never try to understand democracy by evaluating its ends and its claims to justice. He is too close to it; he is a part of it, and so he marches forward as if democracy is unambiguously legitimate and even constitutes reality. Asking the people what they think seems totally natural to Bennett. Holding them up to standards of reason does not. He does not understand that there is a whole tradition of philosophy that had to justify their sovereignty, interpret nature, recognize legitimate ends of government, and create institutions to protect those ends. He has no perspective on democracy and therefore does not understand the thought which is its formative cause. He does not know how political philosophers like Locke and Montesquieu educated founders and how they in turn formed the democracy he is supposedly studying. Even with respect to studying the gritty day-to-day power struggles between the people and their leaders, quantitative analysis is inferior to political thought. One page of Aristophanes is more insightful (and will prove to be more enduring) than all the contemporary quantitative studies combined because Aristophanes had an unmatched genius for characterization, not to mention depth of understanding. Political scientists would be better served by reading Aristophanes and developing capacities for seeing political characters and their problems than learning quantitative methods.

Bennett thinks that the alternative to his own gruff, straight shooting, man of the people character is the politically correct Ivy League snob and activist whose high-minded morality is hypocritically elitist, vain, and self-serving (178). If this is the other alternative, all the more reason why political philosophy should be the core of the discipline. Political philosophy avoids the narrowness and crudeness of quantitative analysis without falling victim to the fanaticisms of moral indignation and the empty vanity of moral fashions. Political philosophy is an exercise in justifying oneself in relation to society that deepens and disciplines while refining. If political philosophy should not become the core of the discipline, it will certainly not be because it deserves to fail.

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Response to Libby and Kremer

My assertion that the "Perestroikans" offend some who might favor disciplinary change has upset some folks.

Mr. Libby does not refrain from writing "mindless number crunching" (2001, 203), but he gets into high dudgeon when he and others of his ilk are on the hot seat.

Libby claims that he still does research. If APSA is dominated by quantitative research, as Libby believes, it has not crimped his style.

Libby takes umbrage at the word "dropout." The *Oxford American Dictionary* stipulates that someone who entered a program but did not finish is a "dropout." If words are eliminated because self-styled censors do not like them, we have taken a long step toward Orwell's "New Speak."

Kaymak (2001) writes that Kasza is a "spokesman" for "Perestroika." A "spokes person" becomes a lightning rod. Kasza's claim that, "it is no wonder that undergraduate enrollments have plummeted in step with the hegemony of hard science" (2001, 598) leaves the mistaken impression that enrollments fell because Political Science is dominated by quantoids. Co-variation does not establish causation.

Before he seeks to characterize another person, Mr. Kremer should learn about that individual. Had he done so, Kremer would have learned that I read those Dead White Males he mentions and others, including Aristotle. (Given his attempt to collect every polis's constitution, Aristotle may have been a crypto quantoid.) My research assesses Americans' competence as democratic citizens, which requires me to read authors such as Plato, Machiavelli, de Tocqueville, Walter Lippmann, Eric Hoffer, Dennis Thompson, and Neil Postman.

In short, some quantoids seek to test propositions derived from political philosophy with data. That is how *The Civic Culture* achieved fame, which leaves quantoids unashamed.

The two central points of my essay remain. Despite claims they favor "ecumenism" in methods, "Perestroikans" are hostile to quantitative scholarship. Some "Perestroikans'" over-weening pride alienates other scholars.

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