Moral Sentiments, Social Exclusion, Aesthetic Education

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1. Philosophers have often been wary of Hume's thought that 'morality is more properly felt than judged of', taking the view, perhaps, that it is more properly judged of than felt.[1] However, the separation of judgment from feeling that both positions imply is itself unfortunate, and I want to consider a view of morality as involving the 'moral sentiments' in a way that restores the unity of judgment and feeling. It may be, though, that the wary philosopher's suspicion derives from a deficient understanding of the emotions, and I want to explore this too. There is a way of thinking about them which is not incorrect in itself, but which may obscure their reality and complexity from view. Thus, it is commonly assumed that the particular instances of 'feeling' are properly identified through classification, by referring the token to the type, so that we get into the way of talking only in general terms about instances of sympathy or benevolence, or other 'moral sentiments', as though we could offer definitive 'global' estimates of their significance. However, it is a commonplace of aesthetics to identify feelings, not by reference to their general concept, but in their particularity by reference to their objects as mediated by relevant descriptions. This is the point at which judgment and feeling converge, and we can begin to see the complexity and subtlety of sensibility in terms of the acuteness of our distinctions and power of judgment. Differences within the emotions, even between instances of the same general kind, are a matter of our descriptions of the world as it affects us. One reason that sympathy, for example, can hardly be a *ground* of morality, apart from the fact that it belongs only to specific situations *within* 'morality', and is not even a single phenomenon, is that our moral assessment of different examples of sympathy depends upon our descriptions of their objects. We can *rationally* assess our sympathetic responses by a closer scrutiny of the situations of those to whom it is directed. It is in such ways that we may distinguish between appearance and reality, say, among appeals for sympathy. Reason can also show us that those who do not in fact receive our

[1] I am grateful to Dr Jan Willem Duyvendak and Professor Marjan Verkerk, both of the Erasmus University Rotterdam, for comments made on this paper at the English-Dutch Workshop on Applied Ethics, March 1998.

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sympathy are often in the same case as those who do. In that sense reason can draw sympathy out, can correct the 'bias to the near' from which we often start. Someone who receives our sympathy does so under a description, and although there is no inconsistency in not feeling the same way about others who fall under the same description, we can at least acknowledge that sympathy is a possibility, and further attention can sometimes draw it out of us. Theoretical reason can also present us with previously unavailable objects of the moral sentiments through the discovery of causal relations, say, that present the situations of others in a new light. We can learn, for instance, that 'these people' are not in fact 'naturally submissive' but have become like this through conditions that we may ourselves be implicated in.[2] The idea of a need to *correct* the bias to the near, and, more generally, to correct and train the moral sentiments, which depends upon a relation between judgment and feeling, in which the critical scrutiny of judgment alters feeling, allows us to make a connection with the neglected Greek vice of *akolasia*, which is translated as 'licentiousness' in English, but implies a lack of chastisement: the *akolastos* is a person with an uncorrected sensibility.

Once we acknowledge the significance for understanding the emotions of our particular descriptions of their intentional objects, the idea that morality is at least properly felt may seem more plausible, especially, perhaps, if we relate the connection between feeling, judgment and descriptions of the world to a *social* world described in historical and political terms, and see the emotions, not as inert generalized quantities, but as energized thoughts, dispositions to strategic action which have a characteristic pulse and feel, which we wrongly take for the thing itself.

Philosophers who are sceptical of the implication of emotion in morality tend to draw attention to the waywardness and fickleness of our sentiments. On the one hand, this is simply realistic. On the other, it overlooks the way in which even the most fickle emotions are anchored in appropriate states of affairs, anchored in the descriptions of those towards whom they are directed. This fickleness is a practical problem that belongs to the instability of moral life rather than a theoretical one, since it is a fickleness of attention to specific realities that the sentiment *itself* has identified. *Feeling* may ebb and flow, but we can latch on nevertheless to the facts about people and other sentient beings that engage our moral feelings, and to the actions that we conceive to be appropriate

[2] I owe this example to a paper given by Catherine Wilson to the Stapledon Society at the University of Liverpool, but it is part of Mill's case against the subjection of women.

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responses. Or to put it another way, the images of those who appeal to us can stay and haunt us even when they fail to compel us to action. This is still a form of the presence of sensibility. The fact that our emotions are fickle is not a reason for doubting their implication in morality. Nevertheless there is an issue about both the *strength* or vitality of our motivational responses and about their *scope*.

2. As to their strength, we can see the difficulty enshrined in Kant's Categorical Imperative, which is precisely a command we address to ourselves. In Kant's own terms, in acting for the sake of duty we find we have to *necessitate* ourselves so to do when we are subject to the sway of contrary inclinations. This thought is a direct descendant of Plato's claim in the *Republic* that reason needs the aid of spirit (*thumos*) in the form of indignation to force our reluctant appetites away from behaviour it judges wrong. Similarly, we find that among his proto-Kantian reflections in the *Social Contract* Rousseau offers a definition of freedom as 'obedience to a law we prescribe for ourselves'. The contrast is with the State of Nature, in which the majority are under the necessity of obedience to the arbitrary law of the strong. This surprising definition of freedom acknowledges the divided self that is given further expression in Rousseau's insistence that the individual member of the Body Politic is both citizen and subject, the citizen as sovereign prescribing laws that the unruly subject only obeys unwillingly. The psychology of inner conflict that we thus find in Plato, Rousseau and Kant, is expressed in terms of the metaphor of political force, the master/slave dialectic internalized and unresolved, as Plato himself ironically points out. Imperfectly rational human beings must necessitate themselves to act according to reason, whereas, by contrast, the holy will does so out of a *subjective necessity*.

Kant's distinction between subjective necessity and necessitation is framed in terms of the will and of Pure Practical Reason, in a way that ignores or resists inclination. This damaging dichotomy is carried over into the conception of humanity that we are commanded to treat as an end, whether in our own person or in that of any other. But treating any person's humanity as an end may be better understood by reference to the development of the moral sentiments, which then both inform the conception of humanity we thus treat as an end and provide us with the sources of motivation for so doing.

Thus I have tried to understand the issue of the strength of our moral responses by reference to the Greek virtues of *enkrateia* and *sophrosune* regarded as different modifications of sensibility, the for-

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mer reflecting necessitation, the latter subjective necessity[3]. *Akolasia*, *akrasia*, *enkrateia*, *sophrosune*, represent different moments in the development of the moral sentiments, from unschooled and narrow in scope, through the painful oscillations between control and lack of control, towards a dominant sensibility. The vacillation we experience between control and lack of control, *enkrateia* and *akrasia*, reflects an instability in our emotional life, in our capacity to respond, so that, to quote T. S. Eliot, 'Between the emotion and the response/Falls the shadow'. *Sophrosune*, traditionally translated into English as 'temperance', reflects, by contrast, a flourishing sensibility the directions of whose attention dominate consciousness, so that there is no longer any inner conflict with the contrary inclinations that the enkratic individual defeats, and the akratic succumbs to.

My own response, then, to Hume's remark that 'morality is more properly felt than judged of' is that of course it is judged of as well as felt. Critical judgment is implicit in the very idea of feeling—'a tear is an intellectual thing'. As Hume himself somewhat optimistically asserts, 'the moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition ... our passions yield to our reason without any opposition'[4]. But *practical* judgment is also an element in the responsiveness of feeling to the situation that engages it. I have attempted elsewhere[5] to analyse the modal language of morality in a way which grounds it in our forms of motivation, rather than our forms of motivation in an unexplained modal language. Part of the problem with the early versions of emotivism was their promiscuous readiness to translate *all* 'ethical symbols' in terms of emotive meaning. They failed to see the functional diversity of such terms, and misidentified what made a purported moral statement a *moral* statement in the first place, looking to the form rather than the use. Modal auxiliaries like 'ought' and 'should' have a different use from those of necessity and impossibility, though the two sets of terms are related and overlap. We do not identify a moral judgment by its form alone, by the presence of an 'ought' or 'should' or even of a 'right' or 'wrong', but need to see its grounds and its context. The statement that you should not abuse your children does not bear a moral construction on its face, as it were. It makes a difference whether we go on to give a reason in terms of the distress and suffering it will bring on the children, or the punishment it will bring on the parent.

[3] Michael McGhee, 'Temperance' in *Philosophical Investigations,* 1989.

[4] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 416.

[5] Michael McGhee, 'Facing Truths' in McGhee (ed.) *Philosophy, Religion and the Spiritual Life* (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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Practical judgments about what we ought to do imply reasons for action, and these refer us to the intentional objects of emotions, which constitute the considerations which move us to act, and that, unsurprisingly, is how moral reasons motivate. The language of moral necessity and impossibility, by contrast, refers us to the 'compulsions of the soul', to the positive and negative impulses of our responses and to their vitality.

3. The issue about the *scope* of our moral sentiments is a problem about the selectivity or partiality of their engagement in action and may be represented in terms of Hume's comment, already referred to, about the bias to the near. Morality is supposed to be not so biased, and that has seemed a further reason for denying that morality has much to do with feeling. The supposition though denies the possibility of the *education* or *correction* of feeling. This development occurs culturally and individually. The development of sensibility in the culture provides the measure of what needs to be corrected in the individual, as we shall see. Correction does not occur in the light of something *external* to feeling, say Reason, but in the light of the historical movement of feeling and judgment. But that the issue of scope is an issue at all is itself an interesting fact. Contemporary gestures of a somewhat wooden kind to universality as an intrinsic feature of 'the concept of morality' may distract us from seeing that the demand for it is an expression of an extraordinary *moral ideal* that has constituted a particular historical and political development, intimated in our spiritual traditions, and frequently received with incredulity. The universality of morality here is the ideal demand that *anyone*'s well-being should count in our moral deliberations if our actions may affect it. We should distinguish this sense from the universalization of Kant's imperative which requires us to ask whether we can coherently or rationally will that the maxim of our action become a universal law of nature. We may conclude that this demand of universalization is a particular product of the universality thesis, since it seems to provide a test for what we are in principle prepared to will for rational beings. We should also distinguish the universality feature from the universalizability of moral judgment, which is a logical feature of the relationship between practical judgments and reasons for action. But making universality a criterion of 'morality' requires us to regard cultures that lack it as 'pre-moral'. It seems more reasonable to acknowledge their moralities and to see universality as a development *within* morality.

There is, incidentally, an extraordinary relationship between the bias to the near or partiality and the available descriptions under which the moral sentiments may become engaged. Thus I may have

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an *immediate* sympathy for a relative who struggles to face their own death. It is a feeling for them as my family member. However, something else can dawn at such moments, so that the immediate becomes *reflective*. Thus I may come to *understand* their struggle as *exemplifying* our common human condition. In referring to exemplification here I intend it in the aesthetic sense of a vivid reverberation of the universal around the particular. I thus see them not just as my family member, but as a fellow human being, and to that extent I discover the possibility of feeling for *anyone* under that description, including myself (and I thus appear to regard the human scene from an impossible point beyond it). The point is that the transition to universality here is a matter of a *revelation* which broadens the descriptions under which my sentiments become engaged. Thus even the plight of an enemy, which I may normally rejoice in, may suddenly reveal itself as the plight of a fellow human being. This is important, because I already know abstractly and with indifference that this enemy is also a fellow human being: the revelation amounts to a leap of the sentiment to seize on that description, whether I like it or not. What is revealed is that their *human* plight is an object of feeling. It is in this sense, then, that humanity becomes an end. In that sense, though, so can other sentient beings become an 'end', so that we become *engaged* by their status as 'fellow creatures' or 'fellow beings'.

4. The historical specificity of the development of this 'stream of tendency' towards universality and its tension with the bias to the near may be illuminated by reflecting on the terms in which Rousseau describes the transition from the State of Nature to the Civil Society. In effect the nascent citizen obliges himself (and alas the masculine pronoun is gender specific in this case) to temper his actions according to how they might affect the well-being of *any* other citizen, and not just that of himself or his own kith and kin. He obliges himself to be impartial. Thus we see how the notion of 'citizen' stretches us *towards* universality and away from narrow communalism, even though it does not carry us all the way, since citizens are state-specific. The issue about the *scope* of our moral sentiments turns on the development of the idea of a civil society and that of being a fellow citizen, and the issue about their *strength* on the distinction between citizen and subject. The two come together well in Rousseau's description of the 'remarkable change' that the transition from the state of nature to the civil society brings about. One is at once a citizen and a subject, as I pointed out earlier, just because the developing self as citizen has to make the resistant self as unwilling subject do what the citizen recognizes to be

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just. Here we can see how the human oscillation between *akrasia* and *enkrateia* has become politically acknowledged and institutionalized, so that 'necessitation' becomes the political reality of justice backed by the force of law. Thus just as the scope of the moral sentiments is broadened and stretched we also see them weaken and falter. Rousseau's *inducement* to his citizens, as opposed to the sanction of the law, takes 'men as they are', and seems to depend upon a reasonable coincidence between justice and interest. The other side of the bias to the near is indifference and hostility to others, and these are the forces that need to be overcome if relative universality is to be achieved. One reading of Rousseau would leave the matter there: justice is a conventional notion and we need the motivation of interest if justice is to prevail over indifference and hostility, so we must show how the two can be made to coincide—through the mediation, in Rousseau's case, of the notion of civil liberty. That is not, however, the reading I propose here, since there seems to me evidence that Rousseau gives prominence to the moral sentiments in his account of the transition to the civil society. The virtue of continence or *enkrateia* is premised upon acknowledgement of the good, and I have tried to make that virtue a modification of sensibility, so I need to show how the citizen might recognize the morality of what the law sanctions in a way that transcends the convention view: there must already be at least a weak motivation towards the good. And so we have to ask questions about the conditions for the possibility of such motivation. But the point is not to look for the sources of a motivation to act morally, as though morality were to be understood independently of what might motivate us to take it seriously, but to see how what we call morality can itself be understood as a set of motivations, a matter of the primeval distribution by the gods of *aidos* and *dike*, 'shame' and 'justice'. If we see these primitive reactions as embedded in human nature, then we move decisively away from a conception of morality as depending upon an independent picture of human nature, as a device for counteracting limited sympathies, say, and towards a conception of morality in which these reactions can be seen as capable of a development which is also a development of human nature itself. This is in fact Rousseau's conception, since the 'remarkable change in man' that the transition from the state of nature to the civil society is supposed to bring about is a change from being a 'stupid limited animal' to becoming 'a creature of intelligence'. It is worth examining the schematic terms in which Rousseau marks the transition:

> it puts justice as a rule of conduct in the place of instinct, and gives his actions the moral quality they previously lacked. It is

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> only then, when the voice of duty has taken the place of physical impulse, and right that of desire, that man, who has hitherto thought only of himself, finds himself compelled to act on other principles, and to consult his reason rather than study his inclinations.

What we are supposed to gain from the transition is interesting: our faculties are exercised and developed, our minds are enlarged and *our sentiments ennobled*. In other words, the transition is towards an alteration of sensibility. The contrast is no doubt too stark, but its proto-Kantian ring is clear enough. On the one hand instinct, physical impulse, desire, inclination, on the other justice as a rule of conduct, morality, duty, right and reason. The introduction of reason on the favoured side of this dichotomy, and it is a dichotomy that needs to be interrogated, need not imply that Rousseau failed to see a place for instrumental rationality in the pursuit of desires. Presumably the point is that the satisfaction of desires previously taken for granted becomes itself a subject of rational reflection in the light of one's commitment to justice.

This might just be interpreted as an instrumental rationality in pursuit of larger ends, but it is worth saying on Rousseau's behalf that these are larger ends that depend upon a *theoretical* realization of one's social identity as a member of the Body Politic. This is connected to my earlier remarks about revelation and the training of sensibility. One realizes that one has a social and not merely private identity, not just in an abstract way, which is compatible with indifference, but through a switch of emotional engagement. Here, though, realization amounts to a (rational) *conversion*, to a dominant way of seeing oneself, a finding one's social identity to be the locus of an emergent sensibility.

But as I have implied, it is tempting to see Rousseau as offering a conception of morality as constituted by a system of rights and duties that we have to find a rational interest to persuade us to uphold. That is certainly in the spirit of his famous opening remark about justice and utility not being divided, though we may want to emphasize that the transition to a civil society effects a change in our self-formation and thus in our very concept of what is to count as utility. But it is civil liberty, not morality, that is constituted by rights and duties, and our willingness to acknowledge them is shored up by interest rather than wholly determined by it. In other words, confidence that one's own (collective) interests are acknowledged or protected may be a condition of sensitivity to the interests of others. Even a grudging willingness to act in this way seems to be a condition of a transformed sensibility, since it is the *acting* that

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changes feeling. That at least is what Rousseau sees as the effect: an enforced universality stretches a 'chastised' sensibility. The notion of rights and duties backed by the force of law is a political acknowledgement of the instability of *enkrateia*, which is already premised on willing the good.

5. The convention view of morality is allied with one obvious way of connecting morality with social exclusion. On this view the socially excluded have no stake in the community since they are excluded from its benefits, and thus have no interest in securing those benefits by conforming to the behaviours that are their condition. It is true, no doubt, that this relationship holds and moreover that it is not in the rational interests of the stake holders to ignore the formation of an underclass, to exclude people who may destabilize their society, and it is true also that on this view it is futile to appeal to the sense of 'moral responsibility' of the excluded when they behave badly, since by definition morality is a set of conventions that it has to be in one's interests to sustain. An appeal of this kind depends upon the conditions for the possibility of inclusivity being met: in their absence the appeal is empty. However, I want to examine the possibility of a deeper relationship between morality and social exclusion.

My own enterprise is to see how morality may be constituted, not by these intermediate conventional obligations it is supposedly in our rational interest to undertake, but by emotion, including of course the calm passions which Hume rightly says we tend to misidentify as the deliberations of reason. In order to see how this could be rendered plausible we need to return to the idea that we identify particular emotions not by reference to their general concept, but by reference to 'others and the world under a description' that engage motivations. What I wish to try to do is show how morality may be understood as the product of powerful feelings in the face of social experience, as grounded in historical forms of relationship with others and the world. Moral language arises out of our responses to these experiences. If I may deploy the key term for Rousseau's State of Nature, what we have to deal with are the vicissitudes of our collective experience of the rule of the strongest, whether on the one side or the other, with our need for mastery and control, and with our contrasting enjoyment of relationships founded not on force but consent and appreciation.

What we call 'morality' has at least a twofold aspect, which corresponds to conditions that human beings have sought emancipation from, and the forms of independent and participatory action that emancipation may enhance. It comprises a defensive, reactive

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(and exclusive) mode on the one hand, and a constructive, creative (and integrative) mode, on the other. Both modes need to be understood historically. I want to highlight *sources* of motivation and the *formation* of sensibility and relationship at a collective as well as individual level. But the essential preliminary point will turn on the idea of formative collective *experience and memory*, which generates an evaluative language constituted by a set of practical judgments governed by the motivational necessities of response. These responses are to two different kinds of experience, that of an 'oppressive' coercion or domination, on the one hand, and that of a 'liberating' participation in collaborative creative endeavour on the other. *Both of these forms of experience have a distinctive and memorable 'taste' to which we react*, on the one hand recoiling, on the other seeking to cherish and preserve.

I hope it is clear that I am not simply making a 'moral' move here, deploring oppression and exploitation! I am seeking the sources of 'morality' *in* such experience and the reaction to it at a collective level. So I am not saying that oppression and exploitation are wrong and therefore we should act against them, but rather that our calling them 'wrong' is an expression of a primal struggle against them, an expression, indeed, which some groups and individuals still do not dare even to voice to themselves. It is not a matter of an 'imperative' belonging to some prior and unexplained conception of morality, but of a necessity of recoil. The *content* of the Kantian imperative, however, *is* relevant to this historical condition, since it makes the master-slave relation the pivotal category of moral criticism, or better, that relation is the paradigm of what the imperative excludes. In summary form, we could characterize the hostile reaction to domination by others, to what it makes us suffer and the possibilities it denies us, as a passion for *justice*. Such a reaction is essentially collective, the response of one group to oppression by another.

What I have in mind particularly in explaining the defensive mode is the experience and the memory of being at the receiving end of what Mill[6] called the *law of superior strength* and the *rule of mere force*. To use Timothy Sprigge's expression, but in an ethical context, *there is something that it is like* to be at the receiving end of the law of the strongest. I should emphasize the sustained *brutality* of this kind of regime. One is not concerned simply with the 'clinical precision' of the use of force in the pursuit of group or national or individual interests, but the use also as an instrument of war or policy, of terror, atrocity, massacre, the unleashing of dreadful

[6] In his essay on *The Subjection of Women*.

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forces onto the streets, entering each domestic dwelling, wreaking havoc wantonly, revelling in the horror of the victims, and so on. The point about such wanton and such calculated brutality is that, like famine and natural disaster, *it is experienced with horror, remembered with grief, and anticipated with dread*. That, no doubt, has always been part of its point. There is something that it is like to be at the receiving end, and the victims are *strongly motivated* to avoid its repetition, either through slavish submission and progressive demoralization in which the power of independent action is gradually lost, or, through the action of resentment and indignation, through rebellion and concerted self-assertion. The pendulum swings between assertion and demoralization, in complex ways which depend upon conditions that I am not concerned nor competent to spell out. Resentment in the face of the forced submission or obedience to the will of *another* reflects a commonly endured adversity and the denial of expression and *Bildung* for oneself and one's own people.

My talk of motivational necessity, to reiterate the point, is related to the modal utterances that express these attitudes. Our judgments express recoil and revulsion as well as, sometimes, a natural bonding and solidarity. Thus they include attitudinal judgments about what we *must* avoid or prevent, fused with practical, strategic and tactical judgments about what in particular *ought* to be done. But this form of bonding and mutual sympathy is the solidarity only of a class and is thus only partially integrative. Members of the oppressed class identify themselves in an implicitly communal and conflictual way, over against the hostile other and around the interests and passions by which they have been formed in the crucible of social life. This tends to limit human sympathies to within the group thus defined—the group with the emancipatory common interest, for example. It is not that members of such a community cannot recognize in an abstract way that they are also human beings, nor that they cannot be stirred at all by sympathy for the plight of a fellow creature. The point is that their *dominant* emotional engagement is with the interest that defines them over against the perceived or real hostility of their enemies. And there is a powerful atavistic satisfaction in the destruction of those enemies, a deep pleasure in their slaughter.

Memory and experience play a central determining role in the emergence and the maintenance of the motivations I have mentioned. We respond in determinate ways to 'oppressive' experience (we precisely *find* it 'oppressive') and remembering it, as a group, say, in songs and stories, is an important part of the way the realities, and our responses to them, as well as the possibilities of

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response, and their various consequences, are kept before the mind of the community, and transmitted to a new generation. These songs and stories also, of course, provide what Marcuse calls 'beautiful images of liberation' and can encode emergent attitudes that extend people's sympathies across classes. People are motivated strongly to do what will prevent repetition of experiences that have caused horror, and that motivation is expressed in the arising of practices and institutions, the winning of rights, checks and balances, as well as in the inherited language, which expresses, in its evaluations, the attitudes I have mentioned. No doubt this will work at an unconscious as well as at a conscious level. Evaluative terms or special resonances isolate and identify the significant phenomena, the realities we want to avoid and the realities we wish to preserve. Such language is both descriptive and expressive, determining a class of phenomena and marking a collective attitude to them. The irony of the role that memory and experience play in the development of a culture is that the new generation for whom the relevant forms of experience have become relatively remote and the memory dim is still initiated from childhood into the attitudes, the language and the practices that express or arise out of earlier communal responses to such experience. They are initiated into the forms and practices of motivational necessities, but the primal motivating experience is not *theirs*, the language is not expressive of *their* response to a reality they have not had to endure, and do not remember. The initiation process has to be supplemented by sanctions. It is easy to see, then, how they will fail to see the point of particular forms of vigilance, or be unmoved by the initial urgent impulse of their class towards cohesion, bonding or solidarity. *The value discourse will pass them by because the conditions of that discourse are no longer present or remembered*, and their initiation into it is an onerous, even harmful imposition, especially when the form of their own experience is taking them in a different direction. But this gives us a hint about the consequences of social exclusion for moral development: if the conditions upon which a particular value discourse depends are absent, then that discourse, that culture, cannot long prevail. Disintegration follows unless there is an alternative, constructive morality of *Bildung*, which generates its own forms of solidarity and commitment.

6. What I am calling a constructive and integrative morality of *Bildung* and expression is generated by a quite different range of experiences from the one that determines the reactive and defensive mode. The key contrasting *motifs* are the teacher-pupil relation rather than that of the master-slave, and the idea of treating human-

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ity as an end. The latter should, I think, be understood as partly constituted by the willingness to enter into sets of relationships that depend upon mutual consent rather than *force majeure*. We may think of it as a 'respect for persons', but only so long as we construe that as a function of sensibility allied to appreciation, rather than as the object of an imperative. Resentment and sympathy may well be the dominant emotions of the defensive mode of morality, and we need to remember Nietzsche's criticisms of an overvalued sympathy. There is some reason to think of sympathy as essentially a reciprocal attitude of mutual support belonging to partners in adversity or affliction, and this makes sense of his remark that sympathy is not a major value in the lives of the masters, who are more concerned with the disciplines of *techne* than with a freedom they have always had. Sympathy may thus be distinguished from compassion (or *karuna*) which is a feeling that may be aroused by the plight of the less fortunate, though presumably mixed with remorse, in the case of those whose class is responsible for the oppression. Perhaps the dominant moral sentiments of the constructive mode are benevolence, appreciation and the kind of 'sympathy' marked by the Sanskrit *mudita*, an attitude of sympathetic joy in the flourishing of another. Again experience and memory are involved and the impulse is to preserve and protect the relationships that arise around *Bildung*, *techne* and *poeisis*, their constitutive and emergent disciplines, virtues and values. There is something that it is like to be thus engaged. If people are excluded from these disciplines, and thus become truly *akolastoi*, then they are denied access to the conditions for this essentially integrative dimension of moral life. It is integrative just because it is non-divisive, since it is generated out of irenic activities that at least do not inhibit the scope of the moral sentiments. The reactive mode, on the other hand, depends upon and reinforces a hostile and wounded consciousness. The domination of consciousness by the categories of exclusion, their angry rhetoric and hostile emotions, *does* inhibit the scope of the moral sentiments, and already entails an embattled and divided psyche. Such domination is sometimes suspended through the work of *poeisis*, the spell of artistic representations, as Schiller pointed out. Sometimes it drops its guard through the spell of *eros* and the pillow talk of noble *logoi*, as in the case of the Nazi who falls in love with another woman she then discovers is Jewish. Plato, of course, gives a special place to the erotic relationship as a source of motivation for the development of *education*. He takes the erotic ascent to move on from the love of moral beauty to the love of *institutions that improve the young*, that is to say, it is a natural development of a form of love which rejoices in well-being. Experience shows that

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successful education depends upon an attitude of appreciative expectancy rather than coercive expectation. This distinction may recall Heidegger's discussion of the different stances that are possible towards nature. The preoccupation with mastery and control, with 'challenging-forth', leaves aspects of reality concealed from view, real aspects whose appearance or non-concealment depends upon a more 'receptive' attitude. A similar preoccupation in the context of human relationships negates or refuses the expressive reality of those who are made mere instruments, and endangers the same reality in those who make them so, because such an expressive reality is revealed in an interaction, a 'conversation'. It is well known that the desire for mastery and control can spill over and infect even erotic and familial relationships. However, alongside the genuine necessities of mastery and control of the elements and natural forces, and even in their midst, there develops a culture of natural fascination with the growth and ways of things, the behaviour of plants and animals, of minerals and metals and wood, of fire and water. We have to learn when to force our will on things and when we have to remain obedient to their qualities and aptitudes, in the making of artifacts and works of art. We also learn the rhythms and conditions of sensibility and desire, and the processes of relationship and mortality. Narrative, song, music, drama are public forms of *reflection*, in which a community looks at itself and discovers at the same time the *terms* of its own reflection, the perspectives uncovered in the way it sees what has happened to it and what it has done. All this is set in the midst of practical interests, but the latter also provide a space for disinterested observation of a kind which makes self-knowledge possible through comparison and analogy. Through 'natural correspondences' (Wollheim) we see the exterior world mirror the inner, or the natural the human, sometimes finding the form of the interior or the human in exterior and natural symbols before we are fully conscious of the interior or human itself.

The constructive mode of morality belongs to a culture of reflection and creative collaboration and participation and it gives rise to its own set of natural attitudes and related practical necessities. Forms of activity have arisen which depend on co-operation and the recognition of mutual dependence. The relationships here are not of master and slave, of arbitrary command and enforced obedience, but of partners, fellow participants, masters and apprentices or pupils in the transmission and development of a tradition. Here forms of human relationship are set up and established around education and common endeavour, the transmission of skills, learning and adapting to the ways of nature and animals, the acquisition of

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knowledge and understanding, the passing on of experience, the teaching of wisdom, and so forth. There are certain real features of such activities and processes, to which the human person has to give ground. A predisposition, in practical contexts, to the use of force to gain what one wants has to give way to patient observation and awareness of cause and effect, the processes by which things are brought forth. The creative process, for instance, is one which we seek to understand, and it is no accident that we learn the connections between natural and human processes, that artists and thinkers, for instance, draw on the metaphorics of conception, birth and growth, because they illuminate for them the phases of their own activities. The rhythms of process have to be learnt and taught, and human relationships themselves are discovered to be of the same kind, as friendships form and develop according to processes that it is not for any individual to invent but only to discover. Spiritual traditions arise around the discovery of the conditions upon which particular states of mind and their expression in action and demeanour depend, in which the same need for patient observation and attention to real processes has to be learnt. Alcibiades has to learn that he cannot have what Socrates knows in exchange for sexual favours just because of the nature of the conditions under which what Socrates knows can be imparted. The acquisition of wisdom is a matter of the acquisition of forms of knowledge that depend upon the states of being of the postulant, a fact, if it is one, that has itself to be discovered. There are degrees of knowledge and ignorance in human beings of the real processes of human life. A person has to learn obedience to these necessities if they are to proceed along the path of creativity or of understanding. But the forms of relationship that are established around these realities and activities do not survive their absence, except as nostalgia.

What we are looking for now, after the taste and experience of oppression and domination, is a contrasting taste of partnership in the context of human growth and development around education and the transmission of knowledge, and the relationships that are thus engendered. These relationships also have a determinate 'taste', as do the relationships founded in force, and whereas we are motivated, at least as victims, to avoid, to protect ourselves from, the rule of mere force, in the present case we are motivated to hold onto the relations of creative and reflective participation; they are forms whose loss we mourn if we have become established in them, because they precisely form *us*. But such historical formation determines our conception of the humanity we might be expected to treat as an end, whether in our own person or in that of any other. It needs to be emphasized that people who seek to preserve human-

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ity are to be welcomed or held at bay according to the conception of humanity they carry around with them. This was a point well made by Nietzsche, but it is also implicit in Schiller. Someone who suffers from the kind of imbalance or onesidedness he describes so well will seek to inscribe it in those to whom they offer aid.

7. But there is a shocking corollary to this, which is that the attitudes, the motivational stances, the practical necessities, depend upon experience of and participation in the relevant activities themselves. In the absence of the relevant experience, the value discourse loses its grip because of the *absence* of what it *expresses*. Better, it is seen never to have had a grip in the absence of these conditions. The forms of relationship that I have attempted to describe, and the motivational necessities that belong to them and are expressed in the language, *cannot be sustained* in isolation from the activities from which they spring. Thus an appeal to these necessities and imperatives will inevitably *fail* if they are made to people who have been *deprived* of the possibility of personal development in the context of these activities, if they have been deprived of formation around participation in creative work and reflection. Participation in these forms of activity is a *condition* of much of what we call morality, though we have forgotten this condition and think that 'morality' stands by itself, an imperative, a 'requirement', for all. It is pointless to address people deprived of apprenticeship and a non-oppressive 'education', or even stable and affectionate nurture, in the value language that derives from these, and to decry the rents in the moral fabric of society as though this can be repaired by 'teaching people the difference between right and wrong'. It misunderstands real connections, though people can be forced or conditioned into a kind of submission. If people stand outside the participating conditions of the motivational necessities I have referred to, then moral appeals in that language will simply mock them, because it is embedded in a form of life rendered unavailable to them. Those who are thus appealed to, moreover, will have no reason to take such appeals seriously, since they cannot recall them to the sense of what they have been deprived of. The reasons are not reasons for *them* because the reasons relate to motivations that depend upon a form of life they have no experience of. It does not follow from my account that participation in educative formation makes people *good*. Such participation is simply a condition for minimal engagement with the value discourse it generates. There is no question here, either, that this perspective of what Mill would have called the moral sentiments is the *right* perspective, as though some independent standard of measurement were available. In that case it may be thought that what I

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have said here leaves us with an arbitrary choice of values. But where we stand in this regard is not a matter of choice, but depends upon the formative experience which grounds the values. It seems to me also that the account on offer undercuts such relativism by focusing on values that are generated by the very impulse to survival (the defensive mode) and on values grounded in the generation of attention and self-understanding (the constructive mode). The 'moral fabric of society' can only be repaired by restoring the infrastructure upon which moral concepts depend, by restoring the possibilities of participation in creative and educative work. Whether that is still possible is another question.

8. My own temptation has been to see what I called the issue of scope as a problem about how we are to explain theoretically a transition from the bias to the near to some kind of universality. I saw the idea of sympathy for the plight of a stranger as something that stood in need of explanation, whereas one's response to a family member, for instance, needed no such explanation. But neither needs an explanation, whereas the *failure* to respond to the plight of a stranger does, even though, as I have suggested, it may come with the force of a revelation that despite oneself another's human struggle engages one's feelings. It seems to me now that this temptation results from confusing a practical problem with a theoretical one. The issue is not to explain universality, but to explain its absence in particular cases. Thus the Good Samaritan's behaviour does not require explanation, even though it is striking, whereas the behaviour of the priest and the Levite *does*, even though it is common. To put it another way, the natural reaction to the distress of a fellow human being is to go to their aid, though it is sometimes rational reflectively to endorse or belay that reaction. Sympathy is a natural reaction, then, but it nevertheless depends upon conditions, and those conditions can be undermined. They are conditions of understanding or recognition. Of course I can look and look and remain indifferent, since understanding is a movement of the soul or imagination in which their humanity becomes suddenly vivid and engaging. There is a natural form of attention which provides the measure of an attention deficit, and it is the deficit which needs explaining. I want to call in aid here some of Schiller's reflections in his *Aesthetic Education* on the fragmentation of the personality and the problem of onesidedness. Schiller effectively focuses on the idea of a fixation or closure of the attention around a restricted sphere of activity. Thus in the Sixth Letter, reflecting on the apparently unavoidable damage to the *psyche* that civilization has brought about, he remarks famously:

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> We know that the sensibility of the psyche depends for its intensity upon the liveliness, for its scope upon the richness, of the imagination. The preponderance of the analytical faculty must, however, of necessity, deprive the imagination of its energy and warmth, while a more restricted sphere of objects must reduce its wealth. Hence the abstract thinker very often has a cold heart, since he dissects his impressions, and impressions can move the soul only as long as they remain whole; while the man of practical affairs often has a narrow heart, since his imagination, imprisoned within the unvarying confines of his own calling, is incapable of extending itself to appreciate other ways of seeing and knowing.

The point here seems to be about perfectly functional forms of attention that come to dominate conscious life and thus take energy away from attention and perception so as to preclude the engagement of the moral sentiments by their natural objects: 'impressions can move the soul only as long as they remain whole', and only as long as they are sufficiently attended to. Thus an academic's failure to help the man who fell among thieves might be explained by a habit of analysis, a businessman's by a habit of calculation, *dominating* their minds as they pass, so that neither can pay the attention that moves the soul. Again, a person can often pay such attention to their own child, or even to another child of their own race, but not for one they perceive under the description 'kaffir', say, or 'Capulet', a description that triggers a conditioned set of hostile reactions of a familiar kind. But the point about the domination of consciousness, the point indeed of Schiller's book, is that art and beauty provide conditions under which these fixations of the attention are relaxed so that whole or unfamiliar impressions may begin to move the soul. The discovery of an inner balance or harmony implies the possibility of a training, a correction of the attention through an aesthetic education. Kant had been concerned with Rousseau's failure to solve the problem of the moral education of the species. Schiller's contribution to this debate is to argue that the education is an aesthetic one, since beauty and art are a major means of restoring the species' lost inner harmony, at least for an interlude. Such interludes at least provide the sense of a contrast with the normal preoccupations of consciousness, and awaken by that means and nurture the moral sentiments through the touch of representations of their objects in the form of concrete universals. In other words moral education is also aesthetic, one in which poetically evocative *images* beget their kind in the mind, and it fails if it does not compel the imagination. The absence of this form of education

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can leave those who miss it 'uncorrected'. An untransformed imagination still remains potent, but it follows an antique and atavistic drum: and in battle the *akolastoi* feel themselves alive and potent, and are, no doubt, unless they have already been defeated and demoralized by the law of superior force, full of passionate intensity.

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