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PART 1.—ORIGINAL ARTICLES.

Morison Lectures on Insanity for 1877.*

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LECTURE I.—INSANITY IN ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME.

The first and one of the most important questions to be determined in dealing with the subject of insanity is the meaning which we ought to attach to the word insanity itself. The condition which the word is supposed to indicate has most important relations, both social and scientific. It is a frequent subject of popular discussion, and it forms an important element in many enquiries—philosophical, medical, and juridical. Speaking generally, it may be said that it invariably signifies a marked abnormality of mental condition. But it is frequently necessary that we should be able to form a much more precise idea of the degree as well as the kind of abnormality that it implies. And a very superficial examination is sufficient to show that the degree and the kind vary greatly, according to the point of view from which the subject is regarded.

It may perhaps seem inappropriate that I should occupy your attention in this place with the signification of the term in its popular acceptation; but I believe that it is of special importance to us as physicians that we should have a very complete appreciation of this aspect of the subject. In the discharge of many of our duties as private practitioners and as servants of the State, we have to take this popular idea carefully into consideration. And I think it is impossible to gain an intelligent view of any of the special relations of insanity without having first correctly appreciated

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its position in regard to the community in general. I shall not be able to present a very sharply edged definition or description of this popular acceptation. The nature of the subject scarcely admits of it; for we find that the limits popularly assigned to the term have been both vague and shifting in character. To obtain a comprehensive view of it, we should, therefore, require to understand its historical development; we should have to examine the mode in which the idea first originated in the early history of civilisation, and to trace the steps of its development down to the present time. This historical examination is indispensable to a proper understanding of the form which many similar ideas have taken in the public mind. The ideas which we form of sanity and insanity, of virtue and vice, of purity and impurity, of luxury and hardship, of enlightenment and superstition, and even of good and evil, are more or less correlated to one another. And they have all received modifications of form or colour at different periods when mingling with the stream of human thought in its progress onward from age to age. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, a most learned historian as well as a most careful reasoner, insists strongly on the importance of the historical elements in such studies. In a letter to Mr. Grote he said, "It seems to me that there is too little *consensus* about elementary facts in the moral sciences for any abstract treatment to be of much avail; and I have come to the conclusion that an enlightened commentary upon historical data well ascertained, is the best form in which instruction in such subjects can be presented to the public."*

It may be well to point out that a recognition of the changes which such ideas have undergone does not affect the question of whether or not they may also exist as typical ideas, based upon unchanging conditions, and, therefore, independent of historical development. It is sufficient for our present purpose, if we perceive that the *popular conception* of them must be an outcome of the thought of past generations, as well as a result of contemporary discussion and speculation. But it must not be supposed that the changes of conception in different periods were merely speculative or theoretical. They were also real and practical. Neither can they be considered as untrue when considered in relation to the changing

* Letter from G. C. Lewis to G. Grote, October 21, 1847. Life of Grote, 1873, p. 118.

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circumstances of successive times. What would be properly regarded as virtue in a savage might be vice if manifested by a member of a highly civilised community. What is luxury in a tent becomes hardship in a town. And "preposterous would be the pedantry," as Isaac Taylor remarked, "of a writer who, in discoursing of Superstition or Enthusiasm, should confine himself to such a definition of those terms as might comport with the sense they bore centuries ago, in the minds of Lucian, Plutarch, Epictetus, or Aristotle." And if we were able to ascertain with accuracy the facts which bear on the history of the development of these ideas, we should not only have a fuller appreciation of their present position, but we should probably be able to perceive also in what direction their further development or modification is to be anticipated.

It would be very useful, therefore, if we could obtain a history of the idea of insanity in its relation to European civilisation. It is to be regretted, however, that the materials at our disposal for this purpose are but meagre; and I must ask you to accept what I lay before you as a very imperfect exhibition of them. I cannot pretend to have explored any recondite sources of information, and I can only hope to indicate the phases through which the idea has passed by a reference to the more salient points in its history. The problem which we have to solve is to ascertain the kind and degree of that mental abnormality which at different epochs was treated as insanity. It will, therefore, be necessary that we should start with a common understanding of what is implied by these words—"*treated as insanity.*" I, therefore, define the phrase as meaning—*subjected to such exceptional treatment on account of abnormal mental condition as, without holding the person legally responsible for that condition or its consequences, involves interference with its liberty, in order to save himself and others from injurious consequences.* It thus includes all abnormal mental conditions which society interferes with, except where criminal responsibility is in some way attributed to the persons who are affected by such conditions.

The classic civilisation of ancient Greece, so perfect in some of its features, so defective in others, presents us, in its annals, with only a fragmentary view of the idea which its public opinion had formed of the limits of insanity. But we must recognise, as is indicated by a very slight consider-

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ation of the facts, that in this and all other periods we have two sets of ideas to deal with. One of these, whose variations are restricted within comparatively narrow limits, characterises the philosophic thought of the highest intellects; the other, whose variations are sometimes both rapid and important, characterises the views which are practically acted on by the community. The philosophic ideas may, in most cases, be found, when looked for in after years, clear and well defined, crystallized in the permanent literature of the epoch. But when we try to discover what have been the common ideas of the community, we must often be content with a mere inference from what seems to have been their effects, and what seems to have been the influences which have acted upon them. This separation of the enquiry into two channels, though more or less necessary for all periods, is peculiarly so in dealing with our knowledge of ancient Greece.

Very little light is thrown on the subject of insanity by that single reference to it in Homer, when the bard calls up the dim figure of Bellerophon—

> "Hated of all the gods, straying o'er Lycian plains,
> Eating his heart, and shunning the footsteps of his kind."

But that insanity existed in the same forms then as it does now, is abundantly evident from the descriptions of it which we find so admirably given by the dramatic writers. The pictures which they paint are excellent representations of some of those phases of insanity with which we are most familiar at the present day.*

We may select as typical of the phase most frequently delineated the representation of the insanity of Orestes by Euripides, in the Electra and in the Iphigenia. The hero is described as impelled by his sister's pleading, to avenge his royal father's death by the murder of his mother Clytemnestra, and he is seized with consequent remorse. This drifts rapidly into deep morbid depression, ending in an explosion of maniacal excitement. He is described by Electra as "sick," and "languishing upon his couch."

> "His mother's blood he shed has tortured him
> With madness; for—"

* I wish to record my obligation to Dr. Gasquet for the aid received from his papers on the Madmen of the Greek Theatre, in the numbers of this Journal for July, 1872, and six subsequent numbers up to April, 1874. I have in several instances availed myself of his excellent metrical translations.—J. S.

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she says, in recognition of the Divine influence, whose vengeful action he had so impiously provoked—

"I may not speak of *them*,
The Gracious Ones, who hunt him down with fear.
Five days have passed since that his mother's corse,
But lately slain, was purified by fire.
These five days gone, he has not tasted food,
Nor washed; but hid within the coverlets.
If eased his body be from his disease,
He weeps in conscious grief. Then from his bed
He swiftly leaps, as bounds an unyoked steed."

During the fits of excitement, hallucinations of vision manifest themselves.

" O, mother, urge them not," he cries,
" The blood-faced furies, with the snaky hair;
There, there they stand, ready to leap on me."

In the Iphigenia, the herdsman describes Orestes as shouting—

" Pylades, sees't thou yonder Fury, and
Another hellish Dragon, who is armed
With fearful snakes, and strives to slay me too.
Ah, and that third one, breathing fire and death,
Bearing my mother in her arms, flies down
Towards yonder rock, which she would hurl at me.
Alas, she'll slay me. Whither shall I fly."

The herdsman then explains that nothing was visible of all the ghosts Orestes seemed to see.

"He but mistook the lowing of the kine,
And barking of the dogs, for sounds
Which we are told Furies are wont to utter.
We meantime, close together, silent sat,
As men about to die. For he drew forth
His sword, and, rushing on the cattle, smote
Them, like a lion, on their flanks, until
(For thus he thought to ward the Furies off)
A bloody foam rose on the very sea?"

* * * * *

"The fit of madness past, the stranger fell
With slaver dropping from his chin; while we
Seeing him timely fallen, did our best
By throwing stones to strike him; but his friend
Wiped off the slaver from his mouth, and sheltered him
By spreading out his garment—warded off
Each threatened blow, and gave him every care."

We have here a graphic description of a maniacal paroxysm preceded by a period of deep dejection, which we would now call melancholic. The ignorant herdsman is naturally alarmed at the symptoms; but Pylades, aware of

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the objectless character of the violence, treats the patient with intelligent kindness. We might extend the illustrations of insanity to many other forms described or alluded to by the Greek writers. But it will be sufficient here to remind you of the old gentleman, who is described by Aristophanes in the "Wasps." His is a form of madness more troublesome than dangerous; and the case is an illustration of the fact that the Greeks were sometimes able to attribute to their true origin symptoms of mental disease which fell far short of wild fury, or speechless stupidity. The story also possesses a peculiar interest from its illustrating the kind of treatment popularly thought suitable to such a malady by Athenians who lived so early as the fifth century before Christ. The patient is thus described by one of his servants:—

"My master's madness, I can tell ye now, if ye be silent;
He loves the law courts more than ever mortal did before him,
And grieves if he can't get a place on the first bench of judges.
At night he gets no wink of sleep, and if perchance he doses,
His mind is always on the strain from watching for the time-glass,*
So used is he to hold the ballot ball, that when he rises
'Tis with three fingers joined as though about to offer incense;
And if he sees on any door chalked 'Demos is so handsome,'
He'll go and scribble by the side, 'O Voting Urn, how lovely!'

* * * * * * *

This is his madness, which, in spite of warnings, e'er increases;
We, therefore, keep him locked in here, from fear that he escape us.
His son has taken much to heart his father's strange disorder;
He sought to make him stay at home, by using moral suasion,
And failed, then had him bathed and purged; but all was unavailing."

We find among the stories told by Athenæus, in his Deipnosophists, those Alexandrian Noctes Ambrosianæ, an actual instance of a somewhat similar form of insanity, which was successfully subjected to medical treatment in the case of Thrasylaus, son of Pythodorus. This young man "was seized with such an insanity that he imagined all the ships which came into the Piræus were his own; reviewed, dismissed, and launched them; received those which arrived in port with as much joy as if he were the proprietor of the merchandise they brought home, of which if any were lost, he made no enquiry about it, but rejoiced greatly for whatever came safe. Thus," he is said to have "passed a life of much pleasure. But his brother Crito, returning from Sicily, had him secured, and put under the care of physicians. Being cured of his

* The κλεψύδρα.

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insanity, he declared he had never before lived with so much satisfaction and pleasure, for he had had nothing to disturb him, and a multitude of things to afford him delight."

The most cultivated intellects of Athens seem generally to have concurred with Hippocrates in regarding mental derangement as a disease similar in its nature to bodily disease. "The evil humours of the body," says Plato, "may disorder the soul, producing manifold forms of melancholy and dejection, of rashness and cowardice, of oblivious-ness and ignorance." And the author of the Second Alcibiades, who, if not Plato himself, was an imitator who wrote what Plato was believed to think, represents Socrates as saying, "There are different kinds of unsoundness of mind. Those who are afflicted by it in the highest degree are called mad. Those in whom it is less pronounced are called wrongheaded and crotchety, or, as persons fond of smooth words would say, enthusiastic or excitable. Others are eccentric; others are known as innocents, incapables, dummies, or are called by other like names. All these kinds of unsoundness of mind differ from one another, just as diseases of the body do." The Stoics, whose school was influential in Greece, and became much more so afterwards under the Roman Empire, took a very broad view of the relations of abnormal mental states. They divided men into two classes, the wise and the foolish—just as sticks may be divided into straight and crooked sticks; and they called special attention to the fact, as it was neatly put by them, that very few sticks in this world are absolutely straight. We should not be justified, however, in suggesting that comprehensive conceptions such as these fairly indicated the practical ideas of the period in regard to insanity. "The general public of ancient Greece," as is remarked by Professor Mahaffy, "did not approach so nearly to the enlightenment of its intellectual leaders as our modern public does. We find, for example, in the ordinary life of Athens, cruelties and barbarities so violently in conflict with the humanity of a Socrates, a Euripides, or a Plato, as to astonish us and make us doubt our estimate of Attic culture." We have sufficient evidence to show that in one sense the Greek public was often disposed to take a broad view of insanity by regarding very harmless deviations from ordinary conduct as indicating its existence. An interesting illustration of this is afforded in the commission which Hippocrates received from Abdera to make inquisition into the mental state of the worthy

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anatomist Democritus, who had caused anxiety to the inhabitants by his practice of dissecting the bodies of the lower animals.

But in the relation of insanity to supernatural influences, the philosophical and vulgar ideas were widely divergent. The madness of Orestes, Ajax, and other similar examples that are pourtrayed by the dramatists, is represented, in accordance with the popular belief, as being induced by the special interposition of Apollo, or some other divine power. But when used in the philosophic writings, such language seems generally to imply merely that madness was like all other mundane states, controlled by the supernatural machinery of gods and goddesses, who constituted the over-ruling providence of the classic mythology. In the general literature of Greece, we find the same phrases introduced, when ordinary disease, or any similar interruption of the ordinary course of events, is described in a rhetorical or poetic manner. But there were certain unmistakable, morbid, mental conditions, that were associated in the minds of the people with their religious rites. This was the case in the prophetic utterances at Delphi, and in the epidemic religious excitements when persons were supposed to be "*inspired or possessed.*" It was supposed to be under inspiration by Dionysus that the Bacchic maidens believed they drew milk and honey from the flowing river.

These associations must necessarily have prevented the less enlightened portion of the community from acquiring the really broad views which we find expressed in the philosophic writings. But there were two other circumstances which must have exercised a most important influence on public sentiment. These were, the frequent political disorganisations caused by war, and the existence of the class of slaves. The influence of such circumstances would necessarily be to divert attention from complicated political or philanthropic questions. It is seldom, if ever, indeed, that the public mind of a community makes any earnest attempts to solve difficult or complicated questions, until some practical necessity forces them inexorably on its attention. Experience has shown that the modes in which such practical necessity may arise in connection with insanity are, when questions of capacity or responsibility before the law require to be solved, and when public provision for the care and treatment of the insane requires to be made. The question of mental capacity did sometimes

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require to be dealt with in ancient Athens; but it was only as part of the process whereby aged and infirm fathers might be stripped by their sons of every kind of power and authority. This proceeding, which seemed to be regarded in cultivated Athenian society as quite consistent with justice and filial duty, was frequently resorted to. But the inquiry which it involved was inspired rather by a wish to facilitate the complete removal of the feeble from power and influence, than from any desire to protect their rights. But even if such a desire had existed, or if there had been a demand for a system of jurisprudence, under which nice and exceptional questions of liberty or responsibility could be determined, a necessary condition for their practical development would have been a prolonged and uninterrupted period of political tranquility. It is obvious, also, that any comprehensive system of public benevolence, under which any public provision for the insane was possible, would have required a similar condition for its development. The frequent occurrence of devastating wars was therefore an insuperable obstacle to the directing of public attention in a practical manner to these subjects. It is evident, also, that the existence of slavery, if it were of the specially harsh form in which it was to be found in Sparta and some other localities, must have so familiarised the mind with cruelty and injustice, as to render impossible any public feeling of philanthropy. But even in Athens, in the age of Pericles, where slavery existed in a milder form, the indifference to the rights of others, always induced by the presence of a class recognised by law as servile, combined with the disregard of human life, which is begotten by the frequency of war, was sufficient to prevent public attention from being forcibly directed to what would probably appear to be, at such a time, evils of only minor importance.* It is indeed curious and instructive to observe how an extraordinary refinement of thought and manners is sometimes found compatible with a brutal ferocity of dispo-

* The number of slaves in the time of Pericles, in Athens, appears to have been 400,000, to a free population of 30,000, including metics. As an illustration of the extent to which mental abnormality is treated as insanity among a servile class, compared with the way in which it is regarded among free citizens, it is interesting to note that in the United States census for 1850, the proportions of lunatics registered among the white population and the free blacks are almost identical, being 1·49 per thousand among the whites, and 1·51 per thousand among the free blacks. In contrast with this, the number registered among the slaves is only ·47 per thousand.

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sition. And perhaps the most memorable illustration of this was the sacrifice of three thousand Athenian prisoners at Ægospotami, which took place during the most brilliant period of Attic history. With all its refinement, it could not be at such a time that legislative protection would have been largely extended to the rights of the insane; nor is it likely that any careful provision was made for their treatment at a time which has left no record of the existence of any public institution for the care of persons sick of ordinary diseases, except one allusion to a house used for that purpose, said to have been situated in the Piræus.

We are probably warranted in concluding that though the higher intellects of the time had a wonderfully clear and just perception of what ought to be regarded as mental disease, it was only in dealing with persons of the most elevated social class that such views were practically applied; that the total number of those who were recognised as insane was comparatively small; and that only a small proportion of these would experience the benefits of considerate care and treatment.

I believe there is no trace in the Solonian legislation, of any provision for dealing with questions of insanity, except in rendering the wills of insane persons invalid, and if we may regard it as coming under the same head, the limitation of the control of prodigals over their property.

There may have been, and I have no doubt there were, a large number of persons of abnormal mental condition, who would now have been counted among the insane. But it is evident that governments of that day did not much concern themselves about persons who did not require to be interfered with except for their own personal benefit. It was only in cases, therefore, where danger to the community was apprehended, that public interference did take place. Weak-minded and harmless lunatics were dependent on voluntary care. Dangerous lunatics who were imprisoned, and harmless lunatics who were cared for by their friends, thus include all who can be said to have been treated as insane. Those who wandered about the unsettled localities alone, or as members of the vagabond herds, were practically disregarded altogether by civilised communities.

The Romans, in the period of their greatest intellectual glory, had made themselves inheritors of the Greek civilisation, and, to a great extent, they adopted the Greek ideas. The teaching of the philosophic schools of Greece was

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imported into Rome, and became incorporated with its literature. Cicero, who was most conspicuous in presenting the Greek modes of thought to the attention of his countrymen, speaks of Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno as "the only teachers who arm and instruct a citizen for the duties of social life." He accordingly adopts very comprehensive views of the nature of insanity. "All fools," he says in his Tusculan Disputations, "are disordered in mind; all fools, therefore, are insane. For it is the opinion of philosophers, that sanity, or health of mind, consists in a certain tranquillity, or equanimity, or as they term it, constancy. And they consider the mind, when void of these qualities, as insane; since sanity can no more exist in a disordered mind, than in a disordered body. We separate, however," he says, "this insanity from fury; for, being of the nature of folly, that term possesses a wider signification." The distinction here drawn between insanity and fury—*insania* and *furor*—was an important practical distinction in ancient Rome. Those persons who laboured under the disorder called *furor* were placed, by the Laws of the Twelve Tables, under tutelage, which freed them from responsibility for their acts, and deprived them of liberty, except such as their tutors granted to them. The tutors thus became responsible for them, and had power to imprison them, or dispose of them in whatever way they deemed best. *Furor* is defined by Cicero as consisting in a confusion of the mind in regard to everything—*mentis ad omnia cæcitas*; a definition which perhaps survives in our modern expression, "blind fury." The law also took cognizance of persons suffering from a less violent kind of insanity, under the name of *mente capti*. These were associated in law with the "deaf and dumb, and those who laboured under persistent disease," as requiring to have their property placed under the care of curators, "since they are unable to take charge of it themselves." But there was also included among those to whom curators should be appointed the class called prodigals. This class, according to the definition of insanity with which we started, must, therefore, be counted by us among those whom the Romans treated as insane. They are defined by Ulpianus, as persons "who have neither method nor purpose in their expenditure, but squander their means in havoc and dissipation." They are, therefore, persons who are *subjected to exceptional treatment on account of their abnormal mental condition*, with the intention of saving them from the injurious consequences of that condition.

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Dementes, that is, *furiosi* or *mente capti*, when under tutors or curators, were held to be incapable of civil actions, and were held irresponsible for crime. The condition of tutelage, was, however, suspended during remissions or intervals in the disease.

The dangerous lunatics were removed, under the authority of tutors, to places of detention, "*carceres*." And it appears to have been the practice also to send insane persons to be subjected to treatment in the houses of physicians. In the Menaechmi, the Comedy of Errors, by Plautus, we find the doctor sending for four men to remove the supposed lunatic to his house, and declaring his intention of making him "drink hellebore some twenty days," when he got him safely lodged there.

The evidence upon which the Roman magistrate declared a person to be furious, was not the opinion of experts, but such evidence as showed *that the fact was admitted by the general voice of those to whom the circumstances of the case were well known*. We thus find that careful provision was made for the treatment of the Roman citizen when he became insane; and it is probable that the religious tolerance or indifference, which prevailed until the time of the Christian prosecutions, must also have been accompanied by a very considerable diminution of the superstitious element which had complicated the idea of insanity among the Greeks. The Romans looked on this condition as a disease which was to be cured, if at all, by ordinary medical treatment. Seneca makes this possibility the distinguishing mark of the kind of insanity which implies civil incapacity.* "We say that every fool is insane," he says, "we do not, however, attempt to cure them all with hellebore, but trust many of them to vote in our assemblies, and to exercise magisterial jurisdiction." This remark received a melancholy illustration in the history of his pupil, Nero; one of the cruelties by which the tyrant marked his mad career being to condemn the great philosopher to death. It is curious, with reference to the remark of Seneca, which has just been quoted, to note that Nero was actually called upon by the satirist, Persius, to "clear his mind with hellebore, instead of meddling with government, for which he was, by nature, so unfit."

Descriptions and allusions might be cited from many authors, showing that the forms of insanity were, in Rome,

* De Beneficiis, lib. ij. cap. xxxv.

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as we have found them to be in Greece, similar to what are met with at the present day. Ovid, Plautus, Horace, and Virgil, all make reference to them. But it is unnecessary to occupy time by quotation of the passages.

The state of the community, which a consideration of the provisions of the Roman law for dealing with insanity naturally suggests, is one which, so far, may properly be regarded with satisfaction. And in the earlier days of the Republic, perhaps, it deserved to be so regarded. But after that period, we require to take an element into consideration, which must produce an important modification of our opinion. In considering the condition of a civilized community at the present time, the persons whose condition would occupy the most important place in our imagination would be labourers, artizans, members of learned professions, and active members of the commercial class. But a few sentences will be sufficient to show how little the vast mass of the Romish population was benefited by the legislation intended only for those enjoying the privileges of citizenship.

The class of slaves were entirely excluded from these benefits. "During the latter times of the Republic, and under the Empire," says Dr. Smith, "this class had greatly increased. The first question asked respecting a person's fortune, was, 'How many slaves does he keep?' Ten slaves seems to have been the lowest number which a person could keep, in the age of Augustus, with a proper regard to social respectability. The immense number of prisoners taken in the constant wars of the Republic, and the increase of wealth and luxury, augmented the number of slaves to a prodigious extent. A freedman, under Augustus, who had lost much property during the civil wars, left, at his death, as many as 4,116. Two hundred was no uncommon number for one person to keep. The mechanical arts, which were formerly in the hands of clients, were now entirely exercised by slaves, a natural growth of things; for where slaves perform certain duties, or practise certain arts, such duties or arts are thought degrading to a freeman. And it must not be forgotten, that the games of the amphitheatre required an immense number of slaves, who were trained for that purpose." Slave-dealing was one of the most lucrative of commercial avocations, and high prices were paid for those who might be sources of pleasure or profit to their owners. Eunuchs, literary men, and doctors, were esteemed among the most valuable.

The proportion of the slaves to the rest of the population,

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is described as being much smaller in the provinces than in the capital, and glowing descriptions have been given of the order, comfort, and happiness which prevailed over the Empire during the period between Trajan and Marcus Aurelius. But I confess that when the condition of slavery was so widely spread, and when, as we know, vice and cruelty were rampant among those occupying the highest places in the government, I am unable to believe that the social state of the community generally was orderly and happy, or that among the mass of the population the sick and the insane could be kindly and intelligently cared for. As for the slaves, they could not, indeed, be killed with impunity, and after the edict of Claudius the killing of them was looked on as murder. But their treatment was certainly inhuman enough. It is not necessary, for proof of this, to show that every Roman wished to follow the example of Velius Pollio, who, in the time of Augustus flung such slaves as displeased him into his fishponds, to feed his lampreys. It is sufficient to know that slaves were often to be seen in chain-gangs, labouring as draught animals upon the farms—that some were specially bred for slaughter in the sports of the arena, and that masters had been frequently known to get rid of old and useless slaves, by exposing them to starvation on an island in the Tiber. When almost the whole of the working classes, and a large proportion of what would now be called the middle class of the population, was in this condition of slavery, and might be subjected to such cruel treatment, it is impossible to believe that the helpless or troublesome among them could have generally received much consideration, or even mercy. We can make no attempt to estimate the proportion of these lower strata of the community which was regarded as insane, in the sense of being irresponsible, and deserving of protection. Neither can we indicate the nature of such protection as was provided. But there can be no doubt that in the latter days of the Empire the number of persons who were objects of benevolent solicitude must have dwindled rather than increased. Whatever healthy energy of public spirit had previously existed, was then rapidly and hopelessly passing away. Almost every institution or pursuit by which virtuous habits would naturally have been formed, had been tainted or destroyed, while agencies of terrific power were impelling the people to vice. The rich, excluded from the most honourable paths of ambition, and surrounded by countless parasites, who inflamed

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their every passion, found themselves absolute masters of innumerable slaves, who were their willing ministers, and often their teachers in vice. The poor, hating industry, and destitute of all intellectual resources, lived in habitual idleness, and looked upon abject servility as the normal road to fortune.* The decay of Paganism and the rise of Christianity did not suffice, in this poisonous moral air, to check the growth of superstition, which found a fitting pabulum in the ignorance and vice which prevailed. The dark ages were at hand. The principles, the habits, the convictions which held society together, were giving way, one after the other, before luxury and selfishness. The entire organization of the ancient world, was, as Mr. Froude expresses it, "on the point of collapsing into a heap of incoherent sand."

I fear that I may seem, in this lecture, to have wandered round about the subject of insanity, when I ought to have presented it definitely to your minds. But you will doubtless appreciate the difficulty of catching more than mere fragments of the popular ideas in any age of the world. And in dealing with the earlier periods of history, it is impossible to get into very direct contact with them. I hope, in dealing with the next period, to bring the subject somewhat more satisfactorily before you.

A Chapter in the History of Criminal Lunacy in England. By DAVID NICOLSON, M.D., Deputy Superintendent, State Criminal Lunatic Asylum, Broadmoor.

Criminal Lunacy is a many-sided subject: but I have no intention here of entering upon it from any special standpoint, whether social, legal, or medico-psychological. I merely wish to recount, briefly and without detail, such general matters of interest connected with successive methods of dealing with criminal lunatics as can be linked together in the form of a historical sketch, which does not pretend to be a criticism.

I propose to deal with the subject as extending over four periods into which, as it seems to me, the narrative of events may legitimately be divided. I venture to think that these periods, the last of which brings us up to the present time, will serve a useful purpose by indicating the nature of the

* See Lecky's Morals, I. 278.

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