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Universalism for open theists

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Abstract: **In this paper I argue that the denial of middle knowledge and emphasis on human freedom characteristic of open theism makes the traditional concept of hell even more morally problematic than it would otherwise be. But these same features of open theism present serious difficulties for the view that all will necessarily be saved. I conclude by arguing that the most promising approach for open theists is to adopt a version of contingent, as opposed to necessary, universalism.**

Of all the traditional Christian doctrines that might challenge a thoughtful person, the doctrine of hell is the most puzzling and perplexing. Indeed, the words 'puzzle' and 'perplex' do not adequately capture the reaction many of us have when we confront the traditional concept of hell. For on this conception, a great many human beings, many of whom are our friends and colleagues, are doomed to a post-mortem existence of extreme and everlasting suffering. While some traditional doctrines, such as the Trinity or Incarnation, may strike us as mysterious or paradoxical, the doctrine of hell presents a moral, not merely intellectual, challenge to the coherence of Christian faith. The problem of hell is even more serious than the traditional problem of evil insofar as the latter merely considers the compatibility of God's goodness and power and limited, earthly suffering. Not only is the suffering of the damned much greater than any earthly suffering could be, but this suffering is an intentional part of God's plan, not something He merely allows to occur. Furthermore, since there is no escape from hell, this suffering lacks the sort of redemptive purpose that earthly suffering may have.

Many Christians cringe at the picture of divine wrath I have just presented. From the earliest period of the Church, there have been universalists who have denied that there are any who are eternally damned. There also are those who, while not being universalists, nevertheless amend or modify the concept of hell in such a way as to make it, at least by their lights, morally acceptable. I think it is

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fair to say that any Christian who wishes to defend the doctrine of everlasting punishment has a lot of explaining to do if the doctrine is to be understood in a way that is morally comprehensible. While I am inclined to think that a full-blooded, traditional concept of hell is incompatible with God's nature on any conception of divine knowledge, I am going to begin by focusing my consideration on the position of those who adopt the theory currently tagged as 'open theism'.

A significant feature of the open view of God is the belief that human beings are possessed of libertarian freedom and that this freedom is incompatible with God's possessing divine foreknowledge of future free choices. I will argue that belief in the openness of God makes a hard case even worse. Furthermore, while this problem is perhaps most vivid in the case of open theism, it also can be generalized for all theists who accept a non-Molinist account of foreknowledge and who accept a libertarian conception of freedom of the will. On the other hand, this very same commitment to libertarian freedom also precludes non-Molinists from accepting the sort of necessary universalism recently advocated by Talbott. The solution, I will argue, lies in adopting a version of contingent universalism that is able to avoid the moral problems of the doctrine of hell while at the same time not doing violence to the strong conception of libertarian freedom to which open theists (among others) are committed.

Let us start with the position of the hellfire traditionalist. It is a part of the traditional doctrine of hell that once one is damned there is no escape. Redemption is impossible for those in hell. There is no hope, only the weeping and gnashing of teeth. In contrast, in this earthly life there is hope for everyone. For as long as we are alive on earth, we have a choice that has infinite consequences for our future state. As long as we are alive, we can accept God's grace and avoid the perils of everlasting suffering. After death, on the other hand, our fate is sealed for good or ill and there is nothing we can do to affect it. A moment's reflection reveals there is no way a proponent of the openness of God could accept this feature of the traditional concept of hell.

Consider the situation of forty-year-old Sally who is driving home from work. Now it's an open question what qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to be damned. But whatever those qualities are, Sally has them in abundance. Not only is she a hardcore atheist, she leads a life of utter self-absorption and complete lack of sympathy or concern for the welfare of other human beings. As she is driving towards work, another human being, Albert, is driving home from the bar after having had a few too many rum and cokes. At the intersection on which they meet Albert cannot control his vehicle and rams into Sally's car, killing Sally. Now, is Sally to be damned? Since we built into her the description, 'candidate for damnation', the obvious answer is yes. In contrast, consider the case of another candidate for damnation, Carl. Carl, as it happens, has all the same damnation-deserving qualities Sally has, and is also forty years old and coming

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home from work, but he does not get into an accident. In fact, Carl lives to be ninety, and at some time before his death has certain experiences which lead him to leave his wicked ways behind him and to follow Christ. Is Carl a candidate for damnation? Obviously not, since by hypothesis he is redeemed.

The important thing to note about these two cases is that, given both libertarian freedom and the denial of divine foreknowledge, there is no way for God to know whether Sally would have, had she continued to live, redeemed herself as Carl did. The open theist cannot, as William Lane Craig does, appeal to middle knowledge to try to argue that God knows that Sally would not have been saved, since God knows how Sally would react to all the situations in which Sally could possibly be placed.[1] Nor can the open theist present the (highly implausible) claim that God somehow arranged it so that, despite the difference in lifespan, Sally and Carl both had an equal opportunity to be saved. On the open view, human freedom is taken seriously, and God is not able to manipulate human beings directly in a way that guarantees that God's ends are met. So God is put in the patently unfair position of saving one person, yet not saving another, even though (for all God knows) the other person might have been saved, given sufficient time. This sort of situation jars not only with the belief that God is perfectly good and loving, but also with the belief that God is just. To limit the possibility of salvation to the earthly timespan presents us with an image of an arbitrary, fickle deity who saves or damns by the luck of the draw. Indeed this sort of conception of salvation bears an eerie resemblance to the view of the theological determinist to which open theists are opposed.

An open theist must, therefore, allow for the possibility of post-mortem salvation. Once this possibility is allowed, however, much of the content of the traditional concept of hell falls by the wayside. For if redemption is possible after death, then post-mortem experiences ought to allow for the same sort of redemptive purpose that earthly experiences have. There is no principled way to justify the claim that a person's eternal fate is determined at death. Salvation for any given individual is always a real possibility at any time, either in the earthly or the post-mortem existence. Of course, it may be said that God, after a reasonable period of time, cuts off this possibility and consigns those stubborn unrepentant souls to everlasting hell. Indeed a view like this seems to be attractive to some open theists. For example, Clark Pinnock and Robert C Brow write: 'There comes a point when God, who has done everything to bring sinners back into fellowship, gives up trying. God accepts defeat at this point and says, in effect, ''Their disposition and direction appear to be fixed. They are a lost cause.'''[2]

To be sure, Pinnock and Brow are anihilationists. When God accepts defeat, He does not consign the sinner to eternal fire, but rather causes, or perhaps allows, the sinner to cease to exist. While Clark and Brow may plausibly argue that anihilationism is less morally troublesome than everlasting torment, the essential problem remains the same. Given the presuppositions of open theism, the time

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when God chooses to give up on any given sinner seems an entirely ad hoc affair. For what criteria could there be that would explain why a good and loving God would give up on any person, given that there always is a possibility that the person would be saved? A human being, who has finite love and goodness, might certainly lose patience with a stubborn insistence on wickedness, but would God? Nor would it do to say that while people have free will, a person may freely choose to create a character for themselves that, in effect, precludes the possibility of salvation. Such a statement amounts to the claim that we can choose not to be free. But if freedom is really an essential part of the human condition, it surely is the one thing we cannot give up. A more natural understanding of the facts is to suppose that while it is difficult for a person to escape from persistent, habitual character traits, it is by no means impossible. Indeed our experience seems to show that such a radical turnaround is something that can occur even in this life, sometimes fairly quickly.

In his interesting book, *Hell: The Logic of Damnation*, Jerry Walls tries to deal with this problem by arguing that God's goodness requires that God provide for each individual an optimal amount of grace. Walls sees that it is implausible to suppose that God has given each of us such grace in this life, but believes that once we recognize that God's grace can extend beyond the moment of one's death, the problem is resolved.[3] I agree with Walls that, given God's goodness, God will provide each of us with an optimal amount of grace. He is also correct that, for many people, such grace will be extended beyond death. The only difficulty here is that, given the openness of God, God can never know when a person has been given optimal grace. If we take libertarian free will and the limitations on God's foreknowledge seriously, we are compelled to admit that God can never know when a person has received optimal grace. There may be certain persons who will never be saved no matter what circumstances they have been placed in or what actions God takes to nudge them directly to salvation. But God can never know who such persons are. Given the pressupositions of open theism, a person may freely reject God's grace at one instance and yet not do so at another time, and there is no way for any one, God included, to predict which way it will go.

If God cannot know when a person has been given optimal grace, and if God desires that all will be saved, then we must abandon at least the 'no-escape' aspect of the traditional doctrine of hell. But perhaps we can even go further. While it may be true that certain kinds of torment and suffering provide a person with an incentive to choose the good, it is not at all clear that pain, *per se*, is usually the most effective instrument for encouraging redemption. Given that God has the salvation of all as one of His chief priorities, then it is gratuitous to assume that the post-mortem existence of the unredeemed will be one of constant sorrow. There may be sorrow and pain of course, but there may also be experiences of forgiveness and love. Indeed, if we believe that God was rational in constructing our earthly existence as (in part) a medium for our salvation, it is not

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unreasonable to suppose that the post-mortem state of the unredeemed is quite similar to our present existence. An existence that, to be sure, has its hellish qualities but is not by any means equivalent to the despair and agony of traditional Christian accounts of hell. Of course this is just speculation. My point in bringing it up is that, given natural assumptions about God's nature and openness-of-God theology, these speculations are not at all unreasonable.

While this problem with hell is most vivid with respect to open theism, it is worthwhile pointing out that this problem also confronts those who accept simple foreknowledge or timeless-knowledge accounts. For in order for God to know that a person would not in any circumstances be redeemed, God would have to know not just what actually will or timelessly does happen, but what would happen were circumstances different. Thus, a God with simple foreknowledge could know that a person is not saved while the door to salvation is kept open. But such a God would not know that a person would not be saved if, contrary to fact, the door to salvation were left open longer than it in fact will be. Only proponents of middle knowledge can avoid this difficulty. With middle knowledge, God knows what the free choices of all persons will be in all possible situations. Clearly, on this account, God does know who could be saved. Indeed, given middle knowledge, God knows who would be damned or saved prior to creation. Whether or not this consequence of middle knowledge is morally troubling I will leave to the reader.

So much, then, for the traditional doctrine of hell. What about universalism? Can a proponent of the openness of God be a consistent universalist of either the necessary or contingent variety? From what has been said it should be clear that contingent universalism is a perfectly legitimate option for the open theist. Given that God desires to save all, and will do all that is in His power (consistent with creaturely freedom) to save all persons, is it not reasonable to suppose that salvation for all is not merely a logical possibility, but a near practical certainty? Certainly there is nothing in open theism that would preclude such a position. But what about necessary universalism? Can an open theist also hold that all will of necessity be saved?

In the recent literature Thomas Talbott has presented the most thorough defence of this sort of universalism. Talbott considers two possibilities. First he considers the case of the unrepentant sinner who comes to see that in choosing evil she is choosing hell, and that an alternative choice is available, one of redemption and happiness. Talbott considers this situation and asks us, would anyone, given such a choice, ever choose hell? Talbott thinks not. His argument seems to be that to choose something, one must at least believe there is something good about what one is choosing. But if one is to see the choices of heaven and hell clearly and without obfuscation, one will see that there is nothing good about hell, and that there is infinite good in heaven. Thus, if in the end God gives us such a choice, even the most recalcitrant sinner will be redeemed. But

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suppose, contrary to this, one insists that a person can resist God's grace even at this last instant, when His existence and goodness is revealed clearly? Talbott considers this case and argues that in this instance, God would have to overcome that person's free choice and compel her to be saved. For Talbott, while free will is of great value, if it comes down to it, salvation is a greater value. Thus, if forced to choose, God will choose to destroy a person's freedom.[4]

Should these scenarios be taken seriously by the open theist? Let us start with the first. I think Talbott is right in thinking that, in order to make a choice, a person must at least believe that there is something good about the thing that is being chosen. But in order for Talbott to make his case, he needs also to support his other contention, namely that God both could and would present a person with such a vivid conception of her possible eternal fates that no good at all could be found in the alternative of hell. I have no doubt that Talbott is right in thinking that God would do as much as God can to show a person both the wages of sin and the glories of salvation. What is unclear to me, however, is whether God actually could perform this feat without compromising a person's free will.

As Sartre has famously argued,[5] our freedom consists not just in the ability to choose how to act, but also in the mysterious but undeniable ability to deceive ourselves. Thus, I may be presented with undeniable knowledge that my gambling habit is leading me to ruin (has already ruined me, perhaps) and yet, it is quite possible that I will come to believe that I am not ruined due to my gambling but rather due to some other thing (perhaps not gambling the right way, or perhaps some other accidental feature of my life). Indeed, I may even come to believe that my life is not ruined at all, that things are not so bad, and I may believe this in the face of incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. From the libertarian perspective, such self-deception is naturally understood as an expression of our freedom. We choose to believe or not believe certain things about ourselves or about our motives, or about the goodness or badness of the goals we take for ourselves. If this is right, if part of what it is to be free involves the freedom to control how the perceived value of something is given, then it is impossible for God simply to set before us a choice between hell and salvation. For God to do so, He would have to strip away our tendencies towards self-deception. God would have to force us to see alternatives in the way He wants us to see them. In other words, God would have to strip us of our freedom. In this way, it seems Talbott's first alternative collapses into his second. Only by interfering with a person's freedom, can God guarantee that a person will be saved.

Talbott, in discussing this possibility, writes as if the deception in question is in some way dependent on God. 'If, as Lewis himself insists, the objective truth of the matter is that union with God is bliss and separation from Him a horror, then, for God to win, He need only refuse to protect us forever from the consequences of our own free choices.'[6] But this statement misdescribes the situation. It is not God who is deceiving or protecting me; I am 'protecting' or deceiving myself.

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God is on the other side, as it were, trying to get me to stop such self-protection, but if I am to remain free, such self-deception cannot be literally overridden. In his discussion of this, Talbott seems at a loss to understand how anyone could choose 'separation and loneliness and utter terror'. And, viewed under this description, such a choice does seem irrational. But the sort of choices that lead us further and further away from God are not of this dramatic sort. They are rather the sort of common choices we are familiar with from everyday life. A happily married man chooses to have an affair, thus risking his marriage. It's not as if the frolicsome romance is itself evil or torturous, but the choice to have such an affair is nevertheless a moral mistake, involving the preference of a lesser good for a greater one. These sorts of choices are common as rain, and yet, in my view, cumulatively lead to further separation. Talbott sometimes writes as if these sorts of choices are possible because of some feature of earthly existence, or, as he puts it, 'the ambiguities of a normal earthly life'.[7] I see the matter differently. The ambiguity is there, to be sure. But this ambiguity is not a special function of our mortal existence, but rather a function of our existence as free agents. If this is right, then the first alternative that Talbott discusses collapses into a version of the second, in which God overcomes our free choice and compels us to accept salvation.

In his criticism of free-will theodicies of hell, Talbott also expresses scepticism about the very idea that we ever do in fact choose our eternal destiny.[8] The whole idea that a person in full knowledge of the consequences of her action would choose eternal separation from God is, to Talbott, an irrational and therefore not a truly free choice. In this matter, I agree with Talbott. I don't think that it is possible for a person to choose eternal damnation. Since it is part of my view that God is always active, always nudging us towards repentance and reconciliation, redemption always remains possible for everyone, and no-one's fate is eternally sealed. What is possible, however, is that I may continue to hold out, that is to say, continue to make choices, the cumulative effect of which is to keep God at a distance, and prevent my reconciliation with God.

Furthermore, it does not follow from anything I have said that those who are unredeemed are any more or less separated from God than various people on earth today are. Much discussion of hell in the literature takes it for granted that hell is a kind of complete separation from God. But I find this notion of separation utterly unclear. As Talbott points out, apart from anihiliation, it is hard to see how anyone could be truly separated from God. But there may, as Talbott also seems to allow, be such a thing as separation from any experience of God. Exactly what such a life would be, it is hard to say. What I want to insist on, however, is that there is a difference between being unredeemed and being completely separate from any experience of God. Perhaps we can think of complete separation from God as a kind of limiting case. Perhaps there are some who are so self-absorbed and limited in their lives that we could say that, for them, God is completely

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absent. This situation need not be considered typical however, and it is no part of my view that those who are unredeemed must exist in this shadowy, hellish state.

If we reject the claim that eternal damnation is ever, in fact, a real choice for a person, and also reject the insistence on the part of some hell advocates that the unredeemed are as completely as possible separated from God, then we must also rethink what is involved in the choice not to be saved. I have already indicated that I don't think it is, properly speaking, a choice. It is rather a series of choices, or perhaps better, a way of life that depends on such choices. A person who is shallow and selfish does not choose to be such all at once, but does so over time, through a series of smaller choices each of which leads that person one step at a time away from God. The further away from God such a person becomes, the more difficult it will be for that person to come back. For the more ingrained a person's habits are, the more difficult it is for her to break her habits. But while it is difficult, it is not impossible. And, with God working on the other side, trying to persuade us to change, the odds that an evildoer will change rise dramatically. But my point is not that such a person needs to remain forever unredeemed, nor even that it is at all likely that she will remain so. I only wish to maintain the quite weak contention that it is logically possible that she may remain so. This, it seems to me, is simply a consequence of human freedom, if such exists.

What shall we say about Talbott's second alternative, in which God overcomes our freedom and, as it were, forces us to be redeemed? The first thing to note is that it is not clear that by overcoming our freedom God is doing something that can be achieved in one instance. The way Talbott presents it, it is as if God can just change a person's act of will in one instance and then all is well. But this will not do. Consider the example of a gambler about to choose freely to wager his house at the craps table. If God were to intervene here, then God would prevent the gambler from choosing to gamble on this one occasion, but this by itself would not keep the gambler from choosing to gamble on other occasions. What would be required for God to force the gambler to change his ways is for God constantly to intervene, basically to take over the gambler's life. Such a divine takeover seems to undercut not only the freedom of the gambler, but also his very individuality as a person.

A chief difficulty here, of course, is the thorny issue of whether human beings have libertarian free will at all and, assuming that they do, whether this free will is essential to being a human person, as I have been postulating. While a full defence of the claim that free will is an essential property is beyond the scope of this paper, we can at least note that, from a libertarian perspective, such a view of free will is natural. There are few libertarians who believe free will is not central to the meaning and character of human life. For God to strip away such a significant feature of human existence is, at least, a very problematic suggestion.

Even granting that free will is an essential property of human persons, it might still be suggested that God could intervene to change a person's choice indirectly

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by changing the character of the person involved.[9] For example, God may intervene in the case of the gambler by means of removing those character traits that make it so difficult for the gambler to quit her habit. Such an intervention could not be considered an infringement of our essential freedom, since even on a libertarian account, a person's choices are influenced by her character. And, while it is certainly true that a person's character is in large measure constituted by her prior choices, it seems also that some people are simply by nature blessed or handicapped by their natural dispositions. (This point will be most evident to parents who have more than one child. Character differences among children are often apparent from birth.) So if these natural dispositions do not constitute an illegitimate infringement on human freedom, then neither should a change in character induced by sudden divine intervention.

Such a divine act is even less problematic if it respects a second-order desire of the person. Our gambler, for instance, may honestly have a desire not to gamble. One may also think here of drug addicts who pray to God to help them overcome their addiction. Certainly God is not infringing on our essential freedom if, by virtue of changing our character, God helps us fulfil a deeper, more heartfelt decision. On the other hand, the situation might be different if a person does not have any such deeper desire. If the earlier point about self-deception is correct, in order for God to change the character traits of someone embroiled in self-deception God would have constantly to be interfering with that person's freely chosen way of viewing the world. This would, again, involve not just one act by God, but a continuous series of interventions, each of which alters the way a person chooses to see the world. As I suggested earlier, it seems that this sort of scenerio involves more than just God interfering with a certain limited set of free choices. Rather, it seems to involve God taking over the whole person, thereby interfering (or perhaps destroying) her very existence as an autonomous individual.

But even if we accept that God sometimes directly alters a person's character or dispositions, it still remains that God cannot, consistent with respecting human freedom, force a person to be saved. As long as God respects the autonomy and character of the individual person, salvation cannot be guaranteed. And if we reject middle knowledge, God cannot know whether an unredeemed person would be saved in some future situation. If this is so, and if, as seems reasonable, God's loving concern for creation is boundless, then it seems inconsistent with the divine nature to suppose that God puts a timetable on salvation. As long as it is possible for a person to be redeemed, God must allow that possibility to be actualized.

Another way of looking at this matter is to ask the question somewhat differently. Instead of asking whether we can be absolutely assured that all persons will be saved, we should instead ask, 'Should we believe that all persons will be saved?'. It seems to me that, while there are serious philosophical objections to

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the claim that God can guarantee salvation for all persons, there are no such problems with the suggestion that God will, in fact, be able to secure salvation for all. Given the boundless resources available to God, and given that salvation is the only thing that can satisfy our heart's deepest cravings, this sort of universalism seems to me to be quite plausible. As John Hick puts it,

> The least that we may say is that God will never cease to desire and actively work for the salvation of each created person. He will never abandon any as irredeemably evil. However long an individual may reject his Maker, salvation will remain an open possibility to which God is ever trying to draw him.[10]

Indeed in this same work Hick goes further, suggesting that, while it is logically possible that all are not saved, it is nevertheless 'morally certain' that all will be saved. I am unclear what it means to be morally certain of something, but if by this Hick means we ought to have faith that God's purposes will be achieved and all will be saved, then I am in basic agreement with him. Nor is there anything paradoxical in this sort of contingent universalism. There are all sorts of possible situations which none of us takes seriously as real likelihoods. It is possible the Chicago Cubs will win every game in next baseball season. Indeed, for any given baseball game it is possible that the game, or even the first inning, last for an entire year. As long as we reject both the Calvinist claim that God did not intend to save all, and the hypothesis that it is possible for a person to choose freely to render themselves incapable of salvation, universal salvation looks to me to be the best bet in town.

It would also be a mistake to conclude that this sort of universalism runs into the problem that Jonathan Kvanvig raises against any sort of contingent universalism. Kvanvig argues that contingent universalism does not really deal with the moral problem of hell, in that it only holds that everyone is saved in this world, and does not get God off the hook in other possible worlds.[11] But Kvanvig's objection is misguided if it is applied to the view I have been defending. For if what I have been saying is correct, then the mere fact that some people are not saved would not, by itself, call into question God's goodness. The moral problem of hell derives not from some person(s) not being saved, but from either: (1) God's giving up on the salvation of a person who may possibly still choose redemption; or (2) the gratuitous suffering of the damned. On the concept of salvation I have outlined, neither of these characteristics applies to God. In other words, the problem arises, not from whether anyone is eternally separated from God, but from how we conceive the nature of this eternal separation.

Kvanvig perhaps would object that what I have suggested here is not really damnation at all, since the door to redemption is perpetually left open. This would be the case if we suppose that a 'no-exit' clause is essential to the traditional doctrine of hell. From this it follows that the sort of damnation contingent universalism countenances as a bare possibility differs from hell as

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traditionally understood. A hellfire traditionalist may also point out that this conception of the unredeemed lacks both fire and brimstone, and indeed allows for the possibility that the sort of suffering the damned receive differs very little from what we ourselves suffer during our earthly existence. Both of these are fair points. But from the fact that eternal separation is here conceived differently from the tradition does not alter the fact that, according to the view I am proposing, eternal separation from God remains a genuine, if unlikely, possibility. And, if what I have been arguing in this paper is correct, this slim possibility is required if we are to have a concept of redemption that, unlike necessary universalism, consistently respects creaturely freedom. To echo another point of Hick's, it is part of the Christian virtue of hope to believe that all will be saved. And, given God's power and love, this hope is not likely to be frustrated.[12]

Notes

1. William Lane Craig '"No other name": a middle knowledge perspective on the exclusivity of salvation through Christ', *Faith and Philosophy*, **6** (1989), 172–188.
2. Clark H. Pinnock and Robert C. Brow (eds) *Unbounded Love: A Good News Theology for the 21st Century* (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996). Electronically published at: http://www.brow.on.ca/Books/ULove/UL08.htm.
3. Jerry Walls *Hell: The Logic of Damnation* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 88–93.
4. Thomas Talbott 'The doctrine of everlasting punishment', *Faith and Philosophy*, **7** (1990), 36–38.
5. Jean-Paul Sartre *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel Barnes (tr.) (New York NY: Gramercy Books, 1957), 47–70.
6. Thomas Talbott 'Freedom, damnation, and the power to sin with impunity', *Religious Studies*, **37** (2001), 417–434, 432.
7. *Ibid.*, 431.
8. *Idem* 'Misery and freedom: reply to Walls', *Religious Studies*, **40** (2004), 217–224.
9. I would like to thank Aaron Preston for raising this possibility with me.
10. John Hick *Evil and the God of Love* (London: Macmillian, 1966), 379.
11. Jonathan Kvanvig *The Problem of Hell* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 74–77.
12. I would like to thank Thomas Talbott for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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