Professor Galanter's book has much to tell us about the beliefs, anxieties, and frustrations of the public regarding the legal profession and its ubiquitous place in modern life. It does not, however, offer the reader a window into the operation of the legal profession itself. Thus, I would offer a modest alteration to the sub-title. Rather than *Lowering the Bar: Lawyer Jokes & Legal Culture*, I suggest "Lawyer Jokes and Popular Perception of Legal Culture." This title more accurately describes the target the author in fact hit, dead center.

In the end I find myself wondering whether the subject of lawyer jokes—and public attitudes toward same—really merits such close analysis and prodigious scholarship. We are not, after all, dealing with Shakespeare or the Book of Job. That said, the jokes are indeed funny, the insights interesting, and I can think of many far worse ways to spend an evening or two than perusing this volume and reflecting on the real-life legal villains of one's own acquaintance so aptly captured in these jokes.

–Robert F. McDermott, Jr.

CONTENTIOUS POLITICS

Charles Tilly: *Regimes and Repertoires* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006. Pp. ix, 256. $36.00.)

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Regimes and Repertoires is another great book by Charles Tilly who publishes books faster than we can read them. It analyzes "how prevailing forms of popular struggle vary and change from one sort of political regime to another" (3), that is, how differences in regime types bring about differences in contentious politics. Tilly argues that a simple matrix of government capacity (high vs. low) and democracy (democratic vs. nondemocratic) explains broad patterns of political contention (27, fig. 2.2).

Tilly has argued for some time that social scientists should abandon the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for complex historical episodes. He advocates a new approach that searches for "causal regularities . . . in the mechanisms and processes that interlace within those episodes" (157). Critics may think that the latter approach easily degenerates into "thick description." In *Regimes and Repertoires*, Tilly does not defend his approach but proceeds to demonstrate how a parsimonious model of capacity and democracy can explain a wide range of contentious activities, both violent (including civil wars, genocide, terror, revolutions) and nonviolent (including unarmed insurrections and social movements), both in earlier centuries and in the contemporary world, and both in the West and in other parts of the world. He lays out his theoretical arguments of regimes in chapters 1 and 2, repertoires in chapter 3, and the shaping of repertoires by regimes in chapter 4. Although

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he separately discusses the anti-apartheid movement in chapter 5, civil wars and terror in chapter 6, genocide and revolutions in chapter 7, and social movements in chapter 8, he convincingly shows that these repertoires do not constitute "separate realm[s] subject to *sui generis* laws" (158) but form an integral picture of "regimes and repertoires."

Tilly starts with citizens making collective claims on and "bargaining" with rulers over "prescribed, tolerated, and forbidden" forms of contention. In this process, a regime's location in the "capacity-democracy space" shapes "the ways that people make collective claims . . . and how authorities respond to those claims" (211). Low-capacity, nondemocratic regimes repress claim-making arbitrarily but exercise only limited control over the means of coercion. While repression of peaceful demonstrations stimulates claimants to resort to violent contention, a weak state capacity allows challengers to organize and acquire weapons in geographical bases that are outside of central control. High-capacity, nondemocratic regimes likewise do not tolerate political contention, but their repression is backed by effective government control over violent means. The result is that while organized resistance does not emerge easily, revolutionaries—if, against all odds, they somehow emerge—are more likely to succeed at wholesale takeover of power. Low-capacity, democratic regimes provide for political rights and civil liberties in centers of control but suffer from lawlessness in peripheries. High-capacity, democratic regimes maintain extensive control over coercive means and stamp out various forms of collective violence within their territories. At the same time, they tolerate a variety of nonviolent claim-making repertoires and are the sites of national and transnational social movements.

Tilly's insightful analysis of how regime type "strongly affects" repertoires (211) leads one to wonder if the causal relationship also is at work in the opposite direction: does contention, in turn, bring about regime change (the subject matter of the bulk of the literature on contentious politics)? If the political opportunity structure and previously established claim-making repertoires interact to constrain the occurrence of collective claims (16, 211), is democratization possible in "high-capacity, nondemocratic regimes such as Morocco, China, and Iran" (129)?

Tilly remarks in the very last paragraph that the book brushes aside three important questions: "Exactly how does contention itself transform regimes? What causes regimes to vary and change from low capacity to high capacity and back again? What causes democratization?" (215–16) In fact, he argues that "[c]ontention itself reshapes regimes both incrementally and in burst of struggle" (214) and that "democratization always occurs in part as a result of contention" (61). He even devotes chapter 4 to analyzing the "trajectories of change" in South Africa.

In Tilly's account, the introduction of apartheid in 1948 simultaneously de-democratized an already nondemocratic regime and increased government capacity. But resistance and opposition began to undermine government capacity sometime around 1970. Although the apartheid regime

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responded with more repressive policies in the 1970s and even declared states of emergency in 1985–1986, P. W. Botha and F. W. de Klerk made huge concessions in the late 1980s. The negotiations with Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress eventually led to democratization in the 1990s. How should we understand this dramatic regime change? Tilly argues that, in general, "concerted popular claim-making itself initiate[s] or accelerates[s] expansion of POS (political opportunity structure)" (213). But why was organized political contention possible under the high-capacity, nondemocratic apartheid regime? How did black activists break out of the constraints of the political opportunity structure and claim-making repertoires? It is noteworthy that Tilly locates the initial impetus with "shifts within regimes" (113) because "relatively little political contention occurs without involvement of government agents" (114) in high-capacity regimes. In the case of South Africa, the causal chain goes from "governmental change to regime realignment to alterations of POS to changes in contention" (114). To demonstrate that similar mechanisms and processes exist in other historical episodes, Tilly shows how "governmental changes unquestionably drove" changes in POS, contentious repertoires, and partial democratization in Britain in the period 1750–1840 (114). He also observes that Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost were critical in creating a political opening in the originally high-capacity, nondemocratic Soviet regime (198–201). If "regime change," defined as democratic transition, can only be achieved by "regime change," defined as change of mind by regime leaders, then the prospect for democratization in other high-capacity, nondemocratic regimes looks rather grim. Let us hope that Tilly will publish another book that directly addresses the three questions that he claims this book brushes aside.

In that future book, it would be helpful if Tilly also elaborates on the issue of state capacity. Unquestionably, Morocco, China, Iran, South Africa under apartheid, and the Soviet Union represent cases of high-capacity regimes. But it is puzzling why Peru, Chechnya, the Philippines, and Colombia, which contain significant zones that escape central control, are also classified as having high-capacity (whether democratic or nondemocratic) (134). As scholars of the state have argued, governmental capacity should be measured not just in capital cities and major urban centers, but also throughout state territories including border control. Such a stricter definition of capacity would further strengthen Tilly's argument that collective violence tends to occur only in low-capacity regimes.

By providing an integral framework for otherwise discrete phenomena, this great book deserves the attention of scholars of social movements, democratic movements, social revolutions, and state formation. Scholars of international relations who study civil wars and terrorism will also benefit from this book's shrewd analysis of POS, or "the ease with which armed insurgents can organize, challenge, and support themselves" (135).

–Victoria Tin-bor Hui

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