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State culture and development in Botswana and Zimbabwe

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ABSTRACT

This article makes two major claims. The first is that independent Botswana was able to generate and sustain a type of developmental state because of the presence of an indigenous initiator state culture that was preserved by the Protectorate state and was inherited by the post-colonial state elites. The second is that the non-emergence of the developmental state in post-colonial Zimbabwe is explained by the presence of a non-initiator indigenous state culture which was preserved by the Rhodesian colonial state and was inherited by the post-colonial state elites. The article briefly reviews the literature, analyses the Tswana and Shona pre-colonial state cultures, and shows that these were preserved by the colonial states and inherited by the nationalist politicians.

INTRODUCTION

The two neighbouring southern African states of Botswana and Zimbabwe have experienced dramatically different fortunes since independence. During the twelve years from 1980 Botswana's gross domestic product (GDP) increased in real terms by an annual average of 10.1%. Between 1985 and 1993, there was an estimated GNP per head increase in real terms at an annual average of 5.7% (Hope 1995). By 1993, Botswana's gross national product (GNP), measured at average 1991–93 prices, was estimated at US$3,630 million, and at US$2,590 per head in 1993. Real GDP per capita was about nine times higher in 1991 than in 1966 when the country became independent (Hope 1995, 1996: 54). Since then, GDP per capita has continued to rise, reaching US$3,200 in 1997 (Euromonitor 2000). All branches of the economy experienced substantial growth rates. In the twelve year period ending 1992, industrial GDP increased by an annual average of 10.1% (Europa 1995a: 604). Between 1979 and 1985, it had the fourth highest growing value added in manufacturing in Africa, after Lesotho (12.9%), Gambia (13.9%) and Cameroon (24.6%).

Development in Zimbabwe since independence has not been so successful. GDP grew at an annual average rate of 3.8% during

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1980–89, the first decade of independence (Buren 1999b: 1196), and at 0.5% annually in 1990–96 (Government of Zimbabwe 1998: 3). Although GDP rose from US$5.862.3 m in 1993 to US$6.106.4 m in 1995 (Euromonitor 1996), per capita income was estimated to have fallen by 9% over the period 1990–96. The budget deficit remained stubbornly high, at an estimated 13.4% of GDP in 1995, and still over 10% in 1998 (Brown 1999: 79).

The economic decline is evident in all sectors of the economy. In the twelve years ending 1992, Zimbabwe's agricultural GDP increased only by an annual average of 1.1% (Europa 1995b: 3500). In a twelve year period ending 1992, Zimbabwe's industrial production similarly increased marginally by an annual average of 1.9%. Many manufacturing firms have either closed down or are facing severe hardships. Zimbabwe's debt at independence, estimated at about 16% of GDP in 1980, had reached 53% of GDP by 1984 (*ibid.*). In 1993 the cost of debt servicing was equivalent to 33.3% of the value of exports of goods and services (*ibid.*: 3500). 'With actual revenue totalling Z$15,257 m in 1994/95, the budget deficit reached Z$7,000 m, equivalent to 13.4 percent of GDP' (Buren 1999a: 1190). This very disappointing performance precedes the catastrophic rates of decline that accompanied the political upheavals in Zimbabwe from 1999 onwards.

The question is: How can the divergent performances of the two economies be explained? Some authors (Fine & Stoneman 1996; Tsie 1996) have explained Africa's generally poor development performance in terms of its incorporation into the world capitalist economy. They looked to regional economic associations, identified a loose economic grouping known as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and claimed that it could be the lynch-pin of Zimbabwe's economic revival. The above authors argue that the challenge facing SADC is to use regional cooperation as means for opposing the debilitating effects of premature integration into the world market. They believe that industrialisation would occur if regional cooperation were sensibly used to break away from the world market and to promote regional economic development. Thus, the approach offers regionalism as a central concept with which to combat globalisation. The authors of this approach implicitly suggest that the Zimbabwean state would best promote economic development by committing itself more to regional cooperation than seeking to transform itself into a developmental state.

This explanation will simply not serve to explain why two neighbouring states should have such *different* records. The approach

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does not usefully explain the conditions under which state elites or revolutionaries can successfully construct individual developmental states to build economies that can effectively compete in the era of globalisation. Regional states must be *individually* developmental states in order for them to successfully promote balanced regional economic development, and participate effectively in the global market. So, the approach fails to provide concepts to explain why Zimbabwe failed to create a developmental state like Botswana, or what it could do to bring this about.

A variation of the above approach is the embourgeoisement of the state or the dominant class-structural approach (Dashwood 1996). This focuses on the class base of the state and on how it has been changing over time. 'The formation of a state based bourgeoisie has led to an erosion of the previous alliance between the ruling elite and the peasantry and the working class, the social base of the earlier development strategy' (*ibid.*: 32). But while this approach reproaches the Zimbabwean state for getting too close to business, it fails to take into account the point that successful developmental states such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia have had close relationships with business. The above studies suffer a vital omission by ignoring the Shona and Tswana pre-colonial state cultures, by denying possible continuities during the colonial era, and by failing to connect the pre- and post-colonial states to explain either their ability (Botswana) or failure (Zimbabwe) to promote economic development.

Other analysts claim that the 'Western state' was not successfully transplanted to Africa (except to Botswana), and therefore claim that Zimbabwe was re-traditionalising or was tending towards its old values. They argue that colonial rule may not have completely destroyed the indigenous political values after all. Others make more explicit claims to continuity, and use it to explain Africa's current political and economic problems (Bayart 1993; Mamdani 1996; Chabal & Daloz 1999). 'Beneath the totalitarian universe that the colonial state tended towards (and that in Southern Africa it approached) one finds social strategies, with a logic of their own which belong squarely to the indigenous timescale' (Bayart 1993: 21). Their approach is relevant to Zimbabwe as it reminds us of the fact that continuities were a real possibility, and that the pan-African and Marxist approaches tended to exaggerate the colonial state's capacity to transform. The continuity approach nonetheless generalises the assumption that all African indigenous state cultures were necessarily negative.

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This bias against indigenous state and political cultures is most evident in the way it is used to explain Botswana's economic success as being due to its colonial heritage. 'Botswana is the only African country that has managed to transform *its colonial heritage* into a viable democracy without first passing through a period of authoritarian rule, mainly as a result of the wise political leadership and a large measure of good fortune' (Landell-Mills 1992: 544, emphasis added). Botswana is credited with having used its colonial heritage wisely in such a way that it promoted democracy and economic development. The implicit assumption is that Botswana did not allow continuities with its indigenous state culture. But beneath this Eurocentric bias is a rare admission that 'The Batswana proceeded modestly and prudently, blending the traditional and the modern in a pragmatic way' (*ibid.*: 544).

Unfortunately, no attempt has been made to differentiate the state culture in Botswana from that in Zimbabwe. 'It is a mistake to look for just one African political system ... there are several, necessarily limited in number' (Allen 1995: 302). This failure led to a second assumption – that any African country which 'proceeded modestly and prudently, blending the traditional and the modern', would have achieved stable democracy and economic development. This was based on the assumptions that the 'traditional' was the same everywhere in Africa, and that the 'modern' or 'colonial heritage' was also the same everywhere in Africa. Yet 'colonial' Botswana was not a colony but a protectorate state. This was a peculiar arrangement in which the protectorate was even based in South Africa, rather than inside modern territorial Botswana. It was a territory where colonial and settler capitalism had been prevented from occurring (Crowder 1985; Gosset 1986; Croston 1993), and where the lack of colonial development had driven a large proportion of the able-bodied men and women to seek employment in South Africa, thus reducing it to the status of a labour reserve for South African mines and farms. So, only the most elementary colonial heritage existed, and this was not the foundation for Botswana's economic success. This leaves us with the traditional heritage that others have excluded.

Thus, while the continuity approach is concerned to establish the continuities of the autonomous Leviathan, as the source of dictatorial state–society relationships and economic stagnation, it does not take distinctions between indigenous state cultures seriously. While the political sociology of cultural renewal posits continuity as a possible outcome, there is a danger of overstating the case by generalisation,

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and failing to properly account for individual economic successes such as Botswana.

My argument is that an indigenous developmental state arises in situations in which the explicit principles of an indigenous state culture promote executive over theatrical state powers. Executive state powers refer to the appointment of state personnel, training and promotion, and command and discipline over security forces. What I regard as promoting the centrality of the state are those explicit principles in a state culture that elevate the state above other social institutions and marginalise them. What I also regard as the centrality of the state is the absence of parallel and rival institutions to the state. On the other hand, theatrical power refers to ceremonial functions and state symbols in a situation dominated by priests.

COMPARING BOTSWANA AND ZIMBABWE

The distribution of social power

Tswana state culture

The Tswana had a state culture that promoted the centrality of the state. To begin with, the Tswana *Modimo* (God) was not a heavenly person. Therefore, It could be approached by the chief and not the priests. 'Modimo is never called "man". As the pronouns agree with the noun, those which "Modimo" governs cannot, without the greatest violence to the language, be applied to "Mogorimo", a "heavenly one", which refers to a human being' (Robert Moffat in Setiloane 1976: 77). The chief's ancestors were regarded as the most senior and therefore only the chief was regarded as the most senior living person (Schapera 1971). The chiefs possessed magical powers and were the rainmakers (Schapera 1971; Setiloane 1976). Thus, the possession of magical and real political power by the Tswana states led to the subordination of all religious and of all magical institutions, and to the centralisation of social power in the states. There was no parallel religious institution which rivalled the state. Instead, political and religious powers and functions were centralised and institutionalised in the state. Thus, there was no fragmentation of social power. This is crucial for the emergence and existence of an initiator state. Before contacts with the missionaries in the 1820s, priestly institutions did not arise or gain ascendance parallel to the Tswana state. In contrast with the pre-colonial Shona states whose priests and priestly institutions mediated between the living and God, the Tswana states were the mediators and the actors.

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The pre-colonial Tswana state culture promoted disciplined states and provided mechanisms for instilling discipline in the states and over the populations. Tswana state religion defined morality in social and political terms. Evil was considered mainly social and political. A doer of evil was one who violated the social taboos and the political unity of the society. A sufferer of evil was one whose social and political life was shattered (Schapera 1953; Setiloane 1976; Alverson 1978). 'Evil is the destroyer of social living; it undermines a person because it ruptures his moral embeddedness in the existence of other people. Personality or self-identity is conceived by the Tswana to be essentially social' (Alverson 1978: 187). Political conflict in the royal family was therefore regarded as an absolute evil. For instance, during the early years of colonial rule, it was alleged that 'whenever Molefi (the then reigning Kgatla chief) tried to make rain, Isang (the former regent) counteracted by sending strong winds to scatter the clouds' (Schapera 1971: 22). By vesting normal religious concepts with explicitly political meaning, the Tswana states were able to convert religious powers into a political code for imposing discipline on state elites as well as on the population. Thus, drought, one of the greatest natural disasters intermittently confronting the nation, was blamed on political conflicts within the royal family. Conversely, political unity in the royal house was an absolute good (Schapera 1971; Setiloane 1976; Alverson 1978).

The question of loyalty to the Tswana states was sharply demonstrated in cases of rebellious individuals or groups, particularly members of the royal families. While it was normal for rebels against the state to emerge as in other societies, dealing with them varied according to the state culture and to the state traditions of each state. Mechanisms for dealing with dangerous political rebels were limited to deportations and to confiscation of property (Schapera 1970: 80). This was an option that states relied on extensively to defuse political tensions in general, and tensions within the royal family in particular. Confiscating a rebel's wealth was an effective measure for preventing the rise of what Joel Migdal (1987, 1988) calls 'strongmen'. Sometimes rebels were either coerced to settle in a part of the country designated for them by the state, or were forced to leave and their property was confiscated. Because the Tswana took the boundaries of their territories seriously, deported rebels always found themselves in another Tswana state demanding loyalty from them as well.

In summary, pre-colonial Tswana politics subordinated civil institutions to the states. Magical powers were possessed by the states rather than by religious institutions. The absence of civil magical

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institutions for staging state rituals helped to centralise social power in the state.

Pre-colonial Shona state culture

In contrast to pre-colonial Tswana, the indigenous pre-colonial Shona state culture was characterised by a political theory which promoted parallel and rival social institutions which had wrested crucial powers from the state, and made it impossible for the state to concentrate and to exercise social power. In the Shona context, religious and magical powers operated through religious institutions parallel to the state (Ranger 1967; Alpers 1968; Samkange 1968; Bhila 1982). Social power was primarily concentrated in religious institutions that rivalled and eclipsed the state. To begin with, Shona political theory imagined an ever-present and an ever-powerful God who originated from a pool. 'Being ever present in His own creation He stands in direct relation to the life giving water and the power present in all forms of magically manipulative objects' (Daneel 1970: 17–18). Because of the emphasis on the closeness between God and man's everyday life, priestly rather than state institutions had more influence over state policy. A class of priests developed parallel to the state to mediate between God and man. Thus, priests and religious institutions possessed the most important magical powers. Yet religious and magical powers were the most important. So, real social power resided with the priests and not the state.

The notion of mediums (*mhondoro*) worked against the centrality of the Shona state. The Shona king became active not as a leader of a state but in his death after he joined the spirit world. 'Each reigning Mwene Mutapa (king) was himself destined, after his death, to become a *mudzimu* and to be worshipped as a national ancestor-spirit' (Alpers 1968: 13). Through death (the spiritual world), the Shona king became part of the religious magical powers that worked to undermine the centrality of the state. The magical powers of the dead king entered the body of a rival relative who then became a *mhondoro* (Weinrich 1971) and worked to undermine the centrality of the state. That is, the dead king became part of the priestly institutions. Accordingly, state and religious power were symbolically rather than effectively blended. In addition, Shona political theory emptied the state of executive state powers and promoted the power of religious institutions. First, the political theory included the view that state 'authority is dew, it evaporates – *Ushundova*, *Lunoparara*' (Beach 1984). In this regard,

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beliefs that hold that state power and authority are legitimate for a brief period of time are counterproductive for they militate against the rise of a coherent, disciplined, competent and strong state that is institutionally central. Such state cultures could be seen as the hallmark of pluralist democracy. But they fragmented the state and constituted the weak point in the emergence of indigenous initiator states.

Unlike the Tswana (Schapera 1953), succession to pre-colonial Shona kinship was collateral. That is, succession was open to the king's sons, brothers and cousins, all of whom headed factionalised and armed groups. The system of collateral succession kept the chiefly title moving from family to family at all levels of the state (Posselt 1935; Beach 1971: 14; Weinrich 1971; Mudenge 1974). 'Since succession seems to have been open to the brothers and sons of the dead Mambo and other Rozvi royal houses, probably the strongest and/or most popular prince succeeded' (Mudenge 1974: 105). The political system opened succession to too many claimants and exposed the state to factional violence (Weinrich 1971). The system worked against the rise of a strong indigenous state that could challenge the powerful religious institutions. It worked in favour of multi-factions that involved some kind of pluralist democracy. But it worked against stability and discipline in a centralised indigenous state, which is the hallmark of an initiator indigenous state culture. What the system meant was that the indigenous state exhausted itself in endless feuding and did not have the time to challenge the power and dominance of religious institutions.

Shona state culture promoted a symbolic (Garlake 1973; Huffman 1996) rather than an indigenous initiator state. Such state symbols included a smartly decorated small hoe: the Mutapa had 'a very small hoe with an ivory handle, which he always carries in his belt, and which denotes peace and that all may dig and draw profit from the earth' (Huffman 1996: 36). The symbols included the insignia that symbolised defence of the state. 'The insignia of his royal state includes one or two assagais [spears], which denote justice and the defence of his people' (*ibid.*). The symbolic granaries and horns (symbols of wealth and defence), 'were fundamental symbols of Zimbabwe leadership …' (*ibid.*: 36). More importantly, the crocodile symbolised kingship. 'According to legend, the founding father of the Shona, the first man and rainmaker, came from the spirit world at the bottom of a sacred pool of water' (*ibid.*: 29). Thus, to complete the state symbolism, 'A new Rozvi king or chief was supposed to eat food cooked with the pebbles from the stomach of a male crocodile which he personally had caught in a deep pool, symbolically becoming a crocodile himself' (*ibid.*: 29). So, by reducing the power of the state largely to the

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possession of symbols, the pre-colonial Shona state culture sacrificed active state leadership by denying the state the performance of those political functions that made a strong state possible. As long as the state was consumed by symbolism rather than the performance of typical state functions performed by other states, the power of the religious institutions remained unchallenged and secured, and this worked against the rise of an indigenous initiator state.

Symbolism was politically more important than the actual performance of political functions. As a result, state leadership was interpreted symbolically to mean the stable health of the king. 'The chief with his wife must annually consecrate and symbolically fertilise the grain for his subjects, a task which he was considered unable to fulfil, both practically and ceremoniously, if his sexual potency vanished' (Wieschhoff 1941: 98). If the symbol of national prosperity – the sexual potency of the leader – vanished, a fact that could only be revealed by his treacherous wives, then the king could not even trust the queens. Thus, pre-colonial Shona queens were potential conspirators against kingship and hence weakened state power.

In summary, the parallel development of religious and state institutions posed serious implications for the conception and exercise of social power in Shona state culture. By trivialising political authority and checking it through powerful religious institutions, Shona political theory discouraged the rise of a coherent and disciplined centralised state with institutionalised political power, and therefore militated against an indigenous initiator state.

Organisation and exercise of state power

Pre-colonial Shona state culture

There is little dispute between scholars that indigenous pre-colonial Zimbabwe was characterised by loose, fragmented and undisciplined small states. The Mutapa state, the first most remembered pre-colonial Shona state, was characterised by loose organisation and by fragmentation. 'By the beginning of the sixteenth century the empire of Mutapa had already collapsed. In its place there were a number of independent states, of varying size and importance, each ruled by its own Rozvi dynasty. Among these, that which was dominated by the Mutapa was neither the largest nor the most important' (Alpers 1968: 12).

Others doubt whether the Mutapa state was ever centralised and then disintegrated. 'However, there is no gainsaying that the Mambo Chedima or Mutapa Kataruza was in fact ruler of a much weakened

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kingdom (as reported by David Livingstone). His was a kingdom divided into many small chiefdoms, each ruled by a ruler whom Kataruza called a ''son'' but each of whom was to all extent and purposes an independent ruler' (Mudenge 1988: 352). No doubt a pre-colonial ruler might have purged and disciplined state elites, swept away the state culture that promoted fragmentation and indiscipline, and replaced it with an initiator state which would have survived for a while (as in Soviet Russia), and then crumbled and allowed the underlying Shona state culture to reassert itself (as in post-Soviet Russia). But 'the Shona people in the early nineteenth century, although possessing a common language, religion, material culture and system of law and custom, were not a united people. Limitations imposed upon them by their laws of marriage, succession and inheritance tended to work against the development of large united states' (Beach 1971: 1).

Pre-colonial Tswana state culture

The pre-colonial Tswana state culture promoted coherent and disciplined states. In the place of administrative institutions, the Tswana states practised an advisory rather than an institutional system of administration. It involved (1) confidential advisors selected on the basis of the trust which the chief had in them, regardless of social status (or *dikala tsa kgosi*); (2) councils of *Bagolwane* (singular, *mogolwane*; usually translated to mean 'headman') (Gosset 1986: 103). The headmen were appointed for life, as long as they remained loyal to the state. In addition, it was normal for the states to invite knowledgeable foreigners (black or white – expatriates in present-day language) to stay in the capitals as advisers. Foreigners who had particular skills which were desirable but which could not be obtained locally were invited (Schapera 1970, 1971; Tlou 1972, 1998; Gosset 1986; Ramsay 1991). Thus, the Tswana states were able to enhance their capacity to govern without the need to create huge administrative institutions.

The Tswana assemblies, *dikgotla*, were the initiator state at work. An inner circle of influential citizens who constituted the state dominated the *kgotla* (Kuper 1970). Active 'participation in the kgotla was limited to a core element of dominant Tswana men' (Good 1992: 70). Though democratic only in the sense that adult males participated, the *dikgotla* were in fact highly centralised institutions.

The chief set the agenda. Before the meeting, he discussed the items to be considered with his close relatives and a council of headmen. Both advisory

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groups would, if at all possible, come to a consensus on the decision to be adopted. When the chief then convened the assembly, the first and most prestigious speakers would be the same advisors. The result was that by the time others spoke, the position of those with the authority was clear. (Holm & Molutsi 1992: 326)

The assembly was 'manipulated' to get the people's 'consent' (Mgadla & Campbell 1989; Holm & Molutsi 1992).

What is most striking is the way that states managed to build highly coherent political systems without the use of standing armies. Tswana age groups or militia were different from age regiments of standing armies. The nation's male population constituted the state militias at times of internal and external threat. Unlike the neighbouring states, such as Shona Rozvi, the Zulu and the Ndebele, which had large predatory standing armies, the Tswana states had only *ad hoc* armies or militias. This was despite invasions by the Ndebele and the Ngoni on a number of occasions. There were no Tswana army generals on whom the fate of the states depended, and who could turn into warlords and threaten the states as in pre-colonial Shona. Instead, the Tswana chiefs were both the commanders-in-chief and personally expected to lead the militias in combat. As the amateur military chiefs were personally expected to lead in times of war, the Tswana states logically preferred negotiation to war most of the time, and this cushioned the states from creating huge and predatory armies. 'But while the Tswana sometimes fight with their spears, they decidedly prefer to do so with their tongues, and are indeed much better qualified for the latter warfare than for the former. And so diplomacy played a prominent part in the public business in each little court, without letters and without secret cypher' (Mackenzie 1884: 221). The Tswana militias could be mobilised to perform varied public duties such as road construction, national hunts and state defence.

The state-initiated three-tiered settlement patterns of the Tswana states codes were enforceable and achievable. First, there were the residential towns where the adult male population was expected to reside at all times. The Tswana lived in huge towns, sometimes with populations of 200,000 people (Hodgson & Ballinger 1932; Schapera 1970). Second, there were the crop fields, where women and slaves temporarily stayed (October–July) during the rainy season to attend to their crops. Third, there was the cattle post where boys and serfs stayed, 'whose contacts with village life were mostly sporadic and brief' (Schapera 1970: 4). People were not allowed to abandon their residence in the town and to settle permanently either at the cattle

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posts, or in the fields. In the event of disobedience, the state ' …sometimes even burned down the huts built there by the people' (*ibid.*: 85). As a result of strict settlement policies, in Kgatla country for instance, about three-fifths of the people lived round the chief at Mochudi, the capital, whose population, according to the 1936 census, was approximately 8,600. The rest were distributed over nine other villages from 6 to 30 miles away (*ibid.*: 3). 'For the Bechuana, unlike most of the southern Bantu, live, not in small villages or scattered family groups, but in large towns built round the chief's kgotla, or courtyard, which serves as the meeting place of the tribe and the court house of the chief' (Hodgson & Ballinger 1932: 7).

In summary, political discipline and political loyalty to the states were enforceable and achievable. The populations were grouped together around the state capitals and economic activities were located and performed outside the capitals. The next section discusses the role of the state in wealth creation.

Wealth creation

Tswana state culture

The pre-colonial Tswana state culture promoted the state's centrality in the process of economic accumulation, regarded economic accumulation as a worthy state function, and fused the state and economic owning class. The Tswana chieftaincy was 'the trunk from which new leaves sprouted' (Wylie 1990: 32). It was the 'wife', 'milk-pail', and 'breast' of the nation. The political theory was based on the belief that wealth could be lost because of natural disasters and because of invasions by other states. 'Wealth is like branches, it comes and goes.' But it could be gained, accumulated and maintained as long as the states provided the right leadership and created the right political environment. The states ensured that their peoples were able to regain the property that they regularly lost to natural disasters and to foreign invasion. The Tswana states were functional institutions through which new wealth was created and maintained.

Wealth was defined in political terms and evidenced by the material possessions of the state and people, and by the stability of the polity. 'Chiefs were the controllers of economic resources – over the long term, mainly land, labour, and cattle – and became individual accumulators of wealth' (Good 1992: 69). In Tswana state theory, 'hunger proverbially slew servants while princes died by the spear' (Plaatje 1916: 37). Chief Khama III of the Ngwato had acquired a herd of

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almost 8,000 cattle by the 1880s, and his annual income 'around that time was £3,000, and was derivative of his control over productive resources – not only in land but also in the services of his hunters, and a levy extracted on all elephants shot in his domain' (Parsons 1973). Tswana state culture and traditions emphasised the intimacy of political and economic elites in which the state was the senior partner. Political and economic power was 'interdependent' (Wylie 1990; Good 1993). It was evidenced 'by the usage of the term *kgosi* for both chief and a rich man' (Wylie 1990: 23). Because cattle were initially the most valued wealth, at burial, 'men dying at their homes were buried in the cattle-kraal of their family group or ward … For a man of some importance, the wet skin of an ox specifically killed for the purpose was used to wrap the corpse' (Schapera 1953: 59).

The inheritance laws of Tswana states encouraged the concentration of wealth in the same hands and encouraged the saving and expansion of wealth. For instance, new types of wealth that were acquired after contacts with the Europeans, such as wagons and money, and cattle the substance of a man's wealth – all went to the eldest son of a man's senior wife (Schapera 1970: 144). Thus, pre-colonial Tswana political theory regarded state leadership as crucial to the process of accumulating wealth. Intimacy existed between the political and economic elites.

Shona state culture

In contrast, the religious institutions in pre-colonial Zimbabwe had wrested economic power and had marginalised the state. To begin with, economic power was understood in terms of magical economic powers rather than material possession. Thus, it did not mean that religious institutions were powerful because they had accumulated enormous wealth in their own hands as happened in pre-modern Europe. Rather, it meant that the priests possessed the magical economic powers and specialised knowledge on the fertility of the land and related magical economic powers. Magical economic powers were concentrated in priests rather than in the state. Indeed, 'as the God of crop fertility, Mwari is first and foremost regarded as the rain-giver … When they (Mwari's messengers) approach the caves they all use Mwari's most popular praise-name, *Dzivaguru* (great pool) which has a direct connotation with rain' (Daneel 1970: 16). David Beach (1979: 407) adds: 'There was a very close connection between religion and the economy: religious leaders, of whatever particular cult, were expected to be able to use their connections with the high-god and

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senior *mhondoro* spirits to produce rainfall and to avert *shangwa*, disaster.' Such a system worked against the centrality of the state in the process of creating new wealth.

While the state had surrendered economic magical powers to the priests, there is no evidence that it possessed any material wealth with which to counteract their power. For instance, while cattle constituted significant wealth for individual families, no cattle enclosure has yet been identified at Great Zimbabwe, the king's capital (Huffman 1981; Reid 1996). Thus, it was probable that the state did not initiate, authorise or control on the economic front because economic magical powers were constituted in the hands of the priests and material possession lay in the hands of individual families. It seems probable that the priests interacted directly with the population to the exclusion of the state.

In addition, the priests were the real initiators, controllers and authorisers. 'What the *mhondoro* says and does is as good as if it were done by God. As the *mhondoro* is believed to be in constant communication with all the higher spirits and with God, his decisions are regarded as final' (Gelfand 1962: 172). But theirs was initiation towards theatre and ceremony rather than towards production. If land were sanctified so that its products were symbolically owned by the priests, then on their advice or instruction to the state, ceremony was a religious purifier and therefore an important ritual state function. 'Therefore we can assume that all the cattle represented in the Hill midden assemblage were of animals introduced to the site purely for purposes of consumption' (Reid 1996: 53). The pre-colonial Shona kings and chiefs ensured that every sub-chief and his people had contributed towards the success of the state ritual ceremony (Gelfand 1962). Thus, the *mhondoro* issued instructions directly to the population and if these were not followed, then this was interpreted as affecting the whole nation and could be reversed by priest-state organised ritual ceremony.

The priests were influential in determining how the land was to be exploited. Religious verdicts often contradicted the Portuguese traders who wanted to extract as much gold as possible (Randles 1981; Mudenge 1988). And religious advice to the state was to wage war against the Portuguese regardless of whether or not the economy and state power were adversely affected. The extensive exploitation of gold by the Portuguese and their tendency to subject the Shona states to Portuguese control (Randles 1981) often led to the *mhondoro*'s simplistic advice to the kings and chiefs to wage war against the white traders at

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the cost of losing their country to foreign rule. Thus, war was a ritual activity to be executed by the Shona state and army.

Colonialism

Tswana state culture

The encounter between the Tswana state culture and the Christian religion was not violent and had little disruptive effect. 'The idea of translating one Christian God with "Modimo" was no suggestion of the missionaries; the Bechuana interpreters, after hearing of God in the Dutch language, said that their name for him was "Modimo"' (John Mackenzie quoted in Setiloane 1976: 78). The Tswana states had already established contact with missionary explorers such as Dr David Livingstone long before the protectorate state started using missionaries for its own purposes (Parsons 1973; Ramsay 1991). The different Tswana states had allowed only missionaries of one denomination in each of their territories which were independent from each other. 'Until fairly recently, many Tswana states had missionaries of one denomination only, so that the Christianity of say, the Ngwaketse (Congregationist) differed in some features from that of the Kgatla (Dutch Reformed) or the Malete (Lutheran)' (Schapera 1953: 58). Thus, the entry of the Christian churches and religion was strictly controlled by the Tswana states.

The Tswana chiefs became Christian rulers. The most influential chiefs were baptised first. For instance, in the Kwena state, Chief Sechele was baptised by David Livingstone and became a convert (Ramsay 1991). Though this action by the head of a Tswana state nearly caused a civil war as the chief switched from Tswana to Christian religious ceremonies, it served to absorb the Christian church and religion into Tswana state institutions and values. In the Ngwato state, Chief Sekgoma I sent his son Khama III to be trained by the missionaries Robert Moffat and his son. Khama III became a Christian and was baptised in 1860 (Tlou *et al.* 1995), and also switched from Tswana to Christian ceremonies. A civil war broke out and Khama III and his Christian associates won, thus uniting the Tswana state and the Christian church. When Khama III's Christian brother sought to separate the church from the state, he was deported and exiled. Thus, the Tswana states were already ruled by Christian chiefs with missionaries as advisers, when the protectorate state was established in 1885.

Effectively, the different Tswana states transformed the only Christian church that had been allowed into each territory into a state

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church and the Christian religion into state law. Subsequently Christian laws, such as the abolishing of beer drinking and polygamy, were introduced and imposed by the Tswana state rather than by the Christian church. In the Kgatla state, rainmaking was abandoned in the 1920s and, instead, the state and the church led the population in prayers for rain at the *kgotla*. Other neighbouring Tswana states followed suit by introducing Christian laws. Age groups and rites were abolished. Thus, the Tswana states established mutual relationships with the Christian church. After the missionaries had been absorbed into the Tswana states and the Tswana state elite had been Christianised, a mutual relationship developed in which the missionaries regarded Bechuanaland as the 'gateway to the north' and defended it as their own, while the Tswana states defended Christianity as their own state religion. The relationship was mutually beneficial for both the Tswana and the missionary purpose. It was a mutuality based on common fears of the South African Republic, Germans in South West Africa, and the British South Africa Company (BSAC). The Zulu and the Ndebele, the strongest and well-defended neighbouring states, were being conquered and colonised. In the 1870s, hostile neighbouring states, including the Boers in South Africa, rendered Tswana defences ineffective and the states vulnerable. The unity of each Tswana state and the Christian church had led to the abandonment of age groups or state militias. Subsequently, there were no new men trained to serve in the state militias. In addition, the long history of state militias rather than a proper army was having a negative effect on the Tswana defences. Thus, there was real danger that the Tswana states would be dismembered and swallowed up. The poorly defended Tswana states could not militarily resist the colonial onslaught.

The missionary 'gateway to the north' was coined as a defence ideology that was intended to convince the British government to defend the territory. By the time a formal Protectorate was established in 1885, Tswana states and missionaries had lobbied extensively in London for the British to declare a Protectorate over the territory (Tlou *et al*. 1995). The Tswana-missionary alliance reached an agreement with the British government to declare a protectorate. I term this 'invited colonisation'. It is a very unusual phenomenon, but as in Malaysia, it played a crucial role in protecting the territory from full-blown colonialism and in preventing the colonial state from using coercion to disrupt the Tswana initiator state. Invited colonialism also undercut the Boers, the Germans and the BSAC (Maundeni 2000).

The protectorate state that was later established preserved the Tswana state culture. It hired Dr Campbell, an anthropologist, to

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document Tswana state practices and traditions. It also worked closely with Professor Isaac Schapera of the University of Cape Town who was doing extensive anthropological work in the territory (Colclough 1976). In addition, 'Section 8 of the 1891 proclamation provided that the jurisdiction of the Resident Commissioner's court shall not extend to any matter in which natives only were concerned, unless to preserve public peace. In matters between Africans, the Resident Commissioner's court shall apply customary law' (Otlhogile 1995: 23). The core Tswana state institutions – the chiefs and their advisers and the *dikgotla* – were spared by the protectorate state and continued to express the old state culture. In addition, the protectorate administrators relied on rather than destroyed or ignored the chiefs and the *dikgotla* in order to reach the ordinary people and to implement policies. These core Tswana state institutions continued to express the state values that embodied them. For instance, at the outbreak of World War II, the state values of the protectorate state based on 'volunteers' came into conflict with the Tswana state values based on a 'tough' state leadership, and the views of the chiefs prevailed. The resident commissioner reported that 'it has now been agreed that the Native Authorities may continue to utilise their customary powers for obtaining recruits … but care must be taken to ensure that the powers are not abused' (Jackson 1999: 45). Thus, the Tswana states continued to practise their values even during the war period!

In summary, the Tswana states absorbed the incoming missionaries and protectorate state and used them to their advantage. The protectorate state preserved and cooperated with, rather than abolishing, suppressing or ignoring, the Tswana states. It introduced new state institutions in which the old Tswana state elite and its associates dominated.

Shona state culture

The absence of an indigenous initiator state in Zimbabwe at the time that colonial forces were unleashed opened the way for colonisation and for rivalry between the colonial and indigenous states to occur. When European colonisation threatened to engulf the whole southern African region, the Shona priests and the Shona state left the country unprotected. When war broke out, indigenous people divided into 'resistance' and 'collaborating' movements (Beach 1986: 70):

> When the First Chimurenga broke out among the Ndebele in March 1896 and then spread to the central Shona in June, a considerable number of people decided to fight on the side of the colonial government. These included some

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of the Ndebele and Kalanga West of Bulawayo, the Budya of Mutoko, some of Makoni's people, the Manyika and scattered groups within the area of the main risings. The most important to do so, however, lived in a chain from the upper Save river to the Southeastern lowveld, primarily the Njanga, Chimuhanzu's Manyika-Govera, Gutu's Rufura, Zimuto's *ngara*-Govera, Chivi's Mhari and Matibi's Pfumbi. The strategic implications of this for the course of the war were considerable. The Ndebele and Kalanga collaborators did help to make it easier for the Europeans in Bulawayo to keep in touch with the south. The Budya, who had actually been fighting the government's tax collectors *until* the main Shona rising took place, did a lot to harass the resistance movement in Murewa in 1897. The Manyika helped to secure the government's communications with the east, while the southerners protected Victoria and the road to Tuli. But the repercussions of the collaboration were more serious than this. The Chimurenga among the Shona outside the area of the old Ndebele state spread from one dynasty to dynasty, with rulers and people deciding on the spot whether to join in or not. If one group decided to go to war, then the word would be spread to its neighbours, who would then make their own decisions. If one of these neighbours decided to stay neutral, however, or to join the Europeans, then its own neighbours farther away from the fighting would usually stay out.

In the first instance, the absence of an indigenous initiator state culture led to a situation in which the European invading colonial forces found it easy to defeat the Shona states, to establish a colonial state and to exploit the indigenous people. Colonisation and excessive colonial exploitation were not inevitable, as the example of Bechuanaland Protectorate shows. It was the absence of an initiator indigenous state that made colonisation unavoidable, left the country exposed to European colonising forces and to unregulated colonial exploitation.

Rather than introducing an imported developmental state culture, the Rhodesian settler colonial state tried to implement indigenous state practices. This is evident from the experiences of social historians who conducted research in Rhodesia. 'I found the files full of desperate attempts by District Commissioners to define what "custom" and "tradition" meant, and even more desperate attempts to carry them out in practice. The story was a tragedy which ended in death for most of the chiefs and headmen involved in it' (Ranger 1983: 20). Peter Ekeh's (1990: 666) observation that 'the doctrine of indirect rule, which enjoined colonial administrators to rule native population at minimum costs to the imperial government by using permissible indigenous institutional arrangement, was the cord tying anthropologists and administrators' has important implications for this study. Indeed, the social historians of Zimbabwe show that the Rhodesian colonial state administered Africans through the Native Affairs

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Department that was staffed with officials who had 'special knowledge' about the Africans.

> The District Commissioner allowed me to see his current files on chiefs and headmen. These files – far fatter than any that had survived from an earlier period in the National Archives – covered the period 1960 to 1980, with a scattering of earlier material. They were full of elaborately researched pre-colonial histories of chiefdoms, the more elaborately researched the later in time they were compiled. They were also full of equally elaborate chiefly genealogies, often a dozen or so pages. (Ranger 1983: 20)

Thus, the Rhodesian African Affairs Department competed with Shona priests and later with nationalists as the custodians of Shona state culture. The Rhodesian state tolerated rather than destroyed indigenous political and welfare associations that helped to sustain the old state culture and to generate nationalists. 'In 1931, the Rhodesian Government established native boards to meet legitimate desires for the united expression of native opinion. These boards consisted of [*old* state elites such as] chiefs and sub-chiefs who represented the traditionally-oriented Africans, and of an equal number of [new indigenous state elites such as] elected Africans, who were thought to represent the educated section of the African population' (Weinrich 1971: 14). Deposed chiefs and spirit mediums joined the nationalists to openly resist European rule (Ranger 1967; Samkange 1968; Tsomondo 1977). They labelled as sell-outs all chiefs and other indigenous elites who cooperated with the Rhodesian state (Ranger 1968; Gann & Henriksen 1981). They provided their own interpretation of Shona state custom and tradition. In the process, the old indigenous state elites who cooperated and were favoured in the state land allocation earned the name of 'sell-out', or the 'doers of absolute evil'. Black nationalism delegitimised and targeted them in the guerrilla war (Gann & Henriksen 1981). All these activities played a part in the preservation of the old indigenous non-developmental state culture. Although 'the creation of the African colonial state coincided with the historical zenith of virulent racism' (Young 1994: 280), the Rhodesian settler colonial state thus preserved the indigenous state culture and institutions rather than destroying them.

The developmental state

The Botswana developmental state

The long Tswana state tradition of concentrating power on an executive leader who surrounded himself with disciplined people, was

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at play in the drafting of the BDP constitution. The 1962 BDP constitution stated that 'When the party is in power as the government of the country, the provisions of article VI (14) (provision related to the election of party leader) shall be waived, and the leader shall remain in office for the duration of his term of office in government.' The BDP carefully selected its leaders and those who did not fit in were quietly allowed 'to cross-the-floor' to join populist parties. Like other constitutionalist political parties which sought to revolutionise and modernise rather than to dethrone a previous regime, the BDP participated constitutionally in the process of reforms and modernisation of the post-colonial state. When constitutional reforms started in 1959 in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, they involved old and new Tswana state elites, the British government and the representatives of the small local white population. Political parties did not yet exist. The first Joint Advisory Constitutional Committee (JACC) made some 'conservative' proposals that united the old and new state elites and which isolated the populist parties. It proposed the setting up of a legislative council rather than either a parliament or a republic. It justified the rejection of both a parliament and a republic, and justified the concentration of state power in the chairmanship of the Protectorate Resident Commissioner, in the following terms: 'Botswana has no experience of the practice and procedure of a legislative council …' (Bechuanaland Government 1963: 23).

Of course, there were other conservative proposals in the document. They included the recommendation of communal instead of common roll type of elections, parity of representation between whites and blacks even though the former were numerically insignificant, and indirect elections of the African members (effectively, chiefs who dominated the African Advisory Council decided who was to be a member of the proposed Legislative Council). The Joint Advisory Council (set by up the protectorate state in 1960) dominated by old and new Tswana state elites, Protectorate officials and representatives of the white community approved the recommendations in October 1960 (*ibid.*: 9). Its approval of a constitution which expressly rejected a parliament and a republic, and which expressly accepted a white resident commissioner as the chairman of the new state institutions, had serious implications.

The pan-African BPP was formed to oppose the chairmanship of the Protectorate resident commissioner, the limited legislative Council and to campaign for a full parliament with a Speaker and for a republic (Ramsay 1998; Maundeni 1998). The BPP was identified as the

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destroyer of chieftaincy and therefore the enemy of the state. It sought direct participation in the constitutional process and in the process leading to the construction of the post-colonial state. It was formed by politicians who had previously been excluded from Tswana state politics and who had been engaged in South African mass protest politics and were expelled and banned from that country (Edge 1996). But its protest nationalism was unsuited to a pre- and post-protectorate Botswana where colonial exploitation had been effectively prevented, and where the only working class was the migrant labour in South African mines, farms and industry.

In contrast to South Africa and Rhodesia where African nationalist protesters had spearheaded the demand for reforms, the old and new Tswana state elites were in full command in pre- and post-protectorate Botswana, and sought limited democratisation and modernisation. The loyalist BDP was formed in 1962. It was clearly identified as the party of chiefs and therefore the inheritor of their legitimacy and institutions. The chiefs and BDP nationalist politicians used conservative constitutional proposals to expose, isolate and destroy the populist mass based parties. In early 1966, the final constitutional conference was called in London as it was common practice to finalise the constitution. But, unlike in other constitutional processes in which populist nationalists had been dominant, the holding of constitutional talks away from home in the Botswana case reduced the bargaining power of the populist pan-African BPP which could not organise mass rallies and mass protests in order to popularise itself. What was more significant was that the last constitutional conference took place after the BDP had already formed the post colonial government after a landslide electoral victory in 1965, when it gained 28 out of 31 seats, and inflicted a humiliating electoral defeat on the BPP which won only three seats. So when Botswana political elites met in London to finalise the independence constitution in 1966, the political landscape had changed in favour of the BDP state and in favour of the concentration of power in an executive presidency. Thus, the BDP won both races: designing of the national constitution and occupancy of state power.

The BDP state set up modernising institutions such as parliament, cabinet, land boards, town and district councils and village development committees that supplanted the chiefs. So that the supplanting of chiefly institutions would not alienate the old Tswana state elites, these became ex-officio members of local institutions by virtue of their office as chiefs. They were appointed to the chairmanship of these local institutions which were wholly composed of modernising

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politicians and officials. In short, the so-called democratic government of the BDP suspended the use of elections in determining the chairmanships of these supplanting institutions and appointed chiefs to their chairmanship. Thus, the old state elites gained the chairmanship of the modernising institutions but lost their own institutions. This blending of the new and the old state elites smoothed the institutional reform process. This was possible because the old Tswana state that the BDP government inherited and revolutionised from above was embedded in the initiator indigenous state culture. In summary, the BDP state inherited an indigenous state culture which it used to construct an indigenous developmental state.

The Zimbabwean non-developmental state

ZANU inherited, rather than suppressing or ignoring, the non-initiator indigenous state culture. It aligned itself with Shona priests who had been an important ritual arm of the old indigenous state. The recruitment of the guerrilla army was authorised and controlled by the Shona priest Nehanda (Martin & Johnson 1981: 77–8). Military surveillance for the ZANLA guerrilla army was carried out by the priests rather than the guerrilla intelligence. This was because the 'mhondoro mediums knew the land intimately and could guide guerrillas, porters and new recruits through terrain that was physically dangerous because of wild animals and dense forests and through territories that held spiritual dangers as well' (Lan 1985: 148).

ZANU borrowed state symbols from the Shona priests to legitimate itself. It borrowed symbols such as *gukurahundi* – the storm supposedly sent by the Shona priests to destroy everything. 'Peasants use this term with terror and awe. *Gukurahundi* occurs during crop seasons and destroys crops, weeds, huts and forests, the good and the bad, including people and beasts. ZANU deliberately sought to link its revolutionary policy with such fearsome association' (Sithole 1997: 131–2). ZANU cooperated very closely with the Shona priests to compel the peasants to join the ZANLA guerrilla army. Thus, the use of past Shona state symbols and of violence by ZANU may have been a 'revolutionary act', but it was predominantly a continuation of the Shona ritual state wars.

ZANU's political activities always prevented the emergence of a strong presidency with executive powers to discipline and purge the party and army members. First, it had been formed by disgruntled members of ZAPU who were displeased with their president Joshua

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Nkomo, a Kalanga-Ndebele national. ZANU was against the principle of a strong presidency and prevented the rise of a strong leader. First Joshua Nkomo, then Ndabaningi Sithole, became alienated from the leadership of nationalist organisations for exercising executive powers. Each decided independently. For instance, after Nkomo had attended a constitutional conference with the Rhodesian state in 1961 and accepted its terms, he came under immense pressure from the majority of the Shona within the party ranks. The Zimbabwe African People Union (ZAPU) split and ZANU was formed.

Furthermore, Ndabaningi Sithole who became ZANU's first president was a Shona who had grown up in the Ndebele capital (Sithole 1976) and soon encountered serious friction with his Shona-dominated central committee and was removed and replaced by Robert Mugabe. He became alienated from the party when he exercised executive powers by agreeing to unite ZANU and ZAPU for purposes of negotiation with the Rhodesian state. When he entered into unity talks which dominated nationalist politics in the mid-1970s, the ZANU central committee accused him of autocracy and of violating the party constitution. The above scenario exposes the vulnerability of Zimbabwean nationalist leaders in an environment dominated by the old indigenous Shona state culture. The leaders could not define party policy because they could not exercise executive powers without alienating their comrades. In negotiations in which only party presidents were involved, as shown above in the case of Nkomo and Sithole, a Zimbabwean nationalist leader always faced a dilemma. Because he was not supposed to exercise executive powers, he could not take decisions, and each issue had to be agreed by all the party institutions and all the leading members.

ZANU built a fragmented and undisciplined rather than a coherent, disciplined and developmental army. Like the FLN in Algeria, it was not the kind of guerrilla army that could have backed and enforced an initiator developmental state culture. To begin with, when the guerrilla army was set up, most senior party leaders were already in prison, including President Ndabaningi Sithole and Secretary General Robert Mugabe (Henriques 1977). Thus, the first president of ZANU was never the commander of the guerrilla army. In addition, the guerrilla army was organised along the lines of the pre-Shona fragmented state. It was run by a *Dare re Chimurenga* (war assembly) of four civilian politicians in exile (none of whom was the party president or secretary general). Initially, the commander of the guerrilla army, Magama Tongogara, was neither leader nor member of the *Dare* and the High

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Command (Henriques 1977; Saul 1979; Cliffe 1981; Martin & Johnson 1981). This arrangement angered the guerrillas who felt that the politicians sacrificed them for short-term political gains by making decisions that made no military sense.

More importantly, the *Dare* neither possessed nor granted the army commander disciplinary powers over the guerrillas. When some of the armed men captured their commander, Magama Tongogara and other senior guerrilla army chiefs (Martin & Johnson 1981: 163–5), the evidence was there for all to see that he neither had disciplinary powers nor a disciplined army. During the revolts in the ZANLA army, ZANU chairman Herbert Chitepo was assassinated in Zambia, the ZANU president Ndabaningi Sithole was removed from office and replaced by Robert Mugabe in 1976, and a faction of the army broke away and temporarily combined with a ZIPRA faction from ZAPU to form a new army (some returned to ZANLA and ZANU later). The factional manoeuvres and kidnapping of senior guerrilla officers which occurred in ZANLA camps in Mozambique were put down by the FRELIMO guerrilla army of Mozambique (*ibid.*: 165–6). Without a commander with appointing and disciplinary powers, the army remained fractious, fragmented and undisciplined.

Dispersed training of the huge number of recruits, whereby the training of guerrillas was done by different foreign countries, led to the emergence of an incoherent ZANLA army. 'From ZANU's Department of personnel, 66,367 people were registered as recruits undergoing military training or trained combatants in 1979. Of this number about 51,868 were of school going age, that is 19–24 years of age' (Tungamirai 1995: 42–3). The many factions of the ZANLA guerrilla army were variously trained in China, North Korea, Tanzania, Mozambique, Egypt, Ghana and Cuba (Martin & Johnson 1981). These large numbers did not make military discipline easy. Thus, ZANLA indiscipline in the 1970s can be seen as to a large extent a consequence of the nature of the war being fought – increasingly large numbers of youngsters pouring across the border to Mozambique, given rudimentary ideological and military training, and sent back into the country where they overwhelmed the security forces not through tactical superiority but through weight of numbers and success in securing peasant support.

Thus, the weight of numbers greatly helped the fissiparous nationalist movement to unleash a guerrilla war which comprehensively undermined white rule, forced Smith's government to the negotiating table and popularised ZANU to win the 1980 and subsequent elections. But

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these commendable achievements were not of the kind that could create a developmentally mobilising political movement.

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In the case of Botswana, where there was an indigenous initiator state culture, new state elites emerged from the indigenous old state, revolutionised it from above, maintained discipline and coherence within the state, embarked upon state-led capitalist development and enjoyed the support of the general population. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) emerged out of the indigenous old state in response to the decolonisation and nationalism that were sweeping the African continent in the 1950s and 1960s. It opposed and displaced the populist nationalists. It displaced the chiefs from the centre of state power. It created a centralised modern government under an executive president who reformed the Protectorate state by combining the Ministries of Finance and of Development Planning and by placing the combined ministry at the centre of state power. It attracted more expatriates into the bureaucracy and strictly regulated the advancement of locals through overseas training. It mobilised parliament to give legitimacy to its developmental objectives and resisted the welfare politics of the local bureaucrats who demanded high pay and speedy promotion. It constrained the labour movement from growing and restricted its activities. The result was the emergence of an indigenous developmental state that was disciplined, developmentally oriented and intimate with business. Thus, through developmental nationalism, financial incentives, and developmental policies, the Botswana state was able to promote economic development for thirty-four years.

In contrast, in the case of Zimbabwe, where there was an indigenous non-initiator state culture, which was neither destroyed by the Rhodesian colonial state, nor supplanted by an imported developmental state culture, nor revolutionised from below by a disciplined and coherent revolutionary movement, the developmental state did not emerge. Instead, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) inherited the indigenous non-initiator state culture. It built a fractious and undisciplined guerrilla army which it used to defeat the Rhodesian colonial state. It allowed the Cabinet and Politburo to rival each other. It denied the president executive state power and dispersed it to individual ministries, parastatals and departments. It encouraged the labour movement to disrupt the economic activities of the country. The ZANU state allowed the army, ministries, parastatals and departments

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to overspend, to rival each other and to resist reforms. It retired experienced Rhodesian bureaucrats and precipitated the speedy Africanisation of the bureaucracy by educated Africans whose uncontrolled training and administrative indiscipline brought divisions and rivalries within the state. ZANU created a state that was distant from and hostile to the business classes whom they regarded as exploiters and enemies. It created state marketing agencies, imposed strict regulatory laws and heavy taxation, in order to pursue its welfare and predatory nationalism. It sustained economic decline and stagnation for the duration of independence.

Thus, the Botswana developmental state and the Zimbabwe non-developmental state are products of indigenous state cultures which survived colonisation and were inherited by the nationalists. The indigenous state culture in Botswana generated a developmental state and the indigenous state culture in Zimbabwe generated a non-developmental state. Zimbabwe was unfortunate in that neither the Rhodesian colonial state nor the ZANU nationalists destroyed the indigenous non-initiator state culture, nor supplanted it with either an imported or a revolutionary initiator developmental state culture, respectively.

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