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On the Professorial Voice

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Argument

Much recent research has established the importance of visualization in modern science. This essay treats, instead, of the continued importance of the aural and oral: the professorial voice. The professor remains important for science since so many scientists still instantiate this persona and, as is here argued, a "voice" constitutes an essential feature of it. The form of the essay reflects its contents. From the Middle Ages until well into the modern era, the archetypal professorial genre was the disputation, an oral event recast in written form. Apropos of the traditional disputation, this essay begins with a disquisition more or less to the point. It concerns Nietzsche's first major publication, which violated norms for the proper professorial voice, thus accelerated the destruction of his academic career. The essay then presents six theses on the professorial voice. The theses treat relevant aspects of the professorial voice from the Sophists onward. It is argued, in Weberian terms, that the professorial voice or persona embodies elements of charismatic and traditional authority which coexist with and condition the rational authority or "objectivity" of science.

> Ladies and Gentlemen. What legitimates making a poet the festive speaker honoring a great researcher? . . . How is it legitimate that a learned society . . . chooses not one of their own, a man of science, but rather a poet to celebrate with words the great day of their Master? . . . Does this perhaps occur in the notion that a poet as an artist . . . is more suited for celebrating festivals, that he is by nature a more festive person than a . . . scientist is? (Mann [1960] 1974, IX, 478)[1]

Thomas Mann began his speech at Sigmund Freud's eightieth birthday in 1936 with those words. In this context, Mann rather quickly uttered the name of Friedrich Nietzsche, an embodiment of the problem of the artist and scientist in one. Here, of course, I use "scientist" in the sense of *Wissenschaftler*, which includes social and human scientists.

Nietzsche's early work was concerned with the theme of art versus science. In 1869, at twenty-four years of age, he became a professor at the University of Basel. In early 1872 his first book appeared, *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. This destroyed his

[1] Unless noted in the bibliography, translations are by the author.

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reputation as a serious scientist and scholar. But artists and friends seem to have liked the book. Franz Liszt quickly read it twice. And Richard and Cosima Wagner loved it. They reported fighting over their only copy. A few of Nietzsche's colleagues liked it too. But the academic world in general hated it and greeted it, at first, with silence. Nietzsche's own doctoral advisor in Leipzig, Friedrich Ritschl, wrote in his diary that the book was "ingenious vertigo." Ritschl said nothing in public about the book. Apprehensive, Nietzsche wrote to him and said that he, Nietzsche, hoped to take control over the younger generation of philologists with this work. About that aspiration, Ritschl wrote in his diary: "megalomania." Nietzsche became alarmed that nobody was reviewing the book. But by good luck, his friend and colleague, Erwin Rohde, a professor at Kiel, got an enthusiastic review published in May 1872.[2]

Alas, in the same month, a *Privatdozent*, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, published an attack on the book. Nietzsche wrote to Rohde that the polemic "reeked of Berlin." Nietzsche hoped for support from other philologists, especially in Leipzig. Under his auspices, Rohde prepared a counter-attack to Wilamowitz-Möllendorff. At the same time, Richard Wagner published an open letter about the affair. Wagner attacked Wilamowitz-Möllendorff and academic philology in general in Germany. The latter attack was not constructive. By July, Nietzsche was writing that he felt exiled, cast out of the academic guild, sentenced to death. By late October, he had given up hope of finding support even in Leipzig, his *alma mater*. In November, he wrote to Wagner, "Winter semester has begun and I have no students! . . . I am now so disreputable amongst my colleagues . . . that our small university [in Basel] is suffering . . . In Bonn a philology professor . . . advised his students that my book is 'pure nonsense' . . .: someone who produces such work is as good as dead."[3] At 28 years of age, as a professor, Friedrich Nietzsche had a brilliant future behind him.

Wilamowitz-Möllendorff had opened his polemic by criticizing the "tone" of *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. He said that Nietzsche did not speak as a "scientific researcher" and that the book was rather more "a work of art" (Wilamowitz-Möllendorff in Gründer 1969, 29, 55). Sixteen years later, Nietzsche wrote a self-critique for a new edition of the book. He now said that the book was impossible, hardly accessible, and strange. He said that now it seems he was trying to pose this question there: "The problem of science itself – science itself for the first time made problematic, made questionable . . ." He was trying "to see science through the optics of the artist . . ." In this book "a *strange* voice . . . concealed itself in the garb of a scholar . . . What a pity that I did not dare to speak as a poet . . . or at least as a philologist" (Nietzsche [1967–77; 1988] 1999, I, 13–15). What did Nietzsche write in this strange book that apparently did not speak in a properly professorial voice?

[2] On the above, see Hayman 1982, 146–47; letter to Ritschl, 30 Jan 1872, in Nietzsche [1974–84] 1986, III, 281–82.

[3] In Nietzsche [1974–84] 1986, IV, 7–8, 17–21, 70–73, 85–87, 89: letters to Rohde, 8 June, 7 July, 25 Oct., Nov. 1872; to Ritschl, 26 June 1872; to R. Wagner, 7/8 Nov. 1872. The polemical works are all reprinted in Gründer 1969.

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Die Geburt der Tragödie is Nietzsche's most difficult work and is thoroughly Nietzschean. It is full of contradictions. The book has no footnotes. There are serious factual errors. The book is about the birth of tragedy. But it is also about the birth of science from the death of tragedy. Nietzsche's thesis is now well-known and goes like this.

Greek art emerged from two tendencies, an Apollonian and a Dionysian. The Apollonian is associated with the visual, with light, consciousness, moderation, control of the self, individuality. The Dionysian is tied to the oral, to darkness, instinct, excess, loss of control, loss of self. The essential Apollonian arts are sculpture and architecture. Dionysian are music and dance. Apollo is the god of truth-telling and divination. He is patron of liberal arts and the Muses. Apollo with his lyre was also god of music. But Dionysus took music away from Apollo and took it in another direction (Nietzsche [1967–77; 1988] 1999, I, 25–28, 33, 40–41, 103, also 581, 583). Let us turn now to tragedy.

Nietzsche holds that Greek tragedy emerged from the Dionysian chorus. The roots of tragic drama lay in a Dionysian choral festival of music and dance. The persona of the actor embodied above all a Dionysian figure. The actor was "the instinctive poet, singer, dancer, but as *enacted* Dionysian figure." Tragic drama emerged as a synthesis of Apollonian-Dionysian styles, a synthesis of scene and music, of speaking and singing, of the orator and the actor. The chorus embodied Dionysus and the core of tragedy was at first the chorus singing and dancing. But the dialogue eventually expropriated the center of tragedy. As tragedy developed from Aeschylus to Euripides, the chorus retreated, while the dialogue triumphed. And the dialogue is, according to Nietzsche, Apollonian in spirit (Nietzsche [1967–77; 1988] 1999, I, 52, 55, 59–65, 73–74, 82, 596).

Where is Nietzsche going with all this? He aims to show that the Platonic dialogue was the ultimate end of this development. He wants to argue that Socratic dialectics came out of drama. The original European hero of knowledge, the persona of Socrates and the Socratic voice, emerged from the degeneration of tragic dialogue. In old tragedy, music and dance were central. In new tragedy, dialogue and dialectics became central. Euripides' plays embody the change from the old to the new tragedy – the Socratic orator in the guise of a "comic" actor. From here emerged the new comedy (Nietzsche [1967–77; 1988] 1999, I, 84, 95, 545–47). Socrates is indeed just such a comic actor, as cast in Aristophanes' *The Clouds.*

None less than Aristotle saw Plato's dialogues as comic drama (Clark 1995, 66). And, as Nietzsche saw it, Socrates as cast by Plato took over the Apollonian persona. Socrates took the Apollonian motif outside art and opposed it to the Dionysian motif. In Plato's "comedies," Socrates is associated with truth-telling dialogue, moderation, consciousness, self-control. Socrates makes the philosopher – or the scientist – and the artist mutually exclusive. As Nietzsche said, an "artistic Socrates" is a contradiction. After Socrates, the artist could only be a Dionysian figure, tied to excess, instinct, and loss of self. Socrates gave birth to himself as the first Man of

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Science. He also bore his Other: the Romantic Artist (Nietzsche [1967–77; 1988] 1999, I, 63, 83, 94, 96, 545, 544, 621, 634).

At this point we see that Nietzsche, too, was writing the history of his present (ibid., I, 21–22, 123–29). He was aware of that, whence for example his critique of Italian opera in the book. As did Aristophanes and Plato, he cast a persona, a mask, for Socrates. Nietzsche says, "I see the spirit of science, first brought to light in the person of Socrates, as the belief in the comprehensibility of nature and the universal salvative power of knowledge." Cast in this light, Socrates is a turning point of world-history for Nietzsche. Socrates plays the original theorist, the *theoretischer Mensch*, the person who says that logic and causality rule. The Socratic spirit leads to the destruction of the tragic and mythic. Nietzsche's Socrates enacts the persona of the modern scientist *avant la lettre*. He heralds the disenchantment of the world. Not only does Socrates take over the role of Apollo. Not only does Socrates demand the artist become solely Dionysian, a festive figure. But Socrates also wants to take over the role of Dionysus who, like Jesus, was a god tied to rebirth. In place of the dying Dionysus, the dying Socrates offered himself as the hero of knowledge (ibid., I, 87–91, 99–101, 111, 115–16, 144–45, 626, 636, 638).

> Our entire modern world is caught in the web of Alexandrian culture and sees its ideal in the theorist, equipped with the highest powers of knowledge and working in the service of science. The archetype and grandfather of this is Socrates. All our educational institutions have at base this ideal in mind. (Ibid., I, 116)

Did Socrates haunt Nietzsche? He celebrated his forty-fourth birthday by beginning an absurdist autobiography, *Ecce Homo*. Here he called *Die Geburt der Tragödie* an attempt to end 2,000 years of cultural perversity. But the problem with Socrates was that he insisted on being reborn over and over, in ever more grotesque forms, such as Nietzsche himself – the eternal return of the same. Nietzsche's view of the Socratic crime changed over time; but Socrates remained a clown or a monster for him. In *Götzendämmerung* in a chapter called "The Problem of Socrates," Nietzsche found him guilty of embodying cultural decadence. Socrates was a decadent Apollo, "a great eroticist."[4]

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At his speech at Sigmund Freud's eightieth birthday, Mann noted, after about five minutes, that he had not come to speak about Sigmund Freud, but rather in Freud's honor. So, too, I have spoken in my disquisition above not about the professorial voice, but rather in its spirit, if not its honor. I beg the reader's indulgence for the continued impersonation of a professorial and speaking voice – this is a writing and I am not a professor. But this oral style and form is central to the point and contents

[4] Nietzsche [1967–77; 1988] 1999, VI, 67–73 – citation at 71; see also 310–11; on *Die Geburt der Tragödie* and cultural perversity, 313. On Nietzsche's Socrates, see Schmidt 1969, passim, esp. 5, 162, 196, 317–44.

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of this essay. The oral genre of the early modern academic or professorial disputation typically had a two-part structure: an opening disquisition, as above, then the theses for disputation, as below.

The Socratic voice is the distant origin of the professorial voice. It echoes still today, not only in disputations, but also and especially in academic seminars, supposedly. The young Nietzsche used Socrates as the figure who cast art and science asunder. I want to let the professorial voice speak as the mediator between them. To put the point differently, what does it say about the persona of the modern scientist when we see that many continue to be professors? What does it mean, for example, that the Max-Planck-Society seems to wish its directors to acquire the title of professor? What further weight does one gain, what further gravity does one radiate, when speaking with such a voice? The scientist is the embodiment of objectivity in our culture. Or, in Weberian terms, the scientist epitomizes *rationale Herrschaft*, rational authority or power. My general thesis is that charismatic power and traditional authority shape the scientist's persona in so far as a professorial voice still speaks in science. I have six theses in the disputation of this sophistical position.

Thesis 1: The professorial voice speaks sophistically.

Two modern classicists agree that a good circumlocution for "sophistical" in its original sense would be: "with an air of authority . . . almost professorial."[5] The Sophists originally taught poetry and singing, but eventually mostly rhetoric and dialectics. The Sophists were above all educators, as was Nietzsche, who agreed with Aristophanes that Socrates himself was the chief ancient Sophist, just as Nietzsche was the chief modern one. As Karl Jaspers noted, one can usually quote Nietzsche on both sides of any important issue, because he always took care to contradict himself, sooner or later (Jaspers cited in Ijsseling 1976, 104).[6] One can hear other echoes of this desire for self-contradiction in a professorial penchant to qualify any statement to death. The Sophists acquired a bad reputation in Antiquity because of their ability to argue both sides of any issue. But they saw that as their duty to truth: One must be able to make a case for both sides on any point. The medieval and early modern disputation continued this belief.

This approach to truth is fundamentally based on agonistics and dialogue. It is dialectics and the Sophists taught it as rhetoric. The rise of the Sophists was correlative with the rise of classical democracy. The Sophists' most famous adversaries, Plato and Aristophanes, indeed rejected democratic values in favor of aristocratic ones. The Sophists claimed that they could teach the average citizen to master the power of the

[5] Guthrie 1971, 31, agreeing with a circumlocution by Michael Joyce translating Xenophon.

[6] On the Sophists, see Guthrie 1971, 30–35. In Aristophanes' *The Clouds*, however, the character of Socrates, as Sophist, still teaches the liberal arts in general. On Socrates as chief Sophist, see Nietzsche [1967–77; 1988] 1999, I, 88, 627.

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spoken word, that they could teach the common citizen to acquire *areté*, virtue or even charisma. *Areté* was the human excellence giving a man authority among men. *Areté* was the quality which the aristocrats claimed as theirs (on the Sophists, see Guthrie 1971, 19–20, 25, 179). Sophistry contends that the human excellence manifested in charismatic or traditional authority, *areté*, can be mastered by the people through the exercise of the tongue. The professorial voice is sophistical in the original sense.

Thesis 2: The professorial voice speaks for the public welfare (salus publica).

The Sophists took fees. Some people frowned upon that and Socrates made a point of not taking fees. He compared the Sophists to prostitutes (ibid., 33–40). The Romans were even more hostile to the so-called mercantile occupations. And the Romans were most hostile to metaphysics, but they invented one that still haunts us: the metaphysics of human agency.

The Romans invented the legal distinction between the public and the private. They invented the notion of the "profession" as an occupation done for the *salus publica*, the public welfare. One might be paid for exercising a profession, but that was not to be confused with mercantile occupations centered on private profit. By the third century C.E. teaching had emerged as a profession in Roman cities, as publicly funded teachers arose. In the Empire, public teachers of higher education, that is, teachers of the liberal arts were called "professor." A state funded professorship was called a chair, a *cathedra*. The Justinian legal code defined the professorship as a profession, for a professor served the *salus publica*. The law thus gave professors many privileges. But it denied those privileges to most poets, freelancing Sophists and philosophers, and primary school teachers.[7]

As a consequence of the Renaissance and Reformation, the Roman law of the Justinian code became diffused and integrated into law codes on the Continent, though not in England. In Continental Protestant lands, at least, the Roman notion of the public welfare was reinstated as the ideological basis of the state, thus of education. A Baroque jurist and political theorist, Gerhard, held, "The purpose of academies [which includes universities] is the public good," a view shared by his colleague, Kundtmann citing his colleague Lansius. On the Continent, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation re-introduced the professorate and professorial chair as the standard academic system. That did not happen in England, where the use of "professor" is now idiosyncratic and parochial. On the Continent the state eventually expropriated the educational system and re-introduced the notion that

[7] See Bonner 1977, 48, 57, 156–61. Relevant passages of the *Corpus Juris Civilis* (ed. by Krueger et al. 1970) are in the *Codex*, 10, 52 [53].1–10, "de professoribus et medicis"; and in the *Digesta*, 50, 13, 1. §4; see also *Codex*, 10,39.5, 10,42.6 &.8, 10,47.1-.2, 10,48.12, 10,50.1-.3, 10,53–54; 12,15.1, 12,30.8, 12,49 et seq.; *Digesta*, 50,4.18, 50,5.8, 50,6.7, 50,13.1-.4. On privileges, see Kibre 1962, 1–3.

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education was a matter of the public welfare. The professor reemerged as an educator of higher learning who exercised a profession for the public welfare, the *salus publica*. Early modern jurists said the following then about professors: They lecture "publicly . . . in a faculty"; to be a professor demands the "knowledge for the profession and . . . a Master's or Doctor's degree." Professors are "Personae Most Noble and Precious." The professor's office is "to teach diligently, to educate youth in letters as well as in morals." "Professors who teach publicly at universities and *gymnasia* ought to be paid by a publicly constituted salary."[8]

The professorial voice thus speaks with the same public power and authority as do the voices of the minister, the magistrate, and the physician. The professorial voice speaks with the force of a public institution. It speaks for the public welfare.

Thesis 3: The professorial voice speaks with canonical authority.

The professorate had to reemerge in the early modern era because it disappeared in the Middle Ages. But the professorial voice traversed the Middle Ages in the mouths of Masters and Doctors. The word "professor" as opposed to "magister" or "doctor" had no magic. "Master" and "Doctor" became juridical titles in the High Middle Ages. "Professor" reemerged in its Roman sense as a juridical title only in the Renaissance and Reformation.[9]

The Roman metaphysics of the public versus the private disappeared for most of the Middle Ages. The professorial voice of medieval Masters and Doctors did not speak for the public welfare. It spoke with canonical authority. "Canon" has many senses, and I mean them all. The medievals perfected the metaphysics of office. In the High Middle Ages, a secular canonry became an office whose holder had a chair in the chapel and vote in the collegium. A Canon Secular had *stallum et votum*, or *Sitz und Stimme*: a chair and a voice. A chair and a voice were what the professor eventually inherited from the Canon Secular.[10]

In the Middle Ages, the podium or lectern where the Master or Doctor lectured and presided over disputations was called the *cathedra*. The magisterial medieval voice thus spoke *ex cathedra*, though not in the technical episcopal sense (on the *cathedra*, see Clark 1992). "Canon" also meant the orthodox and authoritative teachings of the Church. Medieval universities formed part of the clerical estate, more or less.

[8] The quotations on the professor are from Titius 1724, 1250; Lauterbach 1728–29, III, 592ff; Schwimmer 1672, *Diss. I*, unpag. See also Kreittmayr 1758–68, V, 2336. On academies as public institutions, see Gerhard 1655, *Thesis iii*; Kundtmann 1644, *Mem. Prim., Art. Sec.* On the rise of *ius publicum* in the sixteenth century, see Stolleis 1988–92, I, 47–48, 66, 76. On political theory, see Gierke 1954, III, esp. 201–02, 501–03.

[9] On medieval uses of "master," "doctor" and "professor," see Weijers 1987, 133–55; Fried 1974, 9–21; Clark 1992, 101–02.

[10] The Canon had "stallum in choro et votum in capitulo." On "canon"and the above, see Hinschius [1869–97] 1959, II, passim, esp. 55–112; 615–6; Plöchl [1953–59] 1960, I, 349, 373–76; 427–30; II, 155–57; Schieffer 1976, 101–03, 123–25; Schaefer 1903, 87–89; Schneider 1885, 30–31.

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Medieval Masters and Doctors thus taught from canonical texts, in the medieval sense of "canonical." Early modern professors would teach, as befit them and the era, from canonical texts in the modern sense: classic or required texts.

The Protestant Reformation did not at first leave professors free to use whatever textbooks they wanted. Reformed universities usually had statutes requiring that a particular textbook be used. As part of the Enlightenment, however, Protestant and some Catholic professors eventually gained the prerogative of choosing the textbooks they would use. That was a crucial development, since the canon was sacred. The sacral nature of the academic canon was tied to the *cathedra* and the calendar. The evolution of the medieval academic calendar paralleled the ecclesiastical calendar. The academic calendar has, indeed, a liturgical nature. This was even preserved in the Protestant Reformation, as Protestant states undertook not only to reform the ecclesiastical but also the academic year. In some disciplines, certain texts remained canonical, at least for a time and place. In most disciplines, certain topics and truths eventually became, rather, canonical. Varying perhaps from discipline to discipline, the notion and the problem of the "canonical" endured.[11]

From the Middle Ages into the modern era, the professorial voice was empowered by Church and State to speak with authority about the canonical, in its evolving sense. In a chair or *cathedra* vested with the liturgical sanctity of the calendar, the professorial voice lectures with canonical authority about the canonical.

Thesis 4: The professorial voice speaks as masked chorus.

To be a public professor of this or that meant to appear in a lecture hall and to read and gloss canonical texts. Many professors played a persona, wore a "mask," in their public lectures. Academia was theater. For professors often had no interest in the texts. That was in part because junior professors often had to take whatever chair was empty.

The case of Immanuel Kant is a good example. In 1764 at the University of Königsberg, the chair of eloquence and poetry became vacant. Since the Renaissance, the professor of eloquence and poetry was usually known as "the academic mouth," the *os academicus*, the designated festive man at a university. Like a poet laureate, this professor often had to write poems and speeches for festive occasions, such as the king's birthday or the university's birthday. In 1764, this chair

[11] On the regulation of the Protestant academic calendar, see Clark 2000. In the Middle Ages, the universality of academic degrees had originally in part hinged on the universality and stability of the curriculum, that is, of the canonical texts. The fifteenth-century scandal of the "two ways" – the so-called *Wegstreit*, the polarization of universities or colleges at universities into the *via antiqua versus via moderna*, that is, into the warring camps of Realists versus Nominalists – in effect clove the medieval academic liturgy long in advance of the sixteenth-century cleavage of the ecclesiastical liturgy into the warring camps of Catholics versus Protestants (see Ritter 1963). On the changing nature of textbooks in the Enlightenment and Romantic era, see, for example, Clark 1997.

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at Königsberg was offered to the "world-famous" Lecturer, Immanuel Kant, because it was the only open chair at the time. Kant might have taken it, for it was the practice of the time to take almost any empty chair to get a foot in the faculty. But he did not see himself as a festive person, so he said no.[12]

In 1770 Kant received the chair of logic and metaphysics, his true love in life. But Kant still wore another sort of a mask as a professor. In his famous essay on enlightenment, he made a distinction between what one may say as an author in the Republic of Letters, and what one may say as a member of a public institution, for example at a university as a civil servant, which in fact Protestant professors more or less were. As an author, Kant said he could say whatever he wanted. But as a professor, he had to wear the mask of canonical authority and sing in the chorus set by the canon.

Precisely Kant's generation, however, at least in the Germanies, lectured at a time when a new notion of the professor was emerging: the professor as researcher, as someone who adds a new note to the chorus. Kant himself still taught from traditional texts which were eventually made outdated by his own work. But he used a textbook only as a point of departure in a lecture. He began doing philosophy in the lecture instead of just talking about it. Whenever he had wandered too far from the text, however, he would say something such as, "To sum up, gentlemen (*in summa, meine Herrern*)," and then return to a passage in the text (Schultz 1965, 29). The professorial voice now had to let itself be heard individually somehow, while also still singing in tune with the chorus and the canon – a dilemma.[13]

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> I would have liked to have secretly slipped into the discourse I must hold today. Rather than beginning a speech, I would have preferred to have been enveloped by it. . . . At the moment of speaking I would have liked to have felt a voice without name having preceded me for a long time: It would have sufficed . . . had I lodged myself in its folds without anyone noticing. (Foucault 1971, 7)

Michel Foucault began his inaugural lecture in 1970 as a professor at the *Collège de France* with those words. Foucault gave this lecture in a "muffled and restrained voice"

[12] Eloquence and poetry was the only chair for which candidates' appearance seem to have been considered in making the appointment, since they had to make the ceremonial speeches (see Clark 1996, 450). The chair of eloquence and poetry emerged at universities at the same time as the notion of the "poet laureate" was revived from Roman law. On the various duties of the classics or eloquence professor, see Hoffmann 1901, 26–28, 159; Körte 1833, I, 150; Wolf 1935, I, 78; III, 20–21 Ribbeck 1879–81, I, 139–40; Heeren 1813, 232–35; Köchly 1874, 50–51; Bezold 1920, 232–35; Stieda 1934, 45–46; Prutz 1894, 174–75; Goetz 1928, 7–8. On Kant, see Schultz 1965, esp. 20–22, 28–33. On professors' disregard for the actual chair they held in relation to their private interests, see Clark 1996, 432.

[13] Fichte became known for lecturing not on set textbooks but rather on what he was working on at the time (see Jacobs [1984] 1998, esp. 47, 119). On the above, see "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" (1784) in Kant [1902–23] 1968–77, VIII, 33–42. I pass over in silence Kant's strange use of "public" and "private."

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that apparently shocked the audience, used as they were to his past flamboyance (Eribon 1991, 219). Paying homage to his deceased mentor, Jean Hyppolite, whom he was replacing at the college, Foucault ended his inaugural lecture with these words, "I know well whose voice I would have liked to have preceded me . . . I know what was so awesome about beginning to speak, because I was doing so in the place where I heard him, and where he is no more, to hear me" (ibid., 82).

The professorial speaks from a chair where others have sat. It echoes in reverence voices that have spoken lest they be forgotten. Foucault said that he wrote in order to have no face (Foucault 1969, 28). As a professor one speaks best in order to have no voice.

Thesis 5: The professorial voice speaks with academic eros.

Socrates was an eroticist. Socrates wanted to take over the role of Dionysus. Socrates was an actor, like Foucault, who was an acrobat, like Zarathustra. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff did not see the Dionysian streak in Socrates. Nor did Nietzsche at first, even though he saw the dying Socrates as essential. Nietzsche wanted to be a festive man. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff said that he preferred being a Socratic man, but he assimilated that to being a Christian. So, against Nietzsche, he said that researchers learn "the asceticism of self-denying work" (Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, quoted in Gründer 1969, 30, 55). Asceticism or the mortification of the flesh is an *ars erotica*, but not of the Dionysian sort.

"Enchantment is the presupposition of all dramatic art," says Nietzsche ([1967–77; 1988] 1999, I, 61). In the drama of the lecture, the professor as actor has first and foremost a voice. Sophists were interested in training the voice. A deep voice was manly and implied courage. A high voice meant cowardice. The exercise of the voice was part of the care of the self in Greece and Rome. A Roman medical tract said that vocal exercise helps to cure stomach problems (especially in pregnant women who crave unusual foods). Quintilian quotes Cicero, "Let the orator carry himself with a vigorous and manly posture of the upper body that derives not from actors and the stage but from the army or even the wrestling-grounds."[14] For a long time, the professorial voice spoke to make men men.

When Immanuel Kant gave his first lecture, he was surprised to see the auditorium full of students. He became nervous. He started speaking quieter than normal, a disaster, since he had a weak voice. His enchantment as a lecturer could not come from a booming oratorical "manly" manner, as one said then. His voice rather had to seduce the listener. In that first lecture, he stopped and contradicted himself often. In the next lecture, however, he regained himself. As a young professor, he was a fine

[14] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 1.11.18, citing Cicero, *De oratore*, 3–59.220, cited in Gleason 1995, 117; for other points here, see esp. 82–84, 88–89, 106–07, 117.

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lecturer. But by the time Fichte heard him in 1791, Kant's lectures had become disappointing and "sleepy" (Schultz 1965, 28–29).

Christoph Meiners, a professor at the University of Göttingen, addressed this sort of problem at the time. Meiners described the professorial life as regulated by the bi-annual "drama of lecturing" in which one plays a "role." Most professors still had to lecture on canonical texts. That meant that they had to repeat the same chorus year after year. Meiners conceded that this turned many into "spiritual automata." But he defended the drama of lecturing and the professorial persona. He said that the professorial voice had clarity, even if it got old and stale, as Kant's had. This clarity was a result of lecturing to a live audience. The student body altered the professorial voice. "The irritated twisting of the [students'] face muscles, certain movements of the head, hesitation in taking notes, and so on, remind the professor that his auditors do not understand him."[15] Despite the seat of authority from which it spoke, the professorial voice had to speak to keep the attention of young men.

In 1789, in the service of the King of Prussia, Friedrich Gedike visited fourteen non-Prussian German universities. Gedike was an important academic and minister in Berlin. His mission was to scout non-Prussian universities in order to see which foreign professors the Prussians should "acquire," as they put it at the time. Gedike filed a report about his trip. The most pervasive theme in the entire report is not what he saw. The most pervasive theme is what he heard, even though Prussia was at that time enunciating the dictum we know as "publish or perish." Despite that, for Gedike the essential character of each professor was not his publications, but rather his voice. And if one did not have a fine or manly voice, one was not going to be a subject of Prussian "acquisition." Gedike did not like Swabian accents and about Friedrich Schiller's lectures in Jena, Gedike wrote, "He read everything word for word, in a pathetically declamatory tone, that very often did not fit the simple historical facts and geographical notes which he had to convey. Altogether the whole lecture was more an oration than a talk." Schiller was of course a poet.[16]

Foucault's "muffled and restrained voice" in his inaugural lecture at the *Collège de France* apparently shocked the audience because most knew that he was one of the best lecturers of the time. He was "cocky, self-assured and articulate." When Foucault was a professor at the University of Clermont, "he walked back and forth on the podium [and] talked non-stop . . . in his rapid, staccato rhythm. His voice seemed about to fly off at the ends of sentences, with the melodic lift of a question, only to sink again with the confident inflections of an answer to the problems he had raised." In 1966, his last year at Clermont, the students applauded him at the end of every lecture. That was something that had never happened to anyone else before or after that. But from 1970 to 1984 at the *Collège de France*, Foucault never got over the

[15] "Schutzschrift für den Stand und die Lebensart der Professoren" in Meiners 1775–76, III, 115–63 – see 118, 136–40, 143, 145–46.

[16] Gedike's report is in Fester's edition of Gedike [1789] 1905. On the report, see Clark 2001; on publish or perish, see idem 1996, 434, 453.

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nervousness that he displayed in his inaugural lecture. He said he felt isolated, nearly anonymous, cut off from the audience. No one usually dared to interrupt him and ask a question. He said he felt like an actor or an acrobat on a stage. The eroticism of the professorial voice is bound up with the possibility of disputation.[17]

★ ★ ★

> The explanation of the dream seemed to me complete. But she brought me an addendum to the dream a day or so later. She said she forgot to say that, when waking up, she always smelled smoke. Smoke . . . indicated that the dream had a special connection to me. . . . Against this exclusive reference to me, she objected that *Herr K* and her papa were also passionate smokers. . . . Since she refused further comment, it remained for me to decide how I wanted to integrate this addendum into the structure of the interpretation of the dream. As clue could help me that the sensation of smoke came as an addendum, thus had to overcome a special effort of repression. . . . It could only mean the desire for a kiss, which for a smoker necessarily reeks of smoke. . . . Putting together all the signs that likely constitute a transference to me, in that I am also a smoker, I come to the view that it probably occurred to her one day during the session to wish a kiss from me. (Freud [1905] 1981, 72–73)

Sigmund Freud's patient "Dora" could only respond to this with a philosophical laugh, that is to say, with silence. Freud attempted to seduce her with the entire chorus of the professorial voice. He spoke to her in theological, juridical, medical, and philosophical voices. He disputed with her in the manner of a pastor, a magistrate, a physician, a philosopher. Freud was a great Sophist. He wanted to cure Dora by teaching her to talk – to talk about the things he said she repressed: bedwetting, masturbation, lesbianism.

Steven Marcus has written that Freud's case history of Dora is "a great work of literature" (Marcus [1974/1975] 1985, esp. 57, 64–66). The structure of *Dora* resembles a modern experimental novel. Freud occurs as three personae in *Dora*. First, he partakes of Socratic dialogues with Dora. Second, he comments as a narrator on the action and dialogues. Third, in amazing footnotes, he disputes himself as narrator. Despite (or thanks to) his professorial voice, Freud is the "unreliable narrator" of modernist fiction. Like Foucault, Freud was able to play at being Nietzsche without suffering the consequences. Freud was a great eroticist. He knew the power of his voice. He played not only Socrates but also Apollo, diviner of dreams.

[17] On Foucault's lecturing style, see Marc Beigbeder, "En suivant le cours de Foucault," *Esprit*, June 1967, 1066–67 – cited in Macey [1993] 1995, 189, 507. On Foucault at Clermont, see Eribon 1991, 130, 139–41 – quotation at 140; also Macey [1993] 1995, 183–84, 189, 209. On Foucault's nervousness and isolation, Eribon 1991, 222–23; Macey [1993] 1995, 241–47.

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Theses 6: The professorial voice speaks.

The fundamental Nietzschean opposition between the Apollonian and the Dionysian is the opposition between the visual and the oral. Jean-François Lyotard has written, "Science from its origin has been in conflict with narratives" (Lyotard 1979, 7). By "narrative" Lyotard really meant oral story-telling. Much recent work in science studies has concerned the central nature of visualization in science.[18] In focusing on the visual, we indeed undertake a Foucaultian archaeology of science. We articulate its positive unconscious. Lyotard's dictum can be taken to mean that science tries to turn the oral world into the visual, that science seems to be essentially hostile to orality. If so, its rational authority and objectivity must be at odds with the charismatic and traditional authority of the persona known as the professor.

Theses
Thesis 1: The professorial voice speaks sophistically.
Thesis 2: The professorial voice speaks for the public welfare (*salus publica*).
Thesis 3: The professorial voice speaks with canonical authority.
Thesis 4: The professorial voice speaks as masked chorus.
Thesis 5: The professorial voice speaks with academic eros.
Thesis 6: The professorial voice speaks.

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[18] On some of the literature on visualization, see the editors' introduction to Becker and Clark 2001. Daston and Galison 1992, in particular, ties visualization to "objectivity."

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