the apriori (the freedom from *αἴσθησις*) of human knowing, through which this knowledge can become a pure conceptual actuality'.

It is unfair to criticize a book for what it does not have. Nevertheless, precisely because of the range of its topics, I may be excused for feeling the lack of a consideration of modern and contemporary developments, e.g. Heisenberg's view of the 'smallest building-stones of matter' (mentioned by R.-S. at the end of her Introduction), of a discussion of Plato's harnessing of his teleological biology to ethics (Miller takes up plants, animals, men and gods, but only within the context of the 'god-given method'), and especially of the modern and contemporary variations of Plato's use of pure (non-material) mathematical models in physics.

This book is well produced, except for some slips: the cover has Raphael's Plato holding the *Timaeus*, but the reference on the back cover identifies him as Aristotle. In the useful general index, the Arabic *wa-l-aqil* ('and the intellect') and *wa-l-maqul* ('and the intelligible') appear under *wa* ('and'); other Arabic words are correctly indexed.

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PLATO'S MYTHS

M. Janka, C. Schäfer (edd.): *Platon als Mythologe. Neue Interpretationen zu den Mythen in Platons Dialogen.* Pp. vii + 326. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002. Paper, SFr 55.30/ €32.90. ISBN: 3-534-15979-9.

The contributions to this collective volume deal with various subjects and adopt different points of view, but their authors all agree on one point: it is not possible to oppose *mûthos* and *lógos* term for term and consider that the movement of thought takes place once and for all from *mûthos* to *lógos*. In fact, Plato goes from *mûthos* to *lógos* only to return to *mûthos*. We observe this movement both in antiquity, where, immediately after Plato, the 'allegorical' interpretation practiced particularly by the Stoics enabled the transposition of mythical stories onto the level of philosophical doctrines, and in modern times, where Romanticism calls into question the rationalistic certitudes of the period of the Enlightenment, and in contemporary anthropological research, with its insistence on the difficulty of defining what *mûthos* is, and hence of distinguishing it from *lógos*. In this review, I will try to give a rapid idea of each of the contributions in this volume, which begins with a series of articles on general problems, followed by papers that concentrate on particular myths.

In the first article, Glenn W. Most ('Platons exoterische Mythen', pp. 7–19) shows how, in the educational project in which, for Plato, philosophical education consists, dialectic and myth are intimately linked. This characteristic renders the esoteric and the exoteric dimension of philosophical education inseparable, although Aristotle sought to distinguish these dimensions, with the consequence that all that now remains are his esoteric writings, since his exoteric dialogues now survive only in the form of fragments.

In the next contribution, Marcus Janka ('Semantik und Kontext: *Mythos* und Verwandtes im *Corpus Platonicum*', pp. 29–43), who evokes the association of *mûthos* with Latin *oratio*, and of *lógos* with Latin *ratio*, proposes an inventory of occurrences of the term *mûthos* and its composite and derivative forms in Plato's *Dialogues*. The result of the analysis of these occurrences that the term *mûthos* features several

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different meanings as a function of the context in which it appears. The term can take on a negative sense, and be opposed to what Socrates considers as *philosophía*; but it can become ambivalent, when it presents itself as the clothing that conceals a profound truth. It can even be endowed with authoritative value, when it is presented as a story that must be accepted, particularly when discussing life after death.

Theo Kobusch ('Die Wiederkehr des Mythos. Zur Funktion des Mythos in Platons Denken und in der Philosophie der Gegenwart', pp. 44–57) takes as his point of departure W. Nestle's book *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (Stuttgart, 1940), and shows how, particularly in Plato and in the Greek *Aufklärung* of the fourth century, it was very difficult to present *mûthos* as a discourse without any truth value. We must therefore not be surprised to observe a movement towards the rehabilitation of myth today.

Bernd Manuwald ('Platons Mythenerzähler', pp. 58–80) investigates the rôle and function of mythical stories in Plato's dialogues. He insists on distinguishing between the myths told by Socrates, who, most of the time (particularly in the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*), admits that he takes his inspiration from stories that are already known, and those narrated by other characters, who seem to speak in their own name when they recount myths: Protagoras in the dialogue that bears his name, Aristophanes and Diotima in the *Symposium*, the Elean Stranger in the *Statesman*, Timaeus and Critias in the dialogues named after them, and the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws*. In fact, these last myths present themselves as aetiological myths, which propose a cause to explain some events, whereas Socrates tells myths on the existence of the soul in the beyond. Since these myths are not explanatory, they fit with Socrates' claim of ignorance.

Michael Erler ('*Praesens divinum*. Mythische und historische Zeit in der griechischen Literatur', pp. 81–98) widens the debate by examining the kind of time involved in myth as it appears in the totality of classical literature. In fact, we have to do with a present that is transformed into a duration which is nevertheless not historical, but paradigmatic. The story told is valid as an example for all times, and in all the particular cases to which it can be applied.

In contrast, Christian Pietsch ('Mythos als konkretisierter *Logos*. Platons Verwendung des Mythos am Beispiel von *Nomoi* X 903b–905d', pp. 99–114) limits his contribution to the analysis of a very precise passage from the *Laws*. In this 'preamble', intended to persuade a young atheist that he is not neglected by the gods, it is very hard to distinguish what pertains to *mûthos* and what pertains to *lógos*. *Mûthos* might in the end be said to be a concretization of *lógos*.

These contributions on general problems are followed by articles on particular Platonic myths. Three contributions deal with the myth of the *Statesman*. First is that of Christian Schäfer ('Herrschen und Selbstbeherrschung: der Mythos des *Politikos*', pp. 115–36), who tries to uncover what conception of human beings emerges from this story, and how this definition is connected to the notion of self-control. The other two deal with the question of the number of periods mentioned in the myth itself. Christoph Horn ('Warum zwei Epochen der Menschheitsgeschichte? Zum Mythos des *Politikos*', pp. 137–59) wants to show, following the traditional interpretation, that there are only two, whereas Christopher Rowe ('Zwei oder drei Phasen? Der Mythos im *Politikos*', pp. 160–75) contributes arguments to show that we must distinguish three of them, as he had maintained in his translation with commentary of the *Statesman* (Plato, *Statesman*, ed. with an introduction, translation and commentary [Warminster, 1995]). Rowe also indicates the points on which he differs from my interpretation ('Interprétation du mythe du *Politique*', in C. J. Rowe [ed.], *Reading the* Statesman [Sankt Augustin, 1995], pp. 349–63), which he essentially accepts. Denis

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O'Brien ('Die Aristophanes-Rede im *Symposium:* Das Empedokleische Hintergrund und seine philosophische Bedeutung', pp. 176–93) seeks to show how the speech of Aristophanes in the *Symposium* is directly inspired by Empedocles; he adds specificity and gives a new dimension to what he had already said in a preceding article ('L'Empédocle de Platon', *Revue des Études Grecques* 110 [1997], 381–98).

Walter Mesch ('Die Bildlichkeit der Platonischen Kosmologie. Zum Verhältnis von Logos und Mythos im *Timaios*') concentrates on the *Timaeus*. In the Platonic cosmogony, myth does not have a merely didactic function, as the members of the older Academy seem to have believed. In particular, what Plato says about causality and temporality, two questions that refer to the figure of the demiurge, can only be stated in the framework of a story that presents the features of myth.

Joachim Dalfen ('Platons Jenseitsmythen: eine "neue Mythologie" ' pp. 214–30) tries to show how Socrates takes up ancient myths concerning the Beyond and gives them a new dimension. Directing his analysis to one of these myths, Georg Rechenauer ('Veranschaulichung des Unanschaulichen. Platons neue Rhetorik im Schlussmythos des *Gorgias*', pp. 231–50) shows how, at the end of the *Gorgias*, Socrates uses myth as an instrument of persuasion intended to oppose the type of persuasion mobilized in rhetoric; myth thereby becomes a weapon against rhetoric. In a wholly different field of ideas, Theodor Ebert ('"Wenn ich einen schönen Mythos vortragen darf . . ." Zu Status, Herkunft und Funktion des Schlussmythos in Platons *Phaidon*', pp. 251–69) undertakes a delicate analysis of the final myth of the *Phaedo*, in order to bring out as strongly as possible the evidence that the myth is of Pythagorean inspiration. For her part, Karin Alt ('Zu einigen Problemen in Platons Jenseitsmythen und deren Konsequenzen bei späteren Platonikern', pp. 270–89) takes up matters from a more general viewpoint. Myths of the Beyond insist on the fact that we are responsible for our destiny, and that our concern for justice must not let us forget that our life must favour the activity of the intellect; only this type of activity can ensure genuine happiness (*eudaimonía*).

The volume ends with a contribution by Arbogast Schmitt ('Mythos und Vernunft bei Platon', pp. 290–309) which insists on the impossibility of opposing *mûthos* to *lógos* in the same way as the irrational to the rational. For Schmitt, the best *mûthos* is also one that teaches something, and the best *lógos* is a rational *lógos*.

By virtue of the enquiry it undertakes into the occurrences of *mûthos*, its composites and its derivatives in the Platonic corpus, by the general problems it raises, and the analyses of particular myths it proposes, this book, which originated from a colloquium on the theme of 'Plato's myths' at the University of Regensburg on 30–31 July 2001, constitutes an important landmark in research on an old problem: that of the relations between *mûthos* and *lógos* in Plato.

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SYMPOSIUM PLATONICUM V

T. M. Robinson, L. Brisson (edd.): *Plato:* Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides. *Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum*. Pp. vi + 402. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2000. Cased. ISBN: 3-89665-143-9.

This volume differs from its predecessors in that it studies three dialogues in all, and has the welcome additions of an *index locorum*, a subject index and a consolidated bibliography; these were compiled by Brisson, while Robinson took responsibility for

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