understand the work of Anaximander in relation to the methods employed by archaic architects in Greece and Egypt. Anaximander used the unit that measures the height and diameter of the column drum earth (height one unit, diameter three) as the module in terms of which other distances and structures of the architecture of the universe are measured out. Yet there are problems even in this second rehearsal of Hahn's theory, for he uses Anaximander's procedure as evidence for his claim that Milesian architects probably employed that approach (p. 82). Is it more likely that they used that modular approach, once we recognize that he clearly did? Perhaps so, given that he might have learnt it from them, or they from him. But then, so what? Can that hypothesis add anything to our understanding of his choice of the proportions he chose?

What seems crucial is that Anaximander chose a set of numbers with a mathematical rationale: it formed a systematic series, and that fact invites us to suppose that Anaximander adopted the numbers not on the basis of empirical observations but on the assumption that the universe is orderly. Yet Couprie is too swift in dismissing the idea that some kind of measurements could have entered the calculations. It is simply not true that geometry is unable to draw inferences about distance from temporal measurements available to the observer, once the idea of depth in space has been envisaged. Distance is related to speed of travel and time taken, and the last of those factors could be measured. Of course, we must then either assume equal speed of travel on the part of all the bodies, or build in variable speeds at the circumference. In the first case, we could account for the variable time by positing the appropriate distances, but Anaximander clearly did not do that. On the second hypothesis, the distance will be only one of two unknown factors. Still, we may imagine that Anaximander might have measured the time taken for a body to complete a full circle, as one factor in calculating his proposed series of distances.

This collection of essays could have benefited from some competent editing to eliminate a range of errors of grammar, spelling, scholarship, and various kinds of incoherence, particularly in Naddaf's essay.

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PRESOCRATIC IDENTITY

A. LAKS, C. LOUGUET (edd.): *Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie Présocratique? What is Presocratic Philosophy?* (Cahiers de philologie: Série Apparat critique 20.) Pp. 550. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2002. Paper, €29. ISBN: 2-85939-740-X.

As André Laks observes in the preface to this volume, there has been no international forum for the discussion of Presocratic philosophy comparable with those that cater for Platonists, Aristotelians, and students of Hellenistic philosophy. The colloquium at which the papers collected here were delivered was organized in October 2000 in an attempt to put that right—and a second meeting is scheduled for September 2004. There must have been quite a buzz about the occasion, to judge from the ambition and appetite evident in most of the contributions.

The five papers in the opening section all address the identity of Presocratic philosophy, with Laks focusing at the outset on the conjunction of the very terms 'Presocratic' and 'philosophy' to describe it (first used—so far as Laks can establish—by J. A. Eberhard in a history of philosophy manual of 1788). Subsequent

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items contribute to a spirited and wide-ranging debate on whether there is any sense in which Presocratic philosophy constitutes a single distinctive enterprise, given parallels and influences from the Near East on the one side, and on the other in view of something explored in detail by Geoffrey Lloyd and Laura Gemelli Marciano: the variety of modes of intellectual enquiry pursued in Greece itself by versatile practitioners speaking to several different kinds of audiences in a milieu where boundaries between disciplines retained a degree of fluidity throughout the period. The relatively sceptical contributions of Lloyd and Gemelli are sandwiched between others pressing for a more unitary picture (by André Laks, Maria Michaela Sassi, and Patricia Curd). Laks and Sassi—who makes Cornford's *Principium Sapientiae* her principal point of departure—see a group of thinkers bound together by participation in a particular argumentative tradition; Curd makes a robust defence of the commitment to an ideal of systematic rationality evidenced particularly in major figures like Heraclitus and Parmenides as the hallmark of Presocratic thought. This clutch of essays, uniformly well-written and thought-provoking, make an ideal contemporary introduction to higher level study of the Presocratics.

Other contributors, too, take on large themes. With massive learning lucidly and judiciously deployed, Alberto Bernabé revisits the whole issue of Orphic strains in Presocratic thought, and presents a magisterial redefinition of the *status quaestionis* for the early twenty-first century. Walter Leszl (apropos of his forthcoming edition of Democritus) considers the general problem of what sort of thing an edition of a Presocratic should be, and *inter alia* reviews doxographical traditions, usefully reopening questions about the structure and sources of Aetius's *Placita*. Gabor Betegh—in an inevitably speculative piece—argues most interestingly for the general thesis that the creation of new intellectual models of the universe (Anaximandrian or Parmenidean or Eudoxan) probably involved the simultaneous production of three-dimensional representations of the astronomical system: eventually celestial globes and armillary spheres. And in a penetrating philosophical study Mantas Adomenas surveys and analyses the whole range of evidence for reception of Heraclitus in Plato.

Even in studies of more particular topics the contributors mostly offer treatments that aspire to completeness and look likely to become required reading on the subject. That applies, for example, to Alexander Mourelatos's elegant and convincing discussion of Xenophanes' astronomy and its relation to his account of the 'limit' of the earth, David Sider's erudite 'Democritus on the Weather', and Carl Huffman's definitive examination of the number theory—non-Pythagorean, as he demonstrates—of the sculptor Polyclitus. There are studies of Xenophanes' theology (Emese Mogyoródi), Aristotle's evidence on Democritus' psychology and physiology (Pierre-Marie Morel), Aristotle's treatment of Zeno's 'Dichotomy' (Richard McKirahan), and the problem of Anaxagoras' 'other world' (a new solution from Claire Louguet, who doubles up as second member of the editorial team). All provide something of value. One particularly compelling paper is Oliver Primavesi's comprehensive survey of knowledge of Empedocles 'de Zénon a Tzétzès'. As well as drawing attention to Marwan Rashed's recent discovery of hitherto unknown information (in an Aristotle scholium) on time periods in the cosmic cycle, he also discusses evidence for the circulation of copies of Empedocles in medieval Byzantium, including the tantalizing possibility (noted by Jaap Mansfeld a decade ago) that a manuscript of the *Katharmoi* had found its way to Venice by 1424. Primavesi is impatient for exhaustive coverage of Byzantine authors in the TLG—and has not given up hope that a text of Empedocles may still be lurking in some library in Italy or Istanbul. Another contribution marked by an almost evangelical passion is Daniel

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Graham's fresh consideration of the Presocratic discovery that the moon derives its light from the sun. After a careful study of the evidence, he comes to a conclusion many have reached before: the credit almost certainly belongs to Parmenides. What is distinctive about Graham's discussion is his eloquence in making the case for Parmenides as 'un cosmologiste formidable, ainsi que ses successeurs l'ont reconnu lorsqu' ils ont adopté son intuition fondamentale et l'ont exploité pour en dériver un modèle des corps célestes physiquement puissant' (as this quotation indicates, many of the contributions originally written in English have been translated into French). He ends with the claim that Parmenides' perception that the moon is a solid, opaque, spherical body, circling the earth beneath the sun, was perhaps the decisive moment in early Greek astronomy, enabling the eventual development of a mathematical model of the heavens such as the Babylonians (for want of an underlying physical model) never achieved.

Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie Présocratique? is an important book. It launches a debate of high quality on its official subject, as well as presenting a rich selection of exemplary studies on more specific Presocratic topics. The vigour of the work on offer here—whether from leading figures with established reputations in the field or by younger scholars—is a fitting response to André Laks's initiative in arranging the original colloquium, and promises well for successor events. It remains only to add that the volume is beautifully produced, with an extensive *index locorum*.

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THE PRE-PLATONIC PHILOSOPHERS

A. Preus (ed.): *Before Plato. Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy VI.* Pp. 1 + 250, maps, ills. Albany: SUNY Press, 2001. Paper, $18.95. ISBN: 0-7914-4956-4.

Preus's book is the sixth volume in a series dedicated to ancient Greek philosophy. The book includes eleven essays, some of which make use of illustrations, maps, and figures. It also makes available an index of concepts and classical passages cited mostly from the Diels–Kranz collection of Presocratic fragments. In his introduction to the book, P. informs us that all of the essays have been, at one time or another, presented at the meetings of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. The book explores topics in classical scholarship such as the importance of Anaximander's scientific views, the influence of the Presocratics on Plato's philosophy, and the impossibility of motion in Eleatic philosophy. In what follows, I present the main argument of each of the essays in an abbreviated form.

The essays by G. Naddaf, D. L. Couprie, and R. McKirahan focus on the scientific aspects of Anaximander's philosophical investigations. In 'Anaximander's Measurements Revisited', Naddaf argues that to settle the debate surrounding the numbers and/or measurements regarding Anaximander's cosmological model we need to understand that 'Anaximander appears obsessed with units of 3 and not with units of 4' (p. 8). In doing so, Naddaf demonstrates that Anaximander holds a 'mathematical or geometrical' view of the universe (p. 19). In a similar manner, Couprie credits Anaximander with being the 'discoverer of space' (p. 24). He argues that not only does Western astronomy begin with Anaximander, but also that Anaximander was revolutionary in his thinking by providing us with the first 'three-dimensional world-picture' of the universe (p. 48). In 'Anaximander's Infinite

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