Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-8tzhz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-19T14:46:19.780Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Information and Informational Decisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2013

Sushil Bikhchandani
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
John G. Riley
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
Get access

Summary

In Part I of this book, covering the economics of uncertainty, the key topics addressed were (1) individuals’ optimizing “terminal” choices with regard to the bearing of risk, and (2) the market equilibrium determined by the aggregate of such individual decisions. In turning here in Part II to the economics of information, we will similarly be considering issues on individual and on group decision making. On the individual level, the central question is: supposing you could get additional information before having to make a terminal decision, how ought you to decide whether and how much information to collect? On the group level, the main question is: what is the nature of the overall equilibrium that arises when some or all individuals undertake such “informational” actions?

After some introductory discussions, the present chapter first analyzes individuals’ decisions as to the acquisition of information. We then consider the informational choices of groups, since the necessity to act as a collectivity has significant consequences for the nature and amount of information desired. Later chapters take up the implications for market equilibrium.

Information

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×