painlessly engaged with the 'classical tradition' (we are in heritage country here). There is something emblematic in the quotation of *sic transit Gloria mundi* from Thomas A. Kempis (*sic*) in these pages. Practitioners of music and art have been going the same way.

BARBARA LEVICK

*Art and Archaeology*

Downright derision: a crown of thorns. Consummate glory: a crown of olive leaves. From Golgotha to Olympia does not seem very far in Classical antiquity: in both places, at least, we find the pretence of royalty expressed by a garland that will not last. It was a biodegradable coronation: so what was it worth? There is no straight answer to that query, and it would be impertinent here even to consider the symbolic significance eventually given to the mockery of Jesus of Nazareth as 'King of the Jews'. But the Classical archaeologist must engage with the quandary as it affected an Olympic victor. To win an event at Olympia, the most prestigious of the four 'Sacred and Crown Games', ostensibly brought nothing more than a wreath of foliage from a tree kept sacred in the Altis or 'Grove' of the host sanctuary. Of course, further benefits for winning could be expected at home, some of them handsome in social and financial worth. But welcome as a lifetime of free meals might have been, the problem remained: how was the precious *kleos*, the 'renown' of victory, to be broadcast and preserved? An answer was supplied by two types of specialist in the diffusion of renown – the poet and the sculptor. I had always assumed that these poets and sculptors tended to compete as business rivals – with Pindar, the 'epinikian' poet *par excellence*, seeming to boast (*Nemean* 5.1–5) that his commemorations of victory were uniquely portable and durable. To read Deborah Steiner's *Images in Mind*,[1] however, is to beware of such an easy assumption. For the rapport that Steiner explores between literature and statuary is essentially a symbiosis – a mutual dependence, a complex of complementary devices, that almost forces us to envisage poets and sculptors as collaborators. As Steiner begins by admitting, she set out to write a book about how not only poets, but dramatists, philosophers, and historians used statues as 'cognitive and hermeneutic devices' in their texts – how statues became 'good to think with' in Greek literature. But she could not, as she admits, keep those statues on the page. They insisted on being regarded in their own three-dimensional space, as artefacts with something to say (as it were) by themselves. Whatever their function, these objects were once 'performative and efficacious agents, able to interact in a variety of ways with those who commissioned, venerated, and even on occasion defaced them.' Much of the evidence for this roaming interaction comes, naturally, from literary sources, and we can speculate how much of the process took place subconsciously (did Pindar and Bacchylides have bronzed flesh or hollow bronze in mind when they spoke of athletes 'shining'?). Still, there is surely enough evidence collected here to reaffirm that the 'iconology' of Greek art can only proceed by reference to Greek literature; and (*vice versa*) that an awareness of visual aesthetics is essential to understanding Greek texts. 'The task then . . . is to define the conditions that allow artifacts, epigraphical documents, and literary texts to throw light upon one another in reciprocal fashion.' So Gloria Ferrari phrases the

[1] *Images in Mind.* Studies in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought. By Deborah Tarn Steiner. Princeton UP, 2001. Pp. xviii + 360, with 28 figs.

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mission undertaken in her *Figures of Speech*[2] – a statement indebted (as she acknowledges) to J.-P. Vernant, and one way of renouncing the 'attributionist' mode of studying Greek painted pottery. In fact, very few scholars are currently obsessed with trying to attribute vases to names; a concern to extract social history from these relics has been prevalent for several decades now. But there was something exemplary about the best connoisseurs of artistic identity: they scrutinized images with microscopic care. Similar attention to detail is no less necessary when it comes to the interpretation of meaning, as Ferrari demonstrates. Her cautionary case is the sort of scene routinely reproduced as an 'illustration' of female domesticity in Classical Athens – a vignette of women working with wool. The possibility was raised long ago that some scenes of wool-working might show *hetairai*, 'courtesans', not model wives; but Ferrari unravels much further ambivalence. In the course of a close and logical scrutiny of such 'generic' scenes, she shows how vase-painters produced 'a model of maidenhood that is as much a construction of disparate parts unnaturally joined as Frankenstein's creature.' The argument that follows, extending the analysis to *kouroi* and other male figures, can seem dense at first sight, and is not assisted by the consignment of all images to a ghetto-block within the book. Patience is rewarded by a nice, near-paradoxical conclusion: that the numerous representations of women in Athenian art around the time of Perikles not only reflect a state of actual female submission – but promote an ideal virtue of female invisibility too. Ferrari's study is a revision: an act (as my dictionary defines it) of 'critical or careful examination or perusal with a view to correcting or improving.' The capacity of Classicists to revise might be doubted: for what are the 'Classics', if not fixed and incorrigible measures of exemplary expression? And yet we do change and refine our regard for the past, and we should be poor teachers if we did not. In the same spirit, I think, it behoves museum curators to remember that moving things around, in and out of view, is part of their job. Museums were meant to be places of inspiration, not prisons of precious objects. For all that they make claims upon posterity, collections come and go: that is one lesson to be understood from Jonathan Scott's *The Pleasures of Antiquity*.[3] The author is well-placed as witness to such flux, since he serves as deputy chairman to the Victoria and Albert Museum, and has been actively involved in committees that monitor and control (up to a point) the exodus of art-works from Britain. Not surprisingly, there is a wistful tone to his survey of British collectors of Classical antiquities from the early seventeenth century onwards – because of course so many of the assemblages have been dispersed. The plutocrats who gathered them – mostly as part or consequence of making the 'Grand Tour' to Italy and other Mediterranean lands – might well have believed their treasures inviolable. Certainly they built some grand cabinets – Ince Blundell, the Sculpture gallery at Woburn, and so on – as if for permanent display. But shifts of taste and swings of fortune have happened, as they must; this is a book for anyone who likes to think of history in terms of aristocracies collapsing. Already by the late nineteenth century, the German scholar Adolf Michaelis was lamenting the insouciance or philistinism with which the British gentry treated antiquities as 'cumbersome heirlooms', to be traded for champagne. And although Scott

[2] *Figures of Speech*. Men and Maidens in Ancient Greece. By Gloria Ferrari. University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. viii + 352, with 149 figs.

[3] *The Pleasures of Antiquity*. British Collectors of Greece and Rome. By Jonathan Scott. Yale UP 2003. Pp. viii + 340, with 206 figs.

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is inclined to represent Lord Elgin as a 'saviour' of marbles that would otherwise have gone to ruin *in situ*, we are left in little doubt that if Elgin had fulfilled his original intent, the sculptures of the Parthenon would now be scattered throughout transatlantic museums. Scott concludes with praise for the British Museum in rescuing some portion of these private souvenirs as coherent ensembles. The praise is due: though curiously, I find, it adds to pressure on the custodians to go the extra mile in Elgin's case – and for the sake of coherence, deliver the marbles back to Athens.

NIGEL SPIVEY

*Philosophy*

*What is Ancient Philosophy?*[1] Beware if you assume from the title of Pierre Hadot's book that this is a reflection on our *study* of ancient philosophy: it actually means to ask what the philosophy we study 'is'. An unusual question, which was clearly written to Hadot's idiosyncratic answer which, as I understand it, is this: that before the unhappy days when philosophy became enslaved to the service of Christian theology, philosophy was not a tool crafted for any purpose, but a form of self-expression. 'It was the philosopher's choice of a way of life which conditioned and determined the fundamental tendencies of his philosophical discourse' (272–3) not, as one might have thought (and as ancient philosophers themselves claimed) *vice versa*. All of this makes for a study in which the evidence for ancient philosophy is treated in a way which will seem rather topsy-turvy to its conventional practitioners: ancient biographical reports (as e.g., at 111, Diogenes Laertius' satirical caricature of Pyrrho of Elis) are accepted with perfect seriousness, while the specifics of doctrine and argument (which by implication have secondary importance) are covered with a rather airy insouciance. I think I understand what Hadot means when, for example, he says that Stoicism involved becoming 'sharply aware of the tragic situation of human beings' (127), but it creates a somewhat misleading impression. If Hadot were right, one of the surprising things would be how similar the interests of ancient and modern philosophers turn out to be. The 'atmosphere of sublimated love' that is supposed by Hadot to have prevailed in the Academy (60) nurtured a metaphysics every bit as precise, pedantic, abstract, and yet engrossing as any that has come from the colder academies of the post-Christian era. Verity Harte's exploration of *Plato on Parts and Wholes*[2] is an excellent case study of this. Her question is beguilingly simple: What it is to be something which has parts? In a sophisticated and illuminating discussion of, in particular, the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus*, Harte shows how Plato demonstrates that a whole is not (just) the sum of its parts. Rather, a 'whole' is to be understood as a structure of a certain kind. The easy thing at this point might have been to cry 'Form' and have done with; but one thing (among many) that makes this such an interesting study is Harte's deliberate policy of avoiding any systematic attempt to link her discussion to the theory of forms (6). The strain of this self-imposed discipline shows at times: she has to note the 'nascent theory of forms' at a crucial point in the *Parmenides* (cf. 51 with n. 9), and her

[1] *What is Ancient Philosophy?* By Pierre Hadot. Translated into English by Michael Chase. Harvard UP, 2002. Pp. xii + 362. Hardback £19.95.

[2] *Plato on Parts and Wholes*. The Metaphysics of Structure. By Verity Harte. Oxford UP, 2002. Pp. x + 311. Hardback £35.

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