Trajanic expansion was essentially for glory, and find little justification for the military adventurism of Augustus, though, puzzlingly, C. accepts the traditional denigration of Augustus' military activity, claiming that he was no a warrior. Roman strategic policy is strangely ambivalent, with authors proclaiming that Rome was due empire without end at more at less the moment when others appear to be shoring up defences and proclaiming an end to expansion. Again, C. does not resolve this problem, nor focus on it so that the reader can be made aware of the contradictions in Roman policy.

C. represents the imperial army as an Augustan creation, reflecting the general impression that we receive from our sources of fundamental change in the early imperial period, but many of our sources share our benefit of considerable hindsight. The adoption of the Augustan period as a starting point reflects a common and convenient *caesura* in historiography generated by the political change. By starting in 30 B.C., C. underplays continuities with the Republic, perhaps especially important in the relationship between the army and society. The emphases on a rural soldiery, and the political benefits of *gloria* and (relatively) unrestrained imperialism were, it could be argued, features of both Republican and imperial armies. Also, the common tendency to compress the evolution of the imperial army into the Augustan period is not resisted, though the institutional framework of the army continued to evolve throughout the Julio-Claudian period at least. Similarly, C. suggests a relatively clear break at the end of the period, suggesting that the age of the imperial army was over by 284. Historians have to stop somewhere, and 284 is as good or bad a date as many others, and the army of the fourth century appears rather different from that of the first in institutional form. Yet, like most other social institutions, the army was in a more or less continuous state of evolution throughout this period, and many of the same issues of negotiation between local élites and the military figure in the informative mid-fourth-century literary and documentary sources.

C.'s task in this book is unenviable. So many of the issues central to his theme are unsettled in contemporary historiography in ways in which they were not even twenty years ago, and C. gives an impression of a subject in some flux. C. does not cut through these difficulties to offer new interpretations, but that is not his intention. This book sets out to do a job, and does this effectively, offering students and the general reader a plausible, readable interpretation of the Roman army and society. The book might have been enhanced if the contradictions and difficulties that face those studying these issues were more fully exposed.

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AUGUSTUS RE-EXAMINED

M. H. DETTENHOFER: *Herrschaft und Widerstand im augusteischen Principat. Die Konkurrenz zwischen* res publica *und* domus Augusta. (Historia Einzelschriften 140.) Pp. 234. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000. Paper, DM 88. ISBN: 3-515-07639-5.

In this revised *Habilitationsschrift*, Dettenhofer has set herself the ambitious task of showing, through a diachronic investigation, the process by which Augustus collected the functions of state into his hands (or into the realm of his *domus*) at the expense of the aristocracy and the normal organs of the *res publica*. This intrinsically interesting subject has, of course, been intensively studied. In defending the originality of her

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work, D. notes that studies of Octavian/Augustus' actions as *princeps* have tended to be topical, synchronic (or achronic) presentations; the sources are to blame, both because they are incomplete (D. finds at least part of the responsibility in an '*Informationspolitik*' of suppression of news of opposition short of full-blown conspiracy by Augustus, p. 25) and because they reproduce the propaganda of the regime, as when they present as a fact the idea that a monarchy was a necessary solution to *Krise ohne Alternative* at the end of the republic. The former has led to analysis of the ends, rather than the means by which Octavian pursued them; the latter has helped quell skeptical interpretation of Augustus' program and intentions. Unsurprisingly, D. then argues that 'resistance' to Augustus needs to be construed more broadly than acts of rebellion or conspiracies, because to do so conspires with Augustan propaganda to suppress occasions of opposition or resistance which might better be designated by terms like 'competition', 'friction', 'tension', or other subtle terms.

This laudable task is fraught with possibilities for mistakes. Without quibbling over details, it is certainly safe to say that the source picture of Octavian/Augustus is gappy, and we moderns are usually left to infer—or suspend judgement on—the emperor's motivations or the purposes behind his actions. We know the end of the story reasonably well: Augustus ended his life as a hereditary monarch of a Rome vastly changed—politically, socially, and physically—from what he had inherited after the civil wars. But the whole point of working through Augustus' acts diachronically is to establish a chain of causes and effects, and to understand the motivations underlying the circumstantial evidence. Such a focus on the piece-by-piece change of the republic into a monarchy establishes the republic *ab initio* as the protagonist of the sad story of a lost cause, and the calculating Octavian/Augustus D. posits who acts expediently to further his rule and subvert the institutions of the free state unremarkably turns out to be an illiberal totalitarian (the latter a term she expressly invokes: pp. 139 n. 65, 205). For my money, D. has returned a rather modern Octavian/Augustus filtered through the lens of twentieth-century despotism. A few chosen examples will hopefully serve, *pars pro toto*, to illustrate some problems of D.'s approach.

Augustus sought to form a (Roman) urban clientele, and as is well known, one way for him to achieve this was to take upon himself the task of providing for the city's grain supply. Where D. seems to me to go astray is in resurrecting the view that Augustus deliberately starved the Roman populace in late 23 B.C. to secure the *cura annonae* (p. 114). Pompey was the great exemplar of the statesman who took the grain supply in hand, and he had been quick to capitalize on urban unrest in securing it; we likewise find a restriction (or at least the threat of restriction) of the urban food supply under Sextus Pompey. But Sextus Pompey was an outsider and in a way had the city under siege; other cases of calculated cruelty occur under similar circumstances, but the systematic starvation of the noncombatant populace in a time of peace for political reasons smacks more of a Stalin than a Roman. D. herself acknowledges the pestilence and natural catastrophes recorded as the cause of grain scarcity, and her suggestion that Augustus and Agrippa in their 'suspicious' (*verdächtig*) visits to their grain-rich provinces curtailed shipments to Rome surely establishes no more than that D. herself suspects them. The grain supply of Rome was the most complex human undertaking in the preindustrial world, and it was, despite repeated efforts to bolster it, subject to severe setbacks until Trajan's new port was built, some century and a quarter after the shortages of 23–22 B.C.

Again, Augustus sought systematically to weaken the aristocracy. Perhaps at an early point in his career, but certainly by 17 B.C., he instituted moral legislation

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encouraging fidelity in marriage and marriage (or remarriage) for the procreation of children. These attempts, which might appear to be a continuation of public moral positions staked out by generations of disapproving or hortatory Roman leaders (most famously, perhaps, in 131 B.C. by the censor Metellus Macedonicus *apud* Gell. 1.6.2), were instead, we are told (pp. 137–9), designed to weaken the aristocracy's ability to compete with the emperor's resources: the moral rhetoric is just canting persiflage to cover the unattested sinister purpose of breaking up family wealth by encouraging a situation in which multiple heirs would have to share smaller portions of a family's resources. The fallacy here lies in the assumption that because a political advantage (which Augustus may well have seen) accrued from the moral legislation (or any public act), that act must thus have been motivated by that advantage.

D. appears to me regularly to deduce Octavian/Augustus' motivations using the reductive rational actor model of human behavior to interpolate between the pieces of circumstantial evidence we possess. The reasoning goes like this: he must have wanted to do this or that, because it would have had that or this expedient effect on his self-interests which he knowingly pursued (cf. D.'s revealing fondness for the metaphor *Schachzug* to describe protagonists' actions—three times in ten pages: pp. 39, 45, 49). This model cuts a Gordian knot of complexities (real people do things with mixed motives, act from anger or other emotions, act carelessly, or sometimes act just to be doing *something*) and allows a neat reconstruction of the motivations behind the circumstances mediated by the historian's idea of rationality and appropriate motivating self-interest. Naturally, in making this criticism I am not tacitly advancing the equally untenable proposition that a historical protagonist acts only from irrational motivations; nor, indeed, that Octavian/Augustus was free of an at times ruthless desire to control.

No work on the Augustan principate after Zanker's *Macht der Bilder* can afford to ignore or downplay the monuments, and the one major flaw (besides method) in D.'s work is her blindness to the Augustan monuments. What references to monuments she makes are generally prompted by her reading of the ancient sources, but there is only perfunctory contact with such obvious, rudimentary works as Zanker's and none with *LTUR*. A very minor complaint is the lack of any chronological chart in a book dedicated to a diachronic presentation of its subject.

Despite my skeptical critique, I found the task of working diachronically through the material on Augustus with D. quite valuable, even when I was frustrated by leaps of intuition I was unwilling to follow. Her work on establishing connections between events and her minute scrutinization of Augustus' accumulation of power made me look at familiar material in a fresh way, and in a work on such a hoary topic as the first *princeps*'s reign that is no small achievement.

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POLITICS AT POMPEII

J. L. FRANKLIN JR: *Pompeis difficile est. Studies in the Political Life of Imperial Pompeii*. Pp. xiv + 225, ills. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. Cased, £34. ISBN: 0-472-11056-X.

This book offers an analysis of politics at Pompeii during the imperial era, but its overall argument is disappointing, as is its surprising number of errors and its over-conjectural approach.

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