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CHRYSIPPUS ON IMAGINATION IN AETIUS 4.12*

According to Diogenes Laertius (7.49–51), the concept of 'appearance' (φαντασία) played a central role in Stoic philosophy. As staunch corporealists, the Stoics believed that appearances are physical structures in our corporeal soul which provide the foundation for all our thoughts (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.228–41). One of the crucial features of appearance is that it is a representational mental state that has the ability to provide us with accurate awareness of the world through causal interaction between our senses and external objects, and thus supply the means for acquiring knowledge about the reality. However, the Stoics recognized that we can also be aware and think of objects that are real but are not presently affecting our senses, as well as objects that are altogether fictional and thus incapable of ever interacting with our senses. Because of this, it was important for them to distinguish between representational mental states which are and those which are not caused by external objects at the moment in which they are formed. Chrysippus was one of the Stoics who paid special attention to this distinction; in a key text, Aet. 4.12, he is reported as reserving the name 'appearance' (φαντασία) only for the former states, while for the latter he used a different term, 'imagination' (φανταστικόν).[1]

Aetius' original text itself did not survive, but it has been reconstructed in the seminal work by Hermann Diels from several extant secondary sources, all of which appear to summarize the same common text.[2] The reconstruction of chapter 4.12 relies on three such sources, Ps.-Plutarch's *Placita* 900D–901A, Ps.-Galen's *De historia philosophiae* 93 and Nemesius' *De natura hominis* 55.13–22, of which the first is the longest and most detailed. According to Ps.-Plutarch, Chrysippus made two claims about imagination, first, that it is a mental state that involves a 'phantasm' (φάντασμα), a mental image which at the time of being entertained does not represent a present external object, and second, that it is a state in which the subject is 'drawn towards a phantasm'.

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[1] The terms φαντασία and φανταστικόν are derived from the verb φαντάζειν, which means 'to show, to make visible'. They occur in a philosophical context for the first time in Plato. He understood φαντασία as a representational mental state which is equal or very closely related to sensation (αἴσθησις; cf. *Tht.* 152c; *Soph.* 264b). On the other hand, φανταστικόν is used in the *Sophist* (263c) as an adjective referring to the φανταστικὴ τέχνη, the skill in producing φαντάσματα, images that resemble things but are not exact reproductions of these things. Aristotle uses φανταστικόν in the context of describing the part of the soul (φανταστικὸν μόριον, *De an.* 432a31) responsible for the production of φαντασία, which is in turn understood as that in virtue of which a mental image (φάντασμα) arises in us (*De an.* 428a1–2). Later authors mostly follow Aristotle in taking τὸ φανταστικόν to refer to the psychic capacity for producing φαντασία (e.g. Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 66.9–73.11; Plotinus, *Enn.* 4.3.29–31; Procl. *In Ti.* 1.194.15–195.8; etc.). This makes Chrysippus' sharp distinction between φαντασία and φανταστικόν in Aet. 4.12 rather unusual.

[2] H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879).

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The first claim is relatively straightforward and easy to understand given the main theme of the passage, which is the distinction between the way appearance and imagination arise as mental states and what they represent. The second claim, however, is quite obscure and, as closer analysis will show, problematic. Namely, given what we know about Stoic psychology, it is not clear what exactly Chrysippus might have meant by saying that imagination consists in the subject's being drawn towards a phantasm, and it seems that the best attempt at making sense of this idea is destined to fail.[3] This threatens to leave us without a satisfactory interpretation of Aet. 4.12 and a clear understanding of Chrysippus' view on imagination. We need not, however, accept this pessimistic result. The summary of the same passage from Nemesius' *De natura hominis* suggests an interpretation of Chrysippus' view on imagination that I believe is better than the interpretation based on Ps.-Plutarch. Namely Nemesius suggests that Chrysippus viewed imagination not as a state in which we are drawn towards a phantasm but as a state in which *we are drawing* a phantasm from our mind. I shall argue that, by this, Chrysippus meant to say that imagination involves drawing a mental image, that is, pulling it from the memory or conjuring it up by combining previously acquired concepts. I shall also argue that, compared to Ps.-Plutarch, Nemesius seems to be a more reliable source on this section of Aetius' text and consequently on Chrysippus' actual view on imagination too.

Let us begin by analysing the most comprehensive source for Aet. 4.12.1–6, which explains Chrysippus' distinction between appearance and imagination, Ps.-Plutarch's *Placita* 900D–901A:

[1] Χρύσιππος διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων φησὶ τέτταρα ταῦτα. φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον αὑτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· οἷον ἐπειδὰν δι' ὄψεως θεωρῶμεν τὸ λευκόν, ἔστι πάθος τὸ ἐγγεγενημένον διὰ τῆς ὁράσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· καὶ <κατὰ> τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν, ὅτι ὑπόκειται λευκὸν κινοῦν ἡμᾶς· ὁμοίως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως. [2] εἴρηται δὲ ἡ φαντασία ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός· καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὐτὸ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς αὐτήν. [3] φανταστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν φαντασίαν· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, τοῦτ' ἔστι φανταστόν. [4] φανταστικὸν δέ ἐστι διάκενος ἑλκυσμός, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς φανταστοῦ γινόμενον καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ σκιαμαχοῦντος καὶ κενοῖς ἐπιφέροντος τὰς χεῖρας· τῇ γὰρ φαντασίᾳ ὑπόκειταί τι φανταστόν, τῷ δὲ φανταστικῷ οὐδέν. [5] φάντασμα δὲ ἐστίν, ἐφ' ὃ ἑλκόμεθα κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν· ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται ἐπὶ τῶν μελαγχολώντων καὶ μεμηνότων· ὁ γοῦν τραγικὸς Ὀρέστης ὅταν λέγῃ· 'ὦ μῆτερ, ἱκετεύω σε, μὴ 'πίσειέ μοι τὰς αἱματωποὺς καὶ δρακοντώδεις κόρας· αὗται γάρ, αὗται πλησίον θρώσκουσί μου' λέγει μὲν αὐτὰ ὡς μεμηνὼς ὁρᾷ δ' οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μόνον· [6] διὸ καί φησιν αὐτῷ Ἠλέκτρα· 'μέν', ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις· ὁρᾷς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν δοκεῖς σάφ' εἰδέναι.' ὡς καὶ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ Θεοκλύμενος.[4]

[3] This situation is not helped by the fact that the two recent systematic treatments of Chrysippus' philosophy—J.B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (Albany, 1970) and E. Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme* (Paris, 1971[3])—neither discuss Chrysippus' theory of imagination nor offer any detailed analysis of Aet. 4.12.

[4] The Greek follows J. Mau's Teubner edition (*Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. 5.2.1 [Leipzig, 1971]) with the emendations of A.A. Long and D. Sedley (*The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols. [Cambridge, 1987] = abbreviated as LS from hereon) at 2.239 (LS 39 B). For 'light' as a possible etymological origin of φαντασία, see Arist. *De an.* 429a3–4. The two literary references near the end of the passage are to Eur. *Or.* 255–9 and (probably) Hom. *Od.* 20.350–7, as I discuss in P. Stojanović, 'On the status of natural divination in Stoicism', *Theoria* 63 (2020), 5–16, at 13.

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[1] Chrysippus says that the following four [things] differ from each other. Appearance is an affection arising in the soul, revealing itself and that which has made it. For example, when through sight we observe the white [of a thing], the affection is what is engendered in the soul through vision; and this affection enables us to say that there is something underlying white which activates us. And similarly for touch and smell. [2] Appearance gets its name from 'light'; for just as light reveals itself as well as the other things encompassed in it, so too appearance reveals itself and that which has made it. [3] Apparent object is that which makes the appearance; the white [of a thing] or the cold [of a thing], or anything capable of activating the soul, is an apparent object. [4] Imagination is an empty attraction, an affection in the soul that comes about from no apparent object, as in the case of people who fight with shadows and punch at thin air. For an appearance has some underlying apparent object, while imagination has none. [5] Phantasm is that towards which we are attracted in the empty attraction of imagination. It occurs in people who are melancholic and mad. At any rate, when Orestes in the tragedy says 'Mother, I beg you, do not set upon me those bloody-looking dragon-shaped girls! They, they are attacking me!', he says this as a madman, and sees no one, but merely thinks that he does. [6] That is why Electra says to him 'Stay, poor wretch, peacefully in your bed; for you see none of those things you think you clearly know.' And similarly Theoclymenus in Homer.

According to Ps.-Plutarch, Chrysippus distinguished between 'appearance' (φαντασία) and 'apparent' (φανταστόν) on the one hand, and between 'imagination' (φανταστικόν) and 'phantasm' (φάντασμα) on the other.[5] Appearance is an affection (πάθος) in the soul which 'reveals' (ἐνδείκνυται) not only itself but also 'that which made it' (τὸ πεποιηκός).[6] The latter, we are told, is the apparent thing—an external object with its corporeal qualities (τὸ λευκόν, τὸ ψυχρόν)—which has the capacity to 'activate' (κινεῖν) our soul, or in other words to interact causally with it through the sense organs and thus produce an appearance that represents the object that appears. Imagination, on the other hand, is an affection in the soul which is not caused by a present external object.[7] Although this is not stated directly in the text, the implication

[5] Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.50: 'There is a difference between an appearance and a phantasm. Phantasm is a supposition of thought (δόκησις διανοίας) of the sort that arises in sleep, while appearance is an imprint in the soul, or in other words an alteration, as Chrysippus proposes in the second book of his *On the Soul*.' This lends some support—although by no means conclusive—to the hypothesis that the distinctions summarized in Aet. 4.12 were originally discussed in Chrysippus' work *On the Soul*. The fact that, unlike Aetius, Diogenes Laertius contrasts appearance with phantasm and not with imagination does not seem to be significant, and is probably the result of the brevity of Diogenes' report.

[6] The verb ἐνδείκνυσθαι here probably has a technical sense, which the Stoics used to describe both the ability of appearances to directly reveal 'plain' (ἐναργῆ) and 'clear' (τρανῆ) things and their ability to reveal 'obscure' (ἄδηλα) things indirectly via sign-inference (cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.161–3, 7.172, 7.194, 8.143). For a more detailed discussion of the potential significance of ἐνδείκνυσθαι in this passage, see Stojanović (n. 4), 12–14.

[7] A word of caution is necessary here. Although Aetius reports that Chrysippus made a sharp distinction between φαντασία and φανταστικόν, our main sources on Stoicism or even the later members of the Stoic school did not follow Chrysippus in this, as it seems. Authors such as Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, Plutarch, Nemesius, etc. regularly portray the Stoics as talking about 'empty φαντασίαι' and use the word φαντασία to refer to psychic states entertained in dreams, madness, etc. which according to Chrysippus' distinction in Aetius would be classified among imaginations. In other words, a vast majority of our sources suggest that, except for Chrysippus, the Stoics treated imagination as a species of the general genus of appearance. This need not really be a problem if we assume that Chrysippus' intention in the Aetius passage was to emphasize that, although both the psychic states that are and those that are not caused by external objects can loosely be called φαντασίαι, only the former should be taken as φαντασίαι in the strict sense of the word. In my discussion, I will often follow the sources in treating imagination as a species of appearance, but in such cases I will endeavour to emphasize that we are talking about the kind of φαντασία which Chrysippus would strictly classify as φανταστικόν.

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seems to be that imagination does not reveal its actual cause. Instead, it makes us aware of a phantasm, a mental image that represents an object which, at the time the imagination is entertained, is purely the product of thought. Presumably, this is the reason for Chrysippus' characterization of imagination as διάκενος ἑλκυσμός:[8] the expression διάκενος or 'empty' seems to refer to the fact that imagination is not directly caused by an external object which corresponds to the phantasm. However, the precise meaning of the expression ἑλκυσμός here is less obvious. Its purpose seems to be to provide a description of the main psychological activity involved in the process of imagining. In Ps.-Plutarch, this activity is alluded to in the following sentence (*Placita* 901F 4–5 = Aet. 4.12.5):

φάντασμα δὲ ἐστίν, ἐφ' ὃ ἑλκόμεθα κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν[9]

Phantasm is that towards which we are attracted in the empty attraction of imagination.

The presence of the preposition ἐπί in the form of ἐφ' before the relative pronoun ὃ suggests that the voice of ἑλκόμεθα here is passive, which conveys the sense of us being drawn towards or being attracted by the phantasm. Ps.-Plutarch's report thus suggests that Chrysippus understood imagination as a mental state in which we are drawn towards or attracted by its intentional object. Accordingly, all major English translations render the expression διάκενος ἑλκυσμός as 'empty attraction' or 'groundless attraction'.[10]

But precisely how we are supposed to understand this view about imagination is far from clear. What exactly would being drawn towards or attracted by a phantasm mean in this context? Without a satisfactory answer to this question, our understanding of Chrysippus' view would remain woefully incomplete. Unfortunately, Ps.-Plutarch's text is not particularly revealing in this regard, and contemporary scholars and commentators who accept Ps.-Plutarch's version of Aetius as reliable are equally unforthcoming. In what follows, I will try to reconstruct what I take to be the best

[8] The expression διάκενος ἑλκυσμός also appears in Sextus Empiricus' account of the Stoic epistemology in *Math.* 7.241 and 7.245, as well as in Philo, *Cher.* 69, suggesting that the Stoics used it as a technical term. A variation on this expression, διάκενος or κενὴ φαντασία, which was apparently also used by the Stoics (see note 7 above), is referred to in Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.67 and in *P.Berol*. inv. 16545 (see the reconstruction in T. Backhouse, 'Antipater of Tarsus on false "phantasiai" [PBerol inv. 16545]', *Studi e testi per il corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini 10: Papiri filososofici, Miscellanea di Studi* 3 [Florence, 2000], 7–31), and occurs in Cicero's *Acad. post.* 47–54 and 88–90 in its Latin translation, *uisum inane*.

[9] This sentence is identical in Ps.-Galen's *De hist. phil.* 93, while the version in Nemesius' *De nat. hom.* 55.21–2 is slightly (but, as I will argue below, importantly) different: φάντασμα δὲ ὃ ἐφέλκομεν κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν. The concurrence of Ps.-Plutarch and Ps.-Galen is probably not a coincidence, since there are compelling reasons to think that, at least for the part of Aetius' text under discussion here, Ps.-Galen used Ps.-Plutarch's text as its source, unlike Nemesius who appears to have had independent access to Aetius' text (see J. Mansfeld and D.T. Runia, *Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer Volume I: The Sources* [Leiden, 1997], 141–52). If this is indeed so, then Ps.-Galen's text offers no additional support to Ps.-Plutarch over Nemesius in respect to the reliability of reproduction of Aetius' original text.

[10] For the former translation, see LS 39 B, as well as R. Bett, *Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians* (Cambridge, 2005), 49 (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.241) and 50 (*Math.* 7.245); for the latter, see B. Inwood and L. Gerson, *The Stoics Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia* (Indianapolis, 2008), 22.

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possible interpretation in favour of Ps.-Plutarch's version that can be supported by the extant texts of Stoic provenance.

Since the key to Ps.-Plutarch's suggestion that Chrysippus thought that imagination is a representational state in which the subject is drawn towards a phantasm is the verb ἕλκειν in the passive voice, it is logical to base this interpretation on other Stoic passages where this verb, its cognates or other verbs of similar meaning are used in the same way in the context of discussing representational mental states. Four pieces of textual evidence seem particularly relevant here. The first is a fragment from the anonymous Stoic treatise preserved in a Herculaneum papyrus, *P.Herc*. 1020 col. 112. While explaining one of the Stoic virtues of dialectic, 'non–precipitancy' (ἀπροπτωσία), the author writes:

> For the person who is non–precipitate will be both unattracted by a non-apprehensive appearance and strong in [dealing with] appearances, in so far as this person will not be drawn by non-apprehensive appearances and will keep control over his assents, [that is,] in so far as this person will not be drawn by and will not follow appearances that are not apprehensive.[11]

Like in Ps.-Plutarch's *Placita*, in this somewhat repetitive passage the verb ἕλκειν is in the passive voice (ἕλκεσθαι). It conveys the sense of the subject being pulled by or drawn toward a particular kind of appearance, the 'non-apprehensive appearance' (φαντασία ἀκατάληπτος). The Stoics considered the 'apprehensive appearance' (φαντασία καταληπτική) to be the paradigm case of an appearance which is caused by a present external object and which accurately represents that object.[12] They thought that assent (συγκατάθεσις) to apprehensive appearance constitutes 'apprehension'

[11] *P.Herc*. 1020 col. 112, lines 16–30: δεῖ γὰρ | τὸν ἀπρόπτωτον | ἀ[ν]έλκυστόν τε εἶ|ναι ὑπὸ φαντασίας | ἀκαταλήπτου καὶ | ἰσχύειν ἐν ταῖς φαν|τασίαις, ὥστε μὴ ἕλ|κεσθαι ἀπὸ φανται|σιῶν ἀκαταλήπτων | καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν | συγκαταθέσεων ὥσ|τε μὴ ἕλ|κεσθαι ἢ μὴ | ἀ[κ]ο̣λουθε̣[ῖν] φαντα̣|[σίαις μὴ κατα]λη̣π̣[τι|καῖς……]. The Greek text is from the latest reconstruction of *P.Herc*. 1020 edited by M. Alessandrelli and G. Ranocchia in 2015, 'Stoici scriptoris anonymi *Opus incertum* (PHerc. 1020), coll. 104–112', published online at http://www.pherc.eu/publications.html. Cf. also LS 41 D.

[12] According to the standard definition, the apprehensive appearance is ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.248; cf. also 7.402, 7.410, 7.426; *Pyr*. 2.4; Diog. Laert. 7.50). The key term in the definition, the participle ὕπαρχον derived from the verb ὑπάρχειν, has proven difficult to translate into English, not least because the Stoics used it in several different senses (cf. A.A. Long, 'Language and thought in Stoicism', in id. [ed.], *Problems in Stoicism* [London, 1971], 75–113, at 89). Because of this, the interpretation of the phrase ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος in the definition has been highly controversial, and scholars are divided into those that take it to mean that the apprehensive appearance is caused by a real object (e.g. J.M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* [Cambridge, 1969], 136–7; R.J. Hankinson, 'Stoic epistemology', in B. Inwood [ed.], *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* [Cambridge, 2003], 59–84; T. Nawar, 'The Stoic account of apprehension', *Philosopher's Imprint* 14[29] [2014], 1–21) and those who argue that it means that the apprehensive appearance must be true (e.g. M. Frede, 'Stoics and skeptics on clear and distinct appearances', in M. Burnyeat [ed.], *The Skeptical Tradition* [Berkeley, 1983], 65–93; D. Sedley, 'Zeno's definition of *phantasia kataleptike*', in T. Scaltsas and A.S. Mason [edd.], *The Philosophy of Zeno: Zeno of Citium and his Legacy* [Larnaca, 2002], 133–54). For reasons that are too complex to elaborate here and which I have presented elsewhere (see P. Stojanović, 'Zeno of Citium's causal theory of apprehensive appearances', *AncPhil* 39 [2019], 151–74), I favour a modified version of the causal reading of ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος according to which ὕπαρχον refers not to an existing external object *simpliciter* but to an external object that is spatiotemporally present for the subject in the situation in which the appearance is received. This implies that the apprehensive appearance is 'from what is present, and moulded and sealed in accordance with that present thing itself, such that it would not arise from what is not present'.

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(κατάληψις), a favourable epistemic state that provides a necessary step in the process of achieving knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), while assent to non-apprehensive appearances constitutes an unfavourable epistemic state of mere opinion (δόξα).[13] Thus, according to the author of *P.Herc*. 1020, one who possesses the virtue of non–precipitancy would avoid being pulled by non-apprehensive appearances into assent, and thereby avoid holding mere opinions.

The second text is from Sextus Empiricus, who, while reporting the position of the 'younger Stoics'[14] on the criterial role of the apprehensive appearance, says (*Math.* 7.257):

> Hence the apprehensive appearance becomes the criterion of truth not without qualification, but when it has no obstacle. For this one, being plain and striking, all but grabs us by the hair, as they say, dragging us into assent, and needing nothing else to fall upon us in this way or to suggest its difference from the others.[15]

The 'obstacle' mentioned here refers to other (non-apprehensive) appearances that we have previously entertained which are inconsistent with the apprehensive appearance in question and which can prevent us from assenting to the latter (*Math.* 7.253–6). Thus, according to Sextus, some later Stoics thought that, when there are no obstacles, the apprehensive appearance has the effect of 'dragging' (κατασπῶσα) us into assent.[16] Although the verb ἕλκειν does not occur in this passage, the active participle κατασπῶσα of the verb κατασπᾶν ('to drag down') conveys a similar idea as the passive ἕλκεσθαι in *P.Herc*. 1020: certain appearances—this time the apprehensive ones—under right conditions have the ability to drag us to assent to them.

Third, ἕλκειν and its cognates occur in the sense relevant for our discussion in two passages in Epictetus' *Discourses*. While explaining how to avoid assenting to an appearance leading to improper desires through practising the mind to entertain noble thoughts, Epictetus says in 2.18.23: 'If you set these [thoughts] against it, you will overpower the appearance, and you will not be drawn by it' (ταῦτα ἀντιθεὶς νικήσεις τὴν φαντασίαν, οὐχ ἑλκυσθήσῃ ὑπ' αὐτῆς). In 3.12.14–15, Epictetus also says that one of the three topics (τόποι, 3.2.1–2) crucial for moral progress is 'the one which has to do with assents, concerned with things persuasive and attractive (τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ ἑλκυστικά)', that is, concerned with persuasive and attractive appearances.[17]

Finally, there are similar occurrences of ἕλκειν in the writings of Philo of Alexandria and Clement of Alexandria, who admittedly are not Stoics, but are often influenced by their technical philosophical terminology. In *De uita Mosis* 2.236, while describing Moses' reaction to the plea of five daughters to inherit the land of their deceased father,

[13] Plut. *St. rep.* 1056F = LS 41 E; cf. also Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.151–7.

[14] The 'younger Stoics' mentioned here can be identified with some certainty as Antipater and those around him; cf. LS 2.250 (comment on 40 K) and C. Brittain, *Cicero: On Academic Scepticism* (Indianapolis, 2006), 13 n. 21.

[15] ἐνθένδε οὐχ ἁπλῶς κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν ἔνστημα ἔχῃ. αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται, κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτη προσπίπτειν ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰν ὑποβάλλειν.

[16] The passage suggests that the apprehensive appearance's ability to drag one into assent is related to its being 'plain' (ἐναργής). The role of this property of representational mental states that is related to assent will be discussed in more detail below.

[17] In addition to plainness mentioned in the previous footnote, the Stoics thought that 'persuasiveness' (πιθανότης) is another property of representational states related to their ability to induce our assent; cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.242–3, discussed in more detail below.

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Philo uses the passive participle ἑλκόμενος in the sense of one being pulled away from assent by an appearance: 'he admired the prudence of the maidens and their loyalty to their parent but suspended his assent being pulled by another appearance (ὑφ' ἑτέρας ἑλκόμενος φαντασίας), that men should divide inheritances among themselves (…)'. Similarly, Clement says (*Paed.* 2.12.118.2): 'For to chase after stones that are transparent and of peculiar colours and after stained glass is for none other than thoughtless people who are drawn by things that give off a striking appearance (ὑπὸ τῶν πληκτικὴν ἐχόντων φαντασίαν ἑλκομένων)'.

What is common to all these texts is that ἕλκειν and similar verbs in the passive voice are used to describe how someone is (or can be) drawn or dragged to assent. Given the central role which ἕλκειν in the passive voice plays in Ps.-Plutarch's version of Aet. 4.12.5, it seems that the best chance of making sense of the passage is to interpret it along the same lines. According to this interpretation, by defining imagination as an 'empty attraction', a mental state in which we are drawn towards or attracted by a phantasm, Chrysippus was trying to point out that we are *drawn to assent* to the phantasm which is represented by the imagination. To use the example from Aetius, when Orestes is imagining the Furies as bloody-looking dragon-shaped girls, this means that he is being drawn to assent that the Furies are attacking him.[18]

Initially, this interpretation seems quite plausible. Careful examination, however, suggests that it is plagued by several problems. First, unlike the texts talking about dragging one to assent cited above, the focus of Chrysippus' attention in Aet. 4.12 is explaining the difference between appearance and imagination in terms of how these mental states arise and what they do or do not reveal, and not in terms of what kind of effect they can have on our assent. Chrysippus makes two main points: first, that unlike appearance, which is a representational state that arises from an external corporeal object, imagination is a representational state which does not immediately arise from something external; second, and relatedly, that while appearance reveals not only itself but also the thing that appears—the external object that immediately caused the appearance—imagination does not reveal its cause but makes us aware of a phantasm instead. The issue of assent does not seem to be relevant to these points, which is why characterizing imagination in terms of drawing us to assent in this context would be a strange and unmotivated interpolation on Chrysippus' part.

Second, none of the instances cited above of dragging one into assent unambiguously refers to imagination, except probably Epictetus' τὰ ἑλκυστικά in *Diss.* 3.12.14–15.[19] The rest are either definitely or at least plausibly cases where one is being drawn to assent to representational states caused by present external objects, which according to Chrysippus' distinction would be classified as appearances. This

[18] This is, for example, similar to how M. Graver interprets Aet. 4.12.5 in *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago, 2007), 113: 'Orestes is "attracted" to his Furies, not of course in the sense of wanting to pursue them, but in that the nature of his mental experience entices him to believe that they are really there and to pursue a course of action in relation to them.' In general, this approach is consistent with interpreting ἑλκυσμός in the expression διάκενος ἑλκυσμός as conveying the sense of English expression 'to be/get carried away' by one's imagination, which is, for example, suggested by W. Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa* (Westminster, 1995), 321 n. 7.

[19] The reason to think that ἑλκυστικά here include imaginations is Epictetus' description of the subject of the third topic necessary for moral progress in *Diss.* 3.2.5: 'it has to do with infallibility in the matters which have just been mentioned, so that even in dreams, or drunkenness, or a state of melancholy, one may not be taken unawares by an unexamined appearance.' According to the Stoics, representational states that always occur in sleep, and frequently in drunken and melancholic states, are precisely 'empty' appearances or Chrysippean imaginations (cf. Cic. *Acad. post.* 47–54).

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means that, even if the Stoics thought that imaginations have an inherent ability to draw us into assent (which, as we will see below, is itself questionable), they did not consider this ability to be a distinctive feature of imagination but one that is shared by (Chrysippean) appearances too. But if imaginations are not the only representational mental states that can draw us into assent, then centring on this ability as a defining feature of imagination seems irrelevant, especially in the context where imagination is directly compared and contrasted with appearance.

Still, one might think that in the background of the views summarized by Aetius was Chrysippus' idea that all representational mental states share a common structure in that they 'reveal' or make us aware of some content, and also—perhaps in virtue of this revelatory ability—draw us to assent to that content.[20] This hypothesis is not only *prima facie* plausible but also consistent with Chrysippus' emphasis on causal origin as the key remaining difference between appearances and imaginations. Additionally, if true, it would eliminate the two objections mentioned above by providing at least some reason for mentioning assent in this context. The problem with the hypothesis, however, is twofold: first, it is clear that the Stoics did not think that all representational mental states have the ability to draw us to assent, and, second, it seems that they distinguished between the ability of representational states to reveal some content and their ability to draw us to assent to that content because they held that having the former does not entail having the latter. Namely, as we have already suggested above (notes 16 and 17), the Stoics understood the ability of representational states to draw us into assent in terms of properties like plainness (ἐνάργεια) and persuasiveness (πιθανότης): those representational states that have these properties have the ability 'to drag into assent' (εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἐπισπᾶσθαι, Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.172), while those that do not, either 'turn us away from assent' (ἀποστρέφουσαι ἡμᾶς τῆς συγκαταθέσεως) or have no effect on it.[21] Now, Sextus Empiricus reports that in respect to persuasiveness they classified representational states into four categories: persuasive, unpersuasive, simultaneously persuasive and unpersuasive, and neither persuasive nor unpersuasive (*Math.* 7.242–3). The second and the fourth categories are crucial here, because they show not only that the Stoics recognized that there are representational states which lack the ability to draw us to assent but also that they thought that such representational states nevertheless do reveal something. For example, the appearance 'If it is dark, it is day', cited by Sextus Empiricus as an illustration of the category of unpersuasive, does not have the ability to draw us into assent and yet it would be hard to deny that it transparently and unambiguously makes us aware of the content of the conditional that if it is dark then it is day. Likewise, the appearance 'the number of stars is even', which is classified as neither persuasive nor unpersuasive, seems to reveal the proposition that the stars in the night sky are even in number but still does not draw us to assent to it. These examples suggest that for the Stoics the ability of

[20] I am thankful to the anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.

[21] Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.242–3. According to Sextus Empiricus, the Stoics thought that persuasive appearances produce 'smooth movement' (λεῖον κίνημα) in the soul. Similarly, Diogenes Laertius reproduces the following Stoic definition: 'Persuasive proposition is one that leads us into assent' (πιθανὸν δέ ἐστιν ἀξίωμα τὸ ἄγον εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, 7.75). Carneades, who is almost certainly following the Stoics closely here, apparently held that persuasiveness of a representational state depends on whether it is 'clear' (τρανής) or 'plain' (ἐναργής) (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.172). Note the remarkable similarity between Carneades' formulation εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἐπισπᾶσθαι in *Math.* 7.172 and the phrase κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν in Sextus' report about the 'younger Stoics' in *Math.* 7.257 cited above.

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representational states to draw us to assent is independent from their revelatory ability. In other words, they seem to have thought that a representational state can reveal some content to us without drawing us to assent to it. If Chrysippus shared this view—and there is no reason to think that he did not—then we are back to the problem of the relevance of assent for distinguishing imagination from appearance in terms of causal origin and revelatory ability, which is his main goal in Aetius' summary. Furthermore, this raises another important question: if it is possible for representational states to reveal propositional contents without having the effect of drawing us into assent, then why would Chrysippus think that imaginations are special in that they always produce this effect? It seems hard to accept that he thought that each time we imagine something—say, a Cyclops living in a cave or a Centaur wondering in a forest—we are somehow drawn to assent to these things instead of finding them unpersuasive and unbelievable.

Finally, it may be tempting to suppose that Chrysippus' intention was to say that not all imaginations have the ability to draw us to assent but rather only those we entertain when mad or otherwise mentally deranged (indeed, such cases seem to be in the focus of his attention in Aet. 4.12), because our being in an abnormal mental state somehow makes these imaginations plain and persuasive. However, the Stoics' reply to one of the main objections raised against their theory of the apprehensive appearance makes this quite improbable. Namely members of Plato's Academy, which with Arcesilaus' leadership took a strong sceptical turn, argued that it is possible for the apprehensive appearance to be indistinguishable in terms of properties like persuasiveness and plainness from imaginations entertained in dreams, madness, drunkenness, etc. (Cic. *Acad. post.* 47–52; Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.403–4). They reasoned that, if imaginations indeed have plainness and persuasiveness as apprehensive appearances do, then we would often be drawn to assent to falsehoods, and the apprehensive appearance would not be able to serve as a criterion of truth. Apparently, the main strategy employed by the Stoics in response to this objection was to insist that imaginations simply lack these properties.[22] They argued that the same representational content which we eagerly assent to while dreaming, drunk or deranged, we find unpersuasive and unbelievable when sane, sober and awake. For instance, in a dream the poet Ennius assents that he sees Homer, but after waking up he says that it had merely seemed to him that he had seen Homer (Cic. *Acad. post.* 51, 88). Or, to expand on Chrysippus' example from Euripides, during a fit of madness Orestes assents that the Erinyes are attacking him, but after recovering he does not believe the same thing to which he previously assented (*Or.* 277–9). Of course, the Stoics' intention was not to deny the obvious fact that, while dreaming, drunk or deranged, we usually do assent to whatever

[22] Lucullus, who mostly represents the Stoic epistemological views in Cicero's *Academica posteriora*, in response to the Academic objection in 51 says that *perspicuitas*—which earlier in 17 is introduced as his Latin translation of the Stoic concept of ἐνάργεια—is 'absent' (*abesse*) from all imaginations, including those that are entertained in abnormal states such as drunkenness, madness, sleep, and others. *probabilitas*, which is Cicero's rendering of πιθανότης, is not mentioned explicitly in 51, but is discussed a few paragraphs earlier (47–9) in the same context of indistinguishability of empty and apprehensive appearances, which suggests that the Stoics probably thought that imaginations lack persuasiveness too. Furthermore, although this is by no means conclusive, *Acad. post.* 87–8 suggests that the strategy of claiming that imaginations lack plainness can be traced back to Chrysippus himself. The Stoics were likely driven to adopt this position by their strong empiricist and materialist philosophical framework in which the subjective 'look' of an appearance produced by the immediate causal impact of an external corporeal object on our senses can never be matched exactly by an appearance produced internally, solely through the activity of our mind.

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we happen to imagine. Rather, their point was that in these cases we assent not because our imaginations possess plainness and persuasiveness but because the abnormal condition of our soul makes us inclined to assent to them even though they lack these properties. In other words, they held that, while we may have a defective inclination to assent to imaginations entertained when our soul is in an abnormal condition, imaginations *qua* representational states do not possess an inherent ability to draw us to assent to them.

All this makes it unlikely that Chrysippus thought that imagination is a mental state whose defining characteristic is that it draws the subject to assent to a phantasm, as Ps.-Plutarch's version of Aet. 4.12 suggests. And in the absence of a better account of what exactly being drawn to a phantasm would mean in this context, the reliability of Ps.-Plutarch's version of Aetius' summary seems to be seriously brought into question.

Fortunately, one of the alternative sources for Aet. 4.12, Nemesius' *De natura hominis* 55.13–22, suggests a more promising interpretation of Chrysippus' view on imagination. Although shorter and less detailed than Ps.-Plutarch's version, Nemesius' text does retain the sentence that is the focus of our attention (55.21–2):

φάντασμα δὲ ὃ ἐφέλκομεν κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν μεμηνότων καὶ μελαγχολώντων[23]

[23] The Greek text cited is from M. Morani's Teubner edition (*Nemesius De natura hominis* [Leipzig, 1987]). There is some disagreement among manuscripts regarding the first part of the sentence that may be pertinent to our discussion, so it should be addressed here. Namely in his critical apparatus on page 55 Morani notes that, while most extant Greek manuscripts (as well as early Latin and Aramaic translations) of Nemesius read φάντασμα δὲ ὃ ἐφέλκομεν κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν, a few of them offer two alternative versions, (a) φάντασμα δὲ [*sic*], ᾧ ἐφελκόμεν [*sic*] κατὰ τὸ φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν ('Phantasm is that by which we draw in imagination's empty drawing', BN Gr. 1268; Sächsische LB Da 57) and (b) φάντασμα δὲ [*sic*], ὡς ἐφελκόμενον τον [*sic*] κατὰ τὸ φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν ('Phantasm, as what is drawn in imagination's empty drawing', British Library, Harley MS 5685). Both of these versions, however, are problematic. Regarding version (a), if κατὰ τὸ φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν is taken as a single unit, then the sentence is grammatically awkward because ἐφελκόμεν does not have an object. Alternatively, if we take διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν as the object of ἐφελκόμεν and treat κατὰ τὸ φανταστικόν as a separate adverbial phrase (I am thankful to the anonymous referee for pointing out this grammatical possibility), we get 'Phantasm is that with which, in [virtue of] imagination, we draw an empty drawing.' This implies that phantasms somehow play an active role in the process of 'empty drawing' which is involved in imagining. But, according to the Stoics, every phantasm occurring in a human soul represents a 'concept' (ἐννόημα, Ps.-Plut. *Placita* 900A–D = Aet. 4.11), and concepts are mental entities that result from the corporeal psychic process called 'conception' (ἔννοια) which consists in thinking about a concept (cf. LS 1.182). This implies that the role of phantasms is passive: they are produced by the processes such as thinking and imagining, and not the other way around as the latter reading of (a) requires. The problem with version (b), on the other hand, is that the text is highly unreliable; it is clearly visible in the Harley manuscript that the scribe first wrote ὡς ἐφελκόμεν κατὰ τὸ φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν, and then made two corrections—changed the verb ἐφελκόμεν to the participle ἐφελκόμενον by adding the suffix –ον, and then added τον before κατά—probably in an attempt to make sense of the ὡς whose presence here is almost certainly an error. Nevertheless, presumably based on the idea that both version (a) and version (b) suggest the presence of the letter ω before the verb ἐφέλκειν, and on Ps.-Plutarch's version of the same sentence in Aet. 4.12.5—which, as we saw above, uses the verb ἕλκειν in the passive voice (ἑλκόμεθα)—Matthaei in the Oxford edition of 1802 (later reprinted in J.-P. Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* vol. 40, from 1858) emends this into ᾧ ἐφελκόμεθα (page 634), in which he is followed by Diels ([n. 2], 402). However, Morani's version, which gives the verb ἐφέλκειν in the active voice, is more likely to be accurate than Matthaei's passive reading for a number of reasons. First, the former is in accordance with a larger number of manuscripts. Second, it is not plagued by problems such as those we mentioned in relation to versions (a) and (b) above. Third,

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Phantasm is that which we draw in imagination's empty drawing, as in the case of manic and melancholic people.

Crucially, instead of Ps.-Plutarch's ἕλκειν in the passive voice, here we have the cognate verb ἐφέλκειν in the active voice, which implies a different meaning—that phantasm is that which we pull or draw while our soul is engaged in imagining. In other words, Nemesius' version of Aetius suggests that Chrysippus understood imagination not as a mental process in which we are drawn towards a phantasm but instead as one in which *we are drawing* a phantasm.

Taken at face value, Nemesius' version seems no less cryptic than Ps.-Plutarch's is, because it is not obvious what the claim that imagination involves drawing a phantasm might refer to here. However, I believe that a plausible hypothesis can be formulated if we recall what Chrysippus took to be the main characteristic of imagination as a mental state. According to Aet. 4.12.4, the key difference between appearance and imagination is that, at the time of being entertained by the subject, the former is an affection in the soul produced by that which appears—that is, by a present external object—which is its immediate cause, while the latter is an affection that has no immediate external cause. To use Chrysippus' example, at the time Orestes is imagining the Furies, the causal origin of the phantasm of the Furies is not actually in the Furies but in Orestes' own soul. In fact, a more precise Stoic explanation of how the phantasm of a Fury comes about is preserved by our sources: Orestes created it 'by composition' (κατὰ σύνθεσιν), that is, by combining in his mind the concepts of a girl, a bloody-looking person and a dragon, and thus conjured up a thought about something that is at the moment not affecting him causally.[24] This suggests that Chrysippus' talk of 'drawing a phantasm' is referring to the psychological act of creating the concept of a Fury and entertaining a mental image of her.[25] We should not forget, however, that, in addition to fictional objects such as the Furies, the Stoics also thought that phantasms can represent objects that do exist but are not present at the time the phantasm is entertained.[26] In the case of the latter, they would probably say that the phantasm had been recalled from the memory, like, for example, when we imagine Dion, even though Dion is not in the vicinity and thus is not presently affecting our senses.[27] In both cases, the point is the same: at the moment imagination is entertained, both the phantasm and that

Morani's version is more likely from the perspective of internal coherence of Nemesius' text, since in another passage where imagination is mentioned again (70.22–3, discussed further below), although the verb Nemesius uses is ἕλκειν and not ἐφέλκειν, the voice of the verb is active (ἕλκουσι), not passive. Finally, as I will argue below, the use of ἕλκειν/ἐφέλκειν in non-passive voices is attested in contexts that refer to imaginations.

[24] Cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.57. That Sextus' discussion in *Math.* 8.56–60 relies on the views formulated (or at least adopted; cf. Diog. Laert. 10.32 = LS 15 F) by the Stoics is confirmed by Diog. Laert. 7.53, who also cites a number of methods of creation and manipulation of conceptual content.

[25] Here I am setting aside the issue whether the process of creating the concept of a Fury by composition is occurring in Orestes' soul at the moment he is imagining it, or whether he had created this concept earlier (e.g. when he first heard a story about the Furies) and is now merely recalling it from memory. Both of these psychological processes would amount to the act of 'drawing a phantasm' according to the interpretation I am proposing.

[26] This is suggested by Diog. Laert. 7.61 (= LS 30 C2), where phantasm is characterized as a 're-imprint' (ἀνατύπωμα) of something perceived before, like, for example, when the phantasm of a horse arises even though there is no actual horse present.

[27] The example with Dion is from Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.245, and for my interpretation of it see Stojanović (n. 12). The Stoics viewed memory as a set of permanently stored appearances, which give rise to conceptions (Aet. 4.11.1–2 = LS 39 E_{1-2}; Plut. *Com. not.* 1084F–1085A = LS 39 F).

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which it represents are produced by a process completely internal to the subject's soul and not by the impact of an external object on the sense organs. And it seems that this was precisely what Chrysippus was trying to emphasize by saying that a phantasm is what *we draw* when imagining: that we are conjuring up or creating a mental image of something in the absence of a corresponding external thing which is engaged in an immediate causal interaction with our soul.[28] It is in this sense that imagination is an 'empty drawing', an act of pulling out of one's own soul a representation of something that is not actually there at the time the representation is being entertained.

Given the two versions of Aet. 4.12.5 and the corresponding two interpretations of Chrysippus' understanding of imagination, the key question is which one is more reliable, that is, more faithful to Aetius' original text and thus presumably to Chrysippus' actual words. Although it is impossible to be absolutely certain, I would like to suggest that Nemesius' version is the more likely candidate. Namely, as we have seen above, Ps.-Plutarch's version, according to which Chrysippus claimed that an important characteristic of imagination is that we are drawn towards a phantasm, is either doomed to remain unclear or, according to the best available reconstruction, incompatible with what we know about the Stoic psychology of assent. Furthermore, it makes no sense in the context of Chrysippus' main explanatory goal in Aet. 4.12, which is to specify the difference between appearance and imagination in terms of the genesis of these two mental states and their revelatory ability. In respect to this goal, characterizing imagination as a state in which we are drawn towards a phantasm seems completely irrelevant, as I argued above. On the other hand, Nemesius' version, which suggests that Chrysippus thought that imagination consists in drawing or conjuring up a phantasm from our mind, is consistent with the Stoic views on memory and on thinking about fictional entities. In addition, it fits perfectly Chrysippus' main topic in Aet. 4.12, which is the contrast between appearances, representational states whose immediate causal origin is in a present external object, and imaginations, whose origin is internal to the soul.

What about the textual support for Nemesius' version? Our sources unfortunately do not give us much to go on: just like in the case of Ps.-Plutarch's formulation of being drawn towards a phantasm, there is no other extant Stoic text that uses Nemesius' formulation of drawing a phantasm. Nevertheless, there are texts where ἕλκειν in the active voice is used in reference to imaginations such as in Nemesius' version of Aetius. The first text occurs later in Nemesius' text as part of his discussion of the relationship between sensation, thought and memory. In 70.12–71.5 he uses an example from Galen (*De loc. aff.* 8.226 K; *De symp. diff.* 7.60–1 K) to show how in patients who are suffering from one form of phrenitis[29] sense perception can be sound but their thinking adversely affected, while in those who are suffering from a different form of phrenitis thinking can be sound but perception negatively affected. The example is about a patient suffering from the former type of phrenitis, who decided to throw things out of a high window onto the street below in order to amuse the people passing by.

[28] Chrysippus' view would thus be very similar to the Peripatetic position found in commentaries on Aristotle, according to which imagination, memory and remembering all crucially include the process in which 'the soul brings forward phantasms from [within] itself' (προβάλλουσα τὰ φαντάσματα ἀφ' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχή, Them. *in Ar. de an. par.* 28.13–14; cf. also Simpl. *in Ar. de an.* 214.9; Prisc. *Metaph. in Theoph.* 24.12).

[29] In ancient medicine, phrenitis (φρενῖτις) was a mental derangement caused by excess yellow bile and accompanied by fever that can cause hallucinations.

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After throwing a few glass objects, the patient picked up a wool-worker who happened to be in his apartment, asked the bystanders below whether they want to see a wool-worker falling down, and then threw him out of the window as well, much to the spectators' consternation. Based on the example, Nemesius concludes that the patient's senses were working properly because he was able to discriminate between the glass objects and the wool-worker, but that owing to phrenitis the patient's thought processes were compromised since he did not understand that throwing a person out of the window is much more problematic than throwing glass objects. Then he goes on to make the following point about the patients suffering from the second type of phrenitis (Nemesius 70.22–3):

> Others, however, draw an empty appearance and believe that they see what they do not see, but think reasonably in other situations.[30]

Although Nemesius is here talking about drawing a φαντασία, since he is qualifying it with the adjective διάκενος there is little doubt that he in fact has in mind what in Chrysippus' technical terminology would be classified as φανταστικόν. The verb ἕλκουσι occurs here in the active voice and indicates that when they are suffering from the second form of phrenitis people can draw imaginations about things that are not present.

The second text is part of Sextus Empiricus' report on the Stoic classification of different kinds of appearances in *Math.* 7.242–60. According to Sextus (*Math.* 7.247), they held that

> Among true [appearances] some are apprehensive and some are not; the not apprehensive ones are those that strike people in [a state of] affection. For many phrenitics and melancholics draw (ἕλκουσι) an appearance that is true, yet not apprehensive but occurring in this way externally and by chance, hence they are often not confident about it and do not assent to it.

Although this is not immediately clear, there are strong reasons to think that the true non-apprehensive appearance Sextus refers to here is in fact a Chrysippean imagination. Namely, according to the Stoic definition of the apprehensive appearance,[31] there are only two types of situations when a true appearance—one that accurately represents some real object—fails to be apprehensive: either when it is caused by that object but instead of being 'clear' and 'distinct' it is 'faint' and 'mixed-up', or when it is 'empty' and not caused by that object, that is, when it is a Chrysippean imagination.[32] Now, given that the former type of non-apprehensive appearance is caused by a present external object and accurately represents that object, it is hard to see why the Stoics would say for such an appearance that it is true merely by chance. On the contrary, it seems that, because it is caused by the object it accurately represents, such an

[30] ἄλλοι δὲ διάκενον ἕλκουσι φαντασίαν ὁρᾶν οἰόμενοι τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα φρονοῦσι κατὰ λόγον. In *De loc. aff.* 8.226–7, Galen illustrates this second type of phrenitis by an episode from his own life, when while suffering from high fever it appeared to him that little sticks of straw were protruding from his mattress and little pieces of wool from his gown when there were none.

[31] See n. 12 above.

[32] The Stoics thought that one of the crucial characteristics of the apprehensive appearance is that it is 'clear' (τρανής) and 'distinct' or 'thoroughly imprinted' (ἔκτυπος), and that this has to do with the requirement that this appearance is 'such that it would not come about from what is not present' (see Frede [n. 12]). The type of appearance which is caused by an external object but which (contrary to the clear and distinct one) is 'faint' (ἀμυδρά) and represents its object in a 'mixed-up' (συγκεχυμένως) way is mentioned in *Math.* 7.171–2. See also Diog. Laert. 7.46 and Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 71.13.

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appearance would count as being true non-accidentally (even though it would still be non-apprehensive owing to being unclear and indistinct). On the other hand, it is relatively obvious why the Stoics would say for a Chrysippean imagination which accurately represents some real object that it is true merely by chance—precisely because it is not caused by that object.

Furthermore, the fact that the appearance Sextus is talking about in *Math.* 7.247 occurs to phrenitics and melancholics[33] also strongly indicates imagination. We have already seen in our discussion of Nemesius 70.22–3 that phrenitis causes people to imagine things that are not actually there. There is evidence that the Stoics thought the same about melancholy. For instance, all three sources of Aet. 4.12 mention melancholy as a state in which phantasms arise, while Ps.-Galen even specifies that both Orestes and Theoclymenus were melancholic when they have entertained their respective imaginations (*De hist. phil.* 93.10–11). The mention of Theoclymenus is particularly interesting in this context because it is a case of divinatory prediction that turns out to be true, one that the Stoics would classify under the so-called 'natural' or 'non-technical' form of divination.[34] It is thus quite possible that the accidentally true non-apprehensive appearance Sextus has in mind is in fact a Chrysippean imagination entertained in the state of melancholy or phrenitis that turns out to be an accurate divinatory prediction. If so, then Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.247 represents another instance of ἔλκειν in the active voice (ἕλκουσι) used in relation to imagination, occurring this time in a context that is undeniably Stoic.

The third text occurs in the opening paragraphs of Plutarch's biography of Dion of Syracuse. After mentioning that Dion was given advance warning of his untimely death by a spirit, Plutarch says (*Dion* 2.4):

> And yet there are those who deny these things, and say that no one in their right mind is ever visited by a phantasm of a spirit or by an apparition, but that only little children, silly women and weakened men fallen into a state of erratic mind and ill-tempered body draw for themselves [ἐφέλκεσθαι] empty and strange opinions because they have the evil spirit of superstition inside them.

According to Plutarch, people who reject the idea that spirits can speak to us explain this as mere superstition of those who entertain 'empty opinions' (κεναὶ δόξαι) involving phantasms of spirits. Again, the fact that he employs the adjective κενός and says that they involve phantasms strongly suggests that the opinions in question are in fact Chrysippean imaginations. The verb Plutarch uses is ἐφέλκειν in the middle voice (ἐφέλκεσθαι), in the sense of 'drawing imaginations for oneself'.[35] Nevertheless, in this context this conveys a very similar meaning to the active ἐφέλκειν Nemesius uses in his summary of Aet. 4.12.5.

[33] Melancholy (μελαγχολία) was also a type of mental derangement commonly considered in ancient medicine to be caused by excess black bile which, unlike phrenitis, is not accompanied by fever, but which, like phrenitis, can also cause hallucinations.

[34] According to Hom. *Od.* 20.350–7, during a banquet attended by Penelope's suitors Theoclymenus predicts that they will all be dead by the end of the night, which later indeed happens. For the Stoic distinction between 'technical' or 'artificial' and 'non–technical' or 'natural' divination, see Ps.-Plut. *Vit. Hom.* 2.2592–7; Cic. *Diu.* 1.11–12, 1.34, 1.70–2, 1.109–10, 1.127–9, 2.26–7; cf. also Stojanović (n. 4).

[35] Although ἐφέλκεσθαι corresponds both to middle and to passive, the voice of the verb here is middle because it is accompanied by a direct object in the accusative case (δόξας κενὰς καὶ ἀλλοκότους).

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Before concluding, let us address two potential problems with the interpretation of Aet. 4.12 that I am proposing. The first is that all three texts cited above in its support talk about the subject drawing an *imagination* and not about drawing a *phantasm*, as Nemesius does in his summary of Chrysippus. Indeed, as I mentioned above, no other Stoic text employs the language of drawing phantasms. Certainly, one reason for this could be the scarcity of the surviving Stoic texts. Another could be that Chrysippus' technical language failed to become widely accepted by his Stoic followers. It is quite possible that Chrysippus saw the talk of drawing imaginations as imprecise and wanted to clarify that it is in fact more accurate to say that imagination consists in drawing a phantasm but that his clarification was not deemed as important by other authors, just like in the case of his attempt to introduce φανταστικόν as a more technical term for empty appearance.

The second problem is that, except for Nemesius 55.14–24 and Plut. *Dion* 2.4, in all other texts we have cited, the verb used to refer to appearances and imaginations is ἕλκειν and not ἐφέλκειν. This may suggest that the use of ἐφέλκειν by Nemesius in 55.14–24 was his own invention and not a faithful reproduction of Aetius' original text and thus presumably of Chrysippus' language. However, the brief summary of Aetius in Nemesius 55.14–24 represents the sole occurrence of the verb ἐφέλκειν in his entire text, while ἕλκειν and its cognates occur in it more than a dozen times in various contexts. In fact, as we saw above, in the only other passage where Nemesius is talking about imagination in his own words, 70.22–3, he uses ἕλκειν and not ἐφέλκειν. This makes it very unlikely that Nemesius creatively inserted ἐφέλκειν instead of ἕλκειν into his summary of Aetius. On the contrary, it is quite probable that here Nemesius used the verb ἐφέλκειν—which he apparently was not particularly fond of—precisely because that is what was in the original Aetian text he was summarizing.

Although the evidence from extant sources is far from conclusive and leaves a lot to be desired, all this hopefully shows that on balance there are good textual grounds as well as strong interpretative reasons to take Nemesius' version as closer to the original text of Aet. 4.12.5—and thus presumably to the original text of Chrysippus that Aetius was summarizing—than Ps.-Plutarch's version. If so, the verb Aetius used at 4.12.5 was not ἕλκειν in the passive voice but ἐφέλκειν in the active or in the middle voice,[36] which implies that Chrysippus held that imagining consists not in being drawn towards a phantasm but in drawing a phantasm in the sense of conjuring up a mental image of something from within our soul.

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[36] We cannot completely rule out the possibility that the verb in Aetius' original text in 4.12.5 was ἐφελκόμεθα in the middle voice instead of Nemesius' ἐφέλκομεν in the active voice, giving something like φάντασμα δὲ ὃ ἐφελκόμεθα κατὰ τὸν φανταστικὸν διάκενον ἑλκυσμόν ('phantasm is that which we draw for ourselves in imagination's empty drawing'). Plutarch's use of the middle voice ἐφέλκεσθαι in *Dion* 2.4 which is cited above lends some support to this possibility. If ὃ ἐφελκόμεθα was indeed in Aetius' original text, then ἐφ' ὃ ἑλκόμεθα in Ps.-Plutarch may have easily been an orthographic mistake of taking ἐφ from ἐφελκόμεθα and writing it before ὃ, made by the author of the text or perhaps later during the process of copying the manuscript. On the other hand, in this case Nemesius' ὃ ἐφέλκομεν in the active voice was probably a simplification of Aetius' ὃ ἐφελκόμεθα, one which compared to Ps.-Plutarch's version preserved Aetius' original sense more faithfully.

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