Language in Society **38**, 487–511. Printed in the United States of America
doi:10.1017/S0047404509990236

Dizque, evidentiality, and stance in Valley Spanish

ANNA M. BABEL

Department of Linguistics
University of Michigan
440 Lorch Hall, 611 Tappan St.
Ann Arbor, MI 48109.
ambabel@umich.edu

ABSTRACT

While information sources have largely been treated as transparent categories in the literature on evidentiality, understandings of information source can be culturally and situationally variable. This article proposes that the strictly linguistic information encoded in reportative evidentials cannot be cleanly separated from social influences. Defining an information source, especially when referring to information reported by another person, serves social purposes, such as casting doubt, framing gossip, distancing oneself, or indicating empathy. Using the concept of speaker stance, this study explores the relationship of information source to the interpersonal relationships and interactions that are encoded in this linguistic form. Data from a contact variety of Spanish spoken in central Bolivia provide evidence that *diz(que)*, a Spanish word, has undergone influence from Quechua to become a systematic reportative evidential marker in this variety of Bolivian Spanish. Speakers use information source marking in order to shade subtleties of relationships and authority. (Evidentiality, speaker stance, Andean Spanish, Bolivian Spanish, language contact, linguistic anthropology)*

Introduction

Evidentials can be described as grammatical or lexical markers that provide information about the source of information for a particular utterance or proposition. Evidentials are used to connect the content of a message to its provenance, to specify where a particular piece of information comes from. REPORTATIVE EVIDENTIALS are used to mark information that was verbally reported by another person – that is, secondhand knowledge or hearsay. Like classic cases of overlap between social and structural aspects of language, such as pronoun distinctions (Brown & Gilman 1960), reportative evidentials are linguistic markers that refer to a social interaction or relationship. In connecting reference and subjectivity, evidentials constitute a liminal area between formal linguistics and sociolinguistics/linguistic anthropology. In this article, I investigate the relationship between the social and grammatical

© 2009 Cambridge University Press 0047-4045/09 $15.00

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

aspects of language. Can evidentials be separated from their use in particular social contexts? How can evidentials be defined, if not as information source markers, or should they be redefined?

There is an open debate as to whether evidentials as a class refer impartially to information source, or whether they can incorporate other information, such as doubt regarding the veracity of the information. While some scholars argue that evidentials can be very narrowly defined as marking the source of information, regardless of the social situation (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004:5), others note that evidential markers may also vary depending on social factors such as genre and cultural attitudes (Friedman 2003:207, 210). Mushin 2000, 2001 demonstrates that evidential markers may also encode deictic information, reflecting the speaker's strategies to move herself and her audience through frames of a story.

Recent work on evidentiality has turned to its relationship with speaker stance (e.g., Clift 2006, Hsieh 2008). Because stance, with echoes of the concept of the footing (Goffman 1979), represents an attempt to understand the relationship among speakers, audiences, information source, and utterances, it is well suited to the study of evidentials. These studies shift the focus of the study of evidentiality from content to function, showing that people use evidentials, and understand information sources, in culturally and socially situated ways. However, the precise relationship between the category of evidence and the category of interaction remains unclear (Lempert 2008).

In the Andes, studies have found that Quechua evidentials are sensitive to the relationship between the speaker and the proposition expressed. Faller argues that the Quechua enclitic *–mi* cannot be understood as either clearly evidential or clearly validational. Rather, she suggests, it is variable with respect to the type of information conveyed (Faller 2002:13). Feke, in turn, concludes that Quechua evidentials encode a wide variety of pragmatic considerations (Feke 2004:134). Although these observations concern Quechua, it is likely that they are also pertinent to my data, as I explain below.

The evidential that I will describe in this paper is *dizque*, literally 'say-that', and the related forms *diz* and *dice,* which I refer to collectively as *diz(que)*. *Diz(que)* was used in Peninsular Spanish at the time of colonization (approx. 1520–1530 in Bolivia) and is used in many modern varieties today, principally for counterfactual information, or as an irrealis marker (Kany 1944, Eberenz 2004). Speakers of the variety of Spanish that I study use these particles regularly when communicating reported information, as well as for other non-evidential uses. Travis 2006 describes a range of uses for *diz(que)* in both spoken and written Spanish in Colombia. These uses range from reported speech, to hearsay, to doubt, to counterfactual claims or countervolitional actions. *Diz(que)* has similar if not identical uses in the variety of Spanish spoken in central Bolivia, which I describe in this article. However, in contrast to other modern varieties of Spanish, it is used quite regularly for reported speech, and speakers seem to feel it is necessary to felicitous utterances regarding secondhand information; I was corrected,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

or questioned, when I neglected to use it when repeating information regarding events or claims for which my consultants suspected I did not have direct experience. *Diz(que)*, like reportative evidentials in other languages (e.g., English; Kärkkäinen 2003:66), is often phonetically reduced, and it can be used to describe experiences in which one is not in control of one's actions, such as dreams and drunken states (a category also specially marked in Quechua). Travis (2006:1272) notes:

> *(D)izque* is used both as a strict evidentiality strategy and as an epistemic marker. As an evidentiality strategy, its main function is to mark source of information, and the notion of doubt is available as a pragmatic inference according to the context, but is not inherent in the semantics of *dizque* itself.

Dizque, and the related forms *diz* and *dice,*[1] usually occur in clause-final or clause-initial position, and often both initially and finally to frame an utterance. These forms are not without a certain class resonance: Kany notes that *diz(que)* is "rustic," and in the variety of Spanish spoken in the Andes it is most often used in informal contexts or by speakers of stigmatized varieties of Spanish. I would not expect it to occur in formal styles of speech nor to be used by speakers of a prestigious variety of Spanish.

In this article, I focus on the way that *diz(que)* is employed by speakers to manage the relationship among themselves, their audience, and their information source, using the concept of speaker stance. In the following section, I describe debates about evidentiality and recent work that connects evidentiality to speaker stance and cultural variation. Next, I discuss the relationship between Spanish and Quechua, an indigenous language of Bolivia, which I will argue has influenced the use of *diz(que)* in Spanish. After that, I briefly discuss the social situation in my field site and the methodology used for this project. Finally, I will present and discuss my data. I will use this analysis to argue that because, in the case of reportative evidentials, sources are people, the use of evidentials presupposes the existence of a social relationship. Therefore, while it is true that evidentials mark information source, speakers also use this category to describe a relationship between themselves and their interlocutors.

Evidentiality and Stance

A great deal of the literature on evidentiality has been devoted to a discussion of what "counts" as an evidential system (see the review in Dendale & Tasmowski 2001). Some scholars (e.g., Chafe 1986, Willett 1987, Biber & Finegan 1989) take a generally broad view of evidentiality, which lumps languages such as English and Spanish, with non-obligatory lexical marking of evidentiality, together with languages such as Tibetan or Quechua, which have complex, obligatory morphological marking for evidentials. Others (e.g., Aikhenvald 2004) argue that there is

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

a divide between strong and weak evidential systems, or in Aikhenvald's terms, "systems" and "strategies."

The line between strong and weak evidential systems has traditionally been drawn in terms of obligatoriness and grammaticalization (Lazard 2001). Obligatoriness, however, is a moving target. Evidentials are characteristically multivalent, as Dendale & Tasmowski (2001:345) note: "A form may have multiple meanings evoking different subdomains of evidentiality … [and] some of which are not evidential." There are few if any languages in which evidentials do not interact with other categories such as modality, certainty, and authority. In addition, in many languages, directly attested evidence is unmarked (Lazard 2001). It can be difficult to determine the speaker's rationale for using or omitting an evidential.

Curnow (2003:40), a moderate voice in the debate described above, defines evidentiality as

> grammatical morphemes which are at least conventionally employed by speakers to indicate that they have some source for the information encoded in the utterance; depending on the system in a particular language, an evidential may also indicate what the source of information is … To be considered as an evidential, a morpheme must form part of a grammatical system, often but not necessarily a morphological paradigm.

In this article, I will adopt a definition of evidentiality as a category whose fundamental feature is reference to the PERCEPTUAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION. However, I also consider the speaker's CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION to be an essential component of evidentiality. It is in the process of establishing a relationship between the source and the speaker that stance is incorporated into evidential systems.

In my view, it is useful to group evidentials as a class on the basis of grammatical reference to the source of information. However, this does not erase the fact that they are deployed in a particular social context. It is in this social context, as part of a process of CONSTRUCTION of sources, that stance is incorporated into evidentials. Evidentiality, like reported speech, is a window on the way that reality, social relationships, and authority are constructed through the deployment of linguistic markers (Hill & Irvine 1993). Because speakers use reportative evidentials to mediate personal relationships, evidentials (even as grammatical and/or semantic categories) are difficult to analyze without taking social considerations into account.

This observation echoes recent work by other scholars interested in evidentials and stance. Like myself, Clift asserts that "to talk exclusively in terms of what an utterance *means* captures less than characterizing what it *does*" (2006:585). Clift proposes a new typology of evidentials, distinguishing between "stand-alone" and "interactional" evidentials. She suggests that while stand-alone evidentials orient toward explicitness as a mode of accountability, a nongrammaticalized epistemic

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

stance (in this case, reported speech in English) may orient either to accountability or to inexplicitness to avoid conflict with authority. Clift's findings have a parallel in my own data—which show that speakers employ considerable leeway in interpreting sources of information, interpretations that are systematically related to self-presentation and audience.

Like Clift, Lempert 2008 looks to poetics – in particular, repetition or parallelism – as a way of accounting for the slipperiness of epistemic stancetaking, its ability to move from the propositional (evidence-based) to the interactional (interaction-oriented). However, while Clift's work upholds some kind of distinction between types of evidential systems, Lempert's data show considerable flexibility in the way that Tibetan speakers use epistemic stance to establish or challenge claims to authority. Since Tibetan is a language that is widely regarded as a prototypical example of a strong evidential system, this suggests that all evidential systems, whether "strong" or "weak," are flexible enough to be sensitive indicators of speaker stance. (However, in his article Lempert takes a critical view of stance as a category. Like evidentials themselves, the concept of stance seems to lend itself to conflation of evidence and interaction.)

Du Bois (2007:163) suggests that stance be conceptualized as a kind of triangle, by which a stancetaker "(1) evaluates an object, (2) positions a subject (usually the self) and (3) aligns with other subjects." Hence, epistemic or evidential stance involves a three-way relationship among speaker, proposition, and audience. I find two aspects of Du Bois's work especially useful. First, Du Bois relates stance to the Bakhtinian notion of DIALOGICITY, the relationship between a stancetaker's words and those that precede the utterance in time and space, and through dialogicity to INTERSUBJECTIVITY, the relationship between one actor's subjectivity and another's (2007:140). Du Bois sees a need to "look at how the dialogic and intersubjective dimensions of stance relate to the stancetaker's *actions*, and to the sociocultural frames that mediate the consequences of their actions" (2007:141). Second, Du Bois stresses the fact that these actions are "serious business, with potentially profound consequences" (2007:173). The weightiness of this responsibility bears directly on the use of evidentials as individuals position themselves in a world that includes not just the immediate past and present, but has implications reaching back into the past and, potentially, far into the future.

Working from a similar model, Kärkkäinen (2007:185) also emphasizes the interactional component of stance, arguing that the English item *I guess* works "to display and project an upcoming stanced action and organize the stancetaking activity between participants," *not* as an interactionally strong and salient stance itself. As my data will also show, Kärkkäinen establishes that *I guess* is not a "ready-made" stancetaking resource, but rather "'surfaces' in the sequentially constructed intersubjective weave of dialogue" (2007:212).

Throughout this recent work on epistemology and stancetaking, there is a repeated effort to deal with the tension between reference and interaction. In research on both stance and epistemology, rigid classifications and typologies may work to

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

sort data, but they don't really help us to understand it. Evidentials such as the one I will describe below DO have propositional content; they are not empty placeholders. However, as Du Bois points out, claiming or disclaiming responsibility is a weighty matter, one that may have real consequences for speakers. Therefore, like any other signifier, an evidential can be manipulated to the highly nuanced and highly particular ends of a speaker. For example, the reportative evidential in the Spanish conversation I examine may be used to distance oneself from an unpleasant argument, to disclaim authority, or to set up a particularly juicy bit of gossip. With this in mind, I argue that in order to understand evidentials, the referential core of the evidential must be taken in the context of its use in situated interaction.

However, I also reject the assertion, most prominently made by Aikhenvald in the field of evidentials, that the study of the social aspects of language and the formal aspects of language are two fundamentally different projects. Rather, I suggest that the definition and evaluation of sources of information is a culturally specific process that is open to a wide variety of interpretations. As an example of cross-cultural differences, Hsieh (2008:224) notes that reliability assessments attached to different modes of information gathering in Chinese do not conform to typologies based on other languages. Basso (2008:215) suggests that "because notions of truth are not always abstract, and vary widely in world cultures, the study of both evidentiality and epistemology seems to touch very firmly on what may be a persistent Eurocentric dogma in linguistic research." While the distinctions between perceptual sources of information, reported speech, hearsay, and other types of evidentiality may seem to be transparent, these categories and their associations are in fact widely variable. The tacit assumption that identifying information sources is a transparent, straightforward process is an assumption that is firmly rooted in our own culture and ideologies. I will argue that speakers take advantage of the flexibility involved in identifying sources of information as they calibrate the relationship among themselves, their interlocutors, and the information they wish to communicate.

Linguistic Background: Spanish, Quechua, and Portability

Most dialects of Spanish have little in the way of obligatory morphological evidential marking. Because of this tendency, Spanish, like English, is generally considered to be a language with a weak evidential system. While there is an active discussion of the evidential properties of Romance languages, these are generally a low-frequency extension of a mood or tense, the primary function of which is not related to evidentiality (Schwenter 1999, Squartini 2001, Hassler 2002). However, the data that I present show systematic use of evidential features, drawn from a Spanish base but reinterpreted to form an evidential construction that speakers use when communicating reported information.

There are a number of possible explanations of why this shift toward a stronger evidential system has occurred. Although drift, independent innovation, and contact with Amazonian languages cannot be ruled out as factors, the most probable

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

influence comes from historical contact with Quechua. The town where I work was founded by Jesuits in the early 17th century, when Quechua was well established as a lingua franca of the Andes – a policy strongly advanced not by the Inca empire, but by the Jesuits themselves (Mannheim 1991:8). Toponyms and historical records indicate a longtime presence of both Spanish and Quechua speakers in the area. At present, this valley region is home to speakers of both languages, with a few Aymara speakers as well.

In the Andean region in general, Spanish shows extensive and well-documented influence from Quechua. This influence is believed to extend to all levels of linguistic structure: phonetic, phonological, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and social (Adelaar & Muysken 2004:585). Some examples of ways in which Andean Spanish has been claimed to differ from other world varieties of Spanish include the use of double possessive marking, irregular gender and number agreement, syntactic organization (OV vs. VO), and the semantic content of a variety of sentential particles such as *pues* and *nomás* (Escobar 2000, Adelaar & Muysken 2004). The Spanish spoken in the region where I work shows the presence of many of the features identified with Andean Spanish and attributed to contact with Quechua.

Many of these contact features, like the evidential markers I will discuss below, were present in some regional or historical variety of Peninsular Spanish but have since disappeared from most modern varieties outside the Andes. It has been convincingly argued that contact features are most easily transferred not only when certain social conditions are met (Thomason 2001:70), but also when the transfer aligns with a previously existing semantic tendency in the target language (De Granda 1997, Escobar 1997, Sánchez 2004). Potential parallels between Spanish and Quechua semantics are likely sites for contact features to take hold.

It is important to keep in mind that these features are not socially neutral, nor are they evenly distributed among the population. Escobar 1994 has shown that some features are more typical of L1 Quechua speakers shifting to Spanish, while others are present in the speech of L1 Spanish speakers. Vowel quality is one example of a feature that carries a strong social stigma, and in general a higher density of Quechua contact features in Spanish indexes subaltern status (Howard-Malverde 1995, Hornberger & Coronel-Molina 2004).

Quechua is one of the most frequently cited examples of a language with grammaticalized evidentials (Weber 1986, R. Floyd 1999, Faller 2002).[2] Two structures are involved in the discussion of evidentiality in Quechua. The "reportative" enclitic *–si* contrasts with *–mi*, which indicates a personal assertion, and *–chá*, which is used for inference (Weber 1986, R. Floyd 1999). These enclitics are used to direct focus as well as to communicate evidentiality, among other functions. Weber (1986:137) gives the following definition:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

> *–mi/–shi/–chi* give a *perspective* on the information of a sentence. By "perspective" I mean such things as how a speaker came by the information (*evidential*, e.g., first hand or second hand), what the speaker's attitude is towards the information (*validational*, e.g., does he regard it as fact/conjecture), what the speaker intends the hearer to do with the information (e.g., believe it, act on it, doubt it, etc.).

These enclitics are used in the following manner (with relevant morphemes marked in boldface):[3]

Assertion:

Mamay**mi** hamushan
Mother+1sPOSS+AFF come+PROG+3s
My mom is coming.

Reportative:

Mamay**si** hamushan
Mother+1sPOSS+REP come+PROG+3s
(I hear that) my mom is coming.

Speculation:

Mamay**chá** hamushan.
Mother+1sPOSS+INF come+PROG+3s
(Perhaps, it seems) it's my mom that is coming.

These enclitics can be attached equally felicitously to verbs, adjectives, and other parts of speech.

The other structure, the past tense *–sqa*, is the subject of more debate. This past tense, also sometimes characterized as reportative (e.g. Cusihuaman 1976), is used in contrast the unmarked *–rqa* past tense. While de Granda 2001, among others, asserts that *–sqa* uniquely co-occurs with *–si* and is entirely evidential, Faller 2004 rejects this assertion, arguing instead that it is a deictic operator that places the proposition expressed outside the perceptual field of the speaker. Adelaar classifies *–sqa* as a "sudden discovery" or mirative tense, indicative of surprise or of a result that runs counter to expectation (Adelaar & Muysken 2004:224).

The sentences above could be modified as follows:

Assertion, known:
Mamay**mi** hamu**rqa**
Mother+1sPOSS+AFF come+RPAST+3s
My mom came

Assertion, discovery:
Mamay**mi** hamu**sqa**
Mother+1sPOSS+AFF come+SPAST+3s
My mom came, as it turned out

Reportative, known:
Mamay**si** hamu**rqa**
Mother+1sPOSS+AFF come+RPAST+3s
(I hear that) my mom came

Reportative, discovery:
Mamay**si** hamu**sqa**
Mother+1sPOSS+AFF come+SPAST+3s
(I hear that) my mom came, as it turned out

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Here, the past tense in the left-hand column is the unmarked *–rqa* form, while the past tense in the right-hand column is the form that has been argued to correspond to reportative marker, deictic operator, or mirative marker.

It is important to emphasize that the interactions between *–mi/–si* and *–rqa/sqa* may be both complex and context-dependent. Feke 2004 finds that all possible combinations of *–si* and *–mi*, *–sqa* and *–rqa* are grammatical under certain conditions. She finds that these combinations represent not only sources of information, but also degrees of certainty, degrees of speaker participation, and speaker distance (in the temporal, spatial, and psychological senses). Feke elicited judgments from native speakers using a number of methods, including role plays, felicity judgments, and observation. She concludes that "Quechua epistemics simultaneously indicate multiple meanings and are used for a variety of pragmatic functions" (2004:133). This result is compatible with the suggestion that these categories may be manipulated by speakers in the process of establishing stance.

The Spanish spoken in the region where I work, as in the Andes at large, makes use of strategies that parallel these Quechua grammatical structures. In particular, there is a body of literature related to the extension of the Spanish pluperfect tense *había*, which, it has been argued, has been reinterpreted by Andean Spanish speakers to correspond to the Quechua *–sqa* (Escobar 1994, Klee 1996, Sánchez 2004). Claims regarding the exact semantic content of *había* and *–sqa* vary somewhat in this literature. One central point of agreement is the observation that the temporal function of *había* is secondary, or indeed nonexistent, for many speakers of Andean Spanish. Whether or not these particles are evidential markers per se, they have similar functions and perhaps a similar history to the evidential I describe.

In world varieties of Spanish, *diz(que)* has a range of uses (Kany 1944, Travis 2006). The most common uses seem to be casting doubt, mocking, and marking something as unreal or out of one's control. This is not the sort of *diz(que)* that I focus on in this paper. While *diz(que)* clearly has roots in the Spanish particle, I am interested in its use as a true evidential, a reportative marker. Discussing the reportative function, Muysken (2004:163) dismisses *diz(que)* as "a non-grammaticalized or at best semi-grammaticalized set of discourse particles." De Granda 2001, in making a case for the back-borrowing of the Quechua *nispa* (lit. "it is said") reportative marker, posits that *dice* 'say' is an impersonal reportative marker. While De Granda does not present evidence to support this supposition, Travis's article, and my data, support the assertion that that *diz(que)* is used as systematic, grammaticalized evidential marker.

On the structural side, in a study of Spanish verbs, including *diz(que),* Company Company 2006 argues that subjectification of verbs, as a historical process, entails a move toward reduced syntax. In this article, the author places *diz(que)* in the context of other verbs, such as *dale* and *ándale*, which have shifted from verbs with full syntactic properties to discourse markers that have been "stripped" of their syntactic qualities. Company Company specifically links the syntactic structure of these verbs to their degree of subjectivity.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Evidentials can be easily borrowed and are an areal feature of indigenous languages spoken in much of South America, from the Andes to the Amazon. For instance, Epps 2005 demonstrates that the Amazonian language Hup has borrowed evidential markers from two language families that are unrelated to Hup and to each other. She argues for the interaction of grammatical-structural features and cultural contact in the development of complex evidentiality systems. She concludes that it is evidentials' "high salience in discourse that makes evidentiality particularly prone to diffusion among languages" (Epps 2005:643).

Although no systematic investigation has been carried out, anecdotal accounts universally confirm that Quechua speakers consider evidentials to be essential to polite interaction; in fact, speech without evidentials is frequently characterized as animalistic (Hardman 1986 for Aymara; Nuckolls 1993 and Puma p.c. for Quechua). As mentioned above, it has been argued that convergence between Spanish and Quechua depends both on social environment and also on areas in which Spanish and Quechua semantics may contain parallels (Sanchez 2004, 2006; Escobar 1997). The existence of *diz(que)* as a reportative in historical varieties of Spanish may have provided an opportunity for bilingual speakers to express an extremely salient socio-grammatical category.

Given a large population of speakers of indigenous languages with strong evidential systems, and the apparent portability of evidentiality in other areas of the world, such as the Amazon basin and the Balkan linguistic area, it is not surprising that stronger patterns of evidential constructions have emerged in the Spanish of the Andes than in other world varieties of Spanish. These constructions take the form of existing Spanish structures, but, like the past perfect tense *había*, have undergone a semantic shift to more closely parallel Quechua than other varieties of Spanish.

Social Background and Methodology

The data that I examine in this paper are drawn from a corpus of some 34 hours of recordings, in which approximately 30 men, women, and children are represented, which was collected during the months of May through August 2005. In the initial review of data, I marked all instances in which *diz(que)* occurred in this set of recordings, then made notes on the segments of the recordings in which it appeared. On the basis of these notes, shorter segments of about one minute each were selected for transcription and analysis. The data and transcripts were checked both by myself and by a native speaker of this variety of Spanish. Finally, a number of different usages were identified, and short representative segments were selected to present examples of the use of evidentials in this body of data.

The bulk of these recordings was collected from one extended family, representing four generations and ranging in age from babies to octogenarians. During this fieldwork period, I lived with an elderly couple, Don Francisco and Doña Gerónima.[4] In order to gather data, I shadowed Doña Gerónima, helping her with

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

daily chores such as shucking and shelling corn, preparing food, feeding animals and workers, and milking and herding her goats. Doña Gerónima is a skillful storyteller who delights in both traditional and personal stories and serves as a repository of knowledge for her immediate and extended family. I wore a digital tape recorder around my neck, and when I wanted to record, I would ask politely if I could turn it on, then leave it visible as long as it was recording – from 10 to 90 minutes, while we drifted in and out of stories and conversation. At times I made an appointment with another friend or acquaintance, asking her to tell me stories about her life. There was no fixed interview script; I let the speaker tell her own stories and followed the conversation wherever it led us, which was often somewhere else entirely. When asked, I usually told people that I was interested in traditional stories or personal histories. At other times I asked other people to hold the recorder for me, or left it on the table for a few minutes while I went out to do some other task. By the end of my fieldwork, I had recorded a variety of participants in a range of informal conversational settings.

Because of local gender norms, I had more access to women's conversations than to men's. However, because I recorded in a family context, many of my recordings came from mixed-gender groups. On some occasions, on the strength of Don Francisco's sponsorship, my presence with the recorder was tolerated in all-male community meetings and discussions, or when friends came over to the house for a visit.

Virtually all of my recordings came from small landowners, skilled laborers, and their wives and families. In this area, as in much of the rural Andes, farming one's own land is held in high esteem. Although my consultants were unlikely to have much formal education, or indeed great economic resources, they occupied a respectable place between landless day laborers on the one hand, and wealthier truckers, teachers, and merchants on the other. All of these recordings took place in the homes and fields surrounding a town (population 5,000) situated on the main road between the western highland city of Sucre and the eastern lowland city of Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

This geographical positioning is important because the town and its surroundings are situated on the border between the bilingual department of Cochabamba and the Spanish-dominant department of Santa Cruz, as well as being a way station for monolingual Quechua speakers from the highlands, who earn extra money in this irrigated agricultural area by working as manual laborers during the dry season. While this area has traditionally been dominated by Spanish speakers, Quechua and Spanish have been in contact in the valley region for centuries. Even as linguistic shift is occurring owing to the prestige of Spanish and its prevalence in media and education, waves of migration maintain a constantly renewed contact situation.

The speakers who participated in my research speak Spanish as a first language. However, identification as a Spanish speaker involves much more than language ability. Because of the pervasive nature of language contact in the area,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

all speakers have knowledge of basic Quechua vocabulary and loanwords, and even those with the least competence are familiar with Quechua sentences as punch lines in jokes or lines in popular songs. Although many have either passive or L2 competence in Quechua, they would never classify themselves as Quechua speakers; to be a Quechua speaker is not only a question of language ability, but also of race, socioeconomic class, style of dress, and place of origin (De la Cadena 2000).

In this area, it is prestigious to be a Spanish speaker. However, not all Spanish speakers speak alike, nor do they speak the same way in all situations. My consultants were primarily women; many of them were from rural backgrounds and had little education. In family contexts, men and women of all ages tend to speak a variety of Spanish with extensive Quechua contact influence. In public settings, men and educated individuals tend to shift to a more standard variety of Spanish.[5] Rural, uneducated women generally choose not to speak in public contexts. The term *vergüenza* 'shame' is often used to express a person's unwillingness to expose his/her perceived ignorance, lack of education, (semi-) illiteracy, and ultimately, poverty to outside scrutiny.

Speakers of this non-prestige Spanish dialect are typically members of a historically subjugated class. Until the 1950s, they were legally serfs in the feudal *hacendero* system; today, they may be ridiculed by their children, whose teachers (often themselves non-prestige speakers) inculcate them with a strongly normative language ideology. Many people articulate an unwillingness to participate in recording sessions based on the assumption that outsiders consider them backward or uneducated. Quechua contact features such as evidentials are not neutral categories; they are one feature of a style of speech that is widely stigmatized.

It can be difficult for outsiders to foster mutual trust and respect in rural Bolivia. In view of the effects that this fact may have on data collection, I believe it is important to be explicit about my relationship with my consultants. Don Francisco and Doña Gerónima were not only generous hosts; they are also members of my own extended family by marriage. They had known me as a daughter-in-law and as a consistent work partner for three years at the time that I collected these data, and for seven years at the time of this writing. Their children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren were regular participants and collaborators in my recording sessions, and many of the other individuals in my recordings shared ritual kin ties or work relations with the family.

Because stories are felt to be part of the family realm, my best recording sessions were always with the members of my own family group. In these sessions, I did not have to guide the conversation; rather, it flowed naturally; participants did not appear to be self-conscious either linguistically or physically; and conversation included interactions with participants of all ages. It is not natural, in this culture or in my own, to interview a seven-year-old child; it is natural, in the course of a conversation, to engage him through commands, questions, and stories. Adults address their own children in direct terms they would never use with

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

another adult, often revealing normative ideologies. Likewise, while older people may be willing to engage in monologues with relative strangers, I have found a dynamic, interactive conversation with close family members to be a very productive source of data.

My requests to record naturally occurring conversation were baffling to even my best friends and were met with discomfort and suspicion in many cases. Residents of the more rural areas along the valley were among the most reluctant to be recorded, whether because of genuine modesty or because of skepticism regarding the aims of the entire process. The time that I invested in these close relationships with my consultants was essential to the kind of data I was able to collect. Because of the combined effects of the social stigma sometimes attached to nonstandard features and their relative scarcity in formal registers such as interview situations, I have found that evidentials are unlikely to appear in formal elicitation sessions in the area where I work.

Data From Valley Spanish

Diz(que) is the reportative evidential marker in this variety of Spanish.[6] It is derived from the 3rd person singular present form of the verb *decir* 'to say', *dice*, with the sentential complementizer *que*. I cite the evidential form as *diz(que),* because it may appear either as *dice, diz*, or with the sentential complementizer as *dizque.* Indeed, *dizque/dice* often appears as a frame, with a sentence or phrase beginning with *dizque* and ending with *dice,* as in example (1) below.[7]

(1)

dizque ahicito estaba el charango *dice*
'*dizque* the musical instrument was right over there *dice*'

Because Spanish does not require an overt subject pronoun, the marker *diz(que)* is sometimes homophonous with the 3rd person present verb *dice* 'says'. Both its function as a reportative marker and its derivation from the verb *decir* contribute to the overlap of the two forms. It is not always possible to tell the difference between the 3rd person present *dice* and the reportative *dice.* This is especially true of secondhand information, in which either the verb *dice* 's/he says' or the evidential *dice* '[reported]' would be appropriate. These cases can be disambiguated when speakers use an overt pronoun to specify the information source, as in example (2) below. Because the speaker uses her mother as the subject of the second sentence, it is clear that she is using *dice* as a verb, 'she says', rather than as an evidential, '[reported]', which appears in the first sentence.

(2)

Eso *dizque* era asi. Dice mi mamá, no?
'That's what *dizque* it was like. My mother says so, right?'

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Although *diz(que)* has much in common with the verb *decir* – as one might expect, given its history – the evidential *diz(que)* is never inflected for person, aspect, or tense. In fact, *diz(que)* may appear when there is no person referent in the discourse context. In other respects, the *diz(que)* evidential sometimes acts like a verb; for example, when a complementizer would ordinarily be called for in the sentence, *diz(que)* always appears with the *que* complementizer. However, it also appears as a frozen form, for example appearing with the complementizer at the end of a sentence (e.g.. *ha ido, dizque* 'he went, [reported]'). *Diz(que)* may co-occur with the verb *decir*, for example *Dizque decía* '[reported-that] she said'. When this marker is combined with a saying verb, the saying verb, unlike the evidential, is always inflected for tense and person and refers to some individual in the discourse context.

When a section of discourse is marked as reported speech, *diz(que)* appears after every phrase. In this discourse context, if a phrase is not marked with an evidential, it can be assumed to be a personal assertion; thus, within certain discourse contexts, it also satisfies the obligatoriness condition. As mentioned in the previous section, register variation in the community means that not all speakers will use these markers in all settings; however, once they appear, they are very reliable.

Diz(que) alternates with grammatical marking of other epistemic stances. Like Quechua combinations of *–mi/–si* reportative and *–sqa/–rqa* mirative marker (Feke 2004), *diz(que)* reportative often co-occurs with the *había* mirative marker. As in other varieties of Spanish, other forms of epistemic modality are indicated primarily through extensions of verb tenses, such as the future (speculation) and the conditional (inference). Notably, inference and speculation BY THE SPEAKER never appear with reportative *diz(que)*; inference and speculation constitute a different class of information source. This class would correspond to the Quechua *–chá* (speculation), rather than *–si* (reportative). Below I present short examples of these epistemic markers from my data. In example (3), the speaker speculates that the person in question may have been dismissed because he didn't work hard enough. In example (4), the speaker infers from the wateriness of the soup that the lamb had been boiled over and over. The relevant tense morphemes are marked in boldface.

(3) Future (speculation)
Ser**á** que el no ha querido trabajar, o ser**á**....
'Maybe he didn't want to work, or maybe...'

(4) Conditional (inference)
Cuantás veces lo har**ían** hervir pues.
'How many times must they have boiled it.'

At the beginning of this article, I defined evidentiality as a grammatical category whose fundamental feature is a reference to perceptual sources of information. *Diz(que)* acts as a reportative evidential marker in this variety of Spanish: It refers

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

to a perceptual source of information, hearsay; unlike verbs of speaking, it is not inflected for tense, person, or aspect; it is obligatory within certain discourse contexts; and it alternates with other epistemic stances. Finally, *diz(que)* has extensions, such as relating myths, that are also common to Quechua evidentials (Dedenbach-Salazar Saenz 1997, S. Floyd 2005).

This discussion is not meant to establish *diz(que)*'s status as an evidential beyond a shadow of a doubt; rather, it is meant to clarify its place with relation to other epistemic markers, including verbs of speaking, that are employed in this variety of Spanish. Like the discussion of evidentiality in general, what is ultimately most interesting about *diz(que)* is how speakers use these features to distribute responsibility for information, and to manage the relationship among themselves, their audience(s), and the information they are conveying.

The transcript below shows how *diz(que)* evidential can be used to weaken or strengthen an authoritative claim. The four speakers use evidentials to modify their claims to authority as other participants bring new information, and new information sources, to the conversation. In the following transcript, Gerónima and Francisco, an older couple, discuss the provenance and chemical content of the "potable" tap water with their adult daughter, Juana, and adult grandson, Reymundo.

(5)

Transcript 1	Translation 1
1. G: Pero *dizque* echan yodo, no sé qué, no?	1. G: But *dizque* they put iodine or something in it, right?
2. F: Anh, puede, puede. No e - no ve que en Saipina también hay eso.?	2. F: Mm-hmm, could be, could be. Isn't - in Saipina, remember, they do the same thing.?
3. G: Mm	3. G: Mm
4. F: Cloro, *dicen*.	4. F: Chlorine, *dicen*.
5. J: No le echan.	5. J: They don't add that.
6. F: No le echan?	6. F: They don't add it?
7. R: Echaban.	7. R: They used to.
8. J: Antes, ahora no.	8. J: Before, not now.
9. R: No	9. R: No
10. F: Pero había, no ve, unos [brazos] de la Alcaldía para comprarse, decían.?	10. F: But there were, weren't there, some [pipes?] at the Town Hall you could buy, they said.?
11. G: Pero ahora no es del, no ha de ser del este, p', no? Del río.	11. G: But now it's not from the, it must not be from the thing, right? From the river.
12. J: Es potable pero no es	12. J: It's potable but it's not
13. F: *Dizque* es del vertiente, *dicen*.	13. F: *Dizque* it's from a spring, *dicen.*
14. J: Hah	14. J: Mm-hmm.
15. G: Ah, vertiente había sido?	15. G: Oh, it turns out to be from a spring?
16. J: Vertiente.	16. J: A spring.
17. F: Hmm	17. F: Mm-hmm.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Here, G, Gerónima, begins with an assertion that there is iodine in the water, but she softens and distances the assertion by the use of the evidential and tag question (turn 1). Her husband, Francisco, F, responds with the stronger counter-assertion that chlorine is added (turn 4), but continues to distance himself from the assertion with the reportative *dicen*.[8] He is flatly contradicted by his daughter and grandson (turns 5–9), who make a strong claim that chlorine is not added to the water. Neither of these speakers includes any softeners such as evidentials. Francisco backs off from his previous assertion but continues to defend it by using a verb *decían* 'they said' to introduce a specific source of information (the Town Hall) on which he based his statement (turn 10). Finally, the speakers come back into agreement as Francisco adopts a less authoritative stance (turn 13), framing his new statement with evidential markers. Note that in turn 11, Gerónima uses *ha de ser* 'must be', an inference, which is a different kind of epistemic marker, and thus is not modified by a reportative evidential.

Prosodic features also play a part in constructing these stances. While Francisco uses a reportative marker in turn 4 to indicate that his information is not firsthand, he uses a declarative intonation that contrasts with Gerónima's more tentative questioning intonation. Juana and Reymundo both use assertive, downward intonation in their challenge to Francisco's assertion. His response (turn 10) is phrased and intonationally marked as a question. Finally, in turn 13, he makes another declarative statement, although he distances himself by using evidential framing.

This process of negotiation is an example of the use of evidentials to construct stance; as each participant brings his or her own evidence to the table, he or she challenges the authoritative claims of other participants (as Juana and Reymundo do by making unmitigated claims in turns 5–9, trumping Francisco's claim to authority). None of the speakers in this exchange has personally inspected the municipal infrastructure; all their information is secondhand. Through contrasting uses of statements such as those in turns 5–9, specific sources of information as in turn 10, or the use of the reportative evidential *diz(que),* these speakers construct a hierarchy of claims to authoritative sources of information. Since these are competing claims, they in effect force Francisco to admit that he is wrong. At the end of the transcript, the speakers realign with each other by agreeing that the source of the tap water is a spring.

While the preceding transcript demonstrates how participants use information source to test their relationship with other participants, the following two transcripts show how reportative evidentials can be used to highlight a speaker's relationship to the story she tells and to the characters in it. Both sections of speech were taken from the same recording session, as Juana, Ximena, and I rest in the shade during a break from potato planting. The principal speaker, Juana, is the same in both transcripts. The audience, Ximena and myself, is the same. The excerpts occur only a few minutes apart, and our physical and conversational configuration remains identical. Ximena, like Juana, is woman from a rural

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

background, although Ximena is older; both Ximena and Juana use other Quechua contact features such as loanwords (*wawa,* turn 9) and the mirative interpretation of *había* (pronounced *haya*, Line 1) both in these transcripts and in the surrounding conversation.

In first transcript, Juana relates a disagreement that arose between her adult daughter's best friend, Sosi Caravallo, and Sosi's sister-in-law, a slightly older woman, whom I call Dora. She knows of this event because her daughter, Reynalda, told her about it sometime afterwards.

(6)

Transcript 2	Translation 2
1. J: La Dora pero (para eso) es fregadaaa. El otro día a mi hija de la naada me la haya tratado también. La Reynalda de eso se ha resentido, no, no va ya ande los Caravallos ahora.	1. J: Dora is a real pain in the neck though. The other day she yelled at my daughter for nooo reason at all. [My daughter] got mad about that, and she doesn't go to the Caravallos' place anymore.
2. X: No va ya?	2. X: She doesn't go anymore?
3. J: Se discutieron, *dice*, con la Sosi estaba ahí, y.	3. J: They argued, *dice*, she was there with Sosi, and.
4. Estaba juntamente con la Sosi y la Sosi le dice a su sobrinita, "Vení Didi (ya lo) vas a hacer tu tarea,"	4. She and Sosi were there together and Sosi says to her niece, "C'mere Didi, it's time for you to do your homework."
5. no ve que la M para arriba nomás.	5. you know how [Didi's mother] is staying up in Saipina all the time.
6. X: Mmm	6. X: Mmm
7. J: Y no hace su tarea *dice*.	7. J: And she [Didi] doesn't do her homework *dice*.
8. X: Mmm	8. X: Mmm
9. J: Y la otra agarra y le hace ver su wawa *dice*.	9. J: And the other one [Dora] grabs her [Didi] and makes her look at her [Dora's] baby *dice*.
10. X: Mmm	10. X: Mmm
11. J: Su tía.	11. J: Her aunt.
12. X: Mmm	12. X: Mmm
13. J: Y vení Didi vas a hacer tu tarea *dizque* le dice.	13. And c'mere Didi it's time to do your homework *dizque* she [Sosi] tells her [Didi].
14. "No! No va a ir! Aquí va a hacer!"	14. "No! She won't go! She'll do it here!"
15. "Vení yo te voy a enseñar," *dizque* le dice.	15. "Come here, I'll help you", *dizque* she [Sosi] tells her [Didi].
16. "Yo estoy diciendo a la Didi no te estoy diciendo a vos," *dizque* le dijo.	16. "I'm talking to Didi, I'm not talking to you", *dizque* she [Dora] told her [Sosi].

In this transcript, Juana uses *diz(que)* regularly after her turns, as she narrates the conflict between Reynalda's friend, Sosi, and Sosi's relative, Dora. As I describe above, any stretch of speech that is not marked with an evidential may be understood

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

to be a personal assertion; for example, in turn 1 Juana states that 'Reynalda doesn't go to the Caravallos' anymore', a statement for which she would plausibly have firsthand evidence from conversations with her daughter. Likewise, in line 5, she states something that is common knowledge: Didi's mother, who is a public office-holder in the town, isn't home much. In lines 4 and 14, on the other hand, Juana imitates another person's voice by changing her own voice quality and pitch (in line 4, quoting her daughter's friend, she is calm and reasonable; in line 14, quoting Dora, she is high-pitched and aggressive). In all of the material that I examined, I never heard an evidential after a speaker used changes in pitch and prosody to perform another's speech (acting as an "animator," in the sense of Goffman 1981). Imitations such as these often indexed derisiveness or parody – another device by which stance is incorporated into the narrative.

Throughout the rest of the recording, after each turn, Juana marks reported information, information that she has heard from her daughter, with a reportative, uninflected *diz(que)*. In lines 13, 15, and 16 this is combined with an inflected saying verb *le dice* and *le dijo* – narrating and organizing the story. Note here that while Juana narrates the events WITHIN the story with inflected verbs of saying, the story frame itself is marked by *diz(que)* with no inflection, as a simple reportative, although we can infer that she has heard the story from her daughter.

In the second example, the same speaker is telling a story that was related to her by her godfather's daughter. The topic of pensions was brought up by Ximena, who told about a family that only visited their grandmother in order to get her pension money. Juana, again the principal speaker, is relating a conversation between her godfather and his daughter, Miriam. The godfather had given his pension money to his son, Mario, who took it away and spent it. Juana narrates as if she had been present for the conversation between Miriam and her father, as Miriam chides the old man for not having given the money to her. However, despite the fact that she narrates the episode without evidential marking, Juana was not present for this conversation between Miriam and her father; rather, as can be seen in line 17, Miriam told the story to Juana at a later time, possibly at her father's wake, which Juana mentions at the beginning of the transcript.

In example 7, Juana is telling a story about a situation that she empathizes with. She relates a conversation between a woman of her own generation and the woman's father, who is also Juana's godfather. Juana opens the story by using the first person plural, *Ay, que somos las hijas a veceees* 'Oh, we daughters are sometiiimes…' In lines 9–17, Juana quotes a conversation between her godfather and his daughter, but rather than evidentials, she uses inflected saying verbs with personal pronouns. Unlike the previous instance, in which the evidential is omitted when speech is marked as "animated" by changes in voice quality, prosody, and pitch, the speaker narrated this segment in her normal voice.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

(7)

Transcript 3	Translation 3
1. J: Ay! Somos las hijas a veceeees.	1. J: Oh! We daughters are sometiiiimes.
2. X: Mm	2. X: Mm
3. J: Pensando en el Bolivida a ver, pobre abuelita.	3. J: Thinking about her pension, [shameless], poor grannie.
4. X: Si eso debe ser para ella, pues, no?	4. X: Cause that should be for her own self, right?
5. M. Para ella, pues,	5. J: For her own self,
6. X: Mm	6. X: Mm
7. J: para ella para sus deseos--Decía yo una vez pa'l, cuando estaba velandose mi padrino,	7. J: for her for her wishes - I said once at the, at my godfather's wake,
8. X: Mm	8. X: Mm
9. J: Le he dado al Mario, no me lo quiere dar mi plaata, decía.	9. J: I gave it to Mario, he doesn't want to give me my mo-o-ney, he said.
10. X: Mm	10. X: Mm
11. J: Y pa qué daba, pues, debía darme a mí, yo haiga agarrado, decía la Miriam.	11. J: And why did you give it away, anyway, you should have given it to me, I would have held on to it, said Miriam.
12. X: M.hm	12. X: M.hm
13. J: Si Ud. sabe que yo siempre le doy, de peso en peso cuando Ud. quiera, [unintel] uiere siempre para su deseo, pa' qué les da, decía ella.	13. J: You know very well that I always give it to you, dollar by dollar whenever you want, [unintel] whatever you want for your wishes, why do you give it away to them? she said.
14. X: Hm.m	14. X: Hm.m
15. J: Y,,,	15. J: And,,,
16. X: Mm	16. X: Mm
17. J: Me, me han sacado que decía el J, decía. Que, y ahora voy a decir que me lo dé y no tiene, no tengo, no tengo, dice, decía ella.	17. J: They, they took it away from me, what J said, he said. That, and now I go to tell him to give it back to me and he doesn't have it, I don't have it, I don't have it, he says, she said.
18. X: Mm	18. X: Mm

The source of information, objectively speaking, is secondhand in both transcripts. In example 6, Juana repeats a conversation that she heard from her daughter; in example 7, she repeats a conversation that she heard from Miriam. So why does Juana use evidentials in the first excerpt, but not in the second? I suggest that Juana differentiates between these two sources because she wants to shade, to nuance her own relationship to the source and content of the information that she is repeating. Transcript 2 involves someone else's family problems, is potentially contentious and emotionally charged, and primarily concerns members of the younger generation. Juana tells the story from the point of view of her daughter, using her voice to present an unflattering caricature of the unsympathetic character

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

in the story; but she also distances herself from the story through the use of evidentials, as if to say, "This is not my story; these are other people's problems."

In the second excerpt, on the other hand, Juana aligns herself with a person of her own age, with whom she shares a ritual relationship (father/godfather). She empathizes both propositionally, in the first line of the transcript (*Ay, que somos las hijas a veceeees* 'Oh, we daughters are sometiiimes….'), and implicitly, drawing the story closer to her by choosing NOT to use evidentials. Although the story was told to her by her godfather's daughter, Juana construes the information to be of direct relevance to her own experience. Juana's subjective positioning interacts with her presentation of the information, making a distinction between the natures of the two sources of information.

Here, it is useful to recall Du Bois's remark that stance can have repercussions into the future. Juana lives in a community and must maintain her relationship with other community members; women of her own generation are especially important allies or destructive enemies. If somebody decided to make Juana's criticisms of Dora public, Dora could very well make life difficult for her. By using evidentials, Juana avoids taking ownership of the sentiments in the story, while at the same time making her own position very clear. Notice how, in Transcript 2, as the narrative builds to a climax, *diz(que)* occurs more frequently. In the case of Miriam – whose family, because of their ritual kinship ties, is in a patronage relationship with her own – Juana's positioning works to maintain and strengthen an existing relationship.

The point I wish to illustrate with these two transcripts is that the conditions for the use of the reportative evidential, and the semantic content of the evidential, do not change. Rather, Juana communicates a differing relationship to the content and source of the stories that she relates by her choice to use or not to use a reportative evidential.

Conclusion

It is clear that speakers of Valley Spanish use *diz(que)* as a reportative marker. In the Andean region, is not unusual for existing constructions to take on new meanings in this way. Quechua, a neighboring language in close historical and contemporary contact with this variety of Spanish, has a strong evidential system, and speakers who use evidentials exert social pressure on speakers of other languages to make their source of information explicit (Nuckolls 1993).

Evidentiality may follow a pattern of linguistic appropriation and convergence. Research from other linguistic areas (the Balkans, Amazonia) has established that evidentials tend to be areal features. In the Andean region, scholars have identified a connection between Quechua *–sqa* past tense and Spanish past perfect *había*, hypothesized to function as an evidential marker (Escobar 1994, Klee 1996, Sanchez 2004). They point to convergence of Quechua and Spanish grammatical patterns in second-language speakers as a possible motivation for language change. Although these sources may disagree

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

on the details of the semantic content of *había*, they are in agreement that language contact has influenced the epistemic structure of Spanish. However, as Company Company 2006 documents, *dizque* follows a pattern that is common to many Spanish verbs. Because the processes of language change are unpredictable, we cannot rely on our partial understanding of historical and cultural processes as a comprehensive explanation for the persistence of the *diz(que)* construction in the Spanish of this region. Nevertheless, it seems to be the case that language contact features are transferred most readily when an existing structure, such as evidentials in Quechua, meets a semantic tendency, such as the discourse potential of Spanish verbs.

Ultimately, the significance of *diz(que)* is deeper. Speakers use this particle to construct sources of information and to locate themselves in relationship to these sources and their audience. In sociolinguistic research, the analysis of these relationships has a long history. Goffman 1979 described the way that participants establish their orientation to an event, placing themselves on a particular "footing" with respect to those around them. These practices establish participant roles and relationships within a specific context. As Irvine 1996 notes, these contexts are not fixed, nor are they limited to the here and now; segments of speech can be embedded and reused in practically infinite ways.

Like participant roles, a key aspect of speaker stance is its flexibility. As shown in the transcripts above, a single speaker in a uniform context can shift from one interpretation of secondhand information, using a reportative marker, to an entirely different one, without reportatives. This choice does not necessarily indicate doubt; rather, it constitutes a speaker's strategy to position himself or herself with regard to events and sources. Likewise, the choice to use or omit evidentials may reflect a speaker's place in the larger power structure. In their edited volume *Responsibility and evidence in oral discourse,* Hill & Irvine (1993:2) remark: "To interpret events, to establish facts, to convey opinion, and to constitute interpretations as knowledge – all these are activities involving socially situated participants, who are agents in the construction of knowledge." This is the dimension that I believe has been missing from the study of evidentiality.

Scholars disagree about whether related categories such as belief, validation, doubt, and power can be accurately included in a definition of evidentials. While some studies of evidentiality have included categories such as speaker stance and reliability of information, these have often focused on languages such as English in which several epistemic categories, indicating means or qualities of knowledge rather than information source, are conflated in a single structure or set of structures (Chafe 1986, Biber & Finnegan 1989). This has caused dissent among scholars of evidentiality, many of whom strongly protest the notion that evidentiality is analytically equivalent to broader categories of epistemology and epistemic modality (Dendale & Tasmowski 2001).

Aikhenvald (2004:5) asserts that "expressing an appropriate information source, and choosing the correct marking for it, has nothing to do with one's

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

'epistemic stance', point of view, or personal reliability." Aikhenvald's definition of evidentiality is restrictive and would exclude the forms that I describe here; however, Faller 2002, 2004 argues that Quechua *–mi* and *–si* enclitics, which do qualify as evidentials under Aikhenvald's typology, include illocutionary information as part of their core semantic meaning. The point that I wish to make in this article is that, whether a language has strong or weak evidential marking, IDENTIFYING A SOURCE OF INFORMATION IS A PROCESS THAT IMPLIES SOCIAL POSITIONING. It is well known that evidentials are highly variable cross-linguistically. Rather than disputing what "counts" as an evidential, it would interesting to investigate how this variation may be linked to larger interactional and semiotic patterns. Because notions of truth, evidence, and source of information are not only culturally variable but connected to micro-level social relationships, reference cannot, in this case, be cleanly separated from social relationships and stances. As the transcripts above indicate, speakers present sources of information differently depending on their relationship with source, type of information, and audience. Likewise, speakers may claim authority by making assertions or by evoking authoritative sources. Listeners recognize and evaluate these positions, and they criticize people who are perceived to violate norms. While it is true that evidentials do not necessarily comment on the reliability of information, by referring to source of information they incorporate a socially constructed category. The source of the information, and the speaker's relationship with that source, may be just as important as the propositional content of the message (as philosophers of language have long argued; see, for example, Vanderveken 1990:25–27). This process of social construction opens the door to considerations of power, authority, and gender, and it allows speakers to use evidentials in a socially meaningful way.

Many linguists, following the Chomskyan idealization of the language system, accept the assertion that language structure can be analyzed independently of social factors. In some domains and for some purposes it may be possible to treat language as a multi-tiered but functionally independent system. Other cases, such as the one examined here, reveal many points of contact. Evidentials, which speakers use in their construction of stance and authority, are a clear example of the interface between the social and structural aspects of linguistics. This research indicates that social categories such as speaker stance must be considered to be integral to a speaker's use of evidentials, not an external feature. Source of information is one aspect of the core meaning of evidential constructions, in Valley Spanish and in other languages that encode evidentiality. Source of information may usefully be employed in understanding evidentiality as a cross-linguistic category. However, it is important not to bleach evidentials of social relationships in order to make them easier to understand typologically. It is impossible to satisfactorily separate the speaker's positioning, which may encode attitudinal or validational information, from information source. Ultimately, the source of information is an analytic category, one that speakers exploit as they describe themselves, their interlocutors, and their world.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Notes

*This research was funded by the National Science Foundation, and by the Rackham Graduate School, the Department of Linguistics, and the Department of Anthropology at the University of Michigan. I gratefully acknowledge the comments and contributions of Sally Thomason, Robin Queen, and Steve Dworkin, who helped shape this article in its original form, and Bruce Mannheim's mentorship. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Berkeley Linguistic Society and at the Michicagoan Linguistic Anthropology Conference, both in 2006, and I thank audiences and discussant John Lucy for their comments. Special thanks are due to an anonymous reviewer for extensive comments on an earlier draft. Finally, I owe a great debt of gratitude to Gregorio Avila, Gregoria Soliz, and Martha Avila for their hospitality and advocacy, and especially to Raomir Avila, whose contributions to this article are immeasurable.

[1]The alternation between *diz, dice,* and *dizque* will be discussed in more detail in following sections.

[2]Though all varieties of Quechua have evidentials, Quechua IIB is used in the area I describe. This dialect, the best-studied of the Quechua dialects, is spoken in southern Peru and much of Bolivia, with minor variations.

[3]Abbreviations are as follows:
1s: First person singular
AFF: Affirmation (personal assertion)
3s: Third person singular
REP: Reportative
POSS: Possessive
RPAST:*–rqa* past (simple past)
PROG: Progressive
SPAST: *–sqa* past (mirative past)

[4]Francisco, Geronima, and all other names in this paper are pseudonyms. *Don* and *Doña* are respectful forms of address for an adult men and women, respectively.

[5]I am currently at work on a larger project investigating the relationship between sociolinguistic register and contact features, including evidentials; this project also aims to encompass the complicated factors involved in designation as a language speaker.

[6]For a detailed description of the history, syntax and semantics of *dizque,* see Company Company 2006 and Travis 2006.

[7]I do not translate *diz(que)* as there is no exact translation to English. The evidential appears marked by italics in the transcriptions.

[8]It's interesting to note here the slight difference between *dicen* and *dice,* which is used by other speakers. This form does not appear to indicate a third-person plural morpheme, as in standard Spanish, for Don Francisco; rather, some older speakers systematically use *dicen* instead of *dice* as an evidential. Possibly this points to small dialectal differences.

References

Adelaar, Willem, & Muysken, Pieter (2004). *The languages of the Andes*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.

Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y. (2004). *Evidentiality*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Basso, Ellen B. (2008). Epistemic deixis in Kalapalo. *Pragmatics* 18:215–52.

Biber, Douglas, & Finegan, Edward (1989). Styles of stance in English: Lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect. *Text* 9:93–124.

Brown, Roger, & Gilman, Albert (1960). The pronouns of power and solidarity. In T. Sebeok (ed.), *Style in language*, 253–76. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Chafe, Wallace (1986). Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. In W. Chafe & J. Nichols (eds.), *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*, 261–72. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Clift, Rebecca (2006). Indexing stance: Reported speech as an interactional evidential. *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 10:569–95.
Company Company, Concepción (2006). Subjectification of verbs into discourse markers: Semantic-pragmatic change only? *Belgian Journal of Linguistics* 20:97–121.
Curnow, Timothy J. (2003). Nonvolitionality expressed through evidentials. *Studies in Language* 27:39–59.
Cusihuaman, Antonio (1976). *Gramática Quechua: Cuzco-Callao*. Lima, Peru: Ministerio de Educacion.
De Granda, Germán (1997). Replantamiento de un tema controvertido: Genesis y retencion del doble posesivo en el español andino. *Revista de Filologia Española* 77(1–2):141–47.
——— (2001). *Estudios de linguística andina*. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru, Fondo Editorial.
de la Cadena, Marisol (2000). *Indigenous mestizos*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Dedenbach-Salazar Saenz, Sabine (1997). Point of view and evidentiality in the Huarochiri texts (Peru, 17th century). In R. Howard-Malverde (ed.), *Creating context in Andean cultures*, 149–70. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dendale, Patrick, & Tasmowski, Liliane (2001). Introduction: Evidentiality and related notions. *Journal of Pragmatics* 33:339–48.
Du Bois, John W. (2007). The stance triangle. In R. Englebretson (ed.), *Stancetaking in discourse*, 139–82. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Eberenz, R. (2004). Dizque: Antecedentes medievales de un arcaísmo afortunado. *Lexis* 28:139–56.
Epps, Patience (2005). Areal diffusion and the development of evidentiality: Evidence from Hup. *Studies in Language* 29:617–50.
Escobar, Anna María (1994). Andean Spanish and bilingual Spanish: Linguistic characteristics. In P. Cole, G. Hermon & D. Martin (eds.), *Language in the Andes*, 51–71. Newark, Delaware: Center for Latin American Studies, University of Delaware.
——— (1997). Contrastive and innovative uses of the present perfect and the preterite in Spanish in contact with Quechua. *Hispania* 80:859–70.
——— (2000). *Contacto social y linguístico: El español en contacto con el Quechua en el Perú*. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
Faller, Martina (2002). The evidential and validational licensing conditions for the Cusco Quechua enclitic –mi. *Belgian Journal of Linguistics* 16:7–21.
——— (2004). The deictic core of 'non-experienced past' in Cuzco Quechua. *Journal of Semantics* 21:45–85.
Feke, Marilyn (2004). Quechua to Spanish cross-linguistic influence among Cuzco Quechua-Spanish bilinguals: The case of epistemology. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
Floyd, Rick (1999). *The structure of evidential categories in Wanka Quechua*. Dallas, TX: Summer Institute of Linguistics.
Floyd, Simeon (2005). The poetics of evidentiality in South American storytelling. *Proceedings from the Eighth Workshop on American Indigenous Languages. Santa Barbara, CA*.
Friedman, Victor A. (2003). Evidentiality in the Balkans with special attention to Macedonian and Albanian. In A. Aikhenvald & R.M.W. Dixon (eds.), *Studies in evidentiality*, 189–218. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Goffman, Erving (1979). Footing. *Semiotica* 25:1–29.
——— (1981). *Forms of talk*. Philadelpia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Hardman, Martha J. (1986). Data-source marking in the Jaqi languages. In W. Chafe & J. Nichols (eds.), *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*, 113–36. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Hassler, Gerda (2002). Evidentiality and reported speech in Romance languages. In T. Guldemann & M.v. Roncador (eds.), *Reported discourse: A meeting ground for different linguistic domains*, 143–72. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Hill, Jane H., & Irvine, Judith T. (1993). *Responsibility and evidence in oral discourse*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Hornberger, Nancy, & Coronel-Molina, Serafin (2004). Quechua language shift, maintenance, and revitalization in the Andes. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 167:9–67.
Howard-Malverde, Rosaleen (1995). Pachamama is a Spanish word: Linguistic tension between Aymara, Quechua, and Spanish in northern Potosi (Bolivia). *Anthropological Linguistics* 37:141–68.
Hsieh, Chia-Ling (2008). Evidentiality in Chinese newspaper reports: Subjectivity/objectivity as a factor. *Discourse Studies* 10:205.
Irvine, Judith T. (1996). Shadow conversations: The indeterminacy of participant roles. In M. Silverstein & G. Urban (eds.), *Natural histories of discourse*, 131–59. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kany, Charles E. (1944). Impersonal dizque and its variants in American Spanish. *Hispanic Review* 12:168–77.
Kärkkäinen, Elise (2003). *Epistemic stance in English conversation*. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
——— (2007). The role of *I guess* in conversational stancetaking. In R. Englebretson (ed.), *Stancetaking in discourse*, 183–220. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Klee, Carol A. (1996). The Spanish of the peruvian Andes: The influence of Quechua on Spanish language structure. In A. Roca & J.B. Benson (eds.), *Spanish in contact*, 73–91. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla.
Lazard, Gilbert (2001). On the grammaticalization of evidentiality. *Journal of Pragmatics* 33:359–67.
Lempert, Michael (2008). The poetics of stance: Text-metricality, epistemicity, interaction. *Language in Society* 37:569–92.
Mannheim, Bruce (1991). *The language of the Inka since the European invasion*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Mushin, Ilana (2000). Evidentiality and deixis in narrative retelling. *Journal of Pragmatics* 32:927–57.
——— (2001). *Evidentiality and epistemological stance: Narrative retelling*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Muysken, Pieter (2004). Quechua and Spanish, evidentiality and aspect: Commentary on Liliana Sánchez. *Bilingualism: Language and Cognition* 7:163–64.
Nuckolls, Janis B. (1993). The semantics of certainty in Quechua and its implications for a cultural epistemology. *Language in Society* 22:235–55.
Puma, Rosalía. Personal communication, November 2007.
Sánchez, Liliana (2004). Functional convergence in the tense, evidentiality and aspectual systems of Quechua-Spanish bilinguals. *Bilingualism: Language and Cognition* 7:147–62.
——— (2006). Kechwa and Spanish bilingual grammars: Testing hypotheses on functional interference and convergence. *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 9:535–56.
Schwenter, Scott (1999). Evidentiality in Spanish morphosyntax: A reanalysis of "(de)queismo". In M.J. Serrano (ed.), *Estudios de variacion sintáctica*, 65–68. Madrid: Vervuert.
Squartini, Mario (2001). The internal structure of evidentiality in Romance. *Studies in Language* 25:297–334.
Thomason, Sarah G. (2001). *Language contact: An introduction*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Travis, Catherine E. (2006). *Dizque*: a Colombian evidentiality strategy. *Linguistics* 44:1269–97.
Vanderveken, Daniel (1990) *Meaning and speech acts: Principles of language use (vol. 1)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weber, David J. (1986). Information perspective, profile, and patterns in Quechua. In W. Chafe & J. Nichols (eds.), *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*, 137–55. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Willett, Thomas L. (1987). A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality. *Buffalo Working Papers in Linguistics* 87:123–79.

(Received 6 October 2008; revision received 2 May 2009;
accepted 2 May 2009; final revision received 5 May 2009)

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047404509990236 Published online by Cambridge University Press