treasures, as temporary, tradable assets of our present stage of life, as tools and resources for our pilgrimage through this world. With such a view of knowledge there will be no temptation for reason to overreach itself—or for us to think that by our reason we can supply humankind with a morality, meaning, or cognitive access to the ultimate question of what there is.

It is only the secular, I think, who have reason to fear that life without a world-view will be a life without meaning or value.

Notes

My special thanks to Eleonore Stump for her thoughtful, helpful correspondence; the remaining errors and misstatements are mine.

1 John Haldane, "Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy", Aquinas Lecture, Blackfriars, Oxford, February 1998; see also his "What future has Catholic philosophy?" Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophy Association, vol. 72, 1998.

2 Ernest A. Moody, "Empiricism and metaphysics in medieval philosophy", pp. 287–304 in his *Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. I have developed my own views a little further in "The World of Empiricism", pp. 114–134 in Jan Hilgevoort (ed.) *Physics and Our View of the World*. Cambridge University Press, 1994.

John Greco

John Haldane has called for the marriage of Anglo-American (or analytic) philosophy and Thomism, arguing that the union would benefit both. I endorse Haldane's call for a more intimate relationship between analytic and Thomistic philosophy. However, I want to suggest that the obstacles for achieving this are more formidable than he might realize. In order to see why, we must first review how we have reached the current situation of virtual non-engagement.

As Haldane's paper suggests, there is no similar problem between Thomism and the neo-Kantian tradition, or between Thomism and the phenomenological tradition. Part of the reason for this is surely that Catholicism has its intellectual roots in continental Europe, and accordingly a Catholic formation is more likely to reflect the influence of Germany or France than Great Britain. But that is not the entire story. In the remarks that follow I will focus on a dynamic that has largely occurred in the

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philosophical world of the United States. I believe that this is another part of the story.

Haldane notes that many Thomists identify analytic philosophy with logical positivism, a movement during the early part of the century that pretended to reduce philosophy to the logical analysis of language. When I took my first job at a Catholic department in the United States some ten years ago, I found the same view of analytic philosophy to be prevalent. At first I could not understand how my Thomist colleagues could make this identification. Among analytic philosophers, logical positivism is considered to be quite dead, and with no hope of resuscitation. In the context of the history of philosophy, it is thought to be no more than an unfortunate blip on the screen. So how could intelligent people believe that analytic philosophy is logical positivism? Eventually I came up with the answer: the last time they looked, it was!

More exactly, my colleague's impression of analytic philosophy had been formed in the early part of the century, when logical positivism was indeed a dominant force in Anglo-American philosophy. At that time the positivists (and others who looked enough like them from a distance) had succeeded in taking over the American Philosophical Association, effectively marginalizing all other schools of philosophy. One manifestation of this was that attempts to engage in normative inquiry or to pursue traditional metaphysical questions were ruled out of court as illegitimate. Of course people who thought that normative and metaphysical questions were central to philosophy, Catholic philosophers among them, were not about to confine themselves to the logical analysis of language. Alternative philosophical groups were formed, such as the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Over the years new alliances were formed as well, for not only Catholics were interested in pursuing the traditional questions of philosophy. As a result, Thomists and other Catholic philosophers continued to engage with Kantians, Hegelians, phenomenologists, Peirceans and others, all of whom had been disenfranchised by the then current power brokers of philosophy in the United States. The institutional walls went up, people went about the business of philosophizing, and the image of analytic philosophy as logical positivism became frozen in time.

Fifty years later, logical positivism is almost unique among philosophical schools in that it is completely and unequivocally dead. It has literally no takers. What is more, normative and metaphysical inquiry again flourishes in the APA. In fact, it is reasonable to judge that the best of such inquiry is now practised among analytic philosophers. Whereas almost all of Continental philosophy has gone "post modern", Anglo-American philosophy continues to defend truth and objectivity. Ironically, analytic

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philosophy has become the natural ally of Thomism and Catholic philosophy. But old images die hard. The developments in analytic philosophy that have turned it from natural enemy to natural ally have gone largely unnoticed by Thomist philosophers, largely because of the historical, institutional and cultural barriers that are now firmly in place. The strength of these barriers cannot be over estimated. On more than one occasion I have heard Catholic colleagues characterize analytic philosophy as anti-theistic and anti-metaphysical. This view of analytic philosophy persists, in spite of the fact that some of the most prominent members of good Catholic departments, such as at Notre Dame and Fordham, are analytic philosophers who specialize in theistic metaphysics! For my own part, I recently had a student confide in me that he was not interested in analytic philosophy, but preferred the kind of thing we were doing in my class. The student did not realize that I was an analytic philosopher and that we were doing analytic philosophy. Given the characterization of analytic philosophy he had received from somewhere else, he was not able to recognize that what we were doing was an instance of it.

As a result of all this, today we are left with several obstacles to a fruitful interaction between Thomism and analytic philosophy. Some of these can be classified as historical, and now institutional. As we have seen, there is a history of virtual non-engagement since the birth of analytic philosophy at the beginning of this century. Accordingly, many Catholic philosophers have been formed in institutions that are avowedly non-analytic. They were trained in philosophy departments that conceive themselves as such, and they are members of philosophical associations that exist as alternatives to the dominant analytic associations. As a result, they are effectively isolated from the analytic mainstream, both in terms of the people they know and the conversations they are in. Getting familiar with either would be no easy task, even if Thomists were disposed to undertake it. On the other side, it would be difficult for most Catholic analytic philosophers to familiarize themselves with the vast and complex Thomistic system. At the very least it would represent somewhat of a career change, and not one that would be clearly valued by their professional peers. This brings us to a different kind of obstacle—one that speaks to the will of Thomists and analytic philosophers to pursue the kind of engagement that Haldane is calling for. For clearly there are psychological and even cultural reasons for both Thomists and analysts to resist engagement.

On the Thomistic side, Haldane's allusion to the Catholic ghetto is an apt one. But Haldane fails to consider how the psychology of the ghetto works against the kind of engagement he is proposing. From that perspective, a common attitude is that the dominant culture is hostile, and cannot be saved anyway. This sort of cost-benefit analysis makes it difficult

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to rally the troops. On the analytic side there are equally powerful factors working against engagement. The grain of truth in the identification of analytic philosophy with logical positivism is that analytic philosophy remains largely scientistic. Like much of American academia, much of analytic philosophy is anti-religious. Analytic philosophers now do metaphysics, but most commonly it is metaphysics at the service of naturalism. The research program is to work out a world view that saves appearances as much as possible, but which is consistent with contemporary science's picture of an entirely physical universe. In this sort of atmosphere, one risks at least social acceptance when one is explicitly religious. More than once an analytic colleague has asked me, with great concern, what it is like to work at a Catholic university, the premise of the question being that it must be terrible. Visions of Galileo persist. So much so that it does not even occur to the person that I might be Catholic myself, or that I might consider it a value to be at a Catholic university. As a result of this fairly pervasive attitude, many Catholic analytic philosophers are not explicitly Catholic in their professional lives. They are like the person who has left the ghetto for the career downtown, and who chooses to silently endure the prejudices of his unsuspecting office mates. And of course assimilation can have costs worse than this, as when one internalizes the prejudices of the dominant culture.

How is one to overcome these obstacles, which have more to do with the sociology of the profession that the merits of either Thomism or analytic philosophy? One thing that will certainly be needed is good examples of fruitful interaction. Both analytic philosophers and Thomists will want to be convinced that there is a payoff before committing the resources that Haldane's proposal would require. Haldane has provided us with some such examples, both in his own work in the philosophy of mind, and in his edited volume of *The Monist* dedicated to Analytical Thomism.[1] But more will be needed. Second, following through on Haldane's proposal will require the quite substantial personal commitment of a great number of Thomists and analytic philosophers. For even granting the value of the proposal in principle, it will not become a reality without actual people doing the kind of work that it calls for. A great number of individuals will have to overcome the various obstacles detailed above, deciding that for them personally, the benefits outweigh the costs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, carrying out Haldane's proposal will require significant institutional support. Philosophers in mid career will have to be retrained, their research projects will have to be supported, and new adherents will have to be recruited and schooled. None of this will be easy, and all of it will cost money. So not only philosophers will have to be convinced that all this is worthwhile, administrators and benefactors will have to be as well.

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In conclusion, I endorse Haldane's call for engagement between Thomism and analytic philosophy, as well as his thesis that the interaction would benefit both. But I have tried to point out that there is a history and sociology to all this, and that as a result there are serious obstacles to carrying out his proposal. Finally, I have suggested that if these obstacles are to be overcome and Haldane's proposal is to succeed, it will not be entirely by the force of argument.[2]

1 Cf. John Haldane "A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind", *Ratio*, Vol XI, 1998, pp. 253–77; also in D. Oderberg (ed.) *Form and Matter* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). The relevant issue of *The Monist* is vol. 80, no. 4 (Oct. 1997).

2 Haldane is not unaware that these kinds of issue are relevant. See his "What Future has Catholic Philosophy?" in Michael Baur (ed.) *Virtue and Virtue Theories: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D.C.: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1998), pp. 79–90.

Bonnie Kent

Pleading for an end to "neoscholastic hostility" to analytical philosophy, John Haldane urges Catholic philosophers to join the Anglo-American mainstream. Analytical philosophy, he argues, is nowhere near as anti-metaphysical, sceptical, or nihilistic as Catholics in the United States commonly assume. The time has come for Thomists to emerge from the ghetto, learn "the central themes of contemporary analytical philosophy" and engage with it. The only alternative is a Thomism that continues to be stagnant and marginalised.

This plea for a commitment to revitalising Thomism inevitably raises the question of what it is for a Catholic to be a Thomist in our own day, when Aquinas is the foremost doctor of the Church. If a Thomist is one who studies the thought of Aquinas and tries to present a faithful exposition of it, then the only good Thomists today must perforce be historical scholars. If, on the other hand, a Thomist is one who imitates Aquinas's approach to problems in philosophy and theology, then she will work to develop reasonable solutions that form a coherent system, will feel free to deviate from the teachings of any human authority, including Aquinas's own, and will generally operate more as an analytical philosopher than as a scholar.

While Haldane seeks a compromise between these two conceptions of Thomism, he clearly tilts toward the second: the imitation of Thomas. In

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