Conclusion

The three Anglo-Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century have never caused much concern for historians content to separate domestic and foreign policy. Whether ideology or factional squabbles accounted for domestic political turmoil, England's foreign involvements could always be explained by geopolitical considerations. Since contemporaries thought of England and the United Provinces as the two great commercial states of seventeenth-century Europe, it seemed perfectly reasonable to assume that both sides understood themselves to be economic rivals. The long lists of commercial disputes placed on the negotiating table by the trading companies from each side provides ample confirmation for scholars predisposed towards an economic account of these wars. The willingness of both the English Commonwealth and the Restored Monarchy to fight the same enemy appears to clinch the argument: the English fought the Dutch, it is said, because their economic interest demanded it. England's emergence from these struggles as the great trading power of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, coupled with the United Provinces' resubmergence into the watery bogs from which they had unnaturally sprung, has overshadowed English defeats in the second and third Anglo-Dutch Wars. The English might have lost the military battle, but they won the economic war.

A close examination of the first two of these Anglo-Dutch confrontations, however, reveals that these all-too-plausible hypotheses have little basis in the contemporary evidence. Neither war was an English attempt to capture trade routes from a chief economic rival. The first war occurred because members of the Rump Parliament and their political supporters were furious that the Dutch, whom they had long admired as the ideal Protestant and republican state, proved to have been hopelessly corrupted by their long vassalage to the House of Orange. The godly and republican in England, though long aware of the absolutist intentions of the descendants of William the Silent, had expected that with God's merciful elimination of William II, the Netherlands would be restored to its original virtuous republican constitution. The Rump Parliament's leading politicians, infused with this Protestant and republican understanding of the Dutch polity, opted to send

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two of their most eminent statesmen, Walter Strickland and Oliver St. John, to the United Provinces. However, rather than gratefully accept the sincere proposals of union presented by Walter Strickland and Oliver St. John, the Orangist crowds in The Hague verbally insulted and physically assaulted the English ambassadors. The party of Orange, the English political nation learned, had not expired with its leader in November 1650.

Although the good Dutch patriots made every effort to make up the breach, the Orangists did everything to make war unavoidable. Even as the republicans sent a diplomatic team to London, ostensibly to beg forgiveness, the Orangists were busily building up their navy. Then, just as the Dutch deputies prepared to sign a treaty committing the two states to a firm alliance, the Orangist admiral Martin Van Tromp launched an attack on the English navy. Tromp, with Orangist flags prominently displayed, claimed that Admiral Blake and his navy had no authority in the British seas since his commission derived not from the hereditary monarch and proprietor Charles II, but from an illegitimate and usurping political entity. Rump politicians and their supporters quickly concluded that the recent republican revolution in the United Provinces had not offset decades of political corruption promoted by the absolutist Princes of Orange. Until the Lord had shown them the rod, many in England reasoned, the Dutch people would follow the sinful Orangist policies of material self-interest and alliance with the Antichristian House of Stuart. The English were compelled to fight the Dutch in the 1650s to defend their own state against the assaults of monarchy and irreligion, against Orange and Mammon.

Not surprisingly, when the Dutch republicans had tamed the power of their Orangist enemies, English enthusiasm for the war waned. Only after the Dutch republicans, under the leadership of the young Grand Pensionary John De Witt, had reestablished control of the navy, the Province of Holland, and ultimately, the States General, could any English political grouping contemplate the possibility of peace. After months of ineffectual negotiations, the English deputies finally began to retreat from their intransigent positions as they witnessed town after town in the United Provinces replace the bloody ensigns of the House of Orange with the red, white, and blue of the republican States General. The English could be confident that a restoration of Dutch republicanism would bring with it a return to virtue; there was no longer any reason to fear Dutch materialism. The English negotiating team that concluded that war in April 1654, then, provided against the recurrence of hostilities not by seizing Dutch economic assets, but by political means: the exclusion of the Prince of Orange from his traditional offices and the reorientation of English foreign policy against the international menace represented by the alliance of Spain and the Papacy. The materialism and absolutism of the Orangist party, the English now knew, were the outward marks of covert agents of the aspiring universal

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monarch, the King of Spain. The surest means to prevent future Dutch corruption was to strike at the font of corruption itself: the Habsburg monarchy.

The Restored Monarchy, rather than continuing the Protestant and republican foreign policy of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, pursued its mirror opposite after 1660. Since Anglican Royalists were convinced that the twin sins of republicanism and religious fanaticism had precipitated the Great Rebellion, they were determined to stamp out those evils both at home and abroad. While supporters of the Rump, the Nominated Parliament, and, ultimately, the Protectorate had realized that aid for the Stuarts from their Orangist Dutch allies would always threaten their regimes, the Anglican Royalist members of Parliament and courtiers concluded that the Dutch republican pipeline to their radical English brethren would make rebellion endemic in England. After all, the Dutch republicans were committed to religious toleration – irreligion in Anglican Royalist eyes – and had welcomed the most extreme of the Commonwealth's supporters with open arms. Not coincidentally when the Anglican Royalists turned their attention to the economic woes of the Restored Monarchy, they persuaded themselves that Dutch unfair trading practices and Nonconformist obstructionism had debilitated England's trade. Presbyterians and fanatics, Anglican supporters of the Restored Monarchy knew quite well, would do everything to hinder the economic well-being of those who were not members of their dangerous tribe. The solution to this problem – and for the Anglican Royalists the Northern Rebellion and the Dutch seizure of the Malabar coast were emphatically different manifestations of the same problem – was to humble the Dutch.

As long as the war went well and public opinion remained focused on Dutch universalist aspirations, the Anglican Royalist political consensus held firm. However, French entry into the war on the Dutch side and English military defeats made the Anglican Royalist explanation of the war – that it was a struggle of rational government against republicanism and religious toleration – untenable. For enthusiastic supporters of the Restored Monarchy there could have been no more obvious ally for Charles II than that most absolute of monarchs, Louis XIV. Hence, when France made common cause with the republican Dutch, the English were forced to examine their own ideological assumptions and reconsider the political intentions of the French. The military power, and growing economic might, so ostentatiously displayed by the young French monarch, convinced many that he was "as likely to be Universal Monarch, as Spain was," that he was in fact a more serious aspirant to universal dominion than the republican United Provinces.[1] English political moderates were reminded that political

[1] Henry Marsh, *A New Survey of the Turkish Empire* (London, 1664).

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liberty could be threatened not only by republics but by ambitious absolute monarchies as well. This revitalized fear of absolutism abroad was reinforced on the domestic front when these moderates came to analyze England's military defeat. Financial embezzlement, corrupt appointments, and covert dealings with the French, political moderates and many radicals concluded, not English military impotence explained their naval shortcomings. Many in the Parliamentary session of 1666–1667, following Buckingham's lead, insisted that the war be fought in a more efficient, in a more English, fashion. Instead the government chose to conclude a secret treaty with the French, and conserve the supply which Parliament had voted to continue the war. The king and his government had decided to adopt absolutist political strategies. While much of the political nation had come to see the French as a more significant political and ideological threat than the Dutch, Charles II's government increasingly embraced the French as their natural brethren. The spectacular raid on the Medway, planned jointly by the Dutch and the French, made it impossible any longer to deny the extent of French perfidy. While very few in England were willing to embrace the Dutch republican government, most perceived it to be less dangerous than that of France. By the end of the year Charles II had been compelled to eschew both his long-desired alliance with his cousin Louis XIV and any thought of attempting to imitate his political style in England.

Not only was Anglican Royalist confidence in absolute monarchy called into question, but the events of 1666–1667 invalidated the Anglican Royalist identification of religious dissent with political rebellion as well. The English Nonconformist community, which Anglican Royalists had persistently described as Papists in disguise, as political untouchables sure to rebel at every opportunity, had proved remarkably loyal despite the myriad disasters which beset the nation. While a few incorrigible radicals had indeed maintained contacts with their government's enemies, most paid their taxes, volunteered to serve in the navy or the local militia, and sought to sever previous ties with their nation's enemies. They had demonstrated beyond all doubt that they would die for their country before they would rebel to attain religious liberty; they were English first and Nonconformists second.

The willingness of both the Restored Monarchy and the Rump Parliament to go to war against the Dutch, then, demonstrates not a continuity in foreign policy but a radical discontinuity. Both regimes agreed that the Dutch polity was ideologically divided between Orangists and republicans; but the Restored Monarchy found its natural allies in the supporters of the House of Orange, while the Rump knew its friends were the republican supporters of John De Witt and the States of Holland. It was a reflection of the complete ideological reversal represented by the Restoration that while the Interregnum regimes had fought to prevent the establishment of

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monarchy in the United Provinces, the Restored English Monarchy struggled to transform the Dutch Republic into an Orangist monarchy.

This close, and at times microscopic, study of Anglo-Dutch relations in the middle of the seventeenth century has done more than revise the accepted interpretations of the first two Anglo-Dutch Wars; it has pointed to several fundamental transformations in English political culture.

While English popular opinion could disapprove and block foreign-policy initiatives in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries – preventing Elizabeth's proposed marriage with the Duke of Anjou and making Charles Stuart's alliance with the Spanish Infanta well nigh impossible[2] – the two Dutch Wars were the first occasions when activism outside the confines of the court had actually pushed the nation into war. Much evidence suggests that J. R. Jones has gone too far in claiming that "public opinion whether spontaneous or in the shape of pressure groups seems to have had very little effect on those who made the major decisions."[3] In fact, popular anti-Dutch sentiment, fueled by a wide variety of pamphlets, sermons, and broadsides, pushed the Rump into war in 1652. The widespread belief among the officers of the Commonwealth's navy that God demanded belligerence against the apostate Dutch raised the political temperature to such a scalding height that even the cooling effect of the Dutch diplomatic mission was unable to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The popular conviction that the Dutch had reformed by late 1653 placed immense pressure on the Protectorate to put an end to the hostilities and commence a war against the real enemies, the Spanish and the Jesuits. Despite the Earl of Clarendon's plea for a return to the "blessed condescension and resignation of the people ... to the crown" in Queen Elizabeth's time, the outbreak of the second Anglo-Dutch War soon proved that in the England to which Charles II returned "everyman is now become a statesman."[4] Although authors of court memoranda had been advising Charles II to go to war against the Dutch since the moment he returned to English soil in 1660, only when the Anglican Royalist reaction of 1663–1664 demanded action against Dutch perfidy did war become inevitable.

Similarly, popular fears of French political dominion and English absolutism made it increasingly difficult for Charles II's regime to continue the

2 Wallace T. MacCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572–1588* (Princeton, 1981), pp. 243–266; Thomas Cogswell, "England and the Spanish Match," Ann Hughes and Richard Cust (editors), *Conflict in Early Stuart England* (London, 1989), pp. 107–133.

3 J. R. Jones, *Britain and the World 1649–1815*, p. 53.

4 *His Majesties Most Gracious Speech, Together with the Lord Chancellors, To the Two Houses of Parliament, At their Prorogation On Monday the Nineteenth of May, 1662* (London, 1662), pp. 10–11; Marquis of Newcastle, "Treatise," Bod., Clar. 109, p. 65. These sentiments were also expressed in Restoration newspapers. See for example, *Intelligencer*, 31 August 1663, pp. 1–3; *Newes*, 21 April 1664, p. 257.

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Anglican Royalist crusade. Acutely aware of his financial vulnerability after the disastrous conclusion of the war, Charles II felt compelled to accede to the popular demand for an Anglo-Dutch alliance against the aspiring universal monarch Louis XIV. In both cases the political nation proved to be both interested in, and well informed about, foreign affairs. As much as many courtiers may have wished to restore the royal prerogative in foreign affairs, the ferocious and voluminous political discourse of the 1640s and 1650s guaranteed that there could be no turning back. There were now powerful segments of the political nation, motivated more by an understanding of domestic and international affairs than by any particular and selfish interest, which insisted on impressing their views on the makers of English foreign policy. "Foreign policy became of necessity a new thing from the moment the Monarchy was removed," Sir John Seeley observed long ago, "and the change thus made could not be undone by the Restoration of the Monarchy."[5]

Although the wars fought against the Dutch do not represent the simple replacement of a religious by an economic foreign policy, they do suggest a profound shift in the content of English political culture. When members of the Rump discovered, to their surprise and dismay, that appeals to a common Protestantism and republicanism were insufficient for the Dutch to unite with them in a common crusade against the Whore of Babylon and monarchical tyranny, they were forced to rethink seriously their own ideological presuppositions. The broad spectrum of English Protestant opinion now aligned itself along a line marked by two well-defined poles. Some Englishmen and women – predominantly the religious radicals – determined that, since God had demonstrated by innumerable and irrefutable signs that the world was in its last days and that the godly in England were certainly among those who would lead the way in the final struggle against the Antichrist, all those who put up the least resistance to their designs would be but stubble unto their swords. The Dutch, by rejecting the proposed union and by attacking the English in the British seas, had demonstrated that they were now to be counted among the forces of the Beast.

Others, though they were also committed Protestants, were not convinced that the millenium was so near at hand. For these men and women the Lord had not clearly demonstrated a single way to godliness. It was enough, for the present, for the godly to have the root of the matter in them. The essential concern was to prevent demonstrable Popery and arbitrary govern-

[5] This is not to deny the success of Roger L'Estrange's censorship. However, after the Restoration subversive political discussion continued in coffee houses, conventicles, in the theater, and in the underground (and overseas) press. Sir J. R. Seeley, *The Growth of British Policy* (Cambridge, 1922), Vol. II, p. 1. For a more detailed analysis of the Restoration public sphere, see my "'Coffee Politicians Does Create': Coffee Houses and Restoration Political Culture," in *Journal of Modern History* (December 1995).

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ment. But instead of pointing to specific forms or practices as their more radical antagonists did, these moderates suggested that Popery was tyranny and the destruction of magistracy. These men and women were convinced that demands that all governors be godly – demands common to Jesuits and Anabaptists – would lead inevitably to anarchy. In short, they suggested that Popery consisted of religious enthusiasm and political tyranny. They knew quite well from studying recent history that both of these evils sprang from the Spanish court and its religious servants, the Jesuits. When the Nominated Parliament resigned and the religious radicals were defeated, then, much more was decided than the fate of an illegitimate Parliament. A language which appealed exclusively to the Bible and divine inspiration was forever banished from the center of the political stage. While the radicals had demanded the destruction of the Whore of Babylon and the fulfillment of the prophecies of the Book of Revelation, the Cromwellian moderates adopted a foreign policy aimed at obstructing the political machinations of the aspiring universal monarch Philip IV of Spain. In so doing, they were concerned above all to protect the English national interest.

This secularizing trend in political ideology continued after the Restoration.[6] Adopting and adapting the political conclusions of the Cromwellian moderates, Anglican Royalist polemicists attacked their opponents as fanatics intent on subverting magistracy. The Dutch, they argued, were Papists in disguise not because they performed mass in secret but because they followed Suarez and Bellarmine in condoning resistance to magistrates. The Dutch Republic, after all, had been formed in an act of resistance to a legitimate monarch, Philip II of Spain. Nor did those Nonconformists who criticized Anglican Royalist policies and who became increasingly convinced that their government's Hollandophobic policies were misguided, reach these conclusions because of their ecclesiology or their theology. Rather these men and women determined that real Popery was not so much resistance to magistrates as it was the establishment of arbitrary government in Church and state. The true danger to England, they concluded, was from the intolerant and politically powerful Anglican Church and the absolutist and clericist King of France.

The Civil War years and the Interregnum, then, brought decisive changes in the content of English political vocabulary. After the Treaties of Westphalia, Munster, and the Pyrenees had put an end to the universalist pretensions of the Habsburgs and the Roman Catholic Church, English men and women were free to define the new Popery and identify the new

[6] For other parallel discussions of secularization see Steven N. Zwicker, "England, Israel and the Triumph of Roman Virtue," in Richard H. Popkin (editor), *Millenarianism and Messianism in English Literature and Thought 1650–1800* (Leiden, 1988), pp. 37–64; Blair Worden, "Introduction" to his edition of Edmund Ludlow's *A Voyce from the Watch Tower* (London, 1978), especially pp. 5–16, 51–55.

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universal monarch. Popery, one Anglican divine noted with a degree of disgust, "is now a word of very dubious signification, and means rather what everyone dislikes, than what is so indeed."[7] Though differences between Protestants and Papists "be mostly managed on the side of religion," William Penn noted, "the great point is merely civil, and should never be otherwise admitted or understood."[8] "The difference between the Papist and the Protestant," agreed one of Penn's polemical adversaries, "is not precisely religious, nor chiefly such; 'tis a civil empire, and a secular interest consequent thereto, which the Church of Rome aims at."[9] Anti-Popery remained a powerful rallying cry after the Restoration, but one with a significantly altered meaning: Popery was now a civil rather than a spiritual issue. Similarly, the meaning of universal monarchy had changed: aspirations for universal dominion were no longer attributed to the Most Catholic King of Spain. Anglican Royalists identified the republican and pluralist United Provinces as the new threat; while Nonconformists and political moderates pointed to the absolutist and intolerant French king Louis XIV.

Naturally there were both religiously enthusiastic Royalists and millenarian Nonconformists after the Restoration; but neither of these groups had a political future. The plague, the Fire, and ultimately the successful Dutch raid on the Medway invalidated the early religious glosses on the Restoration. It was exceedingly difficult to believe that Charles II was the new David, or Moses, if God so manifestly wished to punish him. In addition, the loyalty of the Nonconformists in these difficult times shattered the association between Protestant dissent and political rebellion. Conversely the rebellions and plots of the religious extremists, such as Thomas Venner and Edmund Ludlow,[10] all ended in failure. Instead the foundation of successful political opposition to the new Stuart absolutism was laid by the former Cromwellian moderate Anthony Ashley Cooper in alliance with the moderate Royalist Duke of Buckingham. These men and their followers appealed to right reason and England's interest rather than to divine inspiration and Israelite precedents.

The secularization of the language of English political culture made possible an equally fundamental transformation: the addition of an economic discourse to considerations of English national interest. Although members of the English political nation had conceived of their foreign policy in terms of opposition to universal monarchy since at least the reign

7 Luke De Beaulieu, *Take Heed of Both Extremes* (London, 1675), sig. A4r.
8 [William Penn], *One Project for the Good of England* (1679), p. 7.
9 *A Seasonable Corrective to the One Project for the Good of England* (London, 1680), p. 4.
10 Venner was a fifth monarchist. That Ludlow was a committed Christian republican; a man who derived his politics from his interpretation of the Bible should be clear from the extensive citations from his correspondence and memoirs throughout this monograph. See also Worden, "Introduction" to his edition of *A Voyce from the Watch Tower*, pp. 5–9.

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of Queen Elizabeth, prior to the middle of the seventeenth century the universal monarch was expected to wield his power almost exclusively through the deployment of massive land armies and a repressive religious inquisition. The late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century universal monarch was simply the most powerful Roman Catholic prince in political and military terms. The transformation of the nature of warfare apparent in the Dutch struggle for independence and in the Thirty Years War, however, had significantly altered Englishmen's understanding of the basis of power. By 1654 it was clear to most English observers that for a universal monarch to succeed in compelling the rest of the world to submit to his will, he would have to control the world's trade. The fantastic wealth of the Indies – both East and West – allowed the aspiring universal monarch to maintain large armies, to bribe and corrupt foreign politicians, and, if necessary, to bring entire states to their knees by means of economic warfare. So when the Protectorate decided to launch a defensive war to prevent Philip IV from achieving his goal of universal hegemony, it attacked the source of Spanish revenue, the West Indies, rather than the Iberian peninsula.

This alteration of the rhetoric of universal monarchy, the addition of mercantile power to the number of the universal monarch's attributes, vastly broadened the field of potential aspirants. Potentially, any great economic power could be interpreted as aiming at universal monarchy. The hegemony of the universal monarch, in this scenario, need not be overt. The universal monarch could exert as much power by pressuring his allies into action or inaction as by conquering them. Significantly the Dutch Republic, though it had no large standing army and was not even a monarchy, could be seen as aspiring to universal dominion. The Dutch, as Anglican Royalist polemicists were quick to point out, might look like small and insignificant merchants in Europe, but in the East Indies they were known as Lords of the South Seas. They might not look as if they could defend themselves from Europe's great military powers, but they had defeated the previously invincible Spanish tercios by wreaking havoc upon the Spanish economy.

By the later seventeenth century most political observers believed the age of religious wars had passed.[11] One polemicist during the second Anglo-Dutch War insisted that "wars for religion" were "but a speculation, an imaginary thing," religion was a pretext "which wise or rather cunning men make use of to abuse fools." "In truth," this polemicist concluded, "there never was nor ever will be any" wars of religion.[12] William Temple, an important Restoration moderate, also doubted "whether there was ever yet

[11] Here I am in disagreement with the conclusions advanced by J. C. D. Clark and Linda Colley. See J. C. D. Clark, *Revolution And Rebellion*. (Cambridge, 1986), p. 65; J. C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty 1660–1832* (Cambridge, 1994), *passim*; Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven, 1992), p. 3 and *passim*.

[12] MSS pamphlet, 1665, NMM, Clifford Papers, Vol. III, Dw100, f. 5.

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any war of religion or ever will be."[13] These observers did not doubt that England's was a Protestant foreign policy, but they were defining that policy in increasingly Erastian terms. A Protestant foreign policy was above all one which sought to protect national laws, and by consequence religions established by those laws.[14] The universal monarchy of the later seventeenth century, like the universal monarchy of the later sixteenth century, would necessarily be Papist. But in the later seventeenth century that Popery would be measured less by the amount of incense the universal monarch burned in his churches than by the amount of money the universal monarch spent in overthrowing his rivals' regimes or in repressing alternative modes of religious worship – in short, by his international commercial and cultural influence.

While Anglican Royalists and Nonconformists agreed about precious little after the Restoration, they did concur that England's foreign policy should primarily aim to prevent any state from attaining a universal monarchy. "The interest of every nation," Algernon Sidney asserted uncontroversially, "is to keep others from attaining [universal monarchy], and maintain its own freedom and independence [of] any for protection."[15] The difference was that Anglican Royalists were certain that it was the United Provinces who were seeking universal dominion, while Nonconformists were equally convinced that the real menace was Louis XIV.

The first two Anglo-Dutch Wars, then, represent a crucial turning point in English foreign policy. While medieval English kings went to war to defend their patrimonies; kings and their councils of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries went to war to defend their religion and their political ideology; the wider political nation of the later seventeenth century went to war to defend the national interest. The English Republic waged war against the Dutch to defend Protestantism and republicanism against the international threat of absolute monarchy. The Restored Monarchy fought the United Provinces to protect England from the unbridled economic ambition of a republican and religiously pluralist state. Though there can be no doubt that Englishmen and women from the accession of Elizabeth were certain they were part of *an* elect nation, that elect nation was only a part of the wider elect nation of European Protestant believers. The nation that was defended from the Spanish Armada, and from the onslaught of the great armies of the House of Austria was the nation of the "Saints and Witnesses of Jesus Christ" who were "but one body politic, or one common-wealth, for they are all united into one common interest in what part of the world

[13] William Temple to Arlington, 29 September/9 October 1665, PRO, SP 77/33. f. 294v.

[14] I have argued this case at greater length in "Britain and the World in the 1650s," in John Morrill (editor), *Regicide to Restoration: The Consequences of the English Revolution* (London, 1992).

[15] Algernon Sidney, "Court Maxims," 1664–1665, Warwickshire Record Office, f. 152.

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soever they be."[16] The nation defended from universal monarchy in the later seventeenth century was conceived in very different terms – it was both geographically delimited and necessarily of this world. It was a nation with its own political institutions, its own church, its own economy, and its own traditions of liberty which would ally with other nations, if need be, to confound "any family or state that set upon the ... design of enslaving all the rest unto their wills."[17] English politicians of all stripes agreed after 1654 that war should be fought to protect the national interest; the controversy lay in defining the national interest.

England did not become a first-rate international power between 1650 and 1668. But England did undergo during that period crucial and dramatic transformations which made Marlborough's and Wolfe's great victories possible. The mid-seventeenth-century alterations were primarily ideological and political in character. Englishmen and women were willing to suffer through the extension of state power and the infringements on their personal liberties so carefully detailed by John Brewer[18] because they knew that they were defending their religious and political liberties against a universal monarch. Englishmen and women rallied around Queen Elizabeth in the 1580s and 1590s in the struggle against Philip II to prevent that Spanish king from conquering the world for the forces of Antichrist. Supporters of the Rump began fighting the United Provinces in 1652, because under the spell of the House of Orange the Dutch had joined the legions of the Whore of Babylon. But after the fierce and critical discussions of 1653, both inside and outside of Parliament, Englishmen were convinced that the eschatological struggle would be a war of attrition rather than a frontal assault. A vastly expanded and politically well-informed nation now knew that Popery and universal monarchy were ideologies with economic and political as well as religious programs. Cromwellian moderates waged war against Spain to prevent it from consolidating the economic hegemony that would finally make Tomasso Campanella's intolerant and absolutist universal monarchy a real possibility. Anglican Royalists, from Whitehall to Yorkshire, desired a war against the Dutch to prevent that republican and

16 M[ary] Cary, *The Resurrection of the Witnesses and England's Fall from (The Mystical Babylon) Rome* (London, 1653), Thomason: 14 November 1653; Patrick Collinson, *The Birthpangs of Protestant England* (London, 1988), pp. 14–17; Paul Christianson, *Reformers and Babylon: English Apocalyptic Visions from the Reformation to the Eve of the Civil War* (Toronto, 1978), pp. 41–46; Katherine Firth, *The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain 1530–1645* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 106–110. All of these are, of course, refinements of William Haller's classic *Foxe's Book of Martyrs and the Elect Nation* (London, 1963).

17 Sidney, "Court Maxims," Warwickshire Record Office, f. 154. The argument against universal monarchy in the later seventeenth century is best summarized by Istvan Hont, "Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy Reconsidered," in John Dunn (editor), *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 41–120.

18 John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power* (London, 1989).

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religiously pluralist state from acquiring the universal dominion which it believed it had inherited from Spain. The wars of the Augustan age were so different from those of the Elizabethan age not because the vocabulary of politics had changed, but because the same words – Popery and universal monarchy – had radically different meanings.

The traditional historiographical separation of domestic and foreign policy, this book has attempted to show, obfuscates more than it explains. Diplomatic and economic historians have been able to describe the seventeenth-century Anglo-Dutch Wars as trade wars only by ignoring the rich cultural contexts in which those conflicts took place. Commercial concerns and diplomatic interests were functions of ideological orientation, just as were commitments to ecclesiologies or political forms. Similarly, domestic political disputes did not occur in isolation from European developments. The English in the seventeenth century were constantly writing and gossiping about the continent; they placed their own histories in a European context. Their ultimate frame of reference was neither localist nor British, but European and universal. When the English went to war in the seventeenth century, they knew why they were risking their fortunes and their lives. They knew, as they had always known, that England's proper role was to prevent universal dominion. Local and domestic politics was so powerfully charged precisely because of this larger significance. By examining that larger significance, by attending to the rich seventeenth-century discussions about affairs beyond the British Isles – about the nature of universal monarchy – historians of Britain gain a deeper understanding of the ideological significance of the political and cultural developments in an age of revolution.

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