oversights immediately spring to mind. First, W. does not mention Daniel Graham's *Aristotle's Two Systems* (Oxford, 1987), even though Graham offers arguments in support of incompatibilism. It is likely that this initial oversight does not detract significantly from the value of W.'s overall argument, since he does evaluate a number of distinct and highly tractable arguments from prominent incompatibilists. However, W.'s second oversight is egregious. He does not mention Robert Bolton's 'Science and the Science of Substance in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* Z' (*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 76 [1995], 419–69). In this paper, Bolton argues that Aristotle is engaged in different projects in the *Categories* and Z, and he offers a pioneering defence of compatibilism. Bolton argues that in Z Aristotle is engaged in a causal inquiry which seeks a scientific explanation of (*Categories*-)primary-substance (Bolton, pp. 433–7). I offer a brief account of three important elements from Bolton's analysis. (i) Bolton defends compatibilism by relying on the 'substance-of' idiom at Z.3.1028b35 (Bolton, p. 442). (ii) He argues against the standard view that form is a basic subject (of accidents) by appealing to *De Anima* A.4.408b5–15: the passage in which Aristotle claims that, while soul is the form of the body, it does not itself enjoy subjecthood (Bolton, p. 448). (iii) Bolton argues that Aristotle's rejection of the universal in Z.13 leaves it open that specific forms are causes of (*Categories*-)primary-substances (Bolton, pp. 458–64). In addition to these accomplishments, Bolton shows that there is a clear overarching methodological framework in Z. This is the framework of the method of scientific inquiry, which Aristotle discusses in the *Posterior Analytics* (Bolton, pp. 429–64).

In some respects Bolton's ground-breaking analysis is in harmony with that which W. has now advanced, in other respects it differs in noteworthy ways from W.'s, and in yet other respects Bolton's analysis presses beyond W.'s. Thus, while W. has offered a fine defence of compatibilism, it is regrettable that he did not take full advantage of relevant secondary literature. For, if he had, his defence might have been considerably improved.

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ARISTOTLE ON EDUCATION

R. R. CURREN: *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education*. Pp. xv + 279. Lanham, Boulder, New York, and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. Paper, £20.95. ISBN: 0-8476-9673-1.

Randall R. Curren's *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education* treats a topic that is of great importance but has also until very recently fallen into neglect, namely education in antiquity. C. reads the thought of one author, Aristotle, within a particular context that has him look at precedents for the philosopher and at his possible applications for subsequent, contemporary thinking on how we teach. The study has seven chapters. The first two look at what Plato and Socrates, as transmitted by Plato, had to say on the topic of education and why it was an important issue for legislators of the classical city. C. concludes that Plato saw education as being important for producing the good citizen (p. 58). The next two chapters, III and IV, focus on Aristotle, and they look in particular at the *Politics*. Chapter III considers the author's arguments for public education in *Politics* 8, and it insists upon the significance of the raising and training of the young when it argues that Aristotle's audience would have included lawmakers (p. 78). Chapter IV argues for the unity of the *Politics*, maintaining that there are important links between Books 5 and

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8 of this work. The final chapters take Aristotle into a contemporary discussion, maintaining that a system of public education creates unity within the city so that the nurture of the individual citizen is identical with nurture of the community (Chapter V), that public education is assumed as a basis for a just system of punishment and corrections (Chapter VI), and that Aristotelian thought requires a system of schooling which requires students who are unalike to be educated together (Chapter VII).

C. has titled his book so as to suggest that it is a work foremost about Aristotle. It is both more than that (for it attempts to straddle a number of different disciplines, including classics, philosophy, the history of education, and social studies) and less (given serious flaws in this scholar's attempt to deal with the ancient material). Let me point out two of my major quarrels with the volume. As a classicist, I observe that C.'s work is insufficiently grounded in prior scholarship from the discipline. Were he more aware of what others had said about ancient education (see e.g. J. W. Jones, *The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks. An Introduction* [Oxford, 1956], pp. 6–14 and *La Loi dans la Pensée Grecque des Origines à Aristote* [Paris, 1971], pp. 227–40), he would not have underestimated the centrality of the laws in ancient Greek education. C. realizes that law and legislation on education point to their importance in the classical city (e.g. pp. 59–60, 98), and notes that the laws have an educative effect; however, he does not take the important next step which equates the laws with the education of the city, which I argue that his reading of the *Crito*, for instance, prompts (see pp. 26–30; on this whole topic of laws as teachers, see Y. L. Too, 'Legal Instructions in Classical Athens', in Too [ed.], *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* [Leiden, 2001], pp. 111–31). In this understanding, the laws are public education, which, despite C.'s major argument, did not otherwise exist in classical Athens because it did not need to.

My second problem with C.'s book is an insufficient understanding of who Aristotle was and what he stood for. C. wants to make Aristotle a basis for a left-leaning pedagogy: state education which results in social equality, education as a means to social betterment through employment, social integration. Yet Aristotle was an élitist. When he speaks of the citizen, he means the aristocratic male *kalos kagathos*, and when he speaks of education, he idealizes it as something that people can do in a leisure untroubled by the need to work, something that C. acknowledges but the significance of which he does not fully understand (cf. p. 200). What this means is that the analogies between antiquity and the contemporary world, something that is more usually a mainstay of conservatives like the late Allan Bloom, fail or are disingenuous. Aristotle is by no means a comfortable spokesperson for the agenda that C. envisages him to be for, and the work would profit from an uncoupling of what I see as the disjunct historical and political concerns. Perhaps the most telling symptom of this approach is this scholar's attempt to force the text of Aristotle to conform to anachronistic and distorting categories, e.g. 'argument from constitutional requirements', 'argument from the origins of virtue', 'argument from a common end', and 'argument from constitutional unity'.

Readers may find C.'s book interesting and it is certainly daring, but apart from having difficulties with its conceptualization and the way in which its arguments are made, I note one obvious omission, which is also telling about the book's flawed perspective. There is no attempt to suggest what an Aristotelian curriculum might have looked like—an obvious topic to broach—or to explain why he does not engage with this subject. It may be that curriculum is what forces us to address the non-continuity of education in the ancient and modern worlds.

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