## POLITICAL THEORY

**Culture and Democracy: Media, Space, and Representation**. By Clive Barnett. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2003. 288p. $79.95 cloth, $29.95 paper.

— Wayne Gabardi, *Idaho State University*

Clive Barnett's examination of democracy today is one that privileges its spatially mediated, communicative, and cultural structures as shaped by new telecommunication and information technologies. Democracy is primarily represented in the mediated spaces created by broadcasting technologies whose form and content are geared toward deploying cultural policies and practices. Thus, a communications-cultural analysis of this condition is required. Furthermore, a reckoning with neoliberal conceptions of autonomy and representation is essential in making sense of the current cultural geography of democracy.

In conceptualizing contemporary democracy, Barnett enlists the help of John Dewey, Robert Dahl, Claude Lefort, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault. His goal is "a deconstructive affirmation of representation" (p. 32). Democracy is about making present a symbolic regime that represents a sovereign people. Yet the people are an "absent presence" whose existence is dependent upon effective mediation. And in today's high-tech world, this makes the democratic rendering of absence and presence much more complicated. Cable TV and the Internet increase opportunities for new public spaces and at the same time produce a consumerist popular culture that undermines the prospect of a democratic public sphere.

Barnett's intellectuals of choice in dealing with the constitution and deployment of mediated public spaces are Habermas and Foucault. While crediting Habermas with having put the idea of the public sphere center stage in critical discussions on democracy, he points out (as have so many others) that Habermas's thought needs revising and updating. He nicely reconstructs the evolution of Habermas's thought project as well as his critics. Foucault, however, provides a much more useful tool kit. From his account of the disciplinary origins of modern liberalism to his analysis of the "paradox of autonomy" to his later idea of governmentality, Foucault is much more on target than Habermas. Barnett reworks Foucault's governmentality research to provide a convincing critical analysis of the mass media as cultural technologies of governance that provide neoliberal repertories and resources for self-regulation.

Barnett's major concern lies in exploring the "cultural pragmatics of democracy" (p. 95). Cultural power, as deployed by mass media institutions and technologies, is both the dominant means of liberal governance and the source of new types of democratic action. That is why Foucault's redefinition of culture as "governmental" (defined in terms of macro–micro population control) is of so much value for Barnett. The media have become the dominant mode of governance as they shape cultural discourses supportive of neoliberal globalization. These symbolic regimes, disseminated through pop culture, actively shape subjectivities around corporate agendas that have effectively captured formal political power.

Barnett spends the second half of his book demonstrating this understanding of power by examining three very different cases of media policy: First Amendment media law, European Union (EU) media policy, and South African media reform. His look at First Amendment communications law in the 1980s and 1990s predictably reveals the establishment of a hybridized doctrine of libertarian and neoconservative paternalist legality that privileges individual autonomy, private property rights, the free market, and invasive indecency over public forum, fairness, and citizen access doctrines. The idea of broadcasting media as fiduciary entities has been eclipsed by Supreme Court rulings and Federal Communications Commission policies that regard media corporations and technologies as autonomous subjects with free speech and private property rights.

Turning to Europe, Barnett focuses on the EU's *Television Without Frontiers* initiatives of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which sought to combat American media imperialism, to create a single European media market, and to construct a democratic pan-European public sphere. He does a good job of rendering the complexity of the EU's task of developing a media policy that included different political, economic, and cultural rationales, as well as trying to integrate national, regional, and global spatial frameworks. In the end, the EU found itself driven by the American paradigm of neoliberal globalization, and thus the priorities of deregulation, consumer sovereignty, and market access won out over democratic public sphere concerns.

Barnett is much more upbeat on the opportunities for mediated democratic action in postapartheid South Africa. A combination of factors—from the privatization of state-owned media to the lifting of heavy censorship policies to corporate restructuring to black empowerment initiatives to new technologies to the changed nature of news coverage—have opened up spaces for new democratic movements to take root. A variety of civic and cultural groups have been successful in capturing media attention and securing democratic publicity. This is due to the transitional nature of South Africa, as well as to the fact that both the media and democratic actors need each other. Mass media crave more and more news while civic groups need low-cost coverage. And media-oriented activism must be dramatic in order to be newsworthy. In a mass-mediated society, democracy becomes more and more dramaturgical.

The author covers a lot of ground, effectively integrating the latest in contemporary social theory, democratic political theory, and public policy analysis. His characterization of democracy today as more about the deployment of culture via mass media is largely convincing, as is his use of Foucault's concept of governmentality as a key analytic lens. At the same time, his assessment of the current state of things is not gloomy, for the same type of power seeking to control us is also the means for initiating new modes of democratic action. Paraphrasing Foucault, power is always a combination of sinister dominating presence, resistance, and productive vitalism. Thus,



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Barnett's theme of democratic autonomy via contexts of mediated communication offers an alternative narrative of hope. This is achieved by reinventing the liberal themes of autonomy, representation, and pluralism for a postmodern network society dominated by media culture.

He also insightfully applies his theoretical framework to his three case studies, all of which conclude that the corporate-governmental-mediated construct of neoliberal autonomy pervades the life-worlds of citizen-subjects in democratic societies. This abstracted utopic imperative to realize private desires through the exercise of market choice and detached from broader relational networks is today's dominant siren song.

I have only a few minor difficulties with *Culture and Democracy*. Stylistically, the writing is too dense, and one often has to slog through an inordinate amount of jargon. I think Barnett could have done a better job of translating what is complex theoretical material into more accessible and enjoyable prose. It can be done and would increase the size of his audience and readership. Organizationally, the book reads as more of a collection of related essays than as a unified text. The chapters are connected through the use of conclusions that enable the reader to transition to the next chapter. But it still reads like a series of related articles reworked for a book. Finally, Barnett concludes that democracy "is not the name for a mode of being, it is a practical problem of political control" (p. 201). To the contrary, it is the name for both.

**Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty**. By Randy E. Barnett. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 360p. $32.50.

**Libertarianism Without Inequality.** By Michael Otsuka. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 168p. $39.95.

— Evan Charney, *Duke University*

According to Randy Barnett in *Restoring the Lost Constitution,* "the original meaning of the entire Constitution . . . is much more libertarian than the one selectively enforced by the Supreme Court" (p. 356). This is because, Barnett argues, the way that the Constitution has been interpreted by the Court over the past seventy years, that is, from the beginning of the New Deal on, has eviscerated a number of clauses and amendments that were expressly designed to limit the power of both federal and state government to interfere with the basic liberties or "natural rights" retained by the people. His ambitious goal is to restore these amendments and clauses to their original meaning through an exhaustive exploration of that meaning.

To this end, Barnett employs a principle of constitutional interpretation he characterizes as "original meaning" originalism, as opposed to "original intent" originalism: Whereas the latter attempts to ascertain the subjective intentions of the lawmakers and ratifiers—something he acknowledges to be impossible—the former seeks "the objective meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment" (p. 92). Barnett ties the importance of such originalism to the function of the Constitution itself: The Constitution was designed to grant and limit powers in such a way that those who governed could not usurp their rightful authority. How can governors, including judges, be constrained by "higher law" (i.e., the Constitution) if the Constitution means whatever they want it to mean?

Armed with these interpretive tools, Barnett seeks to recover the lost "libertarian" Constitution by making two complementary arguments: that the power of government is far more limited by the Constitution than is now acknowledged by the Court; and that the Constitution means what it says when it mentions "unenumerated" rights retained by the people. In support of the former proposition, he argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution giving Congress the power "To make all laws which shall be necessary to carry into Execution the foregoing [enumerated] Powers" was not intended as a freestanding grant of power, but extended only to those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution and was intended to *limit* the means by which those enumerated power could be exercised. He argues for a similarly restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause: The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate commerce, that is, trade, not manufacturing or agriculture, and only insofar as such trade is genuinely between states and not intrastate.

In support of the latter proposition (i.e., unenumerated rights) Barnett begins by attempting to resuscitate the Ninth Amendment, long considered a constitutional dead letter. As he notes, the origin of the Ninth Amendment related to original objections to including a Bill of Rights in the Constitution: Such a list of rights retained by the people would be unnecessary since the authority to interfere with such rights was never given to the government in the first place; and such a list would be dangerous inasmuch as it would give the appearance of being exhaustive and imply that all rights not enumerated could be infringed by the government. It was primarily to guard against the latter danger that the Ninth Amendment was included by Madison in the Constitution. As Barnett shows by canvassing much contemporaneous material, these rights "reserved to the people" were generally held to be natural *liberty* rights, and he argues that it was the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect not only the Bill of Rights from infringement by the states but also these unenumerated liberty rights as well.

On the basis of this narrow reading of the mandate of governmental powers and this expansive reading of the rights and liberties retained by the people, Barnett proposes a method of constitutional review he terms the "presumptions of liberty." As things now stand, he notes, the Court has adopted a very loose conception of "necessity" and presumes that all acts of the legislature are valid except when they infringe upon an enumerated right listed in the Bill of Rights, or some other limited number of rights that the Court has held to be "fundamental" (such as the right to privacy). By contrast, a presumption of liberty would place the burden on the government to show why *any* interference with liberty is both necessary and proper since, Barnett argues, "the Constitution makes no



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

distinction between fundamental rights and mere liberty interests" (p. 260). And for this reason, he lauds Justice Anthony Kennedy's recent opinion in *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003) striking down a Texas antisodomy statute, for protecting "liberty" rather than "privacy" or any other "fundamental" right.

But will Barnett's originalism sanction the libertarianism (both social and economic) that he embraces? As he notes, all of the sources he cites distinguished liberty from an unbounded freedom called "license"; but to many, if not all of the people of this period, license clearly denoted something more than the freedom to violate the rights of others: License meant not simply rights-violating actions (as Barnett implies)—it meant *immoral* actions, where immoral encompassed much more than "rights-violating." This poses a problem for the author, who as a thoroughgoing libertarian is fundamentally opposed to "legislating morality."

Consider, as just one example, early views of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and press. The congressional report on the repeal of the Sedition Act in 1799 stated that seditious libel did not constitute an abridgement of freedom of speech and press because those freedoms never included "a license for every man to publish what he pleases without being liable to punishment." Joseph Story did not doubt that the states could punish individuals for libelous and "other mischievous publications"; Thomas Cooley did not believe that the First Amendment extended to publications that "from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense." To be sure, Madison opposed the Alien and Sedition Act—and Madison is, understandably, Barnett's champion in this book. But Madison's proposal expressly to prohibit the states from limiting freedom of the press and speech did not survive, and his views on free speech were not predominant. Rather, it was Blackstone's view that held sway from the founding to the late nineteenth century: While liberty of speech and press meant the absence of prior restraint, it did not preclude subsequent punishment for speech that was deemed "improper, mischievous, and illegal." And since I have mentioned Blackstone, let us not forget, as the Court reminded us in *Bowers v. Hardwick* (1986), which upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's antisodomy statute (and was subsequently overruled in *Lawrence*), that Blackstone described homosexuality as "the infamous crime against nature," as an offense of "deeper malignity" than rape, a heinous act "the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature," and "a crime not fit to be named." I am not defending this view. What I am pointing out is that Barnett's "original meaning" originalism, which places such an overriding emphasis upon the contemporaneous understanding of words such as "liberty" and "license," may be in profound tension with his libertarianism.

This said, this is a compelling work of original scholarship, combining great analytical acuity with exhaustive historical analysis. It represents one of the most compelling libertarian readings of the Constitution to date and is a welcome addition to a never-ending debate.

In *Libertarianism Without Equality,* Michael Otsuka seeks to combine a libertarian principle of the right of self-ownership with a robust commitment to egalitarianism. He does this in two ways: First, he argues, against Robert Nozick, that all schemes of redistributive taxation are not on a par with forced labor. Something like a "luxury income tax" for redistributive purposes, Otsuka argues, cannot be considered as equivalent to forced labor since it is easy to avoid; that is, persons can forgo the extra income that amounts to a "luxury." Second, he denies that one's right of ownership over worldly resources that one uses for income is as full as one's right of ownership over oneself: Persons can acquire unowned worldly resources only if they leave enough so that everyone else can acquire an equally advantageous share of unowned resources, where "equally" advantageous means that one can derive the same degree of welfare from it. Furthermore, he claims that persons possess only a "lifetime leasehold" on worldly resources, which lapse into a state of nonownership upon death. To this, a libertarian might object that "leaseholding" is not really ownership.

Otsuka then revisits Hume's famous complaint against Locke's concept of "tacit consent": If it is very difficult or costly (or impossible) to withhold what constitutes tacit consent, then such consent cannot be voluntary. The solution, according to Otsuka, is "a pluralistic confederation of political societies on the small scale of autonomous cities, towns and regions" (p. 105). This would facilitate ease of selection among various political arrangements and help to ensure that residence really did imply consent to the political authorities of a given regime.

According to Otsuka, this "pluralistic confederation" would be truly pluralistic: It would include illiberal and inegalitarian societies, and in his willingness to accept such illiberal political societies, he styles himself a "left-libertarian voluntarist." Such societies could be legitimate as long as they were truly voluntary. So, a quasi-feudal political unit (town, region) might arise when each individual entered into a prior agreement "to entrust the collective's powers of legislation and punishment to the owner of the island and to appoint him sovereign for life" (p. 117). Or like-minded individuals might form a puritanical city. To ensure that such a political arrangement is truly voluntary for all members, "parents may not indoctrinate their children into their preferred way of life." Children must "develop the skills, capacity, and knowledge which would enable them to flourish in a range of the political societies on offer" (p. 120).

What range of political societies? Feudal and puritanical societies as well as those dedicated to free love and drug experimentation? Who determines the content of the education? The "confederation"? And could not member "political societies" claim that they are not politically autonomous at all inasmuch as they cannot educate their children into their preferred way of life but must have their educational policies dictated by an outside agency? And are they really illiberal political societies if they must give their children a liberal education? Furthermore, will illiberal political societies be allowed (by the "federation"?) to persecute heretics? Brand disrespectful serfs? Or will they merely "play" at being feudal or puritan societies while deprived of any real *coercive* political power, like a theme park, where one can enjoy all of the fun of a feudal society for



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

a day because one is exposed to none of its dangers—precisely because one is not really in a feudal political society. Otsuka, unfortunately, addresses none of these issues, and in the absence of such considerations, his political proposals strike the reader as having about as much seriousness as an amusement park.

**Toleration and Identity: Foundations in Early Modern Thought**. By Ingrid Creppell. New York: Routledge, 2003. 212p. $75.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

**Sensual Philosophy: Toleration, Skepticism, and Montaigne's Politics of Self**. By Alan Levine. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 336p. $80.00 cloth, $26.95 paper.

— Daniel Engster, *The University of Texas at San Antonio*

Toleration has once again become a central focus of liberal theories of justice. In recent years, many liberal theorists have put aside foundational arguments about autonomy and equality in order to explore directly how individuals with diverse identities and beliefs can live together peacefully. Early modern proponents of liberalism were similarly animated by concerns about identity and difference, originally developing the modern concept of toleration amidst the conflicts of the European wars of religion. In the works under review here, Ingrid Creppell and Alan Levine admirably plumb the insights of these authors in order to propose more fruitful ways for conceptualizing toleration in our own times.

Creppell organizes her work around the seeming conflict between toleration and identity. A strong commitment to a group identity is usually thought to stand in tension with the toleration of others. In her first two chapters, she explores this tension theoretically and proposes an alternative account of toleration to mitigate it. The following four chapters each address a major early modern thinker—Bodin, Montaigne, Locke, and Defoe—whose ideas exemplify this alternative approach to toleration.

Creppell begins her theoretical analysis by arguing that liberal and postmodern approaches to toleration and identity are deficient. Liberal theorists usually attempt to circumvent the dangers of difference by emphasizing the universal nature or common interests of all individuals. Postmodern theorists attempt to overcome the potentially divisive nature of identity by accentuating the multiple identities inherent in each of us.

The author suggests that particularism and difference do not need to be overcome or deconstructed in order to achieve toleration and peaceful accommodation. Her politics of toleration attempts to forge relationships that will bind diverse individuals together in collective life without erasing their particular identities. Indeed, she argues that staying in relation with the person or group with whom one is in conflict is central to the definition of toleration.

Achieving this notion of toleration depends upon convincing individuals to adopt what Creppell calls "bridging identities," self-understandings that help individuals to imagine themselves in relations of mutuality and toleration with diverse others. They do not replace particular identities but overlay them with links to collective life. Political leaders, public thinkers, and artists can all play a role in propagating these identities by emphasizing the value of people's "commitment to continued interaction for common goals" (p. 160).

Creppell's chapters on Bodin, Montaigne, Locke, and Defoe demonstrate how each of these thinkers attempted to reformulate conceptions of the self in order "to bridge animosities between groups while not washing away the content of difference and otherness" (p. 153). Bodin outlines a new identity that directs individuals to refrain from violence, recognize the supreme authority of the sovereign, and accept the neutrality of the public realm. Montaigne complements this vision with a new moral psychology that emphasizes concrete, bodily experience and is intended to ground people's thinking so that their minds will not "fly off in potentially harmful and coercive directions" (p. 84). Locke further justifies toleration by elaborating a set of overlapping dualisms between religion/politics, inner/outer, mind/body, and private/public that encourages individuals to recognize a realm of personal freedom. In the novel *Robinson Crusoe,* Defoe more subtly advocates toleration by making his protagonist the embodiment of a new attitude toward public judgment that accepts diversity and promotes the common good.

Creppell's book deserves attention not only from scholars of the history of political thought but also from contemporary theorists interested in issues of toleration and identity. The early theoretical chapters are among the strongest. The historical chapters are also insightful but suffer from some oversights. The chapter on Bodin, for example, fails to mention that this early proponent of toleration was also the author of a book, *De la démonamanie des sorciers,* that calls upon political leaders actively to root out and persecute witches within their realms. (Creppell does briefly mention Bodin's position on witchcraft in her chapter on Montaigne [p. 72].) The diverse participants in Bodin's dialogue on toleration, the *Colloquium Heptaplomeres de Rerum Sublimium Arcanis Abditis,* likewise argue that atheists should not be tolerated. In his *First Letter on Toleration,* Locke, too, withholds toleration from atheists—a point that Creppell mentions only in a footnote (p. 185 n. 37). Insofar as her intention is to accentuate the positive steps these writers took toward justifying toleration, it is perhaps understandable that she did not emphasize the limits of their views; but these points should at least have been more directly addressed. In addition, these points raise some questions about her account of the political bridging identities outlined by Bodin and Locke. Bodin and Locke attempted to link individuals to a state that was not wholly neutral, as Creppell suggests, but committed to defending and propagating religious values. It is precisely this common good end that appears to make their accommodation possible. Lacking this common good end, as is the case in our own times, we may find it more difficult to formulate bridge identities that successfully link diverse individuals to a tolerant public realm.

Levine's book focuses solely on Montaigne's political philosophy. Since toleration is central to Montaigne's political philosophy, this study overlaps thematically with Creppell's. Yet



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

this book is more than just a study of Montaigne's views on toleration. Levine systematically explores Montaigne's political thought and demonstrates his "important but underappreciated influence on modern thought as a whole and his role in the origins of liberalism in particular" (pp. 15–16). The result is the best book-length study of Montaigne's political ideas yet published in English.

Levine argues that Montaigne's major contribution to the theory of liberalism and toleration was the articulation of a tolerant mind-set or psychology. Central to this mind-set was a withering skepticism that challenged humanity's ability to know any transcendental or metaphysical truths. Yet skepticism alone is not sufficient to justify toleration, for if we cannot know anything, then there would seem to be no more reason to tolerate others than to dominate them. Levine suggests that Montaigne avoids this nihilistic conclusion by grounding his philosophy in a phenomenological conception of the self. Since our senses and reason are faulty, we cannot know with certainty anything about the external world. But we do have direct access to our experiences, and as such, can know with certainty the limits of our knowledge as well as some basic goods of human experience.

Montaigne's skepticism points specifically to two ideals of the good life. One is the natural simplicity of the lives of animals, peasants, and the "cannibals" of the New World. All of these beings live their lives without sophistication according to their bodily needs and wants. The other ideal is the sophisticated simplicity of the sensual philosopher. According to Levine, this ideal is Montaigne's highest vision of the good life. While the sensual philosopher still organizes his or her life around bodily needs, he or she has a more developed sense of reason, is more self-consciously aware of the limits of knowledge, and is more actively engaged in self-creation.

Montaigne's ideal of the good life serves to justify his political argument for toleration. He calls for a sharp separation of public and private so that individuals might freely engage in self-reflection and self-creation. He also emphasizes the importance of stability and obedience, but argues that people will be more likely to obey if rulers abdicate control over personal matters.

Levine ultimately claims that Montaigne offers a more compelling justification of toleration than more well-known defenses. He avoids problematic appeals to metaphysical ideals or rights, and also avoids the problems that characteristically plague postmodern arguments, by basing his defense of toleration upon a phenomenological conception of the self. Yet Levine admits that Montaigne's conception of the self "is only likely to appeal to the most self-aware of thinkers," since it involves both radical skepticism and deep introspection (p. 239). His theory thus lacks the broad appeal of other theories.

The major shortcoming of Levine's analysis is his tendency to impose too much unity on Montaigne's ideas. Montaigne, for example, makes contradictory statements about religion—sometimes praising it, sometimes criticizing it, and sometimes proclaiming ignorance about all divine matters. Yet Levine portrays Montaigne as an atheist and attempts to explain away all those passages where he praises religious values (e.g., p. 52). Similarly, Levine argues on somewhat tenuous grounds that Montaigne not only personally preferred the sophisticated simplicity of the philosopher to the natural simplicity of peasants and cannibals, but also posited sophisticated simplicity as the highest good for all human beings. An equally plausible case can be made that Montaigne saw both lives as equally good for different people in different circumstances.

Ironically, Levine's attempt to unify Montaigne's thought leaves him with an interpretation of the philosopher that appears less tolerant and open to diversity than Montaigne himself seems to have been. Montaigne was equally willing to see both the good and bad in religion, and the benefits and drawbacks of both natural and sophisticated living. His refusal to take sides once and for all, and his willingness to live with ambiguity and inconsistencies, is an aspect of his tolerant mind-set that Levine overlooks.

Despite these criticisms, *Toleration and Identity* and *Sensual Philosophy* are lucid accounts of the early modern origins of toleration that open new avenues for rethinking toleration in contemporary times. They deserve attention from readers interested in early modern political thought, as well as those interested in theories of identity and toleration.

**Trauma and the Memory of Politics**. By Jenny Edkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 265p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Margaret E. Farrar, *Augustana College*

This is an important and innovative book. In it, Jenny Edkins explores the relationship between violence, the traumatic effects of violence, and the foundation and perpetuation of sovereign power. Using historical and field research, Edkins examines sites and practices that commemorate famines, wars, genocides, and terrorist attacks. She describes the evolution of the Cenotaph in Great Britain and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC; Dachau and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum; and the place of the "camp" (concentration camps at midcentury; refugee camps at the millennium) in political discourse. While many of these sites seek to contain and appropriate traumatic experience for the purposes of reproducing sovereign power, she contends, the testimony made possible in part through them has radical potential for helping us to contest nationalism and to rethink our relationship to the state.

A traumatic event, as Edkins defines it, usually involves force, although this is not enough; trauma also "has to involve a betrayal of trust. . . . What we call trauma takes place when the very powers that we are convinced will protect us and give us security become our tormentors: when the community of which we considered ourselves members turns against us or when our family is no longer a site of refuge but of danger" (p. 4). As such, traumatic events obliterate our previously held assumptions about the world and our place in it; they often "reveal the contingency of the social order" (p. 5). In disrupting our understanding of community, trauma also diminishes our capacity for language, our ability to speak coherently about



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

"what happened" (p. 37). Trauma is, in some fundamental sense, beyond language, beyond meaning, "unsayable in the vocabulary of the powerful" (p. 7).

This inability to speak about trauma is closely linked to our temporal experience of it. Traumatic events do not exist in normal, linear time where the past stays past; rather, our response to trauma is often belated, suffered through again and again in dreams and flashbacks, and through reenactments of the experience. Traumatized persons, then, "'live in two different worlds: the realm of trauma and the realm of their current ordinary life'" (Cathy Caruth quoted in Edkins, p. 40).

Sustaining our belief in the security of the state (and in our own coherent identity), Edkins argues, requires us to forget the traumas that brought us into being. Having faith in democratic rule of law necessitates that we forget the wars in which rule of law was suspended and arbitrary exercises of power produced a permanent state of "exception." Submitting to sovereign power for the sake of security requires us to ignore the times when that power has been deployed against citizens, when the state uses "security" as justification for unspeakable violations of body and spirit. Thus, disciplining trauma time—by forcing the events into neat, historical narrative, by carefully policing who is permitted to speak and what stories they are allowed to tell—is crucial to the maintenance of sovereign power; it is "the time that must be forgotten if the . . . modern state is to remain unchallenged" (p. 230). Our most common ways of "remembering" trauma, therefore, are often the most conducive to forgetting, as we try to ignore the event's inherent meaninglessness, its power as an "'*affront to understanding*'" (Caruth quoted in Edkins, p. 41, italics in original). Survivors and witnesses thus often find their experiences medicalized (post-traumatic stress syndrome), narrativized (into the symbology of heroes, villains, sacrifice, and redemption), and otherwise normalized—or erased completely.

Some forms of remembering, however, do not rewrite survivors' experiences into an official, nationalist history. While these sites and practices vary widely, they have in common spontaneous, unscripted responses from the public (the objects brought to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the entries that become entire conversations in the visitors' books at Dachau) and the refusal to see the past as something static, where our interpretations of events are somehow settled. These sites acknowledge the existence of trauma time; rather than channeling or masking the horror of the event, they make use of traumatic memory to unsettle the foundations of sovereign power.

*Trauma and the Memory of Politics* is gracefully written, weaving together nuanced theoretical observations with rich historical and ethnographic detail. Rather than awkwardly imposing a single theoretical framework (or even multiple frameworks) on the cases she studies, Edkins lets the theory emerge almost organically from the cases themselves. Theory happens here in the interstices between events and interpretations. This is significant because her method reflects her intellectual and ethical concerns with bearing witness; "[w]ith a traumatic event," she argues, "we are not able, even in a preliminary way, to say 'what happened'" (p. 39). To impose a clear theoretical narrative on memory would be to ignore the unique dimensions of trauma time, and the difficulty inherent in describing events that are beyond words. Yet, as Edkins asserts, the *impossibility* of saying does not absolve us from the *responsibility* of trying. Thus, her method, like the more "successful" memorial experiences she describes, must "'encircle again and again the site' of the trauma," rather than fix it in time and space with a definitive account of its truth (Slavoj Žižek quoted in Edkins, p. 15).

In part because of its scope and the complexity of the issues it addresses, the book does suggest more than it delivers in certain places. For example, Edkins relies heavily on Giorgio Agamben's concept of *homo sacer* (sacred man, "a creature who can be killed but not sacrificed" [p. 181]) to elucidate the relationship between trauma, power, and subjectivity in the West. She acknowledges that homo sacer is gendered male, and that this might limit (or at least complicate) its explanatory power. Indeed, Edkins discusses the dissonance between homo sacer and the female figure at the center of contemporary political discourse (e.g., the media's focus on rape as an atrocity in Kosovo). "It is surely not accidental," she writes, "that the figure that appears as the victim . . . is the female Muslim, the figure that on two counts is included in western power by virtue of its exclusion from it" (p. 213). She does not follow up on the intriguing set of questions this raises: Is the feminization of trauma a new development, or has trauma always had gendered dimensions? Similarly, her treatment of September 11, 2001, is provocative but abbreviated; I would like to have seen more on how discourse about the planned memorial site attempts (or does not attempt) to co-opt traumatic experience. These points only indicate, however, how very rich the material is that Edkins has chosen for her subject matter, and I hope that her book prompts further discussion regarding memory, power, and resistance.

**Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy**. By Cynthia Estlund. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 240p. $29.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

— Barbara Allen, *Carleton College*

Writing from New York in 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville described "a society formed of all the nations of the world"—peoples of different languages, beliefs, and opinions forming a society without roots, memory, common ideas, or, indeed, a national character. What held such a polity together? "Interest. That is the secret" (Alexis de Tocqueville, "To Ernest de Chabrol 9 June 1831" in Roger Boesche, *Alexis de Tocqueville: Selected Letters on Politics and Society,* 1985. p. 38). Such observations and their author's subsequent hypotheses linking self-interest to the Americans' "science of association" figure centrally in recent studies of "social capital" and "strong democracy." Cynthia Estlund contributes to the literature on communal ties, civic life, and self-government by considering the broad political effects of relationships formed in the not-so-voluntary arena



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of the American workplace. "Interest" that can initially amount to little more than a shared requirement to "get the job done," the "working together" thesis maintains, may develop into shared understandings when activities undertaken in common cultivate and enlarge participants' common ground.

In support of this thesis, Estlund presents a wide-ranging review of empirical studies of workplace regulation and workplace bonds in Part I. Literature from political science, law, sociology, and social psychology is marshaled to show how work experiences may promote cooperation, sociability, and solidarity, enabling individuals to bridge persistent social divisions—including barriers impeding gender equity and racial integration. The two concise theoretical chapters of Part II trace an American public philosophy linking work, association, and self-governance from the founding through the New Deal. In a swift review, the author highlights developments from the market ideal (Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, Adam Smith, the "founders," and Tocqueville) through the social theories of alienation and hope-for solidarity following from the realities of industrialization (Tocqueville, Karl Marx, and Émile Durkheim), which culminate in a reprise of localism and face-to-face deliberation (John Dewey). Although detail is sacrificed in traversing this terrain, the general trajectory rings true. Estlund concludes that the resulting early-twentieth-century proponents of "civil society" (and many advocates of the current ideal) too hastily rejected the workplace as a primary site of participation, deliberation, and collective choice. In Part III, she extends the argument, using the rubric of constitutional analysis to consider how policy and law enable the workplace to integrate individuals and society. Principles of equal protection and due process, as well as rights of expression and assembly, find analogues in workplace governance and regulation in this creative analysis of the workplace "constitution," principles of reform, and proposal for "amendment." These chapters heighten the contrast between associational types, underscoring the importance of an arena that convenes "strangers from diverse backgrounds and inducing them to work together toward shared objectives under the aegis of the socially imposed equality principle" (p. 129).

The "working together" thesis, thus, addresses several puzzles in the social capital discourse (and democratic theory, more broadly), including a central Tocquevillian concern: how, in a plural society motivated primarily by interest, to draw into association those individuals who apparently lacked resources and political or social standing that would make them of interest in the ongoing celebration of social exchange. It was not only the possible thinning of America's dense social networks that concerned Tocqueville but also the limits of the democratic "virtue," self-interest well understood, itself. Where ideas held in common seemed entirely lacking—as in the case of his famously pessimistic forecast of American race relations—there could be no common action, experience, or interest. Estlund argues that those who look to voluntary associations as the sole source of social capital will confront the same challenge in a plural society.

A democracy devoted to liberty will tolerate self-segregation in intimate and expressive associations, Estlund observes. Although exclusive associations can contribute to their members' political efficacy and social trust, as well as to the broader fund of social capital, they may do little to promote necessary communication, empathy, and sense of shared enterprise across social divisions. Workplaces not only produce skills and capacities associated with cooperative problem solving but also offer forums for exchanging diverse ideas and experiences (pp. 102, 123, 129). To the several conditions anticipated by advocates of "democratic deliberation"—freedom from coercion and restraint of speech and equality—the author adds considerations of diversity and interdependence among participants. No social space meets the ideal completely, she reminds. Workplaces may surpass other sites of public deliberation to the extent that they become "place(s) for informal exchange of experiences and opinions and knowledge among people who are both *connected* with each other, so that they are inclined to listen, and *different* from each other, so that they are exposed to diverse ideas and experiences" (p. 123; emphases in the original). The compelled association of workers may, moreover, advance deliberation and bear the fruits of increased social capital across social divisions. Where "spatial segregation"—geographic divisions separating racial or ethnic groups—prevail, workplaces may offer the *only* site of interaction where common effort and experience have the potential to bring forth common interests and ideas.

What enables workplaces to accomplish—perhaps uniquely—the task of fostering deeper ties among people who "find it necessary to get along and get things done with others with whom they would not otherwise choose to associate" (pp. 103–4), particularly as equals? What evidence shows that work, indeed, performs such a function? Estlund acknowledges that hypothesized development of workplace association and the "social spillover" from workplace ties may often fall short of their potential. Causal linkage is equally difficult to establish. Empirical evidence indicating a narrowing of social distances between blacks and whites (e.g., the increased report of interracial friendships), for example, seems at most to have a phenomenological association with the increased racial integration of workplaces. Readers unfamiliar with the cited studies may be frustrated by their inability to evaluate the methods and findings on which Estlund bases some conjectures. The personal narratives meant to illustrate some of the book's central insight may seem too condensed, the culling of principles from them too cursory, to alleviate doubt. But she is aware of the compromises necessary to offer a cogent review of several vast literatures to an audience of nonspecialists, including those who, as workers and supervisors, may look to their own workplaces for evidence and principle. If the evidence presented leaves the reader wishing for more, Estlund, nevertheless, offers a wealth of hypotheses presented in a carefully explicated logic. Throughout *Working Together,* her statements of the propositions affirmed by the available evidence remain modest, while her conscientious analysis of relevant democratic theory and practice underscores the importance of further empirical inquiry.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

**Coping in Politics with Indeterminate Norms: A Theory of Enlightened Localism**. By Benjamin Gregg. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 210p. $54.50 cloth, $17.95 paper.

— Angelia K. Means, *Dartmouth College*

Arguing in the tradition of pragmatists, such as John Dewey and Charles Peirce, Benjamin Gregg proposes that sociotheoretic critique, legal judgment, and public policy should find "criteria of critical judgment this side of universal validity" (p. 8). By this he means that while norms are always relative to particular interpretative traditions, which, in turn, are necessarily open-textured and indeterminate, normative indeterminacy does not preclude the possibility of singular norms that adjudicate between different local traditions (p. 86). Contra postmodernists (and certain adherents of Critical Legal Studies), Gregg rejects the claim that the indeterminacy of norms correlates with the loss of autonomy, on the one hand, and universality, on the other (pp. 78–82).

In the course of distinguishing pragmatism from postmodernism, the author rejects as incoherent recent attempts (by Jacques Derrida and Stanley Fish) to articulate a postmodern concept of agency and law. To his mind, these attempts simply fail. To my mind, the author's critique of the latest statement of postmodernism is too glib. Yet I appreciate the basic point: Deconstructing transcendental norms to get at the local and particular brings with it a duty to construct an alternative concept of universal validity, and postmodernism fails on this score. The great virtue of *Coping in Politics with Indeterminate Norms* is that it poses with clarity *the* question of our historical moment, namely, how we, the inheritors of a democratic tradition, can construct a concept of universal validity that takes account of difference without falling into the trap of incommensurability. In short, how can "we" develop *normative criteria* for adjudicating difference?

Gregg's enlightened localism "begins with cognitive and normative standards immanent to a society's culture*s* but then transcends them," not by fusing horizons or imposing an imperialist order (as in the Soviet *Union*) but by revising procedural democracy. Specifically, Gregg takes deliberative democracy in a pragmatic direction. In contrast to liberals, he emphasizes rights concerned with fair and egalitarian participation as opposed to substantive autonomy (pace John Hart Ely) (p. 104). In contrast to discourse theorists, like Seyla Benhabib, he rejects the claim that fair proceduralism is linked to a "moral-transformative process" that invariably changes the substantive values of participants (p. 105). Rather than seeking moral transformation (oriented by the substantive value of autonomy or substantive values that emerge dialogically), Gregg recommends a more modest aim, a coping strategy that "facilitate(s) cooperation among people who continue to disagree" (ibid.). Yet despite advocating the minimum goal of coping with disagreement (in lieu of moral transformation aimed at consensus formation), he is reliant upon the deep-seated consensus that actually permeates democratic societies. He admits that enlightened localism is not really possible in illiberal polities (p. 130). His version of deliberative democracy (like all forms of deliberative democracy) is uniquely associated with substantive egalitarian achievements that steer "us" to reject hierarchy, totalitarian centralization, and traditionalism (ibid.). Moreover, even when he is concerned with public policy issues like local control of education and immigration, he frames these issues as foremost a matter of rights interpretation. That is, he assumes that all democratic participants accept what Jürgen Habermas refers to as the thoroughgoing juridification (or rights centrism) of mature forms of political legitimacy.

I agree with the implicit assumption that what is at stake is rights interpretation (however indeterminate the interpretative edifice). Yet the author needs to say more about this point since the immigration example, in particular, forces us to encounter a form of difference that not only invokes radical disagreement about rights interpretation but also (potentially) rejects the idea of linking political legitimation to rights discourse. While there are certainly interesting comparisons between demarcating local (municipal) boundaries to decide how democratic citizens are educated and demarcating the borders of the nation-state to decide the identity of the citizen in a different sense, there is also an important distinction that the author misses: Immigrants threaten/promise to introduce fundamental shifts in democratic pedagogy and, hence, identity.

In thematizing the indeterminacy of democratic membership criteria, Gregg is really pointing beyond the procedures of democracy to a substantive question. Assuming that we can agree on how we decide controversial questions (in relation to which there will always be a remainder in terms of value agreement), how do we determine who qualifies as a member of the relevant interpretative community? Qualification here must assume a certain competence, whether it is the competence acquired by democratic education or demonstrated by those who, in a different sense, "become" citizens. In both cases, it seems to me, that what "we" are precisely risking is moral transformation (albeit to differential degrees). Whatever the source of value differences, civic education is transformative: It teaches us to recognize democracy's moral horizon as the interpretative framework that allows us to reconcile ourselves to indeterminacy and make reasonable decisions despite it.

While Gregg's own position on the civic education of schoolchildren remains ambivalent, he suggests that the *Yoder* decision is problematic. Of course, in the case of immigration policy, the *Yoder* "problem" is writ large. Do we, in one form or another, forcibly acculturate all citizens-in-training so that they can take up their role as participants in a "pragmatic" form of procedural democracy? The author studiously avoids this question, not really admitting the extent to which even a minimalist (pragmatic) procedural democracy relies upon the internal transformation of worldviews, a transformation that has in fact only occurred as a consequence of intersubjective/intercultural contact in societies governed by a particular sociocultural, institutional logic.

In its various forms, democratic pedagogy threatens/promises to change us; it precisely counters the idea that



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

what it means for government to be "respectful of the divergent conceptions of the good held by its many constituents" is to take people "as they are, not as they might be" (p. 104). In Gregg's text, the problem of democratic pedagogy, and its various coping mechanisms, is dealt with most cogently when the author takes up the one example to which he consistently returns: race consciousness and racial justice in America. From the outset, he defends the *progressive* potential of segregation. Citing Patricia Williams, he points out that "black" is a "culture" in the sense of a "shared heritage of language patterns, habits, history and experience" (p. 24). Cultural practitioners, on his account, quite reasonably deploy a strategy of identity preservation that seeks to resignify, instead of abandon, "a marginalized social location" (p. 25). This strategy of "making the most" of one's racial locality fully acknowledges the contingency and indeterminacy of racial identity, without either transcending or deconstructing race. Furthermore, this strategy coincides with particular controversial policies, such as Afro-centric schools and race-conscious districting for congressional voting. In both cases, what is at stake is not the (census-like) recording of an ascriptive trait but the recognition of a shared identity, "born of experience and interests, of social status and history" (p. 56).

While the author appears to be persuaded that Afro-centric schools (more so than Amish "un-schooling") can be a part of the democratic experiment, he is most interested in defending race-conscious districting. Geographic localities, which also represent local identity constellations, provide the perfect illustration for his model of proceduralism. On his account, "racial gerrymandering" (as it is pejoratively known) strengthens legislative deliberation by widening participation and including "more relevant viewpoints" (p. 55). In keeping with the logic of minimum proceduralism, it includes self-identifying racial groups (taking them as they are, even potentially transforming a "group-in-itself" into a "group-for-itself"); yet this group consciousness "need not be socially divisive if its raison d'etre is the group members' inclusion in larger society" (p. 54). I find all this persuasive, except I imagine that interaction under conditions of fair procedural democracy (which may well include some form of group representation) will more likely produce the waning of group consciousness than the emergence of a "group-for itself." In our context, I suspect that only "sovereignty" (as it is understood in Native American studies) will allow strong local identities to exist in perpetuity alongside democratic cultures. And this type of strong localism (again on my view) is antidemocratic—it is in fact precisely the type of unreconstructed localism that Gregg rejects.

I applaud the author's efforts to blend the insights of pragmatism and procedural democracy in order to cope with difference and better include "marginalized social locations." However, even if his minimum proceduralism aspires to take groups as they are (even to shore up group identity), I suspect that deliberative democracy (in any form) is more inherently transformative than he realizes.

**The Public Family: Exploring Its Role in Democratic Society**. By David J. Herring. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. 272p. $49.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

— Cathy Marie Johnson, *Williams College*

In the name of the family, the state has tried to encourage marriage for poor, single mothers yet denied marriage to homosexual couples. By terminating parental rights, the state denies certain adults the opportunity to raise their children, but the state has imposed parental obligations on others through measures such as child support enforcement. The state acknowledges the responsibility to educate all children but refuses to provide to all minors other important social goods, such as public assistance. Our policies toward families indicate any number of conundrums. In order to think more clearly about family law and policy, David Herring argues that we need to develop a deeper understanding of the public functions of the family, one with a healthy regard for the ways in which the family challenges and undermines the state.

The family supports the state, Herring notes, by raising children and socializing them to become good citizens. By providing care for dependents, the family frees the state from the obligation to provide such care and masks the true extent of dependency among citizens. These seemingly private activities draw individuals into the family, and the resulting loyalty and devotion dissuade them from seeking membership in other associations, groups that might challenge and undermine the state. Thus, even when it performs as a private entity, the family's tasks buttress the state.

Discussions of the family that consider only these facilitative functions, Herring worries, ignore the family's invaluable contribution to the rich associational life needed to sustain democracy and limit state power. Families also subvert the state. They produce individuals with diverse opinions, interests, and passions. In families children learn both the skills they will need to form and sustain associations when they are adults, and the crucial values of respect and tolerance for diversity essential for flourishing associations. When the state intercedes in families, it undercuts these lessons, teaching children that diverse associations are not to be tolerated and respected. State intervention also encourages uniformity and sameness, for families that deviate from the norm are viewed warily and suspected of not properly performing their facilitative functions, rather than respected for the diverse passions and interests they promote.

Herring argues that prevailing approaches to regulating the family cannot adequately protect both its facilitative and subversive functions. Sympathetic to the parental rights approach because it grants parents considerable discretion over children's lives and thus strengthens associational power, Herring argues that this doctrine gives undue weight to biological ties and can result in excessive intervention when the state privileges biological over associational connections. But in his view the dominant alternative, children's rights rhetoric, does not correct these deficiencies. Centered on the best interest of the child, children's rights rhetoric gives credence to an idealized view of



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the perfect childhood, one that calls on adults to make too many sacrifices for the good of the children. Emphasizing the family's role in raising good citizens, this approach favors the facilitative functions of the family, disregarding its vital subversive functions. In search of the best childhood, children's rights rhetoric legitimizes undue and excessive state intervention when parents fail to live up to expectations of proper childrearing.

Herring calls for a new paradigm to serve as the foundation for public policies and legal doctrines about the family. With greater appreciation of the family's subversive functions, this rhetoric of associational respect would understand the family as an important intermediate association crucial to the flourishing of other associations. Diversity in childrearing would be valued because it would contribute to a rich array of interests, opinions and passions among adults. The state would respect the integrity of the family association, understood as a collective group rather than a collection of individuals, and thus would be more cautious about intervening in its affairs. Integrity and respect for family associations would in turn lead to the tolerance and diversity essential for a vital civic society.

Herring's provocative analysis extends the concept of associations to families without fully considering the significance of the fact that families do not have many of the characteristics of associations. Members freely enter and exit associations, and within them, they are roughly equal. While members may grant more power and authority to a few participants, they do so through some form of democratic decision making and with the knowledge that when dissatisfied, they can either alter the organization or leave it. Certainly, applying these conditions to families is problematic. Minor children cannot enter and exit families. Nor do they, in most families at least, participate equally in major decisions about family life, even though those decisions may have significant effects on their life chances. While Herring recognizes the need for the state to provide minimal protection for children, his protections are precisely that: minimal. They would extend to abuse and neglect resulting in severe, disabling injuries. Perhaps restricting state intervention to such harms would make it possible for child welfare systems to operate effectively, but the widespread failure of child protective services suggests that these systems face fundamental problems, and lowering our expectations of their responsibilities may not improve them. While it may be fruitful at times to consider families as a collective rather than an assembly of individuals, the inequality among members of families, and particularly the powerlessness of children, should make us cautious about situating families as associations.

Herring wants a rhetorical paradigm concerning families that will foster the desirable goals of diversity and tolerance. His argument emphasizes limiting state power in order to achieve such diversity and values the family's role in masking dependency. His analysis does not challenge prevailing assumptions about dependency and gives little weight to the need for public support of families to enable them to flourish. When children have difficult lives, he claims, many will be stronger and more interesting as adults. Perhaps some will. But others will see their life chances limited, their opportunities for education restricted, and their ability to compete fairly for social and material rewards curtailed. Our associational and civic life may be impoverished rather than enriched by deprivation and widespread inequality. Families need more than to be left alone to flourish.

**The Illusions of Egalitarianism.** By John Kekes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 228p. $29.95.

— Matt Matravers, *University of York*

According to John Kekes, contemporary Anglo-American political theory is dominated by egalitarian writers to the extent that all other voices are either drowned out or systematically excluded. Egalitarians "write books about each other's books, and mostly articles about each other's articles" (p. 188), and when confronted by those who disagree, they merely resort to "abuse" (p. 66). This egalitarian hegemony is both surprising and, where it does not render political theory irrelevant, politically dangerous because it is built on illusions rather than rational, defensible, arguments. The point of this book is to reveal those illusions and the absurdities that follow from them.

*The Illusions of Egalitarianism* is in 13 brief chapters, and each follows a similar pattern. First, the illusion is revealed, then its consequences discussed, and finally a gesture is made toward a different way of seeing things. These illusions stem from, and help to reinforce, what Kekes calls "the optimistic faith" of egalitarians "that human beings are, if not basically good, at least inclined that way" (p. 4), from which, Kekes believes, egalitarians draw the conclusion that whatever goes wrong must be the fault of bad institutional design and not the evil of human beings. The result is a fundamental inconsistency in egalitarianism: Its constructive aim is to promote autonomy by trying to ensure that all have access to equal rights (p. 9) and its corrective aim is to decrease the evils of "poverty, exploitation, crime, the abuse of . . . power, racism, sexism [and so on]" (p. 9). These aims are inconsistent, he claims, because decreasing evil requires restricting, and so making unequal, the rights of evildoers (p. 15). What makes egalitarians blind to this inconsistency is their optimistic faith (p. 25).

Kekes's twin attack—that there is an inconsistency at the heart of egalitarianism that is concealed by an untenable belief in the goodness of human beings—then underpins the remaining chapters. These deal with "responsibility" (egalitarians undermine it); "justice" (John Rawls corrupts it by ignoring desert); the absence of any justification for the assumption of equality and the moral inequality of persons; Martha Nussbaum's "maternalism" (which imposes on people ways of life that they might reasonably reject); Peter Singer and the menace of relieving poverty (that is the job of the local government and, in any case, most people in poverty are responsible for their own condition because they continue to breed despite not being able to feed their children); Joseph Raz's perfectionism (too perfectionist); the impossibility of liberal neutrality; and the hypocrisy of liberals proclaiming themselves tolerant when really only permitting those things of which they happen to approve.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Given Kekes's view of the current state of the discipline, there is a problem in evaluating this book. For the author, there is a fight on, in which a liberal egalitarian establishment marginalizes critics, and when such critics do manage to slip the net, egalitarians fail to take them seriously. The problem with such paranoia is that it is self-reinforcing. All criticism can be taken as further evidence of the establishment's refusal to countenance any opposition. Be that as it may, something has to be said lest this book should fall into the hands of the naive or, still worse, into those of students of political theory.

Kekes's project is a worthwhile one. If only for the reasons Mill gives, the dominance of liberal egalitarianism in political theory is indeed regrettable. Everyone could learn from more radical challenges to the intellectual status quo. Moreover, this is not only a general matter. There are specific issues where liberal egalitarianism is weak and important questions (some of them mentioned in this book) need to be addressed: Is "equality" an axiom that cannot be derived from anything else, or does it stand in need of justification? Is it reasonable to expect religious believers, for example, to put their beliefs to one side when thinking of themselves as citizens? And is there an important gap between the moral significance given to responsibility and desert in our broader moral experience and the apparent denial of their significance in much egalitarian writing?

If these questions are important, and the project of challenging egalitarianism worthwhile, this book is neither. The standard of both argument and scholarship is deplorable. Even the index is shoddy. At the heart of the problem is Kekes's unwillingness to take his opponents seriously. The portrayals of Rawls, Raz, Singer, and others will be unrecognizable to anyone with even a passing knowledge of their works. Egalitarians, to take the fundamental inconsistency that Kekes alleges is at the heart of the problem, do not promote equal freedom *simpliciter*. Restricting the rights of rapists and burglars (p. 65) is not inconsistent with ensuring the kind of equal freedom proposed in Rawls's first principle. That principle, Kekes writes, "aims at equality of opportunity," while Rawls's second principle aims at "equality of outcome" (p. 84), which is just wrong.

In short, everyone should welcome books that offer genuine challenges to egalitarianism (if only for the health of the discipline). But mounting that challenge by alleging, for example, that it is an implication of Rawls's work that "Nobel Prize winners should compensate members of the Flat Earth Society" (p. 47) does nothing to further the debate. Quite the reverse; it allows egalitarians to sit back and think their opponents muddleheaded and irrelevant. Sadly, in this case that would be quite right.

**The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom**. By Chandran Kukathas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 304p. $45.00.

— Geoffrey Brahm Levey, *University of New South Wales*

For over a decade, Chandran Kukathas has been a distinctive voice in the debate in political theory over what liberalism mandates with respect to multiculturalism and the political accommodation of cultural diversity. Many contemporary liberals defend cultural rights for cultural minorities while insisting that their practices conform to fundamental liberal values or demands of citizenship. Kukathas denies any warrant for cultural rights but grants great authority to cultural communities to live as they please. His arguments in support of this conclusion have developed over the years. This book represents the culmination of his inquiries, where the relation of his earlier arguments—especially regarding freedom of association, toleration, and freedom of conscience—is explained and set out within a general "theory of diversity and freedom." It is a fitting culminating work for this most independent of thinkers—beautifully written; skeptical, systematic, even tenacious in argumentation; rich in examples and insights; and liberally spiced with wit. The thesis, however, remains as provocative as ever.

Kukathas poses a straightforward question: "[W]hat is the principled basis of a free society marked by cultural diversity and group loyalties?" (p. 4). His answer is that it is one that respects individuals' freedom of conscience to live according to their moral beliefs, upholds their freedom to associate and dissociate, and instantiates toleration as the first virtue of political life, where what is tolerated is dissent or different beliefs or social norms. A free society built on such principles is one in which political society has no special or overriding authority and unifying role. Rather, this free society would amount to an "association of associations"—an "archipelago of competing and overlapping jurisdictions . . . operating in a sea of mutual toleration" (pp. 4, 22), much like international society.

To call this argument original would be to slight one of Kukathas's purposes, which is to retrieve what he takes to be the classical liberal understanding of toleration found in John Locke's *Letter on Toleration* (1689) and especially Pierre Bayle's *Philosophical Commentary* (1686–87). There, toleration was conceived as a way of securing the peaceful coexistence of groups against a backdrop of religious conflict. Still, *The Liberal Archipelago* self-consciously cuts against the grain of most contemporary political theory. Instead of the standard concern with establishing what values, if any, state authority should pursue, Kukathas asks: Who should have authority in the first place? Instead of the idea, revived by John Rawls, that justice is the primary concern of politics, Kukathas assigns this status to toleration. Instead of the deep assumption that the good or free society requires social unity and a closed or bounded society (such as a nation-state), Kukathas avers that such boundedness scarcely describes actual societies and, in any case, assigns political society a privileged authority it does not deserve. And instead of the assumption—shared by many "liberal neutralists" and liberal nationalists alike—that liberal principles and institutions depend for their justification on respect for individual autonomy, he places center stage the unqualified importance of freedom of conscience. So, for example, while the right to exit associations is crucial, there is no need for individuals to be informed that they have such a right (p. 113).

To contemporary liberals, the liberal archipelago is likely to be suggestive of the illiberal gulag. Kukathas forthrightly acknowledges the latitude that his conception of liberalism grants



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

to illiberal practices by and within communities, but he still insists that this "tyranny in a sea of indifference" (p. 137) is preferable to a liberal state that authoritatively seeks to impose a moral code on its citizens and constituent groups. This, of course, is an astonishing position to those accustomed to thinking of liberalism as standing minimally for a range of individual rights. A virtue of the book—which in large part is framed as a response to Will Kymlicka's influential liberal theory of minority rights—is the rigorous way in which Kukathas seeks to respond to Kymlicka's and others' criticisms of versions of the theory, thus anticipating many objections readers will have. Nevertheless, there are a number of problems with the argument, a few of which may be noted here.

Kukathas defends his account from the charge that it condones oppression of internal minorities by arguing that "the threat of oppression is as likely to come from outside the minority community as it is from within" (pp. 135–36), and he points to the murder of the Jews by the Nazis and the one-time policy of Australian governments to take Aboriginal children away from their families. This confuses what is permitted on principle with what occurs by abusing principle. On Kukathas's account of liberal toleration, oppression within minorities is allowed on principle. On the other hand, the kinds of state oppression to which he refers represent rather vivid *violations* of respect for the autonomy and rights of individuals. The answer to these kinds of abuses would seem to be more respect for autonomy, not less.

One need not, however, valorize autonomy in order to question Kukathas's toleration. He believes that the true test of a commitment to toleration is the capacity to tolerate even the grossest intolerance. Yet one might well argue that tolerating gross intolerance, as a matter of principle, only throws into doubt one's commitment to the principle of toleration. There is also raised here a question as to how, in the absence of social unity, overarching political authority, and shared institutions and values, and in the likely presence of myriad group tyrannies, the liberal archipelago transmits and reproduces the value on toleration.

But this may be to take the argument too seriously. Concluding the book, Kukathas considers whether his theory is plausible. It "might seem faintly naïve, if not entirely quixotic," he writes, "to devote an entire work to imagining a world that can never be" (p. 269). The point of the exercise is rather to highlight that aspect of the "liberal inheritance" that best checks all politics of unity and suppression, namely, the possibility to dissent and break away. Some readers might wonder whether the author could afford to have the "courage of [his] doctrines" (p. 187) because there is no question of facing the doctrines of his courage. Nevertheless, in its more modest purpose and as an illuminating challenge to contemporary liberalisms, this book succeeds admirably.

**Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism**. By Anthony W. Marx. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 288p. $26.00.

— Nadia Urbinati, *Columbia University*

This is a bold and challenging study of European nationalism based on the following thesis: Nationalism was a phenomenon of state building that predated the eighteenth-century starting point favored by most scholars and whose genesis was elite pragmatism and popular mobilization. Moving the origins of nationalism back to the sixteenth (and even late fifteenth) century allows Anthony Marx to make two arguments, one explanatory and the other evaluative. Of the two, the former seems to be more persuasive.

The explanatory argument—which Marx makes by combining social science comparative method and historical analysis—suggests that we interpret nationalism as a strategy of state building and centralization. Furthermore, he proposes that we reevaluate the role of the elites and popular mobilization and question the canonical idea that deems nationalism a post–French Revolution phenomenon and, therefore, naturally predisposed toward civic and democratic results. The author claims instead that when inclusion and equality started becoming the leading principles of politics (in the second half of the eighteenth century), most of the process of national unification (uniformity of language, religion, and culture) had already been accomplished. Dating nationalism from the late eighteenth century ignores the foundational dirty work performed by the various ruling elites and populaces and makes for the idyllic tale of "civic" versus "ethnic" nationalism: "If inclusive nationalism was built on a foundation of earlier exclusion, then that later consolidation cannot be understood without reference to such earlier processes too often forgotten or seen as irrelevant" (p. ix). The centrality of the state's coercive authority in the making of the nation is a topos in continental political theory and history that runs from Machiavelli to Hegel and Meinecke, to mention only the main authors. Anthony Marx sides with Machiavelli, who first captured the role of state building in politics and taught the new prince to take the incipient territorial states of Europe as his model in order to gain Italy's political independence and freedom.

Marx bases his sociohistorical theory of nationalism upon three successful cases: the attempts of early modern France, England, and Spain "to impose central authority from above and manage popular loyalties from below" (pp. x–xi). In the tradition of Max Weber, religion is Marx's midwife of the modern nation-state. Religion—but actually post-Reformation religious loyalties—was the instrument those three states used to achieve institutional unity and ethnic homogeneity. Spain used the Inquisition, France religious fanaticism, and England antipapist ideology. Differences among them reflected differences of religious identity. One generalization can be made: Where and when Catholicism was hegemonic and substantially unchallenged by the Reformation, state centralization was weaker and, in fact, never fully achieved. As Antonio Gramsci understood, the cosmopolitan character of Catholicism was the main obstacle to the political project of modernity. This diagnosis coincides with Anthony Marx's historical reconstruction of the centuries-old attempt by the Spanish crown to counter the federative thrust of regional powers. Its failure to cohere lay essentially in Catholic uniformity. This argument gives Marx the chance to strengthen his case that nationalism (as the late child of state building) derived from a politics of homogeneity



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

perpetrated through a politics of (internal) exclusion. Indeed, wherever the risk of civil war was deeper, the process of nationalistic unity was more successful. The case of France, where religious conflict between Christians was not just an elite affair, seems to prove Marx right. The fusion of the monarch's strategy of state unification with the fanaticism of the masses sealed the character of French "civic" nationalism. As the case of Caterina de' Medici shows, the French crown had to abandon the pragmatic politics of compromise between Catholics and non-Catholics and to ally itself with the populist religious zealotry of the majority in order to face the divisive challenge of the aristocratic orders. "One King, one law, one faith" demanded the physical elimination of the Huguenots.

*Faith in Nation* does not tell us how the masses developed their taste for fanaticism, although the author invites us to adopt a realist explanation. Immanuel Kant thought war was the unintended strategy that nature used to disperse people all over the globe and compel them to find a peaceful modus vivendi through the state. Carl Schmitt translated Kant's explanation into a rule that reversed Kant's logic: War, Schmitt thought, is the permanent shaping force of societies, both when it is waged in its violent form and when it is fought in the guise of political antagonism within the state. Marx seems to share Schmitt's view when he claims that exclusion forged the collective subject of the demos-nation. The centuries-old conflict waged by the British monarchs (and later civil society and public opinion) against the pope and the papists, the vilified "blasphemous" Catholics, and the semicivilized southern European countries strengthened Britons' "civic" supremacist patriotism and their loyalty to the state.

As mentioned above, Marx draws an evaluative argument from the explanatory one: European intellectuals and elites fabricated the hagiographic representation of nationalism as a politics of democratic inclusion and liberal toleration in order to celebrate the superiority of their people against all other people around the world. It was used to smuggle the tale of two nationalisms, one "civic" and good (Western) and one "ethnic" and bad (non-Western), the former a factor of civilization and the latter a factor of conflicts, exclusion, and illiberalism.

Space does not permit me to examine all the reasons why this argument, although captivating, is the less convincing. I restrict myself to hinting at what I regard as the more relevant problem, namely, the dualism between the "West" and the "non-West" as homogeneous entities associated respectively with "civic" and "ethnic" nationalisms. Much like the non-West, the West (actually Europe) is a complex phenomenon scholars too frequently identify with a few countries and the victorious project of the territorial state they achieved. Yet if, as Marx suggests, we should understand nationalism as a process of both exclusion and homogeneity, then we should also attend to cases of "weak" state building. The fate of civic and ethnic nationalisms was decided in Germany and Italy, the two countries that, not coincidentally, generated the two totalitarian experiences of the twentieth century. In those countries, state and nation unification were attained together (the latter was not a later evolutionary stage of the former), and ethnic nationalism violently repressed civic nationalism (1849). The former was not a "denigrated" non-Western phenomenon and the latter not merely a French or British (as Western) phenomenon.

**Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism and Collective Action.** By Michele Micheletti. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 247p. $55.00.

— Bente Halkier, *Roskilde University*

Although this book is complex and multifaceted, there is one central argument running through it. This argument consists of the claim that consumption practices can be understood as political practices, and that such consumption practices are significant for societal development. For example, when a woman goes to the supermarket to buy shampoo, she can choose to buy the one with an environmentally friendly label, thus supporting policies of sustainability. The author sees the phenomenon of political consumerism as a reaction to the derooting of politics from the context of the nation-state into more microlocal as well as more global contexts, and she develops her own concept for defining political consumerism as political participation, namely, *individualized collective action*.

The book is organized in five chapters. The first and most theoretical chapter argues in depth why social science should work with political consumerism as phenomenon. The chapter gives an overview of the various approaches within political science, sociology, and business studies that attempt to coin a new conception of politics in the wake of the debates about globalization and localization. It is argued why consumption seen as politics theoretically can be justified: Consumerism can be used by ordinary consumers to express political preferences, and the workings of the market provide tools for such expressions—boycotts and positive buying. Furthermore, consumption is already political because products are political, and consumerism can influence the agenda of other actors and institutions in society, like any other type of civic participation. Thus, the author states that consumerism can imply political agency, and that this agency entails the drawing on private as well as public virtues. The crux of this argument is the development of the author's own concept, individualized collective action, formulated as an ideal type for political consumption practices and juxtaposed with a conceptualization of more traditional civic engagement, called collectivist collective action.

The remaining four chapters exemplify the complex argumentation in Chapter 1. The second chapter deals with different historical forms of political consumerism. The third chapter provides an overview and discussion of contemporary types of political consumerism. The fourth chapter describes and interprets one particular empirical example of political consumerism—the Swedish case of the eco-label "Good Environmental Choice"—underlining the point that political consumerism is not just about how consumers shop but also about the societal configurations of actors and institutions for each political issue of which consumers form a part. Finally, Chapter 5 returns to the question of public and private virtues



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

in political consumerism and links these with the concept of social capital, stating that political consumerism both needs and generates social capital.

In my view, *Political Virtue and Shopping* is an absolutely necessary book in the areas of political participation and consumer politics. The book provides several important contributions to the current debates in these fields and will be of use for many different types of studies and research.

First and foremost, this book contributes a conceptual development much needed in the area of new types of political participation. There have not been many comprehensive attempts to grasp individual consumer strategy theoretically. Michele Micheletti's concept of individual collective action categorizes the significant characteristics about consumerism as political activity in a way that makes us understand how shopping as politics both is different from other types of civic engagements and at the same time displays sufficient common ground with such other types as to be rendered political. The strength of the author's conceptualization of political consumerism is that it combines the ability to work as an empirically oriented conceptual tool with a more general theoretical grounding of her concept by placing the phenomenon of political consumerism in its complex societal configurations.

The book also represents a useful overview of a variety of debates relevant for the study of civic engagement and political participation. In this realm, the author gives a constructive contribution as the accounts and arguments appear systematic and balanced, so that her own position is *not* established via a shooting down of other positions but via a positive dialogue. In this connection, another strength of the book is that the overviews touch upon a number of classical social scientific discussions, such as private versus public and actor structure configurations, and this might also generate more general interest outside the circles of political sociology.

In many ways, a major strength of the book is its broad perspective. However, there is one point where the broadness tends to go too far for my political sociologist likings. It is a distinct argument of the author that political consumerism blurs the boundaries of what is considered private and what is considered public, and that it is this mixture of consumers drawing upon both private and public virtues in their political practices that gives political consumerism its unique status as a participation type (pp. 18–24). I agree that it makes sense to define political consumerism as based on a mixture of privately and publicly oriented motives. But such a definition at the same time makes it incredibly difficult for researchers to categorize and measure when a consumer action or a set of practices should be understood as political, especially if researchers do not work with qualitative methods. Moreover, although theoretically there is such a weight on including consumers' private interests as legitimate political virtues, at several places in the book, the assumption still appears to be that for consumerism to work as political strategy, public virtues (p. 154) and collectivist collective action (p. 22) are necessary.

But this minor critique in no way questions the overall academic virtues of the book as well researched, exciting to read, and contributing constructively to theory development in the fields of political participation, new conceptions of politics, and consumer studies. Shop for this book and participate!

**From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism**. By Charles W. Mills. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. 312p. $75.00 cloth, $26.95 paper.

— Tommie Shelby, *Harvard University*

The author of the influential *The Racial Contract* (1997) has gathered together a provocative collection of his essays. These disparate papers do not form an argument for an overarching thesis. Nor do they converge on a single theme, for example, the need to shift away from a focus on class toward race, as the title might suggest. Rather, the essays reveal the recent changes in Charles Mills's philosophical interests, away from core problems in orthodox Marxism toward the project of developing a critical race theory. One constant throughout is Mills's attempt to demonstrate that the methods of analytic philosophy are not inherently "bourgeois," as many radicals have supposed, but can be usefully applied to problems that concern leftists. Yet unlike much of analytic philosophy, these essays are never boring but instead are generously laced with the author's characteristic biting sarcasm and bold humor.

The essays are divided into three parts. In the first, Mills offers a revisionist interpretation of the Marxist concept of ideology. He argues that Marx and Engels used the concept solely for purposes of attacking the idealist belief that the ideational superstructure has primary causal efficacy in determining the course of social development. Relying on this interpretation, he dissolves the familiar paradox of Marx's amoralism: Marx can consistently claim that morality is ideological *and* that capitalism is unjust, provided that we understand the former assertion as a claim, not about the objectivity of moral judgment, but about the ineffectiveness of moral suasion to bring about radical social change. Also of interest is Mills's critique of G. A. Cohen's technological determinist interpretation of historical materialism. Mills mounts powerful textual evidence to show that, contrary to Cohen's contention, Marx means to include both productive forces and relations of production within the category of "material factors," so that historically contingent social developments, in particular coordinated resistance, can play a crucial role in epochal social change.

In Part Two, Mills tackles the vexing race–class nexus. It includes an insightful review essay that critiques recent neo-Weberian analyses of the urban "underclass" from a Marxist point of view. It also contains an essay, "European Specters," which is not only the most provocative in the volume but also the one that most clearly displays his departure from orthodox Marxist treatments of race. He argues that "race" should be understood not as mere ideology or false consciousness but as a *material* reality that is a primary social force shaping the structure of modern societies. And he insists that "it is (perceived) *racial* group interests, not class interests, that have been the most important motivator in shaping people's decision making [in the modern era]" (p. 170; original emphasis).



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Part Three further clarifies and develops Mills's approach to race, an approach that he maintains has its roots in the neglected black radical tradition. Following such black activists as Martin Delany, W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and Malcolm X, the author urges that we analyze problems of race within a theoretical framework that treats "global white supremacy" as a sociopolitical system in its own right, just as Marxists regard capitalism and feminists regard patriarchy. Moreover, he maintains that "it is politically illuminating to see whites in the United States as ruling as a group, thus constituting the 'ruling race' of what was originally—and is in some ways still—a '*Herrenvolk* democracy'" (p. 183).

*From Class to Race* closes with a lengthy reply to a critique of *The Racial Contract* by Jorge Garcia ("The Racial Contract Hypothesis," *Philosophia Africana* 4 [March 2001]: 27–42). He explains that, contrary to Garcia's mischaracterization, the "racial contract" framework is a methodological stance within political philosophy, not a social-scientific hypothesis about the origins of racial domination. The racial contract trope is not to be taken literally but, rather, is an attempt to exploit a familiar idea from liberal theory in order to reveal the centrality of racial domination to modernity, a tragic history that Mills claims is too often evaded or glossed over by mainstream political philosophy. Further, he maintains that we should operate with a social ontology that replaces the idea of "raceless" individuals standing in relations of equality with one that features socially constructed racial groups facing each other in asymmetric relations of institutional power. These theoretical shifts will, according to Mills, yield better prescriptions for handling questions of racial justice than does liberal contractarianism.

Yet it is on this last point that the book is somewhat disappointing. The author emphasizes that the problem with liberal theory is not its basic values—for example, autonomy, equality, and tolerance—but its failure to appreciate the pervasiveness of race-based exploitation and exclusion. But even if liberal theorists have not (fully) appreciated the facts of race, he has not shown that liberal principles of social justice would need to be altered or supplemented were white supremacy to be regarded as an independent sociopolitical system. It is surprising that there is no sustained critical engagement with John Rawls's theory of justice—certainly the best-known and most influential contemporary liberal theory. An effort to show where or how Rawls's two principles of justice should be revised to take into account the legacy of white supremacy would certainly help the reader to better assess the force of Mills's argument.

Rather than question liberal conceptions of justice, perhaps he would contend that if (white) liberals were to acknowledge the pervasiveness of white supremacist practices, they would have to recognize that, on their own principles, radical *race-based* redistributive measures are called for to realize social justice. But it is not clear that this implication holds. Reasonable, well-informed people can disagree over what concrete institutional arrangements and policy initiatives would be required or sufficient to bring about a fully just society, and such disputes can persist notwithstanding agreement on the normative criteria of evaluation. Even prominent figures in the black radical tradition, for example, Garvey and Du Bois, have sharply disagreed about such matters. Thus, one burden of Mills's argument, which so far as I can tell has not here been fully discharged, is to show how conceptualizing white supremacy as an independent sociopolitical system will help us better understand what racial justice demands, not just in principle but in practice. Yet despite this weakness, this is a valuable set of essays that further articulates one of the most exciting research agendas in the growing field of critical race theory.

**Marx, Tocqueville and Race in America: The "Absolute Democracy" or "Defiled Republic."** By August H. Nimtz, Jr. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 314p. $90.00 cloth, $26.95 paper.

— Richard Boyd, *University of Wisconsin-Madison*

Something Alexis de Tocqueville said about the irritable patriotism of the Americans might be just as easily applied to his own political theory. One would gladly agree to praise much in Tocqueville's writings if one were occasionally permitted to be critical of him. This book serves as a much-needed reminder that he was not omniscient, that he did not get everything right in his visit to America, and that he was never unequivocally on the side of radical participatory democracy. Bringing Marx's critical thoughts on race to bear on Tocqueville's vision of America as the "absolute democracy," this book focuses on the fascinating question of why Tocqueville and Marx saw America in such radically different ways—as the vanguard of democratic equality, on the one hand, or as the epitome of racial inequality, on the other. How can these two mutually exclusive critical visions be reconciled? This book's animating premise is every bit as promising as its execution is disappointing, at least with respect to Tocqueville.

The main problem is that rather than being a serious scholarly attempt to sort out the good, the bad, and the ugly in Tocqueville's life and writings, August Nimtz's Tocqueville is a straw man of Wizard-of-Oz-like proportions. The author castigates him for things he did not say and do, and then ignores well-known counterfactuals. For example, Nimtz asserts (citing only the authority of Seymour Drescher) that "Tocqueville comes close to being a land determinist" (p. 18), an allegation that flies in the face of his explicit dismissal of these ideas among his contemporaries as "false and cowardly doctrines," likely to "produce feeble men and pusillanimous nations" (Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* J. P. Mayer, ed., 1988, p. 705). But even if Tocqueville were indeed guilty of being something as abominable as a land determinist, what would distinguish this kind of thinking from the following representative passage by Nimtz himself? "[In contrast to Hamilton the Englishman], Tocqueville, owing to his class and national origins—the relatively underdeveloped character of France vis-à-vis Britain—had too many feet in the past to be fully cognizant of what was underway in the United States" (p. 29). Some of Nimtz's criticisms are purely conjectural, as in his contention that Tocqueville knew nothing about classical



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

political economy and had no interest in economic questions (p. 29). Others are patently false, such as his overarching conceit that Tocqueville—unlike his friend Beaumont—is hampered by an "almost exclusive focus" on "political 'institutions'" (p. 23). These not only ignore the dozens of chapters and hundreds of pages devoted to things like the family, women, the relationship between laborers and their employers, and the arts and letters in America, not to mention the contemporaneous *Mémoire sur le paupérisme*. They also miss the axial point of *Democracy in America,* namely, that the book is an effort to explore democracy as *"un état social,"* fully comprehensible only in terms of the *moeurs* and sentiments that breathe life into its political institutions. The author's only justification for ignoring this material is that "it's not always clear if [Tocqueville] referred specifically to the United States" in these chapters" (p. 17).

On the issue of race, Tocqueville's sins are allegedly those of commission as well as omission, while Marx can do no wrong. Whereas Nimtz bends over backward to apologize for Marx's use of grotesque racial epithets as "terms of affection" for his son-in-law Joseph Lafargue, he simply asserts that Tocqueville's "views on Blacks can only be described as racist" (pp. 18, 159). Never mind that neither of the two passages from *Democracy in America* cited in support of this accusation bears out Nimtz's attribution of an "essentialist opinion of race relations" to Tocqueville (p. 18). They say only that certain peoples and races have been disproportionately favored or burdened by historical circumstances, and that this will prove a hindrance to their freedom and equality in the future. By way of contrast, Marx's fascination with the scientific racism of Gobineau and others—for which Tocqueville sharply chided Gobineau, it should be remembered—are merely excusable "parts of the essentialist baggage that informed even the then most advanced ideas on the subject" (p. 161). The author acknowledges, almost as an afterthought, that Tocqueville "was clearly opposed to slavery," but the mere fact that he is willing to reckon with the practical difficulties of putting an end to it somehow illogically means that he "comes close to being its apologist" (pp. 20, 19). This all rests on the supposition that Tocqueville—deeply entangled in the ongoing political struggles of France—could and should have done more in America to advance the cause of abolition (p. 60). That Tocqueville "failed to publicly identify with the abolitionists in America" may be a fair criticism (p. 196), although we might quibble that his writings on abolition in the French colonies were translated and published by American abolitionists, a fact that Nimtz notes only in passing (p. 59). I wonder whether Nimtz does not discount Tocqueville's sense of the enduring dilemma of *race* in America, which Tocqueville quite rightly and pessimistically predicted would not be resolved simply by the *abolition of slavery*. This distinction is blurred throughout the book.

The problems go deeper still, stemming from Nimtz's misunderstanding of two major conceptual issues in Tocqueville's treatment of America. First, despite being struck by its "equality of social conditions"—by which Tocqueville does not always mean actual, substantive equality—he is well aware that democratic America has its contradictions. "The surface of American society," Tocqueville famously notes, "is covered with a layer of democratic paint, but from time to time one can see the old aristocratic colors breaking through" (Tocqueville 1988, p. 49). Second, Nimtz fails to absorb the basic fact that Tocqueville was *ambivalent* about democracy, in America and elsewhere. What he characterizes as "Tocquevillean optimism about democracy in America" was experienced by Tocqueville himself as a kind of "religious dread" (p. 201). That he was an elitist and critical of mass democracy—two of his major sins in Nimtz's eyes—should come as no surprise to his readers. Indeed, rather than "cast[ing] doubts on his democratic credentials," these antidemocratic aspects of Tocqueville's political theory are precisely what make him so endearing, for better or worse, to latter-day conservative interpreters (p. 196). On the positive side, the first two chapters are redeemed by interesting conjectures about what Marx may have drawn from Beaumont's, Tocqueville's, and Hamilton's respective portrayals of America in his "On the Jewish Question."

The tragedy of *Marx, Tocqueville and Race in America*—and the thing that ultimately makes it worth reading—is that Chapters 3 and 4 on Marx and Engels are everything that the early chapters on Tocqueville are not: careful, detailed, subtle, and empathetic. The author recounts with grace, passion, and impeccable historical detail the unappreciated story of Marx's involvement in the cause of the American Civil War and his efforts in support of the abolition of slavery. Marx's and Engels's struggle to mobilize German-American workers in support of abolition and the Union cause is a fascinating study in the role of ideas and political agency in history. Nimtz draws from this story the important lesson that the Marxian doctrine of historical materialism need not mean that Marx and Engels were content just to sit back and allow the forces of history to carry the events of their day. Speech, action, and politics truly matter, a conclusion with which the real Tocqueville—as opposed to the caricature who appears in these pages—would wholeheartedly agree.

**Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship.** By Lorraine Smith Pangle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 255p. $65.00.

— Diana J. Schaub, *Loyola College in Maryland*

Aristotle is not generally regarded as the friendliest of writers. No doubt the starkness and seriousness of his elliptical prose is felt to be less than companionable. Nonetheless, he does devote one-fifth of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to an analysis of friendship. Moreover, the two books on friendship (VIII and IX) hold the penultimate position, coming right before Book X's concluding assertion of the superiority of the philosophic life. Lorraine Smith Pangle seeks the reason for and the meaning of friendship's privileged position within Aristotle's ethical explorations.

By situating the books on friendship within the overall movement of the *Ethics* (from the life of moral virtue and prudence to the life of philosophy) and with her sensitivity to the question of who Aristotle's audience might be, Pangle is able to



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

solve some of the puzzles and discontinuities that have long perplexed scholars. Although she concentrates on two of the ten books, she makes of the *Ethics* a whole work. She offers a detailed commentary on Books VIII and IX, showing how Aristotle's searching and complex investigation of such themes as "the naturalness of friendship, the possibility of selflessness in friendship, and the relationship of friendship to justice" (p. 5) prepares the way for the emergence of philosophy as a theme. Moreover, she supplements her reading of Aristotle with expositions of other famous texts on friendship. With a couple of exceptions (Montaigne and Bacon), these are mostly by ancient authors (Plato, Epicurus, Cicero, and Seneca).

The ancients took the phenomenon of friendship seriously as a matter for sustained reflection. By contrast, as Pangle points out in her Introduction, both Christianity and modern philosophy treat friendship slightingly. The egalitarianism and universality of the Christian commandment to love all men renders suspect the particularity and exclusivity of friendship. Modern thought, meanwhile, either has reduced us to solitary egoists (à la Hobbes) incapable of generous attachments, or has issued a high-minded demand for a certain sort of abstract and dutiful selflessness (à la Kant). Friendship falls into the chasm separating self-interest and altruism and, consequently, a large swath of life as actually lived goes unexamined.

I would add that friendship itself may suffer from philosophy's long neglect, inasmuch as our practice of friendship increasingly lacks a language to sustain and inform it. Although popular culture still offers us models of friendship (think of sitcoms like *Cheers, Seinfeld,* and *Friends*), they are models compounded of equal parts cynicism and sentimentality. The resurgence of scholarly interest in Aristotle—to which Pangle's fine book makes a signal contribution—may not only remedy the inadequacies of modern philosophy but provide as well materials for a recovery of the art of friendship.

Particularly helpful is Aristotle's thinking through of the relation of self-love and love of others. Aristotle begins from the commonly held opinion that to be selfish is reprehensible. A bad man is self-serving, whereas a good man, dedicated to both noble actions and his friends, is self-neglecting. Aristotle shows that what the common opinion fails to grasp is that the good man is in fact a great self-lover. While the good man gives unsparingly of those things that most men overvalue (money, honors, and even life itself), he takes for himself the larger share of nobility, and in doing so gratifies what is sovereign in his soul. According to Pangle, Aristotle makes the "radical claim that the greatest self-love is characteristic of the very best people, even or especially in their moments of seemingly greatest self-sacrifice" (p. 169).

There is a problem, however, with this devotion to the noble—a problem that comes to sight particularly when one reflects on the friendship of two such paragons of virtue. Since nobility attaches to one, not to two, they are rivals. In competitive well-doing, to receive is ignoble. Thus, by every gift, the magnanimous man humbles his friend, imposing on him what Samuel Johnson termed "that inferiority which obligation implies." This, then, seems to be the tragedy of friendship between noble men of action: Either the friendship is devoid of doing for one another or the doing for one another is destructive of the friendship.

There is a form of friendship that escapes this self-contradiction, and in which "the love for the friend for his own sake is an extension or expansion of self-love" (p. 142). According to Aristotle, the friendship nonpareil consists in *synaisthanesthai,* or "sympathetic consciousness" (p. 190), achieved by living together and sharing in speech and thought. At its peak, Aristotle's teaching about friendship becomes a teaching about the life of contemplation. Of course, all friends discuss their common pursuits, be they card playing and carousing or bicycling and business ventures; however, that talk, if not exactly extraneous to the activities that constitute their life together, is nonetheless not identical to those activities. One talks of tennis when not playing tennis or to improve one's tennis. Not so with philosophy. The conversation of dialectical partners does not substitute for thinking. Far from there being a loss of thought in speaking thoughts, as there is a loss of tennis in speaking of tennis, thought is furthered by its expression. Friendly philosophic activity is uniquely self-sufficient. Moreover, the common object of philosophic friends—the truth—is perfectly shareable, in other words, shareable not by apportionment but by communication. As a result, the philosophic love of oneself as mind is compatible with perfect friendship. Self-love and friendship do not vie with one another as they would in the friendship of great-souled men of action.

What emerges very clearly from Pangle's account is that modern philosophy's demotion of reason has pulled the rug out from under friendship as well. For friendship to be restored to its rightful place would mean recognizing it as an essential element of the "perfection of man's potential as a rational being" (p. 196).

**Political Philosophy and the God of Abraham.** By Thomas L. Pangle. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 285p. $39.95.

— Andrew R. Murphy, *Christ College, Valparaiso University*

Thomas Pangle's book begins with a flourish: Taking issue with modern rationalists (e.g., Hobbes, Locke) and their claims that Scripture is wholly amenable to and comprehensible by the tools of rational analysis, Pangle argues that "this contention of theirs is in fact a key dimension of a titanic strategy of propaganda, whereby Holy Writ is to be reconceived and in a sense rewritten so as to be subsumed in a vast secular cultural revolution" (p. 6). As opposed to Socratic philosophy, which always recognized and insisted on the knowledge of its own ignorance, such modern rationalists ultimately want "to reduce religious reflection and argument . . . to the status of a birdlike cacophony of merely private and personal, shallow and shifting, opinions" (p. 11). Furthermore, Pangle insists, any reader of the Platonic corpus will recall that Socrates was prosecuted for impiety, and relied heavily on his *daimonin* in justifying his public conduct in the Athenian square, thus throwing into doubt all such attempts to subsume the revealed under the rational.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Fortunately—or not, depending on one's interpretive and ideological commitments—this book does not continue in this broadside against all things (theologically) modern. Having framed the larger project as he sees it, Pangle quickly gets down to business in the nine chapters that follow, and they are both remarkably focused and remarkably free of sweeping claims about modernity, the Enlightenment, and decadent contemporary culture. Instead, he treats the reader to a series of carefully conceived and masterfully executed set pieces on the central episodes and events of the book of Genesis. In chapter after chapter, he invites the reader into a process of questioning, hypothesizing, weighing interpretive moves and their significance, and considering the implications of those moves for the ever-present and always-overriding question (common to both philosophical inquiry and the Biblical text), "How ought one to live?"

This is a book to be savored, to be read slowly and carefully, and then slowly and carefully again. It displays vividly the promise of a Strauss-inspired close reading (I say Strauss-inspired rather than Straussian, both because the latter term is too often used polemically and because, while following Leo Strauss on many points, Pangle freely notes his divergences and differing interpretations when they arise [e.g., p. 28]). At the same time, Pangle shows a deep and rich immersion in the rabbinic and philosophic commentary on Genesis throughout the ages. He makes the reader work, and work hard, at the daunting task of making sense (if this is the right term) of the first 22 books. Moreover, I cannot praise highly enough the extraordinary discussion that takes place in the 80-plus-page section of endnotes. This is the rare book in which one may learn as much from the notes (in which the author invites his reader into a *conversation about,* not merely a *recitation of,* the main sources: classical, medieval, and contemporary) as from the text itself.

Let me say a bit more specifically what makes *Political Philosophy and the God of Abraham* so impressive. Pangle interrogates such important philosophical, interpretive, historical, and textual questions as the regnant "documentary hypothesis" regarding the authorship of Genesis; the relationship between the two very different accounts of creation; the differences between biblical covenants and modern social contract theory; and the individual and collective problem of evil. He provocatively claims that the issue of whether God created the universe ex nihilo, a concern that vexed such philosophers as Augustine, Descartes, and Montesquieu, only became significant in light of the confrontation between early Christian thinkers and Greek philosophy: "It would appear that the full, true meaning of God as creator is not available until or unless the Bible and its believers come into confrontation with Plato and the challenge of the philosophic science discovered first by the Greeks. For only then does the believer grasp what is necessarily entailed in speaking intelligibly about divine omnipotence" (p. 39). Chapters 4 and 5 constitute a remarkably extended thinking-through of the story of the fall and its implications for human agency, free will, moral responsibility, and divine omnipotence.

All is not clear and conciliatory in this "philosophic interrogation of the Bible, in unqualified openness to eliciting and hearing its message" (p. 12). The intensely political legacy of the classical tradition represents one potential obstacle to a fruitful dialogue between revealed text and rational analysis; yet it is a stumbling block that promises a wealth of insight. Pangle is forthright about the fundamental tensions between Aristotle on the political nature of humans (and his notion that humans require a city in order to complete human virtue) and the biblical text. True, Aristotle thinks that cities will have their own gods, to point people toward something beyond themselves (pp. 61–62); but in the biblical account, urban life begins with the murderous Cain and is epitomized by human transgression and overreaching that result in God's destructive interventions (e.g., Sodom, Gomorrah, Babel). For Pangle, the politics of Genesis "culminates in monarchy, not in republicanism" (p. 64); his treatment of the sons of Noah further suggests that "tribal patriarchy remains superior to political life" (p. 122).

Deeply connected with its emphasis on the polis as necessary for the good life, of course, classical philosophy thought incessantly about the question of justice. Here, too, Genesis provides an insightful counterpoint and a promising point of intersection between the two traditions. Consider Abram's conversation with God regarding the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah. Informed of God's intention to destroy the cities, "Abram responds by venturing to remind God, fearfully and in all humility, but with relentless moral insistence, of the requirement that even God—that God above all—must adhere to *intelligible* justice" (p. 155). Significantly, Abram does not push past 10 as the lowest number of just individuals required in order for God to spare the city, demonstrating that his concern is not merely for his cousin Lot and his family but represents a concern for a principle of justice (pp. 158–59). Ultimately, the character of Abram/Abraham *himself* provides the best example of what biblical justice might look like: "The Bible certainly implies . . . that an exemplary faith such as Abram's is inseparable from, and perhaps tantamount to, justice. Such faith is moral, in that it expresses a sense of obligation . . . [and] bespeak[s] a transcendence of self-concern" (p. 142).

If there is a fault in the text, it seems to lie in the rather hurried treatment of Kierkegaard (Chap. 9) and a conclusion of two and one half pages. Simply put, there is much more to say regarding Kierkegaard's bracing treatment of the Abraham and Isaac in *Fear and Trembling* (1843), and the account here does not quite measure up to the careful and thorough exegesis of the earlier chapters. Pangle suggestively concludes by taking the presentation of Isaac and Jacob as representing the limits of Abrahamic patriarchy and the need for a broadening into fraternal society governed by a legal code, the rule of law, and eventually monarchy (p. 182). Questions of law—divine, human, natural, and so forth—seem to cry out for at least a partial consideration. But such criticisms almost seem ungrateful, when the author has given us so much food for thought already. Certainly in the "preliminary task" he set himself in this book—"that of probing and clarifying the divine law's



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

foundation, laid down in Genesis" (p. 183)—Thomas Pangle has succeeded admirably.

**Ruling Passions: Political Offices and Democratic Ethics.** By Andrew Sabl. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 304p. $75.00 cloth, $21.95 paper.

— James S. Fishkin, *Stanford University*

This book is filled with useful insights, but the parts do not fit together. The reader is treated to many interesting commentaries on authors ranging from Cicero to Charles Fried, from James Madison to Anthony Downs. Yet it is often difficult to discern why Andrew Sabl makes assertions that are supposed to be part of, or derived from, the "theory" he proposes in the process of offering these commentaries—his proposed "theory of democratic constancy." On the basis of this theory he offers surprisingly specific prescriptions for how political actors, such as U.S. senators, activists, and political organizers, should act. Yet the connection between the theory and these prescriptions is far from clear. And he goes on to dismiss alternative theories, such as "populism" and "deliberative democracy," that can be interpreted as offering prescriptions for some of the same political roles he is interested in, yet it is difficult to see the basis for the asserted superiority of "democratic constancy" over these alternatives.

*Ruling Passions* begins with a case for fundamental value pluralism tied to the inevitability of conflict between universal and particular political principles, the conflict between impartial consideration of everyone's interests and the special claims of particular groups. Universal principles, whether Kantian or utilitarian, make enormous demands when applied strictly to everyone, and these demands conflict with special obligations connected to roles and personal attachments. My obligations to my wife and children are different from those I may have to total strangers. If we push too hard on universalism, we can end up facing demands for extraordinary sacrifice, but if we acknowledge only special obligations to those close to us, we deny the humanity of strangers. This basic conflict has fueled a long debate enriched by work Sabl cites from Peter Singer, Bernard Williams, Samuel Scheffler, and others.

Sabl proposes not to recast this debate but to build on it. If there is an unavoidable and fundamental "pluralism" of political principles, then the resulting indeterminacies provide an argument, he believes, for our requiring democratic constancy in key political roles. Constancy has three aspects: "consistency of character, consistent attention to certain political relationships and long-termism in the pursuit of political goals" (p. 49).

If we have this kind of pluralism, why democratic constancy? As John Rawls noted, this kind of pluralism means balancing competing considerations in particular cases, trading off moral conflicts or even the elements of tragic choices. It seems to imply a *lack* of constancy, as Rawls's name for it—"intuitionism"—implied (one would intuitionistically balance trade-offs in particular cases). If there are colossal collisions of principle in a particular case in which both principles cannot possibly be satisfied, do we want constancy in devotion to one side or the other? Do we want someone who will not compromise or give in, failing to acknowledge that the moral claim on one side of such a collision might sometimes justify overriding the other side? Why should "certain political relationships" always trump? Maybe the claims of such a relationship need to be overridden in some cases. Why always side with long-termism whenever long-term goals clash with short-term ones? Maybe there is a terrible emergency and long-term goals should reasonably be put off in a particular case until the emergency passes.

Sabl may not, in fact, disagree with these points. But to the extent that is correct, it becomes hard to see how he can proceed under the banner of constancy. When he gets to his surprisingly specific prescriptions for what political actors should actually do, the theory of democratic constancy does not look so constant. For example, he advises politicians such as U.S. senators to formulate their positions in response to focus groups. He discusses focus groups in formerly Democratic areas of Macomb County and advises that politicians who really listened could craft a winning message either by making racist appeals or by "a nonracial message promising say, a middle class tax cut, welfare reform, a tough stand on crime, and federal action on education and industrial policy" (p. 161). While he admits either appeal would work, he commends the nonracist one to us. Still, it is not clear where in the theory he gets this appealing prescription. While we might all be more sympathetic to the nonracist appeal, a racist one could rest on elements of his constancy—on particular attachments, consistency of character, and long-termism. The long-term goals are not ones with which we, or most of his likely readers, will sympathize. However, we are not offered a theoretical basis for distinguishing the good long-term goals from the bad (apart from the pursuit of fame by legislators), or the elements of character that might help us in distinguishing objectionable constant actions from nonobjectionable ones. If Sabl had chosen as a senator Strom Thurmond instead of Everett Dirksen to illustrate his views, he would have had someone who also had long-term goals and who was consistent for many years (and who lived long enough to outlive his consistency), but whose views appeared to many as misguided and stubborn, not worthy of "democratic constancy."

To the extent that politicians rely on focus groups, it is hard to see how their actions will illustrate constancy from the recommendations of one focus group to the next. The same can be said for another of Sabl's prescriptions: "Good Senators must bargain, and in particular must be willing to *bargain even on matters of principle*" (p. 163; italics in original). The author explains: "Since laws must be made and coalitions formed in spite of conflicts of viewpoint, the proper response to this diversity is the utilitarian, reductionist one: to regard these viewpoints primarily as preferences and bargain with them" (p. 163). But if one's moral principles (and those of others abiding by the theory) are all to be bargained in a utilitarian calculus, then it is hard to predict in advance how the calculus will come out in particular cases. Principles treated as principles might yield



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

constancy. Principles treated as preferences to be weighed in a utilitarian calculus can be bargained away.

Sabl's dismissal of deliberative democracy cannot be separated from his commitment to long-termism. There are many possible long-term goals. Some may be excellent and some misguided. Some may serve justice and the common good and some just particular interests. How are we to choose? Democratic constancy enjoins representatives to pursue long-term "fame." But representatives can achieve recognition on the part of a benighted public even though more just or wise policies could have been adapted instead. Because the author embraces fundamental pluralism, he lacks criteria of justice or the common good to tell us which long-term goals are better. Because he rejects deliberative democracy (pp. 145–51), he lacks an account of the appropriate decision/discussion process that might enlighten us as to the most appropriate long-term goals. He is left with just privileging the general idea of long-termism. But this seems unwise in light of the very moral conflicts with which he started (and to which he returns in his discussion of bargaining, noted above). Flexibility and the need for trade-offs in particular cases would seem to require a *lack* of constancy tailored to the moral and political complexity of particular cases. If Sabl's representatives ignore the complexities with which his book starts, they can stay constant, but it is hard to see how they will be doing the right thing. If they do the right thing, it is hard to see how they will stay "constant."

**Sovereign Nations, Carnal States.** By Kam Shapiro. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 208p. $49.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

— Frederick M. Dolan, *University of California at Berkeley*

Kam Shapiro's book is part of a larger literature of radical political theory whose inspiration can be traced to Friedrich Nietzsche and Baruch Spinoza as read by Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, and richly translated into the terms of political theory by William E. Connolly, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, and Brian Massumi, among others. Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (2001), Massumi's *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (2002), and Connolly's *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (2002) are among recent works that provide a context for the studies that Shapiro presents here, for each of them develops concepts for what is taken to be a newly emerging and unprecedented arrangement of society. With the new arrangement of things, "political somatics"—to use a phrase that Shapiro borrows from Terry Eagleton—becomes central to decision making and the exercise of power, even as these might appear to have been overwhelmed by the less tangible, more "virtual" phenomena of global communications. The study of embodiment, of what politics does to the body and how the body defines the political, takes on central importance.

One of the great merits of Shapiro's crisply written, insightful, often original, and always engaging book is to show that there is nothing new in our newfound interest in the body and embodiment. For one thing, it is the story of twentieth-century philosophy, which, off the Continent as well as on it, rebelled against the traditional Platonist admiration for disembodied rational objectivity. The idea that one becomes richer in timeless truths to the extent that one succeeds in freeing oneself from one's body and everything associated with it, such as perceptions, feelings, situatedness, finitude, temporality, vulnerability, and mortality, may live on in the sciences but has been widely rejected by philosophers and, more generally, in the humanities. On the other hand, concern for the body in its substantial sense is intimately bound up with the larger history of modernity, which from Descartes on becomes more and more materialistic in its view of the natural world.

Shapiro's special interests are the nation and the state. How have political theorists imagined the state in relation to the body and its counterpart, the mind—the rational Cartesian ego, the Kantian transcendental subject, Hegelian spirit? His larger intention, however, is to establish terms for the political somatic that go beyond ideas about it that are invoked to shore up this or that ideological orientation toward an emancipatory or transformative politics. Instead, Shapiro turns to classical theorists of established or normative political institutions in order to, as he puts it, "articulate the somatic dimensions of prevalent political forms" (p. 14), above all the nation and the state. This yields a meditation on the ways in which national identity is achieved not only through "strategies of representation," such as the images of the nation by which citizens are hailed and with which they come to identify, but also "in the corresponding production and distribution of habits and desires" (p. 16).

In pursuing this project, Shapiro offers a genealogy of the body as habit and as a force for the interruption of habit, each being imagined with ethical overtones. This takes up Chapter 1, "Thinking about the Body," which offers pithy and pointed commentary on Nietzsche's and Jacques Derrida's attempts to conceptualize what for Augustine are the relentless paradoxes of embodiment. Whereas Augustine is the exemplary ascetic, setting the normative terms for how embodiment will be dealt with in the "prevalent political forms," Nietzsche and Derrida suggest different approaches. Nietzsche exposes the Platonic Other World that Augustine sets against the body as itself an "excitement of various affects" (p. 35). Far from eschewing his passions in order to make contact with a disembodied, affectless world, the ascetic merely gives up certain affects for the sake of others that are presumably more intense and gratifying. And having thus reclaimed the spiritual value of the body, Nietzsche develops a theory of "brief habits," the pursuit of which (as opposed to enduring habits) is consistent with a pluralistic and open-ended conception of the self and world. It is necessary, he shows, to nurture the ability to free oneself of existing habits and to acquire new ones—such, at any rate, is the virtue of the "free spirit" or the practitioner of the "gay science." Finally, Shapiro suggests ways of "fleshing out deconstruction" (p. 56) so that the critique of the metaphysics of presence can be seen not only as a way of *thinking* differently at the end of philosophy but also as a way of *feeling* otherwise.

In Chapter 2, "Somnambulist Nation: Habit in Hegel's Political Philosophy," Shapiro presents a detailed examination of



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Hegel's understanding of the relationship between subjectivity and embodiment and its implications for his theory of the state. In this chapter, as well as in Chapter 3, "Decision, Myth, and Intensity: Carl Schmitt's Affective Nationalism," we find the substance of Shapiro's understanding of how the political somatic has traditionally manifested itself in Western political theory. In both Hegel and Schmitt, Shapiro finds powerful (but generally neglected) concerns with embodiment understood as the establishment of habits, routines, and everyday activities. Shapiro suggests that Hegel's claim for the rationality of "externalized" activities, which are presented as stages in a teleological process running from the satisfaction of desire to the exercise of skill, rests on his assumption that affects come already organized, as it were, in the form of habits. And it is at bottom institutionalized "stable habits" (as opposed to Nietzsche's brief ones) that undergird the state and make sovereignty possible (p. 95). In our own day, of course, the stability of the state tends to be undone by the anarchic action of global market forces for which Hegel makes little or no place. For an answer to the question of how it is that national identity and sovereignty nevertheless persist, Shapiro turns to Schmitt, who imagines the political as that which breaks with or interrupts everything concerned with the habitual, the normal, and the ordinary, *including* the state and its institutions when they are behaving in an unexceptional manner. Given that Schmitt identifies the essence of the political with the isolation of an existential threat to one's way of life, Shapiro finds affect, and hence embodiment, at the center of his political philosophy, and more particularly in the conception of the state and its legitimacy. The state persists, paradoxically, as an exception that is in fact unexceptional (pp. 101–3).

Having made his case for the centrality of a political somatic to normative conceptions of political theory oriented to the state and its legitimation, Shapiro turns to Walter Benjamin for a more emancipatory or radical understanding of the habits (though he had already anticipated this in his reading of Nietzsche). The chapter on Benjamin (Chapter 4, "Walter Benjamin: Toward a Political Somatics") is by far the most rewarding part of *Sovereign Nations, Carnal States*. It pulls together an enormous amount of what would otherwise remain scattered comments and shows their unity in an account of "revolutionary habits" (pp. 152ff), or the identification of habits of perception, analysis, and conception that are conducive to revolutionary transformations on these levels. Benjamin's writings point the way toward a "Baroque" strategy of indirection, machination, and trickery as habitual ways of being in urban settings in which traditional political sovereignty has been overwhelmed by a capitalist market that thrives on nonsovereignty.

This summary can hardly do justice, however, to what is a remarkably subtle and original reading of the tradition of political theory and its modernist critics—including, which I have not mentioned here, contemporary commentators—that should be found rewarding by anyone interested in the vicissitudes of the tradition and its possibilities of renewal.

**Spinoza's Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the Ethics.** By Steven B. Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 256p. $35.00.

— Gregory Bruce Smith, *Trinity College*

Steven Smith's book is not only an approachable and engaging interpretation of one of the most difficult philosophical works—Spinoza's *Ethics*—but an exemplary manifestation of philosophical exegesis. It gracefully positions Spinoza within the ongoing discussion that still constitutes the modernity that forms and informs us. Smith wants to position him within the tradition of modern political philosophy as one of the first to think through the prerequisites for modern, secular, democratic life and what is required morally and psychologically of a modern democratic individual. I would suggest, however, that in the end it is possible that the author comes just as close to positioning Spinoza as a proto-postmodern in the mode of Nietzsche or Heidegger.

Smith's Spinoza primarily reflected upon how to respond to a godless, soulless whole devoid of any natural or divine purpose or meaning, a whole into which man is integrated as just one part among many—not as a "kingdom within a kingdom." But the problem for Smith, and his Spinoza, is how the human in us, which requires some sense of agency, can be saved given these circumstances. He presents a Spinoza who is trying to respond to the twin issues of determinism and freedom simultaneously. In the process, Spinoza becomes more than just incidentally a precursor to Kant. Somewhat paradoxically, by reflecting upon the place of freedom in a largely deterministic whole, Spinoza was primarily trying to emancipate man from a moral and political whole determined by orthodoxy and nondemocratic regimes.

The author confronts competing interpretations that alternately see Spinoza as a soulless materialist or a mystical pantheist, a democratic individualist or a communitarian, a determinist or a philosopher of freedom and self-determination, and he concludes that Spinoza was all of these things, and more. In attempting to show how Spinoza squared what appear to be several circles in his thought, Smith ultimately transforms him not into a contradictory thinker but into a poet who was attempting to inform an indifferent whole with the will of a humanizing spirit. And hence, Smith suggests that the geometrical form that the *Ethics* takes on the surface is primarily just the poetic veneer that Spinoza chose for his project. Thus, the rigid rationalistic form of the book is far from the paean to rationalism it might appear at first sight. In the process, the author provides us with a richer and more nuanced Spinoza than the usual reductionist and monistic readings. This reading may not convince all of his interpreters but it is a challenging addition to the literature.

Smith presents Spinoza as primarily a moralist and not a metaphysician. He was the quintessential teacher of modern democracy, especially of its psychological and moral needs. He wanted a "manly" humanity that was intellectually and morally tough and resolute, with an inner fortitude and self-reliance that would make it possible for man to affirm himself, including the life of the passions, and seek joy and the "enhancement of life." In many ways, Smith's Spinoza approaches the



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

life-affirming teaching of Nietzsche. The discussion of "life enhancement" is more than a little reminiscent of Nietzsche's doctrine of the "will to power." Indeed, Smith explicitly points to this similarity, and others as well.

In the end, however, one cannot help but wonder if one really needs any of Spinoza's theoretical teaching to get to his moral, psychological, and political sentiments. If the theoretical veneer is a form of poetry, then the moral, psychological, and political sentiments rest on the will, and it is not clear that Spinoza is the best or most consistent theorist of the will to whom we might turn. The stance of fearless, clear-eyed, resolute fortitude that seeks joy and all the high things in life as an extension of egoistic drives may be better served on the basis of Nietzsche's teaching. The fiercely independent resolute action of a mind freed of all superstition and consolation may be better served by the teaching of Heidegger, who is never mentioned. Heidegger would appear to be the author sine qua non of the need for resoluteness, based on an act of the will exercised in full consciousness of the meaninglessness of the whole and the groundlessness of the choice.

Smith calls our attention to these issues in the final chapter in which he raises the issue of just how compelling Spinoza's critique of orthodoxy really is, given that reason itself ultimately rests on an act of faith, which is to say, on a groundless choice. The thinking that most straightforwardly confronts precisely how one must respond to groundless choosing is to be found in the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. Like Smith's Spinoza, Heidegger, too, in his own fashion, welds together a fearless, radical individualism and a form of communitarianism. Yet Heidegger clearly comes down more on the communitarian and nondemocratic side of the equation does than Smith or his Spinoza.

Smith seems to find more compelling the side of the argument that sees fortitude as the virtue par excellence of a free democratic individual. He sees the self-esteem that follows from a remorseless confrontation with an indifferent whole as essential to democratic life. Democratic man needs to be clear-eyed yet active, joyful, energetic, and "powerful," understood as striving to enhance life by reaching out to a union with others in a community founded on consent. One can at least reflect upon the question of whether Smith's Spinoza or Heidegger has more clearly understood the ramifications of resoluteness and groundless choosing in the face of meaninglessness. Heidegger did not think that what followed was democratic politics. For that matter, Nietzsche's politics of joy and the will to power are anything but democratic. Has Smith's Spinoza really opened the door to the psychology of modern democratic individualism, and of the needs to the modern democratic soul, or does his teaching point more consistently toward something at the opposite end of the political and moral spectrum. And if reason rests on an act of faith, as Smith seems to affirm in the last chapter, then the orthodoxy Spinoza tried to rout remains standing, and with it the possibility of the return of superstition and obscurantism.

But of these complications Smith is well aware. He raises them himself. In the end, Smith's loving and creative interpretation is no more dogmatic than the Spinoza he presents for us. The great virtue of *Spinoza's Book of Life* is to raise fundamental questions, showing the alternatives and leaving the reader to resolutely engage them. That engagement itself may be what is most necessary for the democratic soul.

**Modern Social Imaginaries.** By Charles Taylor. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. 232p. $64.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

— Mark Redhead, *California State University, Fullerton*

Few contemporary thinkers can match the diversity, quantity, and quality of work produced by Charles Taylor. At the center of this corpus has been his work on Western modernity, the most important effort of which being his 1989 opus, *Sources of the Self*. Fifteen years later, Taylor has now published the first installment of a new, related, but distinct study of Western modernity.

*Sources of the Self* sought to do nothing less than spell out the normative contours of what Taylor called the modern identity, or what more accurately might be described as the constellation of moral values ontologically present within the political cultures of modern Western states. In *Modern Social Imaginaries,* Taylor explores the emergence of the modern social imaginary, a common set of understandings that makes possible a society's common practices of politics, morality, religion, and economics, as well as provides a widely shared sense of the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of these practices. Whereas *Sources of the Self* focuses on the values of what Taylor called life goods and constitutive goods that comprise the normative features of Western modernity, *Modern Social Imaginaries* concerns itself with the emergence of a variety of social practices that arise in conjunction with the development of a modern moral order embodying many of the same goods (such as autonomy, equality, disengaged reason, and the affirmation of ordinary life) that Taylor chronicles in *Sources*. *Modern Social Imaginaries* is the story of how a set of ideas initially wrapped up in the discursive practices of the seventeenth-century natural-law tradition of Grotius and Locke becomes transformed by modern and contemporary intellectuals and along the way drives the development of modern collective practices, such as civility, the market economy, the public sphere, and the practice of democratic self-rule. More specifically, the book chronicles the development of this modern moral order through a series of redactions that make it increasingly more inclusive, richer (in its contents), and demanding (in its requirements on modern Western subjects) as Western modernity progresses from its genesis in the seventeenth century to its present incarnations.

The careful reader of Taylor will find a good deal to have been rearticulations of previously published work. In fact, Taylor is, to a degree, integrating previous work done on, for example, the public sphere with his new concern with the modern social imaginary. *Modern Social Imaginaries* partly reads as the praxis-oriented complement to *Sources* that a variety of his critics needed to be convinced of the account of modernity given in *Sources of the Self*.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

However, *Imaginaries* is more than this, for it is also a story of the rise of secularity in the modern West and the role secularity plays in the development of the modern social imaginary. The book is, in fact, an expansion of a central section of Taylor's 1999 Gifford Lectures, entitled *Living in a Secular Age*. As such, the book provides his first significant published response to an issue that has occupied much of his thought since *Sources*: What does it mean to live in an age that is both secular yet informed by theistic moral sources like Taylor's own Catholicism? Picking up on a point made a decade earlier (see Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments* [1995]) he notes that Western modernity and by extension the modern social imaginary is secular, not in the frequent, rather loose sense of the word, where it designates the absence of religion, but rather in the fact that religion occupies a different place, compatible with the sense that all social action that transpires under the modern social imaginary takes place in profane time, instead of being understood in light of (and often situated within) some theistic narrative of human existence (p. 194). What makes Western modernity an era without precedent is its secularity. Modernity's secularity, Taylor tells us, compels moderns to see both their societies as void of a divine foundation and "any idea of society as constituted in something that transcends contemporary common action" (p. 93). Throughout the middle and later sections of the book, Taylor plausibly shows how modern practices, such as the market economy and the public sphere, as well as the notion of a sovereign people or nation which is central to modern forms of democratic self-rule, are themselves constituted by secularity.

While the story of the rise of the modern social imaginary is insightful, the implications Taylor takes from it are somewhat incomplete. Though he chronicles the different manners in which the modern social imaginary has been experienced through the West (p. 154), one nevertheless wonders whether he has presented a rather overdetermined analysis of the modern social imaginary that might leave the reader with a restrictive account of the limits of moral and political theorizing (or practical reasoning) within modern Western democracies today. Put differently, Taylor, as he often does elsewhere, frequently invokes the "we" when discussing the hold the modern social imaginary has on members of Western democratic societies. Yet one wonders who exactly this "we" is and how exactly (and to what degree) the assorted members of the "we" are constituted by the modern social imaginary.

Moreover, Taylor spends a mere two pages hinting at the meaning and implications of the most provocative idea in the book, provincializing Europe. What does this rich concept entail and mean in the twenty-first century? One wishes he had spent more time answering this question than only hinting at it in passing. These criticisms, though, are ones that the reader senses Taylor will undoubtedly answer when the next installment of this project, *Living in a Secular Age,* makes its way into print. And they only arise because of the thought-provoking power of this concise and rewarding book.

## AMERICAN POLITICS

**Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and the Will of the People.** By Scott L. Althaus. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 384p. $75.00 cloth, $28.00 paper.

— William L. Rosenberg, *Drexel University*

The central theme of this book deals with the relationship between knowledge, representation, and political equality as expressed in opinion surveys. Scott Althaus finds that political knowledge does matter. In addition, the way that knowledge is distributed in society has an important impact on how one should interpret the collective preferences of the public, particularly when assessing the role of the less knowledgeable.

Althaus suggests that the way knowledge is distributed in a society may cause collective preferences to disproportionately reflect the opinions of some groups more than others. While in some circumstances collective preferences may represent the will of the people, he argues that it often does not. He finds it is not a shortcoming of survey research but rather the limited degree of knowledge of some respondents and the influence of others to be better informed that affect the distribution of opinion. Althaus finds that most individuals who know little about politics are often willing to express opinions on issues and policies when asked.

The author argues that opinion surveys have never really been egalitarian. He points out that 1) descriptive representation is only one kind of representation, 2) a representative sample is no guarantee that the survey results will also be representative, and 3) equality at the individual level is no guarantee of the proportionality at the group level.

Althaus raises his concern with the quality-of-interest representation provided by opinion surveys. He focuses on two questions: how accurately the opinions of survey respondents represent the interests of a population and how heavily those opinions are weighed by decision makers who act on their behalf.

His research suggests that a sample, even when it descriptively represents a population, does not guarantee that its results will accurately reflect the population. He notes that knowledgeable respondents are more affluent, educated, male, white, and partisan than ill-informed respondents and are usually overrepresented in surveys, therefore potentially carrying a disproportionate weight in surveyed opinion measures. He also finds that the preferences of the least-knowledgeable opinion givers are often overrepresented in society's collective preferences because ill-informed people tend to give similar responses to survey questions.

Althaus explores a variety of interesting statistical analyses to develop models of opinion using surveyed and simulated opinions that may be ill-informed, fully informed, or enlightened. He presents a discussion about the consequences



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of using simulation methods to generate a fully informed opinion sample. The author suggests the use of demographic variables to simulate their effects on collective preferences and applied these analyses to the attitudes of abortion rights, economic policy, and reducing the federal budget deficit. He found that correcting for the low levels and uneven social distribution of political knowledge often causes collective preferences to change in significant ways. He also found that some of the differences between surveyed and fully informed collective opinion could result from biases that may exist in the information environments of respondents.

Althaus found that information effects are not merely a function of cognitive ability and that they may be smaller for issues that receive prominent media attention. He suggests that the size of the information effects goes down as levels of salience and interest in politics go up. However, he takes the position that it is inappropriate to think that survey findings represent the active voice of the people, even when information effects are minimal or nonexistent.

Much of the empirical testing found in the text relies heavily on the American National Election Studies from 1988, 1992, and 1996. While these are important and well-executed studies, they present a problem for this inquiry since they were conducted during periods of presidential elections when respondents were likely to have elevated knowledge levels. An examination of other data sets to test some of the principal theoretical questions might be pursued in future work.

Althaus suggests that opinion surveys can be descriptive or prescriptive. Descriptive surveys are used to reveal the distribution of attitudes, opinion, and beliefs in the mass public for purely informational purposes. They include interpreting election results and public reactions to political events, revealing the climate of the public's opinions, the marketing of political policies and decisions, and identifying winning issues. Prescriptive surveys seek to identify a course of action for government to follow or to define the boundaries of permissible government activity. According to the author, prescriptive surveys treat collective preferences as if they were collective decisions.

Althaus believes that since individuals and populations can never be fully enlightened, and because few individuals or populations are ever fully informed, he questions whether we should call the results of opinion surveys the "will of the people." He provides four reasons why this is problematic. They include the facts that no formal consent was given by the population to be represented in this manner, surveys are not deliberative, surveys are reactive rather than proactive, and aggregation procedures produce results that may be inconsistent with individual preferences. Due to the limitation of polls to represent collective preferences, Althaus suggests essentially a limited role of description.

Our modern society recognizes the concept of one-man-one-vote that could be expressed through surveys giving each randomly selected respondent an equal voice. However, our founders put in place a variety of institutional mechanisms to have the opinions of the masses constrained by such institutions as Congress and the Electoral College.

Althaus notes that in attempting to develop a case for the use of informed citizens when reporting opinion polls, it may be difficult to determine what facts are relevant to a given set of opinions. He rejects the simple use of filter questions for data analysis because of the depletion effects that result from "Don't Know" responses. He suggests using a few questions to tap knowledge levels on specific issues or the use of an omnibus knowledge scale that could be included at the end of a survey. This approach would allow journalists and political actors to more appropriately use statements regarding how both ill-informed and knowledgeable citizens feel about issues.

Political actors may use opinion research to promote their efforts by defining the issues or agenda items to be explored, as well as by providing analyses that are designed to support their positions, whether it be by choosing what to report or how to report it. Althaus suggests that opinion surveys may be more appropriately used to gather opinions about the larger society's goals, or the relative importance of items seeking space on the public agenda, rather than resolving specific policy issues as the will of the people.

*Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics* provides a strong literature review. However, the writing style lacks accessibility for most undergraduates and early graduate students. This work would be ideal for advanced graduate students and scholars since it is rich in creative concepts and provides numerous opportunities for both hypothesis-testing experiments and philosophical debate. A major strength of the work is that it provides important insights into how knowledge is distributed in society, how it is captured through opinion research, and how this distribution of knowledge impacts the development of collective preferences in a political system. These issues should be carefully assessed by all who conduct, report, and use opinion research to assure that their findings occupy an appropriate role in public discourse.

**Point, Click, & Vote: The Future of Internet Voting.**
By R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 204p. $46.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

**The Politics of Internet Communication.** By Robert J. Klotz. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 280p. $60.00 cloth, $26.95 paper.

— Brian S. Krueger, *University of Rhode Island*

Arguments against remote Internet voting typically point to concerns over access and security. Despite the growth of the medium over the past decade, sizable portions of the U.S. population still lack home access. Moreover, the patterns of Internet access generally reflect the patterns of voter participation in the country; higher income, higher educated, and white citizens connect to the medium and vote at the highest rates. Therefore, the introduction of remote Internet voting likely would reinforce current participatory inequities. The other major concern, security, challenges the fitness of Internet voting even if the United States achieves universal access. Denial-of-service attacks and viruses may disrupt the transmission of



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

ballots, and hackers may change votes already cast by getting past the system's fail-safe mechanisms. In short, most policy reviews agree that the time for remote Internet voting has not yet arrived; federal and state governments should focus their near- and medium-term developmental initiatives on electronic voting or secure kiosk Internet voting, rather than on remote Internet voting.

R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall, in *Point, Click, & Vote,* reject this familiar recommendation that governments should abandon remote Internet voting initiatives. They call for a reframing of the Internet voting debate that moves beyond the false dichotomous choice of either wholesale Internet voting or no Internet voting. Governments should develop remote Internet voting now for special classes of citizens, such as overseas military personal and visually impaired individuals who are systematically disadvantaged by the current voting system. Not only do they argue that remote Internet voting can benefit some groups of voters immediately, but also, by embedding experiments into these small-scale trials, governments can safely vet Internet voting in real-world settings similar to the way in which small-scale drug testing examines the efficacy and safety of a new medication before it reaches the mass public. Alvarez and Hall make their new path clear: "Internet voting trials for special populations also can and should be conducted by using rigorous, quasi-experimental designs, including test and control voters to determine the factors that make Internet voting effective. The results of these small-scale trials then can be used to determine how to make large-scale Internet voting a reality in the future" (p. 29).

In the first two chapters, Alvarez and Hall challenge the conventional terms of the Internet voting debate. Five subsequent chapters give shape to their argument for a new developmental path. Chapters focus on challenges to Internet voting posed by the digital divide; the potential of the Internet for deliberation and direct democracy; security challenges to Internet voting; several analogies to Internet voting, such as Oregon's vote-by-mail system; and the three U.S. trials of Internet voting in Arizona, Alaska, and the Defense Department's Federal Voter Assistance Program (FVAP).

Of these subsequent chapters, perhaps the most important are those that evaluate the prospects of Internet voting given the challenges posed by security concerns and unequal Internet access. Reminiscent of E. E. Schattschneider's (*Semisovereign People,* 1975) view of politics that avoids relying too heavily on the "impossible imperatives" of democratic ideals, Alvarez and Hall use a decidedly pragmatic evaluative method when considering the prospects of Internet voting. Instead of comparing the likely consequences of Internet voting to such ideals as perfect equality, security, and accuracy, they use the product of the current voting system. By doing so, they demonstrate that even if widespread Internet voting were adopted today, the biases and vulnerabilities of remote Internet voting, on balance, would exacerbate only moderately the shortcomings manifest in the current voting system. In addition, they suggest that the adoption of Internet voting may ameliorate some biases and shortcomings; younger individuals should turn out more, visually impaired individuals should secure more privacy, and the proportion of discarded ballots should decline.

The authors' reminder that, in practice, the current voting system is plagued by significant inequality, vulnerability, and imprecision, usefully centers their policy analysis in the messy world of politics. Even so, because of the serious shortcomings of the current system, I wonder if they set the comparative standard too low when arguing that given the sharp differences in turnout among key demographic groups, "reforms must help to attenuate, not exacerbate, those differences" (p. 39). Should governments expend their limited reform energies on a major overhaul of the voting system that potentially only slightly attenuates the current dramatic problems? Although they give little consideration to the possibility that the implementation of Internet voting may crowd out other reform measures, their logic does suggest that governments with loftier goals simply could wait to implement widespread remote Internet voting until the small-scale voting system trials promise major improvements in voter equality, security, and accuracy.

Perhaps a more fundamental problem lies with their assumptions about these small-scale trials. Antibiotics notwithstanding, medical researchers can expect that the number of people receiving a drug will not prejudice an individual's reaction to a drug; a drug's curative properties and incidence of side effects revealed in these trials can be generalized to the population. Yet if hackers choose their targets on the basis of maximization of chaos and publicity, then the number of citizens who vote via the Internet directly impacts the likelihood of a hacker attack. Accepting this logic would call the external validity of their proposed "real world" small-scale trials into question. Although I am convinced that governments can learn much more about the prospects of Internet voting through small trials of actual voting, rather than logical argumentation alone, these trials cannot remove the uncertainty inherent in the final leap to widespread remote Internet voting.

Anyone interested in the future of voting systems specifically, or the likely impact of the Internet on politics generally, will find this book provocative. It should be required reading for every election official and policymaker considering the development of remote Internet voting. More than anything else, *Point, Click, & Vote* will change the way people think about the future of remote Internet voting.

A list of the most frequently added course offerings to political science curriculums over the past decade surely would include some version of "The Internet and Politics." Unfortunately, instructors can choose from only a handful of rapidly aging survey texts. The breadth and dynamic nature of the subject poses substantial challenges to writers and probably explains this dearth of available material. In *The Politics of Internet Communication,* Robert J. Klotz navigates these challenges and provides a compelling new option. Klotz arranges 14 chapters into five sections: 1) Politics of Internet Access, 2) Political Advocacy on the Internet, 3) Government and Media Use of the Internet, 4) Legal and Regulatory Framework, and 5) Global Landscape of Internet Politics. Within each section, he considers both the impact



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of the Internet on political communication and the politics of Internet communication.

Klotz's first focus, the examination of how the Internet influences political communication, centers on the online communications of elite political actors. The author details the use of the Internet by election campaigns, political parties, interest groups, government agencies, and the media. Not content to simply describe the current on-line manifestations of political communication, he pays particular attention to the genesis and changing patterns of these political actors' Internet use. The second focus of these chapters deals with the politics of these communications. I found Klotz at his best when discussing the legislative, legal, and regulatory responses to these emerging on-line communications. Internet communications have not developed and do not occur in an apolitical environment. Politics shapes the prospects of Internet communications at least as much as Internet communications shape politics.

A unifying argument running through these diverse chapters is that the Internet is a net gain for democracy by providing new avenues of citizen mobilization and information dissemination. Compared to earlier introductory texts, such as Anthony Wilhelm's *Democracy in the Digital Age* (2000) that explicitly outlines competing normative perspectives regarding the impact of the Internet on democracy, this book provides a largely consistent, optimistic interpretation of the Internet's role in democratic politics. The general conclusion combines Klotz's optimism with a note of uncertainty stemming from his acknowledgment of the independent role of politics: "Although it will be awkward, the Internet will ultimately strengthen democracy. Whether this will constitute a 'revolutionary' change depends on semantics and a lot more time" (p. 220).

Scholars hoping to discover fresh insights into the relationship between politics and the Internet may find this volume disappointing. Likewise, experienced readers may crave an extended treatment of the subjects covered in the 15-to-20-page chapters. Indeed, nearly every chapter could sustain an entire volume. Yet Klotz keeps his targeted student audience in mind throughout the text. With engaging historical anecdotes and the straightforward use of descriptive statistics, he succeeds in making many of the key dimensions of the politics of Internet communication accessible to an introductory audience. Unlike some texts that deal only with social science theory or the unending presentation of data, Klotz's creative use of historical examples should stimulate interesting class discussion. I suspect that for the next several years, *The Politics of Internet Communication* will be commonly assigned in digital democracy classes.

**You, the People: American National Identity in Presidential Rhetoric.** By Vanessa B. Beasley. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004. 256p. $39.95.

— Andrew W. Barrett, *Marquette University*

As leaders of a diverse democracy, how do U.S. presidents define American national identity in their rhetoric? Using an interpretive approach, Vanessa Beasley attempts to answer this question by examining inaugural and State of the Union addresses from 1885 to 2000. She concludes that presidents have adopted an ideational standard for American identity in their public discourse that is both inclusive and exclusive at the same time.

Referring to it as the "shared beliefs" hypothesis, Beasley argues that presidents have promoted a national identity where "Americans are Americans because they share certain ways of thinking" (p. 46). These ways of thinking have been rooted in "Puritan notions of an American civil religion" where Americans are viewed as "God's chosen people" with global responsibilities (p. 47). This focus on shared beliefs has encouraged the American people to overlook their differences and has remained remarkably consistent for 115 years.

The heart of this book is three chapters that detail "some of the more unfortunate implications" (p. 15) of the ideational standard promoted by presidents. In particular, Beasley contends that presidential rhetoric has often portrayed immigrants, Native and African Americans, and women outside the realm of American shared beliefs. For instance, she argues that presidential discourse in response to immigration problems has frequently implied that immigrants may not be capable of understanding the nation's common convictions and, thus, they are often "portrayed as hopelessly alien and dangerous" (p. 73).

Beasley concedes that the emphasis on common ways of thinking by presidents has been overtly inclusive, encourages social cohesion, and probably has allowed these leaders to manage a diverse democracy. However, she also argues that this focus might make deeds matter less than creed, discourages democratic engagement, fosters a need for opposition, and inhibits good-faith discussions of American differences (pp. 63–66). She pushes for a new type of presidential rhetoric where diversity is spoken of fondly and Americans are told how to put their beliefs into action.

To her credit, Beasley takes a systematic approach to examining presidential rhetoric, an approach that is often missing in rhetorical studies. The decision to analyze only inaugural and State of the Union addresses creates a problem, however. The subjects the author explores (i.e., immigration, race, and gender) are topics presidents have infrequently addressed at length in the speeches examined (as she herself points out). As a result, many of the speech passages used as a foundation for this book are quite short, frequently only a couple of sentences (or rarely more than a few paragraphs). In fact, the passages cited are so brief—and often only indirectly related to the relevant subjects—that there is little basis for many of the author's arguments. She, therefore, often strains to demonstrate that certain themes have remained constant in presidential rhetoric over time, and she also jumps to conclusions. The result is a book littered with such words and phrases as "implied," "subtly," "presumably," "suggests," "hinted at," "underlying message," "seemed to argue," and "one might hear faint echoes" instead of direct evidence.

Here are a few brief examples. Although Ronald Reagan praises a young Vietnamese woman who came to America and



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

graduated from West Point in his 1985 State of the Union address, Beasley argues that his rhetoric "bears traces" of the exclusivist logic of past presidents because he does not utter the word "immigrant" (p. 88). Similarly, she speaks of "the Reaganesque tendency to announce that race is irrelevant to the future of the United States" (p. 120). Yet, in the passages cited, Reagan does not state that discussions of race are no longer necessary; he merely sets a goal to end all racial barriers.

A number of Beasley's arguments are also contradictory. She repeatedly criticizes presidential rhetoric that distinguishes—in any way—immigrants, Native and African Americans, and women from the "true" American citizenry. However, she faults Harry Truman for not "thanking women alone for their wartime industry at home" (p. 142), and she wants presidents to speak more openly about Americans' differences. Likewise, she laments Reagan's failure to identify those people who need assistance in his first inaugural address (p. 117), but she often criticizes presidents for pointing out that certain groups need help because it implies that these groups are "inferior."

The author has some valid reasons for examining only inaugural and State of the Union addresses: These speeches are likely to contain each president's idealized vision of the country and they occur with predictable frequency. Nonetheless, her interpretations would have been more believable had she compared the themes she identifies from the two speech genres studied with themes from other presidential remarks that more directly address the issues discussed. (It is interesting that Beasley ends her book with passages from a Clinton speech made in Austin, Texas, in October 1995 to demonstrate the type of rhetoric she hopes future presidents adopt, finding her ideal in neither an inaugural nor a State of the Union address.)

There are other problems with this work. Beasley argues that presidents are constrained in their language by the logic of past presidential discourse. She provides little evidence to support this claim other than showing some similarities in rhetoric across time, however. As aforementioned, she also bemoans the fact that presidents do not openly discuss American differences, yet she offers few arguments why a focus on diversity will create a healthier society and/or a more united populace than already exists. In other words, she advocates a new type of presidential discourse, but she provides little justification for such a shift.

*You, the People* raises an interesting question about how presidential rhetoric can shape the American national identity. I do not doubt that some scholars interested in interpretive studies of presidential rhetoric will consider this book's interpretations valuable. Nonetheless, I found Beasley's arguments largely unsatisfying and unconvincing.

**A Voice for Nonprofits.** By Jeffrey M. Berry with David F. Arons. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 210p. $26.95.

— Amy K. Donahue, *University of Connecticut*

The field of political science has long grappled with the standing of interest groups in the policymaking process. Debate persists about the leverage of lobbyists, public interest groups, political action committees, and other special interests, and whether such influence is effective or not, appropriate or not, representative or not. This literature largely ignores "mainstream" nonprofit organizations (those covered by section 501c3 of the federal tax code), however, though these organizations serve a substantial—and substantially disenfranchised—sector of society. With this book, Jeffrey Berry shines light on these organizations, illuminating their role not only as service providers but as advocates, and even activists. Berry's book is a welcome addition to a growing literature about nonprofit organizations that will be valuable to the managers working to run them and to academics interested in studying them.

The central argument of the book is that the federal tax law subsidizes public charities but also circumscribes their ability to lobby. Since nonprofits represent a variety of vulnerable populations that otherwise lack voice in the political process, their advocacy role is an important service to those constituents and to a healthy democracy. Berry shows that such advocacy is threatened by the fact that the constraint on nonprofit lobbying embodied in the tax code is artificially intensified by nonprofit directors' misperception of the law as more stringent than it actually is. He further argues that the directors' confusion is exacerbated by the vagaries of the tax code's language, which withholds tax deductibility from organizations where lobbying constitutes a "substantial part" of their activities, and by the fact that additional provisions of the code (specifically the H election) allow an even broader level of lobbying activity but are poorly understood by managers. The author contends that the Internal Revenue Service does little to mitigate the chilling effect the code has on allowable lobbying behavior, or to inform nonprofits of their lobbying rights. At the same time, he demonstrates that many nonprofits do indeed engage in considerable activity that they do not think of as lobbying, but which really does constitute attempts to influence the development, adoption, funding, and administration of public policy. He contends that conservative regimes have long operated to quash the influence nonprofits exert on public policy, but with limited success, and that the contentiousness of the government–nonprofit interaction is differential across levels of government.

Berry describes these effects in detail, and he demonstrates them with empirical evidence from a national study of nonprofit organizations that involved a short written survey, substantiated by interviews and focus groups. Notably, he provides his instrument and a comprehensive discussion of his research method, a transparency that enhances the work's credibility. Findings from the study are integrated throughout the discussion, lending credence to long-standing anecdotes and intuition about the behavior of nonprofits that have rarely received such systematic attention. The analysis presented is generally descriptive, relying on quotations from interview and focus group respondents, or on correlations and contingency tables. This material is nuanced, accessible, and engaging, and Berry successfully reveals the complex fabric of pressures under which nonprofits operate, and the subtleties of how they balance the demands of government with the needs of their constituents.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

As compelling as the author's arguments and evidence are, readers should be cautious consumers. Throughout the discussion, claims are made in broad, strong terms (e.g., p. 64: "the consequences of 501c3 on the mobilization of interests are severe"), though their evidentiary substrate is uneven. Sometimes, in fact, the findings presented could lead to different conclusions (such as the many examples of how nonprofits effectively influence government behavior even if they do not think of themselves as lobbying). Berry's assertions are most convincing where they are supported by multivariate analysis (e.g., p. 134). More often, findings are derived from descriptive analysis based on the self-reported behavior of the leaders of selected categories of nonprofits. These portions of the work are better characterized as suggestive than definitive, as they lack adequate controls to contend with alternative explanations and threats to validity.

Likewise, the discussion makes stark claims about the objectives and motivations of conservative legislators and administrators (particularly Chapter 4). While intuitively appealing, the foundation of this discussion is a narrowly construed historical account not explicitly substantiated with systematic legislative or political analysis, leaving the reader suspicious of bias. Moreover, the book depicts nonprofits from the perspective of their leaders, with only glimpses into the rationale of the legislators and administrators who interact with them. Finally, distinctions are made between the nature of government–nonprofit interactions at the federal versus the state and local levels, but it is not clear what data the author uses to support these discussions. In sum, the book is very strident in its conclusions but less consistent in the evidentiary base for them. This certainly does not invalidate the story Berry tells, but it argues for balanced skepticism on the part of the reader.

Finally, a comment about readability. The structure of the discussion is at times oblique. It is initially hard to discern its direction (the purpose of the book and its research questions are not clearly articulated until p. 41), and some of the logical linkages are hard to trace (for example, Chapter 4 opens with a discussion of local politics that seems disjointed from the remainder of the chapter). Despite these hitches in form, the reader will be rewarded for persistence. Berry draws together relevant literature, historical perspective, practical insights from the field, and empirical evidence throughout the discussion. This approach is revelatory and engaging, at once offering a basic education to readers new to the world of nonprofits and a sophisticated perspective to veterans.

In sum, this work makes an important contribution. It probes the decisions of nonprofit leaders and reveals the basis for and scope of their advocacy activities, in particular presenting a compelling explanation of the effects of the tax code on nonprofit behavior. This combination of managerial decision making and political participation is captivating, and generates a worthwhile and accessible analysis that also helps to fill a prominent gap in the public management and political science literatures. Managers, researchers, and teachers alike will value *A Voice for Nonprofits*.

**Campaigning Online: The Internet in U.S. Elections.**
By Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 240p. $49.95 cloth, $17.95 paper.

— Michael Margolis, *University of Cincinnati*

With the advent of graphic browsers for the World Wide Web, users have surged onto the Internet. Jupitermedia's network user address estimates show that the number of U.S. residents online jumped from fewer than 18 million in 1994 to more than 164 million in December 2000 (www.nua.com/surveys/how_many_online/n_america.html). Such rapid change makes the assessment of the Internet's impact on American elections a precarious undertaking.

Unable to afford significant advertising and mostly ignored by the dominant mass media, minor political parties and interest groups became early adopters of the Web in hopes of exposing their candidates and policies to a broader public. The Republicans, Democrats, and mainline interests soon followed, and political analysts and commentators as diverse as Dick Morris (*Vote.Com,* 1999) and Andrew L. Shapiro (*The Control Revolution,* 1999) predicted mostly positive democratic changes for election campaigns and for policymaking. Notwithstanding their plausibility, these predictions stood upon weak empirical foundations. Projected largely from anecdotal accounts, they illustrated how selected parties and interest groups had successfully utilized the Internet's communication capabilities to advance their causes. Less optimistic projections, such as the report of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (*Falling Through the Net II,* 1998), also remained plausible.

Throughout this period of rapid growth, Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis—separately and now together—have stepped back from particulars and sought instead to assemble and generate representative and reliable data relevant to the assessment of the influence of the Internet on various areas of democratic politics (e.g., Bruce Bimber, *Information and American Democracy,* 2003; Richard Davis, *The Web of Politics,* 1999). In *Campaigning Online,* they continue this effort with a multimethod study that employs historical as well as survey research, content analysis of Web sites, interviews with webmasters and campaign officials, and laboratory experiments in four major cities. They present not only the most comprehensive data currently available regarding how presidential candidates (and statewide candidates in Missouri) used the Web during the 2000 campaign, but also the most thorough analysis of the impact of this usage and its implications for campaign strategy and for democratic theory.

The survey research consisted of five parts: two national preelection telephone surveys of approximately 1,000 respondents; two national postelection telephone surveys of 300, each drawn from previously interviewed preelection Web users; and one statewide survey of 500 Missourians. The laboratory experiments involved the first 210 people who accepted invitations issued randomly by telephone, approximating a goal of 50 for each city. The content analysis focused on the Web sites of



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

George Bush, Ralph Nader, Al Gore, Pat Buchanan, and John Hagelin, as well as those of Missouri's candidates for U.S. senator, governor, and secretary of state. The elite interviews were conducted by telephone or in person with knowledgeable managers or webmasters from all these campaigns (excepting Mel Carnahan's) and with similarly placed individuals who had worked on presidential nomination campaigns in spring 2000 and in statewide races in 1998. A methodological appendix provides details.

The analysis focuses on 1) comparing how candidates present themselves online with how they present themselves through more traditional offline media, and 2) how online campaigning affects "voters' knowledge level, attitudes and behavior" (p. 8). The authors find that online campaigning is producing incremental changes: somewhat disappointing news for those who expected a radically democratic restructuring of electoral politics, but something of a vindication for those who have studied mass electoral behavior over the past 60 years.

At this juncture, the contents of websites suggest—and most webmasters and campaign managers confirm—that the principal aims of the candidates' presence online are to reinforce and mobilize their political bases. These loyal supporters are most likely to turn out and most likely to convey information to friends, relatives, and co-workers about their candidates' personalities, policies, and positions on public issues. Unlike advertising in the mass media, placing information on the Web does not greatly increase the likelihood that messages will reach those who do not actively seek information about the election. Only 9% of adults viewed one or more candidate websites. This compared to 40% who paid at least "a little attention" to the presidential campaign in newspapers and 77% who remembered seeing at least one campaign advertisement on television (pp. 102–3).

Despite their limitations, websites do open new avenues of communication. Journalists and other influential individuals may visit, especially to gain "rapid responses" that answer opponents' charges or react to breaking news that could affect the election result. Donations may be solicited on site, and the accompanying information may be used (with the donor's permission) to expand Internet mailing lists of supporters. Moreover, the laboratory experiments did reveal an issue-based "learning-liking" syndrome. If websites can attract voters who seek information mostly about a candidate's positions on issues, rather than about a candidate's personal traits, the voters are likely to come away feeling more informed and more positive toward the candidate.

Nevertheless, the large amount of political information on the Web is offset by users' increased control over the information they choose to access. If you build a website, who will come? Mostly partisan males with above-average incomes and education: much the same people whose political participation is above average in the real world. The authors conclude that paradoxically, as the traditional mass media cut down on coverage of political news, the users' control of exposure to information on the Web may exacerbate the divide between the politically active and the politically indifferent.

Some of the authors' conclusions hark back to the findings of the pioneering work of Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet (*The People's Choice,* 1944). Their study, which included exposure to radio during the 1940 presidential campaign, concluded that the campaign's effects were primarily the reinforcement of political predispositions, secondarily the reactivation of previous voting habits, and only thirdly the conversion of partisans. Even though radio and later television gradually changed American political campaigns, they did not remake the playing fields. Major parties and interest groups incorporated these new media into their political repertoire and used them for their own purposes.

Cautioning readers that one cross-sectional study cannot capture the swiftly changing nature of Internet usage, the authors are nonetheless brave enough to theorize the future of campaigning online. In contrast to those of most political commentators, however, their theories have solid empirical foundations, and they can be tested over time.

Aimed at general readers as well as students of politics, *Campaigning Online* is clearly written and its argument is straightforwardly presented. To my mind it deserves a wide readership. Let me add one quibble, however. The authors—or the publisher—used endnotes instead of an organized list of references, thus inconveniencing anyone who wants to look further into this important area.

**Television: The Limits of Deregulation.** By Lori A. Brainard. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 198p. $49.95.

— Richard Harris, *Rutgers University*

In many respects, Lori Brainard's case study of the "incremental, incomplete, and highly ambiguous" deregulation of television from the midseventies through the midnineties suffers from false advertising. Rather than a mere case study in a field highly populated by such analyses, it is an ambitious attempt to critically assess competing midlevel theories of regulatory change and macrolevel determinants of policy change. As Alexander George has observed, case studies are extremely valuable, not because they test theories but because they clarify, offer critical insight into, and generate hypotheses for future research on those theories. Viewed from this perspective, Brainard's book provides a strong basis for deeper examinations of change in the regulatory and the broader policy process.

Rather than dwell on the story of efforts at television deregulation, which Brainard tells with considerable skill, I focus on her more far-reaching exploration of regulatory and policy change. She divides the theoretical world of regulatory change in three: market forces explanations, industry determinism explanations, and contingency frameworks. The first is, in effect, the progressive public-interest theory that animated much of the regulatory policy enacted in the first half of the twentieth century and that informed economic critiques of regulatory "failure" in the sixties and seventies. An economist



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

might well label this a "market failures" approach denoting that monopoly, externalities, public goods, and information asymmetries constitute strong arguments for government intervention to serve the public good of efficiently deploying society's resources. The second recasts what most students of regulation would recognize as "capture theory" or "elite theory," essentially laying out the case for powerful private interests determining policy outcomes within subgovernmental arenas that purportedly dominate the policy landscape. The final theoretical category, contingency theory, derives from management models associated with the "resource dependency" school.

In a trenchant analysis woven throughout the book, Brainard convincingly makes the case that the first two approaches are seriously lacking in explanatory power. One might criticize this analysis either as incomplete, in that it does not include pluralist or Marxist explanations of policy change, or as setting up a straw-man argument. Nevertheless, the main idea of this book is quite persuasive, namely, that shifts in regulation and, indeed, in wider policy stem from a complex interaction of ideas and institutions. Students of American political development will recognize this approach as *new institutionalism*. In the contingency framework, institutions function as both exogenous and endogenous variables, at once shaping regulatory change and reflecting changes in ideas and policies. In the case of television deregulation, the Federal Communications Commission and congressional committees at once filtered efforts at policy change and took on the narratives or metaphors of leading figures and organized interests.

As Brainard puts it, "[n]either technology [market forces] nor the influence of the television industry [institutional determinism] was determinative or decisive precisely because they were filtered through the larger issue and institutional context" (p. 164). In contrast to the deregulatory benchmarks of airline, trucking, and banking, television (ultimately "telecommunication") deregulation very explicitly incorporated wider social policy concerns, including impact on children. Consequently, the institutional and ideological scope of conflict was much wider and more multifarious than in the other cases of deregulating infrastructure industries. This fact assured a much more difficult set of problems for advocates of deregulation and a much less decisive set of outcomes. On the other hand, by the time of the Clinton administration, the framework of contingent factors or, more precisely, the political-institutional context signaled the triumph of a more market-oriented approach among conservative, pro-market Republicans, and so-called New Democrats alike, thus assuring a congressional and administrative environment more congenial to policy change. The upshot was the Telecommunications Act of 1996, "incremental, incomplete and highly ambiguous" (p. 147) to be sure, but a landmark in regulatory policy nonetheless.

The suggestive insights of *Television: The Limits of Deregulation* argue strongly for extending the analysis outward to other areas of regulation, indeed, to other areas of public policy, in order to more systematically test the theoretical conclusions adduced.

***Amici Curiae* and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts.** By Scott A. Comparato. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 192p. $64.95.

— Laura Langer, *University of Arizona*

There is a plethora of studies examining whether or not judges engage in strategic behavior, yet many important questions remain about the motivations that encourage judges to behave strategically and how institutional rules shape these motivations. In his book, Scott A. Comparato asks whether institutional rules encourage strategic behavior by state supreme courts, litigants, and *amici* participants. His work is motivated by the idea that information provided by interest groups in *amicus* briefs is an important reference point for state supreme court justices.

The crux of Comparato's argument is that interest groups tailor the information in amicus briefs depending on the state's judicial selection mechanism and the existence of a ballot initiative procedure. These institutional rules force interest groups to lobby courts differently, which has implications on judicial decision making. The author's argument challenges the belief that interest groups behave the same when lobbying Congress and the courts. The author also raises the possibility that the information judges seek depends on the environment within which decisions are made. These theoretical insights are the major strengths of the book and the author's most significant contributions to the field. This book not only advances our understanding of strategic behavior but also offers valuable information about group behavior and the vital role amicus briefs play in this regard.

Comparato adopts an institutional approach. He examines the impact of method of judicial selection and ballot initiative on group and judicial behavior. Using original data from more than 600 court cases, he estimates an impressive number of models to test his hypotheses about the role of amicus briefs in shaping strategic behavior. The enormous amount of data collection requires that he focus on seven American states, which are selected to represent five methods of judicial selection. Some of these states have a ballot initiative process and other states do not.

The author arrays the seven states along a continuum that ranges from most to least judicial accountability to the public and most to least judicial accountability to other branches of government. Method of selection in five states tie justices to the public—Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Michigan, and Wisconsin. In the other states, New Jersey and South Carolina, the judicial selection method ties justices to the governor and legislature, respectively. Where justices are accountable to the public, Comparato expects that interest groups will provide more policy/public preference arguments in the amicus briefs. Strategic behavior by interest groups should be evident in all five states where justices are retained by elections; however, Comparato expects strategic behavior will be most pronounced in partisan election systems (i.e., Alabama), relatively high in nonpartisan election states (i.e., Michigan and Wisconsin) and least evident in merit selection states (i.e., Colorado and



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Kansas). Where justices are accountable to the other branches of government, the author expects interest groups to make more institutional arguments.

Comparato's approach is refreshing and the data collection effort is impressive; however, I was more convinced by the argument than the conclusions. One conclusion is that "[l]itigants and *amici* appear to be behaving in strategic ways, while state supreme court justices are not" (p. 143). Yet results from the analysis in Chapter 4 provide only marginal support for the hypothesis that amici tailor arguments according to method of judicial selection. In Chapter 5, the author examines decision-making behavior by state supreme court justices. Here he tests the idea that justices utilize information from amicus briefs that best advances judicial goals. He also examines whether litigants tailor their arguments to advance judicial goals and if doing so increases the likelihood of winning. Lastly, he tests the hypothesis that greater amici participation on behalf of a litigant should increase the likelihood that the litigant will win. Comparato's models perform poorly, providing very little empirical support for his expectations. Overall, he concludes that state supreme court justices do not behave strategically. He also concludes that amici behave differently than litigants do and interest groups behave differently than other actors that participate as *amici curiae*. The theoretical arguments that motivated this chapter are more convincing than the conclusions.

Ultimately, many of the author's conclusions are based on null results and contradictory findings. Problems with the research design might explain the poor performance of the models as well as some of the unexpected results. One concern with the research design is the selection of states. The theory forwarded builds from the belief that judges face retention pressures from the public or other institutions. However, justices on the New Jersey Supreme Court had life tenure during the time frame of the study. It is not surprising that the results for this variable are contrary to expectation.

Another concern is that the author overlooks rules governing amicus brief submission and content. These rules dictate the degree and type of amici participation as well as the arguments contained in the amicus briefs. For example, some state courts permit amici participation only in certain cases (e.g., Kansas), whereas other states allow amici participation only by leave of court granted on motion or by request of court (e.g., Colorado, Michigan, Wisconsin). Consider also that the Alabama Supreme Court during the time frame of the study required consent by all participants for amici participation. Here it is not surprising that the results for partisan election method were unexpected and "puzzling."

Another confounding factor is that some states in the study restrict the type and length of arguments made by amici or prohibit amici participation in oral arguments. The fact that amici in some states can submit briefs and participate in oral arguments likely influences the content of the amicus briefs; it might also impact who wins. Fundamentally, limits on the type and length of arguments could impact the presence or absence of strategic behavior. New Jersey, for example, requires amici participants to emphasize the public implications of court decisions. South Carolina, Michigan, and Colorado restrict arguments to only those raised by the litigants in the attorney briefs; yet Alabama requires amicus briefs to contain new information. Wisconsin, on the other hand, does not impose restrictions. These rules are not included in the models.

The research-design issues raise questions about the analysis and cast doubt on the conclusions drawn. Despite my concerns, I strongly recommend *Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts* to scholars studying judicial behavior, interest groups, and American institutions. The theoretical contributions are quite impressive; the book introduces us to the possibility of other strategic incentives that shape not only judicial decisions but group behavior. The author also alerts us to the vital role of information in amicus briefs and how this information might induce strategic behavior by groups and judges. Lastly, Comparato makes important theoretical linkages between strategic behavior and winning in court.

**Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution.** By Evan Gerstmann. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 236p. $60.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— Charles W. Gossett, *California State Polytechnic University, Pomona*

One hundred and twenty years ago, the Congress of the United States was embroiled in a debate over how best to regulate a type of marriage that appalled most Americans. Republicans were making political capital out of their vigorous and vitriolic attacks against the idea of such marriages, while Democrats were looking for a way to finesse the issue to maintain the political support of the unpopular minority believing in such marriages without offending the majority. Laws were introduced and passed prohibiting these marriages. Fearing that a law would be insufficient, however, a constitutional amendment was proposed to ban such marriages. The Supreme Court upheld the right of states to criminalize such marriages, though it was never asked to rule on the right of a state to recognize such marriages. Persons wishing to enter such marriages were advised to go to a neighboring country that would recognize the legitimacy of their unions. In the 1880s, the issue was polygamy, the unpopular minority Mormons, and the neighboring country Mexico (see Edward L. Lyman, *Political Deliverance,* 1986). Today same-sex marriages between gays or lesbians, some marrying in Canada, are causing as much turmoil in Congress as the issue of polygamy did then.

Evan Gerstmann provides us with a readable and thought-provoking analysis of the constitutional issues involved in the question of same-sex marriages. Written prior to the Supreme Court decision in *Lawrence v. Texas,* though he notes the case in the preface, and before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced it could find no justification for denying the right to marry to same-sex couples in its state constitution, the arguments in this book continue to have relevance. In his opening sentence, Gerstmann makes clear that he will be arguing that the right of same-sex couples to marry is a "fundamental constitutional right" (p. 3) built on the right of all citizens to equal protection under the law as outlined in



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the Fourteenth Amendment despite, he says, an original plan to write "a book against courts requiring states to recognize same-sex marriage" (p. 10). The book itself both shows the path he took to this conclusion and identifies and refutes competing analyses that conclude that same-sex marriages can be legally prohibited.

The author starts by getting rid of the term (and concept) "gay rights," arguing instead that there are only fundamental rights for all citizens, and should the state wish to deny a particular right to any citizen or group of citizens, it must produce a compelling reason. He is unwilling to try to shoehorn gay men and lesbians into a "protected class" and generally disparages the approach of classifying people into groups for which the denial of rights is subject to varying levels of scrutiny, depending on which group is at issue. The author concludes that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of equal protection is, to be blunt, a disastrous muddle of unclear opinions.

And what reasons do opponents of same-sex marriage offer in support of denying access to the institution of marriage? Gerstmann identifies four categories: "1) definition, tradition, and religion; 2) natural law; 3) the equation of marriage with procreation and child-rearing; and 4) moral disapproval of homosexuality" (p. 19). He outlines the arguments made in each category and then assesses the strength of each as a reason to deny a fundamental right to a group of citizens, and he finds them wanting. To the possible dismay of supporters of same-sex marriage, on the other hand, he also criticizes the effort to equate the denial of the right to marry a same-sex partner with sex or gender discrimination. He argues that the analogy between antimiscegenation laws and anti-same-sex marriage laws is misplaced; the former laws were clearly an element in a social system of white supremacy, while it is not clear which sex is being discriminated against when same-sex marriages are being prohibited. Some might disagree with this reasoning, finding that the denial of the right of gay men or lesbians to marry same-sex partners supports patriarchal systems not unlike racist systems of the mid–twentieth century, but that is a strength of this book: The arguments are laid out clearly and so it is easy to determine where and why you disagree with the author.

Much of *Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution* is a review of cases that, in the author's view, establish clearly that the right to marry is a fundamental right. With the addition of the *Lawrence* decision in 2003, his argument becomes even stronger. He would agree with Justice Scalia's dissent in the case that it is not unreasonable to expect future courts to use *Lawrence* to find a right to marry someone of the same sex in the future. He also shows that the right to marry has not historically been limited to persons with the ability to procreate and agrees with same-sex marriage opponents that identifying marriage as a fundamental right could lead to incestuous (adult) marriages and polygamy. There may be reasons to ban each, but he argues persuasively that you cannot just say "because it has always been that way" or because it offends the moral teachings of a particular religion.

In the concluding chapter, "Principles and Practicalities," the author's preference for principles comes through quite clearly. He recognizes that many legal scholars and, until the last year or so, many gay and lesbian activists had focused on achieving a legal status somewhat less than full marriage rights—civil unions, domestic partnerships, reciprocal beneficiaries, and so on. Gerstmann disagrees with the "half-loaf" approach and insists that nothing less than full marriage equality should be acceptable under the U.S. Constitution. That he would like this goal achieved by using only principled arguments and avoiding what he sees as the false analogy with antimiscegenation laws is also clear. But, of course, the Constitution can be changed and activists for and against same-sex marriage are preparing to do battle over an amendment at this very moment. Both sides must agree with Gerstmann: The Constitution today does protect the right to marry whomever you choose.

**Cultivating Democracy: Civic Environments and Political Socialization in America.** By James G. Gimpel, J. Celeste Lay, and Jason E. Schuknecht. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 278p. $32.95.

— M. Kent Jennings, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

Scholarly studies of political socialization began a dramatic decline during the mid-1970s. One source of this downward spiral lay in the dwindling novelty of studying pre-adults. Political scientists are accustomed to dealing with the "real world" of politics, one occupied and ruled by adults. After a prolonged lull, research began to increase in the 1990s and has continued onward. One driving force in this renewal stems from the decline in civic virtue among upcoming cohorts said to characterize most Western countries. A second influence was the crumbling of the former Soviet Union and the appearance of transitional and new democracies around the globe. In an effort to understand each of these developments and to propose possible solutions, a variety of institutions and scholars have returned to the question of citizenship development, often with the intention of improving the inculcation of civic virtue among the young.

*Cultivating Democracy* provides a most welcome addition to this new literature, much of which is being supplied by non-political scientists working outside the American context. The book relies primarily on a 1999–2000 self-administered survey of 3,060 students, grades 9–12, distributed across 29 high schools in the greater Baltimore–Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Additional materials come from informal interviews with a small number of students and from a follow-up survey in four schools in late 2001 designed to assess the impact of 9/11. Key dependent variables include political knowledge, discussion, efficacy, and attitudes about nationalism, diversity, and the justice system.

The study is innovative in three major ways. First, it goes beyond using individual student characteristics as determinants of political outcomes by employing features of the communities in which the schools are located. One set of contextual characteristics consists of several standard sociodemographic



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

features of the zip code area, courtesy of the Census Bureau, in which the schools are located. Three political characteristics—turnout, party diversity, and partisan bias—were pieced together from precinct maps. In contending that context makes a difference, the authors follow a growing, positive trend in the discipline and extend it to the study of political socialization

The second significant departure, which flows directly from the first, is the employment of structural equation modeling and hierarchical linear modeling to take into account the spatial clustering represented by the size of student samples within schools. Consequently, the authors are able to state more precisely the interaction between individual and environmental effects and to assess how environmental factors affect relationships at the individual level. Although the statistical results are somewhat more difficult to interpret than the more customary ordinary-least-squares procedures, the technique should serve as a model for future investigations using nested designs.

A third departure from preceding work is the detailed attention devoted to race, ethnicity, and religion at both the individual and community levels. To the extent that political socialization studies have looked at racial and ethnic minorities, it has usually been with respect to one particular grouping. This project has sufficient numbers of whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asians, as well as Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and (admittedly in small numbers) Muslims, and those with "Eastern" religions. Their inclusion takes recognition of the increasingly heterogeneous nature of American society and enriches the analysis considerably.

It follows that some of the major findings reflect these three innovations. Here in no particular order is a sampling. Religion tends to be less important as a socialization force than are race and ethnicity. Being in a political minority tends to depress levels of civic engagement, while being reared in communities of high political activity and diversity tends to elevate "good" outcomes. In general, living in coethnic communities leads to what the authors call less desirable socialization outcomes. While most attitudes and behaviors are context-dependent to some extent, a few—such as African American views of the justice system—are not. Information levels rise as a result of traumatic events such as 9/11. Political vitality at the community level can act to overcome the effects of student perceptions of school unfairness and a disliking of civics courses. The critical point to most of these and a host of other intriguing findings is that they are contingent on having observations at two levels.

It might seem ungracious to point out shortcomings in a work that helps restore a subfield, and I do so in the spirit of thinking about future research. The nonprobability sampling within schools leaves open the possibility of selection effects. While the employment of community contextual factors adds enormously to the value of this project, one wishes for more. The indicators of social capital, diversity, and political vitality are rather few and general. More importantly, the way they affect the students is largely a matter of inference. There is little information as to how the students perceive or interact with representations of these community features, aside from a few related to school affairs. Although schools constitute an intimate environment for adolescents, the contextual features of the schools and their student bodies are scarcely tapped. As for individual level characteristics, the failure to distinguish among major strands of Protestantism weakens the analysis according to religion, and the absence of participation in extracurricular affairs represents a glaring omission in view of its known influence. Finally, despite the presence of both individual- and community-level predictors, the explanatory values for most of the models presented are quite modest. On a more churlish note, I was disappointed that the editing process allowed general footnote references to books, rather than to the pertinent chapters, and also permitted endless repetition of certain phrases throughout the book.

These qualifications notwithstanding, *Cultivating Democracy* provides an excellent example of the riches found by taking into account both individual and contextual features in studying political socialization. I hope it inspires others to do the same.

**No Fire Next Time: Black-Korean Conflicts and the Future of America's Cities**. By Patrick D. Joyce. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 240 pages. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

— Michael B. Preston, *University of Southern California*

Patrick D. Joyce's book not only has a provocative title but also says something important about the future of America's cities. Joyce argues that the United States, and by extension, especially its cities, faces a contentious future, and that this is suggested by three trends: First, racial and ethnic diversity is increasing; second, economic inequality has widened; and third, our governing institutions have weakened. He suggests that these trends originate in separate causes, but their coming together at the same point in history means that the potential for racial and ethnic tension may be heightened just as our capacity to cope with them have diminished (p. 3). Central to his concerns is the black-Korean conflict in American cities.

The central question that Joyce raises in the book is this: Why did black-Korean tensions result in violent clashes in Los Angeles but not in New York City? He suggests that tensions between blacks and Koreans emerged in the 1980s around the same issues but that the cities later reached a different climax: One was inexplicably violent while the other was remarkably restrained. Why? He argues that the answer to the question lies in politics, in particular, in political institutions, which vary from place to place but have profound consequences for the way groups interact (p. 2).

Joyce's book goes beyond the sociological and cultural explanations and shows how political practices and urban institutions can channel racial and ethnic tensions into protest or, alternately, leave them free to erupt violently. He notes that while the usual suspects have a role to play—poverty, unemployment, segregation, and racism—they fail to account for the different outcomes in Los Angeles and New York. All, he argues, exist in both cities in roughly the same proportions—thus, there must be other reasons why the outcomes are so different.

It is perhaps useful to note here that Joyce's answer to why Los Angeles and not New York erupted in violence lies in his



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

case analysis. He argues that cities with strong traditions of machine-style politics—in which material incentives and neighborhood-level connections to politics long serve as incentives for people to participate in politics—tend to promote grassroots political activity, which enables community activists to channel tensions by mobilizing support. On the other hand, cities with the insulated reform-style political institutions that were the legacy of the Progressive movement tend to leave tensions unorganized and are more likely to see them result in violence (pp. 7, 169).

Joyce's concluding chapter is excellent in many respects as he attempts to pull it all together. His research points out several important things that cities need to be aware of if they are to avoid violent conflict. First, there are limits to leadership. Mayors, while saddled with the responsibility of solving problems in the city, have limited power in many cases to deal with problems outside the formal structure of government; and while the power and influence of mayors vary depending on leadership style, there are limits to their control over different factions, both inside and outside of government. Resolving conflict at the elite level may be doable for a mayor, but that is different from dealing with problems of groups at the grassroots level. Second, Joyce also advises cities to avoid false hopes. In Los Angeles, he argues, the use of dialogue to settle political issues will not work, and neither will the reliance on the court. The court is not set up to mediate conflicts related to ethnic tensions. In some cases, when they attempt to do so, as in Los Angeles, they make matters worse, not better. Third, there is a need to focus on neighborhoods; if the problems are political, then political remedies need to be political. Joyce is a pragmatist; he argues that city governments can do little to fight widening economic equality in an increasingly diverse nation, but that officials and activists can restructure political institutions to provide the foundations for new multiracial coalitions.

To be sure, *No Fire Next Time* is an overly optimistic view of the future. As the author points out in his conclusion (pp. 180–81), the problems have not been solved, the conditions are still there, government has given no resources to address the problems, and so while they have been overtaken by other events, the basic problems still exist.

Clearly, no help is likely to come from either of the three levels of government in the near future, given their budget deficits. Improving race relations is not a priority for any of them. Thus, the neighborhoods themselves are left to try and solve the problem.

In Los Angeles, for example, there are a few encouraging signs, but they all have their limitations. First, the Neighborhood Councils (NCs), established as part of the Charter Reforms of 1999, have the potential to bring more neighborhood participation to the community—but if these NCs are unrepresentative of the wide variety of interest found in the neighborhoods, or lack diversity, chances that grassroots interest will get on the agenda may be questionable. Second, community activists are reactive rather than proactive; they tend to recede or disappear when the immediate problem is solved, and by definition there are few "institutional activists." Third, neither elite leadership nor grassroots leadership in community organizations have been able to control the "fringe elements"—youth and gangs. It is here that the usual suspects reappear: poverty, unemployment, poor education, and lack of parental guidance. However, a new community organization has arisen in South Los Angeles to specifically address this issue. The slogan is: "Stop the Violence." Led by Kerman Maddox, a political consultant, professor, and news commentator, a group of volunteers has involved churches, black newspapers, radio stations, and others in an attempt to address this "fringe element." It is a start, as the stakeholders in the community are speaking out as one to stop the violence. One can only hope that other communities will follow. Now all we need are leaders with the political will to help them sustain their efforts. This may be asking too much of our leaders and institutions—but it is better than the alternative.

**The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities**. By Karen M. Kaufmann. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 248p. $60.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Timothy B. Krebs, *University of New Mexico*

In her book, Karen M. Kaufmann persuasively argues that context shapes the degree to which racial and ethnic factors structure voting in mayoral elections. While this may sound obvious, what is not obvious is determining which contextual factors matter and how they matter to urban voters. Her answer, in part, provides an explanation for how two quintessentially Democratic cities—Los Angeles and New York City—elected (and reelected) Republican mayors during the 1990s, a fact that alarmed local activists and intrigued both urban scholars and political pundits alike.

What makes this study important is the author's careful and skillful use of local electoral context as the lens through which to understand how race and ethnicity, partisanship, and ideology influence the outcomes of urban mayoral elections. Kaufmann's theory, which is informed by a number of different literatures and approaches, is straightforward: During periods of perceived group conflict, traditional voting cues, such as party and ideology, diminish in importance as primary determinants of the vote relative to salient racial- and ethnic-group considerations. The opposite occurs when conflict is absent: Party and ideology reassert themselves as primary voting cues, and racial- and ethnic-group considerations diminish in importance. The theory is tested by using an impressive array of individual-level data (something not often found in studies of urban politics) from Los Angeles and New York City mayoral elections going back to the mid-1960s.

Kaufmann argues, for example, that the Republican mayoral victories in New York City and Los Angeles in 1993, which caught so many by surprise, were actually quite predictable, resulting from the increased salience of racial and ethnic politics in these cities at that moment. In New York, David Dinkins's political career, a historic one given that he was the city's first African American mayor, was cut short by Rudolph Giuliani, a Republican and former federal prosecutor. At the time of the election, the city was struggling under the weight



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of a slowing economy, fears about rising crime rates, and broad concerns about the state of race relations in the city following several high-profile racial incidents during Dinkins's first and only term. In this context, salient group identities trumped party and ideology as the key determinant of the vote that removed Dinkins from power and inserted Giuliani. More specifically, the model accounts for why white Democrats and white ideological moderates broke ranks with their party to support the more conservative candidate.

A similar albeit less-compelling story played out in the 1993 Los Angeles election. Heightened racial tensions as a result of the 1992 Rodney King riots, a bad economy, and concern over immigration compelled over one-third of white Democrats to vote for the Republican Richard Riordan. But while ideology was the most important predictor of both white and black votes, attitudes regarding race were also significant for white voters, a finding that was particularly striking among moderate white Angelenos who made the difference in the election. Data and analyses from the 1993 election in both cities are supplemented with data and analyses of both preceding and succeeding elections, and strong empirical support is offered for Kaufmann's thesis, especially in the earlier elections. Thus, we see that Riordan's election in Los Angeles and Giuliani's election in New York City were not unpredictable, despite the significant numerical advantage Democrats have over Republicans in both places.

The study of urban electorates is one of the least-developed areas in the urban politics literature, making this an extremely welcome study. Previous research has perhaps paid too much attention to race and not enough attention to context. And previous work also has not incorporated time in the manner seen in this study. While the general political science community may not be all that impressed with a comparative case study of New York City and Los Angeles, despite the interesting differences between these two places with respect to political culture (machine versus reform) and governmental form (strong mayor versus weak mayor), and the over-time component, anybody who does research on urban elections understands the significant empirical contribution that is made here. The theoretical contribution, however, is even more significant given the complicated nature of urban politics. Kaufmann's ability to think through what urban politics is all about—essentially "who gets what" from government—and to relate that struggle to her model of vote choice in two very complicated political environments is especially noteworthy. The core complication, of course, stems from the presence of large, powerful, and active white, black, and Latino constituency groups with different interests, ideologies, and local histories.

*The Urban Voter* should appeal not only to scholars working in the urban politics subfield as it reinforces the unique and fascinating character of big-city politics, but also to those whose work is centered more generally in political behavior, racial and ethnic politics, and public opinion. And while the research design is methodologically sophisticated, the narrative and discussion of the empirical findings should appeal to nonquantitatively oriented scholars. In addition to being a very interesting read, this book demonstrates Kaufmann's real passion for the subject. (That, of course, is one reason it is so interesting.)

One might criticize this book on the grounds that it examines only two cities, both of which are somewhat unique. This, however, is an obvious and easy case to make. The difficult but all-too-necessary work ahead will be in constructing data sets necessary to the application of group theory to other cases. The payoff will be an improved understanding of the behavior of urban voters, an important goal given that what happens in urban America today happens nationally tomorrow.

**The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes.** By Paul M. Kellstedt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 155p. $60.00 cloth, $20.00 paper.

— Kimberly Gross, *George Washington University*

The literature on race and public opinion has been dominated by the debate between those who emphasize the continuing role of prejudice or racial resentment and those who emphasize the role of other values and ideologies, such as limited government or individualism, in explaining sources of individual-level support and opposition to current race policy. Thus, it is refreshing to find a book like *The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes,* which looks at racial attitudes from a different perspective. In the tradition of Howard Schuman and his colleagues in *Racial Attitudes in America* (1997), Paul Kellstedt demonstrates and explains variation in the American public's racial policy preferences over the last half of the twentieth-century. Kellstedt draws on the existing opinion and media effects literature to develop a theory that can explain how the public as a whole evolves on matters of race. This book's most valuable contribution comes from the specific attention he gives to media framing. Many researchers suggest a role for media coverage in the development and trajectory of racial policy preferences over this period, yet little empirical work examines this relationship. Using an innovative approach, the author provides convincing evidence that media coverage "is an important part of a system of influences that determine public opinion on race in America" (p. 134).

Specifically, Kellstedt argues that racial policy preferences have their basis in two core values—individualism and egalitarianism. Most Americans are conflicted about race policy because they are committed to both principles, and these values pull them in opposite directions. Media messages help to resolve value conflict by linking racial issues more closely with a specific value in a specific period. Thus, when media coverage demonstrates the inconsistency between America's egalitarian beliefs and the treatment of blacks, it should pull the public toward more liberal views on race policy; media coverage that highlights the inconsistency between liberal racial policy and the value of individualism should pull the public in a conservative direction.

In testing this theory, Kellstedt faced a major hurdle—he needed to develop a reliable measure of media content spanning a nearly 50-year period and to address the fact that no



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

single policy question is asked regularly over this time. In my view, he addresses these problems creatively. Rather than focus on specific policy questions, he develops and justifies the use of an aggregate measure of "racial policy preferences" following James Stimson's work on policy mood (Chapter 3). To measure media content, he tracks references to the core beliefs of individualism and egalitarianism, as well as references to poverty, in coverage of African Americans in *Newsweek* magazine (Chapter 2). With these data in hand, he tests his theory about the role of media coverage in shaping racial policy preferences (Chapter 4) and explores the role of media coverage in cementing the relationship between racial policy attitudes and more general social welfare policy attitudes (Chapter 5).

The author finds, consistent with his theory, that when the media provide more egalitarian cues in the context of covering black Americans, the public responds with more liberal views on race policy. Moreover, these effects are not insubstantial (p. 102). Generational replacement, media coverage highlighting states' rights, and predispositions toward government involvement also drive racial policy preferences over time. The idea that individualistic media cues will lead the public toward more conservative race policy views finds less support, and I believe further study is required before definitive conclusions can be drawn. It is interesting to note that results from cross-section research also provide little support for the claim that the value of individualism drives individual's racial policy views. Despite the intuitive appeal of the argument, individualism may play a relatively minor role in determining racial attitudes.

Kellstedt's examination of the relationship between preferences on racial policy and the welfare state generates some interesting findings, for example, that racial policy preferences and general welfare state policy preferences became linked in the minds of citizens precisely when national media coverage began to feature black poverty. However, this aspect of the project is less well integrated within the book.

One limitation of Kellstedt's approach is that his conclusions regarding the role of specific value frames may depend upon how he defines those frames. In Kellstedt's theory, egalitarian frames lead to liberal views, but can one appeal to the value of egalitarianism in arguing against liberal racial policy? The answer could be yes: Both sides in a policy debate may try to tap into the same fundamental American value—witness the equal rights versus special rights argument about gay rights. In the case at hand, the author has coded references to reverse discrimination and discrimination against whites as individualistic references (pp. 40–44), whereas he codes discrimination against blacks as egalitarian references. While the reverse discrimination frame for affirmative action often conveys the notion that the policy violates our ideas of individual merit (by implying that blacks receive a job or education over more qualified whites), it may also appeal to our egalitarian notions (by implying that the program is wrong because it violates our sense of equality). Some support for this comes from the affirmative action framing experiment reported by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders (1996) in *Divided by Color*. They find that endorsement of the principle of equal opportunity leads to greater support for affirmative action framed as unfair advantage, but greater opposition to affirmative action framed as reverse discrimination (pp. 174–78). This possibility would still be consistent with Kellstedt's larger framework for understanding media influence over time, but it suggests a more specific conclusion: Egalitarian frames emphasizing discrimination against blacks lead to more liberal policy views.

Kellstedt makes an important contribution to the story of American racial attitudes. The cross-sectional research often characterizes racial attitudes as quite stable. He reminds us that citizens' views can and do change. Moreover, he helps us to explain that change over a seminal period in American racial history.

**The Politics of Quasi-Government: Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control.** By Jonathan G. S. Koppell. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 239p. $60.00.

— Robert P. Stoker, *George Washington University*

Do policymakers surrender popular sovereignty by granting public authority to semiprivate institutions? Jonathan Koppell compares hybrid organizations and government agencies in three policy areas—housing, export promotion, and international market development—and concludes that although hybrid organizations are more difficult to control, they are not inimical to democracy.

Koppell defines a hybrid organization as *"an entity created by the federal government (either by act of Congress or executive action) to address a specific public policy purpose. It is owned in whole or in part by private individuals or corporations and/or generates revenue to cover its operating costs"* (p. 12, emphasis in original). Although a variety of hybrids are discussed, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Export-Import Bank, the Oversees Private Investment Corporation, and Enterprise Funds receive primary attention. The research design that compares these hybrids to government agencies, such as Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Commerce, and U.S. Agency for International Development, is supplemented by a case study of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) of 1992.

Quantitative and qualitative evidence is presented. The qualitative data are drawn from more than 115 interviews and document analysis. The quantitative data are indicators of agency and hybrid output and performance. However, although Koppell terms the quantitative analysis "interrupted time series" and several series are presented in graphic form, no statistical models are presented. Consequently, there is a lack of precision in the evaluation of the quantitative evidence, and the specification of intervention points and terms (critical concerns for hypothesis testing in interrupted time series analysis) is flexible and interpretive.

It is no surprise that *The Politics of Quasi-Government* concludes that hybrid organizations are more difficult to control than public agencies. Koppell's contribution is his explanation for why hybrids are more difficult to control. In part, this is a



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

consequence of the fact that the relationship between principals and their hybrid agents is essentially regulatory. While administrative and regulatory tools can direct governmental agencies, only regulation is applicable to hybrids. Beyond this, Koppell develops an interesting distinction between "positive" and "negative" regulatory preferences and explains why hybrids are more likely to respond to negative regulation. Negative preferences (instructions to cease some activity) are easier to convey as rules and easier to monitor. However, his insight is that hybrids often are involved in cooperative ventures with other private sector organizations; directions to cease an activity are more likely to be followed than directions to initiate or complete an activity because the hybrid can unilaterally abandon partnerships but cannot unilaterally form partnerships and bring them to fruition.

A case study of the development of FHEFSSA is also presented. That legislation revised the regulatory framework for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac following the bailout of the savings and loan industry. Koppell presents this material in order to consider whether hybrids are beyond control because they are capable of influencing the frameworks within which they are regulated. He concludes that hybrids have the potential to become more powerful than private- or public-sector organizations because of the unique combination of powers they possess. Those who create hybrids "should not be surprised if hybrid organizations acquire unusual political influence due to their unique combination of public- and private-sector advantages" (p. 121). If so, it is possible that hybrid organizations will become uncontrollable if they use their political muscle to shape the regulatory framework in which they operate.

It is difficult to know what to make of this claim because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not typical hybrids, nor is the behavior they exhibit necessarily characteristic of hybrids in comparison to other organizational forms. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "are among the most aggressive and influential organizations in Washington" (p. 119). However, despite their unusual political power, Koppell states that the lessons learned in the chapter "are applicable to all hybrids" (p. 98). The ability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to influence their regulatory context may be a result of the unusual characteristics these hybrids possess, rather than their status as hybrids per se. Beyond this, in presenting the case, the author abandoned the research design he used earlier that explicitly compared hybrids to public agencies, and so it is not possible to know on the basis of the evidence presented whether hybrids are more likely to influence their operating context than are other organizational types. The literature on bureaucratic power suggests that governmental agencies are active participants in the policymaking process that seek to influence the legislative, administrative, and regulatory contexts in which they operate. If so, attempts by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to influence their operating contexts may not be exclusive to or characteristic of hybrids.

Although hybrids are more difficult for political officials to control, Koppell does not conclude that hybrids are in opposition to democracy. He argues that there is a difference between democratic accountability and political control. He identifies and discusses five distinct notions of accountability (transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness) and argues that by some of these standards hybrids are "accountable," even though they are not under "control." If so, Koppell believes that hybrids can be a useful tool of government when used for appropriate circumstances and placed within a workable regulatory context.

**Straddling the Border: Immigration Policy and the INS.**
By Lisa Magaña. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. 132p. $37.50 cloth, $16.95 paper.

— Lisa García Bedolla, *University of California, Irvine*

In this book, Lisa Magaña provides a concise and thoughtful analysis of the immigration policy process from inside the bureaucratic agency formerly responsible for its implementation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Using a combination of interviews with high- and low-level INS representatives and immigration advocates, government policy evaluations, immigrant surveys, and intensive field study, Magaña shows the disconnect that often exists between congressional immigration mandates and their actual implementation in INS district offices.

The author begins by laying out the history of the immigration bureaucracy since Congress created the first immigration office in 1864, documenting its period relocation within different federal departments and agencies. Through this analysis, she effectively shows how the status and mandates of the immigration bureaucracy have ebbed and flowed in response to popular and congressional concerns about immigration. This is a theme that she carries throughout the book.

Magaña then turns to working conditions within the INS, using information from 68 interviews with current and former INS officials to provide a "real world" look at the fiscal, legal, and bureaucratic realities faced by INS workers. Some of the concerns echo those of other bureaucratic agencies: a lack of connection between upper and lower management, a highly bureaucratic decision-making structure, lack of education of local officials regarding new policy directives, and a general lack of communication among local, state, and national offices. Others are unique to the INS, particularly the tension between the agency's service and enforcement responsibilities, and the degree to which Congress's attempts to satisfy constituent immigration concerns tend to come at the cost of rational and effective immigration policy.

As concrete examples of the difficulties faced by the INS in carrying out these conflicting mandates, Magaña provides two in-depth case studies: the implementation of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, particularly its amnesty and employer sanction provisions, and the changes in welfare and social service provision for immigrants during the 1990s. Through these experiences, she cogently shows the degree to which congressional policy is often created in response to popular pressures to be "tough" on immigration, with little



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

attention to how effective the policy will really be or to the logistical problems it may create for the INS. For example, the decision by Congress to limit welfare eligibility for legal immigrants, along with the INS's decision to raise the cost of green card replacement, led to a huge upsurge in applications for citizenship that the INS was ill-equipped to handle. This goes a long way toward explaining why, even though most experts agree that the INS is much better at providing services than it is at enforcement, almost two-thirds of funding goes to the enforcement side, particularly the border patrol.

The book ends with a list of recommendations for how to improve the agency, including separating the service and enforcement responsibilities (pp. 68–71). This is exactly what occurred when the INS was renamed and moved under the new Department of Homeland Security. Naturalization and work-authorization documentation is now the responsibility of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and investigative and enforcement responsibilities are now under the control of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Ideally, this will address some of the concerns Magaña raises, but she also cautions that the ineffectiveness of the INS was the result of its being asked to be accountable to a number of competing interests—popular sentiment, politicians, business groups, and the immigrants themselves—without clear policy mandates. Given the politics surrounding the immigration debate, these problems are unlikely to change anytime in the near future.

*Straddling the Border* makes a significant contribution because it offers the first in-depth look at the history, structure, and function of the INS itself. As such, it provides important insights into what immigration policy implementation looks like on the ground, beyond the rhetoric of immigration control. Magaña's writing is clear and straightforward, and her topic is especially timely given that our expectations of the immigration bureaucracy have changed and grown yet again after the events of September 11. The book's main shortcoming is that it is largely descriptive and does not provide a theoretical framework for understanding the intersection of policy creation and implementation. That said, this is an enjoyable read, and it reminds us that our immigration bureaucracy does not do its work in isolation. Until the U.S. public becomes clear about how we view immigrants and immigration, it is likely that our immigration policy implementation will remain contradictory, muddled, and, ultimately, ineffective.

**Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA.** By George Michael. New York: Routledge, 2003. 256p. $104.95.

— Thomas F. Powers, *University of Minnesota Duluth*

"Right-wing extremist" is a label that covers a lot of territory (radical Second Amendmentists, antitax and antigovernment extremists, radical Christians, in addition to a variety of white supremacist groups: Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi, skinhead), but it is a term that perhaps became unavoidable, at least as a practical matter, after Timothy McVeigh bombed a federal government building in Oklahoma City in 1995, killing 168. This is a book written in the post–Oklahoma City period and is not primarily informed by post-9/11 concerns. It is largely descriptive and historical. Although it does make use of interest-group theory at points, this work is not organized around any specific social scientific theory-building agenda. George Michael provides a detailed survey of right-wing extremist groups and their activities (to include terrorism), as well as an account of the efforts of both the government and a wide array of private interest groups to resist and undermine their efforts. Perhaps most notable and interesting are 20 interviews Michael conducted with actors on all sides of this struggle (including William Pierce, chairman of the neo-Nazi National Alliance, and author of the novel *The Turner Diaries,* which served as a blueprint for McVeigh).

The story of right-wing extremism in America since World War II basically concerns the clear success of efforts, both public and private, to weaken these political protest groups. For example, in the 1960s, FBI Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) efforts reduced the Klan's numbers from about 14,000 to just over 4,000. Today, aggressive law-enforcement and civil suits by private groups hamper the organizational efforts of these groups in a variety of ways. Michael's summary of the major players and their history returns again and again to the decisive impact of persistent and effective disruption of these groups by outsiders.

As a source of terrorism, right-wing extremist groups are held responsible for 176 deaths, in addition to Oklahoma City, over the course of the 40-year period covered in this book (1958–98). Michael points out more than once that gang violence in one city (Los Angeles) in one year alone (1991) claimed more than 700 lives. One might wonder about this comparison, but his point is to put the actual threat of right-wing extremist violence into some sort of perspective. Generally speaking, he argues that "the domestic terrorist threat from both the Left and Right had largely evaporated by the mid-1980s" (p. 145). Although Oklahoma City and a number of other prominent events (Ruby Ridge, Waco) occurred in the 1990s, these were isolated episodes. For some time, right-wing extremist groups have been reduced, as a matter of organizational weakness and practical necessity, to a strategy of "leaderless resistance": "No real terrorist infrastructure as such exists in the far-right milieu" (p. 125). Timothy McVeigh was thus a symbol of weakness, not strength.

To explain the weakness of right-wing extremist groups, Michael focuses on the immediate efforts of law-enforcement and various private groups to resist their progress. He emphasizes the role played by myriad private "watchdog" groups devoted largely or solely to resisting right-wing extremism in America. In addition to such well-known organizations as the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center, more than 300 such groups are surveyed. Unlike those they monitor, these watchdog groups are well funded and well organized and enjoy public respectability, as well as easy access to political decision makers.

Private watchdog groups employ a number of strategies to combat right-wing extremists. Sometimes their efforts take the



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

form of straightforward political advocacy and lobbying. But most controversial has been the successful use of civil lawsuits by watchdog groups to target far-right groups' financial assets. Because juries sympathize with victims of racist and other forms of hate-inspired violence, right-wing extremist groups have been held financially responsible for the actions of individuals who are affiliated with them in only the loosest way. The upshot has been to make the open operation of such groups practically impossible.

Some civil libertarians worry that this strategy could be used to stifle a wide variety of politically unpopular organizations and viewpoints in the future. The author shares this concern and indeed goes so far as to suggest a "double standard" in the American view of political persecution: At least in the period he studies, right-wing extremist groups face a higher "level of scrutiny" than do "left-wing and minority groups" (p. 193).

But here the limits of Michael's attempt to explain the status of right-extremist groups in terms of narrow, immediate causes (law enforcement, interest groups) without any reference to broader explanations from political culture and the context of recent history become apparent. There is another interpretation possible here, one that he begins to lay out at various points, suggesting the stamp of liberal democracy at every step in his story. Right-wing extremist groups, many of which are inspired to some degree by a radicalization of liberal democratic principles (Second Amendment, antitaxation, mistrust of the state), emerge out of a context in which they are, in important degrees, tolerated and even protected by the Constitution (speech and association). While government monitoring and intervention has worked to weaken these groups, American policy is nothing like the approach of some European democracies, which simply outlaw such groups. Instead, the main American opposition has come, fittingly, from civil liability lawsuits launched by *other* private associations, and, one hastens to add, from the obvious outlines of post–World War II and post-civil rights–movement political culture.

*Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the USA* is a competent survey of American right-wing extremist groups and their organized opposition. Much more could have been said about the impact of 9/11 in particular—a cursory six-page treatment added to the conclusion does not do justice to the topic—but otherwise the treatment of the issues covered here is thorough and adequate to the needs of anyone wanting general familiarity with the subject matter.

**Chasing the Wind: Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law State**. By Noga Morag-Levine. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 264p. $35.00.

— R. Shep Melnick, *Boston College*

This book covers an impressive array of topics: the contrasting styles of air pollution regulation in the United States and Europe; the English common law of "noxious vapours" from 1611 to 1900; the origin of the highly effective British Alkali Inspectorate; the development of the common law of nuisance in Pennsylvania from 1869 to 1970; American regulation of "smoke" and "odors" over the past century; and a detailed examination of contemporary regulation of odor at foundries in four American cities. The author is to be commended for the extensive research packed into nine dense chapters.

What ties all this together? How does Lord Coke's reading of *Alfred's Case* nearly 400 years ago help us understand regulation of iron foundries in New Haven, Michigan, today? The good news is that Noga Morag-Levine has an answer to this question. The bad news is that in the end her answer is not convincing.

A number of high-quality comparative works have shown that since 1970, the United States has developed an unusual style of pollution control. Compared with European regulation, American regulation is more contentious, rule-bound, legalistic, and stringent. The adversarial style of the United States is more likely than the cooperative style of Europe to produce high transaction costs, overregulation of those pollutants on which it takes action, and underregulation of those pollutants that get pushed to the bottom of the crowded regulatory agenda. Morag-Levine questions this conventional wisdom, suggesting (without explicitly arguing) that American underregulation is far more significant than its overregulation, and that this reflects the traditional American hostility to government that one finds in *Lochner v. NY*. Indeed, linking *Lochner* to the structure of contemporary air pollution regulation is the most arresting aspect of the book.

*Chasing the Wind* makes four linked claims. First, environmental regulation in the United States relies primarily on "risk-based standards," in contrast to Europe, which relies primarily on technology standards. Second, this preference for risk-based standards reflects our "common law regulatory sensibilities" (p. xi). Third, behind common law doctrines on air pollution lies distrust, not just of administrative agencies but of government power generally. Common law judges, she claims, seem incapable of telling the difference between the police powers and the police state (Chapter 4). Fourth, the American risk-based approach is far less effective in reducing pollution than the European technology-based strategy.

Morag-Levine is unquestionably right that the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 placed great weight on health-based ambient air-quality standards, and that this strategy proved administratively cumbersome. But the claim that this dedication to risk-based schemes is both thoroughgoing and deeply rooted in our common law past is hard to square with the subsequent history of environmental regulation. A mere two years later, when Congress passed major water pollution legislation, it virtually abandoned ambient standards in favor of nationally uniform technology standards—the very same approach Morag-Levine lauds in her examination of Britain and Germany. The 1970 CAA itself contains a multitude of "best available technology" standards (most notably for all new sources), and the number of technology-based standards mandated by the act grew significantly in 1977 and 1990.

Over the years, air pollution regulation has relied more and more on technology-based rules and less and less on ambient standards. Indeed, it is hard to talk about air pollution policy



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

without referring to an alphabet soup of technology-based emission limitations: BACT, RACT, MACT, LAER, RACM, BACM, and CTGs. Conversely, European governments routinely and inevitably engage in informal risk assessment to determine which pollutants they should bother to regulate. As a result, the American regulatory scheme looks much more like the European version than Morag-Levine admits.

Another difficulty with the author's argument is the awkward role of Britain in the dichotomies she develops. She first claims that the civil law/common law dichotomy is crucial (pp. 2–3). But she then shows that enactment of Britain's Alkali Act in 1863 represented the triumph of the technology-based strategy and a partial rejection of the common law approach. Her revised argument is that a strong, unitary state can overcome the deficiencies of the common law. So the difference is really between strong, centralized states such as Britain and Germany and weak, decentralized ones, that is, the United States.

In later chapters we discover that even in the United States, a few common law courts started to impose best-available technology injunctions a hundred years ago. More importantly, a "century after Germany adopted its technology-based regime, American cities, finally, conquered the smoke through the same means" (p. 122). In other words, the United States, too, eventually threw off the constraints imposed by its common law past. Political culture is not immutable; we learn from our mistakes, or at least what we interpret as mistakes. To be sure, the United States was slow to develop a more active government. But, of course, we already knew that.

Morag-Levine points out many ways in which the American regulatory regime reflects deep distrust of administrative power. The most obvious consequence of this is our ubiquitous judicial review. But for some reason, she assumes that judicial review is always a method for inhibiting regulation, for protecting what law professors call "private ordering" and the rest of us call private property. As lawyers for the Sierra Club, National Resources Defense Council, and Environmental Defense Fund know, however, litigation can frequently be an instrument for pushing administrators along, for insisting that they perform "nondiscretionary duties," and for limiting the influence of industry lobbyists, the Office of Management and Budget, and Republican presidents.

What is curiously missing from Morag-Levine's discussion of American environmental policy is any appreciation for the moralism of the American environmental movement, a moralism that insisted upon absolutist health-based standards, even when everyone knew these made little scientific sense. These environmental moralists shared the traditional American distrust of bureaucracy—this was an important part of their political appeal—but hardly the traditional American attachment to a small, reactive government. The author manages to record one strain of the American political melody (Lochnerism), while completely ignoring the other (populism combined with a broad understanding of the right to personal security). Imagine a remix of a Crosby, Stills, Nash, and Young song in which everyone sings the same notes. The tunes might be vaguely recognizable, but the most fascinating part of the music would be missing. The same could be said of Morag-Levine's picture of environmental regulation in the United States.

**Unfair Housing: How National Policy Shapes Community Action.** By Mara S. Sidney. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003. 200p. $35.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.

— R. Allen Hays, *University of Northern Iowa*

In this well-written book, Mara Sidney skillfully utilizes the "policy design" approach developed by Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram (*Policy Design for Democracy,* 1997*)* to elucidate the relationship between national policy decisions and local political struggles surrounding the implementation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. The 1968 Act made housing discrimination against individuals because of race, creed, color, and national origin illegal. The 1977 Act was aimed at preventing credit discrimination (redlining) against geographical areas within cities. Sidney argues that the type of local groups that emerge to influence enforcement, and the strategies they utilize, are shaped by the resources built into the legislation's policy design, as well as by local political conditions. Case studies of two cities—Minneapolis and Denver—illustrate the impact of policy design in different local circumstances.

Through the author's discussion of the passage of each measure, we see how proponents developed positive images of the intended beneficiaries and negative images of those who would be sanctioned, in order to marshal support for its passage. Opponents, of course, developed conflicting images in order to defeat it. As each proposal advanced, the rewards and sanctions that were built into its policy design were the result of the images used to sell it, as well as the efforts of opponents to modify the design so as to protect their interests.

The Fair Housing Act was passed during the turbulent year of 1968 over the strong opposition of the real estate and housing industries. According to Sidney, proponents sold it as a way for law-abiding, middle-class African Americans to escape the ghetto and to achieve the American Dream of home ownership. Therefore, it focused on sanctioning *individual* discriminatory acts rather than broad patterns of segregation. Its powerful opponents succeeded in weakening its enforcement mechanism, allowing the federal government only a mediation role and placing the burden of redress on the individual. (Enforcement was strengthened in the 1988 amendments.)

In contrast, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) passed with little controversy, in the context of widespread concern with the continuing decline of urban neighborhoods. The target was lenders' discrimination against whole neighborhoods, not against individuals. The enforcement mechanism was the review process carried out by banking regulators, during which mergers or acquisitions could be blocked if a bank's CRA record was not good. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, passed earlier, gave community groups data that could be used to challenge a bank's record. Again, the weakness of the



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

enforcement mechanism was the result of resistance by the powerful banking industry.

Sidney predicts that these policy designs will attract different kinds of local advocacy groups, in spite of the considerable overlap between the problems of individual and neighborhood discrimination. Fair housing advocates will be specialists in the complex legal strategies necessary to pursue individual discrimination cases. Fair housing will tend to be their exclusive concern, rather than other housing issues, and their focus will be on the private housing market, rather than government actions. In contrast, CRA advocates will be groups with an interest in all kinds of housing and neighborhood problems. Rather than legal action, they will utilize research and publicity to call attention to banks' lack of investment in certain neighborhoods. Their advocacy will be episodic, emerging when banks seek approval to merge and subsiding at other times.

Through in-depth interviews with local actors and reviews of public records in Minneapolis and Denver, Sidney finds that local advocacy generally reflects the federal policy designs, but that important deviations from these expectations result from local conditions. For example, fair housing groups in Minneapolis became heavily involved in the issue of creating more affordable housing, not just enforcement, in response to a growing minority population in the Twin Cities that could not find affordable housing, even with reduced discriminatory barriers. A similar broadening of focus did not occur among fair housing advocates in Denver.

In reviewing Sidney's application of the "policy design" approach, one is at first tempted to ask what this approach adds that is new to policy analysis. Scholars have long recognized that both policy formulation and policy implementation are shaped by a complex dance among legislators, bureaucrats, and the constituencies most affected by a policy. However, on further reflection, it becomes clear that this approach does improve our understanding by increasing our awareness of the cognitive dimension of policymaking. Decision makers form mental images of who has been wronged, what the injustice is, and who the perpetrators are, and these images shape their decisions as to appropriate remedies. These images, formed during the political struggle over the passage of legislation, are carried forward to strongly shape the outcomes of implementation.

Sidney carries this approach a step further by showing how policy design shapes local advocacy. Local groups forge their strategies around the weapons that the legislation places in their arsenal, no matter how inadequate they may be. At the same time, they adapt their strategies to unique local conditions. Her subtle analysis accurately captures this interplay of local and national forces.

In a longer book, Sidney might have included more cities as case studies, in order to provide stronger empirical support for her argument. Also, she might have looked in more detail at how the interests of local government actors affect enforcement. For example, the federally required "Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing" that she mentions is imposed on agencies administering the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. These are often entirely separate from the agencies that enforce fair housing laws. This writer's experience suggests that CDBG agencies view the "Analysis" as routine paperwork, to be dispensed with as quickly and quietly as possible, rather than as a clarion call to action!

However, the lean, economical nature of *Unfair Housing* makes the basic structure of Sidney's argument quite clear, and the two case studies chosen are appropriate. The book's clarity is further enhanced by her excellent writing style. It is to be hoped that her approach will guide further empirical investigation into the complex process of policy implementation by actors at all levels of government.

**Bringing Representation Home: State Legislators Among Their Constituencies.** By Michael A. Smith. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003. 227p. $34.95.

— Christopher A. Cooper, *Western Carolina University*

In his seminal essay on state legislatures ("The State of U.S. State Legislative Research," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 6 [February 1981]: 1–25), Malcolm Jewell seemed puzzled that our knowledge of state legislative representation was so limited. After all, there was a long and productive history of work on representation in Congress, and the states provided variation that could help advance our theoretical understanding of this important topic. Unfortunately, apart from recent work by Alan Rosenthal (*The Decline of Representative Democracy,* 1998) and a few articles on particular aspects of representation (such as casework), research over the last 20 years has not advanced our knowledge of representation as much as Jewell might have liked.

Michael Smith's recent book answers the challenge of learning more about how state legislators represent their constituents by observing how 12 representatives from the Kansas City area interact with their constituents. The first two chapters discuss the advantages of the "soaking and poking" method and offer his views of how representation should be studied. Smith posits that his approach is to ask "how can we discover what representation is?" and then to "focus on its actual practice" (p. 1). The next four chapters present observational data about each legislator, organized by his typology of representation—Burkeans, in-district advocates, advocates beyond the district, and ombudspersons. Some might quibble with his categorizations (for instance, one of the in-district advocates focused on "issues that did not have a large impact on the district," p. 81), but most of his decisions seem appropriate.

According to Smith, the role that a particular legislator displays is a function of his or her own beliefs about representation, as well as ideas about which style of representation best "fits" that district. A good example of this tension can be found in the discussion of one legislator who "seemed to have a strong, personal inclination towards a Burkean approach. But electoral realities pushed him to be an ombudsperson" (p. 140). Of particular importance in this section is Smith's notion that for many state legislators, representation may extend into other parts of the state. This hypothesis is both intuitive and novel and deserves to be revisited in future work. Chapters 3 to 6 each end with useful discussions of how legislators



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

with a particular role might approach Jewell's components of representation—communication with constituents, policy responsiveness, allocation of resources, and constituent service.

Consistent with grounded theory, the final chapter presents the hypotheses that stem from the study. While most of this discussion flows naturally from the rest of the book, two things seem puzzling. First, Smith does not present any hypotheses related to advocates beyond their district. On page 187, he argues that legislators who have ambition for a state senate seat are likely to be in-district advocates, but it could easily be argued that advocates beyond their district share this political ambition. Because they are considering running for office in a district with a larger geographic reach, politically ambitious legislators might focus some of their attention on the constituency outside of their current district, but within the boundaries of the district they wish to represent in the future. Second, the final pages present a discussion of term limits that seems out of place in the context of the rest of the book. Although the Missouri legislature passed term limits, they did not take effect until three years after Smith finished data collection. He himself grants that "on balance, this study provides only limited evidence for any change in the average legislator's progressive ambitions due to term limits. . . . [C]learly that particular conclusion would be more meaningful if tested with a larger dataset" (p. 199).

Smith's approach borrows heavily from past scholarship, but there are two shortcomings that differentiate his approach from that of Richard Fenno, Malcolm Jewell, and others. First, Smith confines his study to state legislators in two states—Kansas and Missouri. By focusing on two states, he is unable to capitalize on one of the major advantages of studying state legislatures—variation. Throughout the book, he mentions the potential effects of different structures, such as multimember districts, district population size, and the physical size of the district. Unfortunately, his research design does not allow us to adequately evaluate these effects. Second, he examines only 12 legislators. There is no "magic number" of subjects for this type of work, but when 12 subjects are placed into four categories of representation, the result raises a few questions about external validity.

In the end, *Bringing Representation Home* is a thoughtful book filled with rich observational and interview data that will be useful for anyone interested in state legislative representation. Rather than merely presenting a typology of representation, Smith attempts to identify the causes and consequences of these roles. His hypotheses about these relationships could also provide research questions on state legislative representation.

**Black Faces in the mirror: African Americans and Their Representation in the U.S. Congress.** By Katherine Tate. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 224p. $37.50 cloth, $18.95 paper.

— Ronald Walters, *University of Maryland College Park*

This is an exceedingly useful study in helping to clarify some of the conflicting findings of researchers addressing the viability of the political representation of African Americans, in this case, within the U.S. House of Representatives. Katherine Tate begins to clarify, at the outset, the frequently used categories of "descriptive" and "substantive" representation by including Hanna Pitkin's "symbolic" representation, or descriptive representation devoid of substance, as the major conceptual focus of discussion.

The primary database of this study is twofold: the pattern of issue representation by black members of the 104th Congress and the 1996 National Black Election Study (NBES) directed by Tate at the Ohio State University. The first two chapters expertly describe the growth of black members of Congress over time, driven by the electoral support of black constituencies. Here, she finds characteristics of black congresspersons that differed from their white counterparts, such that blacks raised $100,000 less than whites in an electoral cycle, black incumbents have higher reelection rates, and black women are "overrepresented" in Congress. Tate also found that the geographical areas where additional blacks can be elected are decreasing due, in part, to recent Supreme Court decisions that have allowed racial packing of congressional districts, together with the difficulty of winning in majority white districts.

In Chapters 4 and 5, the author describes the legislative style and voting behavior of blacks in Congress, discovering that their issue engagement yielded less congruent support for their constituency's positions on those issues. While, as she suggests, this is often obscured by the averages used in constructing composite voter ratings scores, it is also confirmed by the voluminous literature that gives representatives space for behavior related to their own convictions, based often on a different basket of information. Moreover, although she questions this aspect of black representation in Chapter 8, deviations from the orthodox position of a constituency should not automatically be construed to violate issue accountability.

Tate provided further clarification to the work of Robert Singh (*The Congressional Black Caucus: Racial Politics in the U. S. Congress,* 1998) and others who have suggested that as the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) membership expanded, it became less unified on issue positions. However, the lessening of unity was mild, and she points to its source as nonideological but caused by the strains created in the inclusion of untraditional issues, such as agriculture, immigration, and others in the organization's urban-oriented agenda. In any case, the CBC, a liberal organization, illustrated its unity in support of President Bill Clinton, who proposed conservative measures, such as welfare reform legislation. Tate's position is tenable that such unity was born of caution because of 1) Clinton's popularity with black voters, 2) the added pressure on his administration created by the 1994 Republican revolution in the Congress, and 3) the institutional pressures on black members who had achieved a significant degree of institutionalization within the House and the Democratic Party. Thus, I agree with her lack of support for Robert Singh's conclusion of the increasing irrelevancy of the CBC, based on his narrow criteria of legislative productivity, rather than upon her wider criteria that involved symbolic representation as well.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Part IV (Chapters 6 and 7) makes the most important contribution to the debate on the extent to which race matters in black representation. Tate invoked the perspective of black voters as respondents on the NBES, finding a pattern that they consistently gave higher evaluations to representatives of their race than to white representatives, averaging one-half point higher. However, primary racial causality for this finding was tested by a regression analysis, which revealed that "political party overshadowed race in the overall evaluation of the legislator's approval, but race mattered more when members were rated on specific aspects of their service and representation" (p. 122, Table 6.2). This conclusion is a substantial and more empirically based departure from the theses of Carol Swain (*Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress,* 1993) and Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom (*America in Black and White,* 1997).

Nevertheless, in addressing whether descriptive representation had an empowering (knowledge, interest, and efficacy of voting) effect on blacks, Tate posits a new finding that party mattered more, theorizing that the causes are vested in the behavioral effects of such empowerment at the local rather than national (i.e., congressional) level. Both of these findings of the importance of party on evaluations of legislator approval and on descriptive representation, however, should have elicited an extended discussion of the role of political parties in political identification and mobilization.

The analysis in Chapter 8 assesses the parallel trend in the decline of political trust in government by both blacks and whites between 1958 and 1994, finding that black trust in government was unaffected by black descriptive representation. The fact that it was affected negatively by highly educated blacks and conservative blacks is consistent with other data in the NBES that attributes higher levels of alienation to more highly educated blacks and to conservative attitudes toward government's role in their advancement.

Tate's concluding Chapter 9 on the future of black representation is more controversial. It makes the strong inference that given the possibility that "the Voting Rights Act will expire in 2007" (pp. 162, 168)—a misleading point, since only section 5 of the Act expires—other methods, such as proportional voting, should be considered for advancing black descriptive representation. However, this proposal rests on a flawed supposition of potentially weak support for the renewal of the Voting Rights Act by black political and civil rights leadership, when no such evidence is presented.

Otherwise, a change in racially sensitive, district-based representation to a more "race neutral" method presents a series of problems, the most important of which is that any electoral system change perceived to threaten the vested political interests of either blacks or whites, in districts with clear racial majorities, would likely be resisted. Second, the trend in redistricting toward the creation of more racially identifiable districts would likely strengthen their opposition. Third, reaction to the perceived fairness of the change to proportional voting, based on my most recent work (*White Nationalism, Black Interests,* 2003), would be evaluated, especially by conservatives, not only on the racial fairness of the method but also on the extent to which the result is perceived to have racially preferenced black representation, questioning its "race neutrality." In any case, in anticipation of a number of future studies on the efficacy of the Voting Rights Act, *Black Faces in the Mirror* makes a unique and positive contribution in affirming its basic underlying concept, the legitimacy of descriptive black representation.

**Out of Touch: The Presidency and Public Opinion.**
By Michael J. Towle. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004. 176p. $37.95.

— Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, *Texas Tech University*

Public support is vital to the governing strategies of modern presidents. Although presidents, White House staff, and presidency scholars take this for granted during the "permanent campaign," little is known about how administrations react to and interpret information about the public's support for the president. Michael J. Towle asks, How do presidential administrations interpret their wealth of public-opinion polling data? He observes that interpretation of these data by the Truman, Johnson, and Carter administrations varies by the president's own public standing: The more the president's public support declines, the more "out of touch" he becomes with the public.

Towle begins by grounding his study in the presidency–public opinion literature and suggests two alternative frameworks for interpreting presidential responsiveness to public opinion. The first, offered by John Geer, holds that presidents are responsive to public opinion, especially on salient issues. Alternatively, Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro argue that recent presidential administrations do not "pander" to the public to gain or maintain its support. Towle frames his analysis of administration reaction to public opinion from a psychological perspective. Presidents tend to congratulate themselves when they are popular, but resort to rationalization and exhibit cognitive dissonance and selective perception when their approval ratings fall or are low.

Organizationally, the chapters examine administration interpretation of public opinion according to the level of the president's approval ratings: high, moderate, and low levels of approval. During periods of high public approval, such as presidential honeymoon periods, presidents are most cognizant of the public's agenda and responsive to public opinion, consistent with Geer's assessment of the presidential-public relationship. Administrations react to high public support with self-congratulatory praise, reveling in their ability to connect with the American people, while simultaneously fearful of losing support.

Inevitably, the honeymoon ends and presidents experience a decline toward a moderate level of public support. Administrations interpret this descent optimistically, noting that better communication by the president or a change in his style will place him back in the public's good graces, something that political scientists know is quite difficult, as public approval is more a function of contextual events than presidential will. To relieve cognitive dissonance between presidential performance



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and the public's perception of it, moreover, administrations recall more popular times; they are not more attentive to the public's concerns, however, as Jacobs and Shapiro predict.

During low levels of public support, presidencies interpret bad news selectively and dismiss clear indications of failing support; they react by blaming opponents or the press, even patronizing the public. When presidents are unpopular, Towle maintains, they are simply unable to respond to public opinion, as they selectively perceive public support and further consolidate their base of support. Staff attention to and discussion of public opinion polls also increase during these times. Ironically, the more "out of touch" presidents become with public opinion—the more the public disapproves of presidents—the more obsessed they become with it.

Conventional wisdom and logic suggest that presidents should be more responsive to public opinion as the public disapproves of the president's job performance. Towle concludes that they instead grow "out of touch" in response to declining public support. This is a function, in part, of difficulty in interpreting polls, which only provide "a superficial glimpse" into public opinion (p. 115). Having access to data alone does not mean that an administration can use it to understand the public, better especially when the president is unpopular. This is an astounding conclusion in light of the many resources modern presidential administrations devote to tracking and interpreting public opinion.

As much as Towle describes in detail the White House interpretation of the president's public standing by means of countless memos and letters, his arguments do not hold at times. He claims that "with public support falling further, [presidents] shrank the scope of their concern to consolidating and protecting their base coalition" (p. 113). Nevertheless, his own archival work reveals that this was a central strategy of Carter's "permanent campaign," independent of his actual standing in the polls; the Carter administration began thinking about consolidating its base *prior* to inauguration (pp. 29 and 107).

The author also fails to address alternative rival hypotheses. Referring again to the Carter administration, Towle claims that it was the president's declining popular support that made him less responsive to public concerns. It seems more likely that President Carter's need to consult policy experts about international crises, not his declining approval ratings, precluded him from responding to a public uneducated about the Iranian hostage crisis or Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Even though the author suggests several avenues for future research in his concluding chapter, he does not consider what may be a potential flaw in the study's generalizability to other presidential administrations: What happens when the president's approval ratings actually recover, such as Reagan after 1983 and Clinton after 1995? Perhaps the optimism that seems so flawed as public support dropped for Truman, Johnson, and Carter would seem genius for Reagan and Clinton because events conspired to benefit, not harm, these presidents further. Furthermore, White House polling expertise may have improved since 1980, providing recent presidents with a more nuanced understanding of public opinion, thereby shifting the patterns Towle describes for the Truman, Johnson, and Carter administrations. These are but a few examples in which the author's arguments or conclusions do not adhere tightly to his rich body of data. Indeed, the book may have been stronger if it sought description alone and saved explanation for a different study, one that pays more attention to theoretical development and hypothesis testing.

That said, *Out of Touch* tells a compelling story of three administrations' interpretations of the president's public standing, one that should be accessible to novices and experts of presidential politics and public opinion alike. Towle's competent use of archival data from these presidencies not only help him generate relatively sound inferences about White House interpretation and reaction to primarily public polling data, but also do so with a richness typically available only to archival researchers. He raises numerous questions about the relationship of the presidency, public opinion polls, and the American public and offers some stunning conclusions about them. Just as the book adequately answers its core question, ultimately it also raises many more.

## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

**Deepening Democracy: Global Governance and Political Reform in Latin America.** By Francis Adams. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 184p. $64.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

**The Quiet Revolution: Decentralization and the Rise of Political Participation in Latin American Cities.** By Tim Campbell. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. 216p. $24.95.

— Diane E. Davis, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

The terms employed by the authors of these two books may be different, as are their titles, but the phenomena they identify are amazingly similar and the periods they examine are practically identical. What Francis Adams identifies as a "remarkable political transformation" and Tim Campbell calls a "quiet revolution" are the steps toward democratization and decentralization that have marked Latin American politics and society in the last two decades. Taking as their point of departure the political reforms of the state since the late 1980s, the empowerment of civil society through decentralization, and the fact of democratic transition itself, both authors paint a picture of progress and hope for a region of the world that not very long ago seemed mired in the throes of authoritarian governance and economic crisis attributed to nondemocratic, overcentralized, and inefficient state practices.

The most positive—if not celebratory—of the two is Campbell's *The Quiet Revolution,* which reads like an ode to decentralization and the gains it made in terms of efficiency, innovation, and revenue generation at the local level. The



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

author's rosy view is tempered only as an afterthought, by the cautious recognition in a final chapter that the tendency toward greater income inequality across Latin America could serve as an obstacle to deepening these reforms, especially if it affects the legitimization of actors responsible for promoting the decentralization path. But these seem to be only minor concerns for Campbell. Adams, in contrast, is much more cautious about the durability of the political changes in domestic politics and policy. The starting premise of his book is that without the direct involvement of international actors and strong "external" support, the democratic transition under way in Latin America will not deepen, and perhaps even stall. Hence, his call for understanding of the key international organizations, actors, and policy regimes that will enable and support Latin America's political transition.

Some of the difference in tone owes to the fact that these two authors are concerned with different aspects of Latin America's recent political transformations. Adams seeks to understand democracy as an entire constellation of political guarantees and social changes, ranging from increasing political competition to empowering civil society to guaranteeing human rights to establishing social equity to decentralizing political participation. Hence, his focus on actors like the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and such civil society organizations as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—as well as the usual subjects (international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank).

In contrast, Campbell seems to be concerned primarily with the state reforms and grassroots political changes that facilitate neoliberal economic reform on the local level. International institutions and actors are practically absent; and politics of the big "p" kind hardly matters unless they impede decentralization aims. The social and political conditions on the ground—especially if they entail rights abuses or citizen organization around questions of power and accountability—do not generate much critical scrutiny either. Rather, Campbell's focus is almost exclusively on the ways decentralization empowers city-level authorities to undertake reform or revenue projects that spread the burden of financing development to citizens, while also generating local conditions in which private-sector actors are key partners in development. Stated simply, the overriding ethos of Campbell's book is pretty much the World Bank's neoliberal agenda, a fact of little surprise considering that Campbell manages the urban program of the World Bank Institute in Washington, D.C.

This is not to say that *The Quiet Revolution* is compromised as a piece of academic scholarship. It is an engaging and relatively comprehensive description of decentralization and how it works, and as a general text for undergraduate audiences it contains valuable material. The book begins by documenting the recent political changes in Latin America and offering an overview of major state reforms. It then moves onto a more historicized discussion of where and when decentralization first captured attention among Latin American nations (with Mexico and Chile identified as leading the pack). A subsequent section identifies six types of participatory mechanisms that were highly successful in strengthening decentralization. This part of the book is perhaps the most interesting because it is based on serious case study research. A final section raises questions about what it will take to further institutionalize such gains. And while all may not agree on Campbell's proposal for a new model of government based on contest, competition, and so-called civil markets, he does raise important and difficult questions about how to sustain the quiet revolution that is still not yet completely consolidated across the continent. One of the most innovative and important points to emerge in this section on prescriptions is the author's emphasis on empowering cities—and even metropolitan areas—so that they are not hamstrung in their aims to carry forward innovative strategies that enable local gains without compromising citizen priorities. To his credit, he clearly states that this call for new pathways "to city renewal" (p. 165) stands in tension with the World Bank's own preferred modus operandi of working directly with central government.

The World Bank is just one of the many organizations that Adams examines in *Deepening Democracy,* a book that also begins with an overview of changing structures of power and politics in Latin America. But Adams identifies problems where Campbell sees promise. Adams prefers to see energy and innovation for state reform and democratic progress resting in international hands, more than in the strategies of domestic political actors. His claim is that in an increasingly globalized world where domestic politics do not operate in a vacuum and where international conditions mold opportunities for development on the local level, it is wise to analyze international actors and whether their aims correspond or conflict with domestic ones. Because this approach contrasts so starkly with Campbell's emphasis on local actors, the question arises as to why. One possible explanation for the divergent views of these authors may be traced to the units of analysis employed. Adams's focus is democratic progress (or standstill) as a feature of the nation-state, whereas Campbell's focus is on the locality, mainly in cities. One can only wonder whether their divergent assessments about the most significant institutional actors, not to mention their disagreements about pitfalls and possibilities associated with recent political reforms, might converge more if both were examining the same scale of action.

Of course, the fact that Adams is more concerned with national progress may be the cause as much as the effect of his preoccupation with international actors, whose programs target large-scale reforms that make sense primarily on the national scale. From judicial reform to anticorruption projects to the strengthening of electoral institutions to efforts to weed out human rights violations to social empowerment, most of the international organizations identified by Adams have fundamental reforms of the national state and legal system in mind. Only a few of their programs, like institution-building efforts supported by such nongovernmental organizations as Ford and by other key actors such as the Organisation of American States, are intended to operate on the regional or subnational level. Yet this may be precisely the challenge: to prod international



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

institutions to take seriously *both* the subnational and the national levels of decision making, and to develop programs or reform efforts that combine both levels of analysis through engagement with both domestic and international actors.

If one were to look for tough questions to pose to *Deepening Democracy,* it would be why so little progress has been made with a plethora of major international organizations committed to many of same tasks. Adams does a wonderful job of analyzing the programs of the most relevant global actors, and he offers a critical analysis of the policies of each, identifying the biases, constraints, or organizational limitations that prevent these organizations from accomplishing as much as they would like. This is particularly evident in the discussion of the United Nations and the restrictions its own charter imposes on its political work within Latin America, yet it also comes through in the other chapters as well. But nowhere does Adams synthesize the entire picture and ask whether these organizations might in fact be working at cross-purposes, or perhaps even fragmenting the domestic scene in ways that might disempower civil society in its collective struggle to make national gains. Why have multiple organizations with global prestige and massive resources not collectively made more headway in deepening democracy across Latin America? Is it merely a matter of time; or the sheer magnitude of problems; or, is it because somehow they have not read the conditions well enough to know how to actually implement changing conditions from the bottom up in the same way as Campbell's local actors?

It could also be that many of the problems that international agencies and global actors seek to eradicate are better understood as regional or even transnational in scope, an observation that could sustain a call for more horizontal coordination within and between international agencies and individual Latin American countries, and perhaps a new scale of action. Again, the question of at what level(s) to intervene in identifying problems and crafting effective solutions is absolutely central, and one can only hope that the knowledge gained from these two books can push more scholars to work on this and other related questions in the near future.

**The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil.** By Omar G. Encarnación. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 244p. $55.00.

— Kathleen Bruhn, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

When a Google search for "civil society promotion" turns up 847,000 potentially relevant links, it is time for a provocative book like this one. Omar Encarnación takes on the prevailing wisdom that "a strong civil society lies behind successful democracies while a weak civil society is the root of failed or flawed democracies" (p. 3), arguing not only that strong civil societies fail to ensure democratic consolidation but also that democracies can be successfully consolidated without any civil society to speak of. Indeed, "a flourishing civil society can actually be a hindrance to democratization" (p. 5). Encarnación is not the only scholar to raise doubts about the efficacy of civil society to promote a host of social benefits, but he is one of the few to do so in the context of the newly democratizing nations, where civil society promotion has perhaps the most currency today.

At the core of his study is a comparison between Spain and Brazil, the first a successfully consolidated democracy despite marked civil society weakness, and the second a partially consolidated democracy despite being one of the strongest civil societies in Latin America. Encarnación argues that the secret to Spain's success—and Brazil's failure—lies in the differential capability of political institutions and elites to generate trust and legitimacy. In place of the usual causal linkage from civil society to social capital to democratic consolidation, he proposes that political institutions play the crucial role in generating social capital, understood as "a culture of trust, tolerance and reciprocity" (p. 4). Thus, "while civil society theorists have correctly identified social capital as a key ingredient in the consolidation of democracy they have erred in locating the main source of its production." He contends that "social capital is more likely to emerge as a result of the constitution and performance of political institutions . . . than from participation of the citizenry in the endeavors of civil society organizations" (p. 8).

Despite the appealing parallelism of the comparison, Spain and Brazil actually underpin quite different claims, one much more effectively sustained than the other. In the case of Spain, Encarnación makes a compelling argument that a dense civil society is not *necessary* for democratic consolidation, and that the performance of political institutions (particularly elites) can fill in for the expected role of civil society in generating social trust. I think he underestimates the critical role of unions, but he is surely right to stress that union leaders played a bigger part than participating members.

In the case of Brazil, in contrast, Encarnación argues that a strong civil society is not *sufficient* to generate social trust or ensure democratic consolidation. Even if true, this claim is likely to create far less controversy among civil society enthusiasts, who make their claims in terms of improvements in social capital rather than ability to compensate for all other obstacles. Furthermore, in focusing his attention on the outcome, he underplays the deep dissimilarities between the two nations, any one of which might explain Brazil's poorer performance on both trust and consolidation measures. Spain is richer, less unequal, involved in the democratic European Community—the list goes well beyond the performance of political institutions versus civil society in generating trust. In essence, we have two dissimilar cases with dissimilar outcomes.

That Brazil fails to overcome these obstacles is therefore less surprising than the author implies. Indeed, the failures of Brazil's formal institutions may help explain why its vibrant civil society developed, in reaction and protest. One could also argue that the strength of Brazilian civil society made outcomes much less dismal than they otherwise would have been, as Encarnación, in part, concedes. Civil society advocates won numerous concessions in the 1988 Constitution despite important defeats. Moreover, it is not irrelevant that local governments, primarily of the PT (Workers' Party), have been among the continent's innovators in participatory democratic government. Without a strong, independent civil society, the PT



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

would never have existed. Instead, the PT experience has positively impacted democratic development in Brazil.

Another issue is the nature of the evidence. Encarnación's measure of both civil society density and social capital/trust comes from the 1997 World Values Survey. This survey reports the cumulative percentage of the population that belongs to organizations, as well as support for democracy and interpersonal trust. The first measure has come under attack for a "Western-European" orientation, in that some of the categories used have little application in the developing world. Moreover, some World Values results seem a little odd. Argentina, for example, has a cumulative civil society density of 3%, although 30% of the population belongs to a union (pp. 178, 111). It might have proved worthwhile for Encarnación to have developed alternative measures of these key variables.

In addition, the author does not directly address the question of whether social capital varies according to participation in civil society—one of the key claims of the civil society argument. No statistical testing examines this link, even for the World Values database. And while he notes the uneven distribution of civil society in Brazil, he does not further discuss its impact on the distribution of social trust, or the relative level of social trust within socioeconomic groups depending on whether they do, or do not, participate in organizations.

These problems notwithstanding, *The Myth of Civil Society* should be required reading for scholars of democratization, and a useful reminder to international donors to curb their enthusiasm about the prospects for civil society aid to bring about democratic change. In fact, as Encarnación warns, funding civil society might only strengthen organizations with nondemocratic goals. Moreover, if political institutions can substitute for civil society, funding for institutional development may be more effective. The only question is whether Spain's other advantages (wealth, capable leaders, and location) were also necessary conditions for successful institutional reform. If so, then funding some alternative organizations may not be as much of a waste of time and money as he implies.

**Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition.** By Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 218p. $55.00 cloth, $20.00 paper.

— Nikolaos Zahariadis, *University of Alabama at Birmingham*

Multibillion dollar infrastructural projects, or megaprojects such as the Channel Tunnel, the Øresund bridge between Denmark and Sweden, the Hong Kong and Denver airports, or many high-speed rail links in Europe, continue to be built in record numbers despite poor performance and colossal losses. Why? The authors provide ample evidence to substantiate their claim that such projects are systematically misrepresented in public and private deliberations because many of the participants in the process have incentives to underestimate costs, overestimate revenues, undervalue environmental impact, and overvalue economic development effects.

This book is about the political undervaluation of risk in democratic society. Megaprojects involve substantial risk, or consequential uncertainty. Because the time horizon and sheer complexity of such projects extend beyond that of a decade, companies and governments involved often collude to misrepresent the facts to the taxpayers who will ultimately foot the bill. Big business, which has the advantage of economies of scale, frequently underestimates costs to make the projects more appealing and manageable to politicians. Governments often overestimate revenues and development benefits to garner support by cash-strapped taxpayers. Forecasts turn out to be wildly unrealistic driven by optimistic assumptions. Benefits accrue to a few big business interests or users while taxpayers collectively bear the costs. Project objectives are not clearly spelled out often because they are being driven by narrow political or private interests. While the authors do not use this term, we are confronted with a classic case of clientelist politics. The end result is an unsurprisingly big feast of national prestige, public waste, and private greed.

Sound familiar? It should. Even if one were not aware or informed about the economics of such projects, the sheer magnitude of funds should make us all pause to think about the implications. Take the war in Iraq, if one may be permitted to stretch the concept of megaprojects a bit from transport policy to foreign policy. Whatever the reasons for undertaking it, the end result has been a feeding frenzy for all the big firms in charge of rebuilding the country. If the argument of this book is correct, we should all think carefully about the future of these activities. It is not that the Pentagon underestimated the cost of rebuilding Iraq because of the sheer magnitude and complexity of the operation. Rather, it was a politically calculated effort to subsidize big business in the name of national security.

So what are we to do about this? Can advanced democratic societies finally eliminate risk? Will technological advances help us achieve a "zero-friction society," as many commentators predict? The answer is clearly no. It is not because technology is of little use, but rather because the process of conceiving, formulating, and implementing such risky operations is loaded. Important stakeholders are strategically kept out of the loop, be they such nongovernmental groups as environmental groups, scientific and professional experts, or the media. The key to understanding the problem and its solution, the authors conclude, is to gain insight into the institutional incentives actors have and the consequent manipulation of information. More risk deliberation, transparency, and accountability are not just good for democracy, a rather nebulous but important assertion. They also make good business sense.

*Megaprojects and Risk* is well written, amply documented, and well presented. Perhaps the only drawback in this otherwise admirable book is that it does not go far enough. Inductive in their analysis while practical in their recommendations, the authors do not tease out the full theoretical implications of their argument. Because they do not present an overarching framework of power and risk, they miss out on the general implications of manipulation in democratic society. Manipulation is endemic. If more information is not necessarily the answer—that is, cost overruns or other negative effects are the



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

results not of misunderstanding risk but of misrepresenting it—tweaking institutional arrangements may not necessarily help. For example, the authors call for a reallocation of risk by redrawing the public–private boundaries. How? Reduce sovereign guarantees, they recommend among other things, and involve a greater degree of private risk capital (pp. 109–10). Sure, but how many bridges or roads will be built as a result? Even if this is exactly the point, far fewer projects should be undertaken than is currently the case, and one should not underestimate the importance of public human capital. In an era of downsizing and underfunding the public sector, we are in even greater need of better civil servants and politicians. We desperately need individuals who understand the politics of manipulation, recognize it, and are equipped professionally to deal with it. In other words, better institutional arrangements may (or may not) increase risk deliberation, transparency, and accountability, but better civil servants surely will. After all, risk is not simply a question of institutional incentives but, most importantly, of human qualities. Do you want to reduce risk and improve the performance of public–private ventures? Increase the quality of the employees who are at the heart of the decision-making process.

Finally, the authors miss out a bit on the so-what question. Manipulation comes at a price, but not all of us are unhappy about it. I know the Channel Tunnel turned out to be a financial disaster, but so what? I like the idea, I like the project, and though costly, I still think it was worth it. We may know a lot about risk, but as a society we are still poorly equipped to deal with it.

**Democracy in Latin America 1760–1900: Volume 1, Civic Selfhood and Public Life in Mexico and Peru.** By Carlos A. Forment. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003. 488p. $35.00.

— Roderic Ai Camp, *Claremont McKenna College*

Carlos Forment has produced a highly original, intriguing, and thoroughly researched exploration of civic behavior in Latin America from the mid-1700s through 1900. He presents the provocative argument, contrary to much past research, that citizen democracy, "understood in Tocquevillian terms as a daily practice and form of life rooted in social equality, mutual recognition, and political liberty, was by the mid-nineteenth century rooted in the region" (p. xi). This book cites numerous examples and scholarship from many parts of Latin America, but Forment provides detailed evidence from Mexico and Peru. As he argues in his introduction, Latin American forms of democracy are characterized by four qualities. First, democracy is disjointed because those forms that do exist are found among individual citizens, and not between citizens and governmental institutions, which essentially imposed an authoritarian structure on society. Second, he believes that the practice of democracy is one-sided, given his evidence that it is practiced in civil society rather than in political or public life. Third, it is highly fragmented, given the failures in Latin America to meld social equality and cultural/ethnic differences. Fourth, he claims that Catholicism provided the language of public life, and that Latin Americans used it to create new democratic meanings from traditional religious terms, which he labels "Civic Catholicism."

Each of these provocative arguments is based on a research data bank the author created by doing old-fashioned archival fieldwork, identifying 7,056 voluntary groups in four countries (Cuba and Argentina serve as the foundation for Volume 2) from a wide array of sources. He adds to the impact of this information by alluding to such distinctions as size of the organizations and their duration. For example, 80% lasted 6 years or less, but 20% continued for 16 or more years (p. 101). It is refreshing to encounter a scholarly work that provides a detailed, imaginative, and original set of sources in combination with an equally comprehensive swatch of secondary and theoretical literature, all with extensive footnotes where they belong, at the bottom of each page.

As the author admits, his work is influenced by those social scientists who are products of the Tocquevillian tradition. He creates a model for exploring core civic behavior in four sectors: civil society, political society, economic society, and the public sphere. He discovers that Latin Americans practiced democracy in civil society more than in the other three sectors. This is a major finding, which in the case of Mexico, and I suspect elsewhere in the region, is relevant to recent democratic transformations. In the Mexican case, for example, it was civic organizational activity beginning in the mid-1980s that led the way to local forms of democratic behavior. Furthermore, democracy in the public arena is a product of grassroots movements, where opposition parties achieved electoral victories over half the country's population in less than 10 years. Forment would argue that a long tradition of such civic behavior already was well ingrained in the fabric of Mexican society.

The major contradiction the author identifies is, of course, the fact that the majority of those in public life rarely practice democracy in political as distinct from civil society. He cites the interesting example of Mexican debating societies in the mid–nineteenth century. Perhaps his most original insight is that Mexicans and Peruvians created the language of Civic Catholicism to use in their public discussions, and that the central component of this language was the notion of associational life. His first explicit example dates from 1827 (p. 208).

Because Forment consistently cites a broad sweep of social science literature, contemporary and historical, the book provides many tidbits from which useful comparisons can be drawn. For example, note his declaration that "public life in Latin America bears an uncanny resemblance to Bali's Negara polity" (p. 95). Throughout the work, he touches on every conceivable type of organization, as well as every possible group in society, whether the distinction is gender, race, ethnicity, or religion.

The admirable qualities of *Democracy in Latin America 1760–1900* are numerous. Two features, however, are likely to make it less accessible to readers. Anyone, even a specialist in the region, will find this work dense reading. Colleagues persuaded the author to omit several hundred additional pages, with good reason. The examples are so numerous that it is easy



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

to miss the intellectual forest for the trees. Second, the book addresses these numerous characteristics in Peru and Mexico in some 400 pages, but waits until the final chapter to provide a well-formulated set of conclusions. The average reader, and especially the nonspecialist, would be able to extract more valuable insights from this work had each chapter included a short concluding section.

Forment offers several significant conclusions. Most broadly, he challenges Toqueville's application of his original argument—that New England democracy was successful because of a convergence between daily practices and institutional structures—to Latin America. He suggests that Toqueville believed that Latin American practices were anticivic and their institutions unstable. Thus, "the Latin American case has direct relevance for how we understand Tocqueville's work and, more generally, how we study postcolonial life. Contemporary Tocquevillians assume there is a one-to-one correspondence between daily practices in civil society and institutional structures in political society" (p. 430). The author instead concludes that democratic practices in Latin America surfaced through the fissures between daily habits and institutional structures, yet they rarely became the language of the state.

A further argument that deserves greater attention from Forment, however, is the way in which Latin Americans conceptualize and what they expect from democracy. We now know empirically that their contemporary views of this subject differ greatly from those shared by people in the United States. These differences may be a product of the variables the author explores. On the other hand, they may actually contribute to the dichotomies he so aptly discovers. Given the crucial importance of language, the meanings of civic vocabulary today and in the past are crucial building blocks for understanding the evolution and existence of democratic behavior in the region.

**Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America.** By Manuel Antonio Garreton. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 224p. $59.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Paul W. Drake, *University of California, San Diego*

The Consortium in Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Duke University deserves gratitude for launching this series on "Latin America in Translation." This translation clearly presents the complex analyses of a profound thinker, one who excels at elucidating the subtleties, contradictions, and paradoxes of today's democracies. Previously one of the pioneers of studying transitions from authoritarian rule, Garreton now focuses on the constraints on the successor regimes. His trenchant observations will interest political theorists as well as comparativists and Latin Americanists. He devotes the first half of the book to a broad treatment of current Latin American politics and the second half to a study of the crucial case of Chile. This powerful combination of the general and the particular renders this publication valuable for graduate courses, although it is too sophisticated for most undergraduates.

As the author points out, sociology has long been stronger south of the border than political science, particularly with the latter's recent emphasis in the United States on institutionalism. Historically, most Latin American intellectuals have seen politics as a reflection of society, rather than as a separate realm. Moreover, they have defined democracy more as social integration than as liberal individualism. However, as standard democratic institutions have gained practical importance and legitimacy in recent years, they have also begun receiving more empirical and theoretical attention as relatively autonomous entities. Without neglecting the socioeconomic context, Garreton both reflects and advances this shift away from structural determinism, previously identified with studies of dependency and development.

In his general chapters, the author frames the book in terms of four interconnected challenges to the disarticulated relations between the state and society in the posttransition democracies. First, these nations must improve the quality and efficacy of their democratic institutions, particularly the state, political parties, and social actors. Second, they need to expand citizenship by ensuring the equal inclusion and rights of all the members of society. Third, they have to devise a new development model that will move beyond neoliberal formulas for growth through postindustrial globalization. Above all, governments need to find new ways to redistribute benefits to the impoverished. Fourth, the Latin Americans should elaborate a fresh national project that will produce collective consensus, identity, and community behind a shared, sovereign vision of the future. If these challenges are not met successfully, Garreton fears that these countries will remain hollow democracies. Their political systems will exhibit little relevance to society and little ability to represent the nation or make decisions on its behalf. Without more robust states closely connected to civil society by democratic institutions, Latin America is in danger of ceding control over its destiny to global market forces.

Of greatest interest to political scientists, Garreton devotes most of his dissection of these challenges to the deficiencies of today's democratic systems. With his usual incisive disaggregation of concepts, he reminds us that there were three different types of democratization in contemporary Latin America: the founding of totally new democracies, as in Central America; the transitions from authoritarian back to democratic regimes, as in the Southern Cone; and the installation of democratic reforms, as in Mexico and Colombia. All of these processes remain partial because of persistent authoritarian enclaves and corruption. In the author's view, these democracies can only become complete and effective by strengthening, modernizing, and uniting the state, parties, and society. This thesis calls for a transformed state, as opposed to those who would subordinate it to the free market or to civil society.

With the backdrop of this overview, Garreton examines the Chilean experience. He offers his widely accepted interpretation that Chilean democracy before its downfall in 1973 enjoyed stability, representativeness, and effectiveness. However, it lacked social or ideological consensus, guarantees of majority rule, and unquestioned legitimacy. He then shows



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

that these shortcomings generated a crisis opening the way to a military coup d'état. The resulting dictatorship pursued dual objectives. It wanted not only to destroy the previous system of political democracy, social integration, and statist economic nationalism but also to implant authoritarian rule, social atomization, and an open, market-oriented economy.

The return to democracy 17 years later took place within that radically altered context. This book synthesizes Garreton's influential argument that the transition required the united opposition to learn to defeat the regime through the dictatorship's own institutional rules, specifically the 1988 plebiscite to extend or terminate the government of Augusto Pinochet. Since 1990, the restored democracy, although fully consolidated, has struggled to overcome authoritarian residues, such as unelected powers. In a masterful summary of the continuing debates in Chile over how to deepen democracy, Garreton returns to the four challenges he highlighted for all of Latin America.

For mainstream political scientists unfamiliar with the discourse in Latin America, some of the sociological conceptualizing and theorizing may seem somewhat abstract and even obscure, particularly the notion of a national project. More empirical examples would give newcomers clearer references. They may also find the prose at times repetitive because the chapters are drawn from different sources. And they may wish for a more ample bibliography to lead them to further publications on these matters. Above all, however, they should welcome this visit with a brilliant mind tackling some of the central problems in Latin America and Chile over the last 30 years. For political and other social scientists concerned with the region, with democracy, and with political sociology, *Incomplete Democracy* constitutes essential reading.

**Political Economy of Energy in the Southern Cone.** By Anil Hira. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 128p. $59.95.

— Gregg Johnson, *State University of New York at Buffalo*

What role does the state play in the age of neoliberal economics? How autonomous is the government from both domestic and international forces in the privatization, regulation, and integration of the electricity sector? Anil Hira addresses these important questions in his detailed analysis of the evolution of energy policy in the Southern Cone. The book is divided into five chapters that include an introduction, a chapter outlining the author's theoretical framework, one analyzing the domestic efforts to liberalize energy markets, one addressing regional integration, and a concluding chapter with suggestions for improving regulations in the energy sector. He concludes that the state continues to play an important role in shaping energy policy throughout the region, and the role of the state, either through state-owned enterprises or through regulation of the energy market, continues to exert an enormous influence over pricing, reliability, and investment. Furthermore, Hira argues that regional integration, which requires interstate cooperation, is essential in order to enhance the ability of Southern Cone economies to compete in the global marketplace.

The introductory chapter asks whether the state has become irrelevant in the neoliberal age. The author argues that, paradoxically, the role of the state in regulating markets has become more important. Here, he draws upon the framework developed by Peter Evans (*Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation,* 1995), asking whether governments can create policy independent of domestic and international pressures. Hira compellingly argues that the literature tends to focus on macroeconomic changes, while ignoring important differences across states and across industries, and that studies of government regulations are infrequent and generally conducted by neoliberal advocates. He attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining the transformation of electricity markets in the Southern Cone.

The second chapter develops the theoretical framework for testing the state's ability to resist domestic and international influence over policy. Hira argues that the composition of the proliberalization and antiliberalization forces, combined with the institutions of the state, will determine policy change. He chooses to analyze the energy sector because it is basic and vital to a modern economy and, given that the sector is often seen as a "natural monopoly," government autonomy is particularly vital to successfully liberalize the sector without simply moving from an inefficient state-owned monopoly to an inefficient privately held monopoly. He then provides an extensive list of pro- and antiliberalization forces, including presidents, government ministers, state-owned enterprises, the military, consumers, industry, subnational governments, unions, nongovernmental organizations, and public opinion, arguing that the proliberalization forces are stronger and more ideologically unified. Unfortunately, there is no empirical support for this conclusion. Additionally, while the chapter provides a useful outline of the wide array of forces that may attempt to influence liberalization, it is unclear how this forms a framework for determining state autonomy from domestic and international forces.

In the third chapter, Hira moves on to examine market liberalization in the six economies of the Southern Cone, with an emphasis on Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. He argues that there are three generations of reform in the region, with each generation improving upon the mistakes of the previous one. His descriptions of the liberalization processes in these nations are impressive and useful for scholars interested in privatization and regulation. The author argues that Brazil's and Chile's reliance upon hydroelectric power leaves consumers vulnerable to volatile prices and rolling blackouts, meaning that consumers place greater pressure on the state to maintain an active role in the energy sector. It is interesting to note that despite privatization in these three nations, large energy firms Yacimentos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), Petrobrás, and Endesa still have close ties to government officials. Presumably, this undermines state autonomy, although Hira does not explicitly make this claim. He also finds that prices are generally lower where state-owned enterprises continue to dominate, but that prices are more volatile and service is less reliable. Furthermore, there is a significant gap between the prices paid by residential customers and wholesale consumers. He concludes that given that



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

privatization did not lead to markets but to oligopolies, "state intervention is actually needed to create competitive conditions" (p. 70).

Chapter 4 examines *MERCOSUR*'s (the common market of South America's) moves toward integrating the electricity market. Hira argues that domestic forces favoring privatization and liberalization should also favor integration. Integration provides opportunities for net exporters like Bolivia and Paraguay and for net importers, especially Brazil, the region's largest consumer. While the economics of this argument are sound, it seems that domestic forces that favored privatization in Brazil may resist foreign competition. The author finds that while integration is progressing, a lack of clear regulatory policy in states like Paraguay and Uruguay inhibits investment and continued integration. He argues that if integration is properly conducted, the region has the possibility of being globally competitive. Surprisingly, the author provides little advice for how the region's governments can avoid the pitfalls of regional oligopolies, local resistance, and political and economic instability in order to create a strong set of effective regulations to ensure this outcome.

The final chapter offers suggestions on how to improve the energy sector in the Southern Cone. Given that state-owned enterprises are subject to patronage hiring and unproductive subsidization, poor service, and corruption, while privatized firms engage in collusion and are subject to the preferences of foreign investors rather than domestic or regional preferences, Hira claims that there is still an important role for the state. For the author, state autonomy is the key for improving the functioning of the former and the regulation of the latter though no specific prescriptions are offered.

In sum, I would recommend *Political Economy of Energy in the Southern Cone* for scholars interested in privatization or energy policy, as it provides an interesting history of the liberalization of the electricity sector in this region. Unfortunately, the lack of attention to research design and rigorous analysis undermines a work with the potential to fill a large hole in the literature.

**Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family Under Latin American Dictatorships and Democracies.**
By Mala Htun. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 232p. $60.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— Patricia Hipsher, *Oklahoma State University*

Under military rule from the 1960s to the 1980s and increasingly since the transitions to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, second-wave feminists have mobilized for gender equality and to effect legal reforms in Latin America. Despite this activism and despite the steady stream of high-quality publications on gender and politics in Latin America, there has been very little comparative research on gender-related public policy reform in Latin America. Mala Htun's book on gender and public policymaking under democracy and dictatorship is an important scholarly contribution, filling many of the gaps in the literature on public policy and feminist activism in Latin America.

Htun seeks to answer the question of how and why states make particular policy decisions on gender-related issues. She argues that the ability of issue networks promoting gender reform to achieve legislative reform depends on three factors: 1) the "fit" between issue networks and the institutions of the state; 2) the character of state–church relations; and 3) the type of policy issue in question. To demonstrate the explanatory power of these factors, Htun examines public policymaking in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile during military rule and in the postdemocratization era, tracing the evolution of three issue areas—abortion, divorce, and gender equality in the family. In so doing, she is able to disaggregate issues, identify the ways that political institutions and changes therein shape elites' abilities to effect policy change, and determine the circumstances under which reformist issue networks can defeat the Catholic Church on gender issues.

She begins the book by laying out four normative traditions that inform ideas about gender policy issues in Latin America. The four normative traditions are Roman Catholicism, liberalism, feminism, and socialism. This is done to "differentiate the ideas behind various policy options" (p. 30) and uncover the degree of consensus and dissensus on specific gender policy reforms among political actors representing these normative traditions. Developments in the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 1960s to accept the essential equality of men and women in the family "produced a convergence among the Catholic tradition, the liberal tradition, and the socialist tradition on this issue" (p. 45) that facilitated reform on the issue. As to divorce, however, the Catholic Church was divided from liberals, feminists, and socialists. While this division impeded divorce reforms, it did not make them impossible, given the right circumstances. In the case of abortion, Htun notes, "feminism stood alone," as "Latin American liberals and socialists have not interpreted elective abortion to follow from the core principles of their normative tradition" (p. 46).

Each of the next four chapters examines a particular gender policy issue: reform on women's civil status and property rights, divorce, women's equality in the family and distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children, and abortion. In each chapter, the author traces the evolution of the issue in each country, focusing on the importance of political institutions, church–state relations, and the distinct type of politics engendered by that issue, specifically the degree of church involvement and the locus of decision making.

Htun finds that in all three countries, reforms on women's civil status and property rights ironically were achieved under bureaucratic authoritarian governments. This, she argues, was due to the absence of opposition from the Catholic Church because of its fundamental acceptance of men's and women's equality in the family, the "technical" approach taken by military governments toward this issue, and the resulting institutional structures that insulated policymakers from external pressures. In an effort to "modernize" their states, bureaucratic authoritarian regimes created legal commissions, composed of legal experts, to reform their civil codes. The legal experts convened over a period of time, drafting reforms under



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the assumption that "the subordinate position of women with respect to men was . . . a vestige of the past that impeded social and economic development" (p. 76). Only in Chile did the commission have difficulties getting its reforms passed, and that was because of a leak to the press, which mobilized conservative ideologues against the reform. Thus, the states' efforts to modernize had the unintended consequence of opening up a window for gender reforms.

The chapter on divorce uncovers patterns of policy change that are far more diverse. In Brazil, divorce was legalized in 1977 under military rule. In Argentina, divorce was legalized in 1987, but under democratic rule. In democratic Chile, however, divorce remains illegal. Church–state relations and shifts therein are important in understanding these distinct outcomes. Traditionally, there has been a close relationship between church and state in most Latin American countries, the result being the codification of canon law regarding marital indissolubility into civil marriage laws. In Brazil, this cozy relationship deteriorated under military rule, as the bishops became critical of the regime's human rights abuses. In Argentina, however, the relationship between church and state remained favorable until after democracy was restored, at which time the bishops came under attack for not having spoken out against the former regime's human rights abuses. The breach between church and state under these two distinct situations created a "window of opportunity" "to approve a divorce law" (p. 111). In Chile, on the other hand, close relations between church and state since the restoration of democracy have impeded the legalization of divorce.

The final section focuses on abortion and reveals that three key factors have prevented the decriminalization of abortion in the three countries: strong opposition by the Roman Catholic Church, a well-organized antiabortion movement, and public ambivalence concerning abortion, resulting from middle-class access to safe abortion at private clinics (p. 154). The main difference between the three countries has been the extent to which forces supporting the liberalization of abortion laws have succeeded in stimulating debate about the issue. Brazilian forces have achieved the greatest success and Chilean forces the least, with Argentineans holding a middle ground. The relative success of Brazilian abortion rights advocates can be explained by the support of leftist (Workers' Party, PT) deputies for the liberalization of abortion laws and by presidents' failure to oppose abortion. In Argentina and Chile, on the other hand, "most presidents have actively opposed abortion and feminist reproductive rights movements have found few allies in Congress willing to raise the abortion issue" (p. 161).

Htun's work on gender public policy in Latin America is a significant contribution to the field of comparative politics, contributing to the literature on public policy, gender and politics, democratization, and the state, to name a few. The approach taken to public policymaking on gender issues is nuanced, allowing her to disentangle the conditions and factors that facilitate and impede the success of issue networks on specific policy issues. For a few years now, scholars of gender politics in Latin America have recognized that some gender issues are "harder" than others (e.g., see Victoria Gonzales and Karen Kampwirth, *Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right,* 2001); however, little has been known about the factors that make one issue "harder" or "easier" than another. This is but one gap that *Sex and the State* fills. One could not write a review of Htun's book without commenting on the exceptional methodology. She has conducted extensive field research in three countries on three issues, drawing on historical archival data as well as interviews conducted with legislators, feminist activists, and others involved in the policymaking processes in the three countries. The result is an impressive and well-written book that I highly recommend to all students of Latin American politics, gender and politics, and comparative public policy.

**The Wheel of Law: India's Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Context.** By Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 344p. $39.50.

— Ahrar Ahmad, *Black Hills State University*

Since its birth in 1947, India has presented an enigma to many social scientists. A country with a huge population—many living in rather grim circumstances of illiteracy, poverty and despair, bearing a historical legacy of hegemonic rule under the Mughals or the British, and professing a traditional culture marked by deference to authority and hierarchic social arrangements—does not present ideal conditions for democracy to flourish. But India confounded many pundits simply by surviving, indeed succeeding, as a pluralist and constitutional polity. However, one development that may be undermining that confidence is the emergence of an aggressive religious movement coalescing around the *sangh parivar* (i.e., the cluster of organizations dedicated to the principles of *Hindutva*), the extremist Hindu identity movement whose electoral success and social agenda is threatening to unravel one of the cherished pillars of India's democracy—its self-conscious and determined commitment to a secular order. Gary Jacobsohn's book explores the challenges this development poses from within a jurisprudential and comparative perspective, including in his analysis references and themes relevant to Israel and the United States as well.

The author acknowledges that religious liberty and secularism can be protected in societies where "religion is fragmented and its reach into everyday life is relatively shallow." But the "project" of "defending . . . secular aspirations" in a country like India, where the iconic presence of religion is compulsive and overwhelming, forms the central subject of the book (p. xi). He examines this tension, or contested space, where religion and state collide, mingle, and negotiate each other's prerogatives and needs. Does secularism mean impartiality toward religious groups, antireligious orientations to promote progressive goals, or an accommodativeness driven by political and utilitarian calculations? Can a country be secular and simultaneously remain loyal to its spiritual ethos and, at times, the very basis of its existence? Is a popular countermobilization against secular authority necessarily undemocratic? How can



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

democracy be meaningfully practiced in a situation where special groups are provided with privileges, because of their protected status, which are denied to the vast majority of the population? What happens when the "free exercise" and the "no establishment" clauses of the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution come into conflict with each other? The author does not necessarily provide definitive answers to all these questions, but he raises them as critical issues and discusses many of them with assurance and sensitivity.

Jacobsohn develops three analytical constructs, or models of secularism, as "assimilative, visionary and ameliorative—that correspond respectively with the American, Israeli and Indian cases" (p. 10). The first assumes that the state will maintain a studied indifference to religion and hope to inculcate in all citizens a national identity and an encouragement to "share in some constitutive ideas that define membership in the political community" (p. 58). The second promotes a concept of secularism where the "wall of separation" between religion and state is not rigidly drawn but is one that "seeks to accommodate the particularist aspirations of Jewish nationalism within a constitutional framework of liberal democracy" (p. 49). The third advances secularism as a modernist project where the state does not hesitate to rule against the beliefs, symbols, or rituals of any faith that may appear to jeopardize overarching constitutional mandates geared toward social reform and economic progress (Chapter 4). He argues, and demonstrates, that the concept of secularism is not "rigidly deterministic" (p. 267), but that it depends upon specific sociocultural circumstances that different nations have endured, the historical trajectories they have followed, practical realities they must face, and even the different vocabularies they employ.

The author's analysis is buttressed with meticulous and copious references to case law as it has evolved in the three countries. For example, in *Reynolds v. US* and in *Davis v. Beason,* the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that polygamy demanded by the Mormons as a right of free exercise of their religion could be restricted in order to uphold the supremacy of criminal statutes and societal norms. However, in the *Yoshisof* case in Israel, or *Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India,* the courts in these countries opined that some practices may be reserved for a special group and that others could not claim the same privileges unless some specific legal stipulations were satisfied. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court could be much more expansive and flexible in its interpretation of First Amendment rights when it comes to religious and symbolic speech. But in the *Kahane* case in Israel and the *Balasaheb Thackeray* case in India, the courts held that vituperative speech that intimidates or abuses other religious groups would not be allowed in electoral politics (such indulgence in India would actually constitute "political corruption"). Regardless of the divergent approaches they may take on specific issues, the author maintains that all these countries are engaged in upholding very similar principles. In fact, his conclusion is optimistic in that he hopes that each one of these countries can learn from the other's contradictions and predicaments, and design common structures and strategies through which the seemingly awkward embrace of secularism and democracy can become more affectionate and less troubling.

To express minor quibbles about a book of such enormous range and subtlety seems almost churlish. However, Jacobsohn's overattention to detail may, at times, serve to clutter the narrative and distract from his objectives. Also, one is left wondering why a classificatory scheme so rigorously drawn at the beginning is not pursued with equal vigor toward the end where his preoccupation becomes exclusively Indian. Finally, at times, a few sweeping generalizations—for example, about Arabs "whose religious beliefs require that they live in a land that is not identified with the Jewish people" (p. 76) or about principled proponents of minority rights in India who have not been able to "sustain a compelling argument that rivals in rhetorical power the case for Indian unity made by the other side" (p. 285)—are uncharacteristic of his usually scrupulous and disciplined judgments.

But *The Wheel of Law* is a most impressive achievement, thorough in research, astute in insights, and almost dazzling in execution and authorial resourcefulness. Deftly weaving together constitutional history, judicial logic, political development, and philosophical deliberation, this book is not merely a contribution to the discourse; it illuminates, and, in many way, changes it.

**Protest and the Politics of Blame: The Russian Response to Unpaid Wages.** By Debra Javeline. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 312p. $60.00.

— Stephen E. Hanson, *University of Washington*

Why, in the face of massive delays in the payment of wages throughout the Russian Federation during the 1990s, did so few Russian workers engage in organized protest? This empirical puzzle has important implications not only for understanding how the fragile post-Soviet regime managed to endure more than a decade of severe socioeconomic crisis, but also for general theories of social mobilization. In her highly original and thought-provoking book, Debra Javeline argues that the relative quiescence of Russian workers can be explained parsimoniously: In the face of the complexities of post-Soviet political and economic transition, workers could not collectively decide who was to blame for wage arrears, and hence could not organize effective protests against any particular individual or institution.

Javeline's main body of evidence for this hypothesis is a nationwide survey of 2,026 adults that she and her Russian partners carried out for the United States Information Agency in the fall of 1998. Previous efforts to analyze the reasons for low worker activism in Russia, Javeline argues, have been based primarily on macrosociological data; the use of poll data allows for a more careful exploration of the microfoundations of collective action (or its absence). Indeed, her systematic refutation of alternative hypotheses in the literature on the basis of her survey results is remarkably convincing. Some scholars have argued that the absence of Russian worker protest is due to the dependence of workers on managers for nonwage benefits,



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

such as medical care, housing, and subsidized food—but Javeline's data show that such dependent workers report protesting more often than those receiving fewer benefits from their enterprises. Some scholars have argued that Russians do not protest wage arrears because many of them receive additional wages and food in the informal economy—but the author's data show that second sources of income have no significant effect on the propensity to protest. Several demographic factors typically associated with protest activism, such as age, gender, and education, also have either no effect or limited effects on social protest.

By contrast, Javeline's key independent variable, the ability to assign blame for wage arrears to specific institutions and/or people, shows up as a powerful and significant predictor of propensities to engage in strikes or demonstrations in every regression model she tests—as does a general "interest in politics," which, the author argues, works together with blame attribution to make respondents more likely to believe in the efficacy of protest. The only other variables with consistently significant effects on the dependent variable are urbanization, income (with greater poverty encouraging greater protest), the length of time workers have gone without wages, and exposure to specific appeals to join protests from workplace organizers. Since so few Russians report protest engaging in activism of any sort, Javeline argues, even a small increase in the number of Russians who could assign blame for wage arrears to specific people or institutions would have had a major impact on the size of national protests in the Yeltsin era (pp. 140–41).

Objections to the author's argument are likely to center on the adequacy of opinion poll data for assessing the independent and dependent variables here. For example, she quantifies worker protest by asking respondents to self-report their participation in major national protests of wage arrears in March 1997 and April 1998, as well as their general activism on workplace issues over the past three years prior to the survey date. This raises the concern that politically sophisticated respondents who know just whom to blame for wage arrears might be more likely to speak openly to pollsters about their past activism than participants who show up to protest for more spontaneous, unsophisticated reasons. Another possible methodological problem, examined in some depth by the author, is that the survey period in fall 1998 came just after the collapse of the Russian ruble during a severe governmental crisis, making this a difficult time to gauge the long-term trends in Russian attitudes. Finally, as Javeline admits, her sample contains too few respondents to test for the impact of profession on worker protest; this, combined with the fact that she studies a later time period, blunts much of her critique of Stephen Crowley's comparison of coal and steel workers in *Hot Coal, Cold Steel: Russian and Ukrainian Workers from the End of the Soviet Union to the Post-Communist Transformations* (1997). Still, she makes a good case that such methodological objections do not invalidate the systematic relationships among variables she uncovers.

Less convincing is Javeline's argument that a key reason for the inability of Russian workers to assign blame for wage arrears in the 1990s is the objective complexity of this problem (p. 17). She shows that even respected scholars have pointed to diverse and contradictory causes for the nonpayment of wages in Russia, including the ineffectiveness of central and local political elites, the poor advice of international financial organizations, the corrupt behavior of local managers, and the general structural problems of post-Soviet economic transition. But surely every major social crisis that might induce mass protest is similarly complex! Methodologically, at least, it is hard to see how one could test the hypothesis that "objectively complex" problems are less likely to generate specific blame assignment than "objectively simple" ones. Moreover, as Javeline herself is well aware, subjective conspiracy theories can quickly simplify the explanations of complex social problems for those who accept them; indeed, she concludes her book by warning that the Russian crisis is ripe for exploitation by demagogues (p. 242). If so, it would seem that the primary reason for Russian confusion about whom to blame for wage arrears must be sought in subjective factors, such as the weakness of antiliberal ideology and the absence of effective revolutionary leadership in post-Soviet Russia to date. Indeed, the recent electoral success of antiliberal nationalists in the 2003 Duma elections occurred long after the peak of the wage arrears crisis in Russia had passed, posing a puzzle for this part of her analysis.

Despite these quibbles, the central argument of *Protest and the Politics of Blame,* that the general cognitive confusion of individual Russian citizens during the turbulent 1990s has played an important role in hindering protest efforts, is persuasive. One hopes that other scholars will build on Javeline's work in analyzing the politics of blame in the framing of social mobilization in other comparative contexts.

**Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State: Path Dependence and Policy Diffusion.** By Junko Kato. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 276p. $55.00.

— Duane Swank, *Marquette University*

Studies of the welfare state in democratic capitalist systems rarely explore comprehensively the political, economic, and institutional linkages between social programs and tax structure; analysts of tax policy rarely explicate systematically the political consequences of tax structure for social benefit programs. Junko Kato's new book is an engaging, albeit incomplete, effort to fill this void.

Kato's work is motivated by the observation that the most expansive and durable systems of social protection rely disproportionately on regressive general consumption taxation. Specifically, the author argues that in nations where the general consumption tax, that is, the Value Added Tax (VAT) was enacted prior to post-1973 economic and public fiscal crises, policymakers effectively institutionalized significant revenue-raising capacity. The welfare state in these polities expanded during the latter days of the golden age and proved durable against more recent welfare retrenchment pressures. On the other hand, in polities that adopted the VAT after the onset of economic and fiscal stress, the general consumption tax



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

encountered significant political resistance and was never institutionalized to the degree necessary to provide significant revenue-raising strength. That is, tax policy exhibited significant path dependency. In late-adopting systems, pressures to cut (significant) income tax burdens and balance budgets commonly led to substantial rollbacks in the welfare state.

The author utilizes both quantitative analysis and comparative case studies to assess the basic elements of her argument. With respect to the former, she offers a pooled time-series cross-section analysis of data from 18 nations for the period 1965 to 1990, gathered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to assess the proposition that welfare state expansion is associated with greater reliance on regressive general consumption taxation. The bulk of the analysis, however, consists of case studies of the forces that shape the adoption of the VAT and, in turn, its impacts on the welfare state. Chapter 2 explores regressive taxation and the welfare state dynamics in those politics that enacted the VAT prior to a general economic and fiscal crisis (i.e., France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Chapter 3 offers paired comparisons of VAT reform in late (or non-) adopters: the United States and Canada, and Australia and New Zealand. Chapter 4 places consumption tax politics in Japan in comparative context. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes.

As to findings, both quantitative and qualitative analyses lend strong support to the notion that increasing reliance on the regressive general consumption tax is a product of welfare expansion. Yet the case studies of France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom demonstrate that the proximate forces shaping enactment of the VAT in early adopters were quite varied. In Sweden, technical experts and Social Democratic Party politicians recognized the significant revenue-raising capacity of the (clearly regressive) VAT and its future role in expanding the universal welfare state to middle-class constituencies and funding redistributive social programs generally. In France, on the other hand, the VAT was introduced under the mistaken belief that technical adjustments might make it a progressive source of funding for the expansive French public sector. In the United Kingdom, the adoption of the VAT in the early 1970s was largely a function of British membership in the European Economic Community.

Qualitative case-study analysis (Chapters 3 and 4) largely confirms that the introduction of the general consumption tax in the post-1973 era generated dramatic political opposition. In Canada, Japan, and Australia, direct political opposition to the VAT, as well as structural constraints attendant on smaller welfare states, led to the adoption and maintenance of lower consumption tax rates; the establishment of the VAT also significantly weakened or contributed to the removal of extant party governments. The only exception to this pattern is New Zealand, where significant economic crisis, notable income tax reductions, and astute tax reform strategies contributed to minimal political resistance.

Despite the contributions Kato makes through the exposition of this counterintuitive argument and the finely grained, comparative case analysis of VAT adoption, *Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State* suffers from several problems. First, the quantitative analysis is notably underdeveloped; it addresses only the general linear relationship between social welfare expenditure and the relative weight of consumption taxes in national product. Readers would be much better served by 1) a more rigorous analysis of policy diffusion (e.g., event history analysis) and 2) an expanded quantitative analysis of the role of regressive taxation in bolstering the welfare state during the post-1973 era of retrenchment. Specifically, many readers will wish to see a much more sophisticated assessment of the independent role of the relative institutionalization, reliance, and magnitude of consumption taxes on late-1970s to late-1990s retrenchment of social protection. And most readers will be interested in the relative social policy impacts of tax structure in comparison to the social policy effects of the institutions of alternative political economic models, as well as other forces established in the literature as determinants of contemporary welfare state trajectories.

In much the same way, the core case-study chapters could be bolstered by a more comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the role of regressive taxation in mitigating welfare retrenchment. The most developed portion of these qualitative analyses focuses on the immediate political and economic forces surrounding adoption of the VAT. There is relatively little detailed analysis of the manifold retrenchment efforts in the focal countries and the impact of tax structure in influencing reform outcomes. In light of the absence of similarly focused quantitative analysis, a significant component of the author's argument remains untested.

Finally, Kato might have been more thorough in addressing several obvious theoretical questions. First, while the argument about dynamics of diffusion of the VAT to late adopters is clear, she does not provide much of a theoretical explanation for the timing and form of general consumption tax enactment for the early adopters. Beyond the general proposition that these were all large welfare states in the making, we have little theoretical basis for understanding why some countries embraced general consumption taxation in the early 1950s and others in the late 1960s. The case studies themselves undercut the hypothesis that recent or planned welfare state expansion was a systematic and direct cause of enactment of the VAT. Second, and related to this criticism, the author misses a clear opportunity to more fully theorize the relationship between post–World War II political economic structures and institutions and their historical evolution, on the one hand, and the structure of tax extraction by the state, on the other. In the end, many readers will not be satisfied with the answers about the origins and independent social policy effects of tax structure.

In spite of these significant shortcomings, this book should be read by welfare state and tax policy specialists. It offers an interesting perspective on the funding basis of the welfare state and some excellent comparative qualitative analysis of tax policy change.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

**Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond.** By Raúl Madrid. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 336p. $65.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.

— Michelle L. Dion, *Georgia Institute of Technology*

Since the Pinochet regime in Chile privatized its public pension system in 1981, several Latin American countries have enacted public pension reforms, usually incorporating some structural reform or privatization. Why have some countries privatized their public pensions (Chile, Mexico, Bolivia), while others add optional private pensions (Argentina, Uruguay), create parallel systems with both public and private pensions (Colombia, Peru), or fail to enact any structural reform (Brazil)? *Retiring the State* will be required reading for those interested in the answer to this question.

On the basis of a qualitative comparison of pension reforms in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil in the 1990s, Raúl Madrid develops an explanation of pension privatization that combines economic, ideational, and political factors. The explanation is complex because it claims that the policy process proceeds in path-dependent stages and that different factors predominate at different stages. Initially, whether pension reform appears on the policy agenda depends on economic factors, such as the cost of the public pension system and the need for domestic savings. Once reform reaches the public agenda, the executive formulates a reform proposal. At this stage, a privatization proposal, in contrast to a parametric reform, is most likely if the Chilean model is salient, the World Bank participates in policy discussions, and domestic policymakers are neoliberal economists. If policymakers develop a privatization proposal, its ultimate fate will be determined during the enactment stage of the policy process. During this final stage, political factors, such as executive control of the legislature and party discipline, explain whether privatization proposals are enacted with little change, modified, or blocked. At least two results are possible at each stage in the policy process: reform or no reform on agenda; parametric or privatization proposal; and blocked, modified, or enacted privatization proposal.

This description of the policy process is reasonable, yet it implies at least five (and almost certainly many more) possible outcomes, depending on the path a reform proposal takes. Madrid's argument is derived from only three observations: Mexico's 1995 pension privatization, Argentina's 1993 creation of a mixed public/private pension system, and Brazil's 1998 parametric pension reform. In the early 1990s, however, the Mexican executive abandoned a full privatization proposal in favor of a less contentious reform (p. 74), and both Presidents Collor and Franco in Brazil abandoned pension reform proposals due to "overwhelming opposition from both inside and outside the government" and "staunch resistance" (p. 145). To be consistent, the explanation should explain the failed reform attempts as well as those that succeed. Regrettably, Madrid does not give these additional observations methodical analysis. The reader is left wondering whether changes in Madrid's explanatory factors were significant enough in Mexico after 1992 to explain why privatization became possible in 1995. Was President Cardoso's administration able to pass reforms that failed under his predecessors due to changes in executive control of Congress and party discipline? Madrid's overall argument would be more forceful had he more systematically addressed all the variations in his country studies and used these failed reform observations to reinforce the explanation of enacted reforms.

Fortunately, Madrid's analysis does not end with his three country studies. He then tests his explanation of pension privatization on a broader sample of middle- and upper-income countries using quantitative methods. Although some may criticize the choice of statistical models, the quantitative tests are simple and straightforward. They largely confirm the pattern suggested by the qualitative analysis. The accompanying discussion of additional cases of pension reform in Latin America and the postcommunist world will be useful and appealing to a wide audience. Madrid offers a careful description of pension reforms, explanatory factors, and policy process for several countries in both regions. The consistency with which he can explain a wide range of outcomes in many countries is a convincing test of his argument and demonstrates a strong understanding of the reform process in a wide range of cases.

Overall, this book makes at least two important contributions to the literatures on second-generation market reforms and policy diffusion. First, Madrid demonstrates the discreet way in which the World Bank has influenced pension reform in Latin America. Many Latin American countries were considering pension privatization before the publication of the World Bank's *Averting the Old Age Crisis* (1994). Further, World Bank loans often *followed,* rather than preceded, reform and seldom were large enough to finance the full costs of privatization, according to the author. Instead, the World Bank "create[d] an ideational climate that was propitious for pension privatization" by providing technical assistance through pension reform missions in several countries that "enabled World Bank representatives to maintain extended contacts with host country social security policymakers" (p. 176). His description of World Bank influence in pension reform echoes Judith A. Teichman's use of international policy networks among World Bank and domestic policymakers to explain market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America (*The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America,* 2001). Second, Madrid correctly emphasizes that the Chilean pension model and the positive externalities associated with privatization were a powerful influence on policymakers in the early 1990s in Latin America. Although recent studies have called into question the effects of pension privatization on domestic savings and economic growth in Chile and elsewhere, policymakers in Latin America *were* swayed in the early 1990s by limited but powerful evidence from Chile. Thus, Madrid's book offers a potent illustration of how policy innovations, including those with short histories or even limited evidence of success, can become important reform models for other countries and quickly diffuse through international policy networks. In these two ways, this book makes important contributions to our understanding of market reform and policy diffusion.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

In *Retiring the State,* Madrid has pulled together an insightful and complex description of pension reform in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. He has also offered a careful and convincing explanation of the policy process that produces pension privatization. As its subtitle suggests, this book is likely to generate great debate and inform the growing literatures on pension reform, policy diffusion, and second-generation market reforms in Latin America and beyond.

**Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences.**
Edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 468p. $70.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

— Bo Rothstein, *Göteborg University*

Occasionally, when you have really talented graduate students, you are looking for a book that would challenge them to think deeply about their research. This is such a book. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer have put together an excellent volume that takes up some of the most challenging problems regarding questions about research design, how to think about causality in the social sciences, and how to connect questions about ontology to research methods.

In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences,* a number of seasoned veterans reflect on research they and their compatriots have been doing over the last 25 years or so. It reads like a number of interesting and detailed reports from various academic battlefields. The picture one gets is a meeting where staff and frontline officers reflect on what has been accomplished in the latest battles. What they have been doing, why they did it, and why their strategy and approach is preferable to others are the questions they try to answer.

Editors Mahoney and Rueschemeyer give a good introduction to the special characteristics that have distinguished the comparative historical research approach. It is interesting to note that this is not a research program marked by a common theory. Nor is it, unless in the broadest sense of the word, united by a common methodology. When it comes to theory, you will find scholars who give preference to the importance of institutions, to cultural traits, or to state elites, to name a few. Regarding methods, researchers in this field are unashamedly opportunistic. They will use anything (statistical large-n analysis, archival data, elite interviews, surveys) to solve their research problems. What seem to unite researchers in this field are three things. One is that their research is driven by the formulation of puzzles that are created by comparing historical cases. A typical question would be "Why do a couple of otherwise similar countries have very different types of welfare states?" Or why did country X and country Y, that are very different, experience similar social revolutions?

The second distinguishing quality is taking causality as connected to temporality very seriously. Such outcomes as revolutions, national differences in systems of industrial relations, or variation in the outcome of major public policies can be explained. Here, a clear line is drawn against postmodernist and interpretivist approaches.

The third characteristic is a healthy skepticism toward all-embracing universal theories, such as the rational choice theory or the theory about modernization. The argument for this is simple, yet important. The variation we can see around the world is simply too great to be explained by any such "theory of everything." Clear examples would be variation in corruption, or variation in union density. In game-theoretical terminology, researchers in this field are interested in explaining why agents, faced with similar problems, end up in very different equilibria. To take one example, in France, less than 10% of all workers are union members, while in Sweden over 85% join unions. It is certainly impossible to explain this by referring to any form of pure individual rationality. What we need is a historical explanation of why the "payoff" of being a union member has become so different in various countries. In a similar vein, a theory positing that both Palermo and Oslo can be explained by referring to agents' cultural understanding of the state is not very helpful. What we need are historical explanations of why such different cultural understandings of the state have come to exist, and how the causal mechanism that reproduce these different cultural understandings operate.

One criticism that has been launched against this research is that it is inferior to large-n statistical approaches in producing universal explanations. In his chapter, Jack Goldstone gives an excellent rejoinder to this criticism. One of his arguments is that historical case studies should be understood as examples of Bayesian analysis, which is based on strong priors. If you, for example, have a strong theory stating that social revolutions are caused by class-based social forces, *one* case that shows otherwise (e.g., by pointing at the importance of state elites) can be "strikingly important."

Paul Pierson and Kathleen Thelen both present chapters showing different ways of handling time and sequences of events in historical explanations. Pierson gives a fresh account of how to view "threshold effects" and of how and when agents can suddenly change their expectations of others' likely behavior. This approach should be important in cases like the outbreak of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia. Thelen's chapter serves to remind us about the stickiness of many political institutions and how we can explain institutional evolution. Her example (skill formation in different systems of industrial relations) is fascinating.

In his chapter, Peter A. Hall points at the discrepancy between recent developments in our ontological understanding of how societal causality operates, and our standard repertoire of methods, especially the use of multivariate regression analysis in comparative politics. His claim that "the ontologies of comparative politics have substantially outrun its methodologies" (p. 398) is a new and important argument. His first argument is that we often assume unit homogeneity while we know that this is not the case. For example, six years of conservative rule in the 1930s are not equivalent to six years of conservative rule in the 1980s. Secondly, the development of an ontology that recognizes strong feedback mechanisms, lock-in effects, and autocorrelation between variables over time is not compatible with the idea that the world consists of variables than can be clearly distinguished by labeling them "independent" and



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

"dependent." Strategic interaction or institutionally induced payoffs that serve to strengthen the reproduction of that very institution are but two examples of this problem. Thirdly, we have observations that the event(s) that ultimately put(s) a system onto a specific historical "path" leading to a unique equilibrium may have occurred at "formative moments" very early in the process. Hall's point is well taken, namely, that such ultimately important variables to be found in a "distant past" are hard to capture by using the standard regression method. His main recommendation for aligning ontology and methodology in comparative politics is that analysis should be centered on the tracing of processes so that we can uncover how the causal mechanisms operate.

To summarize, researchers working in this approach have certain characteristics that are to be applauded. They do not have a "Theory" for which they only look for data they know beforehand will prove this Theory. And they have not invested so much time and energy in a certain method that they feel they have to use it whether it is appropriate or not. Instead, they are curious about how to explain variation in important political outcomes, and they are willing to use a variety of theories and methods to underpin their explanations for these outcomes. In the end, they may only accomplish tentative explanations of these outcomes, but they do produce a lot of interesting things to read.

**The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development.** By Isabela Mares. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 342p. $65.00 cloth, $24.00 paper.

— Adam Sheingate, *Johns Hopkins University*

Since the 1970s, the power resources model has been the dominant approach to comparative studies of welfare state development. The strength of labor unions and left-wing political parties has been used to explain cross-national variation in both the structure and substance of modern social policies. However, in recent years, a number of scholars have challenged this labor-centered perspective by questioning the notion that capitalists uniformly oppose social insurance or that passage of meaningful reforms can only occur when business interests are politically marginalized.

In her book, Isabela Mares makes a theoretically sophisticated and empirically rich contribution to the growing number of studies that explore the centrality of business interests in the comparative political economy of advanced industrialized countries. Spanning a century of social policy development, her look at the role of French and German employers challenges the view that welfare states emerge out of irreconcilable class conflict.

Mares begins by elaborating a theory of business preferences toward social policy. According to the author, social policies vary along two critical dimensions: the scope of coverage (the percentage of the population that has access to social benefits) and the distribution of administrative control (the role of unions, employers, and the state in policy implementation). Different kinds of social policies—universalistic programs, contributory social insurance, or firm-level benefits—present different mixes of risk redistribution and control.

The preferences of employers toward the degree of risk redistribution and administrative control are, in turn, a function of two principal characteristics: firm size and the relative incidence of labor market risks (such as unemployment, workplace accidents, etc.). Expressed as utility functions and indifference curves, these characteristics yield several predictions about the social policy preferences of firms. For example, large/high-risk firms will prefer contributory social insurance schemes that redistribute risks but still admit a role for employers in social policy administration. By contrast, small/high-risk firms will prefer universalistic social policies that redistribute risks but relieve employers from the complexity and cost of program administration. Meanwhile, large/low-risk firms will prefer private social policies administered at the firm level, and small/low-risk firms will generally oppose all social policies (p. 37).

With these predicted social policy preferences in hand, Mares tests the theory through an in-depth study of the role of employers in France and Germany over a century of welfare state development. Chapters on accident insurance, unemployment assistance, early-retirement schemes, and other social insurance reforms largely confirm her predictions about the preferences of employers toward various types of social policy. For example, in detailing the emergence of accident insurance in France and Germany during the late nineteenth century, Mares shows the considerable disagreement among employers in different industries over various policy proposals. Whereas large manufacturing firms favored giving employers discretion in the administration of social insurance, issues of control were less important for small firms concerned about the costs of new social programs. At the same time, employers in high-risk industries, such as iron and steel, supported a broad redistribution of risks, whereas employers in agriculture and other low-risk sectors opposed policies that redistributed risks (pp. 104–5).

However, employers' social policy preferences do not constitute evidence of business influence in welfare state development—a mistake Mares is careful not to make. Labor unions, political elites, institutional structures, and the long shadow of past policy choices all make appearances throughout the historical narrative. But adding such nuance to the account raises questions about the role employers actually played in social policy innovation. For instance, with capitalists often divided in their views, internecine conflicts might leave business leaders irrelevant in the social policy process. As the author explains, however, key policy innovations many times hinged on the formation of cross-class alliances between some sectors of the business community and trade union leaders. Political elites often figure prominently in her accounts of these cross-class alliances; yet the critical emergence of these "reformist policy entrepreneurs" (p. 109) is not accorded a great deal of theoretical attention in the analysis. In the case of unemployment insurance, for example, Mares notes that an important factor explaining its early introduction in France "was the



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

broader political ascendancy of left-wing forces" (p. 117), but she does not explore the relationship between partisan context and political opportunity more generally. In fact, one is tempted to combine her considerable insights with the power resources model the book aims to dismantle: Left-labor power is a necessary but far-from-sufficient condition for social policy innovation, as the content of social legislation often depends on the role of employers and the sector-specific preferences of various firms. In sum, by clarifying employer preferences toward social policy alternatives, she in fact muddies the role of business in explaining social policy outcomes.

Nevertheless, the book is at its best when Mares recounts these twists and turns of social policy innovation. She marshals an impressive array of primary sources throughout this well-written narrative. The combination of detailed archival work and rigorous analysis results in a book that makes an important contribution to the study of comparative political economy. More broadly, the successful use of multiple approaches in *The Politics of Social Risk* offers a model of scholarship others will no doubt seek to emulate in the future.

**Global Environmentalism and Local Politics: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Brazil, Ecuador, and India.** By Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 195p. $57.50 cloth, $18.95 paper.

— Kathryn Hochstetler, *Colorado State University*

This book brings a new angle to the study of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) by making local choices, priorities, and outcomes the central focus of its analysis. TANs link actors at local, national, and international levels in campaigns across national boundaries. As Maria Guadalupe Moag Rodrigues points out, most such studies have focused on the campaigns' impacts on governmental policies or on public opinion. Her focus is on a network's influence on a part of itself instead. Are local participants empowered by TANs to formulate their own autonomous conceptions of sustainable development and to gain institutionalized mechanisms to articulate those? To answer these questions, a focus on the internal dynamics of politics, resources, cohesion, and legitimacy in the network becomes central. This is not a wholly new approach and is actually quite common in other fields, but does represent a departure from many studies of similar phenomena in political science. Rodrigues argues that it is especially important to look at the impact on local network members because that is central for local outcomes.

The author concludes that local participants are often not empowered by their participation in TANs. They might be temporarily empowered, but then frequently lose ground through ensuing political backlash or through their lack of capacity to fill new political spaces that the network conquers for them. This means that even apparently successful TANs may be unable to secure lasting sustainable development of a kind envisioned by their local participants. These outcomes are especially likely given that participants in the networks have had only partially overlapping priorities, strategies, and time frames in all the cases Rodrigues discusses.

These conclusions are based on case studies of a series of transnational environmental advocacy campaigns in three countries, Brazil, Ecuador, and India. The strength of this book is in the fine-grained analysis it provides of the workings especially of the Rondônia network over a long time period. Because of their focus on international and national impacts, many of the existing studies of TANs concentrate on the comparatively short time spans of intense nonlocal participation. When the nonlocal activists move on, so do the analysts. As Rodrigues shows, local actors do not ever "move on" in the same ways as their partners may. The willingness of local activists who oppose the Narmada River dams in India to pledge suicide by drowning if their villages are flooded is a stark illustration (p. 122). The book also does a good job at showing the varied and often opposing preferences of local actors. The advocacy coalitions may help bridge these differences by providing a forum in which to discuss them, but may also displace local actors.

While the title *Global Environmentalism and Local Politics* implies that the three countries are given equal weight in the study, half the book actually focuses on one Brazilian case study involving a network focused on the World Bank project Planafloro in the state of Rondônia. This is the only included case study that makes an effort to place the particular advocacy network in a wider set of policies and is the one based on the most extensive field research. The Ecuadoran and Indian cases serve primarily as foils to the story of the Planafloro network and occupy an ambiguous analytical status with respect to it. In the absence of much explicit discussion of why these cases were chosen, and given that they simply confirm—with nuances—the conclusions of the Rondônian case, they add more detail than real analytical insight to the argument. Thus, the three cases together do offer solid evidence that TANs have negative as well as positive impacts on locally defined sustainable development, but the lack of strong variation in outcomes makes it difficult to understand when and why this will be the case. The final chapter makes an effort to set the cases against each other comparatively, and identifies a plausible set of lessons for formulating networks that produce outcomes that are more desirable from a local point of view. Given the frequently acknowledged additional points of view and priorities in most TANs, however, these lessons are more likely to be a guide for understanding some of the ongoing difficulties with such networks than to be a clear formulation for overcoming them.

While these case studies improve on many studies of TANs by lengthening the time frame considered, one problem replicated in this book is a failure to place specific transnational campaigns more fully in the context of national environmental politics. I focus my comments here on the Brazilian case, as it is the one that makes the greatest claim to placing a specific transnational campaign in a wider national context. A 12-page chapter on the dilemmas of Amazonian development provides a brief introduction to some of the relevant actors, ideas, and policy but is not then linked to the following chapters. More problematically, the chapters on the Rondônia case raise a number of issues that have analogues elsewhere in Brazil, which might help to explain why they appear as they do in Rondônia



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

or would help to isolate some of the specificities of the Rondônian local situation. The superficially similar and much more successful experiences of neighboring Acre State, for example, are barely mentioned, although they certainly shaped the expectations of participants about how the network might work in Rondônia. Ecological-economic zoning of the Amazon was a national policy throughout the 1990s, not just a piece of the World Bank's Planafloro project. In one final example, the Rondônia Forum was created at a time when state-level socio-environmental forums were being created all over Brazil as it prepared to host the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The fact that the Rondônia Forum faced internationally rather than toward the national preparatory process might help explain the curious lack of connection to national environmental organizations that Rodrigues sees as one cause of the Rondônia Forum's problems.

**The Futures of European Capitalism.** By Vivien A. Schmidt. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 376p. $18.95.

— Mark Blyth, *Johns Hopkins University*

This is a multilevel book that deals with a multilayered topic. It operates on three levels, the national, the European, and the global, and has three distinct (albeit related) objectives. The first objective is to chart the courses that the three main types of European capitalism (liberal, state, and managed) have taken since the 1970s, and then to detail the pressures that have pushed these "national capitalisms" along these different paths. The second objective is to bring the European Union back into discussions of the European political economy. This may seem a surprising objective given the vast amount of ink spilled on the EU in general, but Vivien Schmidt attempts to disaggregate the effects of "Europeanization" from those of "Globalization" and thus give a more nuanced account of the pressures facing European states. The third objective is to "bring discourse back in," thereby giving greater analytic specificity to our understandings of institutional change and economic adjustment. This is a big and bold book.

*The Futures of European Capitalism* is divided into three parts, each comprised of two chapters. The first two chapters deal with how the pressures of globalization and Europeanization have effected change in liberal capitalist states (exemplified by UK), managed capitalist states (exemplified by Germany), and state capitalist states (exemplified by France) since the economic downturn of the 1970s. For Schmidt, globalization refers to the "expansion of financial markets . . . and the exponential growth of international trade" (p. 16). Europeanization, meanwhile, refers to "the domestic impact of EU decisionmaking" and institution building (p. 4). Her claims here are complex and nuanced. In contrast to hyper-globalists who see an inevitable convergence on a single best-practice (U.S./UK) model of capitalism, and globalization critics who see persistence of existing models, Schmidt sees globalization and Europeanization as causing profound changes in all three models of capitalism, but sees no pressure towards any single model. Rather, through an investigation of "what has been lost" under globalization, and comparing this to "what has been gained" through Europeanization, she convincingly argues that while each state-type has indeed changed, it has changed within its own limits. The liberal capitalist UK has indeed become even more open, global, and market conforming, more liberal in fact, but this does not mean that state capitalist France has had to follow suit. Instead, France's statist tradition has, with the increasing independence of business from the state, become more "state enhanced," rather than state directed (p. 141). Similarly, rather than undergoing a neoliberal conversion, Germany's managed capitalism has adopted some liberal elements, but has not converged on the liberal model. Instead, Germany is evolving into a "competitive managed capitalism" where domestic and EU institutions still trump pressures for convergence, but such pressures nonetheless have created adaptations of the original form (pp. 141–45).

Chapter 2 puts more empirical meat on the theoretical bones of this argument by discussing how states adjust and examining the sequencing of reforms. Here, Schmidt's major contribution is to demonstrate how five distinct factors (economic vulnerability, institutional capacity, policy legacies, policy preferences, and discourse) interact within these different national capitalisms (pp. 62–104). The author argues that the timing and sequence of reforms is best explained by examining how these five factors interfere with global and EU pressures. This is achieved through a historical examination of actual policy adjustments undertaken in these three states since the 1970s. In particular, the precise nature of different pathways of adjustment is considered in Chapter 3 as part of a wider discussion of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each model under conditions of globalization and Europeanization (pp. 134–46).

Given the tight-fitting nature of the first three chapters, Chapter 4 sits rather oddly with the foregoing. Taken together, the first three chapters give an excellent summary of the effects of globalization and Europeanization on European political economies and situates this within the broader parameters of the "varieties of capitalism" debate. Thus, Chapter 4, which deals with the dynamics of adjustment in each of these states, tracks back to the discussions of Chapter 2, albeit with more historical detail. Yet there is a logic in doing so, for this chapter serves as a bridge to the final two chapters of the book that deal with the politics of ideas or, as Schmidt puts it, "discourse." In Chapter 4 she brings the differences in policy adjustment dynamics across these states to the fore by making a distinction between adjustment dynamics in single-actor systems, such as the UK, and multiactor systems, such as Germany. Stressing this distinction, and combining it with an analysis of the causal properties of discourse, gives real value-added to the analysis at this juncture.

In Chapters 5 and 6, Schmidt usefully argues that in single-actor systems, governments typically engage in a "communicative discourse." Given the hierarchical institutional configuration of single-actor systems, the object of policy discourse is to convince agents that a particular program is necessary and legitimate. In such a system, policy is formulated at an elite level by



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

*political actors* and communicated to the wider public. In contrast, in multiactor systems, policy is formulated by a multiplicity of *policy actors*. Consequently, a coordinative discourse that seeks to make agreement among a variety of policy actors possible so that reform can take place becomes more important. Though each system needs both coordinative and communicative discourses to make reform happen, the differing institutional configurations of multi- and single-actor systems "select" for different discursive frameworks to both legitimize and make the case for reform (pp. 231–39). For Schmidt, discourses are not post hoc rationalizations; they are instead the very essence of making policy reform, and wider institutional change, possible.

The payoff to making such a distinction is that it allows us to understand why, in multiactor systems such as Germany, early and radical reform is so difficult. Constructing a reformist coordinative discourse that can satisfy numerous policy actors is difficult since it must attempt to encompass, even challenge, a number of different interests and prevailing discourses. The resulting communicative discourse is likely to be less elaborate and, therefore, less persuasive. In contrast, in single-actor systems where the concentration of power is high and policy is formulated at an elite level, the communicative discourse is likely to be elaborate and thus more functional for pursuing radical reforms (pp. 239–43). Chapter 6 substantiates these claims through an examination of the economic reform discourses of the UK, France, and Germany, and goes a long way in explaining the different timing of reforms and the degrees of success each of these states has exhibited over the past 20 or more years.

This is an ambitious book. Read one way, it is an excellent compliment to Peter A. Hall's *Governing the Economy* (1986). It charts the different paths taken by these states since the period covered by Hall and brings the effects of globalization and Europeanization into the analysis. Read another way, it complements later ideational studies of political economy by developing a "discursive institutionalism" that sees discourse—"whatever policy actors say to one another and to the public . . . about a given policy program" (p. 6) as an integral part of policy and institutional reform.

If there is a tension in the work, it lies in the depth of its constructivism. Sometimes discourse is seen as transformative of interests and institutions. Yet at other times it plays a distant second fiddle to more "brute material" factors. How Schmidt treats globalization is illustrative in this regard. At points, she makes the case that globalization is an instrument used by politicians to effect change—a "rationale" (p. 13) that seems to suggest that the real sources of policy change lie elsewhere. Similarly, the role of states in authorizing globalization is acknowledged (p. 21). Yet in other places globalization is seen as an "out-there" material force that states simply have to adapt to (even if the numbers provided are sometimes a little underwhelming—see, for example, p. 120, Table 3.3, Inward FDI flows). Globalization, in this voice, is a material crisis that states have to deal with—period.

But such a position sits awkwardly with the main thrust of the argument: how discourse is absolutely essential, not just to make reform happen but to narrate a particular set of economic circumstances *as constituting a crisis worthy of reform in the first place*. For example, the British economic crisis of the late 1970s was narrated by the governing Conservative Party as a crisis of employment when in 1979 unemployment topped 500,000. By 1983, unemployment neared 4 million and yet this was singularly *not* seen as a crisis *precisely because of the power of the Conservatives' communicative discourse* to reframe the same "fact" of unemployment. Schmidt's analytic framework, as elaborated in Chapter 5, is fully capable of recognizing such a "deep constructivism" and indeed does so in its discussion of the failures of neoliberal reforms in France. Yet more often than not, the author chooses not to take this next step, with the consequence that economic forces are given a materiality that the text itself often contests. Given the complexity of these issues and the sheer scope covered, such tensions are probably unavoidable and in no way detract from the many contributions contained therein. *The Futures of European Capitalism* is an excellent contribution both to comparative political economy and the burgeoning literature on ideas and political change. It is sure to become a standard reference for scholars working in both areas.

**Agenda-Setting Dynamics in Canada.** By Stuart N. Soroka. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002. 168p. $75.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.

— Evert A. Lindquist, *University of Victoria*

The literature on agenda setting has gathered momentum in recent years by tapping into garbage-can models, exploring the dynamics of policy subsystems and decision making, and relying on increasingly sophisticated empirical techniques. Stuart Soroka makes two important contributions with this book: First, he develops an integrating framework for the sprawling literature on agenda setting, and second, he attempts to measure and test hypotheses on agenda-setting dynamics in a parliamentary and federal political system.

The book generally aims to explore why "media, public and policy agendas move together on certain issues and not on others" and the extent to which they relate to real-world indicators (p. 3). Two goals driving the study are to "empirically map relationships between the media, the public, and policy institutions in Canada using an agenda-setting framework," and to confirm "the role of agenda-setting as a coherent and useful model of communications" because the "literature reflects an unfortunate combination of diversity and division" (p. 4).

The first chapter provides a succinct review of the literature and persuasively calls for an expanded model of agenda setting that encompasses the *media agenda* (e.g., news media, influential media, polling agenda, and entertainment media), *public agenda* (e.g., interest groups, influentials, family/groups/friends, issue publics), *policy agenda* (e.g., president/prime minister, lower house, committees, political parties, upper house, bureaucracy), and *real-world factors*. These factors, in principle, can exert influence in almost any direction, but what animates this basic integrating and organizing framework is that



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

different issues should result in different patterns of causal influence.

Chapter 2 reviews previous work on issue types and proposes a new typology of issues—prominent, sensational, and governmental—each hypothesized to have different patterns of causality among media, public, and policy agendas and real-world factors. It briefly introduces the cases chosen for each issue type: prominent (inflation, unemployment), sensational (AIDS, crime, environment), and governmental (deficit/debt, national unity, taxes). The issues are tracked from 1985 to 1995 for several data-related reasons. The next three chapters review past approaches to collecting data, discuss strategies and choices for operationalizing variables in a Canadian context, and test hypotheses for the media, public, and policy agendas, respectively. Chapter 6 sets out the general model for estimating results; provides time-series data for the media, public, policy, and real-world indicators associated with each case; and probes the directions for causality and the extent of autocorrelation. Chapter 7 steps back and explores how issue prominence might affect different patterns in causality, how issue duration might affect media coverage, whether there exists a leading newspaper in Canada, and—given the nature of many of the case issues—whether the *New York Times* might stand as an important cross-border influence.

This study is rich in findings, and this brief review cannot do justice to them. Using data selected from eight Canadian newspapers, Soroka finds convergence on issue salience (as opposed to content) across Canada, and there is "little evidence of regional or ownership-biased trends" (p. 44). Where the public agenda is concerned, issue salience consistently rises and falls across Canada, despite regional variation in opinions. On issue types, he finds that the hypothesis of prominent issues driven by real-world indicators is supported in the case of inflation and unemployment, but the results are decidedly mixed in the case of sensational issues: The model of media-led change works well in the case of the environment but not so for AIDS and crime. For governmental issues, the 1989 Throne Speech moved the issues up the media agenda, which, in turn, led the public agenda, but for national unity, the media led the policy-agenda indicators. Using an exploratory two-stage approach, Soroka finds that changes in issue prominence and duration affect the findings on issue dynamics from the basic model set out in Chapter 6.

The findings are macro in nature; there is little detailed discussion on how each case evolved, which is not surprising, given that Soroka did not aim to track and discern the role of interest groups, entrepreneurs, think tanks, and policy processes, or how decisions were made. This study does not explore whether some provincial governments and newspapers treated specific case issues differently (e.g., in the case of AIDS, the media and the cities of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver and their provincial governments should have been more alarmed than counterparts elsewhere in Canada); whether there were important differences between elite agendas and those of the broader public; whether think-tank press releases led media reporting and exerted more direct influence on decision makers through other channels; and whether the impact of U.S. government decision-making (the Reagan tax cuts precipitated debate in Canada) was as important as media reporting. Budgetary decisions could be better understood by examining how specific agencies reallocated funds to deal with emerging demands and by modeling multiyear commitments in key program areas. Still, this study covers a phenomenal amount of ground, and its framework can integrate these and other research questions.

At the outset, the author makes brief but sweeping claims that *Agenda Setting Dynamics in Canada* "tells the story" of eight issues and will "merge disparate fields of political science and empirically map the structure of political communication" (p. 3), claims out of character in this otherwise balanced, focused, and tightly written study. The empirical exploration is not sufficiently lengthy or rich to increase understanding of the cases on their own terms, nor does the book fundamentally reshape our understanding of policymaking in the manner of John Kingdon's seminal *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (1984). Nevertheless, Soroka makes valuable contributions by articulating a framework linking related fields of research, developing an approach for tracking agenda setting in a parliamentary and federal context, and making several empirical probes. He concisely and transparently reviews the challenges and choices for measuring variables and estimating relationships and effects; the book would be an excellent resource for stimulating discussion in a research design seminar. Soroka identifies several specific conceptual and empirical issues to take up in future studies, and these results should be well worth waiting for.

**Dismantling Democratic States.** By Ezra Suleiman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 368p. $39.50.

— Jon Pierre, *University of Gothenburg*

Market-driven administrative reform has been the leitmotif of profound, perhaps even unprecedented, public sector reform across the Western world for the past decade or so. It is indicative that even in Sweden (the place of writing), a country that has been fairly slow in adopting this model of administrative reform, authorities such as the Migration Board and the Prison and Probation Board nowadays define their clients as "customers."

There is today a host of literature on this type of administrative reform. Usually referred to as new public management (NPM), "reinventing government," or public management reform, the basic tenets of reform have been to introduce markets in the public sector, allow for "customer" choice among service providers, privatize and/or contract out service production, deregulate, introduce purchaser/provider arrangements that remove elected officials from operative responsibilities, decentralize, and—not least importantly—implement powerful cutbacks in the bureaucracy's budget. As a result, Western democracies have seen massive layoffs in the public bureaucracy. This type of administrative reform would not have been possible without strong normative and ideological support.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

During the 1980s, the Reagan administration in the United States and the Thatcher government in the U.K.—followed by political leaders of similar ideological persuasion in countries like Australia and Canada—launched campaigns of bureaucracy bashing without realizing that in doing so, they pulled the carpet from under their own feet, according to Ezra Suleiman.

We already know a great deal about these reforms. Suleiman's purpose with this book is not so much to present those reforms as it is to ask what all this means and what the consequences of this reform strategy have been. Thus, this book invites a critique of new public management and related strategies of reinventing government from a new vantage point. True, other observers of administrative reform, such as George Frederickson, Donald Savoie, Guy Peters, and the late Peter Self, have raised similar questions, but Suleiman's analysis is original in that it evaluates this reform against the backdrop of government legitimacy and the impact of reform on democratic governance. As such, it offers a powerful blow to the advocates of market-based administrative reform and a welcome antidote to the sometimes rather naive accounts of the blessings of introducing markets into the public sector

Suleiman argues that this model of reforming the public administration has ramifications far beyond the bureaucracy itself; it is a matter of tampering with one of the basic foundations of democratic government. In implementing NPM reforms, "democratic societies have been following a path that leads to undermining, or even destroying, one of the central institutions on which a democratic polity depends" (p. 18). Democratic government requires a capable, professional, and nonpoliticized executive branch, and recent administrative reform has reduced the capabilities of the public administration, as well as deprofessionalized and politicized it. Given these developments and the overall neoliberal attack on government in the political debate, small wonder that citizens are becoming increasingly cynical and distrustful of the public bureaucracy: "Democratic societies are based on legitimacy, which itself is largely based on effectiveness. How can governments preserve their legitimacy if they deny themselves the means of being effective?" (p. 2).

The book draws on a comparative analysis of administrative reform. Such countries as the United States, the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand have implemented NPM most extensively. Other countries, such as France, Japan, and to some extent, Germany, have been more reluctant to embark on market-based reform. Suleiman argues that particularly in these countries, there is a stronger notion of the public interest compared to the Anglo-American democracies. The book offers a detailed analysis of the types of administrative reform that have been implemented in the different countries.

Perhaps more than anything else, Suleiman takes up arms against the notion in NPM that management is basically a generic phenomenon and that the specificity of the public sector is exaggerated. Market-based reform has confused and blurred the public interest and reduced the public space in society. The fad to transform citizens into customers, just to give an example, has driven these unfortunate developments. "Customers are not a collectivity," Suleiman reminds us (p. 55), and this reform tends to disaggregate the polity.

The list of important observations and arguments advanced in the book could be much longer. Suffice it to say that *Dismantling Democratic Societies* articulates a systematic critique of recent administrative reform, which raises questions that should have been raised already when the reforms were deliberated and implemented. This is an excellent contribution to the debate on administrative reform.

All of that having been said, Suleiman's crusade against contemporary administrative reform and its advocates is not without collateral damage. His all-out attack on NPM does not take into account that there are elements in NPM reform that clearly empower the citizen/consumer vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, such as the option to choose among different service providers or a more customer-attuned public service. Similarly, for all its flaws and problems, NPM *could* be a strategy to increase the effectiveness of the public bureaucracy, something which, according to Suleiman (inspired by Seymour Lipset), would yield stronger legitimacy. Increased efficiency and effectiveness is probably the one reform objective that the NPM advocates can present with some credibility. While the author certainly is not an opponent of public administration change, increasing efficiency would in fact ameliorate some of the problems he identifies in current administrative reform.

Secondly, as always, there is the devil in the detail. Suleiman's treatment of Sweden is not very clear. At one place (p. 66), Sweden is said to have implemented NPM reforms "extensively"; later, however, Sweden is reported to have a reform strategy that "is similar to Germany's in that it focuses on experimentation and remains highly selective in the parts of the NPM agenda that it promotes" (p. 141). This latter analysis is more correct than the former.

These are details that must not obscure the overall excellent qualities of the book. It marks a welcome contribution to the debate on the contemporary state and administrative reform.

**The Military and Politics in Post-Authoritarian Chile.**
By Gregory Weeks. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2003. 248p. $47.50 cloth, $22.95 paper.

— David Pion-Berlin, *University of California, Riverside*

Since the coup of September 1973, no one can deny that the Chilean political system has been influenced by the armed forces. A democracy that had earlier distinguished itself as one of the most stable and durable in Latin America has had to fight to recover its reputation, and continues to do so. The outgoing Pinochet dictatorship made sure to leave its imprint on the Chilean constitution and democratic institutions in an attempt to protect military interests into the future. To what extent have these efforts obstructed the civilian quest for supremacy over the armed forces? To what extent are civilians gradually gaining the upper hand?

These questions guide much of the research in Gregory Weeks's book. Weeks argues that military influence in Chile



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

remains decisive and that if civilians are ever to fully subordinate the armed forces to their will, they must make key decisions regarding vital issues within the official centers of power. These centers include, first and foremost, the Defense Ministry, as well as the National Security Council (NSC), the Congress, and the judiciary. If, on the other hand, the military eludes these centers in the posttransitional period by shifting decision-making encounters into semiformal venues, then it will be much more difficult for civilians to succeed.

Many scholars would agree with Weeks that formal institutions like the Defense Ministry matter. When heretofore politicized militaries agree to work within proper channels, they exhibit a self-restraint that greatly benefits democratic civilian control. Unfortunately for Chile, the armed forces have repeatedly skirted the Defense Ministry in favor of unofficial venues. The author is at his best when detailing this circumvention and the ministerial frailties. He is also right on the mark when noting how Congress failed to assume a forceful role in civil–military affairs due to lack of expertise and resources.

Weeks structures his book primarily around a series of military-governmental flashpoints during the 1990–98 period: a nationwide military alert, a military deployment in front of army headquarters, the forced resignation of Carabineros head Rodolfo Stange, the arrest of Manuel Contreras, and the congressional accusation against Pinochet. For each, he wants to know what salience the issues had for the military, to whose benefit these conflicts were resolved, and where interactions occurred. If we follow the author's argument, then military victories over key issues outside the confines of official channels would pose the greatest obstacles to civilian control. Conversely, civilian successes over key issues within official channels would enhance civilian control. Presumably, semiformal interactions would be less objectionable if they involved disputes over matters less vital to military core interests.

It is here that the author's characterization of events and points of emphasis and deemphasis generates more ambiguity than clarity about these assertions. Huge attention is devoted to crises provoked over relatively minor issues. The 1990 military alert was set off by an investigation into a fraudulent check-writing scheme that implicated Pinochet's son. The 1993 deployment seemed to be triggered by a series of annoyances, including the rather mundane issue of bureaucratic sluggishness within the Defense Ministry. While small incidents may add up, none of these alone attacked the vital interests of the institution. Yet these crises were undoubtedly serious, suggesting that the military were looking for virtually any pretext to ignite a confrontation that might weaken their civilian overseers.

The second and more serious difficulty is that the author emphasizes crises overshadowed by other events that place civil–military relations in a much more positive light—events which he chose to discount or ignore. For example, he details how the former head of the Directorate of National Intelligence, Manuel Contreras, played cat and mouse with the authorities before finally submitting to arrest over his conviction in the Orlando Letelier assassination. Weeks maintains that the military had won the public relations war by portraying that arrest as the end of judicial recriminations and the beginning of an era of forgiveness. In fact, the Contreras arrest proved to be the preface to a volume of judicial inquests and indictments of military officers that continues to this day.

Eleven pages are devoted to a 1998 congressional accusation aimed at blocking Pinochet's appointment as Senator for Life. The accusation failed, under the weight of veiled threats from the army, thus proving to the author how politically powerful the military was. But this setback was eclipsed just two years later by judicial actions that stripped Pinochet of his parliamentary immunity from prosecution for human rights offenses. To avoid his possible imprisonment, his lawyers were forced to argue that he was too mentally feeble to stand trial, thus barring him from public office as well. Civilians had achieved their goal of removing Pinochet from the Senate, yet the author devotes only one sentence to this historic event.

It is also unclear whether military circumvention of the National Security Council was a good or bad thing. Through constitutional amendment, civilians were able to weaken the military's grip on the NSC. Thus, the military routinely skirted the Council in favor of semiformal political contact and confrontations. Rather than focusing on the civilian victory—one that denied the armed forces a winning majority on the NSC—the author oddly concludes that the Council constituted a permanent challenge to civilian supremacy merely because the military reserved the *right* to convoke a meeting—a right, it turns out, it seldom used. But was military avoidance of the NSC a setback for civilian control? Not necessarily. Plausibly, civilians were better off precisely because the military could no longer push its weight around inside the Council.

In general, it is unclear whether or not the military's use of semiformal contact points in the posttransition helped to undermine or enhance civilian supremacy. At times, unofficial encounters seemed to have eased tensions and built civil–military trust. By the author's own depictions, the two sides enhanced mutual understandings by coming together to write the National Defense Book in 1997 and by helping to clear the air on the fate of the "disappeared" with the *Mesa del Diálogo* that commenced in 1999. Perhaps neither of these semiformal encounters directly contributed to greater civilian control, but neither did they thwart such efforts.

These problems notwithstanding, *The Military and Politics in Post-Authoritarian Chile* should be read by everyone concerned with the relation between democracy and the armed forces. It is a timely volume that advances our knowledge of the subject and stimulates further debate. It is a well-researched, well-written volume that should prove both interesting and useful to scholars and students alike.

**Islamic Political Identity in Turkey.** By M. Hakan Yavuz. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 352p. $49.95.

— Vali Nasr, *Naval Postgraduate School*

In November 2002, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the majority of the votes in the general elections and formed the government. AKP's electoral victory was a



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

major development in Turkish politics, one that was the culmination of the growing importance of Islamic identity since the 1980s, but it also reflected the impact of the liberalization of the country's economy and politics in the 1990s. AKP was formed by a breakaway faction of the main Turkish Islamic political movement, disavowing that movement's more contentious Islamic demands in order to adopt a moderate and democratic platform. The meteoric rise of a party with origins in Islamic activism in the most secular Muslim country, one that has served as the paragon for secularism across the Muslim world, is a member of NATO, and is an aspirant to membership in the European community, has raised a number of interesting questions. There is much in the example of Turkey that is instructive for the study of Islamic activism, but there has so far been a dearth of studies on the subject. Hakan Yavuz's seminal study seeks to fill that lacuna.

The AKP phenomenon reinforces belief in the ineluctable victory of Islam over secularism, yet challenges many of the dominant assumptions about the unchanging nature of Islamic activism and its attitude toward politics. Yavuz's central thesis is that in Turkey, Islamic activism has flourished in the crucible of democratization and economic liberalism, and has its base of support among those who favor globalization and Turkey's integration into the European community. This is possible in Turkey because its Islamic identity is both culturally plural and "modern." Yavuz sees the nature of contemporary Islamic activism in Turkey as a product of state–society relations. The Kemalist state sought to dominate that relationship but has failed. Still, in the process, it has greatly influenced Turkish society and, hence, the nature of Islamic activism in it. This is an important point, which the author could have explored more fully.

Yavuz instead seeks to show that the growing prominence of Islam in Turkey is a consequence of the weakening of Kemalist ideology and its sources of support in state institutions—suggesting that secularism, far from having grown roots in Turkish society, has remained largely dependent on state fiat, which is now on the decline owing to the shrinking of state control of the economy and politics. Islam had never really lost the cultural battle to secularism; it was rather Turkish society that had lost ground to the state. With the weakening of the state in recent years, Islam has once again become a central force in the public space. The victory of secularism was therefore only temporary. What makes Yavuz's work interesting is that it goes beyond the usual approaches to Turkish politics that have been focused on the study of Kemalism and have accepted much of its claims about Islam and its place in politics at face value.

Yavuz provides a rich history of Islam in Turkey beginning with the Ottoman period, but most importantly, during the Republican era about which very little is known. The analytical narrative then moves on to developments after the military coup of the 1980 and the liberalization era of the 1990s. The author analyzes the roles of the various actors: the Kemalist elite, the intellectual classes and Islamic social and religious networks associated with Naqshbandi Sufi orders and the Nur movement, and finally the new bourgeois elite and democratic forces. He provides a historical framework that allows the reader to relate the transformation of what he calls "Turkish Islam" in the context of changes in state and society, thus explaining why Islamic activism in Turkey draws its power from the very forces of modernity—the new business elite and democratic forces—contrary to conventional wisdom on the subject.

The Turkish case sheds new light on the study of political Islam. Here, Islamic identity is rooted in economic progress. It is facilitated by educational opportunities and the growth of new media outlets. Islamic activism is open to modernity and is receptive to the influence of its economic, social, and political expressions. Turkish Islam, as explained by Yavuz, is less rigid and ideological—in fact, it is surprisingly divorced from the Islamist discourse in the rest of the Muslim world. Its reference points are Ottoman rather than early Islamic history. Its political vision is inclusive of secular ideas and practices and sidesteps the uncompromising demands of Islamist dogma and its goal of creating an Islamic state. Neither is Islamic activism in Turkey directed at the creation of such a state, nor does it view the Islamic state as the guarantor of survival and propagation of Islamic values in society. In fact, as the rise of AKP suggests, Islam in Turkish politics is rapidly adapting itself to the demands of a democratic and economically liberal Turkey. All this may be true, but AKP does not exclude extremist elements that continue to draw inspiration from Islamist ideology on a par with their Arab or Uzbek comrades. Yavuz, however, believes that extremist and ideological approaches to Islam in Turkey are of marginal importance to the larger forces that are shaping state and society in the country.

If it is indeed true that a more moderate and inclusive form of Islamic activism has managed to dominate the political scene at the expense of extremist elements, then the Turkish case is indeed worthy of particular attention. This is exactly what Yavuz argues, and as such, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* will generate much debate. This is an important book, which not only examines the relation of Islam to politics anew and from a very different perspective but also provides a fresh look at Turkish politics. For those who are interested in state–society relations, it provides a wealth of information with historical depth of direct relevance to the theoretical discussions on the subject.

**Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy: Political Decision Making in Modern Democracies.** By Nikolaos Zahariadis. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003. 208p. $26.95.

— Mark Cassell, *Kent State University*

Nikolaos Zahariadis has written an interesting and ambitious book that extends to other countries and later stages of the policy process John Kingdon's classic insight into agenda setting—that policies are the result of streams of problems, solutions, and politics, coupled by policy entrepreneurs when windows of opportunity open.

According to Zahariadis, extending Kingdon's multiple-streams framework demands a clear understanding of ambiguity and of how choices are made when there are "many ways of



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

thinking about the same circumstances or phenomenon" (pp. 2–3). Building upon Michael Cohen et al. ("A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Sciences Quarterly* 17 [no. 1, 1972]: 1–25), the source that inspired Kingdon's original work, Zahariadis notes that multiple streams are the structural factors and cognitive processes through which meaning is created from ambiguity. What is needed is a better understanding of how ambiguity and multiple streams come together to create meaning in different national settings and stages of the policy process. Rather than modifying Kingdon, Zahariadis gives greater specification to the multiple-streams framework in three areas and then applies these new specifications to a set of case studies.

First, while Kingdon argues that policy entrepreneurs focus attention by taking advantage of opportunities in the politics and problem streams, Zahariadis provides a more nuanced analysis of the role that symbolic politics plays in a policy entrepreneur's arsenal. Under conditions of widespread ambiguity, policymakers and the public are particularly vulnerable to political manipulation through symbolic politics.

Second, while multiple-streams theory argues that solutions germinate from within a "primeval soup," Zahariadis goes further to show how the period of gestation and adoption are dependent upon the degree to which the policy community is integrated. In less integrated networks—larger in size, more competitive, with lower administrative capacity, and more restricted access—new solutions are quickly embraced but then follow a long and slow period of "softening" in which they become marginal extensions of existing policies.

Finally, Zahariadis demonstrates that under conditions of ambiguity, people are loss averse and are likely to engage in risk-seeking behavior to recoup losses. Thus, if the policy solution is a large deviation from the status quo, entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful if the solution is presented as a loss. He describes several strategies to achieve this goal, including framing, using symbols, and engaging in "salami tactics." In a "salami tactic," a policy entrepreneur divides (slices) the process into distinct stages, presents them sequentially to policymakers, and thereby succeeds in promoting agreement incrementally.

Zahariadis threads his specifications of Kingdon's model through a set of case studies in four different European parliamentary systems (France, Germany, Britain, and Greece) and a computer simulation of a parliamentary system.

Three chapters examine privatization experiences in Europe, one of which compares the privatization of the telecommunications authority in France and Britain. Zahariadis argues that the coupling of the three streams explains the successful sale of British Telecom, while the inability to link all three streams accounts for the failure to privatize France Telecom. A second (coauthored with Christopher Allen) compares the postwar privatization experiences in Germany and Britain to demonstrate how the level of integration among policy networks influences the trajectory of ideas in the policy stream. In a third chapter, Zahariadis examines the timing of British Rail's privatization, arguing that the success of British Rail's privatization in 1993 was a function of successful coupling by Conservative policy entrepreneurs. Following the three chapters on privatization, which rely on secondary sources, Zahariadis turns to his own research on Greece's foreign policy toward the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the 1990s.

This is the strongest chapter in the book, and it effectively illustrates the usefulness of multiple streams and the importance of Zahariadis's specifications. As a bonus, we learn a good deal about a very interesting case. In the face of significant European and American opposition, Greece vehemently opposed recognition of the fledgling state from 1991 to 1995. The author draws upon his own extensive research and data (including 31 interviews with Greek policymakers) to demonstrate how policy entrepreneurs' use of Greek nationalism succeeded in framing the issue of recognition as a direct challenge to Greek identity. He goes on to demonstrate how President Andreas Papandreou in 1995 succeeded in changing Greece's foreign policy using salami tactics, that is, by manipulating officials to do something they would not otherwise agree to by slicing the process into small steps and using the steps to deceive policymakers about the true objective.

In a final empirical chapter, Zahariadis reconsiders Cohen et al.'s (1972) Garbage Can Model of organizational choice by developing a Monte Carlo computer simulation of a parliamentary system to assess the performance of multiple streams.

Overall, *Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy* is interesting and ambitious. The specifications of Kingdon's model are intriguing, and I enjoyed reading examples of multiple streams applied to national systems that differ institutionally from America. At the same time, the book suffers from several weaknesses. Zahariadis neglects to make a strong case for why one should want to apply Kingdon's model to other settings. What does one gain from relying on multiple streams over other approaches that explain policies in other countries? Particularly striking is the lack of attention to scholarship in comparative political economy by Peter Hall, Paul Pierson, David Soskice, and many others, which goes to great lengths to understand how institutions constrain the selection of policymakers' choices. Indeed, the role of institutions is noticeably absent or underdeveloped in the explanation of policy outcomes. This is surprising since a stated purpose of the book is to extend Kingdon's model to other institutional settings.

A final concern is the book's structure, selection of cases, and mix of methodologies. Chapters on privatization, Greece's foreign policy, and a computer simulation of multiple streams are an odd combination. The chapters differ significantly in methodology and scope. Scholars of privatization, in particular, will scratch their heads at the comparisons and some of the details (or lack thereof). At the same time, the mix of cases and methodologies underscores the fact that this is very much a volume designed to illustrate the efficacy of Kingdon's theory. And while specialists in privatization policy or Greece's foreign policy might take issue with some of Zahariadis's accounts, the book nevertheless succeeds in its primary goal of giving us additional theoretical tools to apply multiple streams to other countries and stages of the policy process.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**Food Fights over Free Trade: How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization.**
By Christina L. Davis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 416p. $39.50.

— Raymond F. Hopkins, *Swarthmore College*

Christina Davis's book adds two important insights to our understanding of trade negotiations. First, Davis persuasively argues that complex international institutional factors can alter domestic protection of agriculture. Using the European Union and Japan as cases and marshaling sophisticated statistical evidence, she details historical patterns by which agricultural policy became linked to wider issues and, in the process, allowed trade liberalization to overcome the political advantages that small, well-organized groups, such as farm interests, possess. Second, she documents the contingent character of the politics of trade negotiations. Outcomes emerge not only from negotiating decisions, such as choice in agenda setting and the use of threats, but also from forces external to the negotiations per se, such as budget pressures.

Agriculture subsidies and other trade barriers in industrialized countries have proved the most contentious area within trade liberalization negotiations because of strong domestic political pressure opposing it. Not surprisingly, therefore, beginning with the earliest GATT rounds in the late 1940s, liberalization of agriculture was largely neglected, and later Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds gave it only symbolic attention. In the last decade this has changed. Decline in the power of farm lobbies, the use of international institutions, and the global harm caused by trade barriers in agriculture have made it possible to link progress in agricultural concessions to gains in other areas, thus mobilizing forces to counter agricultural protectionist preferences within key industrial countries.

Davis's study focuses principally on these international moves within agricultural trade discussions, especially those during the Uruguay (or Eighth) GATT Round in 1986–93. The author also examines a wider historical era reaching back to the 1970s and continuing through the early stages of the Doha Round launched in fall 2001. The core questions she pursues are the extent to which and the ways in which negotiations at what Robert Putnam called "Level I" or the interstate level can overcome collective action barriers inside a country that favors agricultural protectionism. Industrial countries protect agriculture, she explains, because farm sector demands are politically stronger than consumer interests, even though this leads to a net welfare loss to a country. This classic political economy problem applies across various commodity areas and national settings. Davis shows how Europe and Japan, either in direct talks with the United States and/or within the larger multilateral arena, agreed to reduce protectionist policies. While acknowledging that budgetary pressures and other domestic changes may have worked in favor of reducing farm subsidies, she suggests that these do not explain the shifts themselves, either the size or timing of them.

So how do international institutions affect bargaining and limit the power of domestic farm lobbies? Davis answers this question by tracing specific agricultural trade-liberalization concessions as they emerged in agreements accepted by both Japan and the EU. Thanks to the institutional framework and laws set up in trade talks, coupled with the ability to link agricultural agreement to other trade gains, liberalization occurred. Sometimes, as with the case of France's reluctance to accept the Blair House deal, threatening to block the entire agreement, linkage leads other European countries to force the agricultural liberalization concessions. This outcome, facilitated by the institutional framework within which negotiations occur, mobilizes domestic pressures for the entire trade package. Thus, these most difficult and central struggles within recent trade negotiations illuminate arguments raised by international politics scholars, providing evidence that institutional settings have an effect. As a whole, the book represents a fine story about the international drama of global regime building in which securing cooperation occurs through the classic means of issue linkage and arena change.

The case Davis presents for the generalizations about international politics lies both in the statistical analyses and the in-depth tracing of patterns within bureaucracies. Measures of each liberalization move allow her to use multivariate statistics to assess the weight of the several factors that soften intractable positions. Success and failure of liberalization turned on more than a single factor; and bargaining has more than a single win-set dimension à la Putnam's essay of two-level bargaining. The book illuminates the role of domestic lobbies and their power in domestic institutional areas, as well as paths by which these are overcome.

The strengths of the book are her careful arguments to support the proposition that institutional context makes a difference in realigning the bargaining arena and enabling cross-issue linkages under GATT and WTO. Weaknesses of the book are its easy dismissal of the view that the agreed reductions were less than what major countries would have done without negotiations, as argued by Robert Paarlberg (noted on p. 41), and the substantial time she dedicates to theoretical arguments. Few readers will welcome the recurring emphasis on "institutionalist" theory in as diverse a field as international trade affairs. Readers will find Chapters 6–8 rich in stories about how decisions work inside the trade bureaucracies of the EU and Japan in their negotiations with the United States. They will be of interest also to those looking for causal paths tracing the inside and outside dynamics for foreign policy choices. The analysis offers an implicit critique of the bilateral tack adopted by the U.S. government since 2003. The succinct conclusion points clearly toward a multilateral path to liberalization.

*Food Fights over Free Trade* is an original contribution to our knowledge about how domestic politics and international



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

negotiation processes interact. We see, in the domain of agricultural politics, the pull and tug of specialized interests and bureaucracies. Further, we learn how agencies established to overcome collective action problems—both commercial and public ones—can turn to international institutions to make progress.

**Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity.** By Kevin C. Dunn. New York: Palgrave, 2003. 228p. $79.95 cloth, $26.95 paper.

— Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, *Miami University of Ohio*

Created to conceal foreign exploitation of ivory and rubber, the Congo represented the instrument of an extractive colonization system, before turning violent and paternalistic. The Congo is the most egregious example of the ruthless exploitation of Africans for riches. Its independence came suddenly and unexpectedly in 1960, the peaceful handover of power being marred only by flashes of bad temper and recrimination. Once independent, the country descended into five years of sheer chaos combining mutinies, secessions, rebellions, coups, and a botched UN intervention, followed by several years of stifling arbitrary rule, predation, economic ruin, and civil war.

Understanding the civil war in the Congo requires an examination of how its identity has been framed over time, and this book historicizes and contextualizes the constructions of the country's identity along with its political implications. Are we just who we are, or do others' biased perceptions "construct" us, preconditioning our relationships with outsiders and limiting our capacity to fashion and assert a healthy self-image? This important question constitutes the thrust of Kevin Dunn's endeavor, in which he brilliantly explores and applies the concept of identity as developed in recent international relations scholarship. By means of a fascinating journey through the symbolic and discursive universe that has shaped Westerners' mental images of the Congo, the book examines how the construction of identity can explain the current state of affairs.

Although Dunn claims that his book is neither an exhaustive history of Congolese contact with the "outside world" nor an in-depth study of Congo's political systems, he covers well the historical and political landscape of the country. Focusing on four specific and pivotal historic moments, he sheds "valuable light on the politics of identity in international relations, and on the often brutal encounter between the Congo and the Western World" (p. 17). The first chapter, which serves as the introduction, provides the theoretical background to the concept of identity in international relations. Dunn exposes how Western understandings of the Congo, even in the twenty-first century, rely heavily upon earlier representations generated by Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (1902). Chapter 2 examines the invention of the Congo as a Belgian "Congo Free State." It also reviews colonial agents, their behavior, and their attitude toward existing political and social structures and, more importantly, their discourses.

Chapter 3 explores the violent conflict over the Congo's identity as an independent, autonomous entity. Here, Dunn elaborates on how Lumumba's attempt at articulating counterdiscourse on Congolese identity was stymied by his inability to access international discursive space. In fact, Lumumba was perceived as *le diable rouge* (the red devil) because of his radical and leftist leanings, and these perceptions led to his demise. Chapter 4 thoroughly evaluates Mobutu's reinvention of the Congo into "Zaïre." Beyond "mere linguistic change, the policies embarked upon by Mobutu's regime constituted an important reimagining of the Congo's identity" (p. 19). Taking advantage of the Cold War environment, Mobutu succeeded in altering his country's image. This chapter shows how "Mobutu and his agents were appropriating Western discourses on sovereignty and the state to justify their power while simultaneously redefining and reinscribing these discourses" (p. 137).

In Chapter 5, Dunn examines recent productions of the Congo's identity as a culmination of past social constructions. To the people's chagrin, "a multiplicity of competing voices has emerged for the authorship of the Congo's identity, from neighboring regional states to armed rebel groups, from Congolese officials to Western governments and organizations" (p. 19). Toward the end, the dying Mobutu tried to democratize Zaïre, but his efforts were too little and too late. Much as the cancer that had ravaged his body, his rule decimated the whole region, if not the continent. The *Léopard de Gbadolité* epitomized what went wrong in Africa's quest for dignity. His project of cultural reconstitution, fundamental to the mission of nation building, was complex and contradictory. It sought to eliminate the alienations of Western modernity and force a return to the "authentic" and pristine values of a precolonial past, invented through the conceptual registers of colonial anthropology. The contradictions were lamentably obvious since, in the end, culture was to be encrusted in idealized "traditional" practices and values while the state-nation succumbed to the modern corruptions of despotism, decadence, and dependency.

Chapter 6 draws the curtains on Congo's painful burst into existence and its seemingly quiet descent into hell. Its ongoing war provides a moment of rupture that exposes the tenuous and contradictory discursive underpinnings of the Westphalian state system (p. 171). The Congo continues to represent the marker of "evil," a place of backward "otherness," and the antithesis to the West, and Mobutu's death and the Kabilas' tenure have yet to change that image. If anything, events in the Great Lakes region promise continuing violence for years to come.

*Imagining the Congo* is a fantastic study of the political implications of the social and historical constructs of the country, both as a place and an idea. Dunn explores how Westerners since the nineteenth century have defined a large swath of central Africa as a mysterious "heart of darkness" occupied by irrational and childlike people for whom chaos and barbarism are the norm. Despite the efforts of Kabila's son at reconciliation, the stakes seem too high to allow an overall and lasting peace agreement.

Dunn's book gives credence to the aphorism "the pen is mightier than the sword." This brilliant work demonstrates



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

that Western imperialism's most effective tools for dominating other cultures have been as much literary as political and economic. Although the book at times exaggerates outside influence on the country's social and political discourse, it constitutes a wonderful and well-researched addition to the historiography of the Congo that both practitioners and academics will treasure.

**Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions.** By Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 392p. $75.00 cloth, $28.00 paper.

— David Mckay, *University of Essex*

This book is a highly ambitious attempt to provide a general theory on the self-sustainability of democratic federal systems of government. The authors' central hypothesis is that federal states can reach an equilibrium when both state- and federal-level political actors have an incentive to make electoral and other concessions in order to maintain the federal order. In contrast to unitary states, however, the central design feature of federations is not how best to create institutions that ensure that elected politicians faithfully serve constituent interests, but rather the opposite: How can institutions be designed in such a way that the politicians can become imperfect agents of the voters? For if the federation is to evolve into a stable polity, state-level elected representatives must persuade their voters that their interests must be put to one side, at least in the shorter term, because of the sacrifices involved in ceding power to the federal government. Similarly, federal-level politicians have to persuade their constituents to grant policy and other concessions to state governments.

In order to facilitate sustainability, novel institutional arrangements are needed, which should operate at three levels. Level one applies to those constraints inherent in the basic constitutional framework that delineates the powers of the federal government in relation to the states. Level two refers to the general principles underlying the constitutional settlement and, in particular, whether bargaining between the two levels of government occurs within the established institutional framework or outside of it. Level three refers to those institutional devices that encourage integrated or inclusive, rather than fragmented and exclusive, political party systems.

The raison d'etre of levels two and three is to create institutional structures that encourage both federal and state politicians to stay within their constitutionally prescribed authority. To this end, some modes of representation are more suitable than others. Hence, what the authors call "within representation" (such as formal representation of states in upper houses) is preferable to "without representation" (such as ad hoc intergovernmental meetings) because the former are more likely to encourage structured bargaining within prescribed limits. Informal intergovernmental meetings, by way of contrast, may lead to the questioning of fundamentals, such as the right of one government to usurp the power of another. So although more flexible, "without" bargaining is inherently less stable than "within" bargaining. Similarly, direct representation and the separation of powers are preferable to delegated representation and parliamentary arrangements because the former encourages the growth of inclusive party systems with the same parties operating at all levels. Inclusive parties (such as most Swiss parties) help sustain federal arrangements, while exclusive parties (such as the Parti Quebecois in Canada) often undermine them. Indeed, the authors are at great pains to stress that a "properly configured party system" is the key to the survival of democratic federations.

Although the book attempts to build a comprehensive theory of self-sustainability, no clear selection criteria are offered for the choice of empirical examples. Much of the discussion dwells on Russia, a system so centralized that the authors themselves admit that it only just qualifies as a democratic federation (p. 331). But the analysis of the European Union, Canada, the United States, and Germany is highly germane and broadly supportive of their argument. One lacuna is the relative absence of reference to Switzerland, a country whose institutional evolution is clearly more theoretically relevant to their argument than that of Russia—let alone the Soviet Union.

This said, there should be no doubt that Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova have made an invaluable contribution to the literature. Indeed, their study represents a quantum leap forward for a subdiscipline that rarely rises above thick descriptive studies at best and low-level taxonomies at worst. They are, of course, building on the work of one of the shining exceptions to this generalization—that of William Riker. But Riker was the first to admit that he never quite solved the puzzle of why federations persisted—and often prospered—after the original reasons for the emergence of the federation in the first place (external threats) had passed. *Designing Federalism* goes some way toward solving this puzzle, but in the end, the authors do not quite crack it. Their fundamental problem is a familiar one to students of theoretically informed comparative study: how to build hypotheses with application to all cases, when the cases in question are characterized by often sharply contrasting histories, cultures, and democratic traditions. In the end, the authors concede the point when faced with the fact that some successful federations, such as India, fail almost every institutional test bar one, the inclusivity of its party system.

Their answer to this problem is to identify a further analytical category—level zero, or those variables that are "beyond design." These include such factors as presence of a democratic tradition, the prestige of holding public office, public access to decision making, and the absence of ethnic, religious, and religious cleavages with a history of redistributive conflict. When these features are absent (as surely is the case with modern-day Afghanistan and Iraq), then any attempt to build a democratic federalism is almost certainly doomed, as rarely if ever can level-zero conditions somehow be "manufactured."

Of course, even if we could successfully create such conditions, we would still not know what weight to assign to each of them, let alone link any weighting to the probability of success. In the end, the authors are (sensibly) obliged to concede



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

that "one should not assume that an endogenously sustainable institutional equilibrium within the federal format is even theoretically attainable in every contiguous part of the world" (p. 331).

But this is to criticize the authors by the very highest of standards. This is the most important book to be written on the subject since Riker's 1964 *Federalism: Operation, Origins, Significance*. It represents political science at its best—rooted in good theory, empirically rich, and sometimes painfully relevant to the problems inherent in institutional design in complex and heterogeneous societies. It is to Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova's credit that, writing in an intellectual tradition that often produces far too complete explanations, they are ultimately able to put in place only the broad brushstrokes of successful institutional design. Among these, the most important is the way in which party systems structure the incentives that state and federal political elites have to support the federal project. This insight alone advances our understanding of the nature of federalism onto a new and exciting level.

**The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas.** Edited by Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 440p. $75.00.

— Stephen Biddle, *U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute*

Realists see systemic competition as the key to international politics and expect states to converge on something like "best practice" under this competitive pressure. For realists, this should be especially true for military practices, where the penalties for suboptimality are most severe. Realism thus predicts rapid and comprehensive diffusion of military methods, with all quickly emulating the state of the art as demonstrated by the strongest. This view is shared by policymakers who worry about technology transfer and its security implications: Can America preserve its current advantages in the use of networked information and precision weaponry as technology and ideas spread to potential challengers?

The authors in this anthology challenge both this realist expectation of convergence and the policy directions it implies. Diffusion, they find, is neither automatic nor universal. Instead, it is highly contingent, with a host of unit-level variables intervening to deflect many states from adopting the apparent military state of the art. Others pursue this state of the art, but they do so not from military competitive pressures but for reasons of prestige or conformance with transnational norms having no immediate military payoff. The result is greater variety in military practice than realists would predict, less connection between military practice and objective threats, and a larger role for unit-level and transnational variables in international politics. This in turn presents a mixed bag for policymakers. Diffusion may be slower or less complete than some fear. But many of the key determinants are nonmanipulable features of states and cultures. Hence, where diffusion *can* occur, there may be little that policymakers can do to steer or prevent it.

The results are persuasive and important. Many identify strategic studies with realism, assuming that concern with the conduct of war must exclude interest in culture, norms, or domestic politics. This volume shows that clear-eyed analysis of war may require systematic treatment of unit-level and ideational variables—the balance of material resources is not enough. Growing interest in unit-level, nonmaterial variables is among the most important trends in modern strategic studies; this volume reinforces this direction and adds much useful empirical detail.

The volume is also well crafted and the authors well chosen. The editors have clearly worked hard to keep the organization coherent and to structure the chapters around consistent cross-cutting themes. The chapter authors are uniformly strong. The Geoffrey Herrerra-Thomas Mahnken chapter is particularly well done, but (unusual for an anthology) there are few real clinkers in a consistently strong collection here.

The volume is a model for policy-relevant scholarship. The authors speak to questions of central importance for international relations theory and strategic studies, but they frame their questions in terms that enable implications to be drawn for policy decision making. Sometimes these implications prescribe action (e.g., when attempting to transplant doctrines or concepts elsewhere, adapt them to local culture rather than simply imposing foreign ideas). Sometimes, however, the authors caution that effective action may not be possible: Where outcomes turn on nonmanipulable variables, the mark of wisdom may be to recognize one's limits rather than attempting the impossible.

Of course, there are ways the analysis could have been strengthened. The focus on diffusion, for example, could have been framed in a larger context. Diffusion, after all, is a subset of innovation (diffusion is innovation derived from abroad), which is, in turn, a subset of doctrine and strategy (innovation is doctrinal or strategic change). Both innovation and the determinants of doctrine per se have been extensively studied; diffusion is certainly an important special case of these broader phenomena, but if treated as a special case rather than an autonomous subject matter, it might have been possible to draw upon a wider theoretical literature and thereby to sharpen the theoretical insights derived.

The book also has the weaknesses of its strengths. As an anthology, it is well suited to the enumeration of a wide range of factors that might bear on diffusion and to the identification of the multiple causal paths through which this variety of variables might operate. But anthologies are typically better at enumerating than at culling, prioritizing, or integrating such variety into determinate, parsimonious theory, and this one is no different. Causal attribution, moreover, is sometimes assumed rather than demonstrated: Chapter authors more often show covariance of a unit-level attribute and a diffusion outcome than they establish that the outcome was due to the attribute.

Finally, one of the book's more interesting policy findings—that today's ongoing information revolution will inevitably spread, posing dangerous security implications (p. 402)—is in tension with many of the supporting chapters. Certainly, many states have competitive incentives to acquire information technology (IT) and adapt it to war making. And the commercial



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

impetus for IT diffusion reduces cost barriers to military adaptation: Economic globalization makes cheap IT widely available regardless of military needs. Yet if successful diffusion turns on culture, domestic politics, or organization—as most of the book contends—then mere availability of cheap hardware does not imply corresponding military capability. Efficient military use of networked information could easily prove as culturally or politically or organizationally bound as efficient use of any of the other foreign innovations considered here. On the contrary, one could easily use the analyses here to challenge claims for a looming global military revolution based on the rapid spread of IT: In a realist world of rapid, uniform response to competitive incentive, diffusion would be likely; in a contingent, messy world of unit-level and cultural constraint, convergence faces daunting challenges.

Overall, though, *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas* is an important contribution. Whatever one's views on convergence or the emerging military role of IT, this book will be essential for making—or breaking—one's case.

**Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations.** By Sarah L. Henderson. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 224p. $29.95.

— Nicolai N. Petro, *University of Rhode Island*

Sarah Henderson has written a courageous and eye-opening account of Western programs to create civil society in Russia. After having spent 12 months conducting surveys and interviews with more than a hundred activists of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in a dozen Russian cities, as well as doing consultancy work for three major foreign foundations over a seven-year period, Henderson has provided one of the first comprehensive looks at the impact that Western democracy aid—now a $7 billion industry—has had in Russia (p. 5). Her disturbing conclusion is that, despite good intentions, such programs have been counterproductive.

Consistently Henderson finds that learning to play by the donors' rules and tuning language to what donors wanted to hear was more important to successful fund-raising than actually building civil society. By 2002, Western donors were increasingly relying for assessment and disbursement on a new elite, a Moscow-centered "civic oligarchy" with the power to determine who gets money and who does not (pp. 162–63). The perverse incentives of the grant-making process resulted in a lack of grassroots support for many programs that, on paper, seemed highly successful. This is understandable, she says, since it is the U.S. taxpayer, not the average Russian, who is often the real constituent (p. 22). These incentives encourage attention to short-term quantitative results and lead to projects that lack sustainability. The result is "principled clientelism" (p. 28)—an unhealthy dependency on foreign assistance that, despite the high-sounding moral claims of donors, has in fact created a "virtual" civil society, with patterns of behavior that may actually undermine indigenous civic institutions (p. 145). Such results, the author points out, are far from unique to Russia. They have arisen before, in Latin America and Africa (p. 11), where similar "supply driven" assistance programs also focused on the agendas of the donor agencies at the expense of the needs of domestic societies (p. 75).

Yet despite her stark findings, Henderson is reluctant to be too critical of democracy assistance. She draws a distinction between "creating civil society" and the "emergence of a nonprofit sector." While the former failed, she attributes the latter directly to the efforts of donor organizations (p. 167). In her concluding chapter, she even suggests reasons for optimism about the long-term impact of such aid.

One reason, she says, is that aid provided to civic development was merely misused rather than stolen. This represents "enormous progress" from previous efforts that channeled money through the state (p. 168). Still, one wonders whether this is a distinction that has any meaning for Russians. It has also been argued, for example, that the money misused in the privatization of the Russian economy nevertheless resulted in a fundamental transformation of socioeconomic incentives. Over time, the first wave of "robber barons" would be sure to reinvest the assets they had stolen, to the benefit of society as a whole. Judging from a 1998 survey that Henderson herself cites, however, only 4% of Russians trusted Russian charities, while 65% considered them "an artificial face for dirty tricks" (p. 55). The present generation apparently sees a direct connection between economic and charitable malfeasance.

Her second argument, not unrelated to the first, is that funding even unsustainable NGOs is not a complete waste of effort. It is, after all, possible that from them a future political leader may someday emerge. Henderson is correct in suggesting that the unintended consequences of Western assistance can be good as well as bad, but this is scant comfort if the problem lies in the unintended consequences themselves. Surely, investing so much money in democracy should be more than a gamble.

Henderson's solutions convey a hopefulness born of unyielding optimism. First, shift the focus from NGOs to a broader vision of civil society that actually accomplishes things the local community wants. As she cogently remarks, "it was unclear to me why one unfunded group's ability to attract 2,000 people off the streets to a health screening clinic sponsored by the local administration was not, in donors' eyes, building civil society, but yet another cookie cutter round table for a smattering of NGO leaders on 'working with local government' was" (pp. 153–54).

Second, she recommends that assistance be shifted from large grants that favor the well connected to small grants that build ties of friendship and mentoring within the local community. A good suggestion, but, as Henderson herself recognizes, one that runs headlong into the reality that implementing it would mean asking development agencies "to put themselves out of work" (p. 173).

It might make more sense to begin by addressing a problem that runs like a red skein throughout the book—the striking imbalance in accountability. While aid recipients are burdened by an endless stream of paperwork—in 1998 over 50% had to write monthly progress reports to the U.S. Agency



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

for International Development (USAID)—Western donors have almost no accountability. "In the end," as one senior program officer at the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) put it, "IREX is always blaming USAID, USAID always blames the State Department and Congress, and so it goes" (p. 87).

Henderson's account of her research methodology in Appendix A should be required reading for graduate students. In addition to providing a thoughtful description of the methodological and cultural problems she faced crafting culturally meaningful surveys, it is an inspiring tale of intellectual perseverance in the face of skepticism about the value of mailing surveys cold to an "unsophisticated" Russian population. Disproving the conventional wisdom, she got a 52% response rate, with more responses from smaller cities than from large urban centers! It seems that local civic activists had a lot to get off their chests, but no one had thought to ask them.

*Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia* is a rare gem, a detailed case study that provides crucial insights into the working assumptions of U.S. foreign assistance. It does for democracy assistance what Janine Wedel's *Collision and Collusion* (1998) did for Western economic assistance to Eastern Europe, exposing the counterintuitive impact that well-meaning but poorly thought-out programs can have. While it is hard to be sanguine about policymakers heeding these lessons, as Henderson herself might say, one can always hope.

**Regions of War and Peace.** By Douglas Lemke. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 235p. $70.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

— Daniel S. Geller, *Wayne State University*

I highly recommend Douglas Lemke's book to all scholars and students who study international conflict and war. This study is an extension of work conducted by the author since the early 1990s, some of which was published in the major quantitatively oriented journals in the field of international politics. The book integrates and advances the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of those earlier studies and makes a notable contribution in the area of peace and conflict analysis. I believe that although it is of primary interest to scholars, it may prove useful in advanced undergraduate classes on international relations and in graduate-level courses on international conflict.

Lemke proposes revisions to standard power transition theory and extends that thesis to an explanation of minor power wars. He hypothesizes that within both global and local power hierarchies, preponderance in capabilities by a dominant state decreases the likelihood of war. If a dissatisfied challenger achieves power parity with the dominant state (in either global or local hierarchies), the probability of war is postulated to increase. Hence, this "multiple hierarchy" model moves power transition theory into the context of regional interactions. The book also contains an excellent review of traditional scholarly works that touch on the subject of multiple hierarchies (e.g., Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, Edward Gulick, and Hedley Bull, among others).

The book opens with an interesting and insightful discussion of the differences between generalist and area studies and then applies the distinction to the study of war. The author correctly notes the prevailing tendency of generalists to apply theories designed to explain only major power behavior to minor power dyads and to do so without consideration of possible regional differences. The potential costs of this research strategy are clearly drawn.

In Chapter 2, Lemke presents an excellent discussion and clarification of the "timing problem" of war occurrence in power transition theory, plausibly explaining why unstable capability balances at any point around general parity between satisfied and dissatisfied states should be associated with the onset of war. Chapter 4 describes his technique for delineating international regions. I consider this aspect of his work to be a major achievement. His identification of "local hierarchies" in terms of the ability to interact militarily is both novel and important. The statistical analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 are performed expertly and explained so carefully that even readers with little or no statistical background will be able to follow and understand the analysis.

One of the more interesting aspects of the book involves an examination of an apparent "African Peace" that the author identifies in his analysis. Here, he explores a variety of possible explanations that would discount the finding, rejecting them one by one, until he is satisfied that the statistical evidence is substantive. He concludes by offering a credible rationale for the cross-regional variation in his results.

I have only a few quibbles with the study: First, Lemke's discussion of the "prevention problem" in Chapter 2 ignores several empirical studies dealing with power balances and the initiation of preventive wars by status quo defenders. The findings of these studies are relevant to this component of power transition theory and are supportive of the basic thesis. Second, the discussion of the South Asia local hierarchy in Chapter 4 is a bit truncated. Specifically, the absence of China in this hierarchy requires an explanation. Not only do Indian/Chinese military plans and weapons procurement policies consider future conflict, but the dyad also engaged in war in 1962. Third, I am not convinced of the validity of "extraordinary military buildups" as an indicator of dissatisfaction with the status quo (Chapter 4, pp. 104–9). However, Lemke goes to great lengths to explain his choice, and readers will have to reach their own conclusions about the validity of the measure.

My final quibble concerns the discussion (in Chapter 8, pp. 202–4) of "rebel states" acting "as though they were great powers," which is given as an explanation for major power/minor power wars that produce greater-than-average battle deaths. This account might have benefited from an observation that major power involvement in regional politics frequently pits the major power against a dominant regional state. In other words, it is not necessarily the minor power "acting as though it were a Great Power" that stimulates conflict, but rather major power intervention in distant areas that provokes violence with a local power at or near the apex of a regional hierarchy. Such an observation would not be



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

inconsistent with the theoretical foundation of the multiple hierarchy model.

Again, these are merely quibbles. Lemke's *Regions of War and Peace* is an excellent work that not only broadens and enhances the research program of power transition theory, but also raises important questions about the impact of multiple hierarchies and regional variation in the study of international politics. It is a major achievement by an accomplished young scholar.

**Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate.** Edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 286p. $70.00 cloth, $28.00 paper.

— Virginia Haufler, *University of Maryland, College Park*

International trade is often wrapped up in a package with many good things—wealth, development, democracy, and peace. The proposition that increased trade is related to pacific international relations is one of the most well-known tenets of liberal theory. Despite its long history in political thought, the relationship between trade and peace has not been subject to extensive and systematic analysis until recently. In this edited volume, Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins collect some of the most current thinking addressing the theoretical and methodological issues that arise in the quest to conceptualize and test the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict. Understanding this relationship is important both theoretically and for policy reasons: Many policymakers today assume that increased trade will create a more peaceful world.

The introductory chapter by Mansfield and Pollins is worth the price of the book alone. They examine the evolution of research on this topic, surveying the different approaches and their strengths and weaknesses, and making valuable suggestions for future research. Anyone interested in becoming quickly familiar with the main lines of debate could do no better than to read this chapter closely. However, close reading of the rest of the volume is rewarding in demonstrating the wide range of approaches, criticisms, and empirical analyses of this topic. The volume as a whole is organized into two sections—the first addressing the theoretical foundations of the interdependence-conflict link, and the second examining methodological issues and developments.

A number of themes run throughout the 20 chapters. Many authors correctly point to the need to go beyond positing a correlation between economic interdependence and peace to examine the causal logic behind it. In other words, if the relationship holds, we need to understand *why* and *how* this might be so. This requires a theory of the state and its relationship to society (Beth Simmons); analysis of domestic politics, including the role of democracy, leadership, and domestic coalitions (Christopher Gelpi and Joseph M. Grieco, Etel Solingen, Gregory D. Hess); and economic statecraft (Bruce Russett, Michael Mastanduno).

The authors differ in the emphasis they place on whether trade influences the likelihood of conflict through economic opportunity costs, versus its role in signaling intentions and providing information. The classic liberal argument of Kant is that war is too costly when trade between countries is high. James D. Morrow, Erik Gartzke, and Arthur A. Stein argue instead that trade provides information that signals intentions. Jack Levy's chapter explores more fully the economic opportunity cost hypothesis, but includes issues of strategy, credibility, and information in an extensive examination of alternative explanations. Russett and Mastanduno treat trade as an instrument of policy, without adopting the information/signaling approach. Russett argues that trade suppresses violent conflict, in combination with other factors such as democracy and alliances. Mastanduno is skeptical about the long-term effectiveness of using trade to change the foreign policy of another state. Both Russett and Levy, in very different ways, address research design issues that come up again in the chapters devoted specifically to methodology.

The authors demonstrate effectively that different definitions of the two key variables of interdependence and conflict can lead to different results. Kant's original argument was that trade reduces war, but recent research has often used data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) instead. Other definitions of the dependent variable are possible, such as political contests (Gartzke); trade conflict (Stein); regional stability (Solingen); or some combination of war, MIDs, and fatal disputes (Russett). Interdependence is most often defined in terms of the trade/GDP ratio, which both Russett and John Oneal defend. But it might also be conceptualized to include capital flows or globalization (Gartzke, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard) or preferential trading arrangements (Edward D. Mansfield). One of the key areas of methodological debate is whether the unit of study is the state, or dyads, and results vary significantly depending on the approach adopted.

Most of the authors here are sensitive to issues of research design and methodology. Levy summarizes a broach range of alternative explanations for the trade-peace proposition, and assesses the appropriate use of large-n research and case studies. While recent advances in this research program have come from large-n data analysis, the volume concludes with two interesting chapters that examine the value of qualitative approaches (Ripsman and Blanchard) and simulations (David H. Bearce and Eric Fisher). Both Katherine Barbieri and Jon C. Reuveny provide excellent overviews of the biases and constraints in the data, such as the lack of complete historical data, limited information on the developing world, and the fact that most existing data is annual and not continuous. A number of authors point to time as an important confounding variable, with Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter, and Christopher J. Zorn surveying new statistical models that incorporate the temporal dimension. Richard Timpone, in a fairly technical chapter, discusses statistical techniques to take account of the endogeneity of the two main variables.

A number of the authors included here are not typically associated with the interdependence-conflict research program, but they consider this program in light of their own theoretical and empirical work. This widens the application of



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

their own research and demonstrates the relevance of this program to broader questions in international relations. The tradeoff made in putting together this comprehensive collection of authors is that chapters are necessarily short, leaving one wanting to see more. Many of the pieces simply introduce an issue or problem without carrying through with an application.

Not all of the chapters work as well as others, and not all the arguments are clearly presented or persuasive. The authors themselves certainly do not all agree on the issues they raise, but they engage the reader in an ongoing set of debates. It is interesting that both Simmons and Barbieri are alone in including Marxist theories as part of their discussion. Simmons takes seriously Marxist theories of the state, and Barbieri looks at dependence as a characteristic of trade relations. Only one author, Mastanduno, brings in a policy dimension, and yet it would have been interesting to include a chapter devoted to the way in which the trade-peace link has been adopted into actual policy. Despite the flaws inevitable in a volume of this scope, this is an excellent survey of the theoretical and methodological issues that animate the interdependence-conflict debate. *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict* should be valuable to anyone who seeks to understand the accumulation and development of research in international relations.

**Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries.** By Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 368p. $60.00.

— Timothy Nordstrom, *University of Mississippi*

One of the most intriguing empirical facts about international conflict is that a vast majority of militarized disputes and wars occur within a very small subset of pairs of states. Scholars have noted the very intense nature of relations within these dyads—dubbed rivalries—and have provided numerous studies of what causes the frequent conflicts between them. In this book, Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor move away from this segment of the literature by treating rivalries, not the conflicts that occur within them, as the unit of analysis. They provide a study of how rivalries start, develop, and terminate, using an evolutionary model of interstate relations. This analytical orientation provides the basis for an ambitious, thorough, and complex portrayal of rivalry development.

The book proceeds in two parts, beginning with three chapters of introductory and theoretical material and concluding with six chapters of empirics and final conclusions. Maoz and Mor begin with a general discussion of rivalries and how other scholars have approached the study of rivalry dynamics. The authors' view of rivalries differs from the two most prominent conceptualizations of rivalry in the extant literature. Rather than considering them to be exclusively behavioral or exclusively psychological in nature, rivalries in this book are seen as bargaining processes that combine the behavioral and psychological aspects. This is a fundamentally important point, as it is the foundation of the authors' treatment of rivalries as repeated and connected games. This point becomes explicit when the authors compare their evolutionary approach to other prominent theoretical views of this phenomenon. Appropriately, they consider this treatment of rivalries to be an improvement over existing evolutionary models.

Chapters 2 and 3 provide the heart of the theory underlying the evolutionary approach to rivalry dynamics. In Chapter 2, Maoz and Mor consider rivalries from the "supergame" perspective, a perspective that is chosen to capture the fact that rivalries are long-term relationships. The supergame consists of 25 2 × 2 rivalry games (15 of which are unique in terms of strategy) that define the strategic context of rivals over time. The key to comprehending where the rivals fall at any given time in the supergame (which game the players are playing) is to know the preferences of each player. The authors posit that preferences are formed on the basis of two key considerations: a player's satisfaction with the status quo and the player's perception of its own capability to alter or keep the status quo.

Chapter 3 builds in the dynamic component of the theory. The supergame perspective provides the context at each time period in the rivalry, but says little about how the players move between games over time. The process by which states move between 2 × 2 games within the supergame is through experiential learning. According to this theory, leaders assess the expected outcome of the game with the actual behavior of the opponent. Learning occurs when a leader reconciles expected and actual behavior and adjusts preferences accordingly, the result of which is a new game being defined by the new set of preferences. Pulling the different components of Chapters 2 and 3 together puts Maoz and Mor in a position to provide expectations about which dyads will develop into rivalries, which will develop into proto-rivalries, and which will be relatively peaceful. Rivalries, in contrast to other types of dyads, should be characterized by shifts in the game structures that are typified by alternating periods of conflict and cooperation.

The first three chapters present a very detailed and complex theoretical picture of rivalry evolution. Given the rigorous nature of the theory, one would expect similarly rigorous testing of the hypotheses. This is precisely what Maoz and Mor provide for the reader. Using both case studies and quantitative methods, the authors go to great lengths to present compelling evidence for their model. Chapter 4 introduces a basic research design that provides the background for the case studies that appear in the subsequent three chapters. The authors are interested in using the case studies as tests of their theoretical propositions and do not settle for merely illustrative case studies. The research design for the comparative cases are as structured as some quantitative chapters, a fact that is necessary when one is exposed to the detailed nature of the data gleaned from the case studies and the more in-depth case studies of Israel-Syria and Israel-Egypt (see Figure 4.1 on page 103 for a schematic of the case study data structure). The final empirical chapter presents quantitative tests of the hypotheses produced by the evolutionary model and provides additional support for the argument.

By all accounts *Bound by Struggle* is a strong contribution to the study of enduring rivalries. It provides a new and interesting deductive theoretical framework that addresses the entire



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

life span of rivalries and in doing so pays more or less equal attention to the onset, evolution, and termination of rivalries. Perhaps one element of the book that will stimulate future work is the relationship between the game structure presented in the theory and the role of exogenous factors. The approach taken by Maoz and Mor, with its focus on learning as the source of preference change, cannot fully incorporate private information, such as issues of domestic politics or a sudden change in capabilities. Thus, while hypotheses concerning exogenous factors are not directly produced by the model, the authors must—and do—consider these factors to be important in the evolution of rivalries (especially in the termination). As it turns out, experiential learning is not the only source of preference change. Instead, the authors allow changes in private information to affect actors' preferences and perceptions. Still, the relative parsimony of the learning and preference-based model is compromised a bit by the role of exogenous factors.

Maoz and Mor present a lot of detailed material as they take the reader through the theoretical and empirical parts of the study. At times, this makes the book somewhat cumbersome to read. However, the authors do a commendable job of being clear in their assumptions and include numerous tables and figures that provide summaries of complex arguments and detailed nuances of the study. The reader should be prepared to utilize the tables as he or she moves through the text. While a couple of the tables are themselves quite packed with information, this provides a nice outreach to those readers who are less technically oriented.

**Our Enemies and Us: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science.** By Ido Oren. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. 256p. $29.95.

— Edward J. Harpham, *The University of Texas at Dallas*

Political scientists periodically step back and reflect on the state of their discipline. Some explore the origins and development of a particular methodological approach to the study of politics, such as behavioralism or public choice. Others place developments in political science in a broader political and cultural context, such as progressivism or liberal reformism. Oftentimes such reflections are laudatory, championing the wisdom that has accrued in the discipline over time. Every so often, however, a critical voice is raised, not only questioning the empirical work being done in the field but challenging the assumptions upon which such work is based. Ido Oren's book is an important addition to this literature. It compels political scientists to stop and think about what they are doing in the discipline and what ideas from the past they may unintentionally be bringing into their empirical work.

The origins of the book lie in contributions that Oren has made to the debate over the "democratic peace" proposition: the idea that democracies do not go to war with one another. He discovered that the debate was trapped in certain assumptions about the nature of democracy that were the product of America's international rivalries. Far from being a detached and objective empirical proposition about the world, the notion of democratic peace was embedded in a set of normative and conceptual assumptions about the world derived from a particular historical context.

Extending this insight, Oren explores how the scientific study of politics has been integrally connected to the politics of a particular era. Earlier reflections generally looked at the close connection between domestic politics and the emergence of political science. In contrast, Oren focuses upon how our understanding of other countries in foreign affairs, particularly our understanding of our enemies, affects our self-understanding of America as a democracy and our studies of politics.

The book is divided into an introduction, a conclusion, and four substantive chapters. The introduction and conclusion try to develop a critical perspective for viewing political science as a social science discipline. Oren questions the consistency of political scientists' commitment to both American democratic values and to scientific objectivity. According to the author, political scientists have forgotten the lesson of Max Weber that social science is grounded in a particular historical perspective and, thus, have failed to appreciate the ideological dimensions to their enterprise. Only by understanding how the study of politics depends upon various ideological visions of the United States and the world can we grasp the limitations and biases of our studies of the political world. After identifying three such ideological visions of America—an oppositional view that looks at American democracy critically, a nationalistic view that champions American institutions, and an accommodationist view that supports domestic reform based upon an understanding of other countries—he explains how the work of various political scientists has moved from one vision to another and the implications that this has for their professional work.

The four substantive chapters investigate four episodes in the history of political science. In the first, Oren discusses how World War I led to a reconfiguration of our understanding of imperial Germany. Once looked at favorably by such scholars as John Burgess and Woodrow Wilson, praise for German institutions and reforms based upon them went into decline, as did the theory of the state that was built upon an accommodationist vision.

In Chapter 2, Oren ferrets out similar themes from the thirties by describing how certain political scientists, such as Charles Merriam, tried to make sense of the phenomena of fascism and Nazism. A science of politics that began with an accommodationist vision in the early thirties was displaced during the early forties by an uncritical nationalistic political science that rejected many of the assumptions about politics and administration held during the earlier period. According to the author, the intellectual crisis that continues to grip the subfield of public administration has its origins in the failure of the field to fully come to terms with the movement from a reform-based accommodationist to an uncritical nationalistic vision of the world. Chapters 3 and 4 carry this argument through the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras, showing how the ideas of totalitarian societies and of a civic culture were more a



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

product of particular historical and political contexts than they were of detached social science observation.

There is much to praise in *Our Enemies and Us*. Oren provides fascinating biographical accounts of leading figures in the discipline, such as Merriam, Harold Lasswell, and Gabriel Almond, as well as numerous other lesser-known lights. He shows how their work was affected by their involvement in government agencies seeking to solve certain problems in America and in the world, and how changes in America's role in the international order caused fundamental shifts in political scientists' studies of that world.

There are, however, some weaknesses with the book. Oren presses too hard in arguing that political scientists have not been very self-reflective about their discipline. The many books and articles cited in his excellent footnotes provide solid evidence to the contrary. I also find it difficult to accept his contention that political scientists have failed to heed Weber's concerns about the importance of one's contextual perspective in social science. Some individuals may have fallen short, but to condemn the entire discipline is going too far. This last point raises a broader question about the relationship between the individual political scientist and the discipline as a whole. Oren paints in broad strokes and moves all too quickly from analyzing the careers of individual political scientists to making generalized statements about "the discipline." Although sensitive to the claim that no one of these individuals speaks for the discipline, he nevertheless suggests that some individuals speak with a hegemonic voice for the disciplinary discourse of their times (see p. 99). Being a prominent member in a prestigious political science department or a former president of the American Political Science Association hardly makes one a hegemonic spokesman for the discipline. To claim that the discipline as a whole is trapped in political biases of these individuals ultimately demands an explanation of the rise and development of the discipline as a profession that is missing here.

These points aside, Oren has written an informative book that encourages political scientists to consider how their work may be biased in subtle ways through funding mechanisms, political commitments, and direct involvement in American state institutions.

**A Certain Idea of Europe.** By Craig Parsons. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 256p. $39.95.

— Walter Mattli, *Oxford University*

This book offers perhaps the most carefully researched analytical study to date of French policymaking in European integration covering most of the post–World War II period. It seeks to show how certain ideas about Europe have shaped the French pursuit of European institutions and, by extension, European outcomes themselves. Ideas, Craig Parsons argues, have provided a measurable "constant cause" fueling the process of European integration. This process, however, was far from linear, as competing ideas battled for dominance in policy discourse and action at all key junctures of integration.

Drawing on extensive archival research and interviews with more than 60 key decision makers, Parsons delivers a thorough account of the battle among three key ideas about French interests in European institution building. He refers to these ideas as the traditional, confederal, and community models for Europe. In the immediate World War II period, the traditional model suggested reconstructing Europe around a dismembered Germany; more generally, the model stands for the institutional status quo and opposes deeper forms of integration. The confederal model favored broad intergovernmental cooperation in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and Council of Europe; such strategy would have allowed France and Britain to supervise Germany in broad continental institutions. The community model saw integration of French and German policies in supranational institutions as the best guarantee of France's future.

It is interesting that these competing ideas of France's relationship with Europe had no direct connection to the right–left cleavage that dominated French domestic politics. That is, positions on Europe cut across domestic coalition building, with similarly placed individuals frequently embracing opposing views. No single idea of Europe ever garnered spontaneously a clear majority in postwar France. This leads to one of Parsons' central claims: When electoral competitions, which were fought over issues unrelated to Europe, installed French leaders in power, these leaders—faced with domestic demands fragmented by crosscutting ideas—were free to pursue their own ideas of Europe. Geopolitical and economic factors are not irrelevant in accounting for economic integration, but, as Parsons insists, they do not offer a sufficiently well-specified analytical framework to explain the selection of one model of Europe over another and, therefore, fail to explain the course of institution building in Europe. In a sense, then, Europe's initial institutional deals owe a great deal to chance and accident. The author offers several revealing examples. For instance, the EEC plan became the object of international discussions only because French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay ignored his government's instructions to reject it in 1955. And the Spaak Report became the basis for treaty negotiation only because a 1956 coalitional shift empowered certain individuals who happened to be pro-community leaders, most notably Guy Mollet, who stepped well beyond his own party, coalition, bureaucrats, and interest groups to pursue a new community deal.

Parsons claims that his ideas-based theory can account for both instances of success and failure in integration: Community, confederal, or traditional projects succeeded when their advocates obtained power on other cleavages for long enough to negotiate and ratify European deals, or failed when unrelated coalitional realignments deprived their advocates of policy control. The book illustrates the plausibility of this claim through a series of case studies of French policymaking leading up to five high points of integration, the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, European Monetary System, Single European Act, and Maastricht, as well as two setbacks, the European Defense Community failure and



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the EEC crisis of 1965–66. The empirical chapters are organized in two main parts; the first one (entitled "Choosing the Community Model") covers the period from 1947, when the battle of ideas began to emerge, to 1967, when the consolidation of the EEC marked the first step in its resolution. Part Two ("From Community to Union") covers the subsequent development of the community model.

Understanding how European institutional deals came about is one part of Parsons's analytical story. The other part, which he calls the institutional construction of interests, ponders the consequences of these deals. Here, he makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the role of ideas in constructing political coalitions in comparative politics and on social construction in international relations. This literature privileges structure over agency, consensus over conflict, and persuasion over political maneuvering. Parsons accepts the literature's central claim, namely, that the intersubjective construction of political relations defines actors' interests, but his analytical emphasis is on agency, conflict, and political dynamics. More specifically, he argues that leaders resorted to party and coalitional pressures, side payments, and issue linkage to get institutional deals approved. These deals, in turn, operate like cognitive constraints that structure expectations, constraining subsequent action. That is, when a set of ideas has been embedded in institutional relationships, actors formerly opposed to these ideas align or reconfigure their interests—not necessarily because they are persuaded by these ideas but because they are faced with a fait accompli that they come to accept as an unalterable part of the new institutional context.

The book is packed with stimulating thoughts on the relationship among ideas, institutions, power, and structural conditions. Some of the causal links among these factors are carefully elaborated. However, not all observations sit easily within his analytical framework, suggesting that there is scope for further theoretical work. For example, we learn that prior to 1947, French elites across the political spectrum shared a stable consensus on the traditional model. Presumably, this consensus was embedded in some institutional framework, conveying staying power to traditional ideas. This staying power, however, turned out to be weak, for a simply systemic shock, the outbreak of the Cold War, disrupted the consensus. Some French elites turned away from the traditional model and embraced confederal ideas, others community ideas. The author's process of "institutional construction of interests" is mostly about why some traditionalists and confederalists came to embrace community ideas. But what causal process explains the earlier convergence by some traditionalists to confederal ideas and others to community ideas? Is it compatible with Parsons's main story? Is it one of many possible causal pathways? In short, how general is his account?

Finally, while the book does a splendid job in elucidating the pattern of mobilization that explains the selection and ratification of particular strategies for Europe in France, it fails to systematically show how parallel mobilizations in other key ECC countries *interacted* with French processes to produce specific outcomes at the European level. French strategies, however important, do not simply translate more or less automatically into European institutional outcomes.

Overall, *A Certain Idea of Europe* is a lucid, provocative, and well-researched piece of work that makes a most valuable contribution to the study of European integration.

**Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization.**
By James N. Rosenau. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 448p. $65.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— William D. Coleman, *McMaster University*

In this book, James N. Rosenau draws together in a helpful, systematic way much of his thinking on global governance and globalization from the past decade. As with other aspects of his work, it is conceptually creative, detailed, and normative. He believes that political science needs to move beyond conceptual frameworks where the nation-state provides the central focus. He justifies this position by arguing that the "the best way to grasp world affairs today requires viewing them as an endless series of distant proximities in which the forces pressing for greater globalization and those inducing greater localization interactively play themselves out" (p. 2). Putting these "distant proximities" at the center of our analysis will challenge distinctions like those between domestic and foreign affairs or comparative politics and international relations.

Part One outlines the theoretical propositions and associated categories of analysis that provide the structure for the subsequent three parts of the book. Rosenau believes that a fundamental transformation has occurred in the world, one that he labels "fragmegration": dynamics involving processes that are simultaneously localizing, decentralizing, and fragmenting, on the one side, and globalizing, centralizing, and integrating on the other. In these changed circumstances, individual persons become less reliant on tradition and more autonomous as they construct and reconstruct their identities, capacities, strategies, and interests. Consequently, any understanding of politics must build upon the fluidity of these characteristics, particularly as they shape forms of micro–macro interactions. Unintentional or intentional micro (by ordinary persons or activists) inputs or unintentional or intentional macro (by elites or collective actors) inputs are all potential catalysts of change.

Rosenau draws on this reasoning to build a comprehensive set of categories for identifying the principal macroforces and the types of microactors who respond to these forces. Beginning at the microlevel, he focuses on how individuals relate to space and the scale of that space. Those who stress a more proximate horizon are said to inhabit "local worlds," while those with more distant horizons are occupants of "global worlds." A third grouping is seen to be so disassociated from public affairs that they have no horizon at all; they are said to inhabit "private worlds." Within each category, there are, in turn, four types. For example, the author defines four types of global worlds: "affirmative," "resistant," "territorial," and "resistant." These twelve categories are then mapped on to eight macrofactors: the microtechnological revolution; rapid



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

improvements in skills; the explosion in the creation of voluntary organizations; the bifurcation of global politics; movements of people; the weakening of territoriality, states and sovereignty; crises in authority; and globalization of national economies.

After elaborating on each of the microworlds and their relations to macrodynamics in Part One, Rosenau turns to some additional conceptual challenges arising from these categories in Part Two. He speaks of the need for "complexity theory," the implications of the skill and information "revolutions," the nature of authority, and the emergence of "spheres of authority" outside nation-states and intergovernmental institutions. Part Three illustrates the value of the conceptual work by presenting five case studies of issues: progress toward human rights; the challenge of systemic hatred; corruption; prosperity and poverty; and governance. In Part Four, a postscript, he provides a sometimes compelling autobiographical account of his intellectual journey over the past 25 years.

Rosenau's conceptual creativity, his passion for world affairs, and his ability to knit together tidbits of empirical research from across the social science disciplines have permitted him to write a book with much to offer political scientists. Those wrestling with the methodological territorialism of the nation-state era in seeking to understand global politics and global governance, as well as those seeking to understand better the vast range of organizations and activities that have come to be grouped under the heading "global civil society," will find considerable food for thought. For those interested in globalization theory, the work complements that of such theorists outside political science as Arjun Appadurai, Zygmunt Bauman, Roland Robertson, and Ulf Hannerz, among others.

Rosenau's complex sets of categories and ideal types are open to criticism on three grounds. First, the analytical framework gives little space to aspects of structural power, leaving one with a vision of fluidity of movement and of individual autonomy that may be misleading. Unlike most analyses of globalization, *Distant Proximities* does not discuss the transformation of capitalism in terms of its global penetration and its perhaps historically unique progress toward globally integrated financial markets and systems. These structural changes in the economy may shape who inhabits which of the author's worlds. Thus, corporate executives, professionals working for global intergovernmental organizations, and nation-state officials working in cooperative arrangements with other states are the most likely inhabitants of several of the global worlds outlined in the book. Similarly, those on the margins of the global economy will congregate in the private worlds and perhaps the "insular" local world.

In providing little place for nation-states in the framework, one also loses sight of power differentials in the system of states, particularly those between the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the one side and the varied states in the Global South on the other. Most empirical examples, including references to nonstate actors, are drawn from OECD countries, especially the United States. Accordingly, one is left with additional questions. Are the 12 types of microworlds adequate for studying social and political circumstances in countries outside the OECD? If they are adequate, would the vast majority of the world's population be found in only a few of these worlds? If so, are we left with a rather Eurocentric view of fragmegration?

Second, Rosenau makes use of the global–local binary, so often found in the globalization literature. Local and global worlds are distinguished on the basis of the scale of the horizon used by the individual. The difficulty in this approach is that it may not take sufficient account of how the local and the global already interpenetrate each other profoundly. If one walks through the Medina in Tunis and sees Indian spices, DVDs of U.S. movies manufactured in China, and firearms from Russia amidst the many French, Italian, and German tourists, can the inhabitants of Tunis really inhabit a "local world" in such a globalized space? In this respect, does not the author's core concept of "distant proximities" itself undermine the local–global binary?

Finally, Rosenau describes the contemporary period as one of "epochal transformation." This claim, however, does not draw very much, if at all, on the growing literature of world historians who have come to examine more closely the roots of contemporary globalization and to draw parallels with earlier periods of globalization. They have stressed the integrating and fragmenting effects of empires and technology in the nineteenth century. They have also moved away from "national histories" to look at the flows of ideas, people, biota, and technologies outside Europe and the United States in the past five centuries. These studies force us to think a little more carefully about what is new about the present era and what is continuous with the past. To Rosenau's credit, however, if the integration-fragmentation dynamic is important to the study of globalizing eras in the past, his categories may prove useful to comparative history as well as to the social sciences. This possibility underlines in another way the strengths of this book.

**China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March.** By Andrew Scobell. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 316p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Wei-chin Lee, *Wake Forest University*

Like heavyweight boxers at the end of a round, the disputing sides in the debate over China's rise have retreated to their respective corners. In one corner are those who stress China's peaceful dispositions in development and consider the country a stable actor in regional security. In the other corner are those who claim that behind the façade of Chinese pacifism lies a strong desire for the fulfillment of "rich country and strong army" and "revolutionary political culture" embedded in the Chinese variant of Marxism-Leninism, and who therefore perceive the country as a potential challenger to the current pecking order of power. These dichotomous views are partially rooted in the two divergent interpretations of China's strategic culture in its use of military force—a nonviolent, defensive, accommodationist, idealized Confucian-Mencian



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

paradigm symbolized by the Great Wall, and a zero-sum, offense-oriented, violent "hard realpolitik" ("parabellum") paradigm as illuminated particularly in Alastair Iain Johnston's (1995) *Cultural Realism*. While each side's position seems well entrenched, Andrew Scobell attempts to combine both strategic strains in a crafty synthesis—"Chinese Cult of Defense, in which realist behavior dominates but is justified as defensive on the basis of a pacifist self-perception" (p. 38).

Other than the concept of strategic culture, China's deliberation of the use of force is further conditioned by civil–military culture and military organizational culture. Substituting the commonly used *relations* with *culture,* Scobell intends to move beyond the usual focus on the linkage between civil and military spheres into an exploration of "patterns of behavior, shared values, norms, and beliefs" (p. 5) between the party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and to examine to what extent China's distinctive characteristics of the close interrelatedness of civil-military spheres went through transitions as the Long March generation of revolutionary leaders withered away. Meanwhile, a study of the "mindsets" of military leaders sheds light on how the military, as a group, perceived the use of force and how their views vary from their civilian counterparts. By adopting the metaphor of a multilayered cake, Scobell claims that China's decision to employ military forces abroad and on the domestic front is a consequence of the interplay of these three cultures, with strategic culture at the bottom, civil-military culture as the middle layer, and the military culture as the top layer.

Five cases were selected from three different eras of leadership: under Mao Zedong (the Korean War in 1950 and PLA Intervention during the Cultural Revolution), Deng Xiaoping (Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 and the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen in 1989), and Jiang Zemin (the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96). Three cases address situations involved with adversaries abroad, and two cases deal with domestic crises.

The general themes and analytical findings that emerge from the chapters are interesting and provocative. The case studies point out that the Cult of Defense is Janus-faced, allowing China to remain flexible in employing the *realpolitik* and Confucian pacifist strands against external and internal threats with claims of self-defense and the use of force as a last resort. Leadership transition through time, especially during the late Deng years, affected the civil-military culture. The PLA became more and more autonomous, especially when the military doctrine was reformulated from "People's War" to "Limited War under High Technology Conditions" in the post-Deng era, and when technical competency became needed to deal with the changing dynamics of warfare caused by the so-called revolution in military affairs. Finally, Chinese soldiers seem to be no more hawkish than their civilian counterparts. Except for the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis with military leaders' strong belief in core issues of national sovereignty and vital interests at risk, all other cases demonstrate that some top military leaders were cautious and reluctant to press for war and held different perceptions from civilian leaders about how and when to use military force. In the end, a Great Wall image of China's strategic culture is not completely in ruins, but we will witness more notable differentiation along civil-military lines with the eventual passing of the Long March generation. A cultural approach to the use of force requires operational definitions and working rules for the examination of empirical evidence. Scobell has demonstrated this best in his painstaking effort to sort out the complexity of civil-military culture and the shift of the PLA's organizational perspective away from the monolithic domain of the Chinese Communist Party.

Despite the quality of its arguments, its wealth of information, and the integration of theoretical frameworks and empirical cases, the book is still not entirely free of drawbacks. Coherence in analytical structure varies with the cases. Although informative and valuable to people interested in the Korean War and the PLA's involvement in the Cultural Revolution, chapters dealing with these cases are less comprehensive than other chapters in tying together the book's main themes with the development of historical events. In contrast, analyses from cases on the 1989 Tiananmen suppression and the Taiwan Strait Crisis are more convincing in showing gradual shifts of civil-military culture and the assertiveness of the PLA in policy deliberation.

This extraordinary scholarly attempt necessarily raises issues for debate. While the application of civil-military culture and military organizational culture to cases on internal use of force during the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen Movement fits nicely and neatly, one cannot resist wondering about the appropriateness of employing the concept of strategic culture in domestic cases. Should the concept of strategic culture be employed without any distinction between the internal domain and the external sphere? In other words, the structural variation between an anarchic international system and a hierarchic domestic system undoubtedly affects the choice of targets, the decision-making procedure, the rules of engagement, and the goal setting in deliberation. Hence, one intuitively expects a higher level of caution, reluctance, and resistance in the use of force in domestic cases than in those dealing with a foreign power. In a spectrum with realpolitik and Pacifist Confucian paradigms at its ends, will we see a clear discrepancy in "cultural" behavior among decision makers between international threats and internal crises? Perhaps, as Colin S. Gray commented in his *Modern Strategy* (1999), "If culture is everywhere, then, inescapably culture is nowhere" (Gray, p. 150). How to employ the concept of strategic culture in various contextual environments still requires additional reinforcement in theoretical construction.

The advocacy of the Cult of Defense seems to offer China the best of both worlds by including, on the one hand, high moral grounds to justify its behavior and, on the other hand, the resort to force when nonviolent means fail to achieve their intended goals. As the author correctly points out, whenever China acts militarily, it can be rationalized as purely self-defense. The answer surely offers comforting thoughts to all parties in the debate, but still it lacks clear policy guidance and prescription, or even a subtle hint regarding why and when



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

China will use force. After all, it really depends on China's self-perception and self-serving justification. The Cult of Defense is, therefore, all-encompassing and convenient in analyzing China's use of force, but, at the same time, it becomes elusive and variable in theoretical examination. In the final sense, readers might come away with an impression that the Chinese Cult of Defense could be simply a body double of realpolitik.

*China's Use of Military Force* is an impressive, scholarly work with extensive incorporation of original sources. Readers would have benefited greatly if a list of names and terms in Chinese, with accompanying pinyin romanization, had been attached. The book is systematic in its treatment and is certainly a pleasure to read. It will appeal not only to scholars of security studies in general but also to all those interested in civil-military relations in China. Most importantly, the author should be commended for bringing culture back into the study of the Chinese military.

**Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.** By P. W. Singer. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 368p. $39.95.

— Andrew M. Dorman, *King's College, London*

Peter Singer has produced a highly commendable volume for the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs series on an area of study that has received relatively little attention within the academic world. Much of the existing literature focuses on the mercenary end of private military companies (PMCs) and ignores the breadth of the industry. Similarly, the debate on transformation has tended to focus on technology and changing approaches to the conduct of war; relatively little has concerned itself with the increasing role of the privatized military companies, yet, as Singer points out, 1 in 10 of those deployed by the United States in the most recent war in Iraq was a contractor. It is not just the scale of the industry at present (one estimate puts it at $100 billion per year) that makes it an important area for study. It is also that this industry covers the full spectrum of defense activities. It ranges from service provision at home to the provision of combat services and military units. This will become even more so as we move away from the linear battlefield and the idea of a front line melts away. Moreover, this is not just a Third World issue; virtually every state uses elements of the industry, with the United States being the largest user.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first examines the rise of what Singer refers to as "Corporate Warriors," placing the industry within developments in military history. It rightly highlights that this is not a new phenomenon. We have seen private groups on the battlefield since biblical times, and Singer cites the example of the Swiss Guard that protects the pope as an example. He considers what distinguishes the industry and argues that what we are witnessing is the increasing privatization of security. He rightly highlights the role that this industry has had throughout the evolution of warfare and that the assumption that the state has a relative monopoly over war is incorrect both now and in the past. He also correctly focuses on more recent post–Cold War developments.

The second part then subdivides the industry along three lines: military provider firms using the case study of Executive Outcomes; military consultant firms using the example of MPRI: and military support firms using the case study of Brown and Root. While this gives the reader an appreciation of the breadth of the industry, it is inevitable that there have been developments since the volume was crafted as the process of transformation continues. For example, Executive Outcomes have left the industry while a number of new players have entered. The industry, like the rest of the defense sector, is undergoing significant change, and therefore any text written on it will suffer from the challenge of catch-up. Nevertheless, the taxonomy is a useful guide.

The third part then considers some of the implications of these trends and raises a series of questions. These include contractual dilemmas, the civil–military balance, and the moral dimension. It would be easy to argue that each of these questions needs more research, which they do, but this ignores the text's role in breaking into this new ground for others to develop in more detail. The text serves as an introduction, and its extensive bibliography and provision of a list of Internet addresses of PMCs are helpful means for further study.

Where *Corporate Warriors* is particularly good is in destroying the myth that the industry is for the Third World and not for the First World. It highlights how the world's leading militaries are using the privatized military industry to support the process of transformation and, more controversially, debating whether particular companies can take over particular roles and, indeed, operations. Here, the United Kingdom's Foreign Office Green Paper on the industry is particularly interesting because it suggests that governments, and indeed international organizations such as the United Nations, may at times be better advised to use such companies for some operations than to provide elements of their own armed forces. Such companies are accountable to those who pay them—an area that the United Nations has had problems with when it comes to members' contributions—and may provide a quality that is otherwise unachievable. While it is relatively straightforward to argue against such trends, particularly with regard to the whole issue of accountability, it is worth noting that when we look at the current contributions in Iraq, we often read that the United States is the largest contributor, followed by the United Kingdom. This is misleading. Private military companies collectively are the second-largest contributor to the coalition in Iraq. Moreover, the industry is seen by many policymakers as a means of allowing the transformation process to take place by freeing up capital. As we shift to what Mary Kaldor refers to as New Wars and Gwyn Prins the requirement for strategic raiding, we are witnessing First World powers looking to use their militaries to fulfill new tasks to achieve their political ends. PMCs have areas of expertise that militaries either never had or are reducing in order to focus resources elsewhere. For example, the United Kingdom has adopted a variety of financial models, such as Public Private Partnerships and leasing, in



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

most areas of defense. These serve as a mechanism to raise capital for early modernization (e.g., the Joint Services Command and Staff College or the leasing of C-17s from Boeing) or to furnish capabilities that would otherwise be unaffordable by sharing them with the commercial sector (e.g., sealift and heavy vehicle transporters).

**Getting It Done: Post-Agreement Negotiation and International Regimes.** Edited by Bertram I. Spector and I. William Zartman. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2003. 332p. $39.95 cloth, $17.50 paper.

— Renée Marlin-Bennett, *American University*

The authors of this edited volume make a useful contribution to scholarship by bringing negotiation theory into the analysis of international regimes. As they note, the approach builds on earlier work on bargaining and regime formation. (See especially two seminal works by Oran Young, "Regime Dynamics," in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes,* 1983; and "Politics of Regime Formation," *International Organization* 37 [no. 3, 1989]: 349–76). *Getting It Done* further examines how regime participants continue to negotiate rules after the ink has dried on their foundational agreements. In doing so, the volume serves as a helpful reminder that regimes evolve in response to changes in the international and domestic environments. Gauging the effectiveness or strength of a regime, as these authors suggest, requires analyzing the negotiations that occur after a regime is established and evaluating whether, indeed, the collective action problem the regime was intended to resolve is being resolved.

To accomplish the theoretical task of explaining how regime theory and negotiation theory come together, editors Bertram I. Spector and I. William Zartman have divided the book into two sections: Part I (chapters by Zartman, Spector, and Gunnar Sjöstedt) sets out the theoretical framework; and Part II provides cases studies that apply the framework to regimes for cleaning up the Mediterranean Sea (Lynn Wagner), fostering security in Europe (Janie Leatherman), halting ozone depletion (Pamela S. Chasek), and preventing the use of torture (Anna R. Korula). A final chapter by the editors provides a summary.

Zartman's chapter sets forth a series of propositions about regimes, how they are negotiated and implemented, and how they evolve. Implicit in his analysis is the goal of creating regimes that exhibit "dynamic stability," which regimes may or may not achieve, depending on a combination of system maintenance, adjustment, learning and information feedback, and exogenous factors. Spector's contribution to the theoretical framework traces negotiation through the regime life cycle, beginning with the preagreement stage and continuing through postagreement negotiations. Spector further emphasizes the two-level game character (Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 [no. 3, 1988]: 427–60*)* of negotiations at all stages. Outcomes, according to Spector, can be judged on regime stability versus instability and on maintaining the status quo versus expanding governance. Sjöstedt rounds out the theoretical framework by focusing on the interaction of the principles, norms, rules, and procedures.

An important point that Zartman makes is that regimes impose "an agenda for combat as well [as cooperation] by providing justifying norms and limiting constraints" (p. 14), a proposition that is well supported by the evidence he and the case study authors present. The idea that regimes provide the context for contestation has usually been ignored, though there have been some exceptions, including my own work (*Food Fights: International Regimes and the Politics of Agricultural Trade Disputes,* 1993) and that of William Coleman and Melissa Gabler ("Agricultural Biotechnology and Regime Formation: A Constructivist Assessment of the Prospects," *International Studies Quarterly* 46 [no. 4, 2002]: 481–506).

Also on the positive side, the case studies provide extremely detailed histories of negotiations, with emphasis on the postagreement negotiations. Judged on their own, each provides a highly usable history and analysis. However, the case studies do not follow the same organizational structure, making it difficult for the reader to compare across cases, even after looking to the final synthesizing chapter for guidance. Thus, Wagner, in her discussion of the Mediterranean Action Plan, stresses the negotiating process at the domestic and international levels; Leatherman focuses on institution building as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was transformed into an organization; Chasek shines a spotlight on how an individual, in this case Mostafa Talba, the executive director of the United Nations Environmental Programme, affects regime negotiation; and Korula puts special emphasis on the postagreement problem of governments avoiding implementation of the antitorture rules they have agreed to.

A useful addition to the theoretical chapters would have been a discussion of the constructivist writings on norms, norm entrepreneurs, and norm evolution. This literature provides analyses of norm change and the role of learning that are similar to those of negotiation theory, albeit relying on different terminology. Although there are a few relevant citations (e.g., Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions,* 1989), a good deal of extant scholarship that focuses on the negotiation of norms remains unexplored. For example, works by Audie Klotz ("Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," *International Organization* 49 [no. 3, 1995]: 451–78; and *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid,* 1995) and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (*Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,* 1998) are highly relevant examinations of how transnational activist groups have an effect on global norms.

The concluding chapter, coauthored by Zartman and Spector, identifies possible regime outcomes in terms of stability: Regimes remain fairly static, grow and evolve steadily through postagreement negotiations, or grow and contract unsteadily. The authors show how efforts at regime maintenance, feedback and learning, adjustment to changing circumstances, and exogenous effects add together to explain different stability



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press

outcomes. As can be expected from a thought-provoking work, this book raises many more questions. When normative goals are being renegotiated, how can the effectiveness of regimes be evaluated? Is there an important analytical point at which a regime has evolved so far from its initial set of principles, norms, rules, and procedures that there has been a change of, and not just a change in, the regime? Are static regimes more effective (in terms of resolving the problem they were set up to address) than growing regimes? Is "dynamic stability" a necessary or a sufficient condition for regime effectiveness? By raising these questions and by introducing regimes theorists to negotiation theory, *Getting It Done* makes a worthwhile contribution.

**The IMF and Economic Development.** By James Raymond Vreeland. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 216p. $70.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— Kendall W. Stiles, *Brigham Young University*

This insightful and carefully researched work by James Raymond Vreeland should end once and for all the debate on whether participation in an International Monetary Fund program tends to improve or depress economic growth. The answer is a resounding no in that, on average, economic growth is roughly 1.5% slower when countries are under an IMF program than otherwise, according to Vreeland. This finding is consistent with several studies—mostly written by authors on the Left—although he takes pains to leave ideology at the door. Rather, he puts together the most systematic and exhaustive study of the subject to date in order to show how the same finding can be arrived at with methods that are qualitative and quantitative, empirical and abstract. Although the result tends toward repetition, there is something here for everyone.

The basic argument of the book is that previous studies of the effects of IMF programs on economic growth have been hampered by poor methods. Vreeland takes aim at conventional approaches used in the past: pre-test/post-test, with/without controlling variables, comparative case studies, and so forth. This said, he utilizes some of these methods himself, but only as a means to an end. His goal is to construct a story of why governments and the IMF enter into contractual arrangements, especially since the result is often disappointing to both in purely economic terms.

Ultimately, he argues that governments see the IMF as a tool for dealing with domestic opposition to what are seen to be necessary—though painful—reforms. This insight is nothing especially new, since it has been noted by IMF scholars going back to the 1970s. He furthermore argues that entering into IMF agreements tends to weaken the incomes of the working class—again an insight already found in work by Manuel Pastor in the 1980s but demonstrated more convincingly by Vreeland. The implication of these two observations is that one must conclude that governments enter into agreements with the IMF without the interests of the working poor at heart. Rather, they seek the IMF's political support (even protection) for what will be painful, regressive policies (elites are sheltered from the programs' worst effects, thereby increasing the likelihood of obtaining their support).

The radical implications of the finding are not seriously pursued, since it is clear that the author seeks only reform rather than revolution. In fact, most of the policy reforms he calls for in the concluding chapter are already being implemented, robbing the work of its political potential.

Be that as it may, this is a work that not only answers important questions but also provides a model for multimethod analysis. Vreeland begins the text with a colorful description of interesting cases (interesting in that they move forward the search for theory): Tanzania, Uruguay, and Nigeria. Already with these three cases we can begin to see some of the patterns that will make up the core of the theoretical model. Following this presentation, he describes an abstract model that factors explicitly the desire of a government to be subjected to conditionality. In the next chapters, he carries out a multivariate regression analysis involving the "usual suspects" in order to explain the propensity to enter into agreements, but with an intriguing twist: He applies a probability-of-agreement model borrowed from his mentor Adam Przeworski that is called "dynamic bivariate probit with partial observability" (p. 84). This allows one to estimate the chance that any two actors will enter into an agreement.

I found that a few paradoxical findings are not given sufficient attention. For example, a positive correlation was found between the length of time a country is under IMF agreements and the country's willingness to enter into a new agreement. This contradicts Vreeland's earlier argument that entering into agreements with the Fund carries "sovereignty costs." In fact, since governments are generally able to shift the burden of adjustment to the poor and weak, it seems that the sovereignty-costs issue is overdone (this may stem from the discussion of the Tanzania case where the ideologically driven regime had its own reasons to shun the IMF as a Western, capitalist institution).

While the methods are carefully crafted, explained and applied, two observations emerge. First, the gradual unwrapping of the theoretical model over the course of several chapters generates considerable repetition and a few contradictions. A few variables and correlations hinted at in the second and third chapters are discarded by the fifth. It would have been better to begin at the end to maintain focus. Secondly, given the complexity and uncertainty in the model—particularly since uncertainty ("hazard," "unobserved variables," and error factors) are made endogenous to the model—it seems that it would be a strong candidate for Bayesian analysis since this would allow for a more inductive approach. That said, my hunch is that it would merely serve to confirm what has already been demonstrated. Overall, *The IMF and Economic Development* is a very solid piece of work that is successful at many levels. It will be left to the radicals to seize on the full political implications of Vreeland's study.



https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592704570378 Published online by Cambridge University Press