1

Introduction

Over the past two decades, there has been a resurgence of authoritarianism around the globe.[1] A third wave of autocratization – the declining quality of institutions for clean elections, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly – stalled the global spread of democratic ideas and principles.[2] In 2023, the US nonprofit organization Freedom House registered the seventeenth consecutive year of the decline in state provision of political rights and civil liberties.[3] In particular, the quality of democracy came under assault in postcommunist Europe.[4] According to some estimates, more than two-thirds of the world's

[1] Anne Applebaum. 2020. *Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism*. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group; Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Christopher Walker, eds. 2016. *Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press; Erica Frantz. 2018. *Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[2] Lührmann and Lindberg define an autocratization wave as "the time period during which the number of countries undergoing democratization declines while at the same time autocratization affects more and more countries." Their empirical analysis is based on data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project for 182 countries from 1900 to 2017. For details, see Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New About It?" *Democratization* 26 (7): 1095–1113, 1102.

[3] Yana Gorokhovskaia, Adrian Shahbaz, and Amy Slipowitz, eds. 2023. *Freedom in the World 2023: Marking 50 Years in the Struggle for Democracy*. New York: Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2023/marking-50-years.

[4] Attila Antal. 2019. *The Rise of Hungarian Populism: State Autocracy and the Orbán Regime*. Bingley: Emerald Publishing; Florian Bieber. 2020. *The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan; Vladimir Gel'man. 2015. *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Henry E. Hale. 2015. *Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Paul Lendvai. 2017. *Orbán: Hungary's Strongman*. New York: Oxford University Press; Adam Przeworski. 2019. *Crises of Democracy*.

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population currently live in autocracies.[5] The persistence of "democratic regression" has far-reaching implications for the pursuit of political change and social justice by ordinary citizens.[6]

A related global trend is an unprecedented frequency, scope, and size of anti-government protests.[7] Between 2009 and 2019, the incidence of mass protests annually increased, on average, by 11.5 percent worldwide.[8] Based on data from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) project, Chenoweth concludes that the past decade saw the largest number of nonviolent campaigns since 1900.[9] Furthermore, there was a proliferation of urban revolutions, involving a high concentration of protesters in urban spaces and popular demands for political freedoms.[10] Using an original dataset of 345 revolutionary episodes from 1900 to 2014, Beissinger demonstrates that citizens extensively leveraged urban space to bring down autocrats.[11] Thousands of people in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) poured into the streets to oust long-serving incumbents and demand political change in

New York: Cambridge University Press; Regina Smyth. 2020. *Elections, Protest, and Authoritarian Regime Stability: Russia 2008–2020*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[5] A team of researchers at the V-Dem Institute estimated that 72 percent of the world's population, or 5.7 billion people, lived in autocracies in 2022. For details, see Evie Papada and Staffan I. Lindberg, eds. 2023. *Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization*. Gothenburg, Sweden: Varieties of Democracy Institute, University of Gothenburg.

[6] Larry Diamond. 2021. "Democratic Regression in Comparative Perspective: Scope, Methods, and Causes." *Democratization* 28 (1): 22–42.

[7] Dawn Brancati. 2016. *Democracy Protests: Origins, Features, and Significance*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs. 2015. *The Complexities of Global Protests*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Hank Johnston, ed. 2019. *Social Movements, Nonviolent Resistance, and the State*. London: Routledge; Sharon Erickson Nepstad. 2015. *Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics*. New York: Oxford University Press; Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds. 2009. *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*. New York: Oxford University Press; Kenneth Roth. 2019. "World's Autocrats Face Rising Resistance." In *World Report 2019*. New York: Human Rights Watch. www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/global; Kurt Schock. 2015. *Civil Resistance Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

[8] Sam Brannen, Christian Stirling Haig, and Katherine Schmidt. 2021. *The Age of Mass Protests: Understanding an Escalating Global Trend*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

[9] Erica Chenoweth. 2020. "The Future of Civil Resistance." *Journal of Democracy* 31 (3): 69–84.

[10] Marco Allegra, Irene Bono, Jonathan Rokem, Anna Casaglia, Roberta Marzorati, and Haim Yacobi. 2013. "Rethinking Cities in Contentious Times: The Mobilisation of Urban Dissent in the 'Arab Spring'." *Urban Studies* 50: 1675–88; Mark Beissinger. 2013. "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *American Political Science Review* 107 (3): 574–92; Mehmet Bariş Kuymulu. 2013. "Reclaiming the Right to the City: Reflections on the Urban Uprisings in Turkey." *City* 17 (3): 274–78.

[11] Mark Beissinger. 2022. *The Revolutionary City: Urbanization and the Global Transformation of Rebellion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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2010–2011.[12] Large-scale anti-government protests also erupted in Belarus, Chile, Hong Kong, Iran, Sudan, Turkey, and Ukraine, to name a few.[13]

Women play a vital role in civil resistance to the entrenchment of authoritarianism,[14] which is closely intertwined with the persistence of patriarchal norms.[15] Across the Middle East, women rose against multiple forms of oppression during the Arab Spring.[16] Likewise, women in Iran joined the Green Movement during the 2009 presidential election and led the 2022 protests against the curtailment of freedoms, abject poverty, and colossal corruption in the country.[17] In Turkey, women protested against the government's

[12] Asaf Bayat. 2017. *Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Jason Brownlee, Tarek E. Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. 2015. *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform*. New York: Oxford University Press; Jeroen Gunning and Ilan Zvi Baron. 2014. *Why Occupy a Square?: People, Protests and Movements in the Egyptian Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press; Neil Ketchley. 2017. *Egypt in a Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Sarah Anne Rennick. 2018. *Politics and Revolution in Egypt: Rise and Fall of the Youth Activists*. London: Routledge.

[13] Yu Loong Au. 2020. *Hong Kong in Revolt: The Protest Movement and the Future of China*. London: Pluto Press; Willow Berridge, Justin Lynch, Raga Makawi, and Alex de Waal. 2022. *Sudan's Unfinished Democracy: The Promise and Betrayal of a People's Revolution*. London: Hurst Publishers; Terri Gordon-Zolov and Eric Zolov. 2022. *The Walls of Santiago: Social Revolution and Political Aesthetics in Contemporary Chile*. New York: Berghahn Books; Paul Hansbury. 2023. *Belarus in Crisis: From Domestic Unrest to the Russia-Ukraine War*. London: Hurst Publishers; Ngok Ma and Edmund W. Cheng, eds. 2019. *The Umbrella Movement*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; Esra Ozyurek, Gaye Ozpinar, and Emrah Altindis. 2019. *Authoritarianism and Resistance in Turkey: Conversations on Democratic and Social Challenges*. Cham: Springer; Navid Pourmokhtari. 2021. *Iran's Green Movement: Everyday Resistance, Political Contestation and Social Mobilization*. New York: Routledge.

[14] For an overview, see Marie A. Principe. 2017. "Women in Nonviolent Movements." Special Report No. 399. United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.

[15] On the linkage between authoritarianism and patriarchy, see, for example, Cristina Awadalla. 2023. "Authoritarian Populism and Patriarchal Logics: Nicaragua's Engendered Politics." *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 3 (2): 701–23; Gökten Huriye Dogangün. 2020. *Gender Politics in Turkey and Russia: From State Feminism to Authoritarian Rule*. London: Bloomsbury; Grewal Inderpal. 2020. "Authoritarian Patriarchy and Its Populism." *English Studies in Africa* 63 (1): 179–98; Valerie Sperling. 2015. *Sex, Politics, and Putin: Political Legitimacy in Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press.

[16] Nermin Allam. 2018. *Women and the Egyptian Revolution: Engagement and Activism during the 2011 Arab Uprisings*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Mounira M. Charrad and Rita Stephan, eds. 2020. *Women Rising: In and Beyond the Arab Spring*. New York: New York University Press; Sherine Hafez. 2019. *Women of the Midan: The Untold Stories of Egypt's Revolutionaries*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Andrea Khalil, ed. 2016. *Gender, Women, and the Arab Spring*. New York: Routledge; Mona Prince. 2014. *Revolution Is My Name: An Egyptian Woman's Diary from Eighteen Days in Tahrir*, trans. Samia Mehrez. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press; Marwa Shalaby and Valentine Moghadam, eds. 2016. *Empowering Women After the Arab Spring*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[17] Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson. 2023. "Woman, Life, Freedom: The Origins of the Uprising in Iran." *Dissent* 70 (1): 82–98; Raheleh Dayerizadeh. 2017. "Iranian Women and Their Strategic Role During the Green Movement." In *The New Global Politics: Global Social*

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infringement on women's rights.[18] Moreover, women in Ukraine played a significant role during the 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity, also known as Euromaidan.[19] Women were also at the forefront of the 2019 revolution that brought down Omar al-Bashir's thirty-year rule in Sudan.[20] In Belarus, women's marches were a hallmark of mass mobilization against gross violations of democratic procedures during the 2020 presidential election and police brutality against participants in peaceful postelection protests.[21] Taken as a whole, women were actively involved in contemporary revolutions and prodemocracy movements that emerged in the aftermath of rigged elections or outside an electoral cycle.

Yet, women's engagement in contentious politics often appears to be invisible in the public discourse. The marginalization of women activists derives, in part, from the media's gendered portrayal of civil resistance, which tends to reinforce a gender-based division of labor within a protest movement. Moreover, the media spotlight often focuses on a handful of movement leaders, which further diminishes the visibility of many rank-and-file female activists. Prior research shows that many African American women who performed various roles comparable to those of African American men were "invisible,

Movements in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Harry Vanden, Peter Funke, and Gary Prevost. London: Routledge, pp. 111–27; Victoria Tahmasebi-Birgani. 2010. "Green Women of Iran: The Role of the Women's Movement During and After Iran's Presidential Election of 2009." *Constellations* 17: 78–86.

[18] For an overview, see Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat. 2021. "Gender Politics and the Struggle for Equality in Turkey." In *The Oxford Handbook of Turkish Politics*, ed. Güneş Murat Tezcür. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 627–48.

[19] In this book, the terms Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity are used interchangeably, without a reference to a specific moment in mass mobilization. The term Euromaidan is a combination of the words Europe and Maidan. The Ukrainian-language word *maidan* denotes open space or a town square. Furthermore, given a long record of anti-government protests in the center of Kyiv's Independence Square in the post-Soviet period, the word *maidan* has become synonymous with mass mobilization against the ruling elite. For an overview of sociological research on women's participation in Euromaidan, see Tamara Martsenyuk. 2014. *Henderna sotsiolohiia Maidanu: Rol zhinok u protestah*. Kyiv: Electronic Archive of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. http://ekmair.ukma.edu.ua/handle/123456789/3511.

[20] Samia Al-Nagar and Liv Tønnessen. 2021. "Sudanese Women's Demands for Freedom, Peace, and Justice in the 2019 Revolution." In *Women and Peacebuilding in Africa*, eds. Ladan Affi, Liv Tønnessen, and Aili Mari Tripp. Suffolk: Boydell and Brewer, pp. 103–28; Balghis Badri. 2020. "Sudanese Women Leading Revolution: Impact on Transformation." *Femina Politica – Zeitschrift für feministische Politikwissenschaft* 1 (May): 146–50.

[21] Elena Gapova. 2023. "Activating and Negotiating Women's Citizenship in the 2020 Belarusian Uprising." In *Belarus in the Twenty-First Century: Between Dictatorship and Democracy*, eds. Elena Korosteleva, Irina Petrova, and Anastasiia Kudlenko. London: Routledge, pp. 161–78; Natallia Paulovich. 2021. "How Feminist Is the Belarusian Revolution? Female Agency and Participation in the 2020 Post-Election Protests." *Slavic Review* 80 (1): 38–44.

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unsung heroes and leaders" of the US civil rights movement.[22] Despite significant advances in our knowledge about women's movements in the US,[23] much less effort has been expended to uncover women's involvement in broad-based pro-democracy movements and contemporary revolutions around the globe.[24] The book seeks to address this empirical gap in contentious politics literature. The empirical focus on women's engagement in a revolution is informed by feminist standpoint theory, positing that our understanding of state–society relations is incomplete without a critical reflection on the experiences of marginalized groups, including women.[25] The book places women at the center of empirical analysis not just as participants in a revolution but also as storytellers.

Theoretically, the book contributes to contentious politics literature by proposing a typology of women's participation in a revolution. This typology is summarized in Table 1.1. Based on women's motivations for engagement, modes of women's participation during a period of mass mobilization, and gender outcomes of revolution, the book distinguishes three models of participation: (1) patriarchal, (2) emancipatory, and (3) hybrid. Reinforcing preexisting patriarchal norms in society, the patriarchal model of women's participation in a revolution assumes that motherhood is a key driver of women's activism, women primarily perform "support tasks" during a revolution, and female revolutionaries retreat into the private sphere in the wake of mass mobilization. The emancipatory model, on the contrary, views feminism as a catalyst for women's activism, assumes women's access to formal positions of leadership within the movement, and anticipates considerable progress in gender equality in the postrevolutionary period. Located between these two

[22] Bernice McNair Barnett. 1993. "Invisible Southern Black Women Leaders in the Civil Rights Movement: The Triple Constraints of Gender, Race, and Class." *Gender and Society* 7 (2): 162–82, 162.

[23] See, for example, Lee Ann Banaszak, ed. 2006. *The U.S. Women's Movement in Global Perspective*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield; Karen Beckwith, Dieter Rucht, and Lee Ann Banaszak, eds. 2003. *Women's Movements Facing the Reconfigured State*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Jo Reger, ed. 2019. *Nevertheless, They Persisted: Feminisms and Continued Resistance in the U.S. Women's Movement*. New York: Routledge.

[24] Lisa Baldez. 2010. "The Gender Lacuna in Comparative Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 8: 199–205; Karen Beckwith. 2000. "Beyond Compare? Women's Movements in Comparative Perspective." *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (4): 431–68; Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp, eds. 2006. *Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights*. New York: New York University Press; Margaret Randall. 1995. *Sandino's Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press; Aili Mari Tripp, Isabel Casimiro, Joy Kwesiga, and Alice Mungwa. 2011. *African Women's Movements: Transforming Political Landscapes*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Georgina Waylen. 2003. "Gender and Transitions: What Do We Know?" *Democratization* 10: 157–78.

[25] For an overview of feminist standpoint theory, see Catherine E. Hundleby. 2020. "Thinking Outside-In: Feminist Standpoint Theory as Epistemology, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science." In *The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Philosophy of Science*, eds. Sharon Crasnow and Kristen Intemann. New York: Routledge, pp. 89–103.

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TABLE 1.1 *Typology of women's participation in a revolution*

	Women's participation in a revolution		
	Patriarchal	**Emancipatory**	**Hybrid**
Main motivations	Motherhood	Feminism	Various motivations, including motherhood, feminism, professional service, and civic duty
Women's roles	"Support tasks"	Leadership roles	Stereotypically feminine, stereotypically masculine, or gender-neutral roles
Outcomes	Retreat into the private sphere	Significant progress in gender equality	Mixed record of gender equality in different domains

extremes, the hybrid model encompasses a variety of motivations for women's engagement in the revolution, underscores the diversity of women's roles over the course of mass mobilization, and acknowledges various degrees of success in gender equality in different spheres. This study suggests that a hybrid model might better capture the diversity of women's experiences during a twenty-first-century revolution.

An in-depth analysis of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine provides a superb opportunity to examine various motivations for women's involvement in a revolution, diverse domains of women's engagement, and multifaceted outcomes of mass mobilization in a polity with fragile democratic institutions. Since the collapse of communism, the former Soviet republic located between the European Union, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other, experienced ebbs and flows in the provision of political rights and civil liberties.[26] In particular, rampant corruption hampered democratization processes and economic development.[27] Nevertheless, Ukrainians repeatedly took to the streets to subvert the entrenchment of authoritarian practices and reaffirm the country's national independence.[28]

[26] For a succinct survey of Ukrainian modern history, see Serhii Plokhy. 2015. *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine*. New York: Basic Books, pp. 305–46; Serhy Yekelchyk. 2020. *Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

[27] Anders Aslund. 2015. *Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics; Erik Herron. 2020. *Normalizing Corruption: Failures of Accountability in Ukraine*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Taras Kuzio. 2015. *Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism*. Santa Barbara: Praeger.

[28] Emily Channell-Justice. 2022. *Without the State: Self-Organization and Political Activism in Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Christine Emeran. 2017. *New Generation*

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An advantage of focusing on the Ukrainian revolution is that there is a trove of under-explored data on mass mobilization. Ukrainian historians meticulously documented citizens' recollections of civil resistance through oral history projects. Furthermore, Ukrainian sociologists conducted on-site surveys of participants in Kyiv-based protests and fielded a nationally representative survey shortly after the conclusion of protest events. Local journalists also played an important role in chronicling civil resistance to the regime. Drawing on data from large-N surveys, oral history projects, and newspaper articles, the book traces multiple ways in which women participated in the revolution.

The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the study of women and revolutions, provides background information about the Revolution of Dignity and its participants, identifies the main trends in gender inequality in Ukrainian society, and describes data sources.

WOMEN AND REVOLUTIONS

In recent decades, there has been a growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship on women's involvement in different types of revolutions.[29] To some extent, the mere presence of women in revolutionary movements is seen as an act of

Political Activism in Ukraine 2000–2014. New York: Routledge; Paweł Kowal, Iwona Reichardt, Georges Mink, and Adam Reichardt, eds. 2019. *Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine II; An Oral History of the Revolution on Granite, Orange Revolution, and Revolution of Dignity*. Stuttgart: Ibidem Press; David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills, eds. 2015. *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution*. Stuttgart: Ibidem Press; Olena Nikolayenko. 2015. "Youth Mobilization Before and During the Orange Revolution: Learning from Losses." In *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle*, ed. Kurt Schock. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 93–120; Olga Onuch. 2014. *Mapping Mass Mobilization: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Sophia Wilson. 2022. "The Ukrainian Revolution: Repression, Interpretation, and Dissent." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 45: 157–88.

[29] Michelle Chase. 2015. *Revolution within the Revolution: Women and Gender Politics in Cuba, 1952–1962*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; Sheila Fitzpatrick and Yuri Slezkine, eds. 2000. *In the Shadow of Revolution: Life Stories of Russian Women from 1917 to the Second World War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Gail Hershatter. 2019. *Women and China's Revolutions*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield; Tabea Alexa Linhard. 2005. *Fearless Women in the Mexican Revolution and the Spanish Civil War*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press; Barbara Oberg, ed. 2019. *Women in the American Revolution: Gender, Politics, and the Domestic World*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press; Jocelyn Olcott. 2005. *Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico*. Durham: Duke University Press; Rochelle Goldberg Ruthchild. 2010. *Equality and Revolution: Women's Rights in the Russian Empire, 1905–1917*. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press; Stephanie Smith. 2009. *Gender and the Mexican Revolution: Yucatán Women and the Realities of Patriarchy*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; Marilyn Yalom. 2015. *Compelled to Witness: Women's Memoirs of the French Revolution*. New York: Astor and Lenox LLC.

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"gender-bending" (the contestation of dominant gender roles),[30] since the revolutionary struggle is traditionally seen as a man's domain.[31] Nonetheless, growing literature suggests that many women sought to challenge the prevailing gender boundaries by assuming a wide range of roles in the revolutionary struggle. Research on eighteenth-century women's history, for example, shows that women assumed multiple roles during the American Revolution, serving as nurses, soldiers, saboteurs, and spies.[32] Focusing on a more recent case of a social revolution, de Volo excavates data from primary documents, memoirs of rebel women, and US declassified material to demonstrate "women's multiple forms of participation" in the Cuban Revolution (p. 6).[33] Another line of inquiry investigates the causes and consequences of women's involvement in armed rebellions and guerrilla movements.[34] Henshaw, for example, analyzes patterns of women's participation in over seventy rebel groups in the post-Cold War period.[35] Specifically, Loken identifies four dimensions of women's involvement in noncombat labor in rebel organizations: logistics, outreach, governance, and community management.[36] Compared to armed insurgencies, nonviolent revolutions

[30] On the concept of gender-bending, see Judith Lorber. 1994. "'Night to His Day': The Social Construction of Gender." In *Paradoxes of Gender*, ed. Judith Lorber. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 13–36.

[31] On women's participation in revolutionary movements, see Jane S. Jaquette. 1973. "Women in Revolutionary Movements in Latin America." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 35 (2): 344–54; Linda M. Lobao. 1990. "Women in Revolutionary Movements: Changing Patterns of Latin American Guerrilla Struggle." *Dialectical Anthropology* 15 (2/3): 211–32; Linda L. Reif. 1986. "Women in Latin American Guerrilla Movements: A Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 18 (2): 147–69; Julie D. Shayne. 2004. *The Revolution Question: Feminisms in El Salvador, Chile, and Cuba*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

[32] Jeanne Munn Bracken, ed. 2009. *Women in the American Revolution*. Boston: History Compass; Susan Casey. 2015. *Women Heroes of the American Revolution: Twenty Stories of Espionage, Sabotage, Defiance, and Rescue*. Chicago: Chicago Review Press.

[33] Lorraine Bayard de Volo. 2018. *Women and the Cuban Insurrection: How Gender Shaped Castro's Victory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[34] Karen Kampwirth. 2002. *Women in Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, Cuba*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press; Sarah Parkinson. 2013. "Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War." *American Political Science Review* 107 (3): 418–32; Susanne Schaftenaar. 2017. "How (Wo)men Rebel: Exploring the Effect of Gender Equality on Nonviolent and Armed Conflict Onset." *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (6): 762–76; Jakana Thomas and Kanisha Bond. 2015. "Women's Participation in Violent Political Organizations." *American Political Science Review* 109: 488–506; Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2006. "Pulled, Pushed, and Persuaded: Explaining Women's Mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army." *American Journal of Sociology* 112 (1): 1–45; Reed M. Wood. 2019. *Female Fighters: Why Rebel Groups Recruit Women for War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

[35] Alexis Henshaw. 2016. *Why Women Rebel: Understanding Women's Participation in Armed Rebel Groups*. London: Routledge.

[36] Meredith Loken. 2022. "Noncombat Participation in Rebellion: A Gendered Typology." *International Security* 47 (1): 139–70.

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tend to provide a wider range of opportunities for women's recruitment and participation.

The book proposes a typology of women's participation in a revolution based on three dimensions: (1) women's motivations for participation, (2) forms of their participation, and (3) gender outcomes of revolution. The selection of these criteria is informed by three main questions that animate scholarship on mass mobilization: *Why do individuals join a revolution? How do individuals participate in a revolution? What are the outcomes of mass mobilization?* In this section, I briefly discuss how the book speaks to these strands of research.

Women's Mobilization

An influential argument in contentious politics literature is that the movement's strength depends on the effective recruitment of activists and volunteers.[37] Specifically, women's participation can bolster the movement's viability, since women represent nearly half of the population in most societies. It is widely upheld that a sizable movement might raise the costs of repression and decrease the likelihood of the deployment of lethal force against movement participants.[38] Recent scholarship also shows that a cross-cutting coalition of social forces is a salient feature of contemporary revolutions in non-democracies.[39] Against this backdrop, it is crucial to understand why individuals with diverse backgrounds get involved in civil resistance at the risk of their lives.[40] An examination of factors associated with women's participation in a revolution will enable scholars to provide a partial answer to this question.

The book makes an empirical contribution to contentious politics literature by demonstrating a wide range of women's motivations for engagement in a contemporary revolution. In her influential article on women's participation in the struggle against Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Molyneux distinguishes between strategic gender interests aimed at achieving women's emancipation and eliminating gender subordination and practical gender interests directed

[37] James DeNardo. 1985. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver. 1993. *The Critical Mass in Collective Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[38] On the unintended effects of repression, see Lester Kurtz and Lee Smitney, eds. 2018. *The Paradox of Repression and Nonviolent Movements*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

[39] Asef Bayat. 2015. "Plebeians of the Arab Spring." *Current Anthropology* 56: 33–43; Beissinger, "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution"; Gianni Del Panta. 2020. "Cross-class and Cross-ideological Convergences over Time: Insights from the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutionary Uprisings." *Government and Opposition* 55 (4): 634–52; Jack Andrew Goldstone. 2011. "Cross-class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 2011." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17 (4): 457–62.

[40] For an overview of the literature on mass mobilization, see Paul Almeida. 2019. *Social Movements: The Structure of Mass Mobilization*. Oakland: University of California Press.

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at tackling the immediate perceived needs of women.[41] This distinction is relevant to identify different models of women's participation in a revolution. An egalitarian model of women's participation in a revolution assumes that the development of feminist consciousness and the pursuit of strategic gender interests is a driving force behind women's activism.[42] Meanwhile, in line with a patriarchal model of women's participation in a revolution, maternal identity might serve as a powerful incentive for women's activism.[43] In her analysis of women's community work in low-income neighborhoods in New York City and Philadelphia, Naples develops the concept of activist mothering to encompass caretaking not only for biologically or legally related children but also for the community as a whole.[44] Thus, the politicization of motherhood "turns needs related to children into political demands and thus promotes political action."[45] The hybrid model assumes that a myriad of social identities, including being a mother or a feminist, might provide a catalyst for women's involvement in contentious politics. In line with a hybrid model, the book illustrates that a broad spectrum of motivations, including motherhood, civic duty, professional service, and solidarity with protesters, provides an incentive for women's engagement in a contemporary revolution. These findings are consistent with Marian Rubchak's astute observation that there are "many faces of women," along with diverse conceptions of feminism, in Ukraine (p. 19).[46]

Moreover, the book contributes to the literature about the impact of biographical availability on protest participation by uncovering conditions under which women might get involved in a revolution. In line with the biographical availability argument, parenthood imposes constraints on

[41] Maxine Molyneux. 1985. "Mobilization without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua." *Feminist Studies* 11 (2): 227–54.

[42] Eric Swank and Breanne Fahs. 2017. "Understanding Feminist Activism among Women: Resources, Consciousness, and Social Networks." *Socius* 3: 1–9.

[43] See, for example, Valeria Fabj. 1993. "Motherhood as Political Voice: The Rhetoric of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo." *Communication Studies* 44 (1): 1–18; Jenny Irons. 1998. "The Shaping of Activist Recruitment and Participation: A Study of Women in the Mississippi Civil Rights Movement." *Gender and Society* 12 (6): 692–709; Nancy Naples. 1998. *Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering, Community Work, and the War on Poverty*. New York: Routledge; Thomas Shriver, Alison Adams, and Rachel Einwohner. 2013. "Motherhood and Opportunities for Activism Before and After the Czech Velvet Revolution." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 18: 267–88.

[44] Nancy Naples. 1992. "Activist Mothering: Cross-Generational Continuity in the Community Work of Women from Low-Income Urban Neighborhoods." *Gender and Society* 6 (3): 441–63, 446.

[45] Graciela Di Marco. 2009. "Social Justice and Gender Rights." *International Social Science Journal* 191: 43–55, 53.

[46] Marian J. Rubchak, 2011. "Turning Oppression Into Opportunity: An Introduction." In *Mapping Difference: The Many Faces of Women in Contemporary Ukraine*, ed. Marian J. Rubchak. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 1–21.

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women's engagement in revolutionary activity.[47] Data from oral history projects, however, reveal that many Ukrainian women with little children tried to carve out some free time for themselves by turning to their parents or friends as a source of tuition-free childcare. The likelihood of women's physical presence on Maidan increased if grandparents temporarily assumed childcare responsibilities. Concurrently, many women tried to combine their childcare duties with their involvement in the protest movement by virtue of social media. These findings demonstrate how women might come up with creative solutions to overcome barriers to protest engagement.

In addition, the book speaks to a debate about the relative importance of various social ties by exploring women's networks of contention.[48] Drawing on data from oral history projects, empirical analysis uncovers a wide range of social networks conducive to mass mobilization in a society with a rather underdeveloped party system and a low level of formal membership in civic organizations. Women were embedded in a wide range of mixed-gender social networks, including professional associations and community-based organizations. Additionally, data from oral history projects indicate that Facebook served as an important source of information about protest events in the mid-2010s. Specifically, individuals with weak offline social ties were more likely to get galvanized into action via social media. For others, friendship ties or professional networks were more influential.

Modes of Women's Participation in a Revolution

Over the course of mass mobilization, women can perform stereotypically feminine, stereotypically masculine, or gender-neutral roles. In line with a patriarchal model of participation, women's performance of "caretaking" tasks is traditionally seen as an extension of women's roles within a household. Meanwhile, involvement in confrontational protest tactics is traditionally viewed as masculine. In line with an egalitarian model, women might break down dominant gender hierarchies by taking up stereotypically masculine roles. Additionally, some revolutionary activities might be less clearly demarcated as feminine or

[47] Kraig Beyerlein and Kelly Bergstrand. 2022. "Biographical Availability." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, 2nd ed., eds. David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 262–63.

[48] On the significance of social networks, see Nick Crossley. 2020. *Social Networks and Social Movements: Contentious Connections*. London: Routledge; Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, eds. 2003. *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*. New York: Oxford University Press; Valentine Moghadam. 2005. *Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Dana Moss. 2021. *The Arab Spring Abroad: Diaspora Activism against Authoritarian Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Zeynep Tufekci. 2017. *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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masculine and fall into the category of relatively gender-neutral roles. According to the hybrid model, women might adopt three different strategies: (1) acquiescence to a traditional gender-based division of labor, (2) appropriation of the masculine forms of resistance, and (3) switching from stereotypically feminine to stereotypically masculine roles or adoption of gender-neutral roles.

An empirical contribution of this book lies in identifying multiple domains of women's activism. Data from oral history projects demonstrate that Ukrainian women coordinated an extensive network of volunteers, executed a wide range of crowdsourcing initiatives, disseminated information, offered pro bono legal aid and urgent medical care, produced art of resistance, and joined self-defense units. Consistent with resource mobilization theory,[49] women's performance of these critical tasks sustained the encampment in the heart of Kyiv for nearly three months. In general, women's engagement in a revolution can bolster the capacity of regime opponents to self-organize through their use of social, cultural, and economic capital.[50]

In addition, a close analysis of women's engagement in a contemporary revolution contributes to the literature on the interplay between gender and nonviolent action. Conventional wisdom holds that women are more prone than men to oppose the deployment of violence against their adversaries.[51] As a principled proponent of nonviolence, Mahatma Gandhi wrote in 1938, "Woman is more fitted than man to make exploration and take bolder action in *ahimsa* [nonviolence]."[52] Research, for example, shows that the suffragist women in the US fought for the right to vote, using such nonviolent methods as hunger strikes, pickets, and marches.[53] Similarly, women played a prominent role in peace movements and employed such nonviolent tactics as vigils and peace camps.[54] Women's presence at protest events is often seen as a deterrent

[49] J. Craig Jenkins. 1983. "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1): 527–53; John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. 2001. "The Enduring Vitality of the Resource Mobilization Theory of Social Movements." In *Handbook of Sociological Theory*, ed. Jonathan Turner. Boston: Springer, pp. 533–65.

[50] On the conceptualization of different forms of capital, see Pierre Bourdieu. 1986. "The Forms of Capital." In *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John Richardson. New York: Greenwood, pp. 241–58.

[51] Anne N. Costain. 2000. "Women's Movements and Nonviolence." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 33 (2): 175–80.

[52] Anima Bose. 1975. "Women in Gandhi's India." *India International Centre Quarterly* 2 (4): 280–91, 283.

[53] Selina Gallo-Cruz. 2018. "American Mothers of Nonviolence: Action and the Politics of Erasure in Women's Nonviolent Activism." In *100 Years of the Nineteenth Amendment: An Appraisal of US Women's Activism*, eds. Holly J. McCammon and Lee Ann Banaszak. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 273–94.

[54] Harriet Hyman Alonso. 1993. *Peace as a Women's Issue: A History of the US Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press; Cynthia Cockburn. 2007. *From Where We Stand: War, Women's Activism and Feminist Analysis*. London: Zed Books; Maja Korac. 2006. "Gender, Conflict and Peace-Building: Lessons from the Conflict in

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to violent clashes with the police. In line with this perspective, the book marshals empirical evidence for the argument that women's participation in a political revolution fosters the use of nonviolent methods of resistance. Meanwhile, the book adds a caveat to this argument. The analysis of state–society relations during the last phase of the Revolution of Dignity reveals that female and male activists were inclined to accept the use of violent tactics when both sides assumed that they reached a point of no return.

Gender Outcomes

One of the main questions in the literature on women and revolutions is, *How do women fare in the aftermath of revolutionary struggle?*[55] Assuming the centrality of gender to state-building, economic development, and the construction of national identity, Moghadam singles out two types of revolution: the woman-in-the-family model "excludes or marginalizes women from definitions and constructions of independence, liberation, and liberty," while the women's emancipation model envisions women as "part of the productive forces and citizenry, to be mobilized for economic and political purposes" in the postrevolutionary period.[56] This book, however, proposes a tripartite typology of women's participation in a revolution. Consistent with a patriarchal model of women's participation in a revolution, women are expected to retreat into the private sphere in the aftermath of a revolution. In contrast, an egalitarian model assumes that women's participation in a revolution will lead to the increasing visibility of women in domestic politics and the advancement of gender equality in the postrevolutionary period. Between these two extremes lies a hybrid model, signifying various degrees of women's empowerment in different domains.

A detailed analysis of women's status in the postrevolutionary period will extend our understanding of outcomes of mass mobilization in new democracies and non-democracies. Prolific research has gauged the impact of social movements on public policies and cultural norms in mature democracies.[57]

the Former Yugoslavia." *Women's Studies International Forum* 29 (5): 510–20; Lepa Mladjenovic. 2003. "Women in Black Against War (Belgrade)." In *Feminists Under Fire: Exchanges Across War Zones*, eds. Wenona Giles, Malathi de Alwis, Edith Klein, and Neluka Silva. Toronto: Between the Lines, pp. 41–44; Amy Swerdlow. 1993. *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[55] On this point, see Julie Shayne. 2006. "Women and Revolution." In *Revolutionary Movements in World History: From 1750 to the Present*, ed. James DeFronzo. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, pp. 936–40.

[56] Valentine Moghadam. 1997. "Gender and Revolutions." In *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran. New York: Routledge, pp. 137–67.

[57] Lorenzo Bosi, Marco Giugni, and Katrin Uba. 2019. "The Consequences of Social Movements: Taking Stock and Looking Forward." In *The Consequences of Social Movements*, eds. Lorenzo Bosi, Marco Giugni, and Katrin Uba. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–38; Mario G. Giugni. 1998. "Was It Worth the Effort? Outcomes and Consequences of Social

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A related strand of research has investigated the dynamics of democratic reforms and economic development in the aftermath of electoral revolutions in the post-Soviet region.[58] There is also growing literature on reforms and social change in Ukraine since Euromaidan.[59] This study focuses on the advancement of gender equality as an outcome of anti-regime mobilization. Specifically, the book traces patterns of women's representation in government, participation in the labor market, and civic engagement, as well as changes in public policies and public opinion. Data from oral history projects further reveal the biographical consequences of women's participation in a revolution. However, the analysis of gender outcomes is confounded by the temporal proximity of the revolution and the ensuing war. Russia's military intervention began immediately after the conclusion of protest events in Kyiv and the ouster of the incumbent.[60] Still, based on insights from women's narratives, it is clear that participation in the Revolution of Dignity served as a catalyst for women's subsequent activism in multiple ways.[61]

Movements." *Annual Review of Sociology* 98: 371–93; Holly J. McCammon and Lee Ann Banaszak, eds. 2018. *100 Years of the Nineteenth Amendment: An Appraisal of Women's Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press; David S. Meyer, Valerie Jenness, and Helen Ingram, eds. 2005. *Routing the Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Kristina Schulz, ed. 2017. *The Woman's Liberation Movement: Impacts and Outcomes*. New York: Berghahn.

[58] Joerg Forbrig and Robin Shepherd, eds. 2005. *Ukraine After the Orange Revolution: Strengthening European and Transatlantic Commitments*. Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States; Stephen Jones, ed. 2010. *War and Revolution in the Caucasus: Georgia Ablaze*. London: Routledge; Lincoln Mitchell. 2009. *Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose Revolution*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

[59] Henry Hale and Robert Orttung, eds. 2016. *Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; George Soroka and Tomasz Stępniewski, eds. 2019. *Ukraine After Maidan: Revisiting Domestic and Regional Security*; Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag; Viktor Stepanenko and Yaroslav Pylynksyj, eds. 2015. *Ukraine After the Euromaidan: Challenges and Hopes*. New York:Peter Lang; Andreas Umland and Valentyna Romanova, eds. 2018. *Ukraine's Decentralization: Challenges and Implications of the Local Governance Reform After the Euromaidan Revolution*. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag.

[60] For an overview, see Serhy Yekelchyk. 2015. *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press.

[61] On different forms of women's wartime activism, see Svitlana Biedarieva and Hanna Deikun, eds. 2020. *At the Front Line: Ukrainian Art, 2013–2019. La línea del frente. El arte ucraniano 2013–2019*. Mexico City: Editorial Diecisiete; Olga Boichak. 2022. "Camouflage Aesthetics: Militarisation, Craftivism, and the In/visibility of Resistance at Scale." *Contemporary Voices: St. Andrew's Journal of International Relations* 3 (1): 1–13; Ganna Grytsenko, Anna Kvit and Tamara Martsenyuk. 2016. *Invisible Battalion: Women's Participation in ATO Military Operations in Ukraine*. Kyiv: Ukrainian Women's Fund; Yuliya Ilchuk. 2017. "Hearing the Voice of Donbas: Art and Literature as Forms of Cultural Protest during War." *Nationalities Papers* 45 (2): 256–73; Christina Olha Jarymowycz. 2020. "Guardians and Protectors: The Volunteer Women of the Donbas Conflict." *Feminist Review* 126 (1): 106–22; Evgeniya Podobna, ed. 2020. *Girls Cutting Their Locks: A Book of Memories, the Russo-Ukrainian*

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Contentious Politics in Eastern Europe

A detailed analysis of women's participation in the Revolution of Dignity seeks to expand the scope of empirical research on contentious politics in Eastern Europe.[62] Despite a rich literature on social and political revolutions that swept across the region in the twentieth century, a great deal of historical research has yet to be done to unravel women's engagement in those tumultuous events.[63] On the centennial of the 1917 Russian Revolution, for example, Ruthchild pointed out that "the voices of women arguing for citizenship, equality, respect, and civil rights are the often silenced or ignored sopranos and altos of Russia; without them Russian history is all bass and baritone" (p. 694).[64] Likewise, women's activism has received relatively sparse attention in the literature on velvet revolutions and civil resistance under communism.[65] In her book *Solidarity's Secret: Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland*, Penn challenges a male-centered narrative of resistance and shows how Polish women worked "tirelessly behind the scenes" and "carved out distinctive, influential roles" within the movement in the wake of the 1981 martial law.[66] Similarly, further research should be done to trace women's engagement in twenty-first-century revolutions in Eastern Europe.

The book builds on existing literature on Euromaidan but departs from it by focusing on women's participation in the revolution.[67] A growing body of research investigates the role of social media in facilitating civil resistance and

War, trans. Mariia Kovalenko. Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and Liuta Sprava; Jessica Zychowicz. 2023. "Women's Activism in Ukraine: Anti-discrimination, Anti-disinformation, and Human Rights in Early Civic Documentations of the Ukraine-Russia War." In *Post-Soviet Women: New Challenges and Ways to Empowerment*, eds. Ann-Mari Sätre, Yulia Gradskova, and Vladislava Vladimirova. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 271–93.

[62] For an overview, see Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik. 2017. "The Study of Protest Politics in Eastern Europe in the Search of Theory." In *The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics*, eds. Adam Fagan and Petr Kopecky. London: Routledge, pp. 197–209.

[63] See, for example, Ruthchild. *Equality and Revolution*; Elizabeth Wood. 1997. *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

[64] Rochelle Goldberg Ruthchild. 2017. "Women and Gender in 1917." *Slavic Review* 76: 694–702.

[65] Western scholarship on the topic has primarily focused on the case of the Solidarity Movement in Poland. See, for example, Belinda Brown. 2003. *The Private Revolution: Women in the Polish Underground Movement*.London: Hera Trust; Padraic Kenney. 1999. "The Gender of Resistance in Communist Poland." *American Historical Review* 104 (2): 399–425; Kristi Long. 1996. *We All Fought for Freedom: Women in Poland's Solidarity Movement*. Boulder: Westview Press.

[66] Shana Penn. 2006. *Solidarity's Secret: The Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

[67] On Euromaidan, see, for example, Hale and Orttung. *Beyond the Euromaidan*; Marci Shore. 2017. *The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Mychailo Wynnyckyj. 2019. *Ukraine's Maidan, Russia's War: A Chronicle and Analysis of the Revolution of Dignity*. Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem Press.

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affording new opportunities for activism.[68] Another line of inquiry has concentrated on the cultivation of offline social networks and citizens' capacity to self-organize.[69] Channell-Justice, for example, meticulously traced how male and female left-wing activists demonstrated the capacity to self-organize despite attacks from far-right groups and the state.[70] Scholars also analyzed sociodemographic characteristics of participants in the Revolution of Dignity.[71] Several studies within this rich literature have examined women's activism during Euromaidan.[72] Phillips, for example, scrutinizes the creation of women's squads as a feminists' response to their exclusion from the barricades.[73] Drawing on visual art, interviews, and other materials, Zychowicz documents a generation of artists and activists who debated the construction of feminism and considered art as a form of resistance in postcommunist Ukraine.[74] Unlike most prior publications, the book explores women's activism in multiple domains critical to the resilience of the protest movement, including the coordination of an extensive volunteer network, the execution of crowdsourcing initiatives, the provision of food, legal aid, and medical services, the formation of self-defense units, the production of art, and the organization of educational activities and library services inside the encampment.

[68] Tetyana Bohdanova. 2014. "Unexpected Revolution: The Role of Social Media in Ukraine's Euromaidan Uprising." *European View* 13: 133–42; Jennifer Dickinson. 2014. "Prosymo maksymanl'nyi perepost! Tactical and Discursive Uses of Social Media in Ukraine's EuroMaidan." *Ab Imperio* 3: 75–93; Tetyana Lokot. 2021. *Beyond the Protest Square: Digital Media and Augmented Dissent*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

[69] Nadia Diuk. 2014. "EuroMaidan: Ukraine's Self-Organizing Revolution." *World Affairs* 176 (6): 9–16; Olga Onuch. 2015. "EuroMaidan Protests in Ukraine: Social Media Versus Social Networks." *Problems of Post-Communism* 62 (4): 217–35.

[70] Channell-Justice. *Without the State*.

[71] Olga Onuch. 2014. "The Maidan and Beyond: Who Were the Protesters?" *Journal of Democracy* 25 (3): 44–51; Daniel Ritter. 2017. "A Spirit of Maidan? Contentious Escalation in Ukraine." In *Global Diffusion of Protest: Riding the Protest Wave in the Neoliberal Crisis*, ed. Donatella della Porta. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 191–213.

[72] Emily Channell-Justice. 2017. "We're Not Just Sandwiches": Europe, Nation, and Feminist (Im) Possibilities on Ukraine's Maidan." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 42 (3): 717–41; Olesya Khromeychuk. 2016. "Negotiating Protest Spaces on the Maidan: A Gender Perspective." *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* 2 (1): 9–47; Olena Nikolayenko and Maria DeCasper. 2018. "Why Women Protest: Insights from Ukraine's EuroMaidan." *Slavic Review* 77 (23): 726–51; Olga Onuch and Tamara Martsenyuk. 2014. "Mothers and Daughters of the Maidan: Gender, Repertoires of Violence, and the Division of Labour in Ukrainian Protests." *Social, Health, and Communication Studies Journal* 1 (1): 105–26; Sabine Rossmann. 2016. "'To Serve Like a Man' – Ukraine's Euromaidan and the Questions of Gender, Nationalism and Generational Change." In *Eastern European Youth Cultures in a Global Context*, eds. Matthias Schwartz and Heike Winkel. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 202–17.

[73] Sarah Phillips. 2014. "The Women's Squad in Ukraine's Protests: Feminism, Nationalism, and Militarism on the Maidan." *American Ethnologist* 41 (3): 414–26.

[74] Jessica Zychowicz. 2020. *Superfluous Women: Art, Feminism, and Revolution in Twenty-First-Century Ukraine*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Furthermore, the book makes an empirical contribution to political science literature by enhancing public understanding of sources of Ukraine's fierce resistance to Russia's invasion. Following the fall of Viktor Yanukovych's government, Russia annexed Crimea, a peninsula in the Black Sea, and provided military backing for rebel groups in eastern Ukraine.[75] As a result of Russia's military intervention, over 14,000 people, including approximately 3,000 civilians, were killed in the conflict-affected areas between April 2014 and January 2022.[76] The scale and the severity of human casualties have dramatically risen with the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.[77] Numerous human rights reports and eyewitness accounts documented a high incidence of war crimes, including a systematic rape of women, rampant torture and extrajudicial executions of people in occupied territories, and the shelling of civilian infrastructure.[78] Yet, Ukrainian men and women are stoically fighting against the Russian armed forces, sharing the goal of living in a free, democratic society.

UKRAINE'S REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY

The definition of a revolution is vigorously debated in the literature, especially with the rise of nonviolent revolutions in urban settings.[79] Broadly construed,

[75] For an overview, see Paul D'Anieri. 2019. *Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[76] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2022. *Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 August 2021–31 January 2022*. www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/report-human-rights-situation-ukraine-1-august-2021-31-january-2022.

[77] See, for example, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2023. *Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update March 13, 2023*. www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/03/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-13-march-2023.

[78] On war crimes committed by the Russian military in Ukraine, see, for example, Amnesty International. 2022. *Ukraine: Russian Forces Extrajudicially Executing Civilians in Apparent War Crimes – New Testimony*. April 7. www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/04/ukraine-russian-forces-extrajudicially-executing-civilians-in-apparent-war-crimes-new-testimony; Human Rights Watch. 2022. *Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas: Summary Executions, Other Grave Abuses by Russian Forces*. April 3. www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas; Human Rights Watch. 2022. *Ukraine: Executions, Torture During Russian Occupation: Apparent War Crimes in Kyiv, Chernihiv Regions*. May 18. www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/18/ukraine-executions-torture-during-russian-occupation; United Nations. 2022. "Reports of Sexual Violence in Ukraine Rising Fast, Security Council Hears." *UN News*, June 6. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1119832.

[79] On different approaches to the study of revolutions, see Mark R. Beissinger. 2023. "The Evolving Study of Revolution." *World Politics* 75 (5): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.0.a920225; Donatella della Porta. 2016. *Where Did the Revolution Go? Contentious Politics and the Quality of Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Jack A. Goldstone. 2014. *Revolutions: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press; Nepstad, *Nonviolent Struggle*; Kurt Schock, ed. 2015. *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Stephen Zunes. 1994.

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the concept of revolution denotes "a collective mobilization that attempts to quickly and forcibly overthrow an existing regime in order to transform political, economic, and symbolic relations."[80] Here, the usage of the concept is not meant to suggest that a profound transformation in political institutions and economic structures actually occurred in the aftermath of mass mobilization. It should also be emphasized that contemporary revolutions differ from social ("great") revolutions in several ways.[81] Twenty-first-century revolutions tend to be less violent, encompass a cross-class coalition, take place in urban areas, and have the regime, rather than the state, as a primary target.[82]

The book considers the 2013–2014 mass mobilization in Ukraine as a case of a contemporary revolution. Consistent with a broad-based conceptualization of a twenty-first-century revolution, participants in the revolution represented a cross-cutting coalition of social forces united by their utmost dissatisfaction with the current regime.[83] According to various estimates, more than four million people, comprising approximately 10 percent of Ukraine's adult population, joined anti-government protests across the country.[84] In addition, thousands of people provided in-kind support, donated money for protesters, and disseminated information through civic initiatives on social media.[85] Given a large concentration of protesters in the urban space and popular demands for political freedoms, the Revolution of Dignity falls into the category of what Beissinger defines as an "urban civic revolution."[86]

The main square in the center of Kyiv – Independence Square (*Maidan Nezalezhnosti*, or simply *Maidan*) – was the epicenter of a three-month-long confrontation between the ruling elite and ordinary citizens. It was a site of large protest rallies and an encampment during the Revolution of Dignity. The choice of Independence Square as a meeting place for regime opponents was not accidental. Over the past century, the square located within a short distance

"Unarmed Insurrections Against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World: A New Kind of Revolution." *Third World Quarterly* 15: 403–26.

[80] George Lawson. 2019. *Anatomies of Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 5.

[81] On this point, see Daniel P. Ritter. 2019. "The (R)evolution Is Dead, Long Live the (R)evolution!" *Contention* 7 (2): 100–107.

[82] Colin J. Beck, Mlada Bukovansky, Erica Chenoweth, George Lawson, Sharon Erickson Nepstad, and Daniel P. Ritter. 2022. *On Revolutions: Unruly Politics in the Contemporary World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

[83] Onuch. "The Maidan and Beyond"; Vladimir Paniotto. 2013. "Ukraina: Evromaidan." *Vestnik obshchestvennogo mnenia* 116 (3–4): 17–23; Ritter. "A Spirit of Maidan?".

[84] Oleksandr Reznik. 2016. "From the Orange Revolution to the Revolution of Dignity: Dynamics of the Protest Actions in Ukraine." *East European Politics and Societies* 30 (4): 750–65. See also The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF). 2014. "Dva misiatsia protestiv v Ukraini – shcho dali? – zahalnonatsionalne opytuvannia." www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2014_polls.

[85] Bohdanova. " Unexpected Revolution"; Dickinson. "Prosymo maksymanl'nyi perepost!"; Lokot. *Beyond the Protest Square*.

[86] Beissinger, *The Revolutionary City*.

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from major government buildings has been a major venue for mass gatherings and protests.[87] In particular, this urban space served as the main site of the 1990 student hunger strike, the 2000–2001 Ukraine without Kuchma movement, and the 2004 Orange Revolution. Moreover, given the political significance of this urban space, the ruling elite frequently renamed it to reaffirm the reconfiguration of power in a changing political landscape. Originally known as Khreshchatyk Square (*Khreshchatytska Ploshcha*), it was named Dumska (1878–1919) after the Russian Tsar Nicholas I abolished Kyiv's Magdeburg Rights and Alexander II established a new system of local self-government, including the City Duma. Under the Soviet rule, the square was named Soviet (*Radianska Ploshcha*) and later Kalinin (*Ploshcha Kalinina*) after the Russian Bolshevik Mikhail Kalinin. In 1977, the square was renamed again to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution. For several years, the October Revolution Square (*Ploshcha Zhovtnevoi revoluitsii*) served as a site for military parades and demonstrations in support of the communist regime. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the square became the most popular venue for mass protests against the ruling elite.

Another salient feature of the Ukrainian Revolution is that it exemplifies mass mobilization demanding the government's recognition of human dignity.[88] Nowadays, the concept of dignity is widely seen as a critical element of international human rights law and an essential attribute of the democratic political system.[89] The idea of human dignity as an inherent, inviolable quality of every human being is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.[90] Drawing upon the human rights discourse, participants in the Indignados movement in Spain, the Occupy Wall Street in the US, and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution articulated their demands for the government's

[87] On the political significance of the square, see Roman Cybriwsky. 2014. "Kyiv's Maidan: From Duma Square to Sacred Space." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55 (3): 270–85; Dmytro Vortman. 2021. "Maidan Nezalezhnosti." In *Entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*, ed. Valerii Smolii. Kyiv: Institute of History, the National Academy of Sciences and Naukova Dumka, pp. 351–52; Serhy Yekelchyk. 2020. "The Ideological Park: How the Tsar's Garden in Kyiv Became a Modern Political Space." In *Postsocialist Landscapes: Real and Imaginary Spaces from Stalinstadt to Pyongyang*, eds. Thomas Lahusen and Schamma Schahadat. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, pp. 25–46.

[88] On this point, see Olena Nikolayenko. 2020. "The Significance of Human Dignity for Social Movements: Mass Mobilization in Ukraine." *East European Politics* 36 (3): 445–62.

[89] Paolo Carozza. 2013. "Human Dignity." In *The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law*, ed. Dinah Shelton. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 345–59; Josiah Ober. 2012. "Democracy's Dignity." *American Political Science Review* 106 (4): 827–46; Michael Rosen. 2012. *Dignity: Its History and Meaning*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[90] Article 1 of the Charter states, "Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected." The Charter's full text is retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A12012P/TXT.

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respect of dignity.[91] As noted by Fukuyama, mass mobilization in the name of dignity represents "a large part of the political struggles of the contemporary world, from democratic revolutions to new social movements."[92] A close examination of the Ukrainian Revolution sheds light on this global phenomenon and in particular unravels women's claim-making within a heterogeneous pro-democracy movement.

The incumbent's abrupt decision to abandon the idea of political association and economic integration with the EU sent shockwaves in Ukrainian society. At the Vilnius Summit in November 2013, President Yanukovych was expected to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, which would liberalize EU–Ukraine trade, introduce a visa-free travel regime for citizens of Ukraine, and spearhead a series of reforms in education, energy, environment, transportation, and other sectors of the economy.[93] In particular, Yanukovych punctured the hopes of many young people to witness Ukraine's movement toward European integration.

The Ukrainian government reportedly declined to sign a treaty with the EU and changed its foreign policy orientation under the Kremlin's pressure.[94] Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia has been trying to reassert its control over the former Soviet republics and install a revamped model of the Soviet Union, with the solo power center in Moscow.[95] Putin's fixation on Ukraine was, in no small degree, driven by his fear of democratic tendencies in the neighboring country, which undermined his grip on power in the authoritarian regime.[96] As a part of Putin's grand plan, Ukraine was supposed to join the Eurasian Economic Union, consisting of such corruption-ridden autocracies as

[91] Marlies Glasius and Geoffrey Pleyers. 2013. "The Global Moment of 2011: Democracy, Social Justice and Dignity." *Development and Change* 44 (3): 547–67; Susana Narotzky. 2016. "Between Inequality and Injustice: Dignity as a Motive for Mobilization During the Crisis." *History and Anthropology* 27 (1): 74–92; Diane Singerman. 2013. "Youth, Gender, and Dignity in the Egyptian Uprising." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 9 (3): 1–27.

[92] Francis Fukuyama. 2018. *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*. New York: Macmillan Press.

[93] The full text of the agreement is available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155103.pdf.

[94] Christoph Hasselbach. 2013. "A Frosty Meeting in Vilnius After EU Snub." *Deutsche Welle*, November 29. https://p.dw.com/p/1AQKO.

[95] Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, eds. 2009. *The Guns of August 2008. Russia's War in Georgia*. London: M.E. Sharpe; D'Anieri. *Ukraine and Russia*; Timur Dadabaev. 2022. *Decolonizing Central Asian International Relations: Beyond Empires*. New York: Routledge; Mark Galeotti. 2023. *Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine*. Camden: Bloomsbury Publishing; Marcel van Herpen. 2015. *Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield; Elizabeth A. Wood, William E. Pomeranz, E. Wayne Merry, and Maxim Trudolyubov. 2016. *Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

[96] Mark Edele. 2023. *Russia's War Against Ukraine: The Whole Story*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; Maria Popova and Oxana Shevel. 2024. *Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.[97] Yet, despite the Kremlin's information warfare,[98] the majority of Ukrainians rejected Russia's model of political and socioeconomic development. In March 2013, for example, only 31 percent of the voting-age population and in particular 19 percent of eighteen–twenty nine-year-old Ukrainians favored a customs union with Russia.[99] Against this backdrop, Yanukovych's policy shift upset many Ukrainians.

The revolution began with a Facebook post by Mustafa Nayyem, a thirty-two-year-old Ukrainian journalist of Afghani descent. "Come on guys, let's be serious. If you really want to do something, don't just "like" this post. Write that you are ready, and we can try to start something," he wrote on November 21. Over 600 Facebook users made a comment within an hour of the original post, and Nayyem suggested meeting on Independence Square that night.[100] Hundreds of people filled the square. A group of university students and civic activists subsequently decided to occupy the urban space to demand the government's commitment to European integration.[101] Ukrainian youth waved the national flag, consisting of two equally sized horizontal bands of blue and yellow, and chanted the slogan "Ukraine Is Europe." The incumbent responded with a violent dispersal of youthful protesters at dawn on November 30.[102] Yet, police violence backfired.

A peaceful protest against the government's reversal of Ukrainian foreign policy has rapidly evolved into a broad-based movement, demanding the incumbent's resignation, respect for human dignity, eradication of corruption, and implementation of democratic reforms.[103] On December 1, 2013, between

[97] Alexander Libman and Anastassia V. Obydenkova. 2018. "Regional International Organizations as a Strategy of Autocracy: The Eurasian Economic Union and Russian Foreign Policy." *International Affairs* 94 (5): 1037–58.

[98] Todd Helmus, et al. 2018. *Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation; Marcel van Herpen. 2015. *Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

[99] Mariia Zolkina and Olexiy Haran. 2017. "Zminy u zovnishnopolitychnykh orientatsiiakh pislia Evromaidanu: zahalnonatsionalnyi ta rehionalnyi rivni." In *Transformatsii suspilnykh nastroiv v umovakh protydii ahresii Rosii na Donbasi: rehionalnyi vymir*, ed. Olexiy Haran. Kyiv: Stylos, pp. 112–41, 121.

[100] Mustafa Nayyem. 2014. "Uprising in Ukraine: How It All Began." *Voices*, April 4. www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/uprising-ukraine-how-it-all-began.

[101] Emily Channell-Justice. 2014. "Flexibility and Fragmentation: Student Activism and Ukraine's (Euro)Maidan Protests." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 58: 59–65; Tom Junes. 2016. "Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity: A Case Study of Student Protest as a Catalyst for Political Upheaval." *Critique and Humanism* 46 (2): 73–96.

[102] Human Rights Watch. 2013. "Ukraine: Excessive Force against Protesters." December 3. www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/03/ukraine-excessive-force-against-protesters; Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. 2015. "Euromaidan Events and Human Rights." May 26. https://khpg.org/en/1432629035.

[103] For an overview, see Olena Nikolayenko. 2022. "EuroMaidan (The Revolution of Dignity)." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, 2nd ed., eds. David

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100,000 and 350,000 people joined the March of Millions to denounce police violence and demand political freedoms.[104] "People felt that if they [police] had beaten students today, then they [police] would beat everyone tomorrow," remarked Sviatoslav Shevchuk, Major Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC).[105] Many individuals who aspired to "change the world ... change Ukraine" got involved in civil resistance.[106] As a result, the encampment on Maidan swelled in size, and protesters occupied a few adjacent buildings to provide shelter and medical services for revolutionaries.[107]

The riot police made another attempt to clear the square on December 11, 2013. That night, the bells of St. Michael's Golden-Domed Cathedral, originally built in 1108, rang the alarm for the first time in modern history since the city's seizure by the Golden Horde in the thirteenth century.[108] In response, hundreds of Kyivites rushed to the protest site to prevent the police's destruction of the encampment. Over time, protesters built more formidable barricades to protect themselves against a police assault.

Another escalation in state–society relations was triggered by the adoption of draconian anti-protest laws in January 2014. These laws introduced prison terms of up to fifteen years for the violation of public order, as well as criminal responsibility for the defamation of state officials and the distribution of the so-called extremist materials.[109] To decimate the protest movement, the riot police deployed tear gas, stun grenades, water cannons, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, which resulted in the deaths of nearly 100 civilians.[110] As a result of the shootings on February 20, 2014, alone, at least forty-eight protesters

Snow, Donatella della Porta, Doug McAdam, and Bert Klandermans. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 745–47

[104] BBC. 2013. "Clashes amid Huge Ukraine Protest Against U-Turn on EU." December 1. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25176191.

[105] Qtd. from *Winter on Fire: Ukraine's Fight for Freedom.* 2016 [Netflix documentary]. Directed by Evgeny Afineevsky.

[106] On this point, see UINP interview with Oleksandra Navrotska, April 15, 2016.

[107] Protesters occupied the Trade Unions building (Khreshchatyk Street 18/2), the October Palace (Instytutska Street 1), and the Kyiv City Administration Building (Khreshchatyk Street 36).

[108] Den. 2013. "The Bell Ringer of St. Michael's About the Clearing of the Maidan at Night on December 11." December 25. https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/video/dzvonar-mihaylivskogo-pro-rozgin-ievromaydanu-v-nich-na-11-grudnya-video.

[109] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2014. "Ukrainian Parliament Pushes Through Antiprotest Measures." January 16. www.rferl.org/a/urkaine-parliament-antiprotest-law/25232537.html; Daisy Sindelar. 2014. "Does 'Black Thursday' Mark End of Ukraine's Democratic Decade?" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, January 17. www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-end-democratic-decade/25233555.html.

[110] Oleksandra Matviichuk and Oleksandr Pavlichenko, eds. 2015. *The Price of Freedom: Public Report by Human Rights Organizations on Crimes Against Humanity Committed During Euromaidan (November 2013–February 2014).* Kyiv: International Renaissance Foundation. https://issuu.com/irf_ua/docs/hr-2015-2engl.

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were killed and 200 people sustained injuries.[111] The slain revolutionaries became known as the Heavenly Hundred. Numerous eyewitness accounts testify that snipers deliberately aimed at protesters' eyes or spines to physically maim Euromaidan participants, including journalists with flash cameras and nurses with a red cross on their clothes, and thus break their will to resist the regime.[112] In turn, some revolutionaries threw Molotov cocktails, while others burnt tires to create a smoke screen and hinder the advancement of the riot police.[113] Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was the bloodiest standoff between the incumbent government and regime opponents in Ukraine.

The Revolution of Dignity culminated in a parliamentary vote on February 22, 2014, declaring Yanukovych's removal from office and scheduling snap elections for May 25, 2014.[114] When leaders of opposition political parties announced that the incumbent had agreed to hold early presidential elections in December 2014, most ordinary citizens rejected the terms of elite-led negotiations and threatened to oust the autocrat by force. On February 21, Volodymyr Parasiuk, a twenty-six-year-old commander of a self-defense unit (*sotnik*), climbed onto Maidan's stage and articulated public disapproval of the politicians' deal with the incumbent. "No Yanukovych is going to be a president for a whole year," Parasiuk said. "Tomorrow, by 10:00 a.m., he must be gone!"[115] Out of concern for his personal safety, Yanukovych fled the capital city and found refuge in Russia, albeit he refused to accept the legitimacy of his removal from power. Meanwhile, the newly elected president Petro Poroshenko signed the Association Agreement with the EU, fulfilling one of the protesters' demands.

A PORTRAIT OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE REVOLUTION

Over the span of three months, thousands of Ukrainians participated in the Revolution of Dignity. Figure 1.1 displays the level of women's and men's participation in different types of activities. According to a nationally representative survey conducted in July 2014, 6 percent of men and nearly 3 percent of

[111] Jay Aronson, McKenna Cole, Alex Hauptmann, Dan Miller, and Bradley Samuels. 2018. "Reconstructing Human Rights Violations Using Large Eyewitness Video Collections: The Case of Euromaidan Protester Deaths." *Journal of Human Rights and Practice* 10 (1): 159–78.

[112] Leonid Finberg and Uliana Holovach, eds. 2016. *Maidan. Svidchennia. Kyiv, 2013–2014 roky*. Kyiv: Duh i Litera, pp. 95, 329, 407, 412, 413, 464, 525, 599, 658, and 768.

[113] See, for example, Shore. *The Ukrainian Night*, pp. 42 and 89.

[114] BBC. 2014. "Ukrainian MPs Vote to Oust President Yanukovych." February 22. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26304842.

[115] Richard Balmforth. 2014. "In Ukraine Turbulence, a Lad from Lviv Becomes the Toast of Kiev." *Reuters*, February 25. www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-hero/in-ukraine-turbulence-a-lad-from-lviv-becomes-the-toast-of-kiev-idUKBREA1O0HP20140225.

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


FIGURE 1.1 Women's and men's participation in the Revolution of Dignity.
Note: Percentages are displayed in the figure.

Source: Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, *Ukrainian Society–2014: Social Monitoring*.

women joined anti-government protests in the capital city.[116] In addition, 6.4 percent of men, as well as 4.4 percent of women, were involved in protests outside Kyiv. Moreover, 9 percent of women and men provided in-kind support and donated money for the protest movement. Overall, the survey results show a high level of women's and men's engagement in civil resistance to the regime.

What is remarkable about this case of an urban revolution is that on-site surveys conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF) and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in downtown Kyiv enable scholars to explore cross-time patterns in protest participation.[117]

[116] Survey data come from the nationally representative survey *Ukrainian Society-2014: Social Monitoring* conducted by the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in collaboration with the Kyiv-based SOCIS Centre for Social and Marketing Research in July 2014. N = 1,800.

[117] For an overview, see Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. 2014. "Vid Maidanu-taboru do Maidanu-sichi: Shcho zminylosia?" Press Release of February 6. http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=226&page=2.

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Ukrainian sociologists distinguished three phases of mass mobilization: *Student Maidan* (November 21–30, 2013), with a high rate of student participation in protest events; *Maidan Tabir* (December 1, 2013–January 15, 2014) marked by the construction of barricades and the growth of the encampment on Maidan; and *Maidan Sich* (January 16, 2014–February 22, 2014), signifying an escalation in state violence and the radicalization of protest tactics. Consistent with this typology, survey respondents represented participants in peaceful protest rallies on December 7–8, 2013 (N = 1,037), inhabitants of the encampment on December 20, 2013 (N = 515), and defenders of barricades on February 3, 2014 (N = 502). Remarkably, 86.3 percent of Maidan participants stated in February 2014 that they were going to stay inside the encampment "as long as it takes" (*skilku bude treba*) to achieve the movement's goals. Meanwhile, the survey results indicate that the share of women inside the encampment drastically dropped from 42.8 percent in early December 2013 to 11.8 percent in February 2014. Some women were turned away from the encampment in response to an escalation in police violence.[118] Yet, despite their physical absence from the Kyiv-based encampment, many women remained actively involved in the revolutionary movement.

As seen in Table 1.2, there were gender differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of participants in Kyiv-based protests. Women, on average, had a higher level of education than men. Furthermore, the share of female protesters with higher education remained quite stable over the course of anti-regime mobilization. In contrast, among men, the percentage of protesters with a university degree decreased more markedly with an increasing level of police violence. Despite the visibility of young people, especially university students, at the start of anti-government protests in November 2013, the survey results show that thirty–fifty four-year-old Ukrainians made up the plurality of participants in the Revolution of Dignity. Among women, the percentage of 18–29 protesters dropped from 42.8 percent in early December 2013 to 25.4 percent in February 2014, signifying the greater physical presence of middle-aged women in the epicenter of civil resistance. Among men, youth made up one-third of protesters throughout the period.

Another statistically significant gender difference is related to the geographical origin of protesters. In early December 2013, one-third of female and two-thirds of male participants in Kyiv-based protests were non-Kyivites. By February 2014, 75.9 percent of female and 89.2 percent of male protesters on Maidan came from outside the capital city. Half of the protesters arrived in Kyiv from western Ukraine, 23 percent came from central Ukraine, and 21 percent were from eastern or southern parts of the country. Reflecting the linguistic situation in

[118] The Maidan commandant Andrii Parubii reportedly advised women against participating in direct combat on the barricades.

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TABLE 1.2 *Sociodemographic characteristics of Kyiv-based protesters*

Variable	Date of the survey					
	December 7–8, 2013		December 20, 2013		February 3, 2014	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Age						
18–29	42.8	34.2	39.0	33.3	25.4	34.4
30–54	41.5	54.3	46.8	53.0	55.9	55.9
≥55	15.7	11.5	14.3	13.7	18.6	9.7
Education						
Secondary/vocational	11.7	30.0	26.3	41.0	22.4	45.8
University student	17.4	9.4	15.8	9.3	12.1	9.1
Higher education	70.4	59.4	53.9	47.8	65.5	40.3
Language spoken at home						
Ukrainian	46.4	58.6	53.2	52.3	57.6	59.5
Russian	35.4	21.6	18.2	19.9	13.6	16.1
Ukrainian and Russian	17.0	19.5	28.6	27.4	28.8	23.6
Kyiv resident	65.6	37.5	67.5	17.4	24.1	10.8
Membership in organizations						
Political party	2.0	5.5	15.6	14.8	15.3	6.8
Civic organization	2.9	3.9	3.9	9.8	10.2	8.1
Number of respondents	453	584	77	438	59	443

Note: Percentages are reported in the table. The three-wave survey Student Maidan (N = 1,037), Maidan Tabir (N = 515), and Maidan Sich (N = 502) was conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.

Ukrainian society,[119] 59.3 percent of protesters mostly spoke Ukrainian at home, 15.8 mostly spoke Russian, and 28.8 percent used either Ukrainian or Russian in their interactions with family members.

A salient feature of the Revolution of Dignity is the development of horizontal social networks and citizens' distrust in politicians of different stripes.[120]

[119] As an outcome of the long-term Russian policy of Russification, imposition of Russian culture and language, Stalin-era purges, wiping out a stratum of Ukrainian intellectuals, and the Ukrainian government's inept policies in the post-Soviet period, Ukraine on the eve of Euromaidan was de facto a bilingual country. Most citizens of Ukraine comprehended Ukrainian and Russian, while they mostly spoke one language at home or switched between languages, depending on the social circumstances. On language policies and practices in Ukraine prior to Euromaidan, see Volodymyr Kulyk. 2011. "Language Identity, Linguistic Diversity and Political Cleavages: Evidence from Ukraine." *Nations and Nationalism* 17 (3): 627–48.

[120] On this point, see Diuk. "Euro Maidan".

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More than two-thirds of out-of-town protesters reported that they had traveled to Kyiv on their own, without any assistance on the part of a political party or a nonprofit organization. At that time, a lot of car owners offered free rides to Kyiv by making posts on social media. Only 2 percent of female and 5.5 percent of male participants in protest rallies on December 7–8, 2013, were members of a political party. By February 2014, the presence of protesters with a party affiliation rose to 15.3 percent among women and 6.8 percent among men. Likewise, 10.2 percent of female protesters and 8.1 percent of male protesters reported affiliation with a nonprofit organization during the revolution's last phase. Apparently, opposition political parties played a minor role in mobilizing the population against the regime.[121]

Additional data from the nationally representative survey *Ukrainian Society – 2014: Social Monitoring* conducted by the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in collaboration with the Kyiv-based SOCIS Centre for Social and Marketing Research in July 2014 provide insights into patterns of protest participation in and outside the capital city (N = 1,800). Consistent with the results of on-site surveys, the analysis finds that the plurality of protesters was aged between thirty and fifty-four. The majority of protesters were Ukrainian-language speakers. Though a sizeable portion of participants in anti-government protests came from western Ukraine, the protest movement embodied people from different parts of the country.[122] In line with prior findings, the analysis finds that a minuscule fraction of protesters was affiliated with a political party or a civic organization. Compared to on-site surveys, however, the results of nationally representative surveys suggest that the proportion of protesters with a university degree was lower. As seen in Table 1.3, only one-third of participants in anti-government protests reportedly received higher education. Apart from educational attainment, opinion polls conducted during and shortly after mass protests sketch a similar portrait of a typical participant in the Revolution of Dignity.

[121] From 1994 to 2014, less than 5 percent of voting-age population annually reported that they were members of a political party in Ukraine. For details, see Valerii Vorona and Mykola Shulha, eds. 2016. *Ukrainske suspilstvo: monitorinh sotsialnykh zmin*. Kyiv: Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, p. 433.

[122] The variable *region* is constructed by grouping Ukraine's administrative units (oblasts) into four macro regions. *West* is comprised of Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Volyn, and Zakarpattia. *Center* includes Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr. *South* covers southern and southeastern oblasts: Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia. *East* includes Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Given Russia's annexation of Crimea, the survey was not administered in the autonomous republic and the city of Sevastopol. On regional cleavages in Ukraine, see Oleksandr Vyshniak. 2015. *Shcho ob'iednuie ta shcho roz'iednuie ukraintsiv: Rezultaty opytuvan hromadskoi dumky*. Kyiv: Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation.

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TABLE 1.3 *Participants in anti-government protests in and outside Kyiv*

Variable	Protests in Kyiv		Protests outside Kyiv	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
Age				
18–29	25.0	39.6	13.6	25.5
30–54	42.9	45.8	61.4	49.0
≥55	32.1	14.6	25.0	25.5
Education				
Secondary/vocational	67.8	72.3	63.7	60.0
Higher education	32.2	23.4	28.9	32.0
Language spoken at home				
Mostly Ukrainian	50.0	64.6	65.9	76.5
Mostly Russian	14.3	14.6	11.4	7.8
Ukrainian and Russian	35.7	20.8	22.7	15.7
Region				
West	41.7	28.6	56.8	54.9
Center	50.0	57.1	13.6	29.4
South	8.3	10.7	20.5	13.7
East	0	3.6	9.1	2.0
Membership in organizations				
Political party	3.6	2.1	4.5	5.9
Civic organization	3.6	0	2.3	3.9
Number of respondents	28	48	44	51

Note: Percentages are reported in the table.
Source: Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, *Ukrainian Society-2014: Social Monitoring*.

The results of binary logistic regression analysis, with participation in Kyiv-based protests as the dependent variable, are summarized in Table 1.4.[123] As shown in the table, gender had a significant impact on citizens' engagement in anti-government protests in the capital city, controlling for a variety of variables. Women were less likely than men to participate in anti-government protests in Kyiv. Across the models, age had a significant impact on the odds of protest participation. Young people were twice as likely as persons aged between thirty and fifty-five to join anti-government protests. The results of multivariate analysis also suggest that *Higher education* and *Income* had weak effects on the odds of citizens' involvement in the Revolution of Dignity. In addition, being married did not appear to affect the likelihood of protest

[123] Binary logistic regression models estimate the probability of falling into a certain category (protest participation versus nonparticipation) given a set of predictors. Stata's logit command is used to calculate odds ratios.

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TABLE 1.4 *Gender and protest participation: multivariate analysis*

Variables	Model		
	1	2	3
Gender (1 = female)	0.512**	0.513**	0.516**
	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.139)
Under 30	2.430***	2.460***	2.374***
	(0.760)	(0.770)	(0.750)
Over 55	0.760	0.757	0.739
	(0.254)	(0.253)	(0.249)
Higher education	1.314	1.292	1.337
	(0.395)	(0.395)	(0.401)
Income	1.000	1.000	1.000
	(8.35e-05)	(8.36e-05)	(8.59e-05)
Married	1.051	1.063	1.017
	(0.297)	(0.301)	(0.288)
Preschool child	0.265***	0.265***	0.277**
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.141)
Ethnic Ukrainian	1.469	1.480	1.508
	(0.826)	(0.836)	(0.864)
Ukrainian language	1.922**	1.897**	1.824**
	(0.526)	(0.526)	(0.512)
Party membership		1.761	
		(1.461)	
Membership in civic organization		1.359	
		(1.594)	
Trust in compatriots			1.404**
			(0.222)
Constant	0.0250***	0.0244***	0.007***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Observations	1,640	1,640	1,638
Log likelihood	-268.4	-268.1	-265.4
Pseudo R-square	0.062	0.063	0.072

Note: Odds ratios are reported in the table, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.10$.
Source: Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, *Ukrainian Society-2014: Social Monitoring*.

engagement.[124] Concurrently, having a preschool child decreased the odds of participation in Kyiv-based protests by 73 percent.[125] The analysis also finds that Ukrainian-language speakers were almost twice as likely to get involved in

[124] The variable *Married* is coded 1 if a respondent is legally married or in a common-law relationship, and 0 otherwise.
[125] The binary variable *Preschool child* takes the value of 1 if a respondent has a child under the age of six.

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protest activity in the capital city. As seen in Model 2, membership in political parties and civic organizations did not boost the likelihood of protest engagement. In contrast, trust in compatriots is positively associated with protest engagement.

This book focuses on female participants in anti-government protests held in the capital city because Kyiv's Maidan was a prime site of the confrontation between the incumbent government and regime opponents. Methodologically, it is advantageous to focus on mass mobilization in one city to control for within-country variation in political conditions.[126] For example, the costs of participation in local protests were much higher in Donetsk, Yanukovych's home base in eastern Ukraine, than in Lviv, a stronghold of Ukrainian culture, located on the western edge of the country. In part, the book highlights how women from different parts of the country joined forces to sustain anti-government protests in the capital city.

GENDER INEQUALITY IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

Women, albeit comprising 53.8 percent of the country's 45-million population, faced a great deal of gender discrimination in Ukrainian society in the early 2010s.[127] Global rankings suggest that the former Soviet republic lagged behind many European countries in terms of women's empowerment. The 2013 Global Gender Gap Index, for example, ranked Ukraine 64th of 136 countries, indicating wider gender disparities in labor market participation and political representation in Ukraine than in Latvia (12th) and Lithuania (28th).[128] Similarly, Ukraine was ranked sixty-first of 149 countries on the 2013 Gender Inequality Index, scoring 0.326 on a scale from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a higher level of gender inequality.[129] A brief overview of the status of women in education, economy, and politics further illustrates the magnitude of

[126] On mass mobilization outside the capital city, see Olga Zelinska. 2015. "Who Were the Protestors and What Did They Want? Contentious Politics of Local Maidans Across Ukraine, 2013–2014." *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 23: 379–400.

[127] A greater share of women in the total population began in the age group of those over thirty-five and became especially pronounced in the oldest age groups. The average life expectancy was seventy-six years for women and sixty-six years for men in 2013. For details, see O. O. Karmazina, ed. 2014. *Dity, zhinky ta sim'ia v Ukraini*. Kyiv: State Statistics Service of Ukraine.

[128] For details, see World Economic Forum. 2015. *The Global Gender Gap Report 2015*. Geneva: World Economic Forum. http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015.

[129] The index measures the level of inequality in achievement between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market. Empowerment is measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by women and the share of the population with at least some secondary education. For details, see the United Nations Development Program. 2014. *Human Development Report 2014*. New York: UNDP. http://report.hdr.undp.org/.

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gender inequality prior to the onset of anti-government protests in November 2013.

Women, on average, have a higher level of educational attainment than men in contemporary Ukraine. At the start of the 2013–2014 academic year, women made up 51.2 percent of all the students enrolled in institutions of higher education.[130] In the class of 2013, women comprised 51.3 percent of graduates with a bachelor's degree, 54.4 percent of those with a specialist (five-year) degree, and 59.6 percent of those with a master's degree.[131] Yet, despite women's access to higher education, there remained a high degree of occupational segregation.[132] In the fall of 2013, for example, 96.7 percent of undergraduate students majoring in elementary education, as well as 90.1 percent of library science majors and 87.7 percent of philology majors, were women.[133] In contrast, women made up 23 percent of computer science, 57.4 percent of international law, and 60.2 percent of marketing majors. Gender differences in educational attainment affected women's participation in the labor market.

In the past two decades, the gender wage gap in Ukraine has reduced, but it remained higher than the EU mean.[134] The average monthly wages were UAH 2,866 ($362) for women and UAH 3,711 ($469) for men in 2013, meaning that female full-time workers made seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned by men.[135] Gender disparities in wages were even larger in higher-paying sectors of the economy and, for example, stood at 66.7 percent in the financial and insurance sectors.[136] Access to a smaller pool of economic resources put women at a significant disadvantage in the political sphere.

[130] Based upon the type of academic programming, institutions of higher education used to be divided into four tiers: I – vocational schools, II – colleges, III – institutes, and IV – institutes and universities. Statistics on student enrollment in institutions of higher education with III–IV level of accreditation are reported in the text. Data are retrieved from Karmazina. *Dity, zhinky ta sim'ia v Ukraini*, p. 263.

[131] I. V. Kalachova, ed. 2014. *Osnovni pokaznyky diialnosti vyshchykh navchalnykh zakladiv Ukrainy na pochatok 2013/14 navchalnoho roku*. Kyiv: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, p. 77.

[132] Iryna Kohut. 2014. "Chym vidrizniaiutsia zhinky i choloviky: Pro hendernu (ne)rivnist v vyshchyi osviti." July 10. Cedos, Kyiv. www.cedos.org.ua/uk/discrimination/chym-vidrizniaiutsia-zhinky-i-choloviky-pro-hendernu-ne-rivnist-u-vyshchii-osviti.

[133] Kalachova. *Osnovni pokaznyky diialnosti vyshchykh navchalnykh zakladiv Ukrainy na pochatok 2013/14 navchalnoho roku*, pp. 126–30.

[134] Norberto Pignatti. 2012. "Gender Wage Gap Dynamics in a Changing Ukraine." *IZA Journal of Labor Development* 1 (7): 1–44.

[135] The estimates of the gender pay gap are based upon the author's calculations. Data are retrieved from the online archive of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. "Average Monthly Wages and Salaries of Women and Men by Type of Economic Activity in 2013." www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2013/gdn/Szp_ed/Szp_ed_e/Szp_ed_2013_e.html. According to the National Bank of Ukraine, the exchange rate for Ukrainian national currency *hryvnia* (UAH) to US dollar was 7.9 in 2013. https://bank.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/category?cat_id=7693080.

[136] State Statistics Service of Ukraine, "Average Monthly Wages and Salaries."

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Women were underrepresented in national and local legislatures.[137] The share of women in Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's national parliament, ranged from 2.9 percent in 1991 to 9.4 percent in 2012.[138] There is mixed empirical evidence regarding the effects of new electoral rules – the introduction of the proportional electoral system – on women's representation in the national parliament.[139] Women edged out a slightly better representation in local governments.[140] Female candidates, for example, secured 12 percent of seats in provincial councils (*oblasni rady*) as a result of the 2010 local elections.

A myriad of structural and cultural factors impeded women's representation in government.[141] First, the ruling elite tossed away the Soviet-era practice of allotting a certain proportion of parliamentary seats for women to maintain a façade of gender equality. Second, the collapse of communism created a fertile ground not only for the emergence of a multiparty political system but also for the rise of oligarchs with enormous political clout.[142] Oligarchs lobbied their business interests, in part, by financing fledgling political parties and placing their loyalists in positions of power. The costs of election campaigning were also on a steady rise. According to some estimates, it cost up to $5 million to win a race for a parliamentary seat in a single-member district in 2012.[143] Moreover, dominant cultural norms created enormous barriers to women's

[137] For an overview, see Tamara Martsenyuk. 2015. "Women's Top-Level Political Participation: Failures and Hopes of Ukrainian Gender Politics." In *New Imaginaries. Youthful Reinvention of Ukraine's Cultural Paradigm,* ed. Marian J. Rubchak. New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 33–52.

[138] Olena Zakharova, Anatolii Oktysyuk, and Svitlana Radchenko. 2017. *Participation of Women in Ukrainian Politics*. Kyiv: International Centre for Policy Studies, p. 6. www.icps.com.ua/en/our-projects/publications/participation-of-women-in-ukrainian-politics/.

[139] Elena Semenova. 2012. "Patterns of Parliamentary Representation and Careers in Ukraine: 1990–2007." *East European Politics and Societies* 26 (3): 538–60; Frank Thames. 2018. "The Electoral System and Women's Legislative Underrepresentation in Post-Communist Ukraine." *Comparative Politics* 50: 251–73.

[140] Ukrainian Women's Fund. 2010. *Henderna arifmetika vlasti*. Kyiv: UWF. www.uwf.kiev.ua/files/arifmetika_ukr2010-1.pdf.

[141] See, for example, Sarah Birch. 2003. "Women and Political Representation in Contemporary Ukraine." In *Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe*, eds. Richard Matland and Kathleen Montgomery. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 130–53; Tetiana Kostiuchenko, Tamara Martsenyuk, and Svitlana Oksamytna. 2015. "Women Politicians and Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine and Georgia in 2012." *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 2: 83–110.

[142] In Ukrainian society, the term "oligarch" refers to "a very wealthy and politically well-connected businessman … who was the main owner of a conglomerate of enterprises and had close ties to the president." For details, see Anders Aslund. 2009. *How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy*. Washington, DC: The Peterson Institute for International Economics, p. 107.

[143] Andriy Meleshevych. 2016. *Cost of Parliamentary Politics in Ukraine*. London: Westminster Foundation for Democracy, p. 4. www.wfd.org/2016/09/05/cost-of-politics-ukraine/.

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empowerment.[144] Opinion polls showed that gender equality was not at the top of public agenda. When asked to identify the top five public policies that should be implemented by the national parliament, only 8 percent of voting-age Ukrainians in 2012 mentioned equal rights and opportunities for women and men.[145] Under these circumstances, Ukrainian women had to overcome a plethora of structural and cultural constraints to realize their political ambitions.

Women played an active role in the nongovernmental sector to tackle a broad spectrum of issues, including domestic violence, human trafficking, and gender equality. According to some estimates, there were over 700 women's organizations in Ukraine in the early 2010s.[146] But few women's organizations captured as much media attention as FEMEN. Since its emergence in 2008, FEMEN stirred up a storm by using topless body as a method of resistance to patriarchal norms in Ukraine and beyond.[147] Bare-breasted activists, for example, protested against prostitution and sex tourism during the Euro-2012 soccer championship cohosted by Poland and Ukraine.[148] Another group of women formed the Feminist Offensive (*Feministychna Ofenzyva*) in 2010 to advance the development of critical gender studies and advocate women's empowerment through public events.[149] The Feminist Offensive, for example, organized marches on March 8 to reclaim the political significance of International Women's Day and raise public awareness of women's rights.[150]

Overall, despite some progress in the education sector and the labor market, Ukrainian women fell far behind in terms of their political empowerment. Women held less than 15 percent of seats in the national parliament and oblast

[144] On this global trend, see Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[145] The poll was conducted on August 21–September 6, 2012 (N = 2,000). For details, see International Republican Institute. 2012. "IRI Poll: Majority of Ukrainians Think Country Is Moving in Wrong Direction." October 17. www.iri.org/resources/iri-poll-majority-of-ukrainians-think-country-is-moving-in-wrong-direction.

[146] Liana Iatsenko. 2008. "Zhinochyi rukh Ukrainy: Etapy stanovlennia." *Naukovy zapysky z ukrainiskoi istorii* 21: 386–90. Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi State Pedagogical University named after Hryhorii Skovoroda, Department of History and Culture of Ukraine.

[147] Emily Channell. 2014. "Is Sextremism the New Feminism? Perspectives from Pussy Riot and Femen." *Nationalities Papers* 42: 611–14; Theresa O'Keefe. 2014. "My Body Is My Manifesto! SlutWalk, FEMEN and Feminist Protest." *Feminist Review* 107 (1): 1–19; Marian J. Rubchak. 2012. "Seeing Pink: Searching for Gender Justice Through Opposition in Ukraine." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 19 (1): 55–72; Jessica Zychowicz. 2011. "Two Bad Words: FEMEN and Feminism in Independent Ukraine." *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 29 (2): 215–27.

[148] Cerelia Athanassiou and Jonah Bury. 2014. "On Caretakers, Rebels and Enforcers: The Gender Politics of Euro 2012." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 21 (2): 148–64.

[149] Feminist Offensive, https://ofenzyva.wordpress.com/about/#_eng.

[150] Mark Rachkevych. 2012. "New Feminist Offensive Aims to Lift Women." *Kyiv Post*, March 22. www.kyivpost.com/article/guide/about-kyiv/new-feminist-offensive-aims-to-lift-women-124777.html.

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legislatures. Furthermore, women were typically denied high-level positions in government. Nonetheless, women en masse joined the 2013–2014 protests to reassert the country's right to choose its own path of political development. Some of them seized an opportunity to raise a feminist voice at a critical juncture in Ukrainian modern history.

DATA SOURCES

Using the case study approach, the book analyzes quantitative and qualitative data from multiple sources. The abovementioned on-site surveys conducted in December 2013 and February 2014 provide an empirical basis for sketching a portrait of participants in anti-government protests in the capital city. Furthermore, nationally representative surveys administered by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in July 2014 allow for a comparison of protesters and non-protesters across different strata of the country's population. To assess gender outcomes of the revolution, statistical data are retrieved from publications and online archives of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada, other government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. Qualitative data primarily come from oral history projects carried out by Ukrainian historians immediately upon the conclusion of protest events.

Oral history as a research method is best suited to uncover "hidden realities" and elucidate women's perspectives on their engagement in a revolution.[151] Oral history helps us better understand women's activism because it documents not only what women did but also how they felt about it.[152] In particular, data from in-depth interviews with female protesters offer valuable insights into diverse ways in which women engage in civil resistance.

The book leverages rich qualitative data from two oral history projects on the Revolution of Dignity. The oral history project "Maidan: Oral History" (*Maidan: Usna istoriia*) was administered by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (*Ukrainskyi instytut natsionalnoi pamiati*, UINP).[153] Between 2014 and 2017, a nationwide team of Ukrainian historians, coordinated by Tetiana Kovtunovych and Tetiana Pryvalko, interviewed over 1,000 Euromaidan participants across the country. Focusing on Kyiv as a key venue for revolutionary events, I retrieved raw data for a randomly selected subset of

[151] Joan Sangster. 1994. "Telling Our Stories: Feminist Debates and the Use of Oral History." *Women's History Review* 3 (1): 5–28.

[152] Kathryn Anderson, Susan Armitage, Dana Jack, and Judith Wittner. 1987. "Beginning Where We Are: Feminist Methodology in Oral History." *Oral History Review* 15 (1): 103–27.

[153] The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance is a government agency that was established in 2006 with the mission to restore and preserve national memory of Ukrainian people.

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women who participated in civil resistance in the capital city.[154] The sample consisted of eighty five interviewees, ranging in age from eighteen to sixty-four in 2014, with a mean of 34.5. The youngest one was a freshman at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, one of the most prestigious Ukrainian universities. Born in 1950, the poets Mariia Makhovets (Volynska) and Olha Strashenko were the oldest respondents. Most interviewees received a university degree or were enrolled in an institution of higher education. Approximately one-third of the interviewees presented themselves as Kyiv-born residents (*korinna kyianka*). More than half of the interviewees lived in Kyiv at the start of anti-government protests. Others came to the capital city during the Revolution of Dignity with the intent to sustain civil resistance. The interviewed women performed a wide range of roles, including crowdsourcing, food provision, hospital guard, legal aid, public relations, shield painting, street actions, and urgent medical care. Approximately half of the interviews (N = 46) were conducted in 2014, and twenty-nine interviews were completed in 2015. Eight women were interviewed in 2016, and only one interview in the sample dates back to 2017.[155] A list of eighty-five female interviewees, including their place of birth and their age in 2014, is provided in Appendix 1.[156]

Most interviews were transcribed by a professional Ukraine-born transcriber. A compilation of transcripts with thirty-two female interviewees was published in two UINP books. The first book, *Maidan vid pershoi osoby: 45 istorii Revoliutsii hidnosti* [Maidan from the first person: forty-five stories of the Revolution of Dignity], showcased the occupational diversity of participants in the revolution, ranging from university students and journalists to clergy and entrepreneurs. Of forty-five interviewees featured in the book, ten were women.[157] The second book, *Maidan vid pershoi osoby: Mystetsvo na barykadakh* [Maidan from the first person: Art on the barricades] featured thirty-six artists, poets, and musicians, including twelve women.[158]

Another oral history project, titled "Maidan. Testimonies" (*Maidan. Svidchennia*), was implemented by the Center for the Studies of History and Culture of East European Jewry at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA). The project was coordinated by Leonid Finberg, distinguished professor of Jewish Studies and the Center's director, and Anna Prokhorova, senior lecturer in sociology and the Center's deputy director. Between late February and July 2014, a team of researchers conducted in-depth

[154] The UINP video-recorded interviews and made audio files available for academic research upon request. Most interviews were transcribed by a professional Ukraine-born transcriber.
[155] Information about the date of the interview was missing in one case.
[156] The age of respondents in 2014 is calculated by subtracting the year of birth from 2014.
[157] Tetiana Kovtunovych and Tetiana Pryvalko, eds. 2015. *Maidan vid pershoi osoby: 45 istorii Revoliutsii hidnosti*. Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance.
[158] Tetiana Kovtunovych and Tetiana Pryvalko, eds. 2016. *Maidan vid pershoi osoby: Mystetsvo na barykadakh*. Kyiv: Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance.

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interviews with 300 participants in the revolution.[159] The quota sampling was employed to reflect the sociodemographic diversity of protesters. Interviews were conducted in Russian or Ukrainian (depending upon the interviewee's language preference) and transcribed in the original language. One of the main outputs from this oral history project was the 784-page long book, *Maidan. Svidchennia. Kyiv, 2013–2014 roky* [Maidan. Testimonies. Kyiv, 2013–2014].[160] This compilation of transcripts with 147 protesters, including sixty women, provides a trove of qualitative data on protest participation.[161] Female interviewees ranged in age from sixteen to seventy, with a mean of 34.6. The youngest respondent was a high-school student during the protest events. Almost half of the respondents self-identified as natives of Kyiv. Others moved to the capital city from all over the country, including Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv. Most interviewees either had higher education or were university students. Many participants in the oral history project were employed in the healthcare sector or the media sector. The interviewed women were responsible for art production, food distribution, legal aid, medical assistance, organization of street actions, public relations, patrol of the encampment, religious services, and transportation of the wounded. A list of female respondents whose interviews were transcribed in the original language (Ukrainian or Russian) and published in the abovementioned book in 2016 is provided in Appendix 2. All the translations of transcribed interviews from Ukrainian or Russian are my own.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

The book is divided into six chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the book places women's engagement in the Revolution of Dignity in the context of women's activism over the past century. Chapter 2 examines women's participation in three revolutions that had far-reaching repercussions for Ukraine's political development. The 1917 February Revolution ended the Romanov dynasty's rule over the Russian Empire and opened up an opportunity for the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic.[162] The 1990 student hunger strike, also known as the Revolution on Granite, exposed the diminishing legitimacy of

[159] Anna Prokhorova. 2017. "Metodolohichni osoblyvosti doslidzhennia osobystyh svidchen' uchasnykiv Maidanu 2013–2014 rokiv metodom napivstrukturovannoho interv'ui." *Naukovi zapysky NaUKMA: Sotsiolohichni nauky* 196: 32–37.

[160] Finberg and Holovach. *Maidan. Svidchennia. Kyiv, 2013–2014 roky*.

[161] A subsequent oral history project focused on activists who were primarily responsible for the provision of medical services and the development of transnational networks during the Revolution of Dignity. For details, see Leonid Finberg, Iryna Berliand, and Olena Andreeva, eds. 2018. *Maidan. Svidchennia. Dopomoha postrazhdalym. Mizhnarodna solidarnist* [Maidan. Testimonies. Aid for the Injured. International Solidarity]. Kyiv: Dukh i Litera.

[162] Stephen Velychenko. 2011. *State Building in Revolutionary Ukraine: A Comparative Study of Governments and Bureaucrats, 1917–1922*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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the communist regime and presaged Ukraine's exit from the Soviet Union the next year.[163] The 2004 Orange Revolution was triggered by gross violations of democratic procedures during national elections and culminated in an unprecedented rerun of the second round of the presidential election, signifying the victory of pro-democracy forces.[164] Although women were involved in these tumultuous events, women's stories of resistance tend to be marginalized in Western historiography on the topic. The chapter aims to address this oversight and trace continuities or ruptures in Ukrainian women's activism over the past century.

Chapters 3–5 illustrate the applicability of a hybrid model to the case of women's participation in Ukraine's Euromaidan. Chapter 3 uncovers a myriad of women's motivations for participation in the revolution. In addition, data from oral history projects show that a variety of social networks, including family ties, professional associations, and community-based organizations, galvanized women into action. Chapter 4 demonstrates that women performed a broad spectrum of roles to sustain civil resistance under precarious political conditions. Additionally, the chapter chronicles how women's multifaceted participation expanded the resisters' access to a considerable pool of material and nonmaterial resources. Chapter 5 traces the political, socioeconomic, and cultural outcomes of the revolution, with a focus on women. The analysis begins with an assessment of women's representation in government and describes women's bids for the presidency. Next, the chapter analyzes patterns of women's participation in the labor market. Moreover, the chapter examines how women contested gender hierarchies in the armed forces during the early phases of the Russia–Ukraine war (2014–2021). Finally, the chapter analyzes public opinion on women's role in society in the post-2013 period. Overall, the analysis registers some variation in the degree of gender equality in different domains.

The concluding chapter underscores the book's contribution to contentious politics literature and elaborates on the implications of the main findings for the study of contemporary urban revolutions. The chapter brings up the cases of the 2013 Gezi Park uprising in Turkey and the 2020 electoral revolution in Belarus to elucidate various forms of women's engagement in civil resistance. The Turkish government's infringement on women's rights ignited women's involvement in anti-government protests and fueled their demands for gender equality. In particular, young college-educated women with a feminist agenda

[163] Ihor Ostrovskii and Serhii Chernenko. 2000. *Velykyi zlam: Khronika 'revoluitsii na hraniti' 2-17 zhovtnia 1990 roku*. Kyiv: Ahentsvo Ukraina.

[164] Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds. 2006. *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Paul D'Anieri, ed. 2010. *Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

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actively participated in the 2014 uprising.[165] Additionally, middle-aged women responded to the government's call to bring their rebellious children home by forming human chains around the encampment and protecting youngsters against police violence.[166] Meanwhile, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya positioned herself as a loving wife and a caring mother who ran for the presidency in the aftermath of her spouse's imprisonment on the promise to create more favorable conditions for the conduct of free and fair elections and subsequently resign from the post.[167] Nonetheless, despite the invocation of maternalist frames and a high level of state repression, many Belarusian women subverted patriarchal stereotypes and reasserted their agency.[168] A cursory look at women's activism in Turkey and Belarus reveals the diversity of women's voices within a protest movement.

In addition, the concluding chapter suggests that an in-depth analysis of women's activism during Euromaidan enhances our understanding of women's multifaceted engagement in the Russia–Ukraine war. Since 2014, Ukrainian women have been fighting for national independence on the frontlines, the home front, and abroad. At the time of this writing, thousands of Ukrainian women serve in the armed forces to defend the country's territorial integrity and protect the Ukrainian nation against Russia's aggression. Women's struggle for democracy and gender equality is far from over in today's world so the book might inform women's ongoing efforts to have a say in domestic politics in Eastern Europe and beyond.

[165] For an overview, see Joyce Marie Mushaben. 2018. "'I'm Here Too, Girlfriend . . .': Reclaiming Public Spaces for the Gendering of Civil Society in Turkey." In *Civil Society and Gender Relations in Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes: New Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Case Studies*, eds. Gabriele Wilde, Annette Zimmer, Katharina Obuch, and Isabelle-Christine Panreck. Leverkusen, Germany: Verlag Barbara Budrich, pp. 185–216.

[166] Öykü Potuoğlu-Cook. 2015. "Hope With Qualms: A Feminist Analysis of the 2013 Gezi Protests." *Feminist Review* 109: 96–123.

[167] See, for example, the full text of the address by the presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya on the TV channel *Belarus 1* on July 28, 2020 (translated in English). https://babariko.vision/en/news-en/speech-by-presidential-candidate-svetlana-tsikhanouskaya.

[168] On the significance of women's agency during the 2020 protests, see, for example, Gapova. "Activating and Negotiating Women's Citizenship"; Paulovich. "How Feminist Is the Belarusian Revolution?".

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