects, from the ways in which Observers felt themselves merge with stimulus objects, systematic introspective methods revealed complex inner images, which were accorded the sober label of fact – the facts of the mind, that is. For Titchener, scientific introspection was, by definition, the "disinterested and impersonal observance of facts," and these facts took place in the Observer's own mind.[38]

If Titchener is often portrayed as narrowing psychology to structural elements in the mind and excluding meanings or lived experience (Danziger 1990, 46–47; Green 2010), the ways in which the mind spun images in his laboratory and the rich complexity of this inner terrain adds another dimension to this portrait. Although kinaesthetic empathic response was firmly based on an individualistic, introspective model, it was reported as complicated feeling- and movement-based images projected into another shape, form, or stimulus. Titchener described imaginative constructions of the mind as accompanied by all sorts of feelings and "empathic experiences, vivifying and personalising the partial products of the constructive effort" (Titchener 1915, 200). He nevertheless acknowledged that the workings of the imagination in empathy moved him away from his framework of a strict scientific psychology: "Figurative, again, all this, and lamentably far from scientific accuracy – but, in broad outline and on the average, we may hope that it is true to the psychological facts" (ibid). But even his student and ardent disciple, Edwin G. Boring, noted that by 1917, Titchener had

[38] In his later work on systematic psychology, Titchener described scientific observation as a "clear and sympathetic awareness." This notion of sympathetic understanding was quite different from the phenomenon of empathy as it emerged in experiments at the Cornell laboratory (Titchener 1929, 39).

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begun to alter his view of the sensation, and was moving toward phenomenological observation rather than narrow introspection (Boring 1927, 502).

At the Cornell introspectionist psychological laboratory, then, empathy performed the work of the imagination in kinaesthetic form, bringing the Observer into the interior life of objects; domesticating the strange with "our own concernment" in the imagined situation (Titchener 1915, 197). Empathy partook of Titchener's focus on the image – part idea, part mental picture – an elementary mental structure which underlay all conscious responses to the world. Images bore the stamp of the advanced mind; they transmuted sensation into idea, but for this reason, were less apt to merely signal the outside world, or mirror its objects faithfully. Empathy was never a method of accurately perceiving the objects in the world, but was rather a projective capacity, a way of seeing the world according to one's own lights.

In some respects, empathy shared many facets of early models of filmic projection in the German-speaking world.[39] Although early German film theorists did not explicitly use the term *Einfühlung*, the centrality of *Einfühlung* in debates on modern aesthetics, the tendency to focus on perception in aesthetic experience, as well as the adoption of a language of emotional projection, as film historian Scott Curtis has described, all point to interesting convergences between empathy theory and film, at least in the German context (see Curtis 2009, 81). Hugo Münsterberg published one of the first psychological theories of film in 1916, stressing the suggestive qualities of movement in film, which were projected onto the images on the screen by the viewer, in a manner not dissimilar to projected moving images as described in Titchener's laboratory (Münsterberg [1916] 1970, 30). This view was directly counter to the imageless thought view, as voiced by the psychologist George F. Stout as early as 1896, when he had spoken against the notion that consciousness could be "a picture gallery or as a magic lantern in which the slides displace each other in rapid succession" (Stout 1896, 85). Did the mind function as a sequencing of images as in a gallery, in a slide presentation, or even in the cinema?

It may have been that the kinaesthetic image became a viable entity for Titchener's psychological science in light of the emergence of moving pictures. Titchener, however, did not venture into applied domains to craft a psychology of film, although he was well aware of the recent popularity and appeal of the "movies."[40] He did conceive the mind as a picture gallery, and in accord with modern trends, it contained impressionist notes, as he put it. But by 1909, the mental images reported in his laboratory began

[39] See the contributions by Robert Brain and Robin Curtis, this issue. Giuliana Bruno discusses empathy as a form of transfer or transport from the inner to the outer world, as exemplified by Münsterberg's early film theory: we invest depth and movement in the film or grasp the forms of the outer world through the shapes of the inner world, particularly through emotions and what she calls the "atmospherics of space" (see Bruno 2009, 91, 97; Münsterberg [1916] 1970).

[40] In a 1918 letter to his prospective doctoral student, Alice Sullivan, Titchener wrote that if she came to Cornell she would receive free tuition, and a $200 scholarship. She wouldn't starve, as he put it, "unless you 'take in' too many 'movies.' Which Heaven forbid!" (Titchener to Sullivan, August 15, 1918, Box 3, EBT).

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to move, and through empathic kinaesthesis one could imaginatively move into and inhabit unfamiliar objects or situations.

The Future of Empathy

"Empathy" in this kinaesthetic or motor-based register became a critical element in the psychologies of art put forth in the following decades by Herbert Langfeld (1920), Kate Gordon (1934), and Robert Ogden (1938). The aesthetician Vernon Lee adopted Titchener's conception of the kinaesthetic image as the core of what she called formal-dynamic empathy in distinction to representational empathy (Lanzoni 2009). This projection model enjoined the entire self, and in Warren's 1934 *Dictionary of Psychology* was listed as empathy's primary definition: the "imaginal or mental projection of oneself into the elements of a work of art or into a natural object" (Warren 1934, 92). This model was also adapted by the head of the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, Elmer Ernest Southard, to develop what he called an empathic index based on a projection of the physician's self onto a patient, in order to gauge the peculiarity of schizophrenic thinking (Southard 1918; Lanzoni 2006). As an imaginal capacity to remake the unfamiliar through forms of bodily projection, the phenomenon of empathy was a projective means to access the strange in these early decades of the twentieth century, circulating nearly exclusively within the walls of the academy, and with roots in the German *Einfühlung*.

Yet empathy's kinaesthetic core began to fade as its interpersonal meaning was taken up by psychoanalysts Otto Rank and Sandor Ferenczi, dissenters from Freudian orthodoxy, along with social workers, sociologists, and psychologists of various stripes. Only after World War II did the American public and media, popularizing psychologists and advertising experts seize upon the interpersonal meanings of empathy as a means to improve family relationships, attract audiences, and sell products. By this time empathy had been much transformed from its early depiction in the turn of the century introspectionist laboratory, and was enlisted to forge social understandings across many aspects of everyday, consumer, and even political life.

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