Language in Society **28**, 273–293. Printed in the United States of America

Toward a comprehensive theory of language and gender

VICTORIA L. BERGVALL

Department of Humanities
Michigan Technological University
1400 Townsend Drive
Houghton, MI 49931–1295
vbergval@mtu.edu

ABSTRACT

The search for explanatory coherence in language and gender research has fostered a variety of research methods and analyses; this article evaluates the contributions of the Communities of Practice approach, with its focus on the constructive practices of a group – especially mutual engagement of learning a jointly negotiated practice of gender. Rather than presupposing gender differences as a starting point, CofP emphasizes the learning and mutability in gendered linguistic displays across groups; CofP theory thus naturalizes intragroup variation, not marking it as deviant. However, while the CofP approach focuses much-needed attention on the social construction of gender as local and cross-culturally variable, gender research must be augmented by critical study of two other facets of gender: ideology and innateness, which are critical components of a more comprehensive theory of gender for language research. (Community of Practice, gender, ideology, innateness, difference, dominance, diversity)*

In the past decade of research on language and gender, a number of tensions have arisen between the study of gender differences and similarities, difference and dominance, universals and particulars. While the field has struggled to find coherence and to explain why gender variation in language arises (e.g. Cameron & Coates 1988, Holmes 1993, Freed 1994), there has also been a growing understanding of the diversity of possibilities of gender expression through language across different cultures (e.g. Ochs Keenan 1974, Brown 1980, 1993, Sherzer 1987, Cameron 1988, Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992b, Gal 1992). Consideration of these complex issues took a major step forward with the publication of Eckert & McConnell-Ginet's landmark essay, "Think practically and look locally: Language and gender as community-based practice" (1992b). This work was among the first in the linguistic tradition to provide a systematic means to address what had become a growing concern in other fields (e.g. psychology, sociology, anthropology, and women's studies): the idea that the categories of "women" and "men" should not be treated as presupposed, monolithic variables

© 1999 Cambridge University Press 0047-4045/99 $9.50

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

in the search for understanding of variation, but rather that they themselves should be subject to scrutiny and analysis.

In this article, I place in historical context the significant contributions of Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992a, 1992b, 1995, and this collection) and the communities of practice (CofP) approach they propose. I examine their call for further ethnographic work, their admonitions against premature generalization – and especially their claim that there was, at the time of their 1992b article, no coherent theory that could bind together the burgeoning research on language and gender. I propose some of the perspectives that a coherent theory of language and gender must address, taking a tripartite approach suggested by Shakespeare's comment on the origins of greatness:[1] "Some are born great; some achieve greatness; and some have greatness thrust upon them." Thus I address three critical facets of gender: (a) the INNATE, concerning the debates about gender, sex, and inborn physical difference; (b) the ACHIEVED, considering the linguistic means through which speakers construct their gendered status (the perspective of the CofP approach); and (c) the ASCRIBED, assessing the role of ideology and hegemonic belief systems which underlie social roles, and which thrust on speakers certain assumptions of gender roles and behavior.

TERMINOLOGICAL EXCURSUS ON *SEX* AND *GENDER*

What is a theory of language and gender a theory of, anyway? Linguists working on language and gender were initially reluctant to use the term "gender" because of its pre-existing linguistic use referring to morpho-syntactic gender (cf. Coates 1986:4). Today, however, most linguists have overcome their unease and have adopted the more common cross-disciplinary sense of GENDER as a social construct, operating in a complex and contested association with the biological construct of SEX (McConnell-Ginet 1988).

The critical questions that most studies of language and gender have grappled with in some form include WHETHER there is gender differentiation of language use, WHENCE it arises, WHAT FORMS it takes linguistically, and WHAT EFFECTS it has in society. West 1990 noted that gender surfaces from among other variables, such as power, citing its role as a "master" status variable (Hughes 1945). Every known society seems to take physical difference as a fundamental principle, reflected in language (e.g. Brown 1980, Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992a, Holmes 1993, Tannen 1993, Wodak & Benke 1996). But it is clear that, across the world, there is great variation in the ways that the social constructions of gender play off sex linguistically.

One explanation advanced to account for cognitive and linguistic gender differences comes from sociobiologists and their popular interpreters, who claim that such differences arose and were reified over the millennia in which women were gatherers and men were hunters (e.g. Joseph 1992, Nadeau 1996, Morris

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

1998; but for criticism, see Lewontin et al. 1984, Fausto-Sterling 1992, Swann 1992, Thorne 1993). However, life in a (post)modern, increasingly technological world seems to rely ever less on physical distinctions based on procreation and physical dimorphism, by which men outsize and overpower women. Yet significant gender-based power differentials persist: Who, having enjoyed the privileges of power, is likely to relinquish it willingly?

Across societies today, clothing covers most evidence of the primary sexual characteristics of bodily differentiation, and could well be used to obscure it; but societies seem more intent on exaggerating and playing up sexual differentiation than submerging it (Morris 1998). Thus secondary and tertiary markers – including voice and vocal behavior – become the obvious means by which to sort people. Yet as Ochs points out (1992:340), "few features of language directly and exclusively index gender." The task of linguists working on gender is to figure out how this complex indexing works, and what it signifies.

The explosion of research on language and gender in recent years has yielded numerous analyses across a wide range of linguistic practice. The subject of at least some part of that debate is the very nature of the variation under study: Are we examining linguistic variation that results from gender, or from sex? Is there any discernible difference between the two? Cameron 1997 considers the theoretical debates surrounding the question of sex and gender, working from paradigms summarized by Mathieu 1989:

(1) a. Is sex basic and fixed, with gender the socially mediated expression of biological givens?
b. Do gender and sex co-vary, with gender symbolizing sex in a freer relationship to biology than suggested by the first paradigm?
c. Is gender the fundamental perspective, itself constructing and interpreting sex?

Should we and can we, as researchers, begin with the sex-based categories FEMALE and MALE, exploring their differences and similarities in the instantiation in WOMEN and MEN? Or do we begin with GENDER, examining the social construction of FEMININITY and MASCULINITY, and their effects on language?

Traditionally, variationist studies have proceeded from assumption of the first paradigm proposed by Mathieu. One begins by reading off the obvious sex of the subjects under study, categorized as male or female, in pursuit of phonological variation and its explanation with respect to gender (e.g. Labov 1991). The second paradigm suggested by Mathieu is social-constructionist, dealing with the social symbolization of gender through language (e.g. Sherzer 1987, Ochs 1992). Only in recent years have linguists and gender theorists really questioned the heart of what constitutes the social construction – seeing its operation not merely on the language produced by speakers, but also on the interpretation of the body itself (e.g. Butler 1990, 1993, Nicholson 1994, Bing & Bergvall 1996, among many others).

However, the careful terminological distinctions created by theorists seem to collapse in real-world usage. Consider these three instances:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

(2) a. A colleague leans over to me during a meeting, and asks what he should fill in when a form asks him to give his gender, when his options are two boxes, "Male" and "Female."
b. In trying to answer his preschool son's question about how boys are different from girls, the father explains to his son, "You are the male gender."
c. A graduate student delving into the nature of women's political involvement is advised to cut the section exploring the social construction of "women" because it will introduce too many complicated variables; she should instead focus on variables of "life stage (age)," within a restricted selection/notion of "class."

These situations suggest at first that the debate about terms merely reveals public confusion. Theorists over the past decade have challenged the binary nature of social gender, and they would generally use the terms *male* and *female* to describe basic biological, rather than social variation. But in popular terms, the resolution of the sex/gender debate comes down to simple substitution of "gender" for "sex" as a more polite term, probably to avoid the taboo implications of sexuality. Certainly, in the first example, I would expect that most institutions would not really care to receive a complicated explanation of the past bisexual-social experiences of my friend that challenge any binary coding of his orientation. As 2b–c suggest, in the rush of everyday life, we push for simplicity in background areas to allow complexity in the area of our focus. From the parents of the three-year-old in 2b, who wish to teach him that girls can do anything boys can do (but who don't want to get into issues of trans-gendered behavior and sexuality), to researchers as in 2c, who can't take time to focus on every possible variable (cf. Labov 1991) – we all simplify, we box and stack, we set aside complications.

Public use of the term *gender* thus seems to transfer old assumptions of basic sexual dichotomies of female and male to a new cover term; but gender theorists intend their use of the term to point to the primacy of the social construction over the physical. As Butler suggests (1990:7), looking hard at the system makes the whole distinction between sex and gender collapse back onto itself:

> If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called "sex" is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all.

Although the general public may prefer to view the gulf between women and men as vast and clear-cut – judging from book sales of *Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus* (Gray 1992) – most linguistic researchers would dismiss the "alien" interpretation, and would point to the obviously high degree of mutually intelligible talk between women and men; they would see the more interesting issue to be the disentangling of the interplay of gender and language in the context of other social variables. As pointed out by Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (1992a,b) and by others (e.g. Sherzer 1987, Bucholtz 1995, Mendoza-Denton 1995), gender is implicated with our other social identities in such a complex way that it is difficult to extract it – or to expect that monolithic behaviors will be exhibited by the world's "women" or "men."

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

BRIEF HISTORY OF EXPLANATIONS FOR GENDER VARIATION IN LANGUAGE

Modern work on language and gender has generally drawn on three accounts of variation: that women's language is regarded as DEFICIENT when compared to men's; that it fundamentally reflects men's DOMINANCE over women; or that it arises from DIFFERENCE in the socialization patterns of women and men. Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992b give a complex synthesis of much of this work, showing the interweaving of all three accounts.

The DEFICIT perspective on gender variation has its roots in medieval notions of the chain of being: God above man, above women, above the beasts. Women were seen as a diminished copy of the original Adam. Women's language was thus also an imperfect, deviant, or deficient gloss on men's. Men were bearers of the vital force of language; women, in shrinking from the coarser but virile expressions of men (Jespersen 1922), employed insipid, ladylike usages. Paradoxically, they were damned as ineffectual if they used these, and chastised if they did not (Lakoff 1975). Women were also placed in a deficit position in a different way, if only by default, in Labov's 1972 characterization of male street gangs as the exemplars of vernacular usage. Cameron 1995, 1996, in her analysis of "verbal hygiene," traces much of the pressure exerted on women to monitor and "clean up" their deficient language practice.

The DOMINANCE explanations that arose in the 1970s linked these negative evaluations of women's language to their social domination by men. It wasn't that women were incapable of vital language (cf. West 1995); rather, men took the upper hand in conversation, enacting social dimorphism in echo of physical dimorphism. Thus power was seen as a central feature (O'Barr & Atkins 1980), where men crowded women into a smaller and less significant space on the linguistic floor by several means: by their interruptions and overlaps (Zimmerman & West 1975, West & Zimmerman 1983); by failing to take up women's conversational gambits (Fishman 1983); by volume of words (Swacker 1975, Spender 1980); or by their semantic derogation of women (Shultz 1975).

Feminists of the 1970s and 1980s sought to reclaim women's place as different but equal linguistic participants, advancing arguments of women's superiority in certain linguistic domains. Under the DIFFERENCE approach, women were cited as better conversationalists, for using elicitory strategies that operated to raise the level of conversation for all participants (Jenkins & Cheshire 1990, Cheshire & Jenkins 1991), as well as for seeking rapport, nurturing, or collaborating in language, in contrast to men's one-upmanship (Tannen 1990). The theory was advanced that women and men learned different behaviors as part of their social differentiation, from playgroups onward (Maltz & Borker 1982, Coates 1986, Tannen 1990, Thorne 1993); and that they shouldn't therefore be blamed for expressing their socialized roles, but that each sex should come to value the style of the other (Tannen 1990).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Critics of this "difference" approach pointed out that such a separate-but-equal, assign-no-blame approach, though valorizing women's contributions, effectively downplayed a social reality in which difference was not equally valued or tolerated (Henley & Kramarae 1991, Troemel-Ploetz 1991, de Francisco 1991, Freed 1992, Uchida 1992). The difference explanation effectively masks the disruption of equality when a sharer/nurturer meets with a turn-nabbing one-upper in conversation: The social position of male dominance places a disequilibrating thumb on the scales of just and equal conversation. Note, however, Tannen's later discussions (1993a, 1994a,b,c) of the non-exclusivity of the dominance and difference approaches.

The 1990s raised the term "deviance" in a special light. Given a two-cultures difference approach, women were no longer viewed as merely aberrant or defective copies of men; they might claim their own distinct linguistic domain. But data from closer examination of intra-category variation (e.g. Eckert 1990, Freed 1996) called into question the generalizability of principles drawn from the study of predominantly white, middle-class, North American and European women: Could the behavior of all women be accounted for by one cultural domain? What then of a woman who acted outside the bounds of this group of other women? In a sense, she was now doubly deviant: not male, nor yet fully female. Furthermore, studies of women and men in other cultures (e.g. Hall 1996) challenged the two-culture mode as overly simplistic, demanding a new examination of the source and effect of gender variation in language – one that could account for cross-cultural variation, both within and across gender and cultural boundaries. Bing & Bergvall 1996 call this a move toward incorporating DIVERSITY, a recognition of the continuum of humans' gendered practices.

Meanwhile, in other fields – psychological, sociological, anthropological, historical, and biological – there was growing dissatisfaction with ESSENTIALIST difference approaches to the study of gender (e.g. Lewontin et al. 1984, Connell 1987, West & Zimmerman 1987, C. Epstein 1988, Scott 1988, Gal 1989, Butler 1990, 1993, J. Epstein 1990, Gordon 1991, Bem 1993, Thorne 1993, Lorber 1994, Nicholson 1994, Crawford 1995, West & Fenstermaker 1995). These theorists began slowly to influence linguistic research on gender.

ASCENDANCY OF THE LOCAL AND PRACTICAL: THE COFP APPROACH

The CofP approach advanced by Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992a,b, 1995 – drawing on Lave & Wenger 1991, Wenger 1998 – played a significant role in this new assessment of variation and deviance. The CofP theory centers on the assumption of variability in gendered practices and identities, challenging the dualized differences between putatively homogeneous groups of females vs. males. It emphasizes the acts of becoming gendered, of moving from peripheral or novice participation in linguistic action to a central or more experienced enactment,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

with a shared repertoire of linguistic resources (cf. Wenger 1998:76). This fine-grained approach allows researchers to study nuances within the categories of "women" and "men," "girls" and "boys." For example, Eckert & McConnell-Ginet's 1995 analysis of the teenagers' language at Belten High demonstrated how the semantics of labeling patterns ("jocks" vs. "burnouts") revealed overt social categorization. Meanwhile, phonological variants gave evidence, on a mostly unconscious plane, of the students' allegiances and alliances – the construction of their relative positions within a complex of gender and social class.

Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992b urged gender researchers to do several things:

(3) a. Recognize that gender is not fixed and pre-existing – a dynamic verb rather than a static noun.
b. Consider how gender interacts with other aspects of social identity (e.g. class, race, ethnicity, and age), rather than taking it as an "additive" variable, easily abstractable from a person's other identities.
c. Challenge premature generalization of the assumptions about gender variations based on studies of small (usually Western, middle-class) populations.
d. Share research with other gender theorists from other fields.
e. Undertake local studies of communities across a broader range of social settings, countries, and languages.

Thus they recognized that diversity within categories was not merely noise in the system, but a natural result of membership in a number of overlapping social communities of practice that must be accounted for by theory.

I was drawn to this perspective, as were others, by the way in which it foregrounds the cultural embeddedness of the notion of gender as inextricably linked to other personal and social attributes. As Eckert notes (1989:247), "Gender differences are exceedingly complex, particularly in a society and era where women have been moving self-consciously into the marketplace and calling traditional roles into question." CofP is well suited to address the complexity of the cross-currents of modern Western and other societies where gender roles are in flux and under challenge; where group members might construct differing practices in response to differing social opportunities and settings, such as work within non-traditional fields (e.g. McElhinny's 1993 study of female police officers, or Bergvall's 1996a work on female engineering students); or where young people are responding to shifting social expectations – e.g. Bucholtz's studies of the language of female nerds (in this collection) and of the use of AAVE by white students (1997).

It is not surprising that the CofP perspective works so well to explain the construction and enactment of gender in the studies among adolescents by Bucholtz and by Eckert & McConnell-Ginet. That is precisely the kind of setting for which CofP was designed, in which learners or novices apprentice themselves to (or resist) the acquisition of gender and other norms – in short, education. However, for the adult settings of Ehrlich, Freed, and Meyerhoff (in the articles of this collection) the explanatory fit may be less than perfect, because the issues here seem to focus less on the acquisition of skills or practices, and more on the display

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and reification of practice through language and other semiotic systems. CofP seems less able to account for the social ascriptions which, at this stage of life, are more pre-existing than immediately under construction (though they are subject to constant refinement, challenge etc.)

TENSIONS BETWEEN PARTICULARS AND UNIVERSALS

The broad applicability of any theory or account of gender has been the subject of recent debate. Researchers have carefully cautioned against assuming that "women" or "men" the world over behave the same (e.g. Cameron & Coates 1988, Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992b, Freed 1994). Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992b warn against the specific dangers of premature or excessive generalization: It may put off close examination of complex linguistic practices and their significance in the community; it may lead to focus on conformity, rather than on intra-gender variation or challenge; and it may distract from more interesting questions about the use and reflection of language in the construction of the complex of gender difference and gender relations.

Eckert & McConnell-Ginet argue that "the content of gender categories and their connections to linguistic behavior can only be determined by ethnographic study" (1992b:485; see also this collection). They assert that decontextualized study of gender variation and assumptions of pre-existing gender categories could yield no real understanding of why there is variation and what it means:

> . . . if we search for patterns in language data unconnected to the practices of particular communities, we can at best get correlational information, and can never offer explanatory accounts. . . . A basic beginning in the search for valid generalizations with some explanatory significance must be the examination of a wide variety of local communities of practice, along with serious consideration of apparent exceptions to candidate generalizations. (This collection, p. 190.)

However, Holmes 1996 argues persuasively that the particularization of ethnographic study needs to be contextualized within larger quantitative studies. She points to another research perspective for understanding gender: the utility of quantitative data to complement the many studies of particular groups and instances. Large-scale quantitative studies collected across a broad population can contextualize the individual communities' usages, and augur the direction of change in the use of linguistic variables.

It is not clear, within a CofP approach, how one moves from individual communities to larger-scale practices. Perhaps one might speak of the accretion of all the local communities of practice as constituting one larger, more global practice; but how does the crucial CofP requirement of "mutual engagement" work beyond local communities? How can we explain the strong beliefs in binary sex/gender that arise and are spread across wide stretches of communities and cultures? How do we talk about widely shared beliefs that do not seem to be globally discussed?

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Do we point to past smaller communities where these matters were debated, and then passed through successive generations by some culturally mediated means?

Our drive for deeper understanding of the significance of gender pushes us to consider the source and significance of gender variation. One way to do this, following the practice of autonomous formal linguistics, is to attempt to distill fundamental principles, stated in precise – and thus testable – claims, and then to test them.

Holmes 1993 carefully formulates six candidate universals regarding language and gender that she proposes to be tested more thoroughly for their possible cross-cultural applicability (see Holmes's article for numerous citations to support these generalizations):

(4) a. Women and men develop different patterns of language use.
b. Women tend to focus on the affective functions of an interaction more often than men do.
c. Women tend to use linguistic devices that stress solidarity more often than men do.
d. Women tend to interact in ways that will maintain and increase solidarity, while (especially in formal contexts) men tend to interact in ways that will maintain and increase their power and status.
e. Women use more standard forms than men from the same social group in the same social context.
f. Women are stylistically more flexible than men.

Holmes acknowledges that the first universal is least disputable. In offering the rest, she recognizes quite clearly that they have been attested mostly in Western societies; they require considerable cross-cultural research if they are to be generalized.

Holmes 1993 is very aware of the danger inherent in proposing generalizations: They may be used to perpetuate stereotypes rather than to challenge them (see also Freed 1994). As Cameron's 1995 work on "verbal hygiene" details, Lakoff's early introspective speculations about the nature of women's language (1975) have passed into popular culture as prescriptions for women on how or how not to speak, despite refutation by later empirical research (e.g. Dubois & Crouch 1975, Crosby & Nyquist 1977, Cameron et al. 1989). Descriptions have been transformed into prescriptions embraced by transsexual trainers, marriage counselors, phone-sex employees, and others (Bucholtz & Hall 1995).

Although there are dangers in seeking generalizations, Holmes 1993 and Freed 1994 capture the need that is satisfied by such generalizations: the public yearning after comprehensible explanation (evidenced in part by the popularity of books such as Tannen 1990 and Gray 1992). This supports the common assumption that there may be some common ground underlying the linguistic positions of women and men in the world, however varied within and across categories.

BEYOND THE LOCAL: A REFORMULATION OF PERSPECTIVES

What would a comprehensive and coherent theory of gender encompass? While considering the explanatory power of the CofP theory for this collection of papers, I recalled the quotation from Shakespeare noted above, and began to con-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

sider how it might be used to focus on different aspects of gender: what is inborn, what is achieved, and what is thrust upon us. The CofP approach focuses on the middle aspect – the performative construction and achievement of gendered identity – but any social construction must be understood in the context of the other two aspects of gender.

The first aspect of gender, that which arises (or is believed to arise) from innateness, is usually conceived in terms of dichotomized and oppositional female/male sex (gender) differences. Recent advances in biology, genetics, and neurophysiology have provided relevant new research, e.g. in the study of the effects of hormones on sex determination of fetuses, and in new technologies that allow study of the living brain. But Fausto-Sterling 1992, Bing & Bergvall 1996, Blum 1997, and others point out that the reports of findings of binary sex-based differences are themselves complex social constructions which demand close and critical analysis, as will be discussed in more detail below.

The third aspect of gender, that which is thrust on us by social expectation, is especially well illustrated in the papers in this collection. Such work demands that we consider and clarify the force of the socially ascribed nature of gender: the assumptions and expectations of (often binary) ascribed social roles against which any performance of gender is constructed, accommodated to, or resisted.

I will argue here that this three-part view of gender better accounts for the variety of gendered linguistic practices that is seen in the articles of this collection and in other recent work. As noted above, the CofP approach fits well with Bucholtz's account of adolescents in school – which focuses on the social construction of local group practices, more than on the gender ascriptions to which the group responds (since nerds are also subject to stereotypic beliefs). It is clear that her nerds see themselves as powerful agents in the definition of who they are, and what their norms and standards will be – often in liberating opposition to expectations imposed by other social groupings that appear very limiting to intelligent women. These women construct themselves as a coherent community of practice via their mutual engagement in negotiated discourse, e.g. in distinction to "Trekkies"; but they also retain their individuality, and mark themselves as core or peripheral members via their teasing conversation. Carrie's role as a liminal member – the "cultural and linguistic broker" for the group – illustrates the flexibility of the CofP approach: She clearly serves as a bridge between different communities, and her linguistic practices illustrate how communities are always shifting and constructing new meanings.

In contrast, the society in Vanuatu that Meyerhoff analyzes employs linguistic forms, such as *sore* 'sorry', along traditional gender lines. Of the articles here, her analysis reports what appears to be the strongest expression of the continued construction of behaviors that fit ascribed, dualized roles that oppose the women's sphere to that of men. This is apparently a traditionally organized society that perceives basic, very different socio-sexual roles and domains: the common do-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

mestic domain for women, as compared to the public domain of men. Women achieve and increase their social status by the use of the linguistic item *sore* constructed in nurturing ways; but the men achieve social status through other means – using *sore* as an expression of "missing someone," or to apologize to them. Is this because the society is fairly homogeneous, not buffeted by other social stratifications? What about age, power hierarchies, or the influence of outsiders? One analysis might be that the openings for contestation of ascribed gender roles based on sexual dualities, and their re-construction or re-negotiation, arise more frequently in societies where different social currents ascribe or valorize different social roles, as in Eckert & McConnell-Ginet's study of Belten High (1995). For example, the cross-cutting of class with gender in Belten High provides opportunities for seeing gender as mutable and susceptible to (re)-construction.

Ehrlich's work illustrates the interplay of ascribed and constructed roles against the background of physical/sexual involvement. The rape trial defendant and his representative speak as if women at the university (and among the tribunal) belong to one cohesive group of "women" in opposition to "men"; the two men therefore expect the women of the tribunal to be more sympathetic and partial toward the female plaintiffs. Ironically, a closer examination of the language of the woman faculty tribunal member, with her series of interrogative statements, suggests the opposite: that she constructs for the plaintiffs a story of lack of resistance (and thus assumed consent), and so creates a model of gender practice in which the women defendants' actions are reinterpreted via language as a deficient practice of womanhood, set in contrast to the woman professor's expectations of appropriate practice.

Freed's work also suggests an interplay of ascribed and constructed communities, with biology again as the backdrop: Here the ascribed community is that of "pregnant women" – who, on the whole, derive their commonality not via mutual engagement in negotiated discourse, but from physical features definitely arising from sexual difference. Communities of discourse practice arise not among the pregnant women, but among those who engage in discourse around and toward pregnant women. Doctors, in their treatment and naming of pregnancy and its complications, constitute one such community, negotiating meaning in the joint enterprise of pregnancy care. Furthermore, women are more often OBJECTS than mutually engaged SUBJECTS in the public interactions with doctors and others, who obviously share a repertoire of discourse and actions (touching women, commenting on their condition, asking personally invasive questions).

Over all, the articles in this volume illustrate what I see as the next stage in understanding the explanatory force of the communities of practice approach: the necessity of seeing the construction of these particular practices against the backdrop of strong social stereotypes and ascriptions about gender, in complex association with biology.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

CHALLENGES TO COFP: IDEOLOGIES THRUST UPON US

How do we study these larger societal ascriptions in a principled way? Butler (1990:33), who strongly emphasizes the performative aspect of gender (cf. Bourdieu 1991 on *habitus*) notes, "Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being." A local approach to gender lacks a principled means to analyze the larger-scale formations of the "insistent and insidious practice, sustained and regulated by various social means."

Despite its many virtues, it is not clear how a "localized" CofP approach can derive a systematic account for gender norms established prior to the local practice of gender, at the more global level of ideology and hegemony. While it is critical to examine the local practices that illustrate compliance to, alliance with, or resistance to larger-scale norms, a study of how certain ideologies are thrust upon us demands a more general approach. As Woolard & Schieffelin note (1994:72), we must study the relationship of "the microculture of communicative action to political economic considerations of power and social inequality, confronting macrosocial constraints on language and behavior."

There is a growing interest in how ideologies operate linguistically, and much of the work is driven by Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995, Gal 1989, Wodak 1989, Hodge & Kress 1993, van Dijk 1993, Woolard & Schieffelin 1994, Fairclough & Wodak 1997). A growing number of studies are focusing on the role of language in the ideological construction of gender (e.g. Remlinger 1995, 1997, Talbot 1995, 1998, Bergvall 1996b, McElhinny 1997, Eggins & Iedema 1997). Intrinsic to the latter set of studies is the notion that gender operates on both local and more global levels.

As van Dijk notes (1993:255), powerful elites have special access to discourse; they exert powerful decision-making and linguistic control via courts, law, police enforcement, media, etc. We must look beyond local domains to explore the gatekeeping powers that the elite have for controlling discourse. Critical Discourse Analysis takes a different approach from CofP, examining how ideology is constructed and imposed from above, often through the control of the media. As Talbot 1995 argues, in her analysis of the "synthetic sisterhood" organized around the consumption of teen beauty magazines, media discourse is powerful and one-sided. Unlike the local CofP, which demands interaction, the mass media impose images and constructions of behavior. Certainly consumers have a choice to buy or not buy a book or magazine, to watch or not watch a TV program; and their choice of what they consume will affect later offerings. But once consumers buy or consume a discourse product, their linguistic choices are limited to a reaction to the media event.

Talbot (1995:143) notes that, in mass media,

> producer and interpreter are sharply divided and distant from each other … Addressing a mass audience imposes on mass-media producers the need to

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

construct an implied reader (or viewer) as addressee. At the same time, it imposes on actual mass-media readers or viewers the need to negotiate with the constructed positions.

This puts media producers in a very powerful position. As "professional practitioners," they control the rights to production, determine what should be included, and decide how to couch these ideas so as to "assign assumed shared experiences and commonsense attitudes."

Of course, non-elite consumers are far from powerless in their consumption of such texts and ideologies (as detailed by, among others, Radway 1987, Houston & Kramarae 1991, Talbot 1995, Bergvall & Remlinger 1996, and de Francisco 1997). Indeed, hegemonic power is not monolithic and unassailable: There are multiple constructions to act within or against (Bakhtin 1981, van Dijk 1993, Hall 1995). Yet the power of mass media to shape general assumptions – to create ascriptions of "appropriate" gender roles – must be examined by those studying the interrelationship of language and gender. The analysis of these ascriptive practices, e.g. via Critical Discourse Analysis, provides a context for studying what Cameron (1997:31) calls "institutional coerciveness": gender construction beyond the bounds of local communities of practice.

The role of modern science in the production of gender falls under this study of ideology as well, because of the status of science as an explanatory force in the Western world. Science maintains its own practices that help reify dualities: Spare, "elegant" equations are perceived as more forceful and explanatory, and stark reports of difference are more easily and readily reported in the popular media than are gray-shaded continua. Here, ideology and biology overlap.

MORE CHALLENGES TO COFP: THE CONTINUED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BODY

The notion that biology plays a role in gender variation seems at first absurdly obvious; we need only consider the relentless social differentiation that begins at birth, at the moment of the recognition of genital status – from naming patterns, to color coding, to toilet practices, to the imposition of many other social norms and expectations. However, the investigation of innate sexual differences has been problematized in the past few decades with the increased understanding of the complex interactions of genetics and hormones in the production of a baby, as well as the forces of social construction of gender that begin to operate even before the child is born. The investigation of this complex interaction certainly involves the local practices of gender construction; but it also demands an investigation into the practices of modern science and their public promulgation, and the belief systems that drive both – a task that exceeds the bounds of a CofP approach focused on local constructions. What is innate, what is socially constructed locally, and what is ideologically constructed: All three avenues of investigation must be used in the study of the body and its interaction with gender.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Researchers investigating the role of innate sexual differentiation have created a more detailed view of the interplay of our genetics and hormones with modern medical practices in the production of what are usually seen as the "two" sexes (Jacobs & Cromwell 1992, Duckett & Baskin 1993, Kessler 1994). The influence of human hormones may determine to what extent chromosomal Xs and Ys are played out in physical form, but even those factors are affected by differences in proportions of hormones. It is not simply that females are awash in estrogen and men in testosterone; timing and amount vary, creating a greater range of difference than the public generally acknowledges – a situation masked by physicians' intervention as they elect to "fix" what they see as nature's mistakes.

From the womb to the brain, new technology has intensified the investigation of sexual differentiation. We might expect sex/gender variation in the brain (as the site of production of language) to affect linguistic output, leading to some innate influence on language variation. Indeed, such claims have been made, e.g. by Chambers 1992, 1995, who cites the finding of Maccoby & Jacklin (1974:354) – that "girls have greater verbal ability than boys" – as among the "sex differences that are fairly well established." Chambers argues that small but statistically significant differences between women and men, as groups, are emphasized by social forces. But Fausto-Sterling (1992:30) notes that, when Jacklin 1979 recalculated the sex variation using a new meta-analytic approach to re-evaluate the magnitude of group differences, she concluded that the variance was much less significant: "It teeters on the brink of oblivion."

Research to determine the extent and nature of gender variation in the brain persists (e.g. Kimura 1992, Shaywitz et al. 1995). Much media comment was provoked by the Shaywitz report of finding statistically significant sex-based variation in the linguistic processing areas of the brain. However, a closer analysis of their research (Bing & Bergvall 1996, Bergvall 1996b) raises questions both about the range of variation within the categories of women and men, and about the robustness of the variation in the first place. Shaywitz et al. investigated three different linguistic tests (orthographic, phonological, and semantic), and found significant variation only in the phonological; and although they report strong sex-based differences – "women" showed more bilateral hemispheric processing in their linguistic functions, while "men" were strongly left-hemisphere lateralized – their conclusion emphasizes the findings of 11 of the 19 women, setting aside the much less bilateralized activity of eight of the women.

Bergvall 1996b argues that biology and ideology intersect in the reporting of these research results, to some degree in the scientific reports and to a greater degree in the public media. That study details how ideologies of difference were fostered by relatively simple linguistic manipulations of text, e.g. by removing preverbal and prenominal modifiers (e.g. *tend*, *many*, *more likely*) and by stating claims in convoluted syntax which hedged the statistical findings of the scientists:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

> Although *we do not want to claim* that phonological processing *makes no demand on right hemisphere sites in males*, we wish to emphasize that in a site uniquely serving phonological processing, the IFG [inferior frontal gyrus], *females devote greater right hemispheric resources* to the task. (Shaywitz et al. 1995:609; italics supplied).

The abstract of the article states the variation less ambiguously (in syntactic terms) and more categorically:

> During phonological tasks, *brain activation in males is lateralized to the left* inferior frontal gyrus regions; *in females the pattern of activation is very different, engaging more diffuse neural systems* that involve both the left and right inferior frontal gyrus. (607)

Thus reports of differences discernible at the level of statistical analysis are overstated in more categorical terms, implying that "men" use the left brain while "women" use both sides of the brain in "very different" ways of processing language.

Reports in the media played up the aspect of categorical differences between women and men, characterizing the difference in essentialist terms; e.g., "men and women will never be like each other because they use their brains differently" (Jet 1995:15). Another popular text about gender differences in the brain (Moir & Jessel 1991:8) concludes on a similar note:

> Men and women could live more happily, understand and love each other better, organize the world to better effect, if we acknowledged our differences. We could then build our lives on the twin pillars of our distinct sexual identities.

Note the explicit separation into two incommensurable categories of MEN and WOMEN, underlined by the final phrase, "the *twin pillars* of our *distinct* sexual identities."

Fausto-Sterling cites many complications in the interpretation of the data on the effects of the innate on gender determination. She concludes:

> Male and female babies may be born. But those complex gender-loaded individuals we call men and women are produced. The complex assembly line includes all of our socialization processes, of which the acquisition of scientific knowledge is but one. Since our culture offers a privileged place to science, however, it is an especially important one. (1992:270)

Because of the social position of science as a dominant ideology in much of the modern Western world, linguists working on gender must continually question how science constructs its research questions, and how research findings are constructed and presented both to other scientists and to the public. Science is not value-free; it views the body through socially constructed lenses, so we must turn our linguistic efforts toward understanding how that interpretive process works.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The analysis of the role of biology (and biologists) in gender variation will extend beyond a study of some mutually engaged, local CofP of scientists in their labs and at their conferences. It will take considerable textual analysis to deconstruct the public face of scientists' work: the publication of their results in scientific journals read by more than their immediate peers (such as *Nature*, the journal in which the Shaywitz article appeared), as well as the reporting and interpretation of their research results in the mass media. As argued above, much of the "conversation" about gender at this level is one-sided, placing ideological control in the hands of a few. Thus a comprehensive theory of gender must have some way of accounting for the continued sedimentation of difference around the body (Butler 1993) in the form of oppositional dualisms, and for the reassertion of duality in the face of so much evidence for gender overlap and continua of form and practice. This will be a question not merely of assessing biological givens, but also of investigating the local and ideological constructions of biological variation.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite a search for coherent explanations, the great array of language and gender variation may not ultimately lend itself to simple explanations, nor yield its secrets through singular approaches; it may not be possible to distill a limited set of overarching cross-cultural generalizations. But to arrive at any full and comprehensive characterization of gender, the study of gender and language demands the intersection of both macro- and micro-level analyses – a multi-methodological approach, as is argued by Holmes 1993, 1996, Wodak & Benke 1996, and others. We need diverse, thoughtful research perspectives to triangulate on this many-faceted issue.

Without careful attention to local practice, we cannot understand how individuals shape and interpret their gender and their social practice with the available linguistic resources. Without broad surveys and collections, we cannot know the significance of individual uses – the convergence, divergence, and movement of social practices. Without the broader studies of ideologies at the textual and global levels, we cannot understand how interpretations of gender by gatekeeping elites are generated or spread. Indeed, we need more studies of local communities of practice: of the local co-construction sites where individuals wrestle with, and challenge, the definitions and the integration of the different aspects of their lives within their communities. But we also need theories that extend beyond local communities of practice: There are forces larger than local communities, where influences go beyond mutual engagement in the shaping of public opinions and ideas.

It is absolutely critical that we hear the most significant messages of CofP research: to prepare for variation, to be wary of generalization, to look for counterexamples and refutation. But while we must ALWAYS check our generaliza-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

tions against the possibilities of variation and refutation (especially in cultures we do not know well), we must also think about how communities cohere into larger aggregates through broadly held social and cultural values, invoked and reified in the national and international media. We must study how expectations of gender are not just local, but play off of larger societal expectations and stereotypes, whether founded or unfounded.

At the end, it may be that the only truly global generalizations are that gender is a point of differentiation in societies, reflected in and constructed through language; and that there is some degree of expectation of difference based on societies' relentless dualization, particularly sedimented around the body in the practice of procreation/recreation. But this too is a hypothesis that remains to be tested. Whatever shape a comprehensive theory of language and gender will take, innateness, local practice, and ideology will all play significant roles.

NOTES

* I would like to give thanks to Janet Holmes for organizing the original forum in which the paper developed, and for her very helpful comments; to Sally McConnell-Ginet and Penny Eckert for their sustained support, through their work, of me and others in the field; and to all three of them – plus Alice Freed, Miriam Meyerhoff, and Susan Ehrlich – for stimulating comments and discussion of these issues. Thanks also go to Mary Talbot and Craig Waddell for comments on an earlier draft. All errors remain my own responsibility.

[1] As Mary Talbot notes (p.c.), the quote on greatness comes from a speech by Malvolio in *Twelfth Night*, where he is reading a letter intended as a joke on him. This does not detract from the utility of the quote as an organizing device for the study of gender and language, though perhaps it calls into question the means by which one can achieve greatness.

REFERENCES

Bakhtin, Mikhail M. (1981). Discourse in the novel. In his *The dialogic imagination*, 259–422. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bem, Sandra (1993). *The lenses of gender: Transforming the debate on sexual inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bergvall, Victoria L. (1996a). Constructing and enacting gender through discourse: Negotiating multiple roles as female engineering students. In Bergvall et al. (eds.), 173–201.

_____ (1996b). Divided minds: Gender polarization in brain and language research. In Warner et al. (eds.), 11–23.

_____, et al. (1996), eds. *Rethinking language and gender research: Theory and practice*. London: Longman.

_____, & Remlinger, Kathryn A. (1996). Reproduction, resistance and gender in educational discourse: The role of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse & Society* 7:453–79.

Bing, Janet M., & Bergvall, Victoria L. (1996). The question of questions: Beyond binary thinking. In Bergvall et al. (eds.), 1–30.

Blum, Deborah (1997). *Sex on the brain: The biological differences between men and women*. New York: Viking.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1991). *Language and symbolic power*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brown, Penelope (1980). How and why are women more polite: Some evidence from a Mayan community. In McConnell-Ginet et al. (eds.), 111–49.

_____ (1993). Gender, politeness, and confrontation in Tenejapa. In Tannen (ed.), 1993b:144–62.

Bucholtz, Mary (1995). From mulatta to mestiza: Passing and the linguistic reshaping of ethnic identity. In Hall & Bucholtz (eds.), 351–74.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

_____ (1997). Beyond covert prestige: Gender and identity among white users of AAVE. Paper presented at the 1997 Linguistic Society of America meeting, Chicago.
_____ et al. (1994), eds. *Cultural performances: Proceedings of the Third Berkeley Women and Language Conference*. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Women and Language Group.
_____, & Hall, Kira (1995). Introduction: Twenty years after *Language and woman's place*. In Hall & Bucholtz (eds.), 1–22.
Butler, Judith (1990). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. London: Routledge.
_____ (1993). *Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex."* London: Routledge.
Cameron, Deborah (1988). Introduction. In Coates & Cameron (eds.), 3–12.
_____ (1995). *Verbal hygiene*. London: Routledge.
_____ (1996). The language–gender interface: Challenging co-optation. In Bergvall et al. (eds.), 31–53.
_____ (1997). Theoretical debates in feminist linguistics: Questions of sex and gender. In Wodak (ed.), 21–36.
_____, et al. (1987). Lakoff in context: The social & linguistic functions of the tag questions. In Coates & Cameron, 74–93.
_____, & Coates, Jennifer (1988). Some problems in the sociolinguistic explanation of sex differences. In Coates & Cameron (eds.), 13–26.
Chambers, J. K. (1992). Linguistic correlates of gender and sex. *English World-Wide* 13:173–218.
_____ (1995). *Sociolinguistic theory: Linguistic variation and its social significance*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cheshire, Jenny, & Jenkins, Nancy (1991). Gender issues in the GCSE Oral English Examination, Part II. *Language and Education* 5:19–40.
Coates, Jennifer (1986). *Women, men, and language*. London: Longman.
_____ (1998), ed. *Language and gender: A reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
_____, & Cameron, Deborah (1988), eds. *Women in their speech communities*. London: Longman.
Connell, Robert W. (1987). *Gender and power*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Crawford, Mary (1995). *Talking difference: On gender and language*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Crosby, Faye, & Nyquist, Linda (1977). The female register: An empirical study of Lakoff's hypotheses. *Language in Society* 6:313–22.
De Francisco, Victoria (1991). Review of Tannen 1990. *Language in Society* 21:319–24.
_____ (1997). Gender, power, and practice, or, putting your money (and your research) where your mouth is. In Wodak (ed.), 37–56.
Dubois, Betty, & Crouch, Isabel (1975). The question of tag questions in women's speech: They don't really use more of them, do they↓? *Language in Society* 4:289–94.
Duckett, John, & Baskin, Laurence (1993). Genitoplasty for intersex anomalies. *European Journal of Pediatry* 152 (Suppl. 2), S80–S84.
Eckert, Penelope (1989). *Jocks and burnouts: Social categories and identity in the high school*. New York: Teacher's College Press.
_____ (1990). The whole woman: Sex and gender differences in variation. *Language Variation and Change* 1:245–67.
_____, & McConnell-Ginet, Sally (1992a). Communities of practice: Where language, gender, and power all live. In Hall et al. (eds.), 89–99.
_____, _____ (1992b). Think practically and look locally: Language and gender as community-based practice. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 21:461–90. [Reprinted in Camille Roman et al. (eds.), *The woman and language debate: A sourcebook*, 432–60. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994.]
_____, _____ (1995). Constructed meaning, constructed selves: Snapshots of language, gender, and class from Belten High. In Hall & Bucholtz (eds.), 469–507.
Eggins, Suzanne, & Iedema, Rick (1997). Difference without diversity: Semantic orientation and ideology in competing women's magazines. In Wodak (ed.), 165–96.
Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs (1988). *Deceptive distinctions: Sex, gender and the social order*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Epstein, Julia (1990). Either/or–neither/both: Sexual ambiguity and the ideology of gender. *Genders* 7:99–142.
Fairclough, Norman (1989). *Language and power.* London: Longman.
_____ (1992). *Discourse and social change*. Cambridge: Polity.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

_____ (1995). *Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language*. London: Longman.
_____, & Wodak, Ruth (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In Teun van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction*, II: *Discourse as social interaction*, 258–84. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Fausto-Sterling, Anne (1992). *Myths of gender: Biological theories about women and men*. Rev. edn. New York: Basic Books.
Fishman, Pamela (1983). Interaction: The work women do. In Thorne et al. (eds.), 89–101.
Freed, Alice (1992). We understand perfectly: A critique of Tannen's view of cross-sex communication. In Hall et al. (eds.), 144–52.
_____ (1994). A cross-cultural analysis of language and gender. In Bucholtz et al. (eds.), 197–204.
_____ (1996). Language and gender research in an experimental setting. In Bergvall et al. (eds.), 54–76.
Gal, Susan (1989). Between speech and silence: The problematics of research on language and gender. In Micaela di Leonardo (ed.), *Gender at the crossroads of knowledge: Feminist anthropology in the postmodern era*, 175–203. Berkeley: University of California Press.
_____ (1992). Language, gender, and power: An anthropological view. In Hall et al. (eds.), 153–61.
Gordon, Linda (1991). On "difference." *Genders* 10:91–111.
Gray, John (1992). *Men are from Mars, women are from Venus: A practical guide for improving communication and getting what you want in your relationships*. New York: Harper Collins.
Hall, Kira (1995). Lip service on the fantasy lines. In Hall & Bucholtz (eds.), 181–216.
_____ (1996). Shifting gender positions among Hindi-speaking hijras. In Bergvall et al. (eds.), 228–66.
_____, et al. (1992), eds. *Locating power: Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Women and Language Conference*. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Women and Language Group.
_____, & Bucholtz, Mary (1995), eds. *Gender articulated: Language and the socially constructed self*. New York: Routledge.
Henley, Nancy, & Kramarae, Cheris (1991). Miscommunication, power, and gender. In Nikolas Coupland et al. (eds.), *Miscommunication and problematic talk*, 18–43. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Hodge, Robert, & Kress, Gunther (1993). *Language as ideology*, 2nd edn. London: Routledge.
Holmes, Janet (1993). Women's talk: The question of sociolinguistic universals. *Australian Journal of Communication* 20:3.125–49. [Reprinted in Coates (ed.), 1998:461–83.]
_____ (1996). Women's role in language change: A place for quantification. In Warner et al. (eds.), 313–30.
Houston, Marcia, & Kramarae, Cheris (1991). Speaking from silence: Methods of silencing and of resistance. *Discourse & Society* 2:387–99.
Hughes, Everett C. (1945). Dilemmas and contradictions of status. *American Journal of Sociology* 50:353–54.
Jacobs, Sue-Ellen, & Cromwell, Jason (1992). Visions and revisions of reality: Reflections on sex, sexuality, gender, and gender variance. *Journal of Homosexuality* 23:4.43–69.
Jacklin, Carol N. (1979). Epilogue. In Michelle A. Wittig & Anne C. Petersen (eds.), *Sex-related differences in cognitive function: Developmental issues*, 357–71. New York: Academic Press.
Jenkins, Nancy, & Cheshire, Jenny (1990). Gender issues in the GCSE Oral English Examination, Part I. *Language and Education* 4:261–92.
Jespersen, Otto (1922). The woman. In his *Language: Its nature, development, and origins*, 237–54. London: Allen & Unwin.
Jet (1995). Why women and men cannot be like each other. *Jet* 87 (3 April), 15–16.
Joseph, Rhawn (1992). *The right brain and the unconscious: Discovering the stranger within*. New York: Plenum.
Kessler, Suzanne J. (1994). The medical construction of gender: Case management of intersexed infants. In Anne Herrmann & Stewart Abigain (eds.), *Theorizing feminism: Parallel trends in the humanities and social sciences*, 218–37. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Kimura, Doreen (1992). Sex differences in the brain. *Scientific American* 267:119–25.
Labov, William (1972). *Language in the inner city*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
_____ (1991). The intersection of sex and social class in the course of linguistic change. *Language Variation and Change* 2:205–54.
Lakoff, Robin (1975). *Language and woman's place*. New York: Harper & Row.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Lave, Jean, & Wenger, Etienne (1991). *Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lewontin, Richard C., et al. (1984). *Not in our genes: Biology, ideology, and human nature*. New York: Pantheon.
Lorber, Judith (1994). *Paradoxes of gender*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Maccoby, Eleanor Emmons, & Jacklin, Carol Nagy (1974). *The psychology of sex differences*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Maltz, Daniel A., & Borker, Ruth (1982). A cultural approach to male-female miscommunication. In John J. Gumperz (ed.), *Language and social identity*, 196–216. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mathieu, Nicole (1989). Identité sexuelle/sexué/de sexe? In Anne-Marie Daune-Richard et al. (eds.), *Catégorisation de sexe et constructions scientifiques*, 109–47. Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence. [Reprinted and translated as: Sexual, sexed, and sex-class identities: Three ways of conceptualising the relationship between sex and gender. In Diana Leonard & Lisa Adkins (eds.), *Sex in question: French material feminism*, 42–71. London: Taylor & Francis, 1996.]
McConnell-Ginet, Sally (1988). Language and gender. In Frederick J. Newmeyer (ed.), *Linguistics: The Cambridge survey, IV: Language: The sociocultural context*, 75–99. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
———, et al. (1980), eds. *Women and language in literature and society*. New York: Praeger.
McElhinny, Bonnie (1993). *We all wear the blue: Language, gender, and police work*. Dissertation, Stanford University.
——— (1997). Ideologies of private and public language in sociolinguistics. In Wodak (ed.), 106–39.
Mendoza-Denton, Norma (1995). Pregnant pauses: Silence and authority in the Anita Hill – Clarence Thomas hearings. In Hall & Bucholtz (eds.), 51–66.
Moir, Anne, & Jessel, David (1991). *Brain sex: The real difference between men and women*. 2nd edn. New York: Delta.
Morris, Desmond (1998). *The human sexes*. Six-part TV series, broadcast in the US on the Learning Channel, Feb. 1998.
Nadeau, Robert L. (1996). *S/he brain: Science, sexual politics, and the myths of feminism*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Nicholson, Linda (1994). Interpreting gender. *Signs* 20:79–105.
O'Barr, William, & Atkins, Bowman K. (1980). "Women's" language or "powerless" language? In McConnell-Ginet et al. (eds.), 1980:93–110.
Ochs, Elinor (1992). Indexing gender. In Alessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin (eds.), *Rethinking context: Language as an interactive phenomenon*, 335–58. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ochs Keenan, Elinor (1974). Norm-makers and norm-breakers: Uses of speech by men and women in a Malagasy community. In Richard Bauman & Joel Sherzer (eds.), *Explorations in the ethnography of speaking*, 125–43. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Radway, Janice (1987). *Reading the romance: Women, patriarchy, and popular literature*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Remlinger, Kathryn A. (1995). *Production, resistance, and opposition: Students linguistically constituting ideologies of gender and sexuality*. Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Michigan Technological University.
——— (1997). Keeping it straight: The negotiation of meanings in the constitution of gender and sexuality. *Women and Language* 20:1.47–53.
Scott, Joan (1988). Deconstructing equality-versus-difference; or, the uses of poststructuralist theory for feminism. *Feminist Studies* 14:33–50.
Shaywitz, Bennett, et al. (1995). Sex differences in the functional organization of the brain for language. *Nature* 373:607–9.
Sherzer, Joel (1987). A diversity of voices: Men's and women's speech in ethnographic perspective. In Susan U. Philips et al. (eds.), *Language, gender, and sex in comparative perspective*, 95–120. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shultz, Muriel (1975). The semantic derogation of women. In Thorne & Henley (eds.), 1975:64–73.
Spender, Dale (1980). *Man made language*. London: Routledge.
Swacker, Margery (1975). The sex of the speaker as a sociolinguistic variable. In Thorne & Henley (eds.), 76–83.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Swann, Joan (1992). *Girls, boys, and language*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Talbot, Mary (1995). A synthetic sisterhood: False friends in a teenage magazine. In Hall & Bucholtz (eds.), 143–65.
_____ (1998). *Language and gender: An introduction*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Tannen, Deborah (1990). *You just don't understand: Women and men in conversation*. New York: Morrow.
_____ (1993a). The relativity of linguistic strategies: Rethinking power and solidarity in gender and dominance. In Tannen (ed.), 1993b:165–88.
_____ (1993b), ed. *Gender and conversational interaction*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
_____ (1994a). Interpreting interruption in discourse. In her *Gender and discourse*, 53–83. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
_____ (1994b). The sex-class–linked framing of talk at work. In Bucholtz et al. (eds.), 1994:712–28.
_____ (1994c). *Talking from 9 to 5*. New York: Morrow.
Thorne, Barrie (1993). *Gender play: Girls and boys at school*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
_____, & Henley, Nancy (1975), eds. *Language and sex: Difference and dominance*. Rowley, MA: Newbury House
_____, et al. (1983), eds. *Language, gender, and society*. Rowley, MA: Newbury House.
Troemel-Ploetz, Senta (1991). Review essay: Selling the apolitical. *Discourse & Society* 2:489–502.
Uchida, Aki (1992). When "difference" is "dominance": A critique of the "anti-power-based" cultural approach to sex differences. *Language in Society* 21:547–68.
van Dijk, Teun A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse & Society* 4:249–83.
Warner, Natasha, et al. (1996), eds. *Gender and belief systems: Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley Women and Language Conference*. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Women and Language Group.
Wenger, Etienne (1998). *Communities of practice*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
West, Candace (1984). When the doctor is a "lady": Power, status, and gender in physician-patient encounters. *Symbolic Interaction* 7:87–106. [Reprinted in Coates (ed.), 1998:396–412.]
_____ (1995). Women's competence in conversation. *Discourse & Society* 6:107–31.
_____, & Fenstermaker, Sarah (1995). Doing difference. *Gender and Society* 9:1.8–37.
_____, & Zimmerman, Don (1983). Small insults: A study of interruptions in cross-sex conversations between unacquainted persons. In Thorne et al. (eds.), 102–17.
_____, _____ (1987). Doing gender. *Gender and Society* 1:125–51.
Wodak, Ruth (1989). *Language, power, and ideology*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
_____ (1997), ed. *Discourse and gender*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
_____, & Benke, Gertraud (1996). Gender as a sociolinguistic variable: New perspectives on variation studies. In Florian Coulmas (ed.), *Handbook of sociolinguistics*, 127–50. Oxford: Blackwell.
Woolard, Katherine, & Schieffelin, Bambi (1994). Language ideology. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23:55–82.
Zimmerman, Don, & West, Candace (1975). Sex roles, interruptions and silences in conversation. In Thorne & Henley (eds.), 105–29.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404599002080 Published online by Cambridge University Press