without the intervention of a narrator, the reader having to draw his own conclusions):[25] Homer shows, while the other epic poets tell. Showing is the most perfect and effective form of *mimesis*, while telling is less effective, because it involves the use of unmimetic narratorial interventions.[26]

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ARISTOTLE, *GEN. CORR.* 317A11–12: AN UNNOTICED GLOSS[1]

In the *De Generatione et Corruptione* I.2, Aristotle argues against the Atomists' conception of nature, and therefore it is no surprise that a discussion about 'points' arises. In this discussion he uses two different terms to signify 'point', *σημεῖον* and *στιγμή*, and most often they clearly mean exactly the same, namely what could justly be termed 'spatial point'. In 317a11–12, however, we find a short sentence that should make every interpreter or commentator consider whether Aristotle makes a distinction between the two words or regards them as synonymous. The sentence, as printed by H. H. Joachim,[2] runs as follows:

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐχόμενον σημεῖον σημείου ἢ στιγμὴ στιγμῆς, . . .

No general agreement concerning the interpretation of this passage has yet been reached. The purpose of this notice is briefly to state and criticize the usual interpretations, and having done this I will propose a new solution to the problem.

Joachim's view is, I think, representative of the majority of scholars. He argues that the two terms are either synonymous or (which he considers more likely) Aristotle has chosen, as he often does, to use two words that signify practically the same but not exactly the same. In such cases the first word is a wide term, covering all instances, while the second word is an explanatory term defining the first more carefully. This latter view is accepted by, for instance, J. Tricot.[3]

[25] The terms received their classic formulation in P. Lubbock, *The Craft of Fiction* (London, 1926), 62, 67. This suggestion is considered (he calls it 'tempting') but rejected by Halliwell (n. 5), 168, n. 46. In narratological handbooks one often finds the names of Plato and Aristotle linked to the telling vs. showing couple, e.g. G. Genette, *Narrative Discourse* (Ithaca, 1980) 163 or S. Chatman, *Coming to Terms. The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, 1990), 111. This is wrong for Plato (whose distinction *dihegesis-mimesis* corresponds to narrative parts-speeches, which is not the same as telling vs. showing) and Aristotle *Poetics* chapter 3 (which is usually referred to, but where we likewise find a distinction between narration and impersonation), but right for his (less well-known) chapter 24. The only narratologist to be right about this is W. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago, [1961] 1983), 4: 'Though Aristotle praises Homer for speaking in his own voice less than other poets, even Homer writes scarcely a page without some kind of direct clarification of motives, of expectation, and of the relative importance of events'; (93) 'If Homer is better than the others for appearing rarely … can we not out-Homer Homer … by not appearing at all, by *showing* everything and *telling* nothing?'

[26] I wish to thank S. R. van der Mije, R. Nünlist, and the anonymous referee of *CQ* for their valuable suggestions.

[1] I am grateful to Dr Sten Ebbesen and to the anonymous referee for the *Classical Quarterly* for comments and suggestions.

[2] H. H. Joachim (ed.), *Aristotle:On Coming-to-be and Passing-away. De Generatione et Corruptione* (Oxford, 1922 and later), 86.

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Another recent interpretation is based on Alexander of Aphrodisias (*in Metaph.* 55.20–57.34). He informs us that σημεῖον is the mathematician's term, which would then, in the present context, mean that στιγμή is either the general term signifying 'point' or more specifically the physical point. The latter of these possibilities is the view of C. Mugler,[4] who sees σημεῖον as the geometrical point, while στιγμή is considered the physical point. Aristotle's own writings contain some evidence in favour of the possibility of such a distinction between the terms.[5]

However, from both of these views it is extremely difficult to explain why Aristotle would wish to include the 'point in time' and the 'geometrical point' respectively, seeing that they have absolutely no relevance here. Aristotle is discussing problems concerning divisibility and division of corporeal things (that is, σώματα or μεγέθη), and neither of the proposed solutions is obviously relevant to the discussion. This is also the reason why I do not accept attempts to see σημεῖον specifically as 'point in time' (and nothing else). Thus, E. S. Forster's translation ('For one moment in time is not contiguous to another, nor is one point to another'), for instance, must be dismissed.[6] Furthermore, as regards Joachim's view, the precise meaning that he assigns to σημεῖον is also troubling. It is obvious from the passages he mentions that σημεῖον can equal τὸ νῦν, but we still need a passage where the term is used in that wider sense which Joachim assigns to it. As I have just argued, it surely cannot signify 'point in time' and nothing else.

Therefore, another interpretation must be sought, and there is, in fact, a relatively simple solution to the problem, although, to the best of my knowledge, it has never been stated before. Thus, I propose that the words ἢ στιγμὴ στιγμῆς should be removed from the text as being a gloss on σημεῖον σημεῖου. In this case the original gloss will probably have been ἤτοι στιγμὴ στιγμῆς, with ἤτοι abbreviated as ἢ$^{\tau}$, and the scribe who thought that the gloss was part of the Aristotelian text made a simple mistake when writing ἢ for ἤτοι. The normal translation of σημεῖον as 'point' would then be the correct one in this passage, and there would be no textual opposition when we claim that in the whole argument presented in the *De Generatione et Corruptione* I.2 σημεῖον and στιγμή are both signifying 'point' with no perceptible difference of meaning.

Philoponus (*in Gen. Corr.* 41.6–7) can be used in support of the emendation. Thus, he cites the passage, but omits ἢ στιγμὴ στιγμῆς.[7] Although one cannot reasonably demand that Philoponus should comment on every single word or phrase, his commentary is indeed a very thorough and excellent work. Had this difficult phrase been present in the text that he was using, there is a good chance that he would have tried to clarify the issue.

Furthermore, τοῦτο in the following sentence should be taken as referring to σημεῖον, but this is not very clear in the transmitted text. Thus, the relatively simple sentence τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ διαίρεσις ἢ σύνθεσις has caused some interpreters a lot of problems, since the manuscript reading of the preceding sentence makes it unclear how τοῦτο is to be explained.[8] The Greek is still difficult, but it would certainly be an improvement

[3] J. Tricot (translator), *Aristote:De la Génération et de la Corruption, de Generatione et Corruptione* (Paris, 1951^{2}), 21 n. 2.

[4] C. Mugler (ed.), *Aristote:De la Génération et de la Corruption* (Paris, 1966), 80–1.

[5] Cf. *An. Post.* 76b2–5, *Ph.* 240a29–b4.

[6] E. S. Forster (translator), *Aristotle:On Coming-to-be and Passing-away* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1955 and later), 183.

[7] Joachim did well in recording this omission in his apparatus. Mugler has no mention of this variant reading.

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if we were to read *οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐχόμενον σημεῖον σημείου, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ διαίρεσις ἢ σύνθεσις*, the meaning being that a point cannot be immediately next to another point, and the point is practically the same as division and composition.[9]

Still, it need to be explained why an interpreter should produce this gloss on a well-known use of the term *σημεῖον*. There seems to be a simple answer. The preceding argument on points (*Gen. Corr.* 317a2–11) has consistently been using the term *στιγμή*, and the phrase that we are concerned with is the first passage using *σημεῖον* since 316b31.[10] Thus, the interpreter would certainly have expected *στιγμή* in the conclusion, and when he found only *σημεῖον*, he helped future readers by writing *ἢ* (or *ἤτοι*) *στιγμὴ στιγμῆς*, probably as an interlinear gloss. Later this helpful comment found its way into the text thereby corrupting it.

Finally, I should point out that this particular kind of corruption is known from other parts of the Aristotelian texts as well. Two examples will suffice.

In the *De Anima* 416a11 all the most important manuscripts read *τῶν σωμάτων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων*, but Torstrik, supported by the ancient commentators, rightly, in my opinion, excised *ἢ τῶν στοιχείων* as a gloss, and he was followed by Ross. And in the *De Memoria* 452a29 almost all manuscripts read: *ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσει τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ*. However, a few manuscripts[11] read *ἢ δυνάμει* instead of *ἐστίν*, and the reason for this is clearly that *ἢ δυνάμει* was at one time written as a helpful comment on *ἐστίν* above the line. Unfortunately, some scribe mistook the comment for a correction and therefore replaced *ἐστίν* with the gloss.

To sum up, I believe that the usual interpretations of Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione* 317a11–12 are wrong, but the passage can easily be understood through the textual emendation proposed above, which clarifies not only the meaning of the term *σημεῖον* but also the analysis of the following *τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ διαίρεσις ἢ σύνθεσις*.

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EUROTAS: WIDE OR DANK? A NOTE ON RUFINUS *AP* 5.60 = 21 PAGE

Παρθένος ἀργυρόπεζος ἐλούετο, χρύσεα μαζῶν
χρωτὶ γαλακτοπαγεῖ μῆλα διαινομένη
πυγαὶ δ' ἀλλήλαις περιηγέες εἱλίσσοντο
ὕδατος ὑγροτέρῳ χρωτὶ σαλευόμεναι
τὸν δ' ὑπεροιδαίνοντα κατέσκεπε πεπταμένη χείρ
οὐχ ὅλον Εὐρώταν, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἠδύνατο.

The poet describes a girl bathing, as though he was watching her. The first couplet focuses on her wet breasts, which are golden upon her milky skin (the precise sense of the dative *χρωτὶ γαλακτοπαγεῖ* is unclear).[1] Her feet, in contrast, are silvery. In the second couplet, the poet's attention is on the girl's buttocks, which

[8] Cf. e.g. E. S. Forster (n.5), 182–3, reading *καὶ* for *ἢ*: 'So much for division and composition', which is certainly not right.

[9] On this cf. *Gen. Corr.* 316b6–8, where *ἁφή* (= *σύνθεσις*), *διαίρεσις* and *στιγμή* (=*σημεῖον*) are equal terms. Cf. also *Metaph.* 1060b12–19.

[10] In particular, one should note 317a2–3: *ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι στιγμὴ στιγμῆς ἐχομένη, ...*

[11] Urb. gr. 37 (M), Par. suppl. gr. 314 (C^c) and Par. gr. 2034 (i). These three manuscripts are closely related.

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