THE
JOURNAL OF MENTAL SCIENCE.
[*Published by Authority of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association.*]

No. 330 [NEW SERIES No. 294.] JULY, 1934. VOL. LXXX

NOV - 1 1934

Part I.—Original Articles.

THE FIFTEENTH MAUDSLEY LECTURE: THE PROFESSIONAL MIND.

By THE RIGHT HON. LORD MACMILLAN,
Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.

Delivered before the Royal Medico-Psychological Association on May 17, 1934.

IN devoting to the foundation of a memorial lectureship a portion of Dr. Maudsley's bequest, the learned Society which I have this afternoon the honour to address made an indulgent concession to the laity in prescribing that the lecture to be delivered should in alternate years be of a scientific and of a popular character. This year it is the turn of the popular lecturer—a rôle which I have assumed with some trepidation. The distinction drawn is an ominous one. It seems to suggest that to be scientific you must be unpopular, and to be popular you must be unscientific. But is there necessarily so absolute a dividing line between the two domains? I hazard the view that it is possible to be at once both popular and scientific. No doubt there is still a tendency in learned circles to deride what is known as popular science, but that is an inheritance from the days of the cheap and inaccurate manuals which used to be written by imperfectly informed persons, pretentiously professing to enlighten the masses on the truths of science. Nowadays, science has become more condescending, indeed almost affable, to democracy. The approach has come from both sides, for democracy is now better educated, and science is now more expert in the art of exposition. The advent of the internal combustion engine, of wireless telegraphy and of many other practical applications of science to daily life has created a new and widespread interest and aptitude on the part of the general public in the acquisition of accurate scientific knowledge, particularly among the younger generation. At the same time the physicist, the chemist and the biologist have found it possible and worth while

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to impart much of their learning to wider audiences. Science is daily entering more and more into the lives of the people, with the consequence that its social, economic and political implications are being more and more realized by its professors. The President of the Royal Society has reminded us that we live in an age when the advance and development of scientific knowledge are continually creating new social and economic problems of the utmost importance, and has emphasized the necessity of bridging the gap between the scientist and the layman by every possible means. The British Science Guild, now doing such excellent work, was founded some thirty years ago by Sir Norman Lockyer for the express purpose of promoting the application of scientific method and results to social problems and public affairs. The market-place can doubtless never supersede the laboratory, but the scientist no longer disdains to take his wares to market.

However, I think I know what is meant by the admonition that I must, on this occasion, deliver a popular address. Every science has a general as well as a technical aspect. The technical side must always be for the expert, and for him alone; the general side is of interest to every intelligent citizen. I have chosen my subject with this distinction in view. I shall not discourse on the legal technicalities which beset and sometimes embarrass the psychiatrist, the only technical department of medical psychology of which I can profess any knowledge. But I shall ask you to consider with me for a little certain phenomena which, while they fall within the province of your special study, are at the same time matters of common observation and interest; I mean the phenomena exhibited by various types of the professional mind in its daily working—not excluding, incidentally, your own, for I recognize that I am addressing an audience of professional men.

My subject would, I believe, have commended itself to the very eminent specialist whom these lectures commemorate, for deeply versed, as he was, in the abstruse and recondite problems of a difficult branch of science, he was ever ready to recognize that his most valuable data were to be found in the ordinary human activities around him. Certainly, few scientists have been more successful in illumining their writings with illustrations drawn from literature and daily life.

The choice and the practice of a profession have, as all will agree, a decisive and pervasive influence on a man's whole mental outlook. I use the word "profession" here in no narrow sense. I do not limit it to the three old-established professions of the Church, the law and medicine, though the practitioners of these three distinctive professions provide the best clinical material for study. I am thinking for the moment in wider terms of the mental characteristics exhibited by those who have chosen and practise a particular vocation, be it that of a clergyman, a lawyer or a doctor, or be it that of a politician, a banker, a teacher, a merchant or an industrialist. The first question we always ask about a new acquaintance is, What does he do? The answer gives us the

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first clue to the kind of man we have to deal with, for wide as are the individual differences among the members of a profession, there are always common elements which are shared by all who belong to it. Our habits are controlled, our thoughts canalized, our prejudices formed by the profession we practise, so true is it that " man's nature is subdued to what it works in, like the dyer's hand ". Even our place of residence may be dictated by our vocation, as witness the Temple, " where studious lawyers have their bowers ", and Harley Street, sacred to Æsculapius.

I do not know enough either of physiology or of psychology to describe the growth of the professional mind in terms of those sciences, but I may adopt and adapt the language which Dr. Maudsley uses in discussing the larger topic of the inculcation of morality. He describes the process as one of moral manufacture, and points out that the whole purpose of education in morals is to produce a nature in which moral action shall have become, not a matter of uncertainty and deliberation, but automatic. Each moral act by the law of nervous action renders the next more easy, and so a man's nature is gradually modified. When a habit of nature has thus been formed, the desire of the organism is to display that function which is embodied in its nature, and the pleasure of gratifying that desire becomes itself a sufficient motive. Imitation plays its part, too, for man, as Gabriel Tarde, the eminent French sociologist reminds us, is essentially an imitative animal: " He imitates his forefathers, that is custom; he imitates his neighbours, that is fashion; he imitates himself, that is habit." It is by some such means that the process of our professional training and experience gradually moulds our minds and characters until our reactions become largely instinctive. And so we say, for example, of a man, " Oh ! he's a lawyer; you know how lawyers always look at things ". I regret that the implication in the case of my own profession is generally disparaging.

From the earliest times the practitioners of a particular art have always shown a tendency to draw apart from the rest of the community and to constitute themselves a separate class or fraternity, with their own ceremonial rites and shibboleths. The widest of all caste cleavages in former days, and still a wide one, was that between the clergy and the laity, between those devoted to sacred things and those devoted to secular things. Indeed the very word " layman " is most often used in popular parlance to denote one who is not a cleric. This fundamental differentiation between clergy and laity runs through the whole history of our law. Within the ranks of the laity in turn many associations grew up of men united by a common calling. The merchant and trade guilds, surviving into our own time as city companies, were typical examples of the segregation of the followers of particular arts and crafts. The lines of demarcation, both social and professional, were much more rigidly drawn in former times, and the resulting mutual exclusiveness produced much more distinctive types of person. Nowadays the barriers are

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broken down and men of all careers mix with each other. This is a more excellent way of living. But there still remain and will always remain certain typical attributes which the lifelong pursuit of a particular calling engenders. Such differences and peculiarities lend colour and interest to social life, and the followers of each vocation have their own distinctive contribution to make to the variety as well as to the welfare of the community. Moreover, in these days of exaggerated and explosive nationalism, it is important to foster all those bonds which tend to unite men of common pursuits irrespective of geographical boundaries. There is a remarkable passage in Prof. Whitehead's *Adventures of Ideas*, in which he describes the widening range of modern professional interests: "Professions," he says, "first appear as customary activities largely modified by detached strains of theory. Theories are often wrong; and some of the earlier professional doctrines erred grievously and were maintained tenaciously. Doctrines emerged as plausible deductions and survived as the wisdom of ancestors. Thus the older professional practice was rooted upon custom, though it was turning towards the intellectual sunlight. Here and there individuals stood out far in advance of their colleagues. For example, in the fourteen hundred years separating Galen from Vesalius, the standard of European medical practice was not to be compared with the attainments of either of these men. Also, more than a century after Vesalius, Charles the Second of England, on his deathbed, was tortured by physicians employing futile remedies customary at that time. Again, as a designing engineer Leonardo da Vinci was unequalled until the advent of Vauban and James Watt. In the earlier centuries, the professional influence, as a general sociological fact, was mainly a welter of bygone flashes of intelligence relapsing into customary procedures. It represented the continual lapse of intellect into instinct. But the culmination of science completely inverted the rôles of custom and intelligence in the older professions. By this inversion professional institutions have acquired an international life. Each such institution practises within its own nation, but its sources of life are world-wide. Thus loyalties stretch beyond sovereign states." I have quoted at such length from Prof. Whitehead because he puts so much better than I could do the new conception of the professions, particularly the learned professions, as exercising not a narrow and sectional influence, but an influence, both broad and catholic, which traverses national frontiers unimpeded by tariffs and quotas, and which, by promoting free trade in all beneficent discoveries, advances the welfare of humanity at large.

While we may claim that devotion to a common calling tends to create a sense of professional brotherhood throughout the civilized world, and thus widens and liberalizes the minds of its practitioners, there is, on the other side of the account, a mental tendency resulting from immersion in a profession which is not so meritorious, and that is the tendency to resist all changes. Those who, by the expenditure of much time and labour, have acquired facility

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and expertness in the practice of the system they have so painfully mastered, are naturally disinclined to scrap what they have found to work well enough. They are reluctant to make the effort of examining, and still more of adopting, new ideas which may prove uncomfortably subversive. The beaten path is so much easier to tread, and experience has so often shown that alleged new lights are only will-o'-the-wisps leading into a morass. I am tempted to instance the hostility which has been frequently shown to the discoveries of the great pioneers in medicine, but in this gathering it will be more discreet, as well as more courteous, to refer to the inveterate conservatism of my own profession, which has almost passed into a proverb. Or I may instance the Civil Service, and cite the case of one of our great Government Departments, the Admiralty, which in 1826, when an eminent inventor placed before it a project for electric telegraphy, curtly informed him that " telegraphs of any kind are now totally unnecessary ", and again in 1830 felt it to be its duty to discourage the introduction of steam as calculated to strike a fatal blow at the naval supremacy of the Empire. The truth is that no profession, no calling, is immune from this tendency. The prophet has always been greeted with a volley of stones, for, again to quote Prof. Whitehead, " routine is the god of every social system ". He who would upset that routine is treated as a heretic and blasphemer. There is a good side as well as a bad side to this instinct. It is not all obscurantism. Without the stability of routine the social fabric would inevitably disintegrate, and resistance to innovation is part of the essential protective armour of civilization. The same Scriptures which lament the stoning of the prophets bid us prove all things and hold fast that which is good. Happily in our day open-mindedness is becoming more prevalent, and there is on all sides a greater receptivity of new ideas.

On the debit side of my reckoning I must also include a charge which has always been laid against the professional mind, and that is its proneness to prefer the interests of the craft to the interests of the community. It is another way of putting the criticism with which I have just been dealing. Changes are often advocated in the general interest which are inimical to the interests of those engaged in a particular calling, who are apt to resist those changes, not on their merits, but for purely selfish reasons. This is one of the less desirable products of the trade union spirit. Examples will readily occur to you of what I mean, but again I had better be discreet. My great compatriot, Adam Smith, was very critical of professional and trading corporations, and was unkind enough to say that " People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible, indeed, to prevent such meetings by any law which either could be executed or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies ; much less to

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render them necessary". I wonder what he would have thought of the innumerable congresses and conferences which in these days are constantly being held by every trade, calling and profession. I am afraid he would often find in a perusal of their proceedings little to dispel the truth of his indictment. There is more lip-service nowadays to lofty social motives, but the pursuit of selfish aims under the guise of the public good is not an unknown phenomenon. I see that the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in their last Annual Review of Legal Education describe "the tendency of organized minorities honestly to identify their own interests with those of the public at large" as being "an inescapable feature of democratic procedure". I could wish that the adverb "honestly" were as well deserved as it is charitable.

There is in these days an increasing resort, in all departments of life, to the particular type of professional man known as the expert. The maladies of the world have become so acute that the specialist has had to be called into consultation. In medicine the specialist has long been a familiar figure, but we now have specialists in every branch of human affairs. The reason, doubtless, is that the field of knowledge has become so vast that no individual can hope to become master of more than a corner of it. Hence, when a public problem arises in any particular province of administration, whether it be water supply, or bacon imports, or London traffic, or the foreign exchanges—just to take some instances at random—the demand always is for the expert to be put in charge, or at least to be consulted. The results are not always happy. The expert mind, as a species of the genus professional mind, is apt to have failings as well as excellences. The attainment of a highly specialized knowledge of one isolated subject tends to create a certain arrogance of assurance. It is not unnatural to assume that if you know *more* about a subject than anyone else you know it *better* than anyone else. But is that necessarily so? It might be so if human life and human knowledge were divided up into watertight compartments, and it were possible to deal with each compartment by itself. But we cannot isolate any one factor in the social organism. The interrelations of the parts with each other and with the whole are infinitely complex. The result is that the conclusions of the specialist, however convincing they may seem to him within his own sphere, have often to be corrected and modified when brought into relation with wider considerations. Then there is the constitutional tendency of experts to differ, so unjustly associated in the proverb with the medical profession only. The faith of the public, for example, in political economists has been rudely shaken by the discordant advice which they have tendered since the war for the treatment of the ailments of the body politic. This proneness of experts to differ is easily explicable. Even the most arrogant expert would not lay claim to complete knowledge of his subject; he has probably devoted himself to one aspect of it to the exclusion of others, and has been led to form certain opinions from

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what is, after all, only partial knowledge. Having formed these opinions for himself, he develops a parental affection for them which becomes emotional rather than scientific. As we say, " there is no reasoning with him ".

On the other hand, the value of specialized knowledge is incontestable, being the product, as it is, of intensive research and experience quite beyond the range of the ordinary practitioner. One of the most interesting problems of the day is how best to utilize the expert in the public interest. In the Law Courts we have tried three methods. First, and most conspicuously, experts are called in by the parties as witnesses in support of their respective contentions, where technical matters are involved. I have had a long and wide experience of expert witnesses, and despite the unkind things which have been said of them, I am prepared to pay tribute to the fairness which they in general exhibit. But the witness-box is a difficult place for the scientific man to occupy. It is wrong for him to be an advocate, and the contentious atmosphere of the courts is not always conducive to the calm and dispassionate exposition of truth. Probably it is quite salutary for the more pretentious type of expert to be exposed to an occasional rigorous cross-examination, but the irritation which that process causes him, especially if at the hands of an advocate for whose knowledge of the subject he has a supreme contempt, may well lead to the pronouncement of confident assertions which he may have occasion subsequently to regret. Fair cross-examination—and I emphasize the epithet—is one of the best means of eliciting and testing the truth, but not all cross-examinations are fair. Of one thing I am certain, and that is that no scientific man ought ever to become the partisan of a side ; he may be the partisan of an opinion in his own science, if he honestly entertains it, but he ought never to accept a retainer to advocate in evidence a particular view merely because it is the view which it is in the interests of the party who has retained him to maintain. To do so is to prostitute science and to practise a fraud on the administration of justice. I remember being told by a very eminent civil engineer that when he received a retainer to give evidence for a client he used to reply that he did not accept retainers to give evidence for anybody, but that he would be happy to consider the matters on which his help was desired, and if he found that he could support the case he would be prepared to do so. The true rôle of the expert witness is to afford the court the best assistance he can in arriving at the truth, and if he bears this duty in mind he will never go far wrong.

A less perilous sphere for the exercise of the expert mind in the administration of justice is to be found in the utilization of the expert as a referee, of which the best known example is the system of medical referees under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The medical referee is exempt from the temptations of the witness-box, and has to exercise the functions, not of a partisan, but of a skilled adjudicator. It is a highly responsible part to play, especially as Parliament has set the seal of finality on the medical referee's certificate, but I have no doubt that the duty is faithfully and conscientiously performed.

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The third method in which the law invokes the aid of the expert professional mind is by employing the expert as an assessor, that is to say, in a consultative capacity, as, for example, when the court sits with nautical assessors, who give their advice on any technical points of navigation arising. Here also the partisan element is eliminated, but in such instances the court is not bound to accept the assessor's opinion. He is there to inform, not to decide.

Upon the whole, I am disposed to think that it is in some form of consultative capacity that the abilities of the expert mind are best utilized in the public service. The faculty of practical judgment is not always to be found in conjunction with scientific learning. The art of judgment is itself an art. The judge, the statesman and the business man may often be better able than the expert to reach a wise solution of a practical problem, even though it does involve technical matters, but it is essential that the requisite technical assistance should be at his disposal in the study of his problem.

So far I have been dealing with some of the characteristics of what I may call the professional mind in general. I propose now to consider some of the mental phenomena exhibited by the practitioners of the three learned professions, so-called because they possess pre-eminently the character of intellectual pursuits. These three traditional professions, however, as the American Bar Association Journal reminds us, " connote something more than mere learning joined to a special vocation. They have brought with them from the past an aura of devotion to the service of others, a sense of individual responsibility, a consciousness of a public function. These ethical implications of professional learning may have been reinforced by the times when so much of learning was confined to churchmen. At any rate, they exist in the case of the theologians, doctors and lawyers, and they thus give to their activities a special significance ". Sir Walter Scott puts into the mouth of his inimitable Antiquary the pregnant aphorism that " the clergy live by our sins, the medical faculty by our diseases and the law gentry by our misfortunes ". It is odd to think that the main object in each case of the clergyman, the doctor and the lawyer is to combat the very thing which is the cause of his existence. But I think Jonathan Oldbuck took too pathological a view of the activities of the three great professions. The clergyman is not always in the confessional, the doctor by the bedside, or the lawyer in the courts.

The legal mind is the type of professional mind with which I am naturally most familiar. There is probably no professional type which throughout the ages has been more consistently the subject of depreciatory comment, not all of it unjustified. The main attack has always been that the practice of the law has a warping effect upon the moral nature of its practitioners. The advocate is supposed to be perpetually engaged in distorting the truth, in his efforts to make the worse appear the better reason. " How," asks your neighbour at dinner, " can a man be honest who defends a criminal whom he

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knows to be guilty?" "It is scarcely necessary to say," remarks Walter Bagehot, "that professional advocacy is unfavourable to the philosophical investigation of truth; a more battered commonplace cannot be found anywhere. To catch at whatever turns up in favour of your own case; to be obviously blind to everything which tells in favour of the case of your adversary; to imply doubts as to principles which it is not expedient to deny; to suggest with delicate indirectness the conclusive arguments in favour of principles which it is not wise directly to affirm—these, and such as these, are the arts of the advocate". It is not an engaging picture. But is it a true one? I can only say, speaking from a long experience, that the conception of the advocate as a kind of artful dodger who makes his living by stupefying his conscience is utterly remote from the truth. I would even venture to say that the lawyer encounters no more problems of moral conduct in his daily professional life than do the practitioners of any other art or business—perhaps fewer, for there is no profession which has a higher, a better recognized or a more rigidly enforced standard of honour. But I am not going to re-open to-day this time-worn controversy. The arguments on both sides are familiar and threadbare. I would only point out that the great bulk of the legal work of the country is administrative and non-contentious, requiring for its successful performance no perverse intellectual sublety, but just the ordinary workaday virtues of industry and honesty; while, as for the contentious work of the Law Courts, I can assure you that an advocate who worked to Mr. Bagehot's pattern would never win the esteem either of his brethren or of the bench, and certainly would not attain to any eminence in his profession. But while I am satisfied that the practice of the law has no deteriorating effect on the moral character, I am not blind to the elements of truth in the popular caricature. The profession is one which undoubtedly tends to foster certain intellectual habits, which, when they become exaggerated, are not admirable. The business of the lawyer is pre-eminently with words, not with things, and preoccupation with words has its dangers. "Words," says Hobbes, "are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools". It is not a good thing to consider arguments from the point of view of how they can be stated rather than from the point of view of whether they are sound or not. There is a danger even in logic in human affairs. The practical problems of humanity are not solved by syllogisms or by neatly framed codes. I think there is a proneness in the legal mind to prefer formulas to facts and to place too much reliance on the power of words. It is perhaps this failing which led a wit to describe the legal mind as delighting chiefly "in illustrating the obvious, explaining the self-evident and expatiating on the commonplace".

It is sometimes said that the lawyer's experience of life is apt to make him cynical. Let me give you the answer which Sir Walter Scott puts in the mouth of Counsellor Pleydell: "It is the part of our profession," says that eminent practitioner, "that we seldom see the best side of human nature. People

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come to us with every selfish feeling newly pointed and grinded; they turn down the very caulkers of their animosities and prejudices, as smiths do with horses' shoes in a white frost. Many a man has come to my garret yonder that I have at first longed to pitch out at the window, and yet, at length, have discovered that he was only doing as I might have done in his case, being very angry, and of course very unreasonable. I have now satisfied myself that if our profession sees more of human folly and human roguery than others, it is because we witness them acting in that channel in which they can most freely vent themselves. In civilized society, law is the chimney through which all that smoke discharges itself that used to circulate through the whole house and put everyone's eyes out—no wonder that the vent itself should sometimes get a little sooty". I am content with my brother advocate's defence.

Then, another defect commonly attributed to the legal mind is that it is unduly critical. The lawyer's training is certainly apt to make him look for the weak points rather than the strong points of any proposition submitted to him. This critical habit is a useful quality in its proper place, but it often handicaps the lawyer in dealing with constructive proposals, where success can be attained only by disregarding risks. And so lawyers are not temperamentally well fitted for leadership either in politics or in business, in both of which spheres an adventurous spirit is essential. They may be admirable in deliberation; they are not so useful in action. In the state and in society the most useful function of the legal mind lies in the orderly and just regulation of human relations. The promotion of justice and order is surely a sufficiently important public service to satisfy any ambition. But I am forgetting the maxim of the law that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and so I will leave the legal profession to your better judgment, with a parting quotation from a great statesman who happily blends his praise with a discerning qualification: "The law," says Burke, "is, in my opinion, one of the first and noblest of human sciences; a science which does more to quicken and invigorate the understanding than all the other kinds of learning put together; but it is not apt, except in persons very happily born, to open and to liberalize the mind exactly in the same proportion". There I must leave it.

That mordant critic of our universities, Mr. Abraham Flexner, declares that "medicine and law are professions essentially intellectual and learned in character, and requiring for their cultivation the traditions, resources, facilities and contacts which exist within a university and nowhere else". I agree that the two professions have this feature in common, but the resemblance does not go much further. It seems to me that the outlook of the physician upon life must necessarily be widely different from that of the lawyer, for his service to humanity is of an altogether different order. According to the Statute of Henry VIII confirming the Letters Patent which established the Royal College of Physicians in 1518, none were to "be suffered to exercise and practise physic but only those persons that be profound, sad and discreet, groundedly

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learned and deeply studied in physic ". I am glad that my own profession is not required to live up to so exacting a standard.

Sir Wilfred Grenfell tells us that in Labrador the Eskimos called him by a name which means " the man that has to do with pain ". The effect on the mind of constant contact with human suffering cannot but be profound. The relation between a patient and his medical adviser has an intimacy which does not subsist between a client and his legal adviser, and it is a relation which makes a call upon the emotions as well as upon the intellect. So far as the medical man is engaged in study and research he is a man of science, and may be expected to exhibit in this connection the mental qualities of accurate observation and induction which we associate with all men of science. But in the region of professional practice calls are made upon him of a very special nature. There is no exact science of therapeutics, and its practice must be largely empirical. It has to deal not only with the body of the patient, which can be the subject of more or less accurate investigation, but also with his mind—a much subtler business. Diagnosis requires not only knowledge, but reasoning power and often imagination as well. Personality counts for a great deal, and the mere presence of a trusted medical adviser may be therapeutic by reason of the confidence he inspires. " Officium medici est confortatio animi," says Petronius. The demand thus constantly made upon the whole physical, mental and emotional resources of the medical practitioner creates a special type of character. This is exemplified in the highest degree in whose who, like the members of this Association, have to minister to minds diseased, for in this region of practice psychological factors necessarily predominate. Moreover, the exacting nature of the doctor's work and its irregular hours tend to cut him off to some extent from ordinary social life. He can seldom take part in public work. When Apollo offered to confer all his accomplishments on Iapis as a reward for his having cured Æneas, the aged physician, we are told, chose rather the virtues of herbs and the practice of healing and to exercise unfamed the silent arts. And it was Dr. Johnson who said that the physician's part lies hid in domestic privacy and silent duties, and silent excellences are soon forgotten. No one probably has a wider knowledge of human nature than the doctor, but it is a specialized knowledge. Can it be said then that there is a distinct medical type of professional mind? I think there is, but it is not easy to put into words. The rôle which the doctor is required to play must react on his mental and moral make-up. I do not believe that his constant contact with suffering renders him callous, but he must acquire a certain calmness in the presence of the emergencies and tragedies of life which is apt to be mistaken for unconcern. His natural sympathies must be under control if he is to perform his work adequately. The very confidence which is reposed in him and the immunity from publicity which he enjoys may tend to make him professionally oracular. The tradition of spells and incantations dies hard, and prescriptions are still made up in

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hieroglyphics. On the other hand, the unselfishness and devotion to duty which are the very hall-mark of the profession far outweigh any of the foibles which may be laid to its charge. It is perhaps in the medical man that the professional mind finds its finest flower. At any rate I envy the physician the epithet which is peculiarly his own and which gratitude and affection have bestowed on him, the epithet "beloved". I have never heard of a beloved barrister or a beloved solicitor.

Let me leave this, in the circumstances, rather embarrassing topic and turn to one other manifestation of the professional mind; I mean the clerical mind—perhaps the most distinctive type of all. By his profession the clergyman is in a peculiar degree removed from the rest of the world. Indeed it is of the essence of his vocation that he should be unworldly. He is called upon to dedicate himself to his work by vows which require of him a manner of life distinct from that of his fellow citizens. The standards of conduct applied to him are more exacting than those applied to others. He must exhibit a walk and conversation becoming his high calling. Intellectually, too, he is set apart. By his profession he has circumscribed his freedom, for he has pledged himself to certain beliefs which he cannot question if he is to remain in his profession. The Church requires of her servants a conformity both ethical and intellectual, such as no other vocation demands. It is no discredit to a lawyer or a doctor to enter his profession from motives of personal ambition, but we feel it to be wrong for anyone to enter the Church unless he has a distinct call to her service. Yet the Church, too, is a profession, and clergymen are professional men, and the practice of his profession undoubtedly induces in the clergyman certain professional ways of looking at things, certain habits of mind, just as does the practice of other professions. The sanctity of his calling, while ennobling his aspirations, is not without its attendant perils. The intellectual dangers are dogmatism with its ugly companions, intolerance and persecution, and casuistry with its accompanying lack of candour. Clericalism and sacerdotalism are not attractive things. The corruption of the best is the worst. On the other side of the account we have to place the long record of saintly lives and noble characters which the annals of the Church contain. In this material world, often so sordid and so ugly, the profession whose calling requires its members to inculcate whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, renders an inestimable service, and those who consecrate themselves to such a task cannot but themselves acquire virtue from their labours.

It would be interesting to discuss the effects of other callings on their practitioners, and to analyse the special mental characteristics displayed by the teacher, the accountant, the politician and so forth. But I have done enough to make my point, which is only an instance of the general rule that specialization of function necessarily produces specialization of the organ

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charged with that function, or, in simpler terms, that the instrument adapts itself to its work. It must be the daily experience of those whom I am addressing to encounter the distinctive mental features of the different types of patients with whom they have to deal. They are worth studying, for treatment must be accommodated to the psychology as well as to the physique of the patient. But it was not the pathology of the professional mind which I set out to discuss. Such a topic, even if it were appropriate for a popular lecture, lies far beyond my competence. Rather I have sought to gather together and present to you a few of the impressions which have been left on my own mind by other minds, engaged in my own or in other occupations. The observation of one's fellow men in thought and in action will always be the most fascinating of studies. Doubtless we each find our most acute critics among the members of our own profession, but equally it is in our own profession that we find the loyalty and comradeship which spring from interests, anxieties and successes shared in common. I may fittingly conclude with the memorable words of Bacon: "I hold every man a debtor to his profession; from the which as men of course do seek to receive countenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavour themselves by way of amends to be a help and ornament thereunto."

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