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Residual history: memory and activism in modern Poland

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This article examines the divide between national and local collective memory in Poland and investigates the role of "memory activists" in mediating and exploiting this divide. It narrows its focus to the ethnic cleansing of Poles by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) from 1943 to 1944 and the forced relocation of Ukrainians in Poland, Operation Vistula, in 1947. It surveys local and national newspapers to understand competing interpretations and analyzes what incidents (e.g. protests, disputes, commemorations, reenactments, etc.) related to these events take place in local communities. It highlights the many actors, "memory activists," and associations involved in pushing specific, often ahistorical, interpretations of these events – motivated by political gain, careerism, or personal conviction. It uses the theoretical works of Maurice Halbwachs and Karl Mannheim to effectively distinguish between local and national phenomenon and to elucidate the various nuances of collective memory.

Keywords: Poland; Ukrainian insurgent army; Operation Vistula; collective memory; nationalist activism

In an era of nation-states, nationalism circumscribes entire political and civic arenas. As the original *raison d'être* of the nationalist fades away, nationalism becomes "a name for the general condition of modern body politic, more like the climate of political and social thought than just another doctrine"[1] (Nairn 2003, 82). It is within this political and social climate of nationalism that specific collective memories take on an ever-growing significance. Collective memories serve to legitimate or undermine competing parties, individuals, and associations – all proclaiming themselves the legitimate representatives of the nation. Collective memories can be appropriated, constructed, and guided by state and civic initiative (Miller 2012), but they can also stubbornly evade efforts at interference (Halbwachs 1980; Mannheim 1972). This struggle between national rhetoric and collective memory mirrors a general struggle between "center" and "periphery."

However, peripheries often comprise fragmented locales, each with their own unique and contested past. The following pages illustrate several local collective memories in Poland that markedly *differ* from mainstream national narratives. Consequently, this work explores how political and civic actors wishing to represent subaltern and alternative viewpoints see these collective memories as a lucrative means to distance themselves from mainstream government – in effect, populism.

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The local collective memories discussed in this work are located at the periphery, but more importantly, they are the product of significant border reconstructions and population transfers. As studies done by Judson (2006) and Murdock (2010) have deftly shown, the state's role in creating, regulating, and interpreting borders and their control over the status and movement of people have a direct impact on creating nations out of local communities. This work argues that this is equally true of national attempts to construct and appropriate collective memories in the decades after national borders have settled. The patchwork quilt of Poland's current borders has left an indelible mark on the periphery of the country. The communities of Poland's periphery are the products of expulsions, population transfers, ethnic cleansing, "encouraged relocation," and thorough border reconstruction during and directly after World War II. When Poland's borderland communities finally settled in the 1950s, the newly minted People's Republic of Poland (along with its neighbor, the Soviet Union) sought to construct sense and meaning (if not order and control) in the new communities of the periphery. This involved prohibiting the discussion of the events that shaped (and created) these new communities. The fall of Communism released a deluge of freedom and reexamination in these communities. Some inhabitants were eager to openly discuss their understanding of local history while some held on to the security and convenience official accounts had provided them. The institutional legacy of official historical interpretation has not been forgotten. Those wishing to completely banish Communist historical narratives and those wishing to restore them both see the appeal of an "official account" as moral arbiter. In democratic Poland, the state does not directly assume this position without legislation and political lobbying. This has led to the creation of official organs of history such as The Institute of National Remembrance; it has also led to the popularity of "memory activists." Memory activism – lobbying for formal and societal recognition of an explicit and exclusive interpretation of a historical event as "national" memory – embodies various motives. Memory activists can use politics to inculcate their rendition of history or they can use memory to further their political career. Either way, activists often operate in communities where their work will resonate with or provoke the population. For the activist, no publicity is bad publicity. The memory activist and associations involved with memory activism will *serve as the chief protagonists* of this work. Individual activists in this study include a priest, a victim of ethnic cleansing, and a politician. Associations in this study include *Kresy* (historical Poland's romantic borderland) organizations and Ukrainian minority organizations.

Perhaps the most controversial and transformative historical issues to shape communities along Poland's periphery are: the ethnic cleansing of Poles by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during WWII; the forced exchange and transfer of Poles and Ukrainians between Poland and the Soviet Union thereafter; and the forced relocation of those Ukrainians left in Poland away from Poland's new postwar eastern border during Operation Vistula in 1947. These events went hand in hand with redrawing Poland's eastern border and they reflected a desire to homogenize eastern Poland (with Poles) and western Ukraine (with Ukrainians) – destabilizing centuries old communities in the process and forging new ones in lands just requisitioned from Germany (now given to Poland and forming her western border). The communities of Poland's periphery involved with these events will *serve as the scene* for this study. They include areas of the so-called "recovered territories" (the lands confiscated from Germany) that served as the destination of these relocated Poles and Ukrainians. Ukrainians forcibly removed from Poland's new eastern border and Poles forcibly removed from those Polish lands that were incorporated into the Soviet Union after WWII (now Western Ukraine) live predominantly in the contemporary province of Warmia and Mazuria and the province of Lower Silesia. Locales

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around Poland's eastern border – contemporary Polish provinces where UPA's ethnic cleansing occurred (Lublin province) and where Communist narratives relocated such carnage (Subcarpathian province) – are also surveyed in this work. These areas have been refashioned several times throughout the Communist period and under the current Republic of Poland. The names of many of these provinces hark back to anachronistic territories to provide continuity as far back as the fourteenth century – not only the constructed continuity of a Polish *nation*, but a narrative of territorial continuity that these lands have always been *Polish*. As the current incarnations of Poland's provinces slowly circumscribe the identities of the communities located within them, these imagined continuities merge into local collective memory and local historical narrative.

As activists adapt their rhetoric to accommodate such complicated historical narratives (Judson 2006, 4), it becomes imperative to understand local collective memory as the arena in which the memory activist operates. This work does this using local newspapers[2] (in a comparative study with national newspapers) and a theoretical framework based on the works of Maurice Halbwachs and Karl Mannheim. Local newspapers (some used in this study include: *Wrocław Gazette*, *Elbląg Daily*, *Eastern Daily*) serve as an arbiter of local narrative. They "decide" what events and interpretations are important to a community and they provide insight into how activists are received by a community – whether activists are well respected, politely accommodated, or rejected. Local editorials attempt to influence how a community thinks about events, while news articles use language that align themselves with specific interpretations or try to remain neutral. Local newspapers sometimes simply omit local events, further underlying the need to understand local media's role in delimiting collective memory. Halbwachs, the father of collective memory studies, made enduring use of the media's ability to disseminate news into editorialized events *experienced* collectively, creating collective memory in the process. Mannheim, in his work on generations, attempted to understand the difference between memories experienced through dissemination (appropriated) and those memories experienced first-hand (acquired). This differentiation will be illustrated by looking at communities directly involved in a specific event (e.g. in Lublin province) and communities simply told by the state, media, films, books, and education that a specific event happened to them (e.g. in Subcarpathian province), as well as mainstream national narratives conveyed through Poland's two major national newspapers, *Electoral Gazette* and *Republic*. Halbwachs' own contribution to understanding forms of collective memory centers around the *displacement* of communities from their original homes (e.g. the Kresy diaspora in Lower Silesia) and the ability of displaced collective memories to thrive and adapt even when "implaced" (Halbwach's term, meaning the opposite of "displaced") in areas that seek to assimilate pre-existing collective memories (e.g. the Ukrainian minorities in Warmia and Mazuria and Lower Silesia). These methods serve to illustrate the pastiche of collective memory in Poland and to highlight the residual nature of collective memory.

Competing collective memories in Poland: from Halbwachs to Mannheim

Halbwachs described collective memory as "a current of continuous thought whose continuity is not at all artificial, for it retains from the past only what still lives or is capable of living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive" (1980, 80). Halbwachs saw the nation within his categorical idea of a group, and that, "in effect, there are several collective memories and between individual and nation lie many other groups" (1980, 83). To Halbwachs, "national" collective memory is thus the confluence of various other group collective memories, imparting their perspectives onto a national framework with varying degrees of

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success. Though Poland's national framework may have had an extensive overhaul in 1989, the collective memory of many other sub-groups in Poland and their social frameworks: for example, religion, family, and what Halbwachs termed "physical surroundings" (1980, 140), did not experience quite the same magnitude of upheaval. What these groups did experience, however, was a sudden flux in political enfranchisement. The pluralism of a democratic Poland has slowly led to what Pierre Nora calls the "politicization of commemoration," where "[…] commemoration has become less a matter of militant expression of the unity of a single group and more a matter of pluralistic unity of the many groups with conflicting agendas that constitute a democratic polity" (1998, 616). In Poland, many such groups reflect a subaltern desire to acknowledge interpretations that were illicit under Communism while some of these groups seek the continuation of accounts constructed by the Communist regime. Mannheim's dictum that "we must make a fundamental distinction between appropriated memories and personally acquired memories" (1972, 296) will be used in this work to delineate collective memories derived from the "acquired" memory of previous generations (in fact, some group members are still living) and collective memory "appropriated" from official Communist history, television, movies, and books.

Gradually, politicians and careerists in Poland have started to see commemoration, and consequently history itself, as a rather "lucrative" endeavor. This recent rise in the political use of history is theorized as an explicitly Eastern European phenomenon (Miller 2012), though it shares much in common with other political uses of history worldwide. In Poland, the contested process of a "national" framework encourages political actors to exploit the collective memories of their constituents. However, there are also individuals motivated by apolitical reasons who actively seek to impart their perspective on national and regional collective memory. Influenced by Halbwachs' and Mannheim's theoretical contributions to collective memory and the sociology of knowledge, and implementing the imperative to research concrete uses of memory activism, the work seeks to unpack and compare competing collective memories of UPA and Operation Vistula in Polish national and local memory while showing how these collective memories are used by political (and civic) actors in Poland.

Halbwachs' concepts of implacement and displacement

According to Halbwachs, collective memory is intrinsic to group processes. Unless you destroy a group, its collective memory remains, as Halbwachs notes:

> The place a group occupies is not like a blackboard, where one may write and erase figures at will. No image of a blackboard can recall what was once written there. The board could not care less what was once written on it before, and new figures may be freely added. But place and group have each received the imprint of the other. Therefore every phase of the group can be translated in special terms, and its residence is but the juncture of all these terms. (1980, 130)

When a group is *displaced* and moved, the spatial framework of its home remains, and when that group is moved into a new place (Halbwachs called this *implacement*), that group absorbs, reconciles, and interprets its new surroundings using its prior spatial framework:

> These groups adapt slowly, and in many circumstances demonstrate an extraordinary capacity not to adapt. They long ago designed their boundaries and defined their reactions in relation to a specific configuration of the physical environment. (1980, 134)

These situations of implacement/displacement create unique hybrid collective memories. This work will discuss the implacement/displacement of both the Kresy diaspora and

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Poland's Ukrainian minority, both forcibly removed: *displaced* from their environments (what are now Western Ukraine and Eastern Poland) and relocated: *implaced* into new locales (what are now the provinces of Lower Silesia and Warmia and Mazuria) during and directly after WWII.

Mannheim's concepts of appropriated and acquired memories

Mannheim's groundbreaking work on generational memory shares many parallels with Halbwachs' ideas on collective memory. However, while Halbwachs places emphasis on the group at the expense of the individual, Mannheim sees his idea of a generation as various individuals "similarly located," and is perhaps less an adherent of social determinism (1972, 297). With less rigid distinctions between individual and collective forms of memory, Mannheim sees our memories as a convergence of acquired (through lived experience) and appropriated (through secondary transmission) memories. This can extend to the individual as well as to groups (as "similarly located" individuals).

Degrees of appropriation may also be significant: a memory appropriated through the acquired memories of someone close to the individual might have different characteristics from one appropriated from a film (1972, 296–300). With the rise of mass dissemination through books, movies, and television, the production of appropriated memory is greater than ever. This work will explore what happens when collective memory crystallizes from acquired memories in the community (such as in what is now Lublin Province) and when collective memory is derived primarily from books, film, and state initiative (such as in Subcarpathian Province).

Historical background

The importance of historical events themselves in shaping collective memory should not be underestimated. As Halbwachs reflected,

> these events have deeply influenced national thought, not only because they have altered institutions but also because their tradition endures, very much alive, in region, in province, political party, occupation, class, even certain families or persons who experienced them firsthand. (1980, 50)

The involvement of UPA and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in World War II remains a complex and controversial topic in Ukraine as well as Poland. Conflicting collective memories inherited from the Soviet Union, today's Western Ukraine, as well as several diaspora communities abroad, make the history of this involvement an intensely partisan issue. Those who extoll the Soviet effort in the "Great Patriotic War" compete with those who wish to commemorate non-Communist and nationalist forms of resistance. A primary point of contention is the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (chiefly the faction under Stepan Bandera – OUN B) and its paramilitary formation, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Though it is arguably a political misconception, the amalgamated OUN–UPA moniker is used throughout Ukraine (and Poland) to refer to what were predominantly the actions and activities of UPA. As David Marples notes, "the tradition of Soviet historiography was to treat the organization as one entity, and historians and government leaders of contemporary Ukraine follow that same practice" (2007, 173). Polish media and government leaders often forgo OUN–UPA and simply use UPA, but the OUN as predecessor to UPA plays an important role in Polish narratives. The OUN as a political organization operated in Poland during the decade before the war and engaged in small-scale incendiary attacks, such as arson, boycotts, and assassinations. This led to the Polish

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government suppressing not just the OUN, but also the entire Ukrainian minority population, a suppression that included the "pacification" of 1930, which involved police and military search missions in several hundred Ukrainian villages. This resulted in the destruction of Ukrainian property and the harassment of Ukrainians; the arrest of several prominent Ukrainian politicians; and the closure of Ukrainian schools, civic organizations, and newspapers, though these actions ultimately failed to deter Ukrainian nationalists from subverting the Polish state (Subtelny 2000, 430–434). Toward the end of WWII, when the Soviet Union emerged as the clearest threat to Ukrainian (and Polish) sovereignty, UPA was willing to operate joint attacks with Polish anti-Communist formations. In contemporary Polish media, the most discussed attacks involve the Polish Freedom and Independence movement (WiN) and UPA's joint operation in the Polish city of Hrubieszów in 1946.

The main reason behind contemporary Polish condemnation of UPA is the group's brutal ethnic cleansing of Poles in the region of Volyn between 1943 and 1944, what is often known in Poland as the *Rzeź wołyńska*, Volyn Slaughter. Overall, Polish historian Motyka (2011, 447) estimates that between 40,000 and 60,000 Poles were murdered in the area of Volyn, with another 30,000–40,000 Poles murdered in neighboring Eastern Galicia. However, these events are often condensed in Polish media to focus primarily on Volyn in the summer of 1943 (the apogee of the killings) with 11 July of that year often known as *krwawa niedziela*, bloody Sunday. As Marples notes, "Soviet propaganda [in Ukraine] rarely focused specifically on OUN-UPA actions against the Polish minority" (2007, 268), contributing to a complicated reconciliation between the two current nation-states. Moreover, many Ukrainian historians whitewash UPA's crimes by equating them to retaliation measures committed by Polish paramilitary formations in 1943–1944 (Tsaruk 2003) while this same event is often omitted from Polish media. Anders Rudling estimates that the Armia Krajowa, The Polish Home Army, killed upwards of 20,000 Ukrainians in Volyn in retaliation for the killing of Poles (2006, 183). However, Polish and Ukrainian leaders have deflected these interpretive discrepancies when mutual goodwill and personal relationships allow. The 60th anniversary of the events in Volyn was marked in 2003 with several official joint ceremonies. Nathaniel Copsey explains that,

> As a test case, the Volyn commemoration demonstrates what has been achieved in Polish-Ukrainian relations over the past decade. In short, whilst the past remains very important in Polish-Ukrainian relations, mainstream politicians will not allow it to damage good relations between the two countries today. (2009, 104)

However, these joint commemorations alienate a very resentful and vocal segment of society in Poland that views Polish foreign policy as pandering to Ukrainians and blighted by political correctness. Besides the Polish counterattacks against Ukrainians in the aftermath of Volyn, the Polish state has admitted responsibility for the interwar "pacification" of its Ukrainian minority, which occurred in response to attacks by Ukrainian nationalists on various buildings and rail lines in Eastern Galicia in 1930 and has also acknowledged the establishment of the Ukrainian prisoner camp at Bereza Kartuska in 1934 (Subtelny 2000, 430–434). However, most attention has been given to the postwar resettlement of tens of thousands of Ukrainians in Poland, strategically dispersed throughout newly acquired German territories. In 1947, what is known as *Akcja Wisła*, Operation Vistula, sought to undermine Ukrainian minority presence in the region, under the official declaration of eradicating support for UPA. Marek Jasiak explains that,

> in addition to eliminating all remnants of OUN-UPA activity, Operation Vistula resulted in 'final solution of the Ukrainian question' in Poland, both in ethnic and territorial terms. All Ukrainians were subject to resettlement, regardless of their loyalty to the Polish state; even members of the Communist Party, employees of the civil police, and functionaries of the

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> public security offices – often people who had themselves been fighting the OUN-UPA – were not spared. Administrative and legal barriers made it impossible for Ukrainians to return to their homes […] between July–September 1949 […] the state treasury expropriated all property left behind, including land and buildings belonging to Greek Catholic Church and to Ukrainian community organizations. (2001, 188–189)

Polish leaders have condemned Operation Vistula on multiple occasions, including a joint statement between then Presidents Lech Kaczyński and Viktor Yushchenko in April 2007 – the 60th anniversary of Operation Vistula.[3] However, the 70th anniversary of Volyn did not fit this paradigm. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych did not show up to the commemorations held in the Ukrainian city of Lutsk (formally Polish *Łuck*) while Polish President Bronisław Komorowski was pelted with an egg by a disgruntled attendee. Furthermore, the anniversaries of both the massacres in Volyn and Operation Vistula consistently generate significant debate in the Polish *Sejm*, Parliament – often in tandem. Volyn's 70th anniversary in 2013 was no exception: preempting parliamentary discussion of Volyn later that year, Ukrainians in Poland called for a resolution on the 65th anniversary of Operation Vistula. In Poland, these two events are often inseparable.

Political pressures in historical scholarship

Halbwachs hoped that the historical method could detach itself from the influence of collective memory. He acknowledged that,

> If history is restricted to preserving the image of the past still having a place in the contemporary collective memory, then it retains only what remains of interest to present day society – that is, very little. (1980, 80)

On the other hand, Nora argues (1998) that collective memory puts immense "pressure" on historical scholarship. At first glance, Poland appears to reinforce this observation. However, the decade and a half immediately following Communism saw a rather positive and independent atmosphere for academics in spite of the significance of Poland's newfound sovereignty. Therefore, the explicit political initiative of politicians in creating the institutionalized atmosphere currently plaguing Polish historians must be accounted for. Since the Sejm increased its political power in 2006 (which coincided with significant investment efforts by national conservative party *Prawo i Sprawiedliwośc* [Law and Justice]), the *Instytut Pamięci Narodowej* [Institute of National Remembrance—IPN] has managed to avoid substantial public scrutiny; accordingly, proposals to cut its budget have been labeled as "hostile to national memory and intended to hide a dark past" (Stola 2012, 53). The scope and authority of the IPN are wide-ranging: It can prosecute what it deems are historical crimes and its jurisdiction has expanded (due to "demands articulated by media and Politicians") to include "all difficult matters of the past" (Stola 2012, 51). The most pertinent bureau of the IPN, the *Biuro Edukacji Publicznej*, the Bureau of Public Education, explicitly deals with interpreting the past for textbooks and historical publications. This bureau receives the most coverage in the press and IPN's members give frequent interviews with journalists. Though Stola (2012) emphasizes that the IPN does not have a monopoly per se, it does pay historians working under its auspices more than a standard university salary. The IPN also provides a considerable amount of professional prestige and unequivocal archive access. As a result, the IPN has become a competing sphere to independent academia, though recent reforms have limited the powers of the IPN's president and have created an executive board of historians and academics (Stola 2012, 53–57).

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A recent casualty of the professional pressures of the IPN may be historian Grzegorz Motyka. Motyka produced several works in the 1990s on postwar Polish cooperation with UPA, consistently taking a balanced approach to interpreting UPA's crimes. Moreover, Motyka is, and has been, one of the most quoted historians in the press about UPA and is an important authority on the subject. Unfortunately, this has made him a prime target for conservative memory activists, who have accused him of whitewashing UPA's crimes and have vociferously attacked Motyka's work on textbook material and teaching supplements.[4] However, following his 2011 appointment to the executive board of the IPN, his works have gradually inched closer to far-right interpretations. A previous article calling for his removal from the IPN board specifically because of his use of soft "euphemisms" (e.g. using "massacre" or "ethnic cleansing" instead of the word "genocide") to describe the events in Volyn may indicate why.[5] Though Motyka denies his stance has changed, the fact that it has can be seen in his newfound enthusiasm for the word genocide, which he attributes to two things: first, the need to definitively call the crimes in Volyn genocide in order to *avoid* their politicization[6] and, interestingly enough, because the use of genocide "is very popular in Western historiography."[7] Semantics aside, the word genocide can be problematic because of its susceptibility to the rhetoric of memory activism. Though Motyka has continuously dismissed the pressure of conservative memory activists as inconsequential to his work, (Motyka 2013) his recent adoption of their political line makes that difficult to believe.

Individual memory in Poland: the case of the memory activist

Halbwachs often underestimated individual memory and the power of individual agency in the construction of collective memory. The sociologist presumed that collective memory reflected the will of the group and not the agenda of *select group members*. The author instead posits that when a new perspective or symbol enters the canon of group consciousness, it is often through the initiative of *select actors* who lobby to advance change or impose it from above. Why individuals seek to change collective memory can range from sincere conviction to careerism and personal gain – either way individual agency delineates passive absorption of collective memory from active social change. Miller (2012, 8) emphasizes the need to study conscientious manipulations of collective memory by individual activists. A fitting example is current darling of Poland's Kresy diaspora, Father Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski. Zaleski first came to prominence by his lustration efforts aimed at Polish priests who had served as informants for the Communist authorities. Zaleski himself was persecuted and tortured by security services in the People's Republic of Poland, and has been a resolute political vigilante since the 1980s.[8] However, as the specter of Communism loses its political clout, Zaleski has become increasingly interested in crusading against the specter of fascism in the form of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and its leader Stepan Bandera. Zaleski is of Armenian descent, and has on multiple occasions gone so far as to claim that UPA committed genocide against Armenians, leaving one to wonder how many of Zaleski's genocide initiatives have been simply appropriated from Armenian diaspora narratives. Though he is a priest, Zaleski has made a bona fide career as a pundit for Polish media, running a blog and writing books for mass consumption and going on frequent promotional tours. Zaleski is highly reactionary, calling any Polish official reconciliation with Ukraine "cowardice;" staging protests; initiating petitions against official Polish conciliatory gestures; and making such statements as "just as the Jews are fighting for the truth about the Holocaust, so finally Poles should fight for the cause of genocide in the borderlands."[9] Zaleski is by far the most dominant memory activist to evoke UPA, espousing

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Kresy doctrine in mainstream Polish media and forcing actual historians, such as Grzegorz Motyka, to reckon with his opinions.

Another memory activist is Andrzej Zapałowski, former MEP (Member of the European Parliament); former Vice-President of the EU Parliamentary delegation to Ukraine; former member of the *Sejm*; and former President of the Przemyśl branch of the Polish Historical Society. Straddling the line between politics and history, Zapałowski continues to be a prominent staple in his local newspaper and to give statements to the press, which dramatize the resurgence of fascism in Ukraine:

> As of today the situation is still dangerous, but let us think what will happen in twenty years. For a long time in Ukraine, there can be seen a creeping takeover of power in the spirit of the Banderite ideology. ("Ukraińcy na demonstracji we Lwowie: przyłączyć wschodnią Polskę do Ukrainy." *Nowiny*, January 22, 2011)

Zapałowski and Zaleski are examples of actors who exploit the Kresy canon for their careers, but there are also activists who operate because they themselves suffered significantly at the hands of UPA. Lublin's Janina Kalinowska, for example, has tirelessly worked to condemn anything she fears will dishonor the memory of her father and brother, who were both murdered in Volyn. However, this understandable initiative often digresses into public consternation toward Polish acknowledgment of any actions committed by Poles against Ukrainians, even before UPA existed: "As far as I know, no one in [the 1930 Polish pacification of Ukrainians] died. What about the tens of thousands of Poles who were murdered a dozen years later, by UPA?"[10] This rationale is not conducive to reconciliation at any level, and highlights a manifest unwillingness to have any real dialogue with Polish-Ukrainians. When asked about the impact of local memory activists, a prominent figure in the Ukrainian community in Poland (who asked not to be named), stated the following:

> These people, in my opinion, exacerbate prejudices against Ukrainians, strengthening stereotypes elaborated during Communism. In addition, these individuals promote and disseminate (through publications) a very subjective picture of the historical past full of simplifications and demagoguery. This is especially visible in the case of Father Zaleski, who was previously honored in the fight against Communism and now, for the sake of rooting out "Ukrainian nationalism," is working with ex-Communists and KGB veterans from Ukraine.[11]

The relationship between Polish memory activists and Russophile Ukrainians is undoubtedly interesting and has likely played a role in far right Polish sympathies toward Russia during the current crisis in Ukraine. Zapałowski himself has written treatises condemning the "fascists" of Maidan – and UPA is often a central feature of such political narratives.[12] However, the legacy of UPA's politicization stems from a much older narrative arc centered on Ukrainian fascism within the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of Poland, and even sometimes Czechoslovakia.[13] The following pages illustrate this storyline in the People's Republic of Poland and its impact on memory activism in contemporary Poland.

The *implacement* of the Kresy: collective memory in the "Recovered Territories"

Collective memory in Poland has been significantly influenced by the mythology of the Kresy, Borderland. The Kresy comprised much of what are today Western Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. After WWII, most Poles in these territories were displaced, and those in Western Volyn and Eastern Galicia (e.g. Lviv) were moved to the newly acquired German possessions (declared by Polish Communist authorities to be long lost *Ziemie Odzyskane*, Recovered Territories), particularly what is now the province of Lower Silesia, and its capital Wrocław (Magocsi 2010, 463). Romantic nostalgia for Polish

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dominion over its eastern borderlands still exists in Poland. Overall, Kresy mythology positions Catholic Poles as the messengers of western civilization, destined to enlighten their Eastern Orthodox brethren. However, as Maria Janion notes,

> The beauty of the affluent landholders' estates, the culture of noble mansions, advances in modernizing agriculture, as well as industrialization in the second half of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, cannot balance out the ruthless exploitation and oppression of the Ukrainian peasantry and the betrayed and expropriated landless nobility. (2006, 173)[14]

Though direct adherents of Kresy mythology are a minority, a Kresy-ian sense of "European" superiority and condescension toward Poland's eastern neighbors plagues Polish society. Though local Kresy societies often form under the guise of friendship to a "lost" Ukrainian city: "friends of Drohobycz," "friends of Lwów," their members are openly hostile to Ukrainians and frequently agitate all across Poland to prevent any form of Ukrainian expression, whether it involves contentious issues like UPA or comparatively benign cultural figures such as the Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko. Though these societies are considered fringe extremists, they have become more and more prominent in local and national news, often operating under the auspices of mainstream memory activists. The collective memory of Kresy descendants reflects their *displacement* in the form of revanchist nostalgia wishing to return Kresy territory to Poland. However, the former German areas in which the Kresy inhabitants have been *implaced* do not just reflect Kresy collective memory. Lower Silesia is also host to a sizable Ukrainian population, mainly descendants of Operation Vistula as well as those who moved to Germany from Soviet occupied territory before the end of the war,[15] because of this, Kresy organizations struggle to dominate memory activism in Lower Silesia. Wrocław (formerly Breslau) is thus a turbulent junction for Poland's myriad collective memories. Kresy societies, that have based their *raison d'être* on nostalgia for territories lost to Ukraine, agitate for a historical narrative in Poland that places UPA's genocide at its fore. On the other hand, Lower Silesia's Ukrainian minority focuses on promoting positive images of Ukrainians, preferring to avoid UPA altogether.

Many of those living in Lower Silesia simply do not adhere to either group, and while Wrocław is home to many Kresy organizations, it also has an honorary Ukrainian consulate and a strong commitment to hosting Ukrainian exchange students. Wrocław's mayor, Rafał Dutkiewicz, has sometimes overlooked his Kresy constituents, opting instead to establish good ties with Ukrainians.[16] Wrocław's diversity is evident throughout its local newspaper, *Gazeta Wrocławska* [Wrocław Gazette]. Though the newspaper consistently reports on Kresy activity and allows Father Zaleski unchallenged freedom to voice his demands and grievances, it also refuses to allow fringe groups to antagonize the Ukrainian minority unchecked. In 2009, in the Lower Silesian town of Legnica, the *Association of Friends of Drohobycz* demanded that a street next to a Ukrainian language school named after Taras Shevchenko be changed to "victims of UPA."[17] Instead of indulging the organization, *Gazeta Wrocławska* gave a very balanced view of events. When the association charged that Shevchenko, "urged Ukrainians to murder the Poles in the eastern borderlands," *Gazeta Wrocławska* interviewed a historian from the eastern borderlands, Stanislaw Tokarczuk, who stated, "Shevchenko was no friend of the Poles, but the claim that he urged them to be killed is an exaggeration." The newspaper put things further into perspective: "in Warsaw the Ukrainian poet even has a monument, erected in 2002."[18] This effort at diffusing tension can also be seen in the newspaper's coverage of Operation Vistula. As late as August 2012,[19] *Gazeta Wrocławska* conducted interviews with Ukrainian minority historians about the legacy and realties of the population transfers. Even in 2013, as provincial

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authorities in Lower Silesia put forth a resolution to define UPA's crimes as genocide, the paper eschewed using the term genocide in its headlines, instead opting for "massacre," "murders," and so on.[20] The newspaper's 2013 coverage of the "Volyn-Genocide" commemoration at Wrocław's main square remained neutral.[21] However, when Father Zaleski feels the need to speak, as in the aftermath of the Sejm's rejection of the 2013 genocide resolution, *Gazeta Wrocławska* eagerly lends him an ear. In "Euphemisms Instead of the Truth – An Interview with Father Tadeusz Zaleski," Zaleski bemoans the manipulation of the Sejm by Minister of Foreign Affairs Radisław Sikorski; politicians' fear of using "genocide," as well as the constant use of "ethnic cleansing," "painful event," and "tragic event," to hide the nature of UPA's crimes.[22] Providing both an outlet for Kresy activists and the Ukrainian minority of Lower Silesia, *Gazeta Wrocławska* maintains a precarious balance of inclusivity, reflecting the heated competition between collective memories in Lower Silesia.

The displacement of Poland's Ukrainian minority: collective memory in Warmia and Mazuria

Ukrainians as a group are most heavily concentrated in Northern Poland (particularly the province of Warmia and Mazuria and its capital, Olsztyn), the final destination for the bulk of Ukrainians transferred during Operation Vistula. Unlike Lower Silesia, here, Ukrainians continue to outnumber any Poles forcibly removed from the Kresy (Jasiak 2001). This is evident in the high visibility of Ukrainian attitudes and opinions in northern Polish newspapers, including the adulation of UPA. However, the *displacement* of Ukrainians in Warmia and Mazuria engenders a different collective memory of UPA than in Western Ukraine. Narratives of UPA in Warmia and Mazuria incorporate a sober and mature remembrance of Volyn. Phrases such as "ethnic cleansing," "massacre," and "murder" are present in news articles written by Ukrainians. Yet, in Warmia and Mazuria, Ukrainian collective memory of UPA manages to remain positive overall and its Ukrainian minority reconcile what they consider to be a dark period in the history of UPA with nostalgia for their beloved partisan organization.

Consequently, an apology for UPA's crimes has manifested itself, not in the denial of these crimes, but in the form of Operation Vistula. A residual Communist myth exists throughout Poland that Operation Vistula was in direct *retaliation* for UPA's crimes, including the assassination of General Świerczewski.[23] Discussion of the population transfers was not allowed under Communism and there are pragmatic concerns (financial compensation, land restitution) requiring some form of lustration. However, more often than not, by emphasizing the victimization of Ukrainians in Operation Vistula, the Ukrainian minority is attempting to deflect attention from the continued campaign for the moral condemnation of UPA's crimes. Furthermore, the ascendance and popularity of pseudo historian Volodymyr V'iatrovych in Ukraine have influenced Polish-Ukrainians as of late and encouraged at least one journalist to cite his questionable work.[24]

Warmia and Mazuria's main newspaper *Gazeta Olsztynska* [Olsztyn Gazette] delegates much of its UPA and Operation Vistula material to its Ukrainian-produced organ *Ukraińcy*. The articles featured by *Ukraińcy* often evoke Operation Vistula, but they also emphasize areas of reconciliation between Poles and Ukrainians. In particular, extensive treatment of the joint operations between UPA and the Polish resistance is used to stress cooperation. In 2011, *Ukraińcy* described a tenuous alliance first between UPA and the Polish Home Army in 1944 and then later with the postwar Polish Communist resistance movement Freedom

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and Independence (WiN) in 1945 and 1946. In this article, *Ukraińcy* clearly acknowledges UPA's crimes in relation to Operation Vistula:

> The period from the Volyn massacre to Operation Vistula is one of the most painful periods in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations. But even then, Ukrainians and Poles tried to communicate. ("WiN i UPA: wspólny atak na Hrubieszów." *Ukraińcy*, August 9, 2011)

Unlike media in Western Ukraine, *Ukraińcy* consistently admits to UPA's crimes. Even in features criticizing Polish memory activism, *Ukraińcy* does not deny the massacres. A 2011 article "A Gypsy is Guilty and Ukrainians are Hanged," although grossly offensive to Roma, observed Polish political correctness with regard to Volyn. The article involved a notorious photo, disseminated amongst Polish historians and activists, depicting several dead children wrapped around a post with barbed wire. This photo had consistently been associated with the actions of UPA since the 1990s, and had been the cover of a 2003 book by Alexander Korman on the genocide in Volyn. Additionally, in 2008, it was the basis for two proposed memorial designs in Przemyśl and Warsaw. In 2010, various demonstrators, led by Father Zaleski (in an action against the erection of a memorial for Ukrainians killed by Poles in the town of Sahryń), touted the photo as part of their protest. The 2011 article convincingly argues that the photo is in fact from 1923, first published in the Polish *Yearbook of Psychiatry*, and that the perpetrator was the children's mentally ill mother, Marianny Dolińskiej (who happened to be Roma). The article was also quick to point out that nationalists in Ukraine have manipulated the misconception surrounding the photo to whitewash UPA's crimes: "Unfortunately the history of this image has been used by chauvinistic politicians in Ukraine to completely deny the Volyn massacre."[25]

In early 2013, anticipating Volyn's 70th anniversary and the ritual draft resolutions on genocide, *Ukraińcy* ran a story urging the *Sejm* to approve a resolution on the 65th anniversary of Operation Vistula.[26] The motion was denied, to the delight of Father Zaleski, who subsequently came to Warmia and Mazuria (on behalf of PiS) to hold a town hall in the city of Elbląg.[27] Yet, surprisingly, *Ukraińcy* was not thoroughly saturated with articles on other Polish crimes against Ukrainians, such as the 1930 pacification. Though an article on the 1945 Nazi massacre of Ukrainians in the Subcarpathian village of Berezka did try to show that Ukrainians were also "hacked to death with axes," and that German *Kennkarte* decided the fate of Ukrainian and Polish villagers. If the identity document was stamped with the letter "U (Ukrainian)" it meant a death sentence, while if it had the letter "P (Pole)" it meant life.[28] Such is the memory activism of Ukrainians in Warmia and Mazuria – more often than not, it seeks to demonstrate that Ukrainians too have been victims.

Appropriated memories of Volyn: collective memory in "Subcarpathia"

Appropriated memories of UPA permeate the Subcarpathian province for several key reasons. After the war, the desire for mutual friendship between Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic created a new, official account of the massacres of Poles by UPA. Locating much of the carnage not in Volyn or Eastern Galicia (which were mostly no longer within Poland's borders) but in the Subcarpathian region of Bieszczady, Communist popular culture perpetuated the residual myth that Poles were slaughtered en masse in contemporary southeastern Poland. Jan Gerhard's ubiquitous 1959 novel, *Łuny w Bieszczadach*, The Glare of Bieszczady, as well as the 1961 movie *Ogniomistrz Kaleń*, Sergeant Kaleń, elicited graphic images of Poles decapitated by Ukrainian nationalists and were

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considered classics in the People's Republic of Poland (Motyka 2009). What is now Subcarpathian province was in fact the site of many postwar skirmishes (not massacres) between Polish forces and UPA; however, it was also a main location of Operation Vistula and the requisition of Ukrainian churches and property. The collective memory of Operation Vistula in the province interprets it as a necessary security measure. The interwar "Executive Order of the President of Poland on State Borders," (which mandated that municipal authorities in the province could move minorities away from the border for security) is still used to justify the forced removal of Ukrainians from the area.[29] This interpretation is even more concerning, given that one of the primary border control stations for the Polish-Ukrainian border (and the Ukrainian–European Union border) is located in the Subcarpathian provincial city of Przemyśl. Beginning as early as 2008, Poland's Independence Day has been a rallying point in Przemyśl for demonstrators to protest against the Association of Ukrainians in Poland (AUP). Large banners inscribed with "Keep Bandera and his followers out of Poland," "AUP is the anti-Polish agenda of OUN-UPA," and "Outlaw the AUP,"[30] have been seen in outright protest against the Ukrainian organization. When asked about the effects of his activism on Ukrainian–Polish relations in Przemyśl, Zapałowski stated:

> My activity should not affect the mutual perception of Poles and Ukrainians. The problem is that if someone treats the inquiry of historical truth as a struggle, or a fight with a nation […] Remember that many of the tragedies of the Ukrainian community are disputed in a political way and not through thorough historical research.[31]

Ukrainians in the Subcarpathian Province counteract such condescension with their own brand of memory activism – so-called "placard wars." These usually take place in the Przemyśl cemetery, where UPA supporters erect shrines on the graves of buried Ukrainians. Anti-UPA activists respond by building private monuments to the "victims of UPA" and both groups destroy and vandalize each other's property. A Ukrainian minority leader stated that they, "think in places where Poles died there should be monuments, but their construction must comply with the [law],"[32] while Zapałowski commented that, "Aside from the fact that they broke the law when they erected these (as they are not gravestones, but monuments), they glorify the fascist organization UPA."[33]

Without necessarily exacerbating tensions, the Subcarpathian outlet *Nowiny*, News, tries to keep abreast of the myriad random political happenings in the area, particularly around the border near Przemyśl. Poles and Ukrainians, embroiled in active and lively disputes over local collective memory, have resorted to innovative and ingenious ways to convey their indignation toward the other. Defacing and erecting memorials, suspending sister-city relationships, and denying visas to Ukrainian nationalists, memory activism in Subcarpathian province is a lively affair.[34] In fact, the 2013 anniversary brought quite a unique event to the town of Radymno: a historical *reenactment* of the massacres in Volyn. Father Zaleski and others were present at this event, put on by the Przemyśl Association for Historical Reenactments "XD.O.K."[35] *News* contributes to such "excitement" by running adventure stories on Polish skirmishes in Bieszczady and the assassination of General Świerczewski.[36]

Acquired memories of Volyn: collective memory in Lublin

What remains of historic Volyn within Poland's current borders comprises the eastern edge of Lublin province. Of the 4000 confirmed Poles killed by UPA in territory that is in present-day Poland, the IPN currently estimates that roughly 2000 died in the Lublin region of Chełm, while many refugees displaced by UPA's crimes fled to

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western Lublin (IPN 2013). The unprecedented coordination of the Polish organization WiN with UPA happened in the Lublin provincial area of Hrubieszów. These acquired memories clearly influence the collective memory of Lublin province, which also shares a border with Ukraine. Reconciliation and forgiveness are a primary theme in the collective memory of Lublin. WiN and UPA's joint attacks have occasionally been used as a symbol of reconciliation and in 2009, the city of Lublin pursued the possibility of naming a street after one of its Polish participants, Marian Gołębiowski, who served in both WiN and AK.[37] The direct legacy of these events contributes to Lublin's comparatively less hostile attitude toward its Ukrainian community than Subcarpathia or even Lower Silesia. Subsequently, with a narrative of victimization founded less in misconception and more in factual events, Lublin's grievances over UPA tend to be addressed in a more mature manner and their activists often have more legitimate claims to redress. The *Zamość Association for the Remembrance of Murdered Poles in Volyn* and its head, Janina Kalinowska, personify this trend. Unlike most memory activists, Kalinowska's immediate family (her father and brother) was murdered by UPA in 1943. Kalinowska's grief has put her at the forefront of the most aggressive platforms for Volyn activism in Lublin. She has tirelessly pursued strict measures against anything that could be considered pro-UPA sentiment. This has yielded mixed results. During the 70th anniversary of Operation Vistula in 2007, Kalinowska reiterated the justification of Vistula vis-à-vis UPA's crimes, stating that,

> No one apologized to us. For what do we have to apologize to Ukrainians? What has hurt them? They were able to bring all of their belongings; they came to brick German houses. Poles from Volyn, those were not caught by the scythe and ax of the Banderites, fled the Bug in one shirt. ("Zamość: Kto kogo ma przeprosić?" *Dziennik Wschodni*, February 1, 2007)

Kalinowska's activism often preoccupies itself not with preserving the memory of UPA's victims, but with controlling Ukrainian expression, in Poland and Ukraine. In 2010, Kalinowska's agitation bordered on the absurd when she single-handedly filed a formal complaint with the city of Zamość against the Ukrainian restaurant *Slava*, for its "nascent nationalism." At this point, Kalinowska took issue with symbols that are now recognizable to all Ukrainians, not just those in Western Ukraine, such as the trident – ubiquitous on Ukrainian documents (including Ukrainian passports) and currency. Kalinowska demanded banning displays of the trident because, "for us, it will always be associated with UPA, with a pitchfork, which killed the Poles."[38] Though it would be optimal for those of Ukrainian descent in Poland to avoid the use of expressions overwhelmingly and exclusively associated with UPA, it must also be said that the restaurant in question was not exactly *Kryivka*,[39] and an establishment displaying some form of Ukrainian identity has the right to exist in a democratic Poland. Kalinowska's convictions often prevent her from seeing Ukrainian interests outside the context of her agenda. For example, she resolutely supported Yanukovych in the 2010 Ukrainian elections, professing, "if Yanukovych becomes president, I will give to the church."[40]

Though the community and the media respectfully accommodate Kalinowska, considerably more progressive currents prevail in Lublin.[41] Lublin's *Dziennik Wschodni*, Eastern Daily, often produces unique pieces on commemoration efforts by Poles who still live in the Ukrainian side of Volyn, such as Francziska Prus. Prus made it her personal mission to erect crosses in all of the former villages destroyed in the massacres, having already put up 70 crosses in Volyn'ska Oblast by 2011. Articles such as these take care to emphasize the good faith of everyday Ukrainians, "we lived in harmony with the Poles, because to us they were good people," and involving Ukrainians in the act of

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collective mourning, "[…] Poles and Ukrainians prayed for the souls of the murdered people […]"[42] This sustained effort to separate Ukrainians per se from the specter of UPA is a laudable current in Lublin province.

Lublin residents remain staunch opponents of Ukrainian nationalism while sharing a substantial border with Ukraine. This has led to cross-border political issues, exemplified by the city of Zamość's relationship with its Ukrainian sister city, Lutsk. For years, Lutsk and other cities in Western Ukraine have pushed for more visible representation of Stepan Bandera and UPA in Ukrainian public memory (streets, statues, and airports). For Zamość, the final straw was a motion in Lutsk to name Bandera an honorary citizen and attendant statements by Ukrainian municipal politicians telling Zamość councilors to frankly "butt out,"[43] of their business. Though bewildered, as a whole, the council of Zamość did not let consternation inhibit them from ultimately taking the high road, voting 15–6 (one councilor abstained) in favor of maintaining relations with Lutsk. Though it was clear that no one on the council appreciated Lutsk's behavior, the decision was reached in order to continue to "work with those Ukrainians who reject nationalism."[44] Janina Kalinowska, as well as the *Zamość Association for the Remembrance of Murdered Poles in Volyn* abhorred this decision, but were unable to affect the outcome.[45] Prevailing attitudes in Lublin reflect the areas' *acquired* collective memory, consisting of a dedicated prerogative to commemorate UPA's victims with mature debate on how to handle relations with neighboring Ukrainian cities; Lublin's more extreme activists have genuine emotional ties to the events, and thus are respectfully included but not always heeded.

Warsaw: depository of national collective memory

The mainstream current of national collective memory is a significant part of painting a complete picture of competing collective memories in Poland. Furthermore, national collective memory is primary in individual remembrances that have no competing regional framework. As Halbwachs notes, "During my life, my national society has been a theater for a number of events that I say I 'remember,' events that I know about only from newspapers or the testimony of those directly involved" (1980, 50). This section will analyze the prevailing interpretive frameworks of the two largest news (non-tabloid) outlets in Poland: Warsaw's *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Electoral Gazette*, and *Rzeczpospolita*, Republic.[46] *Electoral Gazette*, originally an organ of the Solidarity movement (its head editor is still dissident Adam Michnik), has evolved into a modern center-left paper. After the lowbrow tabloid, *Fakt*, Fact, *Electoral Gazette* is the highest circulated newspaper in Poland.[47] Though the paper has come under fire for its avowedly left agenda and its underlying Communist nostalgia, the paper does not adhere to a Communist interpretation of UPA or Operation Vistula. For whatever reason, a resolute condemnation of Ukrainian interpretations of UPA and a denial of the consequences of Vistula have made a definitive shift from being a Communist staple to being a cornerstone of the Polish conservative agenda. Oftentimes, *Electoral Gazette* tries to overcompensate (bordering on the melodramatic)[48] in its protection of Ukrainian perspectives. Its self-appointed role as protector of Ukrainian minority rights is itself a political instrument. However, the progressive newspaper's coverage and commentary on Operation Vistula makes it the vanguard of this issue in Poland. Marking the 60th anniversary in 2007, it ran an editorial calling for Poles to apologize for the forced population transfers:

> We should not fear that Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has initiated a debate on the Dnieper about Operation Vistula […] Ukrainians were at fault only for their nationality. They had lost houses; land. And though I know Ukrainians who have finally come to terms with

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> resettlement, who do not even [attempt to] recover their former property, there is still in their hearts a painful splinter. (Wojciechowski 2007)

Anticipating the 2013 anniversary of the Volyn massacre in July, *Electoral Gazette* covered the theme of "reconciliation" extensively throughout the spring of 2013. Michnik himself wrote an extensive commentary centered on a letter put forth by various Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishops, which called for mutual forgiveness between Poland and Ukraine. (Michnik 2013).

As one *Electoral Gazette* journalist put it, "It's easier to talk about the drama on the grounds of being a Christian [rather] than on political or historical [grounds]."[49] However, these declarations of reconciliation were not unanimous and the paper conceded that the Roman Catholic Metropolitan of Lviv, Mieczyslaw Mokrzycki did not entirely approve, worrying that such reconciliation equated the crimes of Ukrainians with the actions of Poles. Overall, these articles kept the topic alive in the build up to a joint declaration in June 2013, in Warsaw, between the Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk (of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church), Archbishop Jozef Michalik (of the Catholic Church in Poland) and Archbishop Mokrzycki.[50] *Electoral Gazette* felt these Church cooperative measures had, "a chance to lower the temperature in July: the anniversary of Volyn, which is always a difficult test for Polish-Ukrainian relations."[51] *Electoral Gazette's* choice to deflect incendiary coverage of UPA with stories on the Church stands in contrast to provincial uses of Operation Vistula as a blanket rejoinder to all things Volyn.

Given its conservative political leanings, *Republic* is exceptional in its balanced and conscientious take on UPA. Juxtaposing Ukrainian accounts with incendiary editorials by conservative historians such as Siemaszko (2011). *Republic* remains the newspaper of note when it comes to providing all spectrums of the debate. In strictly news items, *Republic* consistently uses *Czystka etniczna* [ethnic cleansing] to describe the events in Volyn, as opposed to the *ludobójstwo* [genocide] favored by regional conservative newspapers. Although Father Zaleski has received ever more fanfare in the pages of *Republic*, the newspaper has managed to walk a very fine line between marginalizing Ukrainians and alienating its conservative base, even amidst the commemorative pressures of anniversaries.

As Polish conservatives habitually avoid issues of Polish culpability (e.g. Vistula, but also other events like Jedwabne), attempts to rehabilitate modern Ukrainians have taken a rather unfortunate turn. Judaism's designation of "Righteous Among Nations" has been grossly misappropriated to bestow the honor on Ukrainians who rescued Poles from UPA. This has been further exacerbated by reactionary furor toward Polish introspection of its history with anti-Semitism, sparked by Jan Gross's watershed work *Sąsiedzi* [Neighbors] (2000).[52] Over time, exonerating Poland vis-à-vis its unconnected suffering at the hands of UPA has become a nuanced trope in the repertoire of conservative Polish discourse. Karłowicz's (2013) book *Ludobójcy i ludzie. Sąsiedzi,* Wołyń 1943, draws explicit parallels with Gross, exemplifying this trend. Though *Republic* has taken a moderate approach in the circulation of these ideas, it did run an article about the "1341 Righteous Ukrainians," which used this initial olive branch as a springboard for a lengthy feature on Ukrainian nationalism and Polish victimization, quoting Karłowicz at length.[53] Ultimately, this seemingly conciliatory gesture toward Ukrainians belies an often fundamentally exclusive understanding of Polish suffering. Father Zaleski's welcome presence is yet another indicator of *Republic's* ambivalence toward self-reflection and compromise. Zaleski's assertion that "the President does not have the courage to tell the truth"[54] is part of a wider Kresy narrative of unassailable Polish valor and righteousness, culminating in a crusade to vanquish the long-extinguished menace of UPA.

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However, in spite of *Republic's* conservative base, the newspaper continues to put its status as Poland's most reputable newspaper first. An interview with Sławomir Sierakowski of the Warsaw-based liberal periodical, *Krytyka Polityczna* [Political Critique] provided an eloquent assault on the fundamental tenets of Polish reactionary thought. In just a few paragraphs, Sierakowski dismissed Father Zaleski as "incompetent" and stressed the efforts of balanced Ukrainian historians, such as Yaroslav Hrytsak, toward the creation of a constructive framework of reconciliation. Proffering such bits of wisdom as "the comparative arithmetic of victimhood, proving or denying parallels, seems morally suspect to me," Sierakowski outlined the need for Polish patience in its pursuit of justice until Ukraine was a real democracy. He stressed that Poland must help Ukraine join the EU in any way possible: "If there cannot be political integration today, let there be cultural integration," emphasizing EU integration for Ukraine and the difficulties Ukrainians face at the Polish-EU border. Sierakowski elaborated that the issue of Volyn had the power to divide Poles and Ukrainians, stating:

> Tragedies [*sic*] and the memories of them are, as we know, [fodder] for ridiculous disputes: infantile, alluring, and dangerous. The only solution is the integration of our societies. At present, Poles and Ukrainians are still segregated by the poorly organized Polish-Ukrainian EU border […] The Iron Curtain still endures – today it is at the border of the Union. ("Nie jesteśmy lepsi od Ukraińców." *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 July 2013)

The interview with Sierakowski was no fluke: *Republic* has taken an even-handed approach in a variety of articles, on topics ranging from the decline in *Svoboda's* support base[55] to the need to locate and exhume Polish victims in Volyn.[56] Ultimately, *Republic's* judicious distribution of material in direct opposition with its conservative proclivities positions it to be perhaps the most unconventional newspaper in Poland.

Conclusion

The collective memory of an area has a significant effect on the outcome of reconciliation and mature debate. In Lower Silesia, where the extreme opinions of former inhabitants of the Kresy have been *implaced,* they converge with less incensed Polish attitudes, which vacillate between adopting Kresy attitudes and protecting the cultural autonomy of the Ukrainian minority in the area. With the presence of Kresy attitudes, the collective memory of the Ukrainian minority tends to mute its enthusiasm for UPA and cultivates the reverence of less controversial figures, such as Taras Shevchenko, in its cultural canon. In Warmia and Mazuria, where the Ukrainian minority has been *displaced* from areas with established collective memories of Volyn or UPA, but where oppositional collective memories from other *implaced* groups are virtually nonexistent, attitudes toward UPA are comparatively positive and open. The national collective memory of Poland (transmitted through textbooks, national news) imparts a general awareness of the massacres in Volyn. In the Subcarpathian Province, where the collective memory of the region itself (and not just one *implaced* group) reflects very hostile attitudes toward UPA, the Ukrainian minority has reacted subversively, cultivating a counter collective memory of UPA that may be the most extreme in Poland. Moreover, because the collective memory of Poles in the Subcarpathian Province is heavily appropriated from Communist myth, movies, and film, it is comparatively garish and lighthearted, though this does not preclude xenophobia toward Ukrainians. Such xenophobia is problematic not only because of the Ukrainian minority living in the area, but also because the Subcarpathian Province is the location of the main control and transit station for Ukraine's border with Poland and Ukraine's border with the EU. In Lublin province, where many Poles were

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in fact murdered by UPA, collective memories are comparatively more sober and focus significantly more on commemorating victims, eschewing hostility toward the current Ukrainian minority, and even Ukrainians on the other side of the border. However, collective memory is vulnerable to the initiatives of individuals wishing to impart their particular perspectives. Volyn, UPA, and Operation Vistula remain essential themes in Polish political rhetoric. The collective memory of these events and their relatively recent acknowledgement in official discourse allow political actors to present themselves as unique crusaders in the pursuit of historical lustration. Several prominent pundits and activists see their local issues as national rallying points that could potentially resonate amongst the general public. This inadvertently embroils the Ukrainian minority in public historical discourse, forcing its representatives to release official statements denying allegations by these pundits, and hindering their sustained effort to recuperate lost property and assets. When the Ukrainian minority displays any form of cultural expression, they are often met with protests, petitions, and demonstrations instigated by activists invoking UPA within a framework of memory activism. In response to this, the Ukrainian minority has wielded Operation Vistula as its own weapon, while the left, in the name of minority rights, has done much the same. In effect, the pursuit of historical scholarship has become a direct casualty of this phenomenon, and it remains to be seen how much Polish academic discourse will reflect the work of memory activists. However, the Polish media plays an ever-increasing role in shaping the trajectory of collective memory and may either diffuse or reinforce their effect.

Notes

1. This quote by Tom Nairn remains one of the most concise descriptions of contemporary nationalism. It was first used by Geoff Eley (in multiple works), see Eley (1981, 104) and Eley (1986, 73).
2. This work is the result of an earlier media analysis conducted on the largest provincial newspaper in every single province in Poland. Using data published on circulation statistics by the Press Control Distribution Association, Związek Kontroli Dystrybucji Prasy – ZKDP, (zkdp.pl) the author searched the main databases of each newspaper and then collected and read every relevant article (articles on the football team Wisła Kraków and the Czech ski resort Malá Úpa were obviously discarded). The search was conducted for the years 2006–2012 (additionally, the provinces discussed in this article were updated through 2013). For a similar media analysis from the mid-1990s to 2005, see Copsey (2009). Initial search terms included Wołyn 1943, Akcja Wisła, Banderowcy, OUN, OUN–UPA, and UPA. However, the strongest key terms (i.e. which were in virtually every article relevant to the massacres in Volyn or Operation Vistula, if not in the headline than certainly in the article text) were undoubtedly UPA and Akcja Wisła, respectively. The terminology used in this article reflects these results. With regard to the killings of Ukrainians by Polish forces, the village of Sahryń was the most frequently cited. Sahryń was razed to the ground on 10 March 1944 by Polish partisan forces (Jasiak 2001). However, in the newspapers analyzed, the killing of Ukrainians by Poles was much less frequently discussed than Operation Vistula or the joint attacks between UPA and WiN. The 2012 circulation data on the average single printed press run of each newspaper are as follows: *National Newspapers: Gazeta Wyborcza* 347,076; *Rzeczpospolita* 133,120. *Lower Silesian Province: Gazeta Wrocławska:* 34,323. *The Province of Warmia and Mazuria: Gazeta Olsztynska (Ukraińcy and Dziennik Elbląski are subsidiaries):* 29,930. *Subcarpathian Province: Nowiny: 31,670. Lublin Province: Dziennik Wschodni:* 14,730. However, all of these newspapers have an online presence in addition to their print circulation and these statistics do not take this into account.
3. Prezydenci Polski i Ukrainy Razem o Akcji 'Wisła' i Przyszłości." 27 April 2007. http://www.pis.org.pl/article.php?id=7235.
4. Józef Wysocki's polemical attack on Grzegorz Motyka's educational work for the IPN can be accessed here: http://www.isakowicz.pl/index.php?page=news&kid=126&nid=3717, accessed 23 December 2013

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5. "Dlaczego dr Motyka nie powinien zasiadać w Radzie IPN." *Salon24*, 13 February 2011. http://www.65-lat-temu.salon24.pl/278272,dlaczego-dr-motyka-nie-powinien-zasiadac-w-radzie-ipn.
6. "Polemika z Czechem. Zbrodnia wołyńska: prawda i demagogia." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18 June 2013.
7. "Za nami konferencja o zbrodniach ukraińskich nacjonalistów na Kresach." *Gazeta Wrocławska*, 24 June 2013.
8. "Book Eyes Church Role in Polish Communist Era." *MSNBC*, 26 February 2007. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17349939/ns/world_news-europe/t/book-eyes-church-role-polish-communist-era/.
9. "Zaleski: Rodziny pomordowanych Polaków mają żal do władz." *Gazeta Lubuska*, 6 March 2009.
10. "*Ukraińcy* wypominają nam pacyfikacje." *Dziennik Wschodni*, 7 June 2010.
11. Interview by S. Allison, 4 April 2012, Kraków.
12. Zapałowski's writings can be found on his website at http://www.zapalowski.eu/.
13. See, for example, "Rubínové kříže." Episode four of the Czechoslovak television series, *Třicet případů majora Zemana* (1975).
14. Translation is from Follis (2012).
15. Website of Wrocław's minority initiative, *Kaleidoscope of Cultures*: http://www.kalejdoskopkultur.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=23, accessed 11 November 2013.
16. Wrocław's decision to honor Oksana Zabuzhko with the "Angelus" literary prize in the lead up to the 2013 Vilnius Summit exemplifies this trend. For an in-depth discussion, please see Uilleam Blacker's blog post here: http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/category/polish-ukrainian-relations/.
17. "Chcą zmienić ulicę Szewczenki na Ofiar UPA." *Gazeta Wrocławska*, 22 April 2009.
18. "Chcą zmienić ulicę Szewczenki na Ofiar UPA." *Gazeta Wrocławska*, 22 April 2009.
19. "Zimę przeżyli w oborze. Rozmowa o Akcji Wisła." *Gazeta Wrocławska*, 7 August 2012.
20. "Dolnośląski sejmik uczcił pamięć pomordowanych przez UPA i OUN na Kresach." *Gazeta Wrocławska*, 23 May 2013.
21. "Obchody rocznicy rzezi wołyńskiej na wrocławskim rynku." *Gazeta Wrocławska*, 14 July 2013.
22. "Eufemizmy zamiast prawdy-wywiad z Tadeuszem Isakowiczem-Zaleskim."*Gazeta Wrocławska*, 20 July 2013.
23. See "Świerczewski symbolem polsko-ukraińskiego pojednania. Śmiechu warte." *Ukraińcy*, 31 March 2013; and "Akcja Wisła: śmierć generała Świerczewskiego." *Ukraińcy*, 24 March 2011.
24. "WiN i UPA bedą miały wspólny obelisk." *Ukraińcy*, 14 June 2012.
25. "Cyganka zawiniła, Ukraińców powiesili." *Ukraińcy*, 14 November 2011.
26. "Projekt uchwały sejmowej w sprawie Akcji Wisła." *Ukraińcy*, 1 January 2013.
27. "Spotkanie otwarte z księdzem Tadeuszem Isakowiczem-Zaleskim." *Dziennik Elblągski*, 13 March 2013.
28. "Berezka: ginęli Ci na literę U." *Ukraińcy*, 13 April 2013.
29. "Trudne rozmowy o akcji Wisła." *Nowiny*, 25 February 2007.
30. "Antyukraińskie transparenty podczas Święta Niepodległości." *Nowiny*, 11 November 2008.
31. Interview by S. Allison, 23 April 2012, Kraków.
32. Interview by S. Allison, 4 April 2012, Kraków.
33. "Zamieszanie wokół upamiętnienia ofiar UPA w Radrużu." *Nowiny*, 4 December 2009.
34. "Zapałowski: trzeba sprzeciwić się *rajdowi Bandery*." *Nowiny*, 2 August 2009.
35. "Zbudują w Radymnie wioskę, odtworzą rzeź wołyńską." *Nowiny*, 16 March 2013; "Rzeź okazała się sukcesem." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 24 July 2013. For an in-depth analysis of the reenactment, please see Pasieka (forthcoming).
36. See, for example, "66 lat temu zginął generał Świerczewski." *Nowiny*, 28 March 2013.
37. "Ulica przepychanek." *Kurier Lubelski*, 21 April 2009.
38. "Dla kogo Sława?: Wołyniacy a restauracja z kuchnią ukraińską." *Dziennik Wschodni*, 24 January 2012.
39. A kitsch restaurant in Lviv styled as an underground UPA bunker.
40. "Bandera bohaterem Ukrainy. Kresowianie: To kpiny z naszego cierpienia." *Dziennik Wschodni*, 24 January 2010.
41. "Chcą zmienić ulicę Szewczenki na Ofiar UPA." *Gazeta Wrocławska*, 22 April 2009; "Ulica przepychanek." *Kurier Lubelski*, 21 April 2009.

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42. "Na Wołyniu stanął kolejny polski krzyż." *Dziennik Wschodni*, 27 July 2011.
43. "Ukraińscy politycy do zamojskich radnych: Nie wtrącajcie się." *Dziennik Wschodni*, 29 April 2012.
44. "Radnym Zamościa z Banderą nie po drodze." *Dziennik Wschodni*, 17 July 2012.
45. "Radnym Zamościa z Banderą nie po drodze." *Dziennik Wschodni*, 17 July 2012.
46. For an analysis of these two newspapers through 2005, see Copsey (2009).
47. ZKDP
48. See, among others, "Skończmy z pięknymi bajkami o UPA." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22 March 2009.
49. "Ukraińskie Kościoły o rzezi wołyńskiej: Wybaczmy sobie." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 29 April 2013.
50. "Wspólna deklaracja Kościołów katolickiego i grekokatolickiego w sprawie zbrodni na Wołyniu." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 19 June 2013.
51. "Ukraińskie Kościoły o rzezi wołyńskiej: Wybaczmy sobie." *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 29 April 2013.
52. See Janowski (2012).
53. "1341 sprawiedliwych." *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 November 2013.
54. "Ks. Isakowicz-Zaleski: Prezydent nie miał odwagi powiedzieć prawdy." *Rzeczpospolita*, 11 July 2013.
55. "Kto zatopi Swobodę?" *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 October 2013.
56. "Wszystkich mogił nie odnajdziemy." *Rzeczpospolita*, 31 October 2013.

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